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HOW DOES THE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE HELP TO EXPLAIN THE PERSISTENCE OF THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT? A CASE STUDY OF THE BARRIER

By

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A thesis submitted to Plymouth University in partial fulfilment for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Law, Criminology and Government

2016
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

There are so many people to whom I am indebted. I will only mention a few and know others will understand given limitations of space. First of all, I would like to express enormous appreciation to Professor Karl Cordell and Dr Shabnam Holliday. Your insightful suggestions, feedback, guidance, and support have been truly invaluable.

I am also tremendously thankful to all who participated in this research. Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed and for your time and willingness to share with me your knowledge and opinions on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Without your incredible insight into the subject matter, writing this thesis would have been an impossible task. I am particularly humbled by those who shared with me their personal experiences, struggles, and how they had been affected by the violence.

Also, I would like to thank all the amazing people I had the pleasure to meet in Israel and Palestine. Without your company, my time in the region would not have been so enjoyable. In particular, I am very grateful to Ayman Abu Zulof for his incredible hospitality, humour, and numerous tours around Palestine.

I would also like to thank Professor Johan Galtung for taking his time to discuss my thesis and share his views on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Not only are his theories at the core of this thesis, but his inspirational vision of a peaceful world guided me along the process.

I am grateful to the School of Government at Plymouth University. I am deeply thankful for the unwavering help and support I have received throughout my studies. I am particularly grateful for the PhD scholarship and the funding of the three trips to Israel and Palestine.

Thank you to my parents, Bernadeta and Ryszard, and my sister, Magdalena, for providing the most loving and supportive environment, and for giving me the confidence to follow my dreams.

I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to my wonderful husband, Gordon. Without your enthusiasm, encouragement, and moral support, not only could I not have finished this thesis, but I would not have had the courage to embark on this journey in the first place.

Finally, I dedicate this work to A. She has dedicated her life to find the solution to unite the two peoples. Thank you for sharing with me your incredible life story. Your optimism and drive are inspiring.
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Graduate SubCommittee.

Work submitted for this research degree at the Plymouth University has not formed part of any other degree either at Plymouth University or at another establishment.

This study was financed with the aid of a studentship from Plymouth University.

Conferences attended:


Word count of main body of thesis: 74,926

Signed………………………………………………………………………………

Date………………………………………………………………………………
ABSTRACT

HOW DOES THE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE HELP TO EXPLAIN THE PERSISTENCE OF THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT? A CASE STUDY OF THE BARRIER

Aneta Brockhill

The Israel-Palestine conflict constitutes one of the longest standing conflicts in modern times. Its continuation has often been attributed to the very nature of the conflict: two peoples pursuing an incompatible goal-ownership of the same piece of land. Violence has constituted a characteristic feature of this struggle, widely employed by the two peoples. The analysis of violence, however, has often been limited to acts of direct and physical violence that can be attributed to an individual subject. This thesis investigates violence in the conflict going beyond this traditional conceptualisation of violence. It employs Johan Galtung’s conceptual and theoretical framework, in which he identifies three types of violence: direct, structural and cultural. This thesis argues that all three types of violence are symbiotic in nature. The underlying assumption in this thesis is simple: violence breeds violence. Thus, in order to understand the persistence of the conflict, it is essential to analyse all three types of violence. The thesis proposes the hypothesis that the continuing failure to address all forms of violence, as well as omitting or minimising the importance of any of them, prevents the possibility of resolving the conflict, and thus has contributed to the protraction of the conflict.

In order to examine this assumption empirically, the thesis investigates the violence in the conflict, concentrating on the Israeli barrier. The study poses two central research questions. The first asks what led to the construction of the barrier. The second asks why the barrier remains, and the Israeli occupation continues. The answers to the research questions and the account of violence have been the subjects of two contrasting
narratives: Israeli and Palestinian. In order to provide both Israeli and Palestinian contributions to these questions, the thesis is divided into two accounts: Palestinian narrative and Israeli narrative. The empirical analysis of violence in the conflict, embedded in the theoretical framework of Galtung’s conceptualisation of violence, and divided into the two narratives, reveals a complex cycle of violence in the conflict. It demonstrates the interconnection between the three types of violence and shows the impact of the violence on the intractability of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ......................................................................................................................... i
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ............................................................................................................................... i
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ....................................................................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATION ............................................................................................................................. ix
LIST OF MAPS ........................................................................................................................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ................................................................. 1
1.2 CONTRIBUTION ....................................................................................................................................... 11
1.3 CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 12
1.4 PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS OF RESEARCH ..................................................................................... 13
1.5 RESEARCH ETHICS ............................................................................................................................... 17
1.6 DATA COLLECTION DIFFICULTIES ...................................................................................................... 19
1.7 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS ................................................................................................................... 21

PART ONE: HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 29

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT ....................................................... 30
2.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 30
2.2 ZIONISM AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM: THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE .................................................. 32
2.3 THE ROAD TO THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL ....................................................................... 36
2.4 THE 1948 WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH ...................................................................................................... 38
2.5 THE 1967 WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH ...................................................................................................... 41
2.6 VIOLENCE INSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ................................................................................ 44
2.7 THE ROAD TO THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS ......................................................................................... 47
2.8 THE BARRIER .......................................................................................................................................... 49
2.9 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 52

CHAPTER THREE: MOVING TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................. 53
3.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 53
3.2 VIOLENCE .............................................................................................................................................. 55
3.3 DEFINITION OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE ............................................................................................. 63
5.7 INTIFADA .................................................................................................................. 144
5.8 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 146

PART THREE: CONFLICT DESPITE THE BARRIER ...................................................... 150

CHAPTER SIX: SECURITY FENCE AND THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: ISRAELI NARRATIVE...................................................................................................................... 151
  6.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 151
  6.2 SECURITY FENCE ..................................................................................................... 153
  6.3 ‘FENCE IS NOT ENOUGH’: THE REASONS FOR THE PROTRACTION OF ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE WEST BANK ................................................................. 157
    6.3.1 THE ‘GAZA SCENARIO’ ...................................................................................... 159
    6.3.2 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ...................... 162
    6.3.3 ISRAEL’S NEIGHBOURS .................................................................................. 167
    6.3.4 PALESTINIAN CULTURAL VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE OF WORDS .......... 172
  6.4 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 181

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE WALL AND THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: PALESTINIAN NARRATIVE ...................................................................................................................... 184
  7.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 184
  7.2 WALL: THE LATEST ELEMENT OF THE ISRAELI STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE ................................................................................................................................. 185
  7.3 THE PROTRACTION OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE .............................................. 193
    7.3.1 AREA C ................................................................................................................ 194
    7.3.2 ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THE SETTLERS’ NEEDS ......................... 196
    7.3.3 WATER .............................................................................................................. 198
  7.4 ISRAELI CULTURAL VIOLENCE ............................................................................ 200
    7.4.1 DELEGITIMISATION AND DEHUMANISATION .............................................. 201
    7.4.2 ‘OWNERSHIP’ OF THE LAND ......................................................................... 205
    7.4.3 GEOGRAPHICAL ‘NATURALISATION’ ............................................................ 209
  7.5 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 213

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 217
  8.1 THESIS AIMS AND ARGUMENTS .......................................................................... 217
  8.2 THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE ...................................................................................... 232
  8.3 CONTRIBUTION AND FUTURE RESEARCH ......................................................... 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 242

APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................... 276

Appendix I: List of Interviewees ..................................................................................... 276
Appendix II: Settlements and settlers in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem), 1967-1993 ................................................................. 279
Appendix III: Settlers in East Jerusalem, 1967-1993 ......................................................... 280
Appendix IV: Settlements and settlers in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem), 1993-2007 ................................................................. 281
Appendix V: Settlers in East Jerusalem, 1993-2007 .......................................................... 282
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIC-Alternative Information Center
ALF-Arab Liberation Front
BESA-Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
DFLP- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DoP –Declaration of Principles
ICAH- Israeli Coalition against Home Demolitions
ICJ- International Court of Justice
IDF- Israel Defence Forces
ISIS-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAI-Joint Advocacy Initiative
JWC-Joint Water Committee
NAD PLO-Negotiations Affairs Department of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation
NGO- Non-Governmental Organisation
PA-Palestinian Authority
PCPSR-Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
PFLP-Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PLO-Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMW-Palestinian Media Watch
PNC-Palestine National Council
PWA-Palestinian Water Authority
UN- United Nations
UNCESR-United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
UNCHD- United Nations Conflict and Humanitarian Division
UNDP-United Nations Development Programme
UNISPAL-United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine
UNOCHA-United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNWRA-The United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WHO-World Health Organisation
LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: The Route of the Barrier.................................................................xi
Map 2: British Mandate Palestine............................................................xii
Map 3: UN General Assembly Resolution 181...........................................xiii
Map 4: Armistice Line............................................................................xiv
Map 5: 1967 Israeli-Occupied Territories...............................................xv
Map 6: Israeli settlement in the West Bank, December 1993.....................xvi
Map 7: The West Bank after the Oslo II Accords.......................................xvii
Map 8: Qalqilyah City.............................................................................xviii
Map 9: East Jerusalem...........................................................................xix
Map 10: Area C.......................................................................................xx
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Typology of Violence.................................................................67
Figure 2: Violence and Human Needs.......................................................72
Figure 3: The Triangle of Violence.............................................................78
Map 1: The Route of the Barrier

Map 1 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Source: B’Tselem (2012) *The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank*, p. 17
Map 2: British Mandate Palestine

Map 2 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Map 3: UN General Assembly Resolution 181

Map 3 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Map 4: Armistice Line

Map 4 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Map 5: 1967 Israeli-Occupied Territories

Map 5 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Map 6: Israeli settlement in the West Bank, December 1993

Map 6 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Map 7: The West Bank after the Oslo II Accords

Map 7 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Map 8 Qalqiliyah City

Map 8 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Source: B'Tselem (2012) *The Long Term Impact of Israel’s Separation Barrier in the West Bank*, p.19
Map 9: Area C

Map 9 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Source: B’Tselem (2014c) *47 Years of Temporary Occupation*, p.3
Map 10: East Jerusalem

Map 10 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Source: UNOCHA (2014d) *In the Spotlight: 10 Years since The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion*, p.9
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The Israel-Palestine conflict has now raged for over hundred years, constituting one of the world’s longest standing conflicts. Since its inception, numerous attempts, involving assorted UN resolutions, bilateral negotiations and third-party interventions, have sought to put an end to the conflict, and yet, today, resolution remains more distant than ever. The protraction of the conflict has often been attributed to the very nature of the dispute. The conflict, as Johan Galtung argued in an interview, is fundamentally a contest of two peoples, or two national movements, each of which claims the same piece of territory for its national homeland. The two, therefore, pursue an incompatible goal: the control and sovereignty over the same piece of land (Galtung, 2015). In essence, the conflict has therefore been often summarised as ‘one land, but two peoples’ (Gerner, 1994, Kelman, 2007, Halwani and Kapitan, 2008, Dowty, 2008). The underlying fact is that violence is a central and characteristic feature of that contest, widely employed by both parties.

Since its beginning, the conflict has claimed countless numbers of victims. In the year 2014 alone, Israeli forces killed more Palestinians than in any other year since 1967. Over 1,500 Palestinian civilians were killed and more than 11,000 were injured in the Israeli 50-day military offensive in the Gaza Strip, Operation Protective Edge (UNOCHA, 2015a:4). In the West Bank, the confrontation between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli security forces resulted in the death of 58 Palestinians, and 6,028 were injured (UNOCHA, 2015a:7). For Israel, the year was similarly traumatic in terms of attacks on its civilians. The Israeli population once again became a target of Hamas rockets and mortars fired into Israel and, according to Shabak, Israel's internal
security service, 1,793 Palestinian terror attacks were carried out resulting in the deaths of 24 Israelis (Shabak, 2016). The violence continued throughout 2015. As of the time of writing (April 2016), the recent outbreak of the new rounds of direct violence in September 2015, often referred to as the third Intifada (uprising) or mini Intifada enters its seventh month. According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there have been 213 stabbing attacks (including 66 attempted attacks), 83 shootings, and 42 vehicular (ramming) attacks. 34 Israelis have been killed in those attacks and 413 people (including 4 Palestinians) injured (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016b). On the Palestinian side, 201 Palestinians were killed, and more than 2,500 Palestinians have been arrested in the West Bank and within Israel (Middle East Monitor, 2016, Amnesty International, 2016).

The recent outbreak of violence has once again reminded the world of the intractability of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The violence the ‘world’ has again been exposed to is the direct violence of shooting, stabbing and injuring. Related images help to construct and influence our perception of violence in the conflict, which is often limited to these gruesome acts of direct violence. This, consequently, leads to the limitation in conceptualising the phenomenon of violence and subsequently restricts the analysis of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict to only one form of violence: direct violence. The association of violence exclusively with the direct violence reduces the accounts of violence in the conflict to acts such as killing or injuring, often solely attributed to Palestinian ‘terror’, and Israeli violence often being equated with a legitimate self-defence measure. Such accounts seem to pose a crucial question: Why are the outbreaks of direct violence so persistent?

To answer this question, the point of entry into this research is, first and foremost, the rejection of a definition of violence restricted to the acts of direct violence. This thesis,
therefore, approaches the conflict by utilising a framework that is new to study the continuation of the Israel-Palestine conflict, an approach that employs Johan Galtung's extended definition of violence, which includes direct, structural and cultural violence. Structural violence is differentiated from direct violence by the lack of a perpetrator who can be claimed responsible for the act. It is an indirect form of violence built into social, political and economic structures, and manifests itself as an unequal distribution of power and resources, and consequently, as unequal life chances (Galtung, 1969) or as ‘avoidable insults to basic human needs’ (Galtung, 1990:292). Galtung identifies exploitation, repression, fragmentation, marginalisation and penetration as the primary mechanisms or aspects of structural violence (Galtung, 1990). The study of cultural violence, as Galtung maintains, ‘highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimised and thus rendered acceptable in society’ (Galtung, 1990:292). It refers to ‘those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science – that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence’ (Galtung, 1990:291). Galtung goes on to state: ‘the culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all’ (Galtung, 1990:295). Therefore, according to Galtung, to understand the mechanism and persistence of direct and structural violence, it is crucial to analyse what factors stimulate it and legitimise its use (Galtung, 2014).

Galtung’s approach not only challenges the ways in which violence has been conceptualised traditionally, but also offers an alternative framework for the study of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It provides a useful analytical tool to analyse and address violence in conflict that often goes unnoticed, or often, may not be
perceived as violence, due to an identifiable actor who causes harm. The study of structural violence, underpinned by cultural violence, is of critical importance here as it constitutes an underlying reason for the outbreaks of direct violence, thus the continuation of the conflict. The underlying assumption in this thesis is very simple: violence breeds violence. Thus, in order to understand the persistence of the conflict, it is essential to analyse all three types of violence. When discussing the importance of the three types of violence, Galtung refused to privilege direct violence, structural violence or cultural violence, arguing that they constitute a mutually reinforcing vicious circle. He emphasised that the three forms of violence represent three corners of a ‘violence triangle’ (Galtung, 2015). Violence, he argues, can start at any corner of the triangle and can ‘be easily transmitted to other corners’ (Galtung, 1990:302). Therefore, in order to understand the persistence of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the thesis argues, the analysis of all of the acts of violence is required. In light of these findings, the aim of the thesis is: 1) to provide an empirical analysis of direct, structural and cultural violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict; 2) to demonstrate the ‘interrelationship’ between the three types of violence (how one type of violence fuels the use of another); and 3) to analyse the implications of the violence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The empirical analysis of direct, structural and cultural violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the thesis argues, offers a more comprehensive understanding of the continuation of the conflict. The thesis develops the notion that by shifting the focus beyond acts of direct violence, an incredibly complicated mechanism of the cycle of violence in the conflict is revealed. Specifically, the thesis proposes the hypothesis that the three types of violence are closely symbiotic in nature. The thesis illustrates how the continuing failure of the warring parties to address all forms of violence, or how minimising the importance of one of the ‘angles’ of the violence, has prevented the possibility of resolving the conflict, and thus has contributed to the protraction of the conflict. Galtung's framework provides
a useful conceptual means of addressing and analysing different types of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict, going beyond the traditional conceptualisation and perception of violence. To this end, the thesis employs the case study of the barrier. In this thesis, the barrier is identified as an example of structural violence. Although the barrier is a visible manifestation of the conflict between the two peoples, its implications are built into a structure, manifesting itself as unequal power distribution and deprivation of basic human needs. The study of the barrier, as this thesis demonstrates, provides an excellent example of the interconnection between the three types of violence. The barrier, constitutes not only structural violence in its physical form, a physical border between the two peoples (although this point, as the thesis shows, is widely challenged by the Palestinians), but also structural violence in its psychological form, a psychological border affecting the basic identity needs of the Palestinians. However, the reasons for its construction, its longevity and the mechanism of the barrier, cannot be analysed in isolation. It needs to be placed within an analysis of a wider violent structure. The conceptual and theoretical framework provided by Galtung provides a useful analytical tool for us to contextualise the barrier and place the analysis within the mechanism and the cycle of violence. The barrier constitutes just one element of the violence structure. As the barrier is the focal point of the thesis and will be analysed in detail in the following chapters, only a brief introduction to the issue is provided here.

On April 14, 2002, the government of Israel adopted a decision to initiate the construction of a barrier which was to be built between Israel and the Palestinian territory of the West Bank. Construction commenced in June 2002 in the northern West Bank (Map 1). The total length of the constructed and projected fence is approximately 712 km (UNOCHA, 2013). The barrier is composed of several components: fences, a trench on the eastern side, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads for security forces (on both sides of the fence), and a buffer zone
(UNOCHA, 2013, Roy, 2006:45). The total width of the barrier, including all of these components, ranges between 35 and 100 metres (B'Tselem, 2012:12). In places, where Jewish settlements are close to the barrier, a wall, consisting of eight-to-nine-metre-high concrete panels, has been built to prevent direct shooting at the Israeli side from its eastern side (Brom, 2004:4). According to the government of Israel, the construction of the barrier was a direct result of the Palestinian suicide-bombing campaign against Israelis, and the failure of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to fulfil the commitments it made to fight terrorism (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Furthermore, according to the Israeli government, the route of the barrier has been determined on the basis of security needs and topographical considerations. It is stated that the barrier, ‘is a temporary, defensive measure, not a border, and will not annex Palestinian lands, nor change the legal status of the Palestinians’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).

Two years after the beginning of the barrier's construction, on July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The ICJ acknowledged that Israel ‘faces numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian population’ and that it ‘has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens’ (ICJ, 2002:63). The ICJ however stated:

It is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated regime, gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies, or by the requirements of national security or public order (ICJ, 2002:61).

As sections of the planned route go inside the West Bank, annexing Palestinian territory, the Court accordingly ‘finds that the construction of the wall, which runs
inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, together with the associated gate and permit regime, are contrary to international law’ (ICJ, 2002:63). The court called upon Israel to ‘cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall’, and it urged for:

the dismantling forthwith of those parts of that structure situated within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto (ICJ, 2002:66).

Despite international condemnation and widespread Palestinian criticism, fourteen years later, the barrier, a ‘temporary security measure’, remains on ground with some parts of its route still under construction.

In light of this context, the study poses two central research questions. The first asks what led to the construction of the barrier. The thesis argues that in order to understand the most immediate reasons for Israel’s decision to build the barrier, it is essential to provide a wider historical context of what led to the construction, and look at the underlying rationale of Israel’s policy. Utilising Galtung's framework, the thesis seeks to examine the emergence of violent structures within the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the extent to which structural violence, in this case the barrier, has become an integral feature of the conflict. In other words, the analysis puts the barrier within the wider analysis of the Israeli structural violence and demonstrates that the barrier constitutes only one element in the violent structure. The thesis, therefore, analyses the cycle of violence leading up to the building of the barrier. It pays considerable attention to the Oslo Peace Process period (1993-2000), and assesses why the Oslo Peace Process, the most promising peace initiative to resolve the conflict, failed to address the violence, and why subsequently, the barrier was constructed. The account demonstrates the process by which the cycle of violence is re-enforced. The second research question asks why the barrier remains, and Israeli occupation continues. To understand the
permanence of the barrier and the protraction of Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the thesis examines the cycle of violence following the barrier's construction. The thesis seeks to examine why the Israeli occupation continues and violent structures remain unaddressed. The answer to these questions are based on the application of the conceptual framework of Galtung's triangle of violence, and are cast within wider theoretical questions on the mechanism of the cycle of violence: 1) How does structural violence lead to direct violence?; 2) How does direct violence lead to structural violence?; 3) How does cultural violence justify and legitimise the use of structural and direct violence?; and 4) What aspects of culture are used to legitimise the use of violence?

Early into the data collection, it became apparent that the answers to the research questions varied significantly depending on the individuals’ perceptions of violence and its impact on the protraction of the conflict. The thesis employs Yoram Meital’s definition of the term ‘perception’ as the ‘complex ways in which reality appears to individuals and groups’. In other words, the implicit ways in which notions, such as ‘violence’ have been constructed and consumed (Meital, 2011:29). Palestinian and Israeli perceptions, Daniel Bar-Tal, whose research examines intractable conflicts, argued in the interview with me, are rooted in their national narratives, which have continuously clashed with each other. Narrative, Theodore R. Sarbin argues, is ‘a way of organising episodes, actions and accounts of actions; it is an achievement that brings together mundane facts and fantastic creations; time and place incorporated. The narratives allow the inclusion of actors, as well as the causes of [their] happening’. Anyone researching the Israel-Palestine conflict, Bar-Tal continued may think that he/she is reading about two entirely different conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2014). Today, the Israeli and Palestinian narratives differ on most aspects of the conflict, such as the origin of the conflict, the stumbling blocks, or the reasons as to the conflicts durability.
Understanding the complexities of the two narratives, Roberg Rotberg argues, is critical to an appreciation of why the Israel–Palestine conflict seems so intractable (Rotberg, 2006:3). To account for the complexity of each narrative, the thesis is divided into a ‘Palestinian narrative’ and an ‘Israeli narrative’. It is important, however, to point out at this point that there are also contestations within these two narratives and there is no single narrative within each ‘camp'. The problem with the Israeli narrative, Adam Keller, a spokesperson of Gush Shalom, the Israeli Peace Bloc, argued in the interview with me, is that it is highly divided as is Israeli society. Although it is hard to make a generalisation, Keller offered a useful explanation. Israeli society, according to him, can be divided into three groups. The first group, 'the left', often referred in Israel as 'radical left', consisting of roughly 10 percent of the Jewish Israeli public, and Israeli Palestinians. As he argues:

They are very committed to making peace with the Palestinians. They believe that the Israeli occupation not only is immoral, it is also very much against the interest of Israel, and that the future of Israel depends on making peace and becoming integrated into the region (Keller, 2014).

On the other side of the spectrum, the second group, also consisting of roughly 10 percent of Israeli society, includes 'intransigent nationalists’. They are mostly religious.1 They argue that 'every square inch of land belongs to Jews. It is not only their right but their duty to keep and settle this land'. The third category, the remaining 80 percent, consists of people who are more pragmatic. As Keller argued:

They do not believe it is a principle that we [Israel] should keep the whole land, and they do not feel particularly attached to Judea and Samaria. If the government can prove to them that we can have peace by giving up this land they will agree to it (Keller, 2014).

---

1 In fact, Keller explains, one of the religious groupings, ultra-orthodox, calls themselves anti-Zionists. Originally they were completely against Zionism, claiming that Zionism is a sin as God decided that Jews have to live in exile until He sends the Messiah. 'But you could say that most of them have pragmatically accepted Zionism. [...] they have come to realise they can call themselves anti-Zionists, but if they want to live here they have to hide behind the guns of Zionists because otherwise they will not survive'. Today, the biggest settlements in the occupied territories are settled by them (Keller, 2014).
Within these three groups, Keller concludes, there are further sub-groups (Keller, 2014). The answers to the research questions differ depending on the groups. Therefore, with regard to the Israeli narrative, the official government’s position, with sources such as the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Israel Ministry of Defence, and the narrative of the majority of Israel’s citizens who belong to the two latter groups are addressed.

On the other hand, unlike the Israeli narrative, the Palestinian narrative is more centralised. The vast majority of Palestinians (excluding those who continue to question the very idea of a Jewish state, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad) see the West Bank, along with the Gaza Strip, as the territory of their future state. The Palestinian narrative to the research questions is based on the interviews conducted with the Palestinians, who belong to this majority, but also the interviews with the 'Israeli radical left'², whose narrative is synonymous with the Palestinian narrative. The Palestinian narrative will also include the analysis of literature of Simha Flapan, Benny Morris, and Ilan Pappé, known as the new historians as they have 'challenged' the standard Zionist version of the origins, character, and course of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The thesis argues that there are two narratives regarding the reasons for the construction of the barrier and the reasons for its permanence. The thesis, therefore, is clearly divided into two accounts of violence: the Palestinian narrative and the Israeli narrative. The analysis of three types of violence, divided into two narratives, reveals a complicated cycle of violence.

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² These groups, organisations and individuals are often regarded by the government or another fiction of the society (for example the NGO Monitor) as anti-Zionists (Keller, 2014)
1.2 CONTRIBUTION

This thesis is set apart from comparable studies by its distinctive framework for the study of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This, however, does not imply that structural violence has been completely neglected in the analysis of the Israel-Palestine conflict. There is countless literature discussing different aspects of Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, such as the expansion of the settlements (Bishara, 2002, Karmi, 2007), unequal distribution of water resources (Gray and Hilal, 2007, Selby, 2003), the Israeli policy of closure (Hass, 2002), or analysing issues such as Palestinian incitement (Baker, 2012, Kuperwasser and Fredman, 2012, Marcus and Zilberdik, 2011). They are however not analysed as examples of violence, and often considered as violations of human rights or stumbling blocks to conflict resolution. There are also studies, which offer similar analysis under the heading ‘structural violence’. For example, Tamis Kapitan (2004) highlights structural violence in the conflict, discussing the expansion of the Israeli settlements and ‘an institutional framework of economic control, land expropriation, destruction of property, and regulation of Palestinian movement built to maintain and protect them’. He also briefly addresses how 'Palestinian protests against this institutional framework have been routinely met with more direct forms of violence'. However, in the study, structural violence seems to have been examined independently without a clear link between the three dimensions of violence, and the focus is often entirely on Israeli violence.

This thesis, therefore, provides original contribution by identifying and analysing all forms of violence employed by Israelis and Palestinians from both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives. The empirical analysis of violence is believed to provide a better understanding of why the conflict has not been resolved, and to contribute to a
wider body of literature on the persistence of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Furthermore, it is hoped the empirical analysis and a qualitative methodology will contribute to a theoretical framework of the phenomenon of violence, and the impact of violence on conflict protractons. It needs to be stressed at this point, however, that whilst the purpose of this thesis is to provide a possible explanation for the persistence of the conflict, the thesis does not propose a solution to the resolution of the conflict, though it is believed the thesis's findings can contribute to both. Consequently, the issues, such as which solution - a one-state or two-state solution, or indeed any alternatives - is the most appropriate to resolve the conflict, are not addressed. Although the thesis concentrates entirely on the Israel-Palestine conflict, it hopes to demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical and conceptual framework employed in the thesis, to a wider analysis of protracted conflicts and the reasons for their continuation.

1.3 CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY

For the sake of clarity, it is important to address the terminology employed in this thesis. During the data collection, I quickly came to realise how crucial the use of language is in conducting research on the Israel-Palestine conflict. As one of the interviewees, Eitan Shamir, pointed out, ‘everything in this area has a historical and associational weight, so people use different terms, which consequently imply where they stand politically’ (Shamir, 2014). The employment of an accurate terminology is, therefore, crucial, as carelessness in doing so may result in a researcher facing the risk of taking sides or being more sympathetic towards one side. As numerous terms in the Israel-Palestine conflict carry a political statement, the use of neutral language is essential to avoid a researcher's positionality.

The first term that needs clarification is the ‘barrier’. While the barrier is referred by the Israelis as the security or anti-terrorist fence, or just a fence, for the Palestinians, it is
known as the wall or anti-apartheid wall. This thesis uses wall and fence interchangeably depending on the narrative in context. But in a general context, it employs a commonly accepted neutral term: the barrier. Secondly, for the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘occupied territories’ shall be limited to the area of the West Bank. It needs to be noted, however, that despite Israel's withdrawal of its citizens and military from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, for many Palestinians, and a number of international organisations, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) or Amnesty International, Gaza is still an occupied territory and Israel remains an occupying power as it maintains its controls over the Gazan land crossing, sea and air space. As the thesis employs the case study of the barrier, built between Israel and the West Bank, it concentrates on the West Bank. The implications of Israel's control of Gaza, however, are highly relevant to the themes and arguments discussed in this thesis, and the resolution of the conflict, as it will be shown in the thesis, is highly dependent on the political situation in the Gaza Strip. Lastly, this thesis refers to the area of the West Bank (Map 7) as the West Bank, except when directly quoting the interviewees who referred to the area as Judea and Samaria, the biblical term for the territory.

