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dc.contributor.supervisorHandley, Simon
dc.contributor.authorSerpell, Sylvia Mary Parnell
dc.contributor.otherFaculty of Science and Engineeringen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T15:50:30Z
dc.date.available2011-08-31T15:50:30Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier803318en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/560
dc.description.abstract

Abstract Necessity, Possibility and the Search for Counterexamples in Human Reasoning Sylvia Mary Parnell Serpell This thesis presents a series of experiments where endorsement rates, latencies and measures of cognitive ability were collected, to investigate the extent to which people search for counterexamples under necessity instructions, and alternative models under possibility instructions. The research was motivated by a syllogistic reasoning study carried out by Evans, Handley, Harper, and Johnson-Laird (1999), and predictions were derived from mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). With regard to the endorsement rate data: Experiment 1 failed to find evidence that a search for counterexamples or alternative models took place. In contrast experiment 2 (transitive inference) found some evidence to support the search for alternative models under possibility instructions, and following an improved training session, experiment 3 produced strong evidence to suggest that people searched for other models; which was mediated by cognitive ability. There was also strong evidence from experiments 4, 5 and 6 (abstract and everyday conditionals) to support the search for counterexamples and alternative models. Furthermore it was also found that people were more likely to find alternative causes when there were many that could be retrieved from their everyday knowledge, and that people carried out a search for counterexamples with many alternative causes under necessity instructions, and across few and many causal groups under possibility instructions. .The evidence from the latency data was limited and inconsistent, although people with higher cognitive ability were generally quicker in completing the tasks.

en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Plymouthen_US
dc.subjectSyllogisms
dc.subjectConditionals - with everyday and abstract content
dc.subjectTransitive inference
dc.subjectMental model theoryen_US
dc.titleNecessity, Possibility and the Search for Counterexamples in Human Reasoningen_US
dc.typeThesis
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.24382/4551


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