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dc.contributor.authorFelgenhauer, M
dc.contributor.authorLoerke, P
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-29T09:30:11Z
dc.date.issued2017-08-25
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.issn1468-2354
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/9868
dc.description.abstract

This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto-dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation, the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the sender's stakes.

dc.format.extent829-856
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.subject38 Economics
dc.subject3801 Applied Economics
dc.subject3803 Economic Theory
dc.titleBayesian persuasion with private experimentation
dc.typejournal-article
dc.typeArticle
plymouth.issue3
plymouth.volume58
plymouth.publisher-urlhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12237
plymouth.publication-statusPublished
plymouth.journalInternational Economic Review
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12237
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Business
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Business/Plymouth Business School
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA/UoA17 Business and Management Studies
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-04-18
dc.rights.embargodate2019-8-25
dc.identifier.eissn1468-2354
dc.rights.embargoperiod24 months
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1111/iere.12237
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2017-08-25
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review


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