1.4 PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS OF RESEARCH

The thesis seeks to contribute theoretically and empirically to the discussion of the protraction of the conflict by examining the role of three types of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It relies on the accounts of violence from both parties, the Israelis and the Palestinians. The thesis focus, therefore, has led me towards qualitative research. I share John W. Creswell's definition of qualitative research: ‘an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem’ (Creswell, 2014:4). This research is located within a constructivist ontological
paradigm that rejects positivist assumption that realities exist independently of the meaning which actors attach to their action. They are 'constructed by people' (Howell, 2013: 90) and ‘shaped by social, economic, ethnic, political, cultural, and gender values, crystallised over time’ (Sobh and Perry, 2004:1195). Social actors may place many different interpretations on the situations in which they find themselves, shaped by history and culture through social and historical processes (Howell, 2013:85). The understanding of social phenomena, therefore, is created ‘from the perceptions and consequent actions of social actors’ (Saunders at al., 2009:111). The social phenomena, therefore 'are social constructs in the sense that their shape and form is imbued with social values, norms, and assumptions, rather than being the product of purely individual thought or meaning' (Halperin and Heath, 2012:45-46). Reality, therefore, is subjective and multiple (Crotty, 1998:8-9).

This research, therefore, approaches the concept of violence as being socially constructed and dependent on the meanings the two peoples attribute to the phenomenon. The Israeli and Palestinian understanding, interpretations, experiences and perceptions of violence, therefore, are the main focus of this study. Similar to the ontological position, the research's epistemological position employs constructivism in conjunction with critical theory. In addition to providing the understanding of the phenomenon of violence, and its impact on the persistence of the conflict, the project is concerned with confronting and challenging the conventional definition and perception of violence, which has been limited to acts of physical violence.

In order to address the complexity of the situation in response to the research questions, the thesis relies on different data collection techniques which enable to minimise the possibility of excluding relevant data. Data was collected through primary and
secondary sources and elite interviews. The conflict has produced a comprehensive body of literature, and there is certainly no lack of secondary documentation on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Secondary sources used in this thesis include written narratives. Written narratives are understood here as ‘stories of events, experiences and the like told by participants, observers or scholars’, typically published as books, book chapters, reports, academic journal and newspaper articles (Möller, 2011:75). The sources used included relevant books, academic journal articles and relevant newspapers, such as Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post, The Times of Israel and The Jerusalem Times. The study also relies on reports published by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as B’Tselem, Al-Haq or Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, located both in Israel and the West Bank, and international organisations such as the UNOCHA and Amnesty International.

Primary sources include extensive field research that took place in June and July 2014. To understand how violence is experienced and understood in the region, and the impact it has on the persistence of the conflict, in-depth elite interviews had been selected as the most appropriate research method. I employ Beth Leech’s definition of elite interviewing, in which she argues that elite interviewing ‘can be used whenever it is possible to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic in hand’ (Leech, 2002:663).

In this study, elites include personnel of the NGOs and the grassroots peace organisations in Israel and the West Bank, Israeli and Palestinian parties’ politicians, Palestinian and Israeli academics, all with direct knowledge of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In total, 40 interviewees\(^3\) participated in the research.

The interviews were semi-structured comprising of roughly 20 questions. The length of the interviews varied from 50 minutes to 2:30 hours, with an average time of one hour. The questions varied, of course, according to interviewees’ field but in general, they

\(^3\) See Appendix I for a list of ‘on-the-record’ interviews.
were focused on the two main research questions outlined earlier. For those who specialise in a particular issue questions tended to be restricted to their expertise, but they were framed in a way to provide a wider context of the impact of discussed issues on the protraction of the conflict. For example, in an interview with Itamar Marcus, the founder and director of Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), an Israeli NGO that studies Palestinian incitement in the PA's media and schoolbooks, I concentrated on the issue of Palestinian incitement. As the focal point of the research is the barrier, the thesis pays considerable attention to the interviews with Danny Tirza, the architect of the barrier, Jamal Juma, the director of the Palestinian human rights organisation 'Stop the Wall', and Roy Dolphin, UNOCHA’s Barrier Specialist. The interviews are supplemented by primary sources such as official documents, speeches, statements, negotiated agreements, court rulings, protocols, official statistics provided by Israeli governments and the PA, and resolutions adopted by the United Nations (UN). They are all widely published and easily accessible. Both the state of Israel and the PA maintain several internet websites on the conflict in general, and violence in particular.

The final stage of the data collection was an interview with Galtung. The interview took place over a three-day workshop ‘The Art of Peace’, run by Galtung in Brussels, Belgium in November 2015. The interview was secured prior to the workshop through direct correspondence with Galtung. The interviews occurred during numerous breaks in the workshop, with one extensive discussion following the second day of the workshop. As structural violence forms the theoretical framework within which the thesis is cast, the interview was a great opportunity to discuss the conceptual framework in relation to the arguments made in the thesis. The interview, therefore, concentrated on discussing the thesis's empirical findings within the theoretical and conceptual framework. The interview enabled a further reflection on the issues raised in the thesis
in relationship to Galtung's conceptual framework of violence and helped to further develop the theoretical framework of the thesis.

The process of analysing the interview data collected involved several stages. I transcribed the interviews myself, which allowed for enhanced familiarisation with the material. Once the general sense and meaning of the information were established, each interview was analysed again, and the data was organised by dividing it into categories and themes that directly corresponded to the research questions. Then the categories and themes were compared across all interviews. This ensured that all relevant material is included in the analysis. The codes, which emerged during data analysis, fell into six categories: structural violence, direct violence, cultural violence, the barrier, peace process, and the impact of violence on the protraction of the conflict. They reflected multiple perspectives from individuals and were later grouped into 'Israeli narrative' and 'Palestinian narrative'. As all interviewees mentioned, referred to, or emphasised an importance of certain events or issues without providing a detailed analysis, I triangulated the interviews data with secondary data to fill the gaps in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis. The interviews' findings were also compared with the data collected from secondary sources.

1.5 RESEARCH ETHICS

Whilst preparing and carrying out the research, careful attention was paid to the ethical issues involved in conducting research. The research was conducted according to Plymouth University’s Ethical Principles for Research Involving Human Participants, ‘The University of Plymouth Code of Good Practice in Research’ (Plymouth University, 2007). Ethical approval was gained from the Faculty of Business Research
Ethics Committee before the field data collection began. The Committee was fully satisfied that the project's compliance with Plymouth University’s ethical standards for research involving human participants. The Committee offered one recommendation regarding ‘Protection from Harm’. It was recommended that to help ensure the researcher's safety, ‘the protection from harm must be part of an ongoing dialogue between the researcher and supervisors as the methodology and operation of the interviews unfolds’. This was assured by providing the Director of Studies, Professor Karl Cordell, with a detailed schedule of the interviews, and regular update during the data collection. With regards to protecting participants from harm, safety was ensured by emphasising that all interviews will take place at a time and location of the participants' own choosing. Therefore, the interviews did not in any sense increase the quotidian risk in the locations in question.

Informed consent from research participants, as Clifford G. Christians argues, constitutes a fundamental ethical requirement in social research. Research subjects, he argues, have the right to be informed about the nature and consequences of experiments in which they are involved' (Christians, 2005:144). There are two main principles; they must agree voluntarily to participate and the agreement must be based on full and open information (Christians, ibid). Informed consent from research participants was secured prior to undertaking the research, through an invitation to meet. As such participants were informed by email in clear, non-technical language about the purposes of the research, the research process, and the use of data. The email provided an explanation that the participant was not under any obligation to participate and might withdraw from the study until the date of July 6, 2014 (the planned end of the data collection and the beginning of the data analysis). Informed consent was again established verbally at the start of each interview, along with the reminder of the participants' right to terminate the interview at any point, to omit the questions they do not wish to answer and their right
to withdraw from the study. Furthermore, all interviewees were assured of the researcher's commitment to protecting their identities. It was determined at the beginning of each interview whether an interviewee consented to be named in any publications stemming from the research, preferred only to be identified by their membership of a particular group, or whether they wanted to be totally anonymised. The majority of the participants, except four, indicated at the outset that everything they said was on record, and they were willing to be named in any publication. Occasionally, a few interviewees stated that a particular statement was off the record, or that they would rather not be named if I referred to specific information in any published work. All, except five interviews, were digitally recorded with the permission to record the interview secured at the beginning of the interviews. I ensured that all interviewees were afforded total integrity in how I handle their data. Their data has been held securely, stored in password-protected PCs and in locked storage until securely destroyed. With regards to protecting participants from harm, all audio files were transcribed by the researcher.

1.6 DATA COLLECTION DIFFICULTIES

As one of the aims of the research is to challenge the traditional definition of violence and extend the analysis of the phenomenon to include structural violence and cultural violence, I believe it is important to discuss some methodological obstacles encountered during the data collection. Difficulty stemmed from the timing of the data collection. A few days after arriving in Israel on June 2, 2014, three Israeli youths had been abducted in Gush Etzion, an Israeli settlement in the West Bank (their bodies were later discovered near Hebron). In response, the Israeli government immediately accused the members of the Hebron-based Hamas cell of kidnapping them, and launched its largest
military operation in the West Bank in a decade, Operation 'Brother’s Keeper'. Hundreds of military raids were launched across the West Bank. A few days following the kidnapping, a Palestinian youth, was murdered by Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem, reportedly in retaliation for the killing of the three Israeli youths. The event was followed by several weeks of violent clashes erupting throughout the Palestinian neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, and at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. The events later led to a large-scale Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip 'Protective Edge', as well as an extensive outbreak of direct violence in the West Bank. There were regular clashes at the Qalandiya Checkpoint between thousands of Palestinians and Israeli soldiers (Institute for Middle East Understanding, 2014).

The above political events had some critical methodological implications. Firstly, they had a significant impact on the responses of the research participants. When discussing the continuation of the conflict, the interviewees were often focused on the current events and the threat of Palestinian terrorism to Israeli national security. The Israeli interpretation and understanding of violence were therefore significantly reduced to accounts of direct violence, such as that of the kidnapping. On a number of occasions, Israeli respondents found it hard, or sometimes even frustrating, to go past direct violence and talk about the barrier or other elements of Israel's occupation in terms of violence. The responses reminded me of a statement former Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, made in response to the ICJ's ruling regarding the barrier:

It’s certainly unpleasant to have the ruling, but it’s more unpleasant to have suicide attacks from territories not defended by the fence [...]. The fence is removable and reversible, and death is not (Richburg, 2004).

Consequently, the importance of structural violence was often minimised by means of responses similar to that of Olmert. Israelis often used current events as the justification
for the conflict, which consequently made the interviewees less responsive to discuss the importance of the structural violence and its impact on the conflict resolution. It is believed, however, that these responses proved in itself a purpose for this thesis. Few interviewees made comments such as ‘it is devastating what is happening in Israel at the moment because we had such a long period of ‘quietness’ or ‘the violence was relatively low’. But while the months prior to the events may have been relatively ‘quiet’ in terms of direct violence, structural and cultural violence, as this thesis will demonstrate, continued at its normal pace.

1.7 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

This thesis is composed of three main parts. The first part, ‘Historical and Conceptual Background’, comprising of two chapters, provides a literature review on the historical background to the research on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the conceptual and methodological framework for studying violence in the conflict.

Chapter Two, ‘Understanding the Israel-Palestine Conflict’, contextualises the research by placing the analysis of the barrier in a historical context. As the barrier cannot be understood and analysed in isolation, the chapter constitutes an essential point of entry and reference into an understanding of its construction, and more broadly the dynamics of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The chapter aims to explain how the conflict has developed in this manner but, at the same time, the selected points in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian relations provide a necessary background to the empirical analysis of violence in the next chapters. As one of the basic assumptions of this thesis is that the conflict constitutes the contest between the two peoples over one piece of land, where violence is the main characteristic, it is crucial to understand the origin of the contest,
the main actors, and the central developments in the conflict. The chapter, therefore, is
dedicated to reviewing the main academic debates on these issues. As the barrier is at
the heart of the thesis and will be discussed in detail in the thesis, the chapter highlights
critical junctions in the conflict and reviews the events, in chronological order, up to its
creation. The chapter reviews the literature on the origin of the conflict, the emergence
of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, the establishment of the state of Israel, and
subsequent the 1948 war, development of Palestinian leadership, the 1967 war, which
resulted in Israel capturing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (and subsequently the
beginning of the Israeli occupation), Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation in
the form of the first and the second Intifada, and the Oslo Peace Process. As the Israel-
Palestine conflict is one of the most researched conflicts of our times, producing
voluminous literature, sources can only be selective. Furthermore, the chapter cannot
claim to serve full justice in addressing all issues in the conflict in the allotted space.
Therefore, it only addresses the critical junctures in the conflict, which are believed to
crucial in understanding the dynamic of the conflict. It needs to be stressed however that
the key literature on all the events, and the critical issues related to the research
questions, are embedded in the thesis and are discussed in the following chapters.

Chapter Three ‘Moving towards a Better Understanding of Violence: Conceptual and
Theoretical Framework’ provides a conceptual and theoretical framework that guides
the empirical analysis of the violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict and its impact on
the continuation of the conflict. The chapter outlines and examines the key concepts
which underpin the thesis. As violence is the core of the thesis, the chapter argues, it is
crucial to establish what exactly the phenomenon constitutes. The chapter argues that
the extended conceptualisation of violence, which goes beyond direct violence and takes
into account structural and cultural violence, offers a more comprehensive
understanding of the continuation of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The chapter argues
that the three types of violence are interrelated, therefore ignoring the importance of any of them helps to explain the persistence of the conflict. This chapter is structured in four parts. The first part sets out the general conceptual framework of the notion of violence and the theoretical discussion on the need to extend the concept of violence. It identifies the limitations of the traditional, 'restricted' category of violence. The analysis of the limitation subsequently serves as a justification for the rejection of the category of violence and the employment of a more comprehensive conceptualisation of violence. The second and third part introduces the typology of Johan Galtung’s triangle of violence and provides a theoretical account of structural and cultural violence respectively. It analyses the mechanism and the main characteristics of the phenomena, and also acknowledges and addresses the criticism of the theory. The last part analyses the interconnection between the three types of violence (direct, structural and cultural). Employing the concept of positive and negative peace, the chapter investigates how Galtung’s theorisation of violence helps to understand the protraction of a conflict.

The second part of the thesis, ‘Underlying Causes for the Construction of the Barrier: The Cycle of Violence’, comprising of Chapters Four and Five, is devoted to an empirical examination of violence leading up to the construction of the barrier, and its impact on the protraction of the conflict. It addresses the first research question: What led to the construction of the barrier? The chapters argue that in order to understand the immediate causes for the construction of the barrier, it is essential to provide a wider historical context of what led to its construction, and look at the underlying causes of Israel’s policy. This analysis is embedded in the conceptual and theoretical framework of Galtung's triangle of violence. The premise of these two chapters is quite straightforward: they analyse the cycle of violence leading to the construction of the barrier as seen by the two parties and two narratives.
Chapter Four, ‘The Cycle of Violence before the Construction of the Fence: Israeli Narrative’, puts forward the Israeli narrative regarding the construction of the barrier. It argues that according to Israel, the construction is an obvious and natural response to the protracted use of Palestinian violence, culminating with the outbreak of second Intifada. The fence, therefore, is a legitimate tool to prevent the Palestinian direct violence, and it constitutes a security measure to protect the state of Israel and its citizens. Hence the chapter investigates Palestinian violence going back to the beginning of the conflict. The chapter is divided into two main chronological periods. The first part identifies the cycle of violence from the beginning of the conflict, focusing specifically on the period following the 1967 war, to the Oslo Peace process (the intensification of Palestinian violence). The chapter demonstrates how, according to the Israeli narrative, the years of protracted use of direct violence by the Palestinians resulted in Israel’s justification and rationalisation of the use of structural violence (its presence in the Palestinian land with security measures such as the barrier).

The second part of the chapter concentrates on the Oslo Peace Process and analyses the impact of Palestinian violence on the failure of the peace negotiations. Drawing on the conceptual analysis of violence and positive and negative peace, it is argued that according to the Israeli narrative, the continuation and the intensification of Palestinian direct violence, fuelled by cultural violence, constituted the main reason for the failure of the process, and consequently, resulted in the barrier's construction. Hence, the chapter provides an empirical analysis of the Palestinian use of direct violence and cultural violence during the Oslo period. The chapter then turns to the analysis of violence within the Palestinian leadership, and the failure of the Palestinian leadership to establish a viable state of the Palestinians, thus security for the Palestinian people. This chapter argues that, given the opportunity, the Palestinian leadership failed to
provide effective governance for the Palestinian people. The failure, it is argued, has contributed to the continuation of the Israeli presence in the territories.

Chapter Five, ‘The Cycle of Violence before the Construction of the Wall: Palestinian Narrative’, puts forward the Palestinian narrative in response to the research question: what led to the construction of the barrier? The chapter argues that, according to the Palestinian narrative, the wall constitutes part of Israel’s long-standing strategy of displacement of Palestinians carried out by means of expulsion (direct violence), and the structural violence carried out by Israeli ‘matrix of control’, with practices such as land and resources confiscation. The chapter, therefore, places the analysis of the wall in the context of Israel’s violence since the beginning of the conflict. The chapter is divided into two main chronological periods. The first part identifies the Israeli violence from the beginning of the conflict, focussing specifically on the period following the 1967 war (the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank), to the Oslo Peace process. The second part of the chapter concentrates on the Oslo Peace Process period and analyse the impact of violence on the failure of the peace negotiations. Drawing on the conceptual analysis of violence and positive and negative peace, it is argued that according to the Palestinian narrative, the Israeli structural violence constitutes the major reason for the failure of peace negotiations. The chapter demonstrates that not only did Israeli structural violence not cease, but the period was characterised by the intensification and formalisation of structural violence. Consequently, the chapter concludes with the argument that the Oslo Peace Process constituted negative peace, as it failed to address the three types of violence.

Part Three, ‘Conflict despite the Barrier’ consisting of Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, address the questions: (1) What was the immediate reason behind the construction of the
Chapters 6, 'Security Fence and the Cycle of Violence: Israeli Narrative' puts forward the Israeli narrative. The chapter argues that the continuous use of direct and cultural violence by Palestinians, explains the permanence of the fence and the continued Israeli presence in the West Bank. The chapter analyses four main arguments of Israel's assertion of its need to retain the fence and remain in the territory of the West Bank. Firstly, by examining Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip, and the dramatic intensification of violence that followed, the chapter argues that according to the Israeli narrative the 'Gaza scenario' is likely to be repeated following withdrawal from the West Bank. Secondly, the chapter places this analysis in the context of the current state of Palestinian national leadership. It seeks to answer the question, whether given the opportunity to create a state; the PA would be able to provide stable and efficient governance. It is argued that according to Israeli narrative, taking into consideration the weak state of the current PA's leadership, the Palestinian state would constitute a failed state, posing a direct threat to Israel's security. Thirdly, Israeli presence in the West Bank is placed within a wider context of the current perilous strategic situation across Israel's borders, and the plethora of potential threats Israel faces. It is argued that given the weak state of the PA's leadership, Israel's presence in the West Bank is essential to prevent the infiltration of militant Islamists groups into the territory. The fourth part concentrates on Palestinian cultural violence within the PA's official discourse. The chapter argues that continuous Palestinian cultural violence constitutes another reason for Israel's necessity to retain the fence, and to remain on the Palestinian side of the
barrier. The account of all these factors demonstrates Israel's need for defensible borders in the West Bank, and consequently, helps to understand the protraction of Israeli structural violence against the Palestinians. The fence, as it is demonstrated, is a part of the wider security apparatus to protect the state of Israel and its citizens.

Chapter Seven, 'Wall and the Cycle of Violence: Palestinian Narrative' presents the Palestinian narrative to the questions: why, despite wide international condemnation, the wall remains, and the Israeli occupation continues? It begins with an analysis of the Palestinian account of the reasons behind the permanence of the wall. The chapter argues that the wall has nothing to do with Israel's security. It constitutes the latest measure in a long history of the Israeli use of structural violence. It highlights the impact of the wall on the Palestinian population and the Palestinian territories, arguing that the mechanism of the wall is similar to other practices of Israeli occupation. The second part of the chapter focuses on Israeli cultural violence. It seeks to answer the question how Israeli structural violence continued uninterrupted, and its impact often been ignored, minimised and, to a certain extent, was rationalised by a large sector of Israeli society? The chapter analyses different elements of the Israeli cultural violence. It concentrates on Israel's public messages, transmitted through Israeli officials' statements and the Israeli education system, which delegitimises and dehumanises the Palestinians, and denies them the right to their land. These messages, it is argued, have helped to justify and rationalise Israeli structural violence in Israeli public consciousness, making Israeli occupation look 'right' or, at least, acceptable.

Chapter Eight, 'Conclusion' brings the main arguments and findings together to examine the role of violence in the conflict. The thesis concludes with the argument that the empirical analysis of direct, structural and cultural violence in the Israel-Palestine
conflict offers a more comprehensive understanding of the continuation of the conflict. The three types of violence are closely interrelated, and the failure to address them all helps one to understand the protraction of the conflict. The arguments and analysis put forward in this thesis, I believe, will remain relevant in the coming months and years. Given that the situation in Israel-Palestine is unfolding in the present-continuous, and the focus is again on direct violence, the chapter returns to the argument that an extended definition of violence is needed to understand the current outbreak of Palestinian violence.
PART ONE: HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The Israel-Palestine conflict, as discussed in the previous chapter, has been one of the most protracted conflicts of modern times. The continuation of the conflict has often been attributed to the very nature of the struggle; a contest between two national movements, Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, each pursuing an incompatible goal: ownership of the same piece of land (Gerner, 1994, Kelman, 2007, Halwani and Kapitan, 2008). Although the often cited phrase ‘one land, two peoples’ captures the essence of the conflict, over the years the conflict has evolved to involve a number of actors and contentious issues. The barrier constitutes an example of such contentious issues. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to contextualise the wider research by providing a historical context to the study of the barrier. The barrier constitutes just one form of violence in a long history of the cycle of violence in Israeli-Palestinian relations. In sum, the chapter provides an essential starting point to understand the origin and the dynamic of this relation.

The chapter reviews the scholarship on the dynamic and evolution of the conflict by highlighting the main critical events in the history of the conflict, such as the emergence of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism; the establishment of the state of Israel, along with the resulting 1948 war; development of Palestinian leadership; the 1967 war, in which Israel captured the remaining parts of the historic Palestine, the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip (and subsequently the beginning of the Israeli occupation); the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation in the form of the first and the second Intifada, and the Oslo Peace Process. As the construction of the Israeli barrier is at the heart of this thesis and will be analysed thoroughly in the following chapters, the last part of the chapter only briefly reviews the main scholarly arguments on the subject.

The selection of these critical junctions in the history of Israel-Palestine relations was based on two considerations. First of all, they emerged as the most discussed issues during the research data collection. When conducting elite interviews, the majority of the interviewees repeatedly referred to these themes and events and underlined their importance in the understanding of the dynamic and the continuation of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Consequently, the selected themes constitute an essential background to the issues discussed in the thesis. Although the themes and events reviewed in this chapter will be discussed in great detail in the thesis, the chapter provides a point of reference for the reader. The chapter adopts a chronological approach to the literature review. The chronological order of events allows a reader to understand the history of the conflict as a logical chain of events, which have contributed to the outbreak, escalation, and protraction of the conflict.

When reviewing literature on the history and the dynamic of the conflict, however, one is faced with two potential problems. First, as discussed in the introductory chapter, the history of the conflict is complex and disputed. Simona Sharani and Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2004:169), for example, argue that the two parties’ interpretation of history often appear irreconcilable. Prior to providing a comprehensive account of the Arab-Israel conflict, Ian J. Bickerton (2009:19) explains, that in order to provide a balanced account of the history of the Arab/Palestinian–Israeli conflict, a scholar is ‘faced with
the daunting task of balancing three disparate viewpoints: traditional Israeli, new or ‘revisionist’ Israeli, and Arab interpretations’. Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi (in Matthews, et. eds., 2011:40) goes further, arguing that although the narrative of Israeli new historians, such as those of Benny Morris (2007, 2009), Ilan Pappé (2007) or Baruch Kimmerling (2008), came closer to the Palestinian standpoint, the Palestinian narrative of the conflict still differs considerably with the Israeli classic narrative, such as those of Anita Shapira (2012) or David Meir-Levi (2005, 2007). This chapter aims to review the literature on the Israel-Palestine conflict that takes into consideration the narratives of both sides. Secondly, it needs to be highlighted that any study on the history and dynamic of the Israel-Palestine conflict in one chapter is bound to be incomplete. Although the chapter acknowledges the main developments of the conflict, there are many other topics of importance that are not be discussed in this chapter, most notably the issues of the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), simply because the detail of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, they will be discussed to greater or lesser extent in the next chapters. Moreover, importantly, as some of the critical issues discussed in this chapter constitute the main subjects of the thesis, they will only be briefly addressed here, but the key literature on these issues is embedded in the thesis.

2.2 ZIONISM AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM: THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE

In discussing the origin of the Israel-Palestine conflict, it is important, I believe, to dispel a common misconception. Repeatedly, the conflict has been portrayed as an ‘age-old ethnic conflict’, an extension of an ‘ancient struggle that has lasted for hundreds of years, or even since the time of Abraham’s sons, Isaac and Ishmael' (Dowty, 2008:2, 4 For a comprehensive study of the history of ancient Israel and history of Jewish people see Dowty (2008) and Tessler (1994)
Harms and Ferry, 2008:3). The studies of Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry (2008), Mazin B. Qumisiyeh (2004) and Raja Halwani and Tomis Kapitan (2008) provide a detailed analysis of the emergence of the conflict. Although they acknowledge the ancient existence of both groups, they dismiss the claim of the ancient foundation of the conflict. They are in agreement that tension between the Jews and Palestinians derived from competing political developments in the late nineteenth century.

Undoubtedly, one of the most crucial developments was the emergence of Zionism in the late nineteenth century. Although, as Manuel Hassassian (1990) discusses, the movement was rooted in ideas as old as the Jewish "Dispersion", the history of Zionism as an organised political movement, Baruch Kimmerling argues, began in the late 1890s (Hassassian, 1990:8, Kimmerling, 2001:23). Zionism was a political movement, born as a response to the intellectual and political environment of nineteenth-century Europe (Kamrava, 2005:76) and the continual oppression, exclusion and persecution of the Jews in Europe (Faure, 2005:483). The aim of the movement, founded and led by Theodor Herzl, was the promotion of the creation of a separate Jewish state in Palestine based on Jewish identity and self-determination (Kamrava, 2005:73). Contrary to Mehran Kamrava (2005:217), who argues that 'in its earliest manifestations, Zionism was assertively secular', Beverly Milton-Edwards (2009:125) argues, that there was always a religious element within the movement. Jewish settlement in the Holy Land was perceived as part of fulfilling God’s covenant to give the land, the Eretz Yisrael to the Jewish people. The Jewish right to the land, Claude Faure (2005:485) was seen therefore as inalienable [See Chapter Seven]. Although originally the boundaries of

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5 The name derives from Zion, a biblical expression for Jerusalem
6 The idea of Palestine as the location for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was firstly introduced in 1903 at the Sixth Zionist Congress. Before that, Herzl considered locating it in Uganda (Sachar, 2007:59–63)
7 Classical Zionism did not promote the idea a return of the Jews to Palestine (before the 1930s many opposed it). In fact, one of its central principles was that the Jews would return to Zion only at the second coming of the Messiah. Even today a few consider it blasphemous (Faure, 2005:483, Kamrava, 2005:73)
Eretz Yisrael, Kimmerling (2001:232) clarifies, run from the Euphrates River to the Rivers of Egypt, today, the boundaries of British colonial Palestine are the reference point (Map 2). The early Zionism therefore, Yiftachel continues, was a combination ‘of an ideology of national revival/liberation in the ancient homeland and the need to shelter stateless Jews’ (Yiftachel, 2006:57).

Aliyah (ascent), the migration of the Jewish diaspora to the land of Eretz Yisrael, became the cornerstone of Zionism. The first Aliyah, Mark Tessler (1994:43) reports, began in 1882. It doubled the Jewish population of Palestine raising it to about 50,000. Jewish migration to Palestine inevitably, 'put them in a confrontation with the rights of a well-established native population' (Dowty, 2008:4). ‘A land without a people for a people without a land’ as Zionists frequently claimed (at least in the early stages of Zionism movement), was in fact, as famously described, a beautiful bride but ‘married to another man’8 (Karmi, 2007). Mazin B. Qumisiyeh (2004) provides a detailed analysis of 6,000 years of civilisation in the area and the history of the people residing on the land, and of the last 2,000 when the land was called Palestine. Similarly, Halwani and Kapitan (2008:2), argue that the land was never empty. In 1890, at least half a million people lived in Palestine, of which 92 percent were Arab, and 8 percent were Jews.

Kamrava examines the origin of Palestinian nationalism and traces it back to the early 1900s. He emphasises the role of Zionism in the emergence of Palestinian nationalism, and argues that Palestinian identity ‘was shaped and hardened by a gradual awakening to the threat of the increasing physical presence and economic dominance within

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8 The phrase originates from an 1897 report to the rabbis of Vienna on the prospects for a Jewish state in Palestine. The report concluded that ‘the bride is beautiful, but she is married to another man’. The phrase provides the title of the Ghadi Karmi’s book (2007)
Palestine of incoming Zionist immigrants\(^9\) (Kamrava, 2005:84, 217). Baruch S. Kimmerling and Joel Migdal (2003) further elaborate on the role of Zionism in the formation of Palestinian nationalism. They argue the very concept of a Palestinian people would not have developed if it had not been for ‘the pressures exerted on the Arabs of Palestine by the Zionist movement’ (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003:xxviii). Similarly, Benny Morris (2009:37) claims that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine quickly understood Jewish mass migration ‘as a threat to the “Arab-ness” of their country and, perhaps, down the road, to their very presence in the land’.

