Abstract
This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto-dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation, the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the sender's stakes.
DOI
10.1111/iere.12237
Publication Date
2017-08-25
Publication Title
International Economic Review
Volume
58
Issue
3
Publisher
Wiley
ISSN
1468-2354
Embargo Period
2024-11-19
First Page
829
Last Page
856
Recommended Citation
Felgenhauer, M., & Loerke, P. (2017) 'Bayesian persuasion with private experimentation', International Economic Review, 58(3), pp. 829-856. Wiley: Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12237
