Abstract
We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s advice about the execution of a project if its execution yields more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker evaluates the project before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.
DOI
10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
Publication Date
2017-08-20
Publication Title
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume
46
Issue
3
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Embargo Period
2024-11-19
First Page
693
Last Page
714
Recommended Citation
Felgenhauer, M., & Schulte, E. (2017) 'Preselection and expert advice', International Journal of Game Theory, 46(3), pp. 693-714. Springer Science and Business Media LLC: Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