In contrast, Rashid Khalidi (1997) rejects the notion that Palestinian identity emerged solely as a reaction to Zionist movement. Although he acknowledges that Palestinian identity developed to a certain extent as a reaction to ‘other’, Zionism and British imperialism, he argues that even before Zionism, there was already high level of Palestinian entity-consciousness. He lists several elements, which caused the Arab population to identify with Palestine prior to the arrival of Zionism: religious attachment of both Muslim and Christian Arabs to Palestine as a holy land, the conception of Palestine as an administrative entity, the fear of external encroachment and local patriotism. Although he acknowledges that the emergence of a Zionist movement ‘accelerated’ the development of the Palestinian consciousness, as the Palestinian population saw the movement as a threat to their land and to the Palestinians as an entity, the attachment to Palestine antedated the encounter with Zionism (Khalidi, 1997:173-176, 188).

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\(^9\) Kamrava highlights five identifiable phases of Palestinian nationalism. First phase, started in the early 1900s, and lasted throughout the mandate up until 1948. The second phase, as Kamrava defines, the ‘lost years’ of Palestinian nationalism, was characterised by the trauma of Nakba and the dispersion of Palestinians, and continued until 1967 and the Israeli occupation of the remaining 22 percent of historic Palestine. The third phrase was characterised by institutional reorganisation and military self-assertion, and the rise of the PLO. The next phase was marked by the local and indigenous uprising, Intifada in 1987 and lasted throughout 1993. The final phase commenced with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, which in turn led to the emergence of the PA. See Kamrava (2005) for the detailed analysis of the five phases of Palestinian nationalism, pp. 84-106.
2.3 THE ROAD TO THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

To secure the massive migration of Jews, and subsequently to establish a state for them in the territory, Zionism recognised the importance of the support of the Great Powers. In November 1917, Zionists secured their most significant political victory, namely Britain’s support for the establishment of a ‘National Home’ for the Jewish people in Palestine (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003:24, Morris, 2009:68). In the Balfour Declaration, the British government declared that it ‘views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object’ (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:51). Despite the objection of the Arabs, the terms of the declaration were subsequently incorporated into the terms of a 1922 League of Nations decision that assigned Britain Mandatory control over Palestine (Map 2) (Halwani and Kaplan, 2008:3).

The British authorities immediately opened the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration. As a result, the number of the Jewish population in the area went from 11.1 percent in 1922 to 20 percent by 1931 (Halwani and Kaplan, 2008:3). With the atrocities committed by Nazis during the Holocaust, the migration of Jews to Palestine intensified and by 1947, Yiftachel (2006) reports, the number of Jews in Palestine rose to 610,000, constituting 32 percent of the population (Yiftachel, 2006:58). The rising Jewish migration and Jewish national aspirations in Palestine had been met with the violent resistance of Palestinian Arabs in the territory. Although Morris (2009: 37) traces the beginnings of violence against Jewish settlers back to 1891, more organised
anti-Jewish strikes swept Palestine in 1920, 1921, and again in 1929. The increasing opposition towards Jewish immigration reached its peak in 1936. The General Arab strike was declared, initiating three years of violent rebellion against the Jewish population (as well as British rule) (Byman, 2011:13). When the revolt was put down by the British in March 1939, more than 4,000 Arabs and 400 Jews had been killed (Bikerton, 2009:51). The Royal Committee of Inquiry, widely known as the Peel Commission, was appointed ‘to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances’ (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:70). The commission established two main underlying causes of the 1936 revolt: the desire of the Arabs for national independence, and their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:71). As ‘there is no common ground between two national communities’ and ‘their national aspirations are incompatible’, the commission concluded that an establishment of a single state is impossible. It recommended, therefore, a partition of the land under which independent Arab and Jewish states would be established (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:74).

The Aliyah and the growth of the Jewish population had been accompanied by political, social and economic developments in the territory The Jewish National Home, according to the 1937 Peel Commission report, is 'no longer an experiment [...] The temper of the Home is strongly nationalist' (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:72). Rashid Khalid (2006) argues that during the Mandate period, whilst Zionists focused on its goal of establishing a state for Jewish people, Palestinian polity was unable to unite diplomatic efforts in a common cause. Instead, the Palestinian political scene was dominated by various political frictions and inter-elite rivalries, which were often exploited by the British and Zionists. This, in consequence, contributed to the failure of the Palestinians ‘to develop the attributes of stateness, or even to appreciate the
importance of developing quasi-state structures as a paramount national goal’ (Khalidi, 2006:141,160).

With the increasing inter-communal violence in the area, in 1946, Britain decided to hand its Mandate for Palestine over to the United Nations, leaving the question of its future in the hands of the organisation (Pappé, 2006:39-40). In November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, dividing Mandated Palestine into Jewish\textsuperscript{10} (56.5 percent) and Arab (43.5 per cent) states (Map 3) (Morris, 2009:68). The reasons for Jewish approval and Arab rejection of the UN Partition Plan have been the subject of great historical debate. David Meir-Levi (2005:7) argues that Zionists’ acceptance of the partition was a ‘desire for peaceful diplomacy and Israel's willingness to share the land. In his view, the very idea of partition became an agenda because the Arabs could not live peacefully beside Jews and the reason of the Arabs’ rejection was the desire to launch a war against Israel. On the other hand, Simha Flapan (1987:33) considers the Zionist decision a ‘vital step in the right direction- a springboard for expansion’. The acceptance of the resolution, he maintains, was a necessary step to take over the entire area of historic Palestine.

2.4 THE 1948 WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

With the end of Britain’s rule, on 15 May 1948, Zionism had achieved its goal: the establishment of the state of Israel as a Jewish state. The following day, forces from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq invaded the territories of the Palestine Mandate. After nearly seven months of intense fighting, Israel defeated the Arab armies. Under the subsequent 1949 Armistice Agreement, signed between Israel and Egypt, Jordan,

\textsuperscript{10} At the time Jews made up about 33 percent of the inhabitants of Palestine and owned between 6 to 7 percent of the land. The area under Jewish control was also to include some 45 percent of the Palestinian population (Kamrava, 2005:89)
Lebanon and Syria, the Armistice Line, often referred to as the Green Line, was established between Israel and its Arab neighbours (Map 4). Whilst the territory of the new state of Israel extended to 78 percent of Mandate Palestine, no Palestinian state came into existence in the remaining parts of Palestine. The West Bank, with East Jerusalem, came under Jordanian military rule and was formally incorporated into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1950. The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian military control, but ruled as a separate legal unit, and was never incorporated into Egypt. While the Israeli narrative portrays the 1948 war as the War of Liberation, a heroic struggle for the survival of the newly established state, for the Palestinians, the events of 1948 came to be known as al-Nakba – the Palestinian national catastrophe.

For the Palestinians, the worst outcome of the war was the problem of the Palestinian refugees: more than half of Palestine's native population, had been displaced. The exact number of Palestinian refugees varies according to different studies. Whilst Ilan Pappé (2006) reports that close to 800,000 people had been displaced, David Meir-Levi (2005) reports the number amounts to 725,000, Benny Morris (2009) to 750,000, and Simona Sharoni and Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2004) to 780,000. Whilst the Israeli narrative presents the radical demographic change that occurred as a voluntary transfer, encouraged by the Arab leaders\(^ {11} \), expecting a triumphal return after the destruction of the newly established Jewish state by the Arab armies (Meir-Levi, 2006), Avi Shlaim (2006) and Pappé (2006) argue that the Palestinians did not leave voluntarily, but the Jewish forces played an active part in forcing them out. Whilst, Chaim Weizmann, the first president of Israel, considered the exodus of the Arabs as ‘a miraculous clearing of the land: the miraculous simplification of Israel’s task’ (Kapitan, 2004:180), the

\(^ {11} \) David Meir-Levi argues that the refugee problem was intentionally created and perpetuated by the Arab states, ‘who kept the Arab refugees in a state of wretched poverty for propaganda purposes’. Therefore, Israel’s role in creating the refugee problem was a relatively minor one restricted to legitimate military contexts (Meir-Levi, 2005:23).
suddenly depopulated landscape in 1948 was, according to Pappé, nothing other than ethnic cleansing (Pappé, 2006).

As As'ad Ghanem reports, after the 1948 War only about 150,000 Palestinians remained in the territory of the newly established state of Israel (Ghanem, 2001). Since then, both Ghanem (2001) and Oren Yiftachel (2006) discuss, the Israeli Palestinians have been deemed by a large section of Israeli Jews to be part of an Arab majority in the region, and therefore perceived as a security, cultural, and demographic threat, and the 'enemy' to the Jewish population. This has been reflected, as Sammy Smooha claims, in the deep division between the Israeli Palestinian minority and the Jewish majority, characterised by the treatment of Israeli Palestinians as second-class citizens. Since Israeli Arabs are part of the Arab world, Smooha argues, which 'presumably threatens Israel’s existence, restrictions of their rights can be plausibly justified' (Smooha, 1997:208).

The establishment of the state of Israel, and the subsequent ‘transfer’ of the Palestinians to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and neighbouring countries, as Ghassan Khatib discusses, fragmented the Palestinian society and the Palestinian political elite (Khatib, 2010:25). Although in the 1950s, and part of the 1960s, Jamil Hilal argues, the Palestinians identified themselves within the wider political field of pan-Arabism, Palestinian national identity was preserved (Hilal, 2003:163). Living in exile, he argues, strengthened the feeling of belonging to the homeland, the aspiration for its own independence from Arab regimes and the need to resist Israeli domination (Khatib, 2010:29). Khatib argues that the geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian elite and a reliance on Arab states’ political assurances of a return to a historic Palestine

12 However, it needs to be noted that ethnic divisions and tensions also arose between Jewish ethnic groups in Israel. Particularly striking, Yiftachel argues, has been a persistent socioeconomic gap between Mizrahi and the Ashkenazi groups (Yiftachel, 2000). See Yiftachel (2000, 2006) for the analysis of Jewish ethno-class relations in Israel.
contributed to a ‘delay’ in the development of effective Palestinian leadership (Khatib, 2010:26, 30). Hilal claims, however, that with the continuous failure of the Arab governments to deliver on the ‘promise’ of liberating Palestine as well as the escalating conflicting pressures of assimilation and segregation the Palestinians in exile, produced the need for an organisational expression of their national identity (Hilal, 1993:47).

The ideology of pan-Arabism had gradually been abandoned, and strong internal solidarity within Palestinians in exile, with the united aim of establishing the Palestinian national movement, began to develop. This gained momentum with the establishment of Fatah in 1959 (Hilal, 2003). Fatah, an acronym whose letters in reverse stand for Harakat al-Tahrir al-Falastini, emerged, in its own words, as ‘the expression of Palestinian people and of its will to free its land from Zionist colonisation in order to recover its national identity’ (The Seven Points of Fatah, January, 1969, in Mahler and Mahler, 2011:139). Along with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the movement had united under the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 and expanded rapidly in the late 1960s when Fatah took control of the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat13 (Bröning, 2013:1, Sayigh, 2006:70). The PLO, Hilal (2006) argues, provided a sense of unity, not only among fragmented Palestinian communities of the diaspora, but also among the Palestinians inside the occupied territories (Hilal, 1993:47).

2.5 THE 1967 WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

For Israel, the 1949 armistice agreement did not bring peace with its neighbour. Following the war, Arab governments continued to refuse to recognise Israel’s right to exist. In the first four decades of its existence, Israel was involved in three wars with the

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13 Full name Muhammad Abdel-Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini
Arab neighbouring countries: the 1956 war\textsuperscript{14}, the Six Day war of 1967, and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The 1967 war, however, had the most profound impact on the dynamic and evaluation of the Israel-Palestine relations (Bickerton, 2009, Milton-Edwards, 2009). On June 5, 1967, following the Egyptian deployment of its troops along Israel’s border\textsuperscript{15}, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria (Weizman, 2007:27). The war, Avi Shlaim (2014) discusses, was the most spectacular military victory in Israel’s history. In six days, Israel managed to launch an almost simultaneous aerial attack and land campaign, defeating the Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan. There has been a debate as to whether the 1967 war was an Israeli defensive war or an Israeli plan of expansion. Shlaim (20014) discusses that the speed and scale of Israel’s military victory led many observers to suspect that Israel launched the war not in self-defence; but, rather it was deliberately provoked in order to expand its territory. Shlaim (2014) however concludes that the war was a defensive war to protect its security, not to expand its territory. Similarly, Ami Gluska (2007:xii) claims that the Israeli attack was a 'result of authentic feelings of an existential threat', and its sole purpose was to eliminate that threat without territorial aspirations (Guska, 2007:259).

The impact of the war on the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be overstated. First, it radically transformed the territorial status quo in the conflict. Israel made significant territorial gains, including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with East Jerusalem, Egypt’s territory of the Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights (Map 5). The

\textsuperscript{14} The 1956 war, referred to also as the Suez Crisis or the second Israel-Arab war, was a military confrontation between Egypt on one side, and Britain, France and Israel, on the other, triggered by the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt's Gamal Abdal Nasser in July, 1956. On October 29, under the leadership of General Moshe Dayan, Israel launched a combined air and ground assault into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, “Operation Kadesh”. Under American pressure and the threat of UN sanctions, Israel withdrew its forces and, on March 6, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) evacuated from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh, turning them over to the UN emergency force (Faure, 2006:438–439).

\textsuperscript{15} Eyal Weizman (2007:27) discusses the events leading up to the 1967 war. In May 1967, after several clashes between Israeli and Syrian troops, originating in earlier dispute over water sources, Egypt honoured his country's military pact with Syria and deployed ten divisions along the border to Israel, ordered UN observers to leave the Sinai and, on May 23 closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
territories (with the exception of East Jerusalem) were annexed by Israel and became the subject of Israeli military and administrative control. For the Palestinians, the events following the 1967 war symbolize another great tragedy, often referred to as a second al-Nakba. The war saw a second major Palestinian exodus. As Kamrava (2005:234) reports, over 300,000 Palestinians were forced out of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 120,000 of those becoming second-time refugees. Secondly, the speed and efficiency of the Israeli army not only humiliated the defeated Arab forces, but it discredited the Arab regimes as liberators of the Palestinian people. Consequently, as Mazin B. Qumsiyeh (2004:154) discusses, the PLO increased its prominence as an alternative to the failure of the Arab regimes to solve the Palestinian question. Similarly, as Raja Kapitan and Tomis Halwani (2008:6-7) argue, it was not until after the 1967 war that many Palestinians became convinced that if their homeland was to be liberated, it was exclusively in their hands to realise it.

The Arab states’ inability to lead the struggle over Palestine was confirmed again in 1973 (Sharoni and Abu-Nimer, 2004:174). On October 6, 1973, the joint armies of Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Initially, as Gary L. Rashba (2011:230-231) reports, Egypt and Syria made some significant gains: the former crossed the Suez Canal and established itself along its entire length on the east bank; the latter overran the Golan Heights and came within sight of the Sea of Galilee. However, with American political intervention, along with its substantial aid to Israel, Israel managed to force the Arab forces out of the territories. On October 23, a United Nations-sanctioned ceasefire came into effect, officially ending the war. Despite the great success in surprising Israel both strategically and tactically, after nineteen days of fighting Israel claimed another victory over the Arab armies in what became known as Yom Kippur war (Bickerton, 2009:136). The failure of the Arab forces to reclaim the territory led to the increased prominence of the
PLO as an alternative to the Arab regimes to solve the Palestinian question. A year later, during a summit in Rabat, Morocco, in October 1974, the Arab League formally recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with the right to establish national authority over any liberated Palestinian territory. Following the recognition, Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly, warning of violence if proposals for a Palestinian state were not considered (Lea, 2002:8,399). With the lack of any political solution to the conflict and any prospect of the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, the PLO continued its armed struggle to liberate Palestine. Right from the onset of the PLO, it attacked Israel from the neighbouring countries. Jordan, however, became the main springboard for the organisation’s attacks on Israeli targets [See Chapter Four]. The PLO became a state within a state in Jordan, challenging the legitimacy of the Hashemite regime. Following the events of Black September\textsuperscript{16}, Jordan expelled the PLO and the organisation’s headquarters were forced to move to Lebanon, and in 1971-72 Southern Lebanon became the main base of direct attacks against Israel\textsuperscript{17} (McDowall, 1989:32, Bickerton, 2009:129). The invasion of Israeli troops, and subsequent siege of Beirut in 1982, forced Arafat to move the PLO headquarters to Tunisia\textsuperscript{18} (Lea, 2002:399).

2.6 VIOLENCE INSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Following the 1967 war, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with an estimated one million Palestinians, who remained in the territories, came under direct Israeli military control (Gordon, 2008b:6). In the first twenty years of Israeli military occupation

\textsuperscript{16} In September 1970, the PFLP hijacked two airplanes, landing and blowing them up in Amman, Jordan. The attack humiliated the authority of Hussein bin Talal, and exposed the incompetence of the king to control the activities of the Palestinian groups. As a result, Hussein expelled the guerrilla movements from the territory (McDowell, 1989:32). Around 3,000 Palestinians were reported to be killed (Bickerton, 2009:128).

\textsuperscript{17} The PLO’s military and political activities became a significant factor in the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975 (Haugbolle, 2010)

\textsuperscript{18} The move came as a result of a joint deal of Philip Habib, the US Envoy to Lebanon, and Ariel Sharon, Israel’s Defence Minister, to give Arafat a safe passage to Tunis, his new headquarters in exile (Chehab, 2007:27)
countless attempts at resistance were initiated. Most of these attempts, Eitan Alimi (2007) reports, lasted no more than a week and motivated insignificant commitment and participation by the Palestinian population. It was, however, not until the first *Intifada* in 1987 when the Palestinians ‘succeeded in mounting a widely popular and intensive revolt’. On December 8, 1987, the *Intifada* broke out as a protest against the continuation of Israel’s occupation. What began as a protest over the death of four Palestinian workers, killed as a result of an Israeli army tank collision with a line of Palestinian cars waiting at the military checkpoint in Gaza City, soon escalated to protracted fighting and quickly spread to East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank (Sharoni and Abu-Nimer, 2004:178). The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, Sharoni and Abu-Nimer (2004) argue, needs to be understood in the context of Israeli policies in the territory, such as the policy of ‘creating facts on the ground’ (Karmi, 2007), enclavisation and fragmentation of the territories (Halper, 2008), or the de-development of the territories (Roy, 1995). This is at the heart of the thesis and will be discussed in great detail in Chapter Five.

The outbreak of the first *Intifada* led to the emergence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Hamas, an abbreviation of *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (Islamic resistance movement), emerged in January 1988 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood, under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin19 (Cordesman, 2006:295; Levitt, 2006:8). The Islamic Jihad, *Jihad Islami*, was founded in 198220 by two 1948 Palestinian refugees who grew up in camps in the Gaza Strip, Fathi al-Shaqaqi and 'Abd al-'Aziz Auda. The group was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood

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19 Israel’s role in Hamas’s formation remains the subject of great controversy. At the time of Hamas’s rise, Israel continuously attempted to suppress any movement suspected of a connection to Fatah or leftist groups, opening space for religious groups to develop. Byman argues however, that Israel’s contribution to the formation of Hamas was ‘by changing the playing field rather than by direct support’ (Byman, 2011:96).
20 The name was formally adopted only in 1987 (Stork, 2002:71)
in Egypt, and particularly by the Islamic militant groups, *al-Takfir wa al-Hijra* (The Atonement and Holy Flight), and *Tandhim al-Jihad* (the Jihad Organization). By the mid-1970s, Islamic Jihad rejected the teachings of the Brotherhood, which held that the destruction of Israel must await an “internal jihad” to reform and unify the Islamic world. Following the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, al-Shaqaqi was expelled from Egypt and returned to Gaza, where he formally established Islamic Jihad (Abu-Amr, 1993:8; Levitt, 2006:25). The goal of the two groups was the total liberation of all of the historic Palestine and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territory [See Chapter Four].

Although the 1980s has often been presented in literature as the years of protracted direct violence, it was also the time, as Halwani and Kapitana (2008) as well as Sharoni and Abu-Nimer (2004), argue, when Israel laid the foundation for the permanent retention of the occupied territories. The period witnessed not only the rapid expansion of Israeli settlements construction in the occupied territories, but also increasing Israeli control over economic, social and infrastructural activities in the region (Halwani and Kapitan, 2008:8, Sharoni and Abu-Nimer, 2004:176). As Sharoni and Abu-Nimer (2004:176) report, ‘for Palestinians, this period has been characterised by ‘harsh economic conditions and a growing dependency on Israel, a shortage of adequate housing, [and] crisis in education […]’ [See Chapter Five]. In contrast, David Meir-Levi (2007) rejects the image of Israel’s control as a heartless and illegal ‘occupation’. He discusses Israel’s development of the land and the beneficial role of Israel’s control over the territories. He argues that from late 1967 onward, Israel invested in infrastructure ‘that brought the West Bank up to twentieth-century standards’. Under the Israelis, the Palestinians had the highest standards of living of any Arab country with the exception of the oil states.
2.7 THE ROAD TO THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS

The end of the 1973 war commenced another important chapter in the history of Israel-Arab relations. Although Israel suffered a high casualty rate, the war once again demonstrated the military might of Israel. By late 1970s, Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler (1997:24) argue, many Arab states have gradually realised that the conflict cannot be resolved by force, which in consequence led to the process of Israeli 'acceptance' into the region. The process began with the Egypt-Israel peace agreement signed on March 26, 1979, followed by the peace with Jordan signed on October 26, 1994 (Inbar and Sandler, 1997:24). Growing political realism and the gradual acceptance of Israel in the region resulted in a shift in the PLO’s policy towards Israel and the conflict. In November 1988, at the 19th session of the Palestine National Council (PNC), the PLO accepted the 1947 UN resolution calling for the partition of Mandate Palestine into two states (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:187). In October 1991, the PLO decided to participate in the Madrid conference, shortly followed by secret negotiations, which took place in Oslo, Norway and resulted in the Israel-PLO agreements.

On September 13, 1993, Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister, and Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister, signed the Declaration of Principles (DoP), known as the Oslo Accords. The famous handshake between Arafat and Rabin on the lawn of the White House in the US signalled the official birth of the Oslo Peace Process. In September 1995, Oslo II was signed, and additional interim agreements were signed in January 1997 (Hebron), October 1998 (Wye River Memorandum), September 1999
(Sharm el-Sheikh). The difficult issues – borders, settlements, Jerusalem and the nature of the Palestinian entity – were to be dealt with at a later stage in the final status talks, the Camp David Summit (Inbar, 2008:111). The Oslo Peace Process constitutes a major breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Undoubtedly, both Israelis and Palestinians saw a spark of hope in the Oslo Accords; in 1993, 73 percent of Palestinians and 61 percent of Israelis supported the peace negotiations (Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1993). The ‘age of peace’, however, formally ended seven years after the signing of the Oslo Accords [See Chapter Four and Chapter Five]. Ariel Sharon’s visit to Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, on September 28, 2000, led to clashes between unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces. The following day, a large number of unarmed Palestinians held demonstrations and threw stones at Israeli police. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 Palestinians and injuring about 200. The violent confrontation that erupted in September 2000 began what has become known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada or second Intifada, the outbreak of Palestinian mass resistance [See Chapter Four and Chapter Five] Many, such as Kirsten E. Schulze (2001), Phyllis Bennis (2007) or Marwan Bishara (2002), believe that Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount was the immediate cause of the outbreak of Intifada, but its underlying cause was the popular Palestinian frustration with the continued Israeli occupation during the Oslo Peace Process. Bishara (2002:30), for example, argues that the Oslo ‘Peace’ Process was an attempt to legitimise Israel's domination of the West Bank and Gaza. While Palestinians were required to cease direct violence and recognise Israel, the Israeli occupation continued (Bishara, 2002:19). This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.
Contrary to the above argument, many like Arie M. Kacowicz (2005) or Steven Plaut (2005) argue that the failure of the Oslo can be attributed to the continuation of direct violence by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Kacowicz (2005) argues that ‘Arafat made a tremendous strategic mistake by keeping violence as a bargaining option, and by not controlling and suppressing the Islamic fundamentalism of Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the Palestinian-controlled territories’ (Kacowicz, 2005:260). Plaut (2005) goes further, arguing that the PLO not only failed to stop Hamas’ violence, but that its own members were involved in terror attacks, sometimes under Hamas’s banner. In fact, more Israelis have been killed by terrorists since the beginning of the Oslo process, than in any such period of like duration in Israel's history (Feith, 1996). The analysis of Palestinian violence during the Oslo Peace Process constitutes an essential background to the study of the barrier and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four.

### 2.8 THE BARRIER

The second *Intifada* initiated almost daily deadly attacks against Israeli targets, mainly civilians. On April 14, 2002, in the midst of the second *Intifada*, the Israeli government, under the leadership of Sharon, declared its plans for the establishment of a barrier in the West Bank (Gordon, 2008b: 212). Raphael Cohen-Almagor (2012:570) argues that the trigger of Sharon’s decision to establish the barrier was the March Massacre, in which a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 30 Israelis and injured another 140. The creation of the barrier, therefore, was a security response to the increased number of suicide bombings, and the stated purpose of its formation was to prevent Palestinians from crossing into Israel, thus reducing the potential for further acts of violence.

Similarly, Elizabeth G. Matthews (2011), maintains that the security threat Israel faces from the territories of the West Bank is significant and real. The barrier, therefore, is a
reasonable response to these threats. The rationale behind the construction of the barrier constitute the core of the thesis and will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

Israel’s security concerns as to the rationale behind the construction of the barrier are, however, often questioned. Ray Dolphin (2006) examines the background to the decision to construct a barrier. Although he acknowledges that the barrier was born out of genuine security concerns, he argues that the construction of the barrier was ultimately determined by Sharon and Israel’s settler interests. As he argues, ‘the wall joins the major settlement blocs to Israel, in addition to enclosing large tracts of the West Bank’s most fertile land and productive water resources’ (Dolphin, 2005:xi). Further studies present a similar argument. Kamrava (2005:253) argues that the construction of the barrier was Israel’s attempt to create new facts on the ground, and as David Newman (2011) adds, including as many Jewish settlements on the Israeli side as possible, effectively resulting in the annexation of parts of the West Bank (Newman, in Matthews, et al., 2011:58). The UN Special Rapporteur, John Dugard’s report (2003), supports this argument. Dugard perceives the establishment of the barrier as ‘a visible and clear act of territorial annexation under the guise of security’.

Cohen-Almagor (2012) reports, since the construction of the wall, the number of terrorist attacks has substantially decreased. Whereas before its construction, the number averaged 26 per year, since the barrier has been built, the number has dropped to between 3 and 0 per year (Cohen-Almagor, 2012:571). While direct violence, in the form of fighting or suicide attacks, may be minimised or ceased, structural violence either continues intact or is maximised. This approach to violence, the limitation of the concept to acts of direct violence, dominates the literature on the history and dynamics of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Reviewing the literature, one can notice chapters or
sections entitled ‘violence’, ‘the outbreak of violence’ or ‘return to violence’. They commonly refer to events such as terrorist attacks, military invasions or *Intifadas*, very commonly referring to the violence of Hamas or Islamic Jihad. In *The Israel–Palestine Conflict: Parallel Discourses*, for example, Elizabeth G. Matthews states that ‘violence, per se, is not the subject of this book […]. The work presented in this book is a reminder that even when the violence stops, there is still a plethora of issues to be addressed, […]’ (Matthews et al., 2011:1). A major problem with this approach, and this particular statement, is that since the beginning of the conflict, violence has never stopped. It is true, as Neve Gordon (2008a, 2008b) points out, that in some periods of the conflict, while direct violence was significantly minimised, structural violence has continued. Structural violence has been a perpetual and inherent element of the conflict. Gordon (2008a, 2008b) is right when he calls for another approach to the analysis of Israel-Palestine confrontation, one that takes into account the structural dimension of Israeli military rule. He analyses the two major principles, which he believes, have informed the occupation over the past four decades: the colonisation and separation principles.  

Gordon (2008b) however, understands them as a means of Israeli control over the Palestinians rather than the acts of violence. This thesis contributes to this existing scholarship by investigating these structural dimensions of Israeli military rule, concentrating on the study of the barrier. The violence inherent within the barrier, as the thesis argues, however, cannot be seen and analysed in isolation. For both parties, as the thesis demonstrates, the barrier needs to be understood in the context of the cycle of violence. Therefore, in order to understand structural violence, in this case the Israeli barrier, it is essential to examine this cycle and investigate the interrelationship between three types of violence.

21 While the former refers to a form of government whereby the coloniser attempts to manage the lives of the colonised inhabitants while exploiting the captured territory’s resources, the latter means the ‘reorganisation of power in the territories in order to continue controlling the resources’. As Gordon continues, ‘with the adoption of the separation principles, Israel loses all interest in the lives of the Palestinian inhabitants and focuses solely on the occupied resources’ (Gordon, 2008a:25).
2.9 CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to contextualise the research by providing a historical context for the study of violence in the conflict. The chapter has aimed to provide the reader with the point of entry and reference into an understanding of the dynamics of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and to explain how the conflict has developed in this manner. At the same time, the selected points in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian relations provide a necessary background to the empirical analysis of violence in the next chapters. The following chapters expand on these sections and present an original contribution of the Palestinian and Israeli narratives to the research questions outlined in Chapter One, based on my field work.

The historical account of the conflict has shown the continuous and persistent use of violence between the two parties. Direct violence, as the chapter demonstrated, has been a ubiquitous and inherent element in the shared history of the two peoples. It has been the strategic tool in over a century old 'contest' between two national movements, Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, which clashed recurrently over the right to self-determination and statehood. To understand the continuation of the conflict, it is crucial, however, to go beyond the analysis of direct violence between the parties, and move towards a more comprehensive conceptualisation of violence, one that takes into account the acts of structural violence. The importance and the implications of structural violence on the Israel-Palestine conflict will be analysed in detail in the following chapters, but before that, I will proceed with analysing the theory of structural violence.
CHAPTER THREE: MOVING TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The history of the Israel-Palestine conflict, as the previous chapter demonstrated, is characterised by violence between the two sides. The analysis of violence, however, has often been limited to the account of direct violence, and the acts of structural violence often ignored or not seen as violence. The chapter argues that an analysis of violence in the conflict needs to go beyond the traditional conceptualisation of violence, limited to the acts of direct violence. The extended notion of violence, that takes into account structural and cultural violence, the chapter claims, offers a more comprehensive understanding of the continuation of the conflict. It provides a means of examining violence in the conflict that either goes unnoticed or is not perceived as violence. The chapter proposes the hypothesis that the three types of violence are interrelated, therefore the resolution of the conflict highly relies on the elimination of all three types of violence. The empirical analysis of the barrier, demonstrates this interconnection.

Consequently, the chapter argues, ignoring the importance of any of them helps to explain the persistence of the conflict. The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and conceptual framework that guides the empirical analysis of the violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict and its impact on the conflict.

In light of this, it is crucial to establish what exactly the phenomenon constitutes. Although, it may seem apparent what violence constitutes, however when it comes to
conceptualising the phenomenon, disagreements, as this chapter demonstrates, begin to emerge. As Claire Thomas points out, it is often the case in social science that authors employ the concept of violence with little clarity about what they actually mean (Thomas, 2011:1816). As ‘there is the potential to interpret violence in a broad way’, he continues, ‘it becomes unclear whether the word violence refers to physical, direct violence or to the ‘violence’ of ideas, or repression and so on’ (Thomas, 2011:1816). In other words, as violence may involve a variety of forms, it is central to have a clear conceptualisation of the term and to determine what we refer to employing the term. Moreover, misunderstanding, or as Hannah Arendt phrased it, ‘conceptual carelessness’, have political importance and social implications (Coady, 1999:23, Arendt, 1999).

Similarly, both George Kent and C.A.J. Coady suggest that the adoption of any of the definitions of violence depends on the interests of those employing them (Coady, 1999:24, Kent, 2003:284). Therefore it is important to provide a comprehensive differentiation of the theories of violence and take into account the implications of the employment of any particular definition.

The chapter, therefore, reviews different theories of violence and identifies the reasons as to the contested nature of the concept. It first assesses the limitations of the traditional, ‘restricted’ category of violence. The analysis of these limitations serves as a justification for the rejection of this traditional category of violence and the employment of a ‘wide’ category of violence, represented by Johan Galtung. The second, and the main part of the chapter, introduces Galtung’s conceptualisation and typology of violence and concentrates on the theory of structural violence. It analyses the mechanism and the main characteristics of the violence and the criticism the theory has attracted. The wide category of violence, it is argued, enables one to analyse violence within the Israel-Palestine conflict by going beyond the traditional concern of peace research- the elimination of direct violence- to the broader agenda of the removal of
In order to understand the mechanism and the persistence of structural violence, it is argued, it is crucial to analyse the factors, which stimulate and legitimise its use. The study of cultural violence, Galtung maintains, ‘highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the facts of structural violence are legitimised and thus rendered acceptable in society’ (Galtung, 1990:292). The next part of the chapter, therefore, introduces the concept of cultural violence and provides a theoretical and conceptual account of cultural violence. The last part of the chapter discusses the interconnection of the three types of violence and places this analysis within the framework of positive and negative peace.

3.2 VIOLENCE

Violence is one of the most elusive and contested concepts in social science (Imbusch, 2003). Despite the vast literature on the phenomenon, the question regarding what the appropriate definition should include remains a subject of unsolved debate. There are many factors which cause the difficulties in defining the phenomenon, which consequently results in the contested nature of the concept. While Willem de Haan argues that the problem of understanding the phenomenon of violence lies in the concept being either ‘under’ or ‘over-defined’ (or both), Rasheeduddin Khan opts for the latter claiming that the complexity of the concept lies in the fact it ‘suffers from a surfeit of meanings’ (de Haan, 2008:27, Khan, 1978:834). As he argues, the rapidly growing literature on the concept is ‘enough to show the bewildering medley in which the concept is entrapped’ (Khan, 1978:834). Peter Imbusch, for example, argues that the complexity of defining violence is perhaps caused by the notion being ‘hampered by connotations that partially overlap with semantically-related concepts, such as force, aggression, conflict or power, that are not identical with violence’ (Imbusch, 2003:14). As Hannah Arendt adds, ‘it is rather a sad reflection on the present state of political
science that our terminology does not distinguish among such key words as "power", "strength", "force", "authority", and finally, "violence" [...] (Arendt, 1999:6). Although all these concepts are of similar nature, they refer to distinct, different phenomena.

In *Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept*, de Haan suggests that the complexity in defining the phenomenon lies in the concept being multifaceted, socially constructed and highly ambivalent. Not only are there many different facets of violence, but also violence can be exhibited in a great variety of contexts. Violence can be physical or psychological, individual or collective. Also, depending on the motive of violence, it can be intentional or accidental (de Haan, 2008:28). Secondly, an ambivalence of the concept lies in the way violence is ‘socially sanctioned, legitimised and institutionalised, as well as how it is culturally transmitted and experienced as graphic illustrations of violence around the world press, photos, on television screens, in the movies and in video games’. Violence is so omnipresent that it has become socially legitimised and often morally accepted. This, in consequence, creates a certain degree of irony or dilemma as to whether violence should be condemned and considered immoral and illegal, or admired and considered moral and legal (de Haan, 2008:28). Moreover, the concept involves major ambiguity between the destruction and the creation of order (Heitmeyer and Hagan, 2003, Imbusch, 2003:14). While violence is often associated with a negative act, it can also be employed as a means to create order and peace, for example, to destroy what one believes to be a terrorist organisation. Finally, the complexity in defining the concept results from violence being ‘socially constructed because who and what is considered as violent varies according to specific socio-cultural and historical conditions’ (de Haan, 2008:28). The perception of violence differs depending on the influence of social and cultural development. While legal scholars may view violence as a strictly direct, personal act, in some cases verbal aggression may be more debilitating than physical violence (de Haan, 2008:28). The
definition of violence would also considerably vary depending on different actor perspectives. For instance, the definition of the phenomenon would differ from the perspective of a perpetrator to this of a victim, third party or natural observer (de Haan, 2008:28, Bufacchi, 2009:25).

Not only is there no agreement concerning the definitions of violence, but the debate regarding the origin of violence remains unsolved. Although Piero Giorgi argues that the origins of violence must become a topic of careful multidisciplinary research, Peter Imbusch, in his study on the concept of violence, suggests that there are two main views, which dominate the debate (Giorgi, 1999:171, Imbusch, 2003:13). Firstly, violence is ascribed to human nature, which is considered indisputable, with a genetically transmitted predisposition for aggression and domination. Secondly, the origin of violence is linked to social conditions (Galtung, 1996:201, Imbusch, 2003:13). This thesis employs the latter view.

Despite great disputes among theorists as to the origin of violence and how the concept should be defined, there appears to be a common agreement that the definition involves the physical and direct infliction of pain through visible bodily injury (Barash and Webel, 2002:7). Indeed, traditionally, violence has been understood as an act of physical violence, motivated by hostility and a deliberate intent to cause harm in the pursuit of one’s own preferences. However, as Kent underlines, ‘harming’ can take different forms and be categorised in different ways, it is essential to have a clear categorisation of the concept (Kent, 1993:378). Vittorio Bufacchi and de Haan go some way to explicating the categorization of violence. At the core of Bufacchi’s paper, ‘Two concepts of violence’, and de Haan’s study ‘Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept’ is the analysis as to whether the concept of violence should be defined narrowly and limited to physical attack-violence as force, or whether it should be

22For the debate on the origin of violence, see Piero Giorgi (2001)
extended to a broader definition—violence as violation. Similarly, Coady examines different forms of violence, and consequently, distinguishes three types of definitions of violence, which can be found in philosophical, political and sociological literature. He labels them ‘wide’, ‘restricted’ and ‘legitimate’. Coady’s ‘restricted’ category of violence, described by Bufacchi as the Minimalist Conception of Violence, includes interpersonal acts of force involving the infliction of physical injury. Coady discusses the strong affinity between the concept of violence and the concept of force and argues the two cannot be understood independently (Coady, 1986). Indeed, most definitions of violence, including the one proposed in the Oxford English Dictionary, define violence as ‘the exercise of physical force’ (Bufacchi, 2009:18).

Indubitably, there is an advantage in defining violence in a 'restricted' way, in terms of an excessive and destructive force. It delineates 'clear boundaries around what constitute an act of violence [...]’ and what does not and it makes acts of violence more apparent and easier to report. (Bufacchi, 2005:197). The traditional minimalist or restricted category of violence, however, has some limitations, and it omits several significant elements of an act of violence. Firstly, both Newton Garver, and Felipe MacGregor and Marcial Rubio C., argue that it is crucial to differentiate between violence and force. Although Garver admits that in many contexts the two words are synonymous, he stresses that violence is not the same thing as force. While force can breed positive results, as discussed above, violence should be considered to have negative results (Garver, 1968:257, MacGregor and Rubio C., 1994:44). Moreover, importantly, as it will be illustrated in greater detail, not all acts of violence require the use of force. For example, as the traditional 'restricted' category limits the acts of violence to intentional, physical and direct acts of force; it excludes many other important dimensions of violence such as a psychological dimension. Therefore, Garver stresses the importance of this aspect of violence and argues that the idea of violence is more closely connected
with the idea of violation than with force (Garver, 1968:256). As he argues, ‘what is fundamental about violence in human affair is that a person is violated’. Garver discusses how persons can be violated with regards to their bodies (physical violence), or with regards to their ability to make their own decisions (psychological violence). While, in the case of the former, individuals should have the right to determine what their body does and what is done to their body, in the case of the latter, individuals should have the right not to be forced to do certain things, which they do not want to do (Garver, 1968:258). I will come back to this point in more detail later below.

Another problem with restricted or minimalist theories of violence is that they exclusively associate the phenomenon of violence with visibility. The definition of violence, according to this stance, should only include visible, direct, and immediate infliction of physical harm. Yves Winter, in ‘Violence and Visibility’, analyses the correlation between violence and visibility. She criticises what she refers to as a positivist definition of violence, which tends to associate and analyse violence on the sole basis of visibility of actions that can be attributed to an individual subject. In my opinion, she rightly poses the question, ‘on what grounds can we assume that violence occurs always at the surface, that its effects are always visible, that it constitutes an action performed by one or more individuals?’ (Winter, 2012:196). She argues that ‘the fetishization of the visible hinders analyses that seek to connect visible modes of injury to concealed ones, while the priority of the act hampers investigations into social and historical conditions for contemporary formations of violence’ (Winter, 2012:196).

The above limitations have been addressed and incorporated into the ‘wide’ category of violence, referred by Bufacchi as the Comprehensive Conception of Violence (Coady, 1999:24, Bufacchi, 2005). This schemata takes into account a variety of harms associated with a variety of interpersonal, institutional, and structural relationships and
behaviours, and subsequently extends the term violence to structural violence of social inequalities and injustice (Barak, in de Haan, 2008:32). The ‘wide’ category, which involves acts of structural violence, is at the heart of this thesis, hence, it requires a comprehensive and separate analysis, which will be presented in the following section.

The third category of violence, ‘legitimist’, includes a reference to an illegal or illegitimate use of force. Sidney Hook describes this category as ‘the illegal employment of methods of physical coercion for personal or group ends’ (cited in Coady, 1999:24). Robert Paul Wolff, an advocate of this type of definition, argues that the concept of violence lies in the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate political authority. As he admits, the idea of legitimate/illegitimate authority is in itself ‘inherently incoherent’, which may explain the elusiveness of the concept of violence.

In his study On Violence, Wolff defines violence as ‘the illegitimate or unauthorised use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire of others’ (Wolff, 1999:15). The interpretation of violence, he maintains, involves an implicit appeal to the principle of de jure legitimate authority. Whilst murder is an act of violence, capital punishment by a legitimate state is not; theft or extortion is violent, but the collection of taxes by a legitimate state is not (Wolff, 1999:15). This leads to the question whether only states are legitimate actors to use violence? Thomas makes a claim that ‘the legitimacy of an act is often measured according to the legitimacy of the actor’23. Therefore, for example, violence exercised by a democratic state would then be perceived as being legitimate (Thomas, 2011:1824). Thomas argues, however, that ‘violence carried out in the name of self-determination, representative of the desires of a people group in that territorial location may also be perceived as legitimate’ (Thomas, 2011:1824). Although the violence against Israel carried out by the Palestinians during the second Intifada, could be perceived as legitimate acts of self-determination, they often fall into the category of

23 The legitimacy of an actor is often measured by its democratic credential, representativeness, moral authority
terrorism. The concept of terrorism is difficult to define because the acts are seen differently by the victim or the perpetrator of an attack. Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, defined terrorism as ‘the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent’ to inspire fear for political ends’ (Netanyahu, 1985:9). Although for many Palestinians, Israeli military tactics in the West Bank during the second Intifada, which will be discussed in the thesis, fit within this definition of terrorism, Israel is generally recognised as a democratic state and its actions justified as a legitimate means to protect its national security thus they are not classified as acts of terrorism.

Furthermore, Coady argues that the employment of any of the above-mentioned definitions of violence can also play a political role. He suggests that there is a complex interplay between the definition of violence and commitment (Coady, 1999). Both Kent and Coady point out that the adoption of any of the above definitions of violence depends on the interests of those employing them. Therefore the heterogeneity of the definitions of violence reflects rather a political, than a scientific position (Coady, 1999, Kent, 2003). Whilst the ‘restricted’ definition tends to serve the conservative Right, the ‘wide’ definition, which extends the concept to a great range of social injustices and inequalities, is preferred by the liberal Left. An extended definition not only includes the concerns of most disadvantaged people of a society, that are more likely to be subjects of structural violence, but also provides a justification for revolutionaries to resort to direct physical violence in order to cease structural violence, following the claim that violence is merely met with violence (Coady, 1999:24, Kent, 2003:384).

Michael Fleming argues, and rightfully so I believe, that ‘discarding structural accounts of violence has to be seen as a political act, as it naturalises exploitative social relations’ (Fleming, 2012:484). Therefore, rejecting a broad definition of violence not only

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24 Ten years later, Netanyahu replaced the phrase ‘the innocent’ by the term ‘civilians’ (Netanyahu, 1995:8)
contributes to discrediting the magnitude of the acts of structural violence but also results in ‘widespread impunity, an impunity that disproportionately benefits the relatively powerful’ (Nevins, 2002:523).

The analysis of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict, as discussed in Chapter One, has often been limited to the ‘restricted’ definition of violence. Many Israeli accounts of the conflict have concentrated entirely on visible acts of aggression against the state of Israel such as Palestinian terrorist acts or uprisings. These accounts of violence have certainly served the interests of Israel’s political parties, such as the right of centre HaLikud (Likud), the nationalist party Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home), or HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home), who see Palestinian aggression as the only cause for the persistence of the conflict. When limiting the analysis of violence in the conflict to acts of direct, visible acts of force, it can be argued that direct violence is widely used by both the Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians have employed direct violence in the form of shooting, cross-border incursion, suicide bombings, killing and terrorising innocent civilians. For example, during the ten-year period from the eruption of the second Intifada in September 2000, until September 2010, 1,083 Israelis were killed (B’Tselem, 2010). Likewise, Israel has used military incursions and targeted killings, which often takes a heavy toll on non-combatant civilians. In the same period, the number of Palestinians deaths reached 6,371. At least 2,996 of the fatalities did not participate in the hostilities when killed (B’Tselem, 2010).

Although it needs to be acknowledged that direct violence is a critical obstacle with regard to achieving peace between the parties, it is important to examine what factors stimulate its use. In order to understand the continuation of the conflict, a different approach is therefore needed; one that takes into account the structural and cultural dimension of violence. Conflict, Galtung argues, is much more than what meets the
naked eye as ‘trouble’, direct violence. There is also the violence frozen into structures, and the culture that legitimises violence (Galtung, 1996: viii). Therefore, it is crucial to go beyond a concern with manifest violence and take into account the magnitude of structural violence, legitimised by cultural violence, and its impact on the protraction of the conflict. Therefore, like Galtung, I reject the ‘restricted’ concept of violence, arguing it prevents us from gaining a comprehensive understanding as to the permanence of the conflict. For that reason, I believe it is crucial to understand the concept of structural violence, how it operates, and how it differs from direct violence.

3.3 DEFINITION OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

Galtung’s starting point as to the analysis of structural violence is that ‘violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations’ (Galtung, 1969:168). The core of the definition lies in the distinction between ‘actual realisations’ and ‘potential realisations’. Human beings suffer violence whenever their actual realisations in life fall below what they could potentially achieve (Meyer, 1998:5). Violence is what ‘increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance’ (Galtung, 1969:168). In other words, if the potential is higher than the actual, and when it is avoidable, and yet still happens, then we can say that violence is exercised (Galtung, 1969:169). Violence would then refer to ‘everything that hinders individuals from developing their capabilities, dispositions, or possibilities’ (Winter, 2012:195).

Mark Vorobej, in ‘Structural Violence’, analyses the definition of structural violence and the criticism the notion attracted. He points out that although the definition seems to be simple and logical to understand, ‘as a working definition, it invites enormous
difficulties and complications’. Indeed, both Lauryn Brokate and Kathleen Ho criticise Galtung’s definition for the ambiguity of the term ‘potential’. They both question how one defines what is possible or potential and how one can be aware that potential has been achieved. Furthermore, Ho challenges how one can determine whether something is avoidable or not (Ho, 2007). Kjell Eide, in ‘Note on Galtung’s Concept of’Violence’, discusses the limitations as to the measurement of structural violence. Firstly, he raises the problem of the technical feasibility of potential. He argues that the difference between the actual and the potential cannot be measured as there is no accurate way to determine what the potential is. He maintains that ‘there will always be a major discrepancy between the technically feasible and the economically possible’ (Eide, 1971:71). He continues:

The ‘potential’ referred to in Galtung’s definition of violence, thus cannot relate meaningfully to technical feasibility; it must include also the availability of resources. This, however, leads straight into the question of the allocation of scarce resources (Eide, ibid.).

Jukka Gronow and Jorma Hilppo seem to be in agreement with Eide. They argue:

Even if we could agree on resources, we still have the problem of allocation. We cannot possibly avoid all evil at the same time because of the scarcity of our resources, our ethical and political goals have to determine what is necessary and also what violence is (Gronow and Hilppo, 1970:312).

In this context, they argue that Galtung’s definition constitutes just a model of a definition as we can define violence in many ways (Gronow and Hilppo, 1970:312). MacGregor and Rubio C. are also sceptical about the concept. They argue that the potential of performance is relative to each society. Whilst in a developed society, securing the minimum level of human life is probable, it is not necessarily the case in third world countries. For this reason, they consider the concept as ‘an exceedingly inclusive’ one. They argue that there are many other elements of reality such as natural
disasters or unpredictable events, which reduce a person’s effective performance (MacGregor and Rubio C., 1994:47). Gronow and Hilppo make further valid observations. Firstly, they argue that ‘already at the beginning of an exchange relation, the resources of the participants are different’ and that ‘the social positions of the participants are different’. Moreover, they maintain that ‘no influence or exchange relation is separate from other social relations’ (Gronow and Hilppo, 1970:315).

Formulating the definition of structural violence as the difference between actual and potential, Galtung himself admitted that the concept ‘may lead to more problems than it solves’ (Galtung, 1969:168). Galtung, however, aware of developing ‘an extended concept of violence’, which he believes is ‘indispensable’, attempts to justify his concept as ‘a logical extension, not merely a list of undesirables’ (Galtung, 1969:168). In ‘Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization’, Galtung and Tord Hoivik attempt to justify the efficacy of the concept by operationalizing it. They argue that structural violence can be measured in the same way as direct violence: in the number of deaths, looking at for example ‘the number of avoidable deaths that occur because medical and sanitary resources are concentrated in the upper classes’ (Galtung and Hoivik, 1971:73). The problem, however, emerges when one aims to measure mental realisations. Galtung himself admits that, the meaning of ‘potential realisations is highly problematic, especially when we move from somatic aspects of human life, where consensus is more readily obtained, to mental aspects. Our guide here would probably often have to be whether the value to be realised is fairly consensual (Galtung, 1969:169).

Peter Lawler helps to explain the ambiguity of ‘potential’. He argues that an important qualification is that ‘potential’ was to be understood as a contingent category connected to ‘the given level of insights and resources’. Therefore, a failure to realise potential is
only indicative of violence if it is knowingly avoidable (Lawler, 2008:84). Eide also attempts to offer a solution to the problem. She proposes a logical solution 'to relate the concept of a potential to the notion of an optimal allocation of resources. Violence, she argues, ‘would then be the cause of a deviation from an optimal resource allocation; it becomes identical to the cause of 'irrational behaviour', or simply 'inefficiency" (Eide, 1971:71). Ho offers a simpler explanation to the ambiguities in Galtung’s theory. He argues that ‘the examination of inequality by comparing the ‘haves’ with the ‘have-nots’ allows for a more realistic understanding of what constitutes human potential, where ‘haves’ represent potential and the ‘have-nots’ the actual’ (Brokate, 2009:77). The theory then is based on what is currently possible for all people given existing resources’ (Barnett, 2008:77).

Consequently, in order to establish the potential, we need to compare it to what others with the same resources can achieve. Deniss Soron explains further that ‘widespread starvation and malnutrition in conditions of generalised natural scarcity is tragic but inescapable, whereas it is simply inexcusable in situations where food is overabundant, and the necessary supply chains are ready in place’ (Soron, 2007:4). Therefore, to define the potential, it is essential to determine the availability of resources and their location at a given point of time in a particular region. It is also crucial to establish the allocation of resources at the beginning of exchange relations and examine the history and dynamics of resource allocation between involved groups. When there are enough resources available, but due to certain imposed policies, resources are accessible only to a particular group, then violence is exercised.
4.4 DIMENSIONS OF VIOLENCE AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

Galtung, in ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, distinguishes six dimensions of violence, which separate, both conceptually and empirically, structural violence from behavioural violence [See Figure 1]. First, he makes a distinction between physical and psychological violence, arguing that the analysis of violence cannot be confined only to physical violence (Galtung, 1969:169). In this sense, as Tim Jacoby explains, ‘violence of containing a person’s potential can be done mentally and institutionally as well as affecting them bodily’ (Jacoby, 2008:40). Psychological violence may include acts such as brainwashing, indoctrination or threats, which in result could lead to increasing individual isolation or marginalisation (Jacoby, ibid). The second distinction Galtung proposes is between the negative and positive approach to influence. As he explains:

a person can be influenced not only by punishing him when he does what the influencer considers wrong, but also by rewarding him when he does what the influencer considers right (Galtung, 1969:170).

This is based on the reward-oriented system, where a person is rewarded for something, which a perpetrator manipulated him/her to do, which according to the victim is bad or immoral. Violence, therefore, may be contained within rewards and not just simply with punishments (Jacoby, 2008:40). Galtung further makes a distinction whether or not there is a direct subject/person to hurt (Galtung, 1969). As he explains:

when a person, a group or a nation is displaying the means of physical violence […], there may not be violence in the sense that anyone is hit or hurt, but there is nevertheless the threat of physical violence (Galtung, 1969:170).

Violence may then occur even though someone is not bodily hurt but relate to the issues such as ‘threats to others’ interests and values, the destruction of property and forced displacement’ (Jacoby, 2008:40). These examples of conflictual behaviour may limit
peoples’ free will and reduce or impede their potential realisations, thus do violence (Jacoby, 2008:40). The next distinction, Galtung makes, is between violence that is intended and unintended. Often, a violent act is tied more to an intention than to its consequences, which may produce a bias when thinking about violence. Galtung emphasises that it ‘will easily fail to capture structural violence in their nets’ as an unintended act of violence may not be considered as violence and its consequence easily ignored (Galtung, 1969:172). The fifth distinction is between the manifest and latent forms of violence. While the former refers to both personal and structural acts of violence that are observable, the letter is almost impossible to identify. As Lawler notices, both structural and direct violence can be latent or manifest. While direct violence may ‘become manifest in conditions of social instability; structural violence might be eradicated through revolutionary action, only to reappear as a new hierarchical order evolves’ (Lawler, 2008:82). Highly tense situations, which result in an increase in the latent potential for violence without the presence of behavioural violence, can still hinder potential and reduce individuals’ capacity to pursue their objectives (Jacoby, 2008:40).

Figure 1. Typology of Violence
The final distinction, and as Galtung emphasises, the most important, is whether there is a subject/person who directly harms another person. He poses a question whether violence is exercised when nobody is committing direct violence. Whether we discuss direct or structural violence, in both cases individuals may be killed or hurt. However, as Galtung explains, in the case of direct violence ‘these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors’, in the case of structural violence, ‘this is no longer meaningful’ (Galtung, 1969:171). This distinction between personal and structural violence is therefore based upon the presence/absence of the actor. Violence with a clear subject-object relationship is manifest as it is visible as action. The problem appears when both subject and object is indistinct. Galtung explains it by giving an example; ‘when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence’ (Galtung, ibid). MacGregor and Rubio clarify Galtung’s concept by arguing that while direct violence is face-to-face violence where an ‘aggressor can and may be identified’ through direct confrontation, in structural violence the ‘oppressor is faceless’. It comes from the structures, not from people (MacGregor and Rubio, 1994:49). The violence is then built into social, political and economic structures, and although not visible in specific events, it ‘shows up as an unequal power, and consequently, as unequal life chances’ (Galtung, 1967:171). Therefore, although the act of violence is hidden into violent structures, ‘its effects are most clearly observable at the social level, as systematic shortfalls in the quality of life of certain groups of people’ (Kent, 1993:383). Winter notes another connection between the issue of invisibility and structural violence. She argues that invisibility of structural violence is more likely, not because
the oppressor is faceless, but because of violence’s perpetual repetition in the open. As she argues, what makes violence structural ‘is not that it is invisible, but that it is inherited across generations’ (Winter, 2012:201).

George Kent, in ‘Analysing Conflict and Violence’, breaks the concept of structural violence into two categories. He distinguishes economic violence from political violence, where the former results in deprivation, malnutrition, and disease, and the latter is characterised by repression, deprivation of peoples’ freedom and their human rights (Kent, 1993:381). In the political aspect of structural violence, violence ‘is accomplished by political repression, through which people with power gain benefits for themselves at the expense of others who have less political power’ (Kent, 1993:383). Galtung however, perceives power not only in a political but also in an economic sense. He considers power as a resource, something that can be possessed and distributed (Parsons, 2007:177). The unequal power results in resources being distributed unequally (Galtung, 1969:171). Put simply, if Galtung perceives power as a resource, structural violence can be understood as an unequal distribution of resources. Structural violence produces a concentration of wealth or resources for one group while exploiting the other (Ofreneo and Vela, 2006:8). This then generates alienation, marginalisation, poverty and deprivation (Weber, 2004:33). Exploitation [See Figure 2], however, is a centre-piece of structural violence. Topdogs, Galtung explains, ‘get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs’ (Galtung, 1996:198). Although structural violence, unlike direct violence, does not lead to immediate harm, it has the same ability to harm. The underdogs, Galtung argues, may be so disadvantaged that they die (starve, waste away from diseases) from it, or they may be left in a ‘permanent. unwanted state of misery, usually including malnutrition and illness’ (Galtung, 1990:293). The difference is that structural violence operates at a slower pace.
Peter Prontzos refers to structural violence as ‘collateral damage’ because, as he argues, it is ‘an unintentional side-effect of specific policies’ aimed at increasing the wealth or economic resources of specific groups or institutions (Prontzos, cited in Atack, 2009:42). Roberts, however, questions this claim. Rightly, in my opinion, he argues that 'structures are created by people, thus structural violence can be prevented and does have responsible actors' (cited in Thomas, 2012:1831). I agree with John Burton’s argument that social structures ‘emerge as the result of decisions which reflect the interest, norms and beliefs of people who make them’ (Burton, 1997:41). Similarly, Thomas argues that although structural violence results from the structures in society, ‘the actual act of violence itself is intentional in that it has a conscious actor, it is the result of a decision by the person perpetrating the act’ (Thomas, 2011:1828). In the same fashion, MacGregor and Rubio C claim that ‘such depersonalisation hardly entails the absence of particular interest being at work in these structures, nor does it entail the absence of individuals and agents as their vehicles’ (MacGregor and Rubio C., 1994:49). Although the main example of structural violence, discussed in detail in the following chapters, is the construction of the barrier, Israeli policy cannot be analysed in isolation. This is just one element of the violent structure created with a specific interest being at work in these structures, and with a clear presence of individuals and agents as their vehicles. To understand the creation and mechanism of the barrier, the thesis also analyses other elements of the violent structure. One such pertinent element is inequality in water distribution and consumption between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel uses four times more ‘shared’ water than do the Palestinians (Amnesty International, 2009a, 2009b). The history of Israeli control of water resources and unequal distribution and consumption of water will be examined in detail in the following chapters, for the purpose of this argument it needs to pointed out that there are individuals and agents of the unequal exchange and interest at work. The control
over water resources was not only a priority in Zionists’ plans for the creation of the state of Israel but, for many, it has played an important role in the 1967 war and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank (Amery, 1997). The existing unequal distribution of water in the West Bank is a result of a series of Israel’s policies issued since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. Immediately after the beginning of the occupation, Israel began the process of connecting Palestinian supplies in the occupied territories to the central water conveyancing system within Israel, systematically preventing Palestinians from developing autonomous water resources in the West Bank (Frederiksen, 2005). The origins of structural violence in this instance are, therefore the Israeli policies and administrative decisions made since the beginning of the occupation. Therefore, the barrier, the thesis argues, along with other elements of structural violence, can be seen as constituting an intentional act, created and sanctioned by people with certain self-interest at work.

