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dc.contributor.authorMoizer, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorFarrar, S
dc.contributor.authorHyde, M
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-22T16:49:09Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-06T11:35:23Z
dc.date.available2017-11-22T16:49:09Z
dc.date.issued2017-11-06
dc.identifier.issn0003-6846
dc.identifier.issn1466-4283
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/10375
dc.descriptionPeer review statement: The publishing and review policy for this title is described in its Aims & Scope, url: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=raec20
dc.description.abstract

Pay-as-you-go state pension schemes such as that operated in the United Kingdom face growing pressures from the rising old-age dependency ratio and improvements to life expectancies. Alongside compulsory increases in the statutory retirement age, governments have used incentives to encourage workers to postpone voluntarily their exit from employment, deferring their Basic State Pension in exchange for the additional financial reward of an enhanced pension at a later point in time. The impact of pension deferral upon the sustainability of the state pension system is dependent on the interplay of short-term savings from payment delay and increased subsequent longer-term payments to pension recipients. This article presents a model that simulates the financial effect of deferral uptake on the National Insurance Fund over a 40-year projection under alternative scenarios, including current and revised post-2016 deferral incentives. The findings indicate that the recent change in enhancement rate from 10.4 per cent to 5.8 per cent will significantly impact on state pension sustainability while still providing an incentive to defer. We estimate that any reduction below 4 per cent would result in zero uptake of the deferral option, based on a rational financial choice.

dc.format.extent2356-2368
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)
dc.relation.replaceshttp://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/10260
dc.relation.replaces10026.1/10260
dc.subjectUK state pension
dc.subjectretirement
dc.subjectdeferral
dc.subjectenhancement
dc.subjectincentive
dc.titleUK state pension deferral incentives and sustainability
dc.typejournal-article
dc.typeJournal Article
plymouth.author-urlhttps://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000424415700004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=11bb513d99f797142bcfeffcc58ea008
plymouth.issue21
plymouth.volume50
plymouth.publication-statusPublished
plymouth.journalApplied Economics
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00036846.2017.1397850
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Business
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Business/Plymouth Business School
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/REF 2021 Researchers by UoA/UoA17 Business and Management Studies
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Users by role
plymouth.organisational-group/Plymouth/Users by role/Academics
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-11-06
dc.rights.embargodate2019-5-6
dc.identifier.eissn1466-4283
dc.rights.embargoperiodNot known
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1080/00036846.2017.1397850
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2017-11-06
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review


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