ORCID
- Ioannis Litsios: 0000-0003-0895-9817
Abstract
Despite the common Euro Area (EA) requirements, we find notable differences in the quality of fiscal governance among the 19 member states. Moreover, characteristics of the delegation approach, which have been largely ignored in the EA fiscal governance framework, remain important in various member states. Using a two-way fixed effects panel data model for the EA countries during 2006–2018, we find that the delegation approach can be effective to improve the fiscal position. On the other hand, the imposition of centrally mandated common rules-based reforms has not taken into account the national political, social and institutional setting, and this may have also affected their effectiveness to achieve fiscal discipline. Our findings thus suggest a reconsideration of the one-size-fits-all, rules-based approach to fiscal governance in the EA.
DOI Link
Publication Date
2024-07-01
Publication Title
Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Volume
71
Issue
3
ISSN
0036-9292
Acceptance Date
2023-10-17
Deposit Date
2023-11-15
Embargo Period
2023-11-22
Funding
The University of Malta's Scholarships and Bursaries Funds
Keywords
budget balance, budget institutions, euro area, fiscal governance, government debt
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
First Page
346
Last Page
378
Recommended Citation
Litsios, I., Ctania, M., & Baimbridge, M. (2024) 'Forms of fiscal governance in the Euro Area – what role for the delegation approach?', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 71(3), pp. 346-378. Available at: 10.1111/sjpe.12370