The chapter has so far established that structural violence is the unequal distribution of power and resources, which results in human beings’ somatic and mental realisations being below their potential realisations. Galtung, however, also sees the violence as an obstacle for basic needs satisfaction. In ‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses and Cultural Violence’, Galtung revisits his analysis of violence and examines the phenomenon from a human needs perspective. He maintains that ‘the best approach is probably to root violence in the concept of basic human needs’ (Galtung, 1985:146). He defines violence as ‘avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible’ (Galtung, 1990:292). Violence is ‘the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, or more specifically, ‘avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible’ or ‘what could have been and what is’ (Galtung,
When the actual is unavoidable, then violence is not present. As Wilfried Graf et. al argue, 'although the potential and the actual can in practice never coincide completely, it is more the enormous gulf between the two which is worrisome' (Graf, et. al, 2007:131). Accordingly, violence can then be understood as the avoidable deprivation of human needs. Galtung establishes four categories of basic needs: survival needs, well-being needs, freedom needs, identity needs. He considers the categories of human needs as equally important and strongly opposes any attempt to prioritise them.

Structural violence leads to deprivation of these basic human needs and results in exploitation, penetration, segmentation, marginalisation and fragmentation [See Figure 2]. For Galtung, exploitation, as mentioned earlier, constitutes a ‘centre-piece of violent structure’. The topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs. This may either result in death, referred by Galtung as exploitation A, or a permanent, unwanted state of misery, exploitation B (Galtung, 1990:293). Although the next four terms, penetration (‘implanting the topdog inside the underdog so to speak’), segmentation (‘giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on’), marginalisation (‘keeping the underdogs on the outside’) and fragmentation (‘keeping the underdogs away from each other’), Galtung argues, can be seen as ‘parts of exploitation or as reinforcing components in the structure’, they ‘should also be seen as structural violence in their own right and more particularly as variation on the general theme of structurally built-in repression’ (Galtung, 1990:294). The barrier, as demonstrated below, has resulted in exploitation, penetration, segmentation, marginalisation and fragmentation, the main elements of an over-arching violent structure.
4.5 CRITIQUE OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

The concept of structural violence brought a significant contribution to the study of peace research. In Mark Vorobej’s words, ‘Galtung has made a radical proposal that calls for a fundamental shift in the way we understand, evaluate, and tackle the problem of violence’ (Vorobej, 2008:92). It enabled researchers to ‘shift the category of violence away from surface phenomena towards a broad set of social relations’ (Winter, 2012:195). This marked a transition from the central concern of peace research of the reduction or elimination of direct violence to the broader agenda of the removal of social inequalities and injustice (Weber, 2004:32).

However, many believe that the wide scope of the concept of structural violence marks its potential weakness (Nevins, 2002:524). Both Kenneth Boulding and Kjell Eide argue that the concept of structural violence is too broad to be analytically valuable (Boulding, 1977:84, Eide). Boulding, in ‘Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung’, reviews Galtung’s collected works. He considers the concept of structural violence to be too normative, ‘to the point perhaps where the description of reality suffers’ (Boulding, 1977:77). Eide goes further, arguing that the concept seems to be anything Galtung does not like (Eide, 1971). In the same way, Andrea Kirschner and Stefan Malthaner argue that structural violence ‘widens the scope of the subject to the point where it
becomes too vast to handle, both from a normative and from an empirical perspective’ (Kirschner and Malthaner, 2010:5). In this way, they continue, the concept of violence acquires an enormous potential for mobilisation, but it simultaneously loses its distinctiveness’ (Kirschner and Malthaner, *ibid*). Similarly, MacGregor and Rubio C. argue that the concept of structural violence is a ‘model in the sense of a system, a theory of reality’ and should be considered as a working hypothesis, valid only when measured empirically and objectively (MacGregor and Rubio C., 1994:44). Similarly, Gronow and Hilppo regard Galtung’s definition of structural violence only as a model of a definition, claiming it does not enable us to separate violent from non-violent phenomena (Gronow and Hilppo, 1970:313). Boulding goes further arguing that the concept is a misleading metaphor (Boulding, 1977:75). He argues, ‘there is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung’s metaphor of structural violence as he used it has diverted attention from the problem’ (Boulding, 1977:83).

Nevins, however, argues that the wide scope of the concept of violence is the strength of Galtung’s approach. He argues;

> rather that reducing violence to singular, visible acts or events, Galtung pushes us to appreciate that violence like any other social act does not take place in vacuum. It emerges out of a complex web of social relations that involves individual acts, structures or processes and discourse—all of which are mutually constitutive (Nevins, 2002:524).

As there are many various forms of violence, it is imperative to have a comprehensive concept of violence that can accommodate them all. Although it needs to be acknowledged that the concept of structural violence is wide in scope, and may refer to many aspects of limiting people's potential, the theory is necessary in order to develop a comprehensive explanation of the origins of certain violent behaviours, which otherwise would not be registered as they do not meet the criteria of violence (Giorgi, 1999:216).
Galtung’s approach offers an alternative framework to the study of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. His typology of violence gives one a means of access to study violence more systematically and profoundly. This study allows for going beyond the direct manifestation of violence, often entirely attributed to Palestinian acts. It enables one to catalogue and characterise different levels of violence and outline theoretically significant dimensions of violence (Barnett, 2008:78). Furthermore, it challenges the ways in which violence has been conceptualised. The concept, therefore, has become a ‘powerful rhetorical weapon’ and a ‘useful corrective to […] our conventional understating of violence’ (Soron, 2007:3). It provides a conceptual means of addressing many types of violence which often go unnoticed or they ‘may often not be perceived as violence by its victims, because the harm to which it gives rise to, cannot be easily connected to an identifiable actor who can be held responsible’ (Soron, 2007:4). The following chapters identify and discuss structural violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict built into the economic and social structures, and manifesting itself in various forms such as inequality in resources distribution and needs deprivation.

4.6 CULTURAL VIOLENCE

As the chapter has established, structural violence can be understood as an unequal distribution of power and resources and the deprivation of basic human needs, which results in human beings’ actual somatic and mental realisations being below their potential realisations. However, as Marc Pilisuk argues, ‘structural violence is not just an act of nature, but a product of social arrangement, created by people and sanctioned by normative beliefs and practices of culture’ (Pilisuk, 1998:198). As Galtung maintains, ‘the study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence, and the fact of structural violence are legitimised and thus rendered acceptable in society’ (Galtung, 1990:292). Therefore, to understand the mechanism and
persistence of structural violence, it is crucial to analyse what factors stimulate it and legitimise its use.

Galtung defines cultural violence as ‘any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct and structural form’ (Galtung, 1990:291). It refers to those aspects of culture exemplified by religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science and formal science (Galtung, ibid). It needs to be stressed however, that this does not mean that an entire culture is violent, but within a culture, there are certain aspects, which can be employed to justify the use of structural or direct violence or both (Galtung, 1990:291, MacGregor and Rubio C., 1994:52). As Galtung explains, ‘aspect A of culture C is an example of cultural violence’ (Galtung, 1990:291).

The concept of cultural violence is not new. Pierre Bourdieu, as Imbusch explains, discussed a similar concept, which he referred to as symbolic violence. Bourdieu regarded symbolic violence as violence exemplified in concepts, language, or systems of symbols aimed at obscuring unspoken conditions of rule (Imbusch, 2003:25). As Imbusch explains, ‘conditions of power and government, and the structures of violence they embody become unrecognisable to the extent that they seem no longer able to be challenged and are thus overlooked, but at the same time are accepted’ (Imbusch, 2003:25). Simply put, because structural or symbolic violence is so ingrained in an over-arching violent structure, it is no longer visible, therefore, often not challenged. Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence ‘look, even feel, right or at least not wrong’ (Galtung, 1990:291). In the following chapters the thesis demonstrates the interrelationship between structural violence of the barrier, and the cultural violence of language and ideology that dehumanise and delegitimise one group in the conflict, making the use of direct violence against that group justified and rationalised in the public consciousness.
Mila Alexis P. Ofreneo and Tesa C. Vela argue that cultural norms, maintained by economic and political hierarchies of power, built into the structure, help to rationalise violence thus making it morally acceptable (Ofreneo and Vela, 2006:9). They suggest that moral exclusion is the key social psychological process, which further serves as the moral justification for both structural and direct violence (Ofreneo and Vela, 2006:8). Opatar defines moral exclusion as ‘the process whereby individuals or groups are perceived to be outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply’ (Opatar, cited in Ofreneo and Vela, 2006:9). Therefore, inflicting violence upon ‘the others outside the boundary’ of one’s scope of violence seems to be justified’ (Ofreneo and Vela, 2006:10). ‘Us-them’ thinking is the psychological process that rationalises and legitimises the act of violence in the collective mind (Ofreneo and Vela, 2006:7). In the same way, Galtung argues that the ‘Self-Other gradient can be used to justify violence against those lower down on the scale of worthiness’ (Galtung, 1990:302). As Imbusch recapitulates, cultural violence functions by ‘switching the moral connotations of actions from wrongs to rights, or at least acceptable and unobjectionable’ (Imbusch, 2003:25). Galtung compares the mechanism of cultural violence to a traffic lights system. Cultural violence ‘changes the moral colour of an act of violence from red (wrong) to green (right,) or at least yellow (acceptable)’. Another way, he continues, is by ‘making reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent’ (Galtung, 1990:292). Exploitation and/or repression is then seen as normal, natural or at least acceptable, or not seen at all. Then, as Galtung argues, comes the eruption, ‘the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage, and counter-violence to keep the cage intact’ (Galtung, 1996:200). A major form of cultural violence indulged in by ruling elites, Galtung concludes, is to ‘blame the victim of structural violence who casts the first stone, not in a glasshouse but to get out of the iron cage, branding him as an ‘aggressor’” (Galtung, ibid).
4.7 THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

Analysing the interconnection between structural, cultural and direct violence, Galtung compares it to the image of a (vicious) violence triangle (See Figure 3). When the triangle is stood on its 'direct' and 'structural violence' feet, the image invoked is cultural violence as the legitimizer of both. Standing the triangle on its 'direct violence' head yields the image of structural and cultural sources of direct violence’ (Galtung, 1990:294). Despite the symmetry of Galtung’s violence triangle, there is a basic difference in terms of time relations of the three types (Demmers, 2012:61) Galtung explains:

Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs, and cultural violence is an invariant, a “performance”, remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformation of basic culture (Galtung, 1990:294)

In order to clarify the time relation, Galtung uses a metaphor from geology, with ‘earthquake as an event, the movement of the tectonic plates as a process and the fault line as a more permanent condition’ (Galtung, 1990:294).
Galtung stipulates then that the three types of violence are interconnected and equally important. As the vicious cycle of violent can start from any ‘corner’ of the triangle, underplaying or ignoring the significance of any of them is dangerous. The underlying assumption is simple ‘violence breeds violence’ and the reaction to structural violence and cultural violence is often direct violence (Galtung, 1990:295). Galtung claims that ‘much direct violence can be traced back to vertical structural violence, such as exploitation and repression, for liberation, or to prevent liberation’ (Galtung, 1996:270). Structural violence can breed direct violence on the part of oppressed groups, as a form of resistance, or an attempt to initiate social and political changes (Atack, 2009:44). Similarly, in his theory of Protracted Social Conflict, Edward E Azar identifies the
deprivation of human needs as the underlying source of protracted social conflict. He argues that 'protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity' (Azar, 1990:12). He considers the importance of security needs, development needs, political access needs, and identity needs (cultural and religious expression) (Ramsbotham, 2005:115). The deprivation of these needs, as he maintains, gives an explanation as to the persistence of a conflict. He continues, ‘grievances resulting from needs deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict’ (Azar, 1990:115). In this sense, direct violence is used by underdogs as ‘a way to get out of a ‘structural iron cage’ of powerlessness and poverty, or to get back at the society that put them there’ (Pilisuk, 1998:198). On the other hand, elites can also depend upon the use of direct violence to maintain their superior political or social position in an unequal social structure (Atack, 2009:44). Direct violence, therefore, could be considered as a manifestation of the conflict, rather than its cause (Dudouet, 2010:3). Following that argument, structural violence could be regarded as a root of the conflict, and consequently, pose the main obstacle to its resolution.

Defining violence in terms of human needs deprivation helps to understand the importance of structural violence and its impact on the protraction of a conflict. Structural violence, in the form of unequal power and resources distribution, results in a violation of basic human needs and, as Schnabel explains, ‘leads to human suffering and social and communal deterioration, and therefore to more violence in its direct and structural manifestation’ (Schnabel, 2008:87). Structural violence generates a threat to basic human needs, and subsequently provides the incentive for a protracted conflict ‘as

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26 Deprivation of human needs is one of the four clusters of variables identified as preconditions for the transformation of conflict to a high level of intensity. The other is the communal content, government and the states' role and international linkages.
individuals and groups strive to preserve and protect their identities' (Moshe, 2001:18).
Uneven or unjust distribution of the resources for meeting the basic human needs of the
various groups cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict (Chriost, 2003:159,
Azar, 1990:9).

Galtung argues that if violence is only about the act of direct, physical violence, and
'peace is seen as its negation, too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal'
(Galtung, 1969:168). Peace has often been described as the absence of direct violence,
and particularly the most manifested form of direct violence: war. Galtung claims that
this interpretation of peace is ‘naïve’ and warns peace researchers to avoid that mistake,
as the absence of direct violence is only the first stage in the peace building process
(Galtung, 2004; Galtung, 1980:293). As violence is two-sided, with the distinction
between personal and structural violence, the concept of peace, he argues, also needs to
be extended. He differentiates between two types of peace: absence of personal
violence, he refers to as negative peace, and absence of structural violence, he refers to
as positive peace (Galtung, 1969:183). The reason for the use of the terms 'negative' and
'positive', Galtung explains, should be easily noticed. The absence of direct violence, as
he argues, ‘does not lead to a positively defined condition, whereas the absence of
structural violence is what we have referred to as social justice, which is a positively
defined condition (egalitarian distribution of power and resources)’ (Galtung,
1969:183). As Richard Quinney explains, positive peace is ‘a condition of society
where exploitation is minimised or eliminated altogether, and in which there is neither
overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of structural violence’ (cited in Moshe,
2001:19). Simply speaking, while negative peace involves the elimination of direct
violence, positive peace symbolises the removal of structural violence beyond the
absence of direct violence. The concepts of positive and negative peace, however, are
not mutually exclusive. While Timothy Murithi argues that the establishment of positive
peace is impossible without establishing negative peace, Geoff Harris and Neryl Lewis claim that ‘the absence of direct violence is unlikely to persist without sustained efforts towards the realisation of liberty and justice’ (Murithi, 2009:5, Harris and Lewis, 1999:32). Therefore, negative peace is a necessary, although an insufficient condition for achieving lasting peace (Murithi, 2009:5). The starting point of a firm and lasting peace, however, ‘should be the need to deal with the structural violence underlying the conflict’ (Harris and Lewis, 1999:32). The outbreaks of direct violence are likely to continue if the inequalities and injustices, which have been the source of the tension, are not addressed (Harris and Lewis, 1999:32). Lasting peace, as Galtung concludes, can only be achieved with a complete elimination of structural violence of suppression, exploitation, divide and rule, exclusion, and cultural violence that legitimises structural and direct violence (Galtung, 2004:114).

The elimination of direct violence is an essential but insufficient step to resolve a conflict. If violence consists of three types, the absence of violence in all of its forms is required. As I have argued, violence can start at any corner of the Galtung’s direct-structural-cultural triangle, therefore ignoring the importance of any of them, helps to explain the persistence of the conflict. I argue that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies in addressing not only direct violence, but also structural violence. The concepts of positive and negative peace provide an excellent framework for the analysis of the Israel-Palestine peace process. I believe that the analysis of what constitutes a positive and lasting peace helps to understand the reasons as to why peace between the Palestinians and Israelis has not been reached. I argue that all undertaken peace initiatives to resolve the conflict constituted negative peace, which, as this thesis argues, is insufficient to achieve a lasting peace. The systematic undermining of the importance of structural violence has arguably contributed to the failure, and more importantly, contributed to the persistence of the conflict itself. I intend to show this by
analysing the history of the Israel-Palestine peace process, concentrating on the Oslo Peace Process. The following chapters examine how violence, in its direct, structural and cultural form, was downplayed during the ‘peace’ negotiations. Consequently, I analyse how this has led to the failure of a peaceful agreement and subsequently, the lack of peace between the parties.

4.8 CONCLUSION

Violence remains one of the most contested and most difficult concepts in social science. Despite proliferating literature on the issue, the question concerning an appropriate definition remains the subject of constant debate. Traditionally violence has been understood as an act of direct violence, an excessive and destructive force, with a clear visibility of an actor and subject of an act. Galtung challenged this conventional understanding of the phenomenon and shifted the focus ‘beyond the realm of direct or manifest violence’ into anything that hinders individual human potential (Lawler, 2008:80). He extends the definition of violence to include structural and cultural violence. Structural violence is built into social, economic and political structures and shows up as unequal power distribution or deprivation of human needs, and consequently, as unequal life chances. Cultural violence refers to any aspects of culture such as religion, ideology or language that can be used facilitate the use of direct and structural violence. Although structural and cultural violence are deemed to be invisible, they are only invisible as forms of active violence committed by people. They became visible as different forms of exploitation, discrimination and the marginalisation of certain groups. The three forms of the violence triangle are interconnected and mutually supportive. Structural violence produces a deprivation of needs and concentration of wealth or resources for one group whilst facilitating the exclusion, marginalisation or exploitation of others. Structural violence, therefore, leads to social and communal
deterioration. Oppressed groups may resort to direct violence as a form of resistance, or as an attempt to initiate social and political changes. Alternatively, structural violence can be employed to maintain one’s superior political, economic or social position in an unequal social structure. Moreover, it can be used as counter-violence to direct violence. Cultural violence serves as the legitimizer of both direct and structural violence, making the two look right, natural or not seen at all.

This conceptual and theoretical framework guides the later empirical analysis (see below) of the violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Galtung’s conceptualisation provides a means of examining violence in the conflict that either goes unnoticed or is not perceived as violence: the barrier. As structural, direct, and cultural violence are interconnected, it is essential to analyse them all. The construction of the barrier, therefore, is a part of a cycle of violence in the conflict. The next chapters, therefore, examine the origin of the barrier placed in the context of the cycle of violence, and analyse the interconnection between them, and the impact of these acts on the persistence of the conflict.
PART TWO: UNDERLYING CAUSES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARRIER: THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FENCE: ISRAELI NARRATIVE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In June 2002, in the midst of the second Intifada, the construction of the Israeli barrier commenced in northern West Bank. As illustrated in Chapter One, there are two very contrasting narratives regarding the reasons for the construction of the barrier. This chapter addresses the Israeli narrative in response to the first research question, what led to the construction of the barrier, and argues that the fence, therefore, should be seen as a natural and obvious response to decades of unprecedented and continuous Palestinian violence culminating with the outbreak of the second Intifada. A key finding that emerged from the elite interviewing is that, according to the Israeli narrative, in order to understand the Israeli decision to erect the fence\textsuperscript{27}, it is crucial to analyse the Palestinian protracted violence against the state of Israel since the beginning of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is quite straightforward. It places the security fence within the historical context of Palestinian violence and the theoretical framework of Galtung’s conceptualisation of violence. The framework enables one to assess and analyse all three types of Palestinian violence and understand the correlation between different types of Palestinian violence in the conflict. The chapter argues that, according to the Israeli narrative, the perpetual use of direct violence by the Palestinians, that is justified and legitimised by Palestinian cultural violence, has resulted in Israel resorting

\textsuperscript{27}This chapter presents the Israeli narrative; therefore, as explained in Chapter One, it refers to the barrier as fence or security fence.
to the use of structural violence (the fence) as a necessary measure to provide security for the state of Israel, and to protect its citizens against Palestinian violence. Whilst the immediate causes of the creation of the fence will be discussed in Chapter Six, this chapter traces the underlying causes of Israel's policy regarding the fence. The chapter highly relies on Israeli sources, such as the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to fill in the Israeli narrative.

The chapter first investigates Palestinian violence in the pre-Oslo Peace Process period. The chapter argues that, according to the Israeli narrative, Palestinian violence had been an omnipresent feature of Israel’s existence and the most persistent threat to Israel’s security. A significant argument that emerged from the interviews is that Israel’s perception of the threat of Palestinian violence has been shaped by the anti-Israel violence of the surrounding Arab world, and more broadly the history of the Jewish people. The chapter, argues that, according to the Israeli narrative, Palestinian violence needs to be understood as a part of existential dangers posed to the Jewish people throughout generations, prior to and after the creation of Israel. The second part of the chapter examines Palestinian violence in the period of the Oslo Peace Process. It is argued that according to the Israeli narrative, despite the Palestinians declaring their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, Palestinian direct violence, fuelled by cultural violence, not only did not cease, but it significantly intensified. Drawing on the conceptual framework of negative and positive peace, the chapter argues that the continuation and the intensification of Palestinian direct and cultural violence constituted the main reason for the failure of the process, and consequently the construction of the fence. The analysis of violence, as emerged during the data collection, would not be complete without an analysis of the failure of the Palestinian leadership to provide effective governance for the Palestinian people. Hence, the
chapter turns to an analysis of Palestinian governance during the Oslo period. It is claimed, according to the Israeli narrative, that the Palestinian leadership use violence against its citizens and its governance was riddled with authoritarianism, clientelism, corruption, neo-patrimonialism. Empirical analysis of the Palestinian direct, structural and cultural violence helps facilitate a better understanding of the protraction of the conflict and subsequently the erection of the security fence. It will also contribute to the understanding of the mechanism of the violence triangle and the correlation between different types of violence.

4.2 THE BEGINNING OF THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: PALESTINIAN DIRECT VIOLENCE

Zeev Maoz argues that no state in the post-Second World War era has been more concerned with its national security than the state of Israel. In fact, he argues that from 1948 to 2004, Israel was the most conflict-prone state in modern history (Maoz, 2006). Palestinian violence has constituted the oldest concern for Israel’s national security. My interview with Ze'ev Elkin, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and now Minister of Immigration and Absorption and Minister of Jerusalem Affairs and Heritage, illustrates well the Israeli narrative on the scope and magnitude of Palestinian violence and its impact on Israel threat perception. Since the very beginning of the conflict, Elkin explains, Yishuv, the pre-state Jewish community in the area, has been subjected to Palestinian violence (Elkin, 2014). According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the 1920s anti-Jewish strikes swept Palestine, resulting in the death of 164 Jews. By the end of 1939, the number reached 345, and almost tripled by the end of the 1940s (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 200b). For Jews, many of whom had come to the area fleeing the horrors of the Holocaust, Elkin explains, violence was a clear manifestation of Palestinian intentions: getting rid of the Jews from the land.
Subsequently, he concludes, the violence was seen as an existential threat to the very existence of the Jewish community in the territory (Elkin, 2014).

On May 14, 1948, as discussed in Chapter Two, a local struggle between Jews and Palestinians transformed into a conflict between the state of Israel and the Arab world. The combined Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, invaded Israel, endeavouring to eliminate the newly established state. For Israel, Elkin argues, the invasion posed an existential threat to the state (Elkin, 2014). Although after nearly seven months of intense fighting, Israel defeated the Arab armies, the war resulted in the death of 4,000 soldiers and 2,000 civilians, about 1 percent of the entire Jewish population (Elkin, 2014). Despite the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and the Arab armies, Palestinian violence did not cease but its armed struggle expanded in scope. As Elkin discusses:

Until the 1967 war, Israel's borders were being discussed as the 'Auschwitz Borders'. From the security point of view, the borders were extremely dangerous for Israel in terms of geostrategy. There were many attacks on the Israeli citizens from these borders, and every time Israel’s leaders felt that their country faced an existential threat (Elkin, 2014).

Israel's sovereignty within its borders has repeatedly been challenged by fedayeen (those who sacrifice themselves) groups’ cross-border infiltrators’ attacks from West Bank and Gaza Strip (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2002b). As Benny Morris estimates, in the period of 1949–56, up to 250 Israelis were killed as a result of these attacks (Morris, 1993:136-7, 415). The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that 1952 was particularly dramatic in terms of fedayeen cross-border incursions, with about 3,000 incidents ranging from 'the malicious destruction of property to the brutal murder of civilians' both in frontier settlements and more heavily populated centres (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002b). Palestinian violence intensified further after the establishment of Fatah in 1959 (Kapitan, 2008:143). From the beginning of 1965 until
the 1967 war, 113 *fedayeen* raids into Israel from neighbouring Arab countries were carried out: 108 of them by Fatah (Alon, 1980:34). Although Fatah had initially declared that it would not target Israeli civilians, especially not women and children, this commitment was often ignored, and as both Tomis Kapitan and Daniel Byman report, almost from the start the organisation targeted Israeli civilians (Kapitan, 2008:143, Byman, 2011:32). Whilst Jordan constituted the major springboard for Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets, with 71 operations carried out by infiltration from Jordan in this period, the territory of the West Bank constituted a sanctuary for terrorist groups before and after operations carried out in Israel (Alon, 1980:34). Prior to 1967, over 1,300 Israelis had been killed by the Palestinian attacks28 (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002b).

### 4.3 THE POST-1967 REALITY: DIRECT AND CULTURAL VIOLENCE

For Israel, the events of 1967, as discussed in Chapter Two, again put Israel’s existence at risk. With rising tensions between Israel and the Arab states, on June 5, 1967, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The war resulted in Israel capturing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The newly seized territories, Elkin argues, freed Israel from the greatest threat to its national security: indefensible borders (Elkin, 2014). The territories did provide Israel with territorial protection for Israeli population centres, industrial assets, and military facilities from easy reach of Arab armies (Roadman, 2001:72-73). On the other hand, however, Israel’s control over the West Bank and Gaza did bring about very difficult challenges: it led to a proliferation of Palestinian terrorist organisations and intensification of Palestinian anti-Israel resistance in the form of terrorist and guerrilla activities (Merari, 2006:227, Alon, 1980:24). Fatah,

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28 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002b) for a list of documented acts of the attacks against Israel between 1952 and 1967.
which in 1969 had taken control of the PLO, remained the largest and most active anti-
Israel organisation.

Since the emergence of Fatah, Israel became a target of the group’s cultural violence. 
Cultural violence, as illustrated in the previous chapter, refers to the different aspects of 
culture, such as language or religion that can be seen as a source of violence, by 
consenting not only to the dehumanisation and delegitimisation of a certain group, it 
also by justifying violence against a given group. Although cultural violence does not 
result in direct harm, it helps to rationalise the use of direct violence making it morally 
acceptable and justifiable. This section concentrates on one aspect of culture, language. 
I selected this particular facet because it had emerged as the most important during the 
ette interviews. The chapter analyses the Palestinian official rhetoric on the 'resolution' 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The rhetoric, according to the Israeli narrative, not only 
delegitimises the state of Israel, denying Israel's right to exist, its political and historical 
right to their land, but also openly calls for an armed struggle against the state. For 
instance, this is evident in the PLO’s National Charter (1968).

In July 1968, Fatah, under the PLO, issued its first National Charter. The document 
delegitimised the state of Israel by declaring Mandatory Palestine the homeland of the 
Palestinians and rejected any legal or historical rights of the Jewish people to the 
territory. As the document states, ‘the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, 
and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void’ (Article 20). 
The organisation legitimised the use of violence against Israel by rejecting all but one 
solution to the conflict: the armed struggle for the total liberation of Mandatory 
Palestine (Article 8), with fedayeen action constituting the nucleus of the popular 
Palestinian war of liberation (Article 10). The armed struggle was recognised not only
as the only solution to the conflict but as ‘a national duty’ for all Palestinians\(^{29}\) (Article 21 and 15) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1968).

