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dc.contributor.authorHoyer, Men
dc.contributor.authorBault, Nen
dc.contributor.authorLoerakker, Ben
dc.contributor.authorvan Winden, Fen
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-09T14:21:23Z
dc.date.available2020-01-09T14:21:23Z
dc.date.issued2014-01-01en
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/15297
dc.description.abstract

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment-like damaging public goods-is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.

en
dc.format.extent295 - 299en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.titleDestructive behavior in a Fragile Public Good gameen
dc.typeJournal Article
plymouth.issue3en
plymouth.volume123en
plymouth.publication-statusPublisheden
plymouth.journalEconomics Lettersen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.023en
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Faculty of Health
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Faculty of Health/School of Psychology
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA/UoA04 Psychology, Psychiatry and Neuroscience
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Users by role
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Users by role/Academics
dc.rights.embargoperiodNot knownen
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.023en
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen


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