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Abstract

Revisionist historians of the Western Front have demonstrated that Britain had no alternative but to wage a war of attrition to defeat Germany. However, the effort to assess this process has been neglected in the historiography. This article explores British attempts to gauge the success of their strategy of wearing down German manpower. Efforts in London proved unable to supply a convincing answer. Using General Headquarters’ dubious estimates from the front, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig argued that his strategy was working. Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s inability to confound these estimates shaped his decision to permit the Passchendaele offensive.

DOI

10.1080/02684527.2016.1270994

Publication Date

2017-04-16

Publication Title

Intelligence and National Security

Volume

32

Issue

3

First Page

333

Last Page

350

ISSN

0268-4527

Embargo Period

2023-03-01

Organisational Unit

School of Society and Culture

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