The armed struggle to liberate Palestinian territory as the official Palestinian position on the resolution of the conflict continued through the 1970s, and it was confirmed in the document 'Palestinian National Council: Resolutions at the 12th Session of the Palestine National Council' in June 1974. The PLO committed itself to a ten-point plan, known as the Phased Plan. The plan outlined the group’s pledge to employ all means, but first and foremost an armed struggle ‘to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated’ (Article 2) (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:141). The plan, therefore, stipulated reclaiming whatever territory Palestinians could at the time, and using such territory as a launching pad for further attacks until the complete liberation of historical Palestine. The same rhetoric is present in the 1977 Six-Point Program of the PLO. The Program rejected reconciliation, recognition or negotiations with Israel, and it confirmed the PLO’s ambitions for ‘the realisation of the Palestinian people’s rights to return and self-determination within the context of an independent Palestinian national state on any part of Palestinian land’ (Article 5) (Mahler and Mahler, 2010:159).

The PLO's violent rhetoric legitimised Palestinian direct violence and justified its use as a national duty. The delegitimisation of Israel was accompanied by a dramatic increase in direct violence. Shortly following the 1967 war, Palestinian anti-Israel activities expanded in scope and the fedayeen attacks against Israel intensified. From June 1967 to December 1978, Palestinian militant organisations carried out 6,939 operations

\(^{29}\) The position was in line with the official Arab ‘solution’ to the conflict based on the famous ‘three noes’: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1967).
against Israel (Alon, 1080:43). The Palestinian tactics of cross-border incursions gradually transformed to different modes of armed struggle against Israel, such as firing across the border with Katyusha rocket launchers, mortars, bazookas, and small arms from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Groups such the PFLP and Black September Organisation (Fatah’s military unit), resorted to more ‘sensational terrorist tactics’ including airplane hijacking or hostage taking. By the 1980s, Israel was faced with violence carried out by numerous anti-Israel Palestinian groups, ranging from the smaller ones, such as the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Fatah Revolutionary Council, better known as the Abu Nidal Group, and the larger ones, such as Fatah, Black September Organisation, the PFLP, and the DFLP (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a, Alon, 1980:47-49).

The outbreak of the first Intifada, at the end of 1987, as discussed in Chapter Two, added another dimension to Palestinian violence against Israel: the emergence of Palestinian Islamic terrorism, led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Heller, 2000:28, Zuhur, 2010:7). Similar to the goal of Fatah, the primary objective of Hamas has been the total liberation of all of historic Palestine. In contrast to Fatah, however, the group has justified its armed struggle in the name of Islam. According to Hamas, the land of historic ‘Palestine’ is holy to Islam (Article 11) and ‘abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directly against part of religion’ (Article 13). ‘Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences’ as the charter states, ‘are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Article 13). According to Hamas, ‘there is no solution for the Palestinian question but Jihad’ (Article 13); a ‘struggle against the Zionist invaders’ (Article 7) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998).

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30 Operations from Syria started on December 2, 1967, and from Lebanon on May 7, 1968.
In the early stages of Hamas’s existence, the group’s activities were restricted to violent street demonstrations and disturbances in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Israel Foreign Ministry, 1998a). Hamas used mosques as a centre for the distribution of leaflets, calling for violent struggle against ‘the Zionist entity’ in order to establish an Islamic state in all of Palestine, and as recruitment centres for terrorist attacks against Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993a). With rising prominence among the Palestinians, due to its charitable work and social welfare, Hamas gradually developed a wing for militant action focused on guerrilla and terrorist attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians (Zuhur, 2010:10, Levitt, 2006:8). At first, according to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they resorted primarily to explosive charges and other 'popular' means (firebombs, arson and other property damage). The tactics then evolved to include kidnapping and murder, stabbing and shooting. From the beginning of the first Intifada (December 9, 1987) until December 1992, 20 Israelis were killed in Hamas attacks\(^1\) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993a)

Islamic Jihad’s ambitions, similar to those of Hamas, were outlined in one of the documents produced by the movement: ‘Palestine- from the river to the sea- an Arab, Islamic land whose jurisdiction prohibits giving up any inch of its land’ (Byman, 2011:103). This, as Fathi Al-Shaqaqi, the co-founder and Secretary-General of the group, publicly expressed, can be achieved by ‘a strategy of “exceptional” martyrdom against “enemy territory,”’ based on the destruction of ‘the morale of the enemy’ and planting ‘terror into the people’ (Al-Shaqaqi, cited in Stork, 2002:15). Throughout the 1980s, the Islamic Jihad carried out a series of armed attacks on Israeli military targets, becoming particularly active in 1986–87 (Jensen, 2009:17). Like Hamas, Islamic Jihad employed unconventional tactics in the war against Israel, but its attacks have been less

\(^1\) During the period, according to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamas assassinated close to 100 Palestinian residents of the territories (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993a)
intense than those of its larger rival. According to the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, based in Oklahoma City, US, between 1968 and February 2006, 130 incidents were linked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (compared to 545 with Hamas), which caused 997 injuries and 193 deaths (Cordesman, 2006:310).

4.4 PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE IN CONTEXT

For Israel, Palestinian violence has been an omnipresent feature of its existence. Prior to the Oslo Peace Process, Israel had been faced with continuous violence from multiple anti-Israel groups. For Israel, they posed a threat to the very existence of the state of Israel. According to the Israeli narrative, the Israeli perception of the threat of Palestinian violence and its magnitude, however, needs to be understood in a wider context of the history of the Jewish people in the pre-state of Israel era. As Eitan Shamir, former head of the National Security Doctrine Department in the Israel Ministry of Strategic Affairs and an expert on insurgencies and combat doctrine, told me:

> In order to understand Israel's behaviours, and what we call the strategic culture, you have to take into account the 3,000 years of history of the Jewish people, concluding with the Holocaust. If you do not understand the Holocaust you do not understand Israel (Shamir, 2014)

Similarly, Nimrod Goren, the founder and chairman of Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, told me in an interview that the Israeli threat perception is shaped by the Jewish long history of exile, persecution and ultimately genocide during the Holocaust in Europe (Goren, 2014). According to Elkin, the Jews, from the time of the destruction of the Second Temple and the beginning of the forced exile in the Roman era, through the Middle Ages until the present, have consistently and continuously been subjects of anti-Semitism. Although some elements of this early 'history' constitute more foundational myths than established empirical facts, the events
have become accepted societal beliefs and been incorporated into the Zionist narrative of the history of the Jewish people (Goren, 2014). The Holocaust, which resulted in the destruction of one-third of the Jewish people, symbolises the ultimate culmination of the Jewish exile and persecution (Yadlin, 2014:8). The Holocaust, according to Bar-Tal, has played a crucial, if not the most important, role in understanding the Israeli perception of the threats posed to its national security (Bar-Tal, 2014). The Israelis look at the Palestinian violence through the prism of the Jewish ‘troubled’ history, and the experience and the memory of the Holocaust. Palestinian cultural violence of anti-Israel rhetoric is viewed by some Israelis as a ‘first step on the path to genocide and a return to the tragedy of the Holocaust’ (Pollock, 2013:78).

Furthermore, the Palestinian armed struggle has been perceived by the Israeli public as part and parcel of the violence of the surrounding Arab world. According to Horowitz, all Israeli thinking on national security, ‘begins from the premise that Israel is engaged in a struggle for its survival’ (Horowitz, 1993:11). Prior to Oslo, Israel has been engaged in five full-scale wars against its Arab neighbours; the 1948-49 War of Independence; the 1956 Sinai Campaign; the 1967 war; the 1973 war; and the 1982 Lebanon war. Furthermore, the Israeli security threat perception had been further aggravated by fundamental asymmetries between Israel and the Arab states (Kam, 2003:358). In the realm of conventional warfare, the geographical and demographical imbalance has remained the real threat to Israel's security. While this imbalance prevented Israel from ending the conflict by military means, it, in theory, allowed the Arabs to do so (Kam, 2003:358, Bar-Joseph, 2001:2). The threat to Israel's security went however beyond the conventional battlefield. At the high end of the unconventional warfare spectrum is the nuclear threat. Since the early 1960s, Israel had been faced with the threat of chemical and nuclear warfare, first from Iraq, and since the
1990s from Iran (Roadman, 2001:71). In addition to the ‘threat’ of direct violence, Israel had been the subject of cultural violence, in the form of extremely hostile Arab rhetoric, often directly promoting the destruction of the state (Marcus, 2014). The Israeli perception of the Palestinian threat is seen as a part of an existential danger Israel has been faced with since its creation.

The perception of the existential threat to the very existence of Israel, Goren argues, is part of Israeli mentality, often referred to as a siege or ghetto mentality (Goren, 2014). Shamir told me that the national holidays of Passover, Holocaust Remembrance Day, and Memorial Day for Israel’s fallen soldiers, observed a few days apart, serve as annual reminders of the danger the Jewish nation has faced throughout generations (Shamir, 2014). The perception of the existential threat to Jews and the state of Israel, Bar-Tal argued, has been strengthened by the belief that the Jewish people have stood alone in a hostile world. The sense of isolation and victimisation in a hostile world contributed to Israeli thinking on national security, reflected in the phrase ‘never again’, which assumes that the atrocities committed against Jewish people throughout the history cannot and will not be repeated in future (Bar-Tal, 2014). Palestinian direct violence feeds therefore into the Jewish siege mentality, characterised by the perception of the existential threat to the very existence of Israel.

4.5 THE OSLO ‘PEACE’ PROCESS: INTENSIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

The Palestinian violence during the first Intifada resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Israeli citizens. By 1992, the number of Israeli victims had reached 185\(^3\) (B’Tselem, 2000a). The magnitude of Palestinian violence and Israel’s inability to prevent it, Heller argues, drove Israel to the political decision of recognising and negotiating directly with the PLO (Heller, 2000:24). In the Letters of Mutual Recognition, exchanged by Arafat

\(^3\) Whilst 94 of the victims were civilians killed by Palestinians, 91 were soldiers killed during fighting (B’Tselem, 2002a)
and Yitzhak Rabin in September 1993, a precondition which had to be met before the DoP could be ratified, Israel recognised ‘the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people’. The letter signalled the start of ‘negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993b). On September 13, 1993, Arafat, Rabin, and Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister signed the DoP, known as the Oslo Accords. According to Danny Tirza, who took part in all the negotiations with the Palestinians from 1994 to 2007, Israel's recognition of the PLO was a considerable step for Israel. As he told me in an interview:

It was a moral dilemma. You have to understand how difficult it was for Israelis, including myself, to talk to Arafat who for years was regarded Israel's arch enemy. The first meetings were very hard for me because I chased this man all over the areas in Lebanon. Now I had to meet with him, shake his hand. I knew how bloody his hands were (Tirza, 2014).

In exchange for a complete cessation of the Palestinian violence, Israel, however, he continued, was ready to give up strategic territories for its security and the defensible borders (Tirza, 2014).

In signing the Oslo Accords, the PLO officially recognised ‘the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security’ and it assured about its ‘commitment to the Middle East peace process and a peaceful resolution to the conflict’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993b). Almost right from the onset, Goren told me, the peace negotiations were rejected by Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Goren, 2014). Immediately after the DoP was signed, Hamas rejected the agreement, accusing Arafat of betraying the Palestinian cause and a ‘sell-out of Palestine’. Hamas issued leaflet Number 102, which outlined its stance towards the agreement; struggle and Jihad against the occupation power (Kristianasen, 1999:22, Jensen, 2009:22). Islamic Jihad’s position towards the peace negotiations with Israel was comparable. In September 1991, Fathi Al-Shaqaqi stated:
Our tactical and strategic objective is to liberate Palestine, and therefore, the composition of the peace delegation is of no interest to us. The task of the 'Islamic Jihad' or any other patriotic Islamic group is to escalate the level of the uprising and popular resistance against Israel and to mobilise the masses against the peace process (Al-Shaqaqi, cited in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993c).

Shortly after the signing of the DoP, direct violence against Israel intensified. Although a large number of terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic Jihad, during the period between the Oslo Accords and September 2000, Hamas, with its two paramilitary organisations, the Palestinian Holy Fighters and the Security Section, played a major role in radical terrorist operations against Israelis (Cordesman, 2006:296). Hamas's 'strategy', according to Goren, entailed suicide bombing attacks, targeting crowded places such as buses, restaurants, and shopping malls. For him, ‘the Palestinian suicide attacks against the Israelis carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad blocked the process’ and eventually led to its collapse (Goren, 2014).

Under the terms of the Oslo Accords, the PA was obligated not only to take law enforcement responsibilities for the West Bank and Gaza Strip's areas under its control [see Chapter Five], but also to take all available measures to prevent suicide, or other attacks, against civilians by the armed groups operating from these areas (Stork, 2002:109). Goren stresses that Arafat not only failed to stop the attacks carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad but he utilised the attacks to put pressure on Israel during the negotiations, failing to commit himself to total non-violence (Goren, 2014). Whilst Joe Stork, in his report for Human Right Watch, acknowledges that the PA took some measures to stop the violence of the two groups, arresting hundreds of their members and supporters, they were not charged or brought to trial in connection with the bombings (Stork, 2002:14). According to Stork, the PA failed ‘to investigate, arrest and

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33 Approximately 26 percent of the West Bank and 60 percent of the Gaza Strip
prosecute terrorist suspects’ or to take any ‘credible steps to reprimand, discipline, or bring to justice those members of its own security services who, in violation of declared PA policy, participated in such attacks’. The report concluded that although ‘there were steps that the PA could have taken to prevent or deter such attacks’, ‘it remained unwilling to risk the political cost of acting decisively’ (Stork, 2002:110). Byman argues that at times the PA used a ‘revolving-door system’, detaining some terrorist suspects and releasing others (or even the same ones) a few days later (Byman, 2011:106). Arafat’s failure, or reluctance to counter Hamas and Islamic Jihad, created an atmosphere of impunity. According to Stork, free of serious consequences for those who planned or carried out attacks, the Islamists were pretty much free to develop military capabilities, plan and launch attacks against Israeli citizens (Stork, 2002).

Furthermore, importantly, throughout the years of the Oslo process, the PLO failed to stop the attacks of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, or to prevent military and terrorist capabilities from developing in Palestinian-controlled areas in violation of the Oslo agreements (Elkin, 2014). In addition, the PLO, Fatah, and Arafat himself financed, directed, and equipped some dozen competing security organisations, providing nearly 60,000 “security forces” with weapons. The weapons, such as mortars and Katyusha artillery rockets, Aharon Ze'evi Farkash reports, were either locally manufactured or smuggled from Iran through Egypt into Gaza via the Philadelphi Corridor, and even from Gaza into the West Bank (Farkash, 2011:38). In fact, at the very beginning of the Oslo Peace Process, Byman reports, Arafat, returning from exile in Tunis to Gaza, not only smuggled weapons, such as Kalashnikov rifles and night-vision equipment, in the car, but also people wanted by Israel, such as Mamduh Nofal, the former military
commander of the Democratic Front 34, and Jihad Amarin, who allegedly had planned the 1974 attack on a school in Ma’alot, Israel, which claimed the lives of 22 Israeli students (Byman, 2011:81).

In the first five years after the beginning of the Oslo process, more Israelis had been killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks than in the fifteen years preceding it: 279 men, women and children were killed in a total of 92 attacks. This equated to fifty percent more than the number of Israelis killed in the six years of the first Intifada (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998a). During the entire Oslo Peace Process (from the signing of the DoP until September 2000, 269 civilians and soldiers were killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000a).

For Israel, the PLO failed to deliver on its primary Oslo commitment: namely recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. As demonstrated above, as far as the Israeli narrative is concerned, Palestinian direct violence against Israel not only did not stop, but it significantly intensified. For Israel, the Palestinian commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflict can be further questioned by analysing Palestinian cultural violence during the Oslo process. Drawing on material gleaned in interviews with Itamar Marcus, the founder and director of the PMW35, and a member of the Israeli delegation to the Wye River Accord Anti-Incitement Committee, this section illustrates cultural violence of Palestinian official discourse, which, according to the Israeli narrative, delegitimises Israel and in turn, serves as a justification and legitimisation for the use of direct violence against Israel.

34 Byman reports that whilst Mamduh Nofal was hidden in the car boot, Arafat was actually sitting on Jihad Amarin (Byman, 2011:81).
35 PMW’s major focus is on the messages that the Palestinian leaders, from the PA, Fatah and Hamas, send to the population through the broad range of institutions and infrastructures they control.
During the Oslo Peace Process, the elimination of incitement to violence was recognised as an important factor in the resolution of the conflict. Article XXII of the Interim Agreement of September 28, 1995, stipulated that Israel and the PA shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principles of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997).

In 1997, in the Note for the Record, which accompanied the Hebron Protocol of January 15, 1997, the Palestinians reaffirmed their commitment regarding ‘preventing incitement and hostile propaganda’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). Again, the 1998 Wye River Memorandum signed at the summit in Wye River (Maryland, United States) in October 1998, stipulated that ‘the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998d). Despite the great emphasis on the elimination of incitement, throughout the Oslo process, Marcus explained:

The scope of incitement by the PA was incredible, way beyond just occasional incitement. Despite its public commitments, the Palestinians continued to reject Israel and its right to exist. The PA spread libels, dehumanised Jews, and glorified violence against the state of Israel (Marcus, 2014).

Discussing the issue of Palestinian incitement, Mark Heller, Principal Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, told me in an interview that right after signing the Oslo Accords, ‘Arafat became subjected to some serious criticism, not just from Hamas, but even from his own party. Instead of counterattacking, Arafat became apologetic and self-excusatory’ (Heller, 2014). While committing himself to

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36 A joint U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian committee “to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence and terror and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement” was established (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998d).
peace and delivering a peaceful message to Israelis and the international audience,

Heller continues, the message to his home audience had the opposite tone:

The first thing Arafat did was run off to the biggest mosque in Johannesburg, South Africa, and explained to his critics look, this is the behaviour, which was sanctioned by the Prophet himself. He agreed to a truce with his enemies, because he was not strong enough to fight them. But as soon as his power grew greater, he threw that truce to the wastebasket. The truce was called the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. He [Arafat] was simply trying to legitimise religiously what he has done. The signing was just a springboard for further action. Clinton can call it peace, but it is not. It was really a tactical move (Heller, 2014)

The comparison of the Oslo to the 1974 ‘phased strategy’ was actually made earlier into the process. Efraim Karsh reports that at about the same time of the signing ceremony in September 1993, Arafat sent a personal message to the Palestinian people, broadcast by Jordanian television:

Do not forget that our Palestinian National Council accepted the decision in 1974. It called for the establishment of a national authority on any part of Palestinian land that is liberated or from which the Israelis withdrew. This is the fruit of your struggle, your sacrifices, and your jihad … This is the moment of return, the moment of gaining a foothold on the first liberated Palestinian land […] (Arafat, cited in Karsh, 2003:59)

Furthermore, Arafat made his intentions quite clear during his speech at the Dheisheh refugee camp in the West Bank on October 21, 1996, only a few months after signing the Oslo II:

We know only one word: jihad, jihad, jihad. When we stopped the Intifada, we did not stop the jihad for the establishment of a Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem. And we are now entering the phase of the great jihad prior to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem...We are in a conflict with the Zionist movement and the Balfour Declaration and all imperialist activities (Arafat, cited in Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996)
For many Israelis, Arafat’s rhetoric\(^{37}\) suggested the Oslo Peace Process constitutes a continuation of the 1974 Phase Plan and a tactical step to realise its ultimate strategic goal of recovering the entire territory of historic Palestine, thus the destruction of the state of Israel (Marcus, 2014). Faisal Husseini, one of the members of the Palestinian leadership, directly confirmed the argument. In the interview for an Egyptian newspaper Al-Arabi in 2001, shortly after the collapse of Oslo Peace Process, he explained the PLO’s so-called ‘Doctrine of Stages’. Hussein called Oslo a ‘Trojan horse’, whose essence was deception. According to him, the peace process was ‘a temporary procedure or phased goal’ to ‘ambush Israelis and cheat them’. The strategic goal was a Palestinian state with borders ‘from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea’ (Al-Husseini, cited in the Middle East Media Research Institute, 2001). Arafat himself, in a 1993 radio interview, asserted that the Oslo Accord is part of the PLO’s 1974 Phased Plan:

> It [the agreement] will be a basis for an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the Palestinian National Council resolution issued in 1974 ... The PNC resolution, issued in 1974, calls for the establishment of a national authority on any part of Palestinian soil from which Israel withdraws, or which is liberated (Arafat, in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996)

The Oslo Accords, Karsh argues, complemented the phased strategy ‘by enabling the PLO to achieve in one fell swoop what it had failed to attain through many years of violence and terrorism’ (Karsh, 2003:5). And indeed, during Oslo, many Israelis feared the scenario where Palestinians, using the peace process as a strategic means of gaining the territories, would use the land as a springboard for a launching pad for military and terrorist operations deep into Israel (Ceslo, 2003:70). As early as 1994, 73 percent of Israelis believed that Arafat would not keep the commitments he made in the DoP (Yedi’ot Ahronot, cited in Plaut, 1995). Three years later, in January 1996, over 60

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\(^{37}\) See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997) for a collection of nearly 100 statements made by Palestinian officials since the September 1993 Oslo Accords, which constitute incitement to violence and hostile propaganda against Israel.
percent of Israelis agreed with the statement 'most Palestinians have not come to terms with the existence of Israel and would destroy it if they could'\(^{38}\) (Steinberg, 1997:213).

During the Oslo Peace Process, cultural violence, as demonstrated above, continued uninterrupted. For the Israelis, the delegitimisation of Israel and constant referencing of the Oslo Peace Process to the 1974 Phased Plan, seriously questioned the Palestinian commitments to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and suggested that the Oslo process is a tactical move to regain the territory of the Mandate Palestine. Furthermore, the official rhetoric comparing the Oslo Accords to the Phased Plan, and the rejection of the existence of Israel made Palestinian violence permissible, justifiable or even morally acceptable, and consequently, as demonstrated, resulted in the increase of direct violence against Israelis.

4.6 CAMP DAVID

According to Israeli narrative, the final manifestation of the Palestinian true intentions was Arafat’s rejection of the Israeli offer at the Camp David summit. On July 11, 2000, Palestinian and Israeli delegations met at Camp David to reach a final settlement on the ending the conflict. The Camp David summit was seen as a last resort to salvage the failing 'peace' process. After two weeks of intensive negotiations, Israelis and Palestinians were unable to reach a consensus on the core issues of the conflict. Tirza, who took part in all Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the 1994-2007 period, told me:

> During the last evening at the Camp David Summit, Barak said to Arafat 'I am willing to give you almost everything'. When he said almost everything, he meant 100 percent of Gaza and 94 percent of the West Bank, including large areas of Jerusalem, and even the Temple Mount. But he said to Arafat 'I need one thing from you. By signing this agreement that will be the end of the Palestinian demands. Otherwise, I cannot give you anything, because today I will give you what I can, and tomorrow you will come with new claims'. The 6

\(^{38}\) Survey performed by "Modiin Ezrachi" on behalf on the Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies at Tel-Aviv University.
percent were settlements blocks. At the time we did not talk about a swap, but later we talked about a swap. It is not a matter of kilometres, or where the border would be. The main problem is whether the other side prepares themselves and their children for peace or not. If you are preparing yourself for peace, you can compromise because your main aim is peace. If you are not ready to compromise in the negotiations, you cannot make peace. And the problem was that Arafat was not ready to compromise. And that was the reason the Camp David failed (Tirza, 2014).

In a press conference following the failure of the Camp David Summit, Ehud Barak, the Israeli Prime Minister at the time said, ‘We did everything to resolve the dispute. We touched the most sensitive nerves but, regrettably, had no results’ (Barak in Jewish Virtual Library, 2000). According to the Israeli narrative, Barak made the most generous offer yet, which Arafat turned down revealing his lack of commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The failure of the Camp David, Jonathan Rynhold, a senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) and director of the Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People, argued in an interview, illustrated that Arafat was not interested in making peace with Israel:

At the end of the day, the Israeli government was ready for a Palestinian state in the West Bank with its capital in Jerusalem. [...]. If the Palestinians really wanted peace, we would have reached an agreement. But Arafat rejected it because he does not want to sign a peace agreement that means the state of Israel will survive and thrive over the long term. [...] Whilst he was prepared to do tactical deals, he was not prepared to live with us in the long term (Rynhold, 2014).

For the Israelis, the Camp David summit was the final manifestation of the Palestinian unwillingness to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. For the Israelis, the Oslo Peace Process, not only did not bring the values of positive peace, and the elimination of structural and cultural violence, but it did not address the core requirements for the achievement of negative peace: the elimination of direct violence. Israel entered the Oslo Peace Process with the belief that Palestinian violence will be completely eliminated. Not only did violence against Israel not cease, but it significantly
intensified. Since the beginning of the Oslo process, more Israelis had been killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks than in the fifteen years preceding it, including the six years of the first Intifada (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998a). Arafat not only failed to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in the areas under the PA control, providing a safe haven to terrorist organisations such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, but he himself also smuggled in and produced locally vast amounts of illegal arms and ammunition (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a). For Israel, therefore, Palestinian violence constitutes the reason behind the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and signifies a crucial part in the understanding of the Israeli decision to build the fence.

4.7 THE FAILURE OF PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP

According to the Israeli narrative, as discussed above, Palestinian violence constituted the main reason for the failure of the Oslo Peace Process. The account of Palestinian violence during the period, however, would be incomplete without an analysis of violence within Palestinian leadership, which, according to the Israeli narrative, contributed to the failure of the peace process.

The Oslo Accords led to the establishment of the PA [see Chapter Five]. The PA was to govern in the territories for an interim period of no more than five years until a permanent status agreement was concluded and a Palestinian state established (NAD-PLO, 2013). However, the Palestinians, given a chance to create a strong leadership for an emerging Palestinian state, failed to provide effective governance and the rule of law, and the PLO and Arafat himself used violence against his citizens.

Shortly after the establishment of the PA, Arafat came under criticism for its autocratic practices. In 1996, Arafat was elected as President of the PA in a landslide victory. In
addition to the executive branch of government, headed by the President, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was elected in the same year, with Fatah acquiring the overwhelming majority of the seats (Le More, 2008:64). Hussein Sirriyeh reports the internal criticisms around the election regarding running Fatah candidates as independents in order to gain a Fatah majority (Sirriyeh, 2000:50). Following their boycott of the 1996 election, the organisations that opposed the Oslo Accords, such as the PFLP, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, were kept out of the formal political process (Turner, 2011:5). This, in effect, helped to facilitate the dominance of one party rule and the political hegemony of Fatah, under the leadership of Arafat (Le More, 2008:64, Turner, 2011:5, Khalidi, 2006:152).

Another factor contributing to the failure of the Palestinian leadership is attributed to the character of Yasser Arafat himself and the autocratic tendencies in his style of decision-making. Serving as head of the PLO, the leader of Fatah and the elected president of the PA, Arafat exercised a virtual monopoly over the PA (Jamal, 2001:13, Sayigh, 2007:15, Sayigh, 2006:79). In essence, as As'ad Ghanem argues,

 [...] Arafat was able to make decisions and run the affairs of the PLO alone, to the point that he was accused of lacking respect for the opinions of the Palestinian public, the PLO, and even his closest colleagues, and of failing to include them, if only for appearances’ sake, in decision making (Ghanem, 2010:77).

His position enabled him to marginalise the ‘young guard’, locally popular Fatah leaders and appoint his people, the ‘old guard’ (the PLO in exile, and now returnees) to central positions and to intervene at all levels of decision-making. The Palestinian political scene of the 1990s was dominated by intra-group rivalries and internal competition for power. As Amal Jamal argues, internal disunity was not a new phenomenon, and it had dominated the Palestinian political scene since the beginning of the Palestinian movement (Jamal, in Turner, 2011:7). The balance of power quickly
tilted towards the old guard, with their appointment to high-ranking positions within the PA. The dominance of the ‘old guard’ in Arafat’s government, at the expense of younger Fatah activists, contributed to the widening disconnect between the PA and the local residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Jamal, 2001:13-14, Turner, 2011:7).

Arafat ‘managed’ the opposition by means of intimidation. Arafat’s security services silenced the opposition, closed opposition newspapers and imposed political censorship on Palestinian mass media (Klein, 1997:389, Sirriyeh, 2000:51, Ghanem, 2010:75). The activities of civil society institutions were monitored by PA intelligence organisations, with the institutions’ active members being often harassed or even arrested (Sirriyeh, 2000:52). Furthermore, Sirriyeh records the PA’s violations of Palestinians’ human rights, such as detention without trial, the holding of suspects without specific charges, the lack of proper trials, torture, ill-treatment and the implementation of the death sentence (Sirriyeh, 2000:51). Having signed Oslo Agreements, the PA committed itself to curb violent opposition to the Oslo process and acts of violence against Israeli targets. The PA, however, according to the Palestinian Human Rights Organisation, violated Palestinian human rights, arresting journalists due to their work, imposing press censorship, repressing union activity, suppressing dissent, and placing restrictions on assembly (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 1999).

Furthermore, Arafat's style of governance was characterised by clientelism and the neo-patrimonial distribution of resources according to familial affiliation or/and as a reward for loyalty or as a means of co-opting the opposition (Le More, 2005:985, Jamal, 2001:14). Without paying attention to professional qualities, Arafat appointed close relatives and affiliated friends to important positions (Le More, 2005:985, Jamal, 2001:14). Despite the broad social and geographical distribution of the cabinet members, Jamal argues, one cannot speak about real plural representation:
All of the appointed ministers were personally loyal to Arafat and indebted to the Arafat for entrusting them with a portfolio, reimbursed by personal loyalty and allegiance\(^39\) (Jamal, 2001:15).

