Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFelgenhauer, M
dc.contributor.authorXu, F
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-26T10:58:35Z
dc.date.issued2019-03-25
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/13537
dc.description.abstract

This paper studies the informative content of controversial scientific arguments depending on the state of the debate. Researchers are assumed to differ in their degree of opportunism. The arguments considered are manipulable, may stem from sequential private experimentation and can be revealed selectively. Arguments of opportunistic researchers tend to be informative if there is a lack of consensus in the debate and uninformative if it is more settled. Arguments of more sincere researchers may be uninformative if there is a lack of consensus in the debate and informative if it is more settled. The effect of institutional incentives on the informativeness of arguments should depend on the state of the debate.

dc.format.extent46-48
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectPersuasion
dc.subjectExperimentation
dc.subjectManipulation
dc.titleState of the debate contingent arguments
dc.typejournal-article
dc.typeJournal Article
plymouth.author-urlhttps://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000471084200012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=11bb513d99f797142bcfeffcc58ea008
plymouth.volume179
plymouth.publication-statusPublished
plymouth.journalEconomics Letters
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.027
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Business
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA/UoA17 Business and Management Studies
dcterms.dateAccepted2019-03-22
dc.rights.embargodate2020-9-24
dc.identifier.eissn1873-7374
dc.rights.embargoperiodNot known
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.027
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-03-25
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

All items in PEARL are protected by copyright law.
Author manuscripts deposited to comply with open access mandates are made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the details provided on the item record or document. In the absence of an open licence (e.g. Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher or author.
Theme by 
Atmire NV