ORCID
- Jim Hordern: 0000-0002-2933-7593
- Nick Pratt: 0000-0002-7112-7792
- Peter Kelly: 0000-0002-1050-7433
- Katherine Evans: 0009-0003-3172-647X
Abstract
In this paper we examine the notion of ‘deliberate practice’, which has formed the basis of several teacher education programmes in England and the United States and promises to improve the quality of teaching via highly structured training programmes. We identify early criticisms of deliberate practice and unpack the assumptions embedded in its underpinning thinking. We demonstrate that deliberate practice is insufficient as a basis for teacher expertise as teaching is not a ‘performance profession’, the activities of teachers cannot all be easily or meaningfully decomposed, and the ‘goals’ of teaching are not solely geared towards maximising measurable student attainment. We suggest that deliberate practice is problematically aligned with reductive assumptions about teacher and student behaviour, causality in social relations and a superficial approach to learning as acquisition, and this reflects how the notion has been extracted from its psychological roots and recontextualised into debates about teacher preparation.
DOI Link
Publication Date
2025-06-27
Publication Title
Cambridge Journal of Education
Volume
55
Issue
4
ISSN
0305-764X
Acceptance Date
2025-06-02
Deposit Date
2025-06-11
Funding
This paper is underpinned by a research project funded by the Society for Educational Studies entitled ‘A Crisis of Teaching Expertise? The Challenge to Expert Teacher Knowledge Arising from the Contemporary Policy Context in England’.
Keywords
Teaching practice, sociology of educational knowledge, teacher education
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
First Page
569
Last Page
586
Recommended Citation
Hordern, J., Pratt, N., Kelly, P., & Evans, K. (2025) 'Why deliberate practice is not a basis for teacher expertise', Cambridge Journal of Education, 55(4), pp. 569-586. Available at: 10.1080/0305764X.2025.2516524