Also, Arafat employed a variety of ways to persuade Palestinians to support the authority. Direct financial support from public revenues, jobs and the opaque allocation of business contracts were the most important ways of achieving this objective. The PA was therefore increasingly perceived as corrupt (Ghanem, 2010:75, 86, Le More, 2005:985). Moreover, whilst the Israeli policy of closure, as the next chapter will illustrate, constituted a major factor in economic decline during the Oslo period, Roy argues that the PA also played a damaging role. It adopted a system of economic management that was protectionist and corrupt, lacking accountability, transparency and recourse. Not only did the PA hold a despotic control over the market, trade revenues, foreign investment, and credit sources, among others, but, as Roy reports, Arafat and his close associates used some of the profits from the economic activities for their personal gain (Roy, 2001:12).

Marcus links the failure of the PA’s governance to an increase in Arafat’s violent anti-Israel rhetoric. He argues that cultural violence, demonising Israelis and delegitimising Israel, was used both to incite Palestinians to use direct violence, but also, towards the end of the Oslo process, it was employed as a strategic weapon to divert the Palestinian public attention away from the PA’s poor governance (Marcus, 2014). As he argued in the interview:

> A few months before the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Palestinian polls showed the worst ratings for the PA. So what does the PA do? It shifts a high gear into anti-Israel demonization and religious hatred. Of course, this had been happening along the way, but in the summer of 2000, it was particularly intense. Two weeks before the Intifada started, we [the PMW] published a report about the situation. The opening sentence was ‘the atmosphere in the Palestinian media is on the eve of the outbreak of war’. And we had 10-page, documenting, qualitatively and quantitatively, how hatred was much worse [...]. This was

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\(^{39}\) See Jamal (2001) for an account of neopatrimonialization of politics in the governing bodies of the PA.
happening with great intensity, so when the *Intifada* started, we were not surprised because we saw what Arafat was doing. Once it was announced Sharon would be walking on the Temple Mount, Arafat used the moment. Certainly, he did not anticipate four years. But he was in big trouble politically; he didn’t have the respect from the people anymore. He needed an outside conflict and decided to use it as a spark (Marcus, 2014).

Consequently, with the failure of the Camp David and the outbreak of the second *Intifada*, [discussed below] the Palestinians had been proclaimed as 'no partners for peace'. This is a narrative, according to Bar-Tal, that has remained unchallenged within Israeli society since then (Bar-Tal, 2014).

### 4.8 INTIFADA: THE CONTINUATION OF VIOLENCE

Sharon's visit to Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, on September 28, 2000, as discussed in Chapter Two, led to the outbreak of the second *Intifada*. The visit, Jonathan Rynhold explained in an interview, was a manifestation of Sharon’s opposition to Barak’s potential deal with the Palestinians (Rynhold, 2014). For Israel, the outbreak of the second *Intifada* brought about terrorism on a large scale, resulting in a sharp rise in the number of attacks and casualties. In the period of September 2000 to the end of 2001, the number of Israelis who died as a result of Palestinian terrorism reached 251 (and 1811 wounded) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001). The majority of these deaths and injuries were caused by suicide bombing attacks carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in places such as Israeli cafes, bus stops, and buses⁴⁰ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001b). Khaled Mashal, the chairman of Hamas, called for ‘every Palestinian to turn into a time bomb - to fight them with every means at your disposal’, stating that Israel has ‘no place here, on the holy land of Palestine’ and it ‘will never have security in this place, not even on a single centimetre of this land’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001b).

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⁴⁰ See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) for a detailed list of all terrorist attacks during the second *Intifada*. 

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Violence against Israelis continued through 2001, and 2002 turned out to be the bloodiest year yet, resulting in the death of 452 Israelis and 2,284 wounded (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for most of the attacks, the PFLP and Fatah\(^41\) claimed responsibility for some (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Israel’s breaking point was reached with Hamas's suicide attack on the Park Hotel on March 27, 2002. The attack resulted in the death of 30 Israeli civilians with 140 wounded (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002c). The attack, however, was not an isolated event. During so-called 'Bloody March', more than 130 Israelis were killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a).

On March 29, Israel responded with a military operation, Operation Defensive Shield, and re-occupied most of Area A of the West Bank\(^42\) (Stork, 2002:33, Byman, 2011:142). The purpose of the operation was to destroy the ‘infrastructure of Palestinian terrorism in all its parts and components’, to apprehend as many terrorists as possible, and to gather the ‘intelligence necessary to prevent future attacks’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a). As most of the terrorists were concealed in the heart of the civilian population, such as Jenin’s refugee camp, the IDF was forced to operate in densely populated areas. By the end of the operation, April 21, 2002, the IDF had captured many wanted terrorists, seized thousands of guns, rifles, explosives and explosive belts, ready for use by suicide bombers. During the operation, 29 IDF soldiers were killed, and 127 were wounded (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a).

The operation was the largest order of battle since the 1982 war. Israel succeeded in capturing many Palestinian terrorists and seizing a large amount of weapons. The

\(^41\) See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) for a list of attacks carried out by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and Fatah

\(^42\) The area given to the PA to administer under the Oslo Accords, which included the major Palestinian population centres, apart from East Jerusalem and about 18 percent of the total area.
operation, however, turned out to be quite ineffective in the fight against Palestinian terrorism (Frisch, 2007:12). According to the Israeli government, ‘the terrorist infrastructure was so entrenched in the PA areas that no single operation could destroy it’, and soon the acts of Palestinian terrorism resumed (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a). In May and June 2002, another wave of attacks hit Israel, killing 67 civilians and 20 soldiers, numbers comparable to the period before the operation (Byman, 2011:152). In late June all the major towns in the West Bank were reoccupied. Within three months of re-occupation, 38 Israeli civilians and 4 soldiers had been killed in terrorist attacks (Frisch, 2007:13). In 2002, 5,301 terrorist attacks were perpetrated against Israeli targets, in which 451 Israeli soldiers and civilians were murdered (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b). In this environment of the protracted violence, the Israeli government decided to build a security fence.

4.9 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to assess the Israeli rationale for the construction of the security fence. The chapter has argued that according to Israeli narrative, Palestinian protracted violence constitutes the sole reason for the construction of the fence. The chapter has therefore placed the building of the fence into the wider context of Palestinian violence. The chapter has argued that, according to Israeli narrative, the fence is a natural and obvious response to the Palestinian protracted violence against Israel since, and even before its establishment. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Jewish community in the area had been subjected to Palestinian violence. Israel, as Chaim Herzog, Israel's sixth President, described was 'born in battle' and would be 'obliged to live by the sword' (Zuhur, 2010:1). As the chapter has demonstrated, since its establishment Israel has ‘lived by its sword’ and Palestinian violence has constituted a perpetual concern for Israel’s national security. The tactics of Palestinian armed
struggle against Israel have evolved over the years, and the initial cross-border incursions, guerrilla warfare, hostage taking and hijacking, were later replaced by suicide attacks and indiscriminate mass assaults against Israeli targets. Regardless of the methods, according to the Israeli narrative, the Palestinian intentions were clear: the destruction of the state of Israel. The Palestinian violence was therefore perceived as constituting an existential threat to the state of Israel.

The perception of this existential threat has been further shaped by Palestinian cultural violence. The stated goal of most of the Palestinian groups had been the destruction of Israel. This, the PLO emphasised, constituted a phased process. The Palestinians should strive for whatever territory they can at the time until the total liberation of Mandatory Palestine. To achieve the goal, the organisation justified and legitimised the use of an armed struggle as a national duty. The goal of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad was the same. The violence against Israel, however, was justified as a religious obligation. The Israeli perception of the Palestinian threat, however, the chapter has further argued, has been influenced by the 'troubled' history of the Jewish people prior to the creation of Israel: the history characterised by exile and persecution culminating in the atrocities committed against the Jews in the Holocaust. Furthermore, the Israeli perception of the Palestinian threat to its security had been perceived as part of the anti-Israel violence of the surrounding Arab world, and aggravated by fundamental geographical and demographical asymmetries between the two. The years of a hostile environment and the rejection of the Arab world to accept the existence of the Jewish state strengthened the Israeli siege mentality characterised by the feelings of isolation and victimisation and the existential danger. Palestinian violence, therefore, has been seen as part of the existential threat the Jewish people have faced throughout the generations – as far as the Israeli narrative is concerned.
For Israel, the signing of the Oslo Peace Process brought the expectation that Palestinian violence would totally cease. The Palestinians officially recognised the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, and they committed themselves to a complete cessation of violence. The situation, as the chapter has discussed, was however precisely the opposite. For Israel, the alleged ‘age of peace’ turned out to be an ‘age of terror’.

Shortly after the signing, Palestinian violence intensified and the number of Israeli deaths quickly outnumbered the deaths of Israelis killed in the fifteen years prior to the process. Although the majority of these attacks were carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the chapter has argued that according to the Israeli narrative, Arafat contributed to the rise in violence not only by failing to counter Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad and to prevent the groups from strengthening militarily, but also by developing analogous military capabilities himself.

Although the PLO recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist in 'peace and security', the official rhetoric to his home audience carried out the opposite message. Throughout the Oslo process, Arafat continued to delegitimise Israel and compare the Oslo to the Phased Plan, a tactical move to gain a foothold in the territory necessary to launch a struggle against Israel, until the total liberation of the Mandatory Palestine. Palestinian cultural violence, therefore, legitimised the use of direct violence, making it permissible and morally acceptable. In other words, cultural violence has not only fuelled the violent acts of direct violence but has also led to their legitimisation and naturalisation.

For the Israelis, the continuous cultural violence threw into question Palestinian intentions. The final manifestation of the Palestinian lack of commitment to resolving the conflict, however, was the rejection of Barak’s offer at Camp David. For Israel, this demonstrated that the Palestinians were not interested in establishing a state that could
live peacefully side by side with Israel. The analysis of violence during the Oslo period, according to the Israeli narrative, would have been incomplete however without discussion of the violent rhetoric of the Palestinian leadership, and its failure to provide effective government and the rule of law. The PA’s incompetence, authoritarianism, clientelism, corruption and neo-patrimonial style of governance, along with the violence of its repressive practices, all contributed to the failure of the Oslo Peace Process. With the outbreak of the second Intifada, mass violence against Israel, the Palestinians proved to be no partners for peace. In the context of the persistence and intensification of Palestinian violence, in both a cultural and direct form, Israel made a decision to construct the security fence.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL: PALESTINIAN NARRATIVE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter puts forward Palestinian narrative in response to the research question: what led to the construction of the barrier? The chapter argues that, similar to the Israeli argument, for the Palestinians, to understand the Israeli decision, as well as the route and mechanism of the barrier, the analysis needs to be placed within the wider context of the long history of Israeli violence against the Palestinians, and as such it needs to be traced back to the commencement of the aforementioned violence. The chapter argues that, according to Palestinian narrative, the wall is part of Israel’s strategy of displacement of Palestinians carried out by means of expulsion (direct violence), and the structural violence of fragmentation, segmentation, together with exploitation carried out by Israeli ‘matrix of control’, with practices such as land and resources confiscation and the policy of closure. The chapter starts with an analysis of the direct violence of expulsion. Then it turns to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The chapter examines the main aspects and mechanisms of structural violence. It reveals how Israeli practices of the ‘matrix of control’ have contributed to the fragmentation, segmentation, and exploitation of the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian nation. The scope of this chapter hardly enables me to give a detailed account of all aspects of the Israeli occupation. The goal, however, is to show the general pattern of the Israeli

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43 This chapter presents the Palestinian narrative; therefore, as explained in Chapter One, it refers to the barrier as wall.
practices in the West Bank, and the impact they have on the Palestinian population in the area.

The second part of the chapter concentrates on the period of the Oslo Peace Process. Such analysis, according to the Palestinian narrative, is crucial to understand the outbreak of the second Intifada, and consequently the construction of the wall. The chapter addresses the Israeli claim that Palestinian violence was the main reason for the failure of Oslo, by arguing that according to the Palestinian narrative, during the Oslo period not only did Israeli structural violence not cease, but the violence significantly intensified. The chapter illustrates intensification and formalisation of different elements of structural violence, built into the structure of the Israeli control over the Palestinian territory and its citizens. Drawing on the conceptual framework of violence and negative and positive peace, the chapter argues that, according to the Palestinian narrative, the continuation and the intensification of Israeli structural violence during the Oslo period led to the outbreak of Palestinian direct violence, in the form of the second Intifada. The chapter demonstrates how ignoring or minimising the importance of one type of violence, in this case, structural violence may help to explain an outbreak of another type of violence. The empirical analysis of the Israeli structural and direct violence further shows the correlation between the two types of violence and helps to understand the protraction of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

5.2 THE BEGINNING OF THE CYCLE: DIRECT VIOLENCE

According to the Palestinian narrative, the construction of the wall has to be understood and put in the context of the Israeli strategy of displacement of Palestinians carried through the Jewish/Israeli practices of expulsion, fragmentation, exploitation and marginalisation, manifested in its direct and structural forms. From the very early stages
of the conflict, Kapitan argues, the expulsion of the Palestinians, ‘the forced transfer’, had been discussed by the Zionist leaders as an inevitable act to establish a Jewish state in a Mandate Palestine (Kapitan, 2004:177). The process of transfer, Pappé explains, came in two main phases. The first began in early December 1947 with a series of Jewish attacks on Palestinian villages and neighbourhoods44 (Pappé, 2006:36,40). The attacks were followed by forced expulsions of Palestinians in February 1948, when 5 Palestinian villages were 'emptied' in one day. The 'strategy of transfer' was clearly outlined in the so-called 'Plan D' or 'Plan Dalet', launched by Major General Yigael Yadin on March 10, 194845 (Kimmerling, 157-159, Shlaim, 2014:32, Pappé 2007:36). The plan, according to Pappé, ordered the systematic expulsion of the Palestinians from vast areas of the country regarded as integral to the future Jewish state, with the expulsion methods including:

large-scale intimidation; laying siege to and bombarding villages and population centres; setting fire to homes, properties and goods; expulsion; demolition; and, finally, planting mines among the rubble to prevent any of the expelled inhabitants from returning (Pappé, 2006:xii)

The first phase of Plan D concentrated on the urban centres of Palestine. About 250,000 Palestinians were uprooted from their homes. The expulsions were accompanied by several massacres, most notable of which was the Deir Yassin massacre on April 9, 1948, committed by Jewish factions of the Irgun and the Stern Gang, in which 93 Arabs were killed. The ethnic cleansing continued after the establishment of the state of Israel on May 15, 1948, and the Arab states’ attack on the new state. By the time the war ended, '531 villages had been destroyed, and eleven urban neighbourhoods emptied of their inhabitants' (Pappé, 2006:xiii). For the Palestinians, the events of 1948 came to be

44 See Pappé (2006) for a broader context of the attacks and detailed account of the attacks, pp. 55-60
45 Plan D was a revised version of three earlier plans, A, B and C. They all aimed to prepare the military forces of the Jewish community in Palestine for the offensive campaigns they would be engaged in against rural and urban Palestine the moment the British were gone (Pappé , 2006:80). See Pappé (2006) for detailed analysis of the plan A, B and C, p.28
known as al-Nakba – the Palestinian national catastrophe. The worst outcome of the war was the problem of the Palestinian refugees: close to 800,000 people, had been displaced (Pappé, 2006:xiii).

The second phrase of 'transfer' came in 1967. Israeli army captured the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip expelling Palestinians from areas in the Jordan Valley (excluding Jericho) and the Latrun enclave46 (Gordon, 2008b:5-6). It is estimated that 200,000 Palestinians, most of them refugees from the 1948 war, fled or were expelled as a result of the Israeli actions (NAD PLO, 2015a). The violence, however, did not stop with the capture of the Palestinian territories. According to the Palestinian narrative, although the direct manifestation of the physical expulsion, or 'transfer', was minimised, the Israeli strategy of displacement of Palestinians has continued through the mechanisms of structural violence: fragmentation, marginalisation, exploitation.

5.3 STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: THE MATRIX OF CONTROL

Following the 1967 war, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with an estimated one million Palestinians in the territory, now came under direct Israeli military control (Gordon, 2008b:6). Immediately after the war, Israel began constructing a comprehensive matrix of control in the territories. The ‘matrix of control’, as put forward by Jeff Helper, refers to a system allowing Israel to maintain full control over every aspect of Palestinian lives. The system operates on three interlocking levels of military controls and military strikes, creating facts on the ground, and a bureaucracy of administrative measures. The policies and practices of the matrix have enabled Israel to maintain hegemony, and total control over the Palestinian territory and the Palestinian

46 See Gordon (2008) for Israel’s rationales behind the operations in those two areas, pp. 5-6
population (Halper, 2004:109, Halper, 2006b:63, Halper, 2005:10-15). This section demonstrates how different components of Israeli control over the Palestinian territories and its population, such as land annexation for the purpose of the settlement building, followed up by the destruction of social and industrial infrastructure, accompanied by restriction of Palestinian movement and exploitation of Palestinian water resources, contributed to a further fragmentation and exploitation of Palestinian territories, and to the fragmentation, segmentation and marginalisation of the Palestinian nation, the most fundamental elements of structural violence. If analysed separately, the elements certainly show different violations of the Palestinian rights under Israeli occupation, but when analysed together as a system, as the following section illustrates, they constitute a violent structure deeply ingrained in the Israel-Palestine relationship. The analysis of the system, according to the Palestinian narrative, is crucial to understand the underlying reason for the wall construction.

5.3.1 SETTLEMENTS

The Israeli policy of building settlements in the occupied territories is argued, according to the Palestinian narrative, to have had one of the most devastating effects on the territorial cohesion of Palestinian land. The construction of the settlements in the West Bank began immediately after the capture of the Palestinian territories. Only three weeks after the war, Israel decided to annex East Jerusalem to the western Israeli municipality of Jerusalem (Gazit, 2003:247, 333). The following year, a new urban master plan was drawn, outlining the guiding principles of development and 'unification' of the city, thus preventing the possibility of its re-division. The plan outlined the

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47 Eyal Weizman examines this process offering an alternative analysis. He argues that building the fence and the settlements in the occupied territories, with their associated infrastructure of buffer zones or roads, aims to tighten the urban matrix of Israeli control over the totality of space, infrastructure and the environment, thus undermining the possibility of an establishment of a viable or contiguous Palestinian state. Israeli architecture, he concludes, constitutes a powerful military and geopolitical tool with which to achieve this goal (Weizman, 2004).
annexation of areas sparsely populated, avoiding, as far as it was possible, areas densely populated with Palestinians (Weizman, 2007:25). As for the rest of the occupied territories, the initial policy was to keep the land as a 'bargaining chip' for future negotiations with the Arab states, yet as early as September 1967, Israel built its first settlement in the West Bank, Kfar Etzion (Gazit, 2003:247). When discussing the Israeli settlements, Adam Keller, a co-founder and spokesperson for Gush-Shalom, the Israeli Peace Bloc, told me:

> Since 1967, there has been a dominant ideology in Israeli politics, which has stipulated that Israel should create as many accomplished facts on the ground as possible and as fast as possible, making de facto annexation of as much territory as it can. There are, of course, all kinds of subdivisions of people and groups adopting this view. Some people want to settle only in particular parts of the West Bank, other wants to settle everywhere in the area. There are also different rationales presented behind the construction. They vary from security, nationalistic or religious reasons (Keller, 2014)

Although the ideology of settling the area, as Zach Levey, Associate Professor at the University of Haifa, further explained, 'comes in different shades, it is basically the same phenomenon: it is the deterrent view that Israel can and should rule over as much of its biblical, historical patrimony as possible' (Levey, 2014).

The second dominant policy with regards to settlements, parallel to the first one in terms of the importance, has been the emphasis of exclusion of the indigenous population on the annexed land (Keller, 2014). Simply speaking, Keller argues, the principle was to annex as much land as possible with as small a number of Palestinians as possible (Keller, 2014). The strategy was first outlined in the 1967 strategic plan created by Yigal Alon, the Labour Minister and head of the Ministerial Committee on Settlements at the time. Later, the 1968 urban master plan advocated the avoidance of the annexation of densely populated areas. The plan called for Israel's territorial expansion and annexation of half of the West Bank, with the Palestinian population confined to the
other half in two unconnected cantons to the north and south, which would become part of a Jordanian-Palestinian state (B’Tselem, 2002:12). According to Halper, the reluctance of the Israeli government to annex the whole occupied territory was only based on a fear of incorporating one million Palestinians into Israel (at that time it had less than 2.5 million Jews) and the possible consequences of such an action (Halper, 2008:143).

Although it is often misguidedly believed that the Israeli policy of building settlements is the Likud, right-wing, government’s domain, by the time Likud came to power, the Labour-led government had established 31 Israeli settlements in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) inhabited by some 4,400 Israelis (Appendix II). It is true, however, that the 1977 Likud party’s electoral victory, headed by Menachem Begin, signalled a sharp increase in settlement activities (B’Tselem, 2002). The ‘territorial compromise’ of the Alon Plan was abandoned, and the goal of the new government’s settlement policy was to change, as quickly as possible, the demographic reality in the West Bank (Gazit, 2003:278, Le More, 2005:988, Le More, 2008:41, B’Tselem, 2002:12). In 1977, Matitiyahu Drobless, head of the World Zionist Organization’s Settlement Division, proposed a comprehensive plan for the construction of settlements throughout the West Bank, which became a guiding document for the government (B’Tselem, 2002:14). As the Drobless Plan stated:

There is not a shadow of doubt regarding our intention to remain in Judea and Samaria. [...] A dense chain of settlements on the mountain ridge running southward from Nablus to Hebron will [...] minimize the danger of the establishment of another Arab state in the region (Halper, 2008:150)

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48 Most of these settlements were built in areas allocated for annexation to Israel, according to the Alon Plan (B’Tselem, 2002:12).
In 1977, Ariel Sharon was appointed Minister of Agriculture (1977-1981) and the head of the Ministerial Committee on Settlements under Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Sharon's strategy was a rapid expansion of the settlements, making Israel's presence in the Palestinian territory irreversible (Halper, 2005:11). While organisations, such as Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), a right-wing national religious movement formed in 1974 under the spiritual leadership of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook (Tenenbaum and Eiran, 2005:171), appealed to settlers with religious or nationalist motivations, Sharon was able to attract the general public with economic incentives. By the time the first Intifada erupted in December 1987, about 40 percent of the Palestinian land in the West Bank and Gaza had been appropriated (Gordon, 2008a:28). In the West Bank alone (excluding East Jerusalem), Israel constructed 110 settlements and transferred about 60,000 citizens to the area (Appendix II). Settlement activities continued at a full pace under the newly elected Likud government (1988-1992), and by 1993, the number of West Bank settlers increased to 110,000, and to over 146,000 in East Jerusalem (Appendix III) (Tenenbaum and Eiran, 2005:173).

5.3.2 HOUSE DEMOLITION

As the Map 6 illustrates, by 1993 Israeli settlements punctuated the West Bank, further fragmenting the Palestinian territories. According to the Palestinian narrative, the territorial fragmentation of the Palestinian territories, caused by the expansion of the settlements, however, has been accompanied by fragmentation and segmentation of the Palestinian people and marginalisation of their needs. The continuous expansion of the Israeli settlements has produced much media coverage. With the perpetual bombardment of media headlines, the term ‘Israeli settlement’ is so often used that the essence of what it involves is often overlooked. Settlement building can only be carried
out by confiscating Palestinian land. As B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, reports:

Tens of thousands of hectares of land have been seized from Palestinians for the Israeli settlements. A significant portion of these lands has been declared state land\(^{49}\); other areas have been usurped from Palestinians by force by actual construction that would make the settlement seem a fait accompli [...]. All lands allocated to settlements – built-up areas and environs – have been designated closed military zones which Palestinians may not enter without a permit (B'Tselem, 2014:2).

Land confiscation is proceeded by forced evictions and house demolitions. As Ruth Edmonds, a member of the Israeli Coalition against Home Demolitions (ICAHD), explained to me:

Ethnic cleansing is not in fashion anymore; there are too many cameras around. It has been replaced instead by the bureaucratic laws. Demolitions of Palestinian houses without a permit are one of them (Edmonds, 2014)

Since the beginning of the occupation, any Palestinian-owned structure lacking building permits has been demolished by the Israeli authorities (UNDP, 2010:59). As a result, ICAHD reports, since 1967, Israel has demolished over 25,000 Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (ICAHD, 2012). House demolition, according to the Palestinian narrative, constitutes the ongoing displacement of Palestinians for the purpose of accommodating the Israeli settlers.

5.3.3 WATER RESOURCES

The confiscation of Palestinian land and demolitions of Palestinian houses has been accompanied by the diversion of water resources into Israeli settlements (Juma, 2014).

As Jamal Juma, the head of the Palestinian human rights organisation 'Stop the Wall', told me in an interview:

\(^{49}\) Military Order 58 issued in 1967, known as the Absentee Property Law, was the primary military order used to legitimize the confiscation of Palestinian land by transferring lands and properties of absentee Palestinians to the Civil Administration. In addition to this, in 1969, the Civil Administration issued Military Order 321, which gave the military the power to confiscate land for public services (Isaac and Powell, 2007:152)
Since the beginning of the occupation, Israel has had full control over our water resources: stealing our water and not allowing us to develop our water system. Whilst the Israeli settlers have plenty of water, we are locked into ghettos and deprived of water (Juma, 2014)

Shortly after the beginning of the occupation, Israel assumed near complete control over all water resources in the Palestinian territories (NAD PLO, 2015b). It issued a series of military orders that transferred full authority over all water resources in the occupied territories to the Israeli army (Military Order 92 of 1967). Under the military regime, Palestinians could no longer drill new wells or even repair existing ones, or carry out other any water-related projects without first obtaining a permit from the Israeli army (Military Order 158 of 1967) (Amnesty International, 2009:12). In 1982, the Israeli military regime over water resources ended, and control was transferred to Mekorot, the Israeli national water company. Since then, the process of developing water systems in the occupied territories became even more complex. According to the B’Tselem:

The numerous bureaucratic difficulties imposed by Israel were intended to discourage Palestinian residents from drilling a new well or even restarting or repairing existing wells. To obtain a permit, an applicant must pass eighteen stages of approval in various departments of the Civil Administration, Mekorot, the Water Planning Authority, and the Ministry of Agriculture (B’Tselem, 1998:4)

Since 1967, permits for new wells, or for the repair of existing ones, have been regularly denied. As Alice Gray and Jane Hilal report, between 1967 and 1990, only 23 permits were issued for digging new wells and 20 of these were for domestic use only (Gray and Hilal, 2007:100). The Palestinian agricultural sector was particularly affected. Between 1967 and 1995, no permits were granted for agricultural wells. Israel installed metres on all existing wells, imposing quotas, ‘with excess abstraction punishable with heavy fines’ (Selby, 2003:81). Between 1967 and 1999, Thomas Homer-Dixon reports, quotas on water remained virtually static (Homer-Dixon, 1999:75). Israeli construction policy was designed primarily to ensure that new Israeli
settlers would receive enough water supplies to encourage them to live in the occupied territories (Selby, 2003:83). Whereas Mekorot has been expanding its network to connect settlements not linked to a water system, it has not made any effort to improve or repair the Palestinian water systems (UNCESR, 2003:13). On many occasions, the wells drilled by the company have only supplied water to Israeli settlers and not to the Palestinian populations, which live near the wells or along Mekorot’s water lines (UNCESR, 2003:13). Moreover, due to deep water drillings by Mekorot to facilitate the industrialised settlements, many Palestinian wells have naturally dried up (Heyden, 2006:7).

The discriminatory division of water resources, according to the Palestinian narrative, is clearly visible in the unequal distribution of water between the two groups. There are two main ‘shared’ water sources in the West Bank. The first is the Mountain Aquifer (composed of three aquifer drainage basins: the Northern, Western and Eastern aquifers), which lie under both Israel and West Bank (Amnesty International, 2009a:8). The second is the basin of the Jordan River, which includes the Upper Jordan River and the streams flowing into it, the Sea of Galilee, the Yarmuk River, and the Lower Jordan River (B’Tselem, 2001:4). Israel uses 80 percent of the Mountain Aquifer’s water and about 30 percent of the Jordan River water. While the remaining 20 percent of the Mountain Aquifer is allocated for Palestinian use, the Palestinians do not have access to the Jordan River basin at all (Amnesty International, 2009a:9). The sense of injustice is further deepened by the fact that whilst Israel exploits the Jordan River and Mountain Aquifer (the only remaining source of water in the West Bank), it still has two other main water resources: Lake Kinneret/Tiberias/Sea of Galilee and the Coastal Aquifer (Amnesty International, 2009a:9).

As a result of this unequal division and the restrictions imposed on the development of water resources in the West Bank, Palestinians suffer a permanent water shortage.
The water shortage in the territories has been further deepened by Israel's relatively minimal investment in the Palestinian water infrastructure (B’Tselem, 2000b:43). According to B’Tselem, in the period from 1967 and 1993, Israel's expenditures in the occupied territories (not including expenditures for security and the settlements) were significantly less than the revenues Israel collected in taxes from Palestinians in the area. This significantly delayed the development of water infrastructure and contributed to the underdevelopment of the Palestinian economy (B’Tselem, 2001:10).

5.4 THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS: PROTRACTION AND INTENSIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

By the early 1990s, the Palestinian territories had been severely punctuated by the Israeli settlements and the Palestinian people segmented into a number of enclaves, deprived of their basic human needs, such as well-being, survival, and freedom. The Oslo Peace Process, therefore, brought a hope of an end to Israeli violence. On September 13, 1993, at the signing ceremony of the DoP, Arafat expressed Palestinian hopes that the event would introduce an ‘age of peace, coexistence and equal rights’, ending ‘the chapter of pain and suffering’ (cited in Pressman, 2003:120). Two years later, signing the Oslo II Agreement, Arafat again emphasised the importance of the Oslo Peace Process:

We urge you all to recognise the importance of this historic interim step that demonstrates [that]...the Israeli and Palestinian peoples would coexist on the basis of mutual recognition of the rights while enjoying equality and self-determination without occupation or repeated wars and without terrorism (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995)

In an interview, Nimrod Goren, the founder and chairman of Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, argued that the major structural problem of the Oslo process was the power asymmetries between the two parties, which guided the
negotiations throughout the entire period of negotiations, and the failure to address the imbalance (Goren, 2014). The asymmetrical nature of the two parties, however, was evident from the very beginning of the Oslo process. In the Letters of Mutual Recognition, exchanged by Arafat and Rabin in September 1993, a precondition which had to be met before the DOP could be ratified, the PLO recognized, ‘the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security’; assured about its ‘commitment to the Middle East peace process and a peaceful resolution to the conflict’; and ensured that ‘the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval, the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993). In response to Arafat’s letter, Yitzhak Rabin wrote:

The Government of Israel has decided to recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993)

The letters, as the Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO (NAD PLO) states, provide 'an important illustration of the inequity and asymmetrical nature of the accords; an asymmetry which has defined the peace process ever since' (NAD PLO, 2013). Israel neither recognised the Palestinians as a nation with legitimate claims to the land nor did it mention their national right of self-determination (Halper, 2008:175-176). The power asymmetries guided the process from this point. Israel was in a position to dictate the conditions of the peace process, the nature of the accords, withdrawals from the Palestinian territories, or what should be discussed at what stage (Bishara, 2002:65). The power imbalance was further reinforced by the United States, the mediator of the process. It was evident from the start, Goren argues, that the US was clearly tilted towards Israel (Goren, 2014). For the Palestinians, the United States was providing political and economic support for Israel even when Israel was clearly violating the main principles of Oslo. When discussing the issue, Nassar Ibrahim, a
political analyst and a member of the Alternative Information Center (AIC)\textsuperscript{50}, told me that the unconditional support of the US towards Israel undermined Palestinian faith in being an equal partner in the negotiations (Ibrahim, 2014).

5.4.1 SOLIDIFICATION OF THE OCCUPATION

Entering the Oslo Peace Process, the Palestinians expected an end to Israel's occupation, and subsequently, the creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state. The Oslo Accords provided a framework for extensive Israeli withdrawals from the Palestinian territories, beginning with the West Bank town of Jericho. The provisional agreement, signed in Cairo in May 1994, established the PA (Ghanem, 2010:13). The PA was to govern in the territories for the interim period of no more than five years until a permanent status agreement was concluded and a Palestinian state established (NAD PLO, 2013). However, according to the Palestinian narrative, the Oslo Accords, instead of establishing a viable political and territorial entity for the Palestinians, formalised the fragmented landscape of the occupied territories. The 1995 Interim Agreement\textsuperscript{51}, known as Oslo II, divided the territory of the West Bank into areas A, B and C\textsuperscript{52} (Map 7). Areas A and B, comprising 40 percent of the West Bank, were handed over to the PA for its full or partial control.\textsuperscript{53} In Area C, consisting of about 60 percent of the West Bank, Israel has retained full responsibility for both security and all land-

\textsuperscript{50} The AIC is a joint Palestinian-Israeli organisation promoting justice, equality and peace for Palestinians and Israelis.

\textsuperscript{51} Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, ‘Oslo II’, Taba / Washington D.C. 28 September 1995. The division of the West Bank was planned to last five years until a permanent agreement was signed (B’Tselem, 2014:4).

\textsuperscript{52} The agreement divided the Gaza Strip into Yellow and White areas (until the 2005 Israeli withdrawal). Furthermore, the Hebron Protocol, signed on January 15, 1997, divided the city of Hebron into area H1 (akin to Area A) and H2 (akin to Area C) (UNDP, 2014:56, Dumper and Pullan 2010:5).

\textsuperscript{53} The three zones were redefined in the Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement of 1999 but the transfer of lands has ever been made. In Area A, currently comprising 18 percent of the West Bank, the PA assumed ‘powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order’. In Area B, currently comprising of approximately 22 percent of the West Bank, the PA assumed ‘responsibility for public order for Palestinians but retained ‘responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism’ (B’Tselem, 2014:4)
related civil affairs, including zoning and planning\(^{54}\), land requisition, allocation and registration. Whilst the responsibilities, such as providing education and medical services to the Palestinian residents of the area were given to the PA, construction of the infrastructure necessary for these services have remained in Israel’s hands (B'Tselem, 2013:11). Whilst areas A and B, the lands handed over to the PA, included the majority of Palestinian population centres in the West Bank and the population of approximately over 2.4 million people, the territory consisted of nearly 165 ‘islands’ of land with no territorial contiguity, are surrounded and divided by land designated as Area C (Map 7) (B'Tselem, 2013:12). Area C, the only contiguous tract of the West Bank, includes the majority of Palestinian farmland and natural resources (UNOCHA, 2014d: 1). In practice, whilst the vast majority of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank live in Areas A and B, all the land reserves required for developing their communities remain in Area C, including many lands that were once within the municipal jurisdiction of these communities, some of them privately owned (B'Tselem, 2014:4).

For the Palestinians, the Oslo II agreement signified the solidification of the Israeli occupation. Whilst getting rid of densely populated Palestinian areas, Israel maintained control over a large area of the most strategic land. Area C, under full Israeli control, consists of land of the Jordan Valley and the main settlement blocs located above the West Bank’s main water aquifers (Le More, 2008:41). With the areas of high Palestinian population under the jurisdiction and governance of the PA, Israel was able to start separating the two peoples without having to end the occupation of the Palestinian territories (Le More, 2005:988). Moreover, now with the Palestinian population under the PA's control, Israel relinquished itself from responsibility for the

\(^{54}\) According to the Interim Agreement, powers and responsibilities related to zoning and planning in the area should have been transferred to PA within 18 months, but the transfer has not happened yet (Epshtain, 2012)
welfare of the Palestinian population (Le More, 2008:41, Gordon, 2008b:xix, Roy, 2002:14). By transferring the responsibility to the PA, the Oslo Accords transformed the Israeli occupation into ‘legitimate rule with the official partnership of Arafat’s PLO’ (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997:270). Arafat's job, as Moshe Machover argues, amounted to nothing more than the job of Israel's proxy Palestinian Police Chief (Machover, 2004:13). This move, he explains, was carefully planned. During the first Intifada, he explains, it became clear that Israel could not afford to control the Palestinian population directly:

These more pragmatic Zionists looked for a Palestinian leadership to do the job for them: to control and repress the Palestinians, thus guaranteeing the security of Israel (Machover, 2005:13).

This logic, Machover argues, became the essence of the Oslo Accords (Machover, 2005:13). Similarly, Gordon argues, the PA was never meant to be an independent agent but rather it was created to be a 'subcontractor to Israeli occupation', solely responsible for managing the occupied population and providing a number of services for Israel. Oslo therefore:

was not a process of phased devolution of Israeli rule over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the transfer of authority to the PA and the implementation of the two-state solution, but the extension of Israeli rule through a subcontractor that was created to manage the population (Gordon, 2008b:171-172)

According to Gordon, the Oslo Agreement does not order the withdrawal of Israeli power, but stipulates the reorganisation of Israel’s power and reconstruction of Palestinian space, still under Israeli occupation (Gordon, 2008b:172). Legally, Halper summarises, Israel has achieved what it always desired: occupation-by-consent (Halper, 2008:148).
5.4.2 SETTLEMENTS

Israeli peaceful intentions, according to the Palestinian narrative, are further questioned when looking at the Israeli settlement activities in the period of the Oslo Peace Process. As Juma argued, one would have expected that Israel, by committing itself to peace with the Palestinians, would stop the construction of settlements in the West Bank. Signing the Oslo Accords, Israel obligated itself to the principle that:

neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.\(^{55}\) (Felton, 2008:258)

Israel did not only fail to stop the construction of the settlements but, throughout the 1990s, it accelerated the construction at its most spectacular rate since 1967. Between the signing of the DoP in September 1993, and the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2001, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) rose from 110,900 to 200,297 (Appendix IV), representing a growth rate of some 90 percent, and from 146,800 to 167,230 in East Jerusalem (Appendix V). The Israeli policy of expansion was quite clearly explained by Sharon, then Minister of Foreign Affairs (October 13, 1998 – June 6, 1999):

Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we take now will stay ours...everything we don't grab will go to them (cited in Carter, 2006:147).

As Sara Roy reports, over 40,000 acres of Palestinian land, much of it viable agricultural land worth more than 1 billion USD, was confiscated for that purpose (Roy, 2002:13). Despite having signed the Oslo Accords, Israel pledged it did not establish new settlements and would halt the expansion of the existing ones; it excluded the

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\(^{55}\) This is included in Paragraph 7 of Article xxxi of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995 (Felton, 2008:241-259)
construction of settlements to meet the natural growth of the local population (Halper, 2008:15-16). The term, however, is not limited to the natural growth of the existing population through birth rates but includes the growth of the population by migration, which has been actively encouraged through offering generous financial benefits and incentives (Halper, 2008:155, B'Tselem, 2002:16).

5.4.3. WATER

The Oslo Peace Process was also an opportunity to remove the inequality in water distribution between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and to provide the Palestinians with a greater access to the water resources situated in the West Bank. According to the Oslo II Accords, "Israel recognises the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources' (Palestinian Water Authority, 2013). Oslo II transferred the powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage to the PA and gave the limited functional administration of water resources in the areas that it controls (B'Tselem, 2000b:7, Husseini, 2007:302). In practice, however, as Amnesty International reports, the responsibilities were limited to operating the insufficient quantity of water allocated for Palestinian use, and the responsibility for maintenance and repair of an extremely deteriorated water network system that was already in urgent need of major conservations (Amnesty International, 2009b:17, Palestinian Water Authority, 2013). Whilst Israel passed the responsibilities for the repairs of the damaged water system; the Oslo II did not require Israel to address an equitable re-distribution of the existing 'shared' water resources (UNCESR, 2003:16, Amnesty International, 2009:20). The unequal distribution of the shared water resources

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56 Topics relating to water and waste water were addressed by Annex III of the Interim Agreement (the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs), and principally in Appendix 1, Article 40 (entitled Water and Sewage).
the Mountain Aquifer and the Jordan River—was maintained, with just 20 percent of the Mountain Aquifer allocated to the Palestinians (80 percent to the Israelis), and a total ban on the latter (Amnesty International, 2009b:20). In contrast, the Oslo Accords specifically stipulated that there would be no reduction in water extraction or consumption by Israelis or the Israeli settlers (Amnesty International, 2009b:20, UNCESR, 2003:16).

As postulated in the Accords, a Joint Water Committee (JWC) was established in 1995. The committee assumed equal representation in coordination and decision making relating to developing and regulating the use of some water resources in the West Bank in the interim period (Human Rights Watch, 2010:18, UNCESR, 2003:15). Despite 'equal' Palestinian representation on the committee, Israel has retained almost total control over decision-making regarding every new water-related project, such as drilling of new wells, laying pipes or building a reservoir, or upgrading existing wells, as well as the amount of water that may be extracted from existing wells and springs in the West Bank (Amnesty International, 2009:17). Using the veto power, Israel has continued to prevent Palestinians from developing the water sector and sanitary utilities or constructing more efficient water contribution and extraction systems (Palestinian Water Authority, 2013).

Whilst every new water project in Area A (under complete PA control) required the consent of Israel’s representatives on the JWC, allowing Israel to use its veto power over any Palestinian water-related initiative, the JWC did not have the authority to regulate the use of water by Israeli settlements (UNCESR, 2003:15, Amnesty International, 2009:22). Furthermore, the proposed water projects located in, or passing through, Area C (under complete Israeli control), which contains the most productive locations for drilling wells, has required an approval not only by the JWC, but also the Israeli Civil Administration (UNCESR, 2003:16). Consequently, the Palestinians have
been consistently prevented from developing any water or sewage project in the area by rejecting them outright, delaying the projects already approved by the JWC, or preventing their implementation by the Israeli army (Amnesty International, 2009b:22). Therefore, in practice, despite the alleged ‘equality’ of the JWC, whilst Israelis were free to construct new water systems for the settlements, the Palestinians have been systematically denied new constructions by being required to an Israeli consent. As the Work Bank reported, by April 2009:

the commission had approved all but one of the Israeli-proposed projects in the West Bank, but only half of the projects proposed by the PA for the benefit of Palestinians, of which only one-third had been implemented or begun implementation (The World Bank, cited in Human Rights Watch, 2010:18)

Although a Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) has since been established, the scope of the Israeli control did not change. Israel has maintained complete control over the amount of water available for the Palestinians, and the decision making regarding development of water resources. The PWA's responsibilities, therefore, were reduced to allocating the limited supply made available by Israel (UNCESR, 2003:15). Further discussions on the issue of water were supposed to be undertaken in the final status negotiations (El-Fadel, et al., 2001:57). The outbreak of the second Intifada, and the consequent breakdown of the Oslo Peace Process, left the problem unresolved. However, even before the Intifada, Ehud Barak made his stance on the control over the water resources very clear, when he stressed that there is no return of control over the West Bank water resources (Frederiksen, 2005). The Oslo Peace Process, therefore, as the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESR) summarises:

achieved little in the way of improving the water situation for Palestinians. Instead, it further institutionalised the structural inequality between Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories by refusing to address the issue of reducing Israeli water consumption, and by delaying discussions of the unfair distribution
of water and the discrimination between Palestinians and Israeli settlers to final status negotiations (UNCESR, 2003: 16-17)

As with the formalisation of Israel’s rule over the Palestinian land, the Oslo Peace Process, according to the Palestinian narrative, formalised Israel’s control over resources.

5.4.4 ECONOMIC MALAISE

The structural violence of land annexation led to the segmentation and fragmentation of Palestinian society. The social and geographical fragmentation, according to the Palestinian narrative, was accompanied by the economic marginalisation and exploitation of the Palestinian market. During the Oslo Peace Process, the economic situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, not only failed to improve (it started declining following the first Intifada) but it had rapidly deteriorated (Kimmerling, 2008:259, Farsakh, 2001, Roy, 1999). In fact, Roy argues that:

at no time since the beginning of Israeli occupation in 1967 had the Palestinian economy been as weak and its people as vulnerable as during the seven Oslo years, a tragic irony given the enormous expectations that accompanied the early days of the process (Roy, 2001:9-10)

During Oslo Peace Process, Israel retained full control over the Palestinian economy, controlling key factors of production, land, water, labour, and capital, along with external and internal borders (Roy, 2001:10). The Israeli policy of closure is however recognised as having been the main cause of the economic downturn in this period (Farsakh, 2001; Bishara, 2002, Roy, 2001, Roy, 2002). Within the first three years of Oslo, Israel imposed 291 days of total closure in the West Bank and 342 days of total closure in the Gaza Strip, prohibiting the Palestinians from any physical or economic movement outside the West Bank and Gaza (Roy, 2002:21). The closure had a dramatic effect on the Palestinian economy, particularly labour and trade, and has led to the
emergence of new economic trends in Palestinian economy: economic enclavisation and economic autarky (Roy, 1999:68). Whilst the new restrictions were introduced, resulting in the closing of the Gaza Strip and West Bank markets to each other, and reduction of the Israeli market for Palestinian exports, old patterns of the economic fundamentals of occupation, such as keeping the Palestinian market open for the Israeli exports and controlling Palestinian access to the international market, remained intact (Roy, 2001:11).

Another direct impact of the Israeli policy was the drastic reduction of the number of Palestinians allowed to work in Israel. Previously dependent on cheap Palestinian labour (particularly agriculture and construction industries), Israel started to replace Palestinian workers with foreign workers brought in on a temporary basis from Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe (Vitullo, 2005:101). As a result of the reduction in the flow of Palestinian workers between 1992 and 1996, the average unemployment rate among Palestinians increased from 3 percent to 28 percent in the West Bank. The highest levels were reported during total closures, with 66 percent of the Palestinian labour force being reported as either unemployed or severely underemployed in March–April 1996 (Roy, 2002:21). As the closure was eased, unemployment levels decreased but still remained high, standing at 10 to 20 percent in the West Bank and 18 to 30 percent in the Gaza Strip between 1997 and 1999 (Roy, 2002:21). Increasing unemployment undermined the Palestinians’ standard of living. Per capita income fell by 17 percent between 1994-1996, while the percentage of people living in poverty increased to 40 percent in Gaza, and 11 percent in the West Bank in 1997 (Farsakh, 2002). In 2000, when asked in a poll how they would describe their economic conditions since the beginning of Oslo, 50 percent of Gazans respondents said their standard of living had worsened, and 42.9 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank shared the same view (Bishara, 2002:121).
5.5 CAMP DAVID

The Camp David summit, that took place from July 11-24, 2000 in Maryland, constituted the last hope for the resolution of the conflict. As the previous chapter demonstrated, according to the Israeli narrative, Palestinians, proposed with the most generous offer ever made, uninterested in a peaceful solution to the conflict, rejected it, proving once again they are not partners for peace. For the Palestinians however, the failure of the Camp David needs to be discussed analysing the content of the proposal, but also in the context of the political events preceding the summit.

After the US announcement of the Camp David summit, Arafat, distrustful of Barak's policies and strategic priorities\(^{57}\), was reluctant to accept Clinton's invitation. Arafat's reluctance to enter the negotiations, and the Palestinian distrust of Israel’s intentions of the ‘final’ negotiations, according to the Palestinian narrative, has to be understood however in the context of the political scene prior to the Camp David, as described in the previous paragraphs. Although Arafat felt that permanent status negotiations were long overdue, and the core issues should be finally addressed, he insisted on Israeli completion of the delayed interim withdrawals before moving ahead with new negotiations (Malley and Agha, 2001). Barak, however, refused to carry out the third redeployment that he himself had negotiated under the Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement, signed on September 4, 1999, insisting instead on moving directly to final status talks. In practice, therefore, when the Camp David summit was held, the PA was only in control of 17.2 percent of the West Bank and between 66 and 80 percent of the Gaza Strip in isolated, encircled enclaves (Peters, 2013:74, Roy, 2002:24).

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\(^{57}\) Like Barak's policy of prioritising reaching peace agreement with Syria over the PA (Malley and Agha, 2001)
Entering the Oslo Peace Process, the Palestinians believed they had already made a historic compromise in accepting the principle of conceding 78 percent of Mandate Palestine to Israel. The notion that Israel was 'offering' land, or 'making concessions' of the remaining 22 percent, was therefore seen as being far from generous. For the Palestinians, the very fact that Israel was negotiating on the remaining 22 percent affirmed Israel's denial of the Palestinian right to the land (Peters, 2013:75, Roy, 2002:26, Malley and Agha, 2001). After initially speaking of a Palestinian state covering roughly 80 percent of the West Bank, Barak gradually moved up to the low 90s, and then to the mid-90s range (Malley and Agha, 2001). The territory 'proposed' to the Palestinians, did not include annexed East Jerusalem, and a sizeable portion of the Jordan Valley was to remain under Israeli control (Roy, 2002:25). Under this scenario, Roy reports, the Palestinian state on the West Bank would have been split into four separate cantons: northern, central, and southern (with the passages between them under full Israeli control), and an encircled and divided East Jerusalem cut off from its Palestinian hinterlands (Roy, 2002:25). The offer also denied Palestinians control over their internal or external borders to the West Bank or Gaza, airspace and water resources. In practice, the Palestinian state would consist of non-contiguous cantons, isolated from each other by large Israeli settlement blocs, with no control over their groundwater resources and no political and economic sovereignty over their borders with the outside world (Roy, 2002:17-18, NAD PLO, 2000).

Furthermore, the Israeli offer regarding the most contentious issues of the conflict-Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees- was far from 'generous' for the Palestinians. Although Barak overcame his “red lines” discussing for the first time the issue of sovereignty of Jerusalem (in terms of shared sovereignty or limited sovereignty over certain areas of Jerusalem), what was discussed did not meet the minimal demands of
the Palestinians (Malley and Agha, 2001, NAD PLO, 2000). The Palestinians were offered sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, but only a loosely defined “permanent custodianship” over the Haram al-Sharif\(^{58}\), with Israel retaining ultimate sovereignty. The status of the rest of the city was to fluctuate between Palestinian sovereignty and functional autonomy (Malley and Agha, 2001). The Israeli 'solution' for Jerusalem also included the annexation of the main bloc of settlements in the occupied East Jerusalem: the Adumim bloc, 120 square kilometres around Ma’aleh Adumim, and the Etzion bloc. Under this scenario, Roy argues, the borders of Greater Jerusalem would have extended as far south as Gush Etzion near Hebron, dividing the northern part of the Palestinian state from the southern, preventing territorial contiguity and functional economic borders between Jerusalem and the West Bank, and between regions within the West Bank (Roy, 2002:25). With regards to the issue of Palestinian refugees, Israel refused to recognise the right of Palestinian refugees to return or to acknowledge responsibility for the creation and solution of the refugee problem (NAD-PLO, 2015a). A "satisfactory solution" for the Israelis, Hanan Ashrawi reports, was to allow a small number to return through family reunification or humanitarian reasons (NAD PLO, 2000). In exchange, Israel wanted Palestinian negotiators to sign an end-of-conflict statement releasing Israel from all further responsibilities for the refugee problem (Roy, 2002:26).

Furthermore, whilst Barak, following the failure of Camp David, claimed to have 'left no stone unturned' in his quest for peace with the Palestinians, according to B’Tselem report, the sharpest increase of settlements building was indeed recorded in 2000, under his government. In 2000 alone, the construction of almost 4,800 new housing units was commenced (B’Tselem, 2002:16-17).

\(^{58}\) Haram al-Sharif, known to Jews as the Temple Mount, is a contested religious site in the Old City of Jerusalem. Haram al-Sharif, containing the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque, is one of the three holiest sites in Islam. It is of deep religious and national importance to Palestinians (Terdiman and Zuhur, 2008:423)
5.6 NEGATIVE PEACE

It is a basic assumption that for the conflict to be resolved, violence needs to be eliminated. Whilst, according to the Israeli narrative, Palestinian violence constitutes the main reason for the failure of the Oslo Peace Process, however as it has been established violence was extensively used by the Israelis during the period. The concept of structural violence has allowed analysing violence going beyond its direct manifestation. As illustrated, the Oslo Peace Process did not address Israel's structural violence of the Israeli occupation, but rather the violent structure was further formalised. The ‘potential’, or ‘what could have been’ was clearly outlined and expressed at the beginning of the Oslo. In the words of Arafat, it constituted the ‘end of occupation, coexistence and equal rights’. For the Palestinians however, after the seven years of Oslo, the gap between the expectation of peace, and the 'actual', of what was delivered, was striking. Oslo further fragmented the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian people, confining them into enclaves with the ability of movement between them severely constrained. The exploitation, the centrepiece of structural violence, according to Galtung, did not stop during the process. Whilst Israel continued to transfer the resources from the West Bank into its own economy and polity; it marginalised the Palestinian market and labour. Instead of ending the occupation, Oslo just reorganised Israel’s power. Whilst Israel continued to exploit Palestinian resources; the Oslo process absolved Israel from any responsibility for the Palestinian population. Furthermore, the power asymmetries were not addressed. As Ibrahim argued in an interview:

The main problem of the Oslo was the fact that the power relationship between the two sides, based on the status of the occupier and the occupied, were never addressed. Based on power relations, we are not equal partners. It is impossible to be equal, meanwhile the system of economic and social occupation continues. The Oslo never had a chance because Israel was trying to keep the equation between the occupier and the occupied intact, and trying to make the Palestinians to accept this relationship (Ibrahim, 2014)
For the Palestinians therefore, the Oslo constitutes nothing more than solidification of structural violence and the continuation of the occupied-occupier relationship. The Palestinians, therefore, reject the Israeli claim that violence had been exclusively exercised by them.

5.7 INTIFADA

For Palestinians, the outbreak of the second Intifada has to be therefore understood as a natural reaction to the last seven years of structural violence, described above. As Nidal Abu Zuluf, the Manager of the Joint Advocacy Initiative (JAI) of the East Jerusalem YMCA and the YWCA of Palestine, told me, 'it was just a matter of time the Palestinians would react to Israeli violence' (Abu Zuluf, 2014). The Palestinian frustrations exploded after the provocative visit of Sharon, accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli troops, to Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif. The visit was interpreted by the Palestinians as a manifestation of Israeli authority over the Haram al-Sharif and, as discussed in the previous chapter, sparked widespread protests and riots, and subsequently became the immediate cause of the outbreak of the second Intifada (Zuhur, 2010:10). Although, as illustrated in the previous chapter, according to the Israelis, the PA cultural violence of the inflammatory language instigated direct violence, the Intifada, and the violent rhetoric was used as a strategic tool, according to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report, known as the 'Mitchell Report', there is no evidence for such a claim (US Department of State, 2001).

In contrast, the Palestinians argue that, being aware of the mounting Palestinian anger with the lack of progress during the Oslo Peace Process, Sharon's visit was a calculated and intentional effort to spark Palestinian violence. For the Palestinians, however, the visit was only an immediate trigger. The underlying reason for the uprising, Said Zeedani, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Al-Quds University, and the former
Director General of the Independent Palestinian Commission for Citizens’ Rights, told me, was the popular Palestinian disillusion and frustration with the Oslo Peace Process (Zeedani, 2014). When it comes to the violence of the second Intifada, as Abu Zuluf argued:

Palestinian violence was a direct reaction to the Israeli violence. What the seven years long 'peace' process delivered was the daily humiliation, more restrictions on movement and more of our land being taken (Abu Zuluf, 2014)

Galtung claims that ‘much direct violence can be traced back to vertical structural violence, such as exploitation and repression, for liberation, or to prevent liberation’ (Galtung, 1996:270). As Graf, et. al argue,

A riot, a revolt or a revolution with the accompanying violence remains puzzling without a deeper understanding of violence. Mass violence does not erupt without a reason, although the reason is not a justification. This type of direct violence is an event. To understand the event one needs to understand the process which led to it (Graf, et. al, 2007:131)

The confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces immediately evolved into a more tangible cycle of violent actions and responses. Israel's response to the Palestinian uprising involved excessive force. From September 29 to December 2, 2000 alone, Israeli security forces killed 204 Palestinian civilians and 24 members of the Palestinian security forces and wounded approximately 10,000 Palestinians59 (B’Tselem, 2000a:4). Palestinian towns were subjected to bombardment from the air and the ground, with their residents being locked inside their towns and villages for months (Bishara, 2002:10). As Hiba Husseini, who currently chairs the Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis, told me:

59 The figures do not include civilians killed within Israel’s borders (B’Tselem, 2000a:4)
I could not access my office for months because of the closures. The tanks were parked in front of my building [Ramallah city]. Whilst Israeli air forces were shelling, Israeli tanks and foot soldiers were operating on the ground. We could hear about people being killed. It was a war zone. All of us were civilians with no arms and no means of protection. They [the Israeli soldiers], on the other hand, were in full gear with orders ready to shoot. It was nothing more than a collective punishment (Husseini, 2014).

Within a few days of the Israeli military operation in the West Bank, Operation Defensive Shield, six of the largest cities in the West Bank, and their surrounding towns, villages and refugee camps, were occupied by the Israeli military and thousands of Palestinians were arrested. ‘Destroying the infrastructure of terrorism’, the slogan of the Israeli campaign, involved the widespread destruction of Palestinian private and public property and extensive physical damage to Palestinian Authority civilian property. On a number of occasions, the IDF was reported to have used Palestinian civilians as human shields to protect soldiers from danger while house searching, checking suspicious subjects, or standing in the line of fire. From March 1, through to May 7, 2002, 497 Palestinians were killed and 1,447 wounded in the course of the IDF reoccupation of Palestinian areas (UN, 2002).

In the midst of the Israeli military operation, on April 14, 2002, the government of Israel adopted a decision to initiate the construction of a wall between the state of Israel and the Palestinian territory of the West Bank with the proclaimed aim of stopping violent attacks by Palestinians inside Israel. For the Palestinians, however, as the next chapter demonstrates, the wall needs to be understood in the context of the continuing ‘matrix of control’ and the Israeli strategy of the displacement of the Palestinians.

5.8 CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of the conflict, the Palestinians have been subjected to the Israeli violence of expulsion, fragmentation, exploitation and marginalisation. Since the start of
the Israeli occupation, it has been structural violence that has stood at the heart of Palestinian insecurity. Structural violence has been deeply ingrained into the violent structure of the Israeli ‘matrix of control’. The Israeli policy of settlement building constitutes a major element of the structure. However, to maintain and protect the settlers, Israel employed a series of policies that feature land and water expropriation, destruction of property, economic control and regulation of Palestinian movement.

As Galtung argues, violent structure is characterised by the fact that ‘the topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs […]’ (Galtung, 1990:293). Whilst Israel has been extensively expropriating the Palestinian resources; the Palestinians have been locked into numerous territorial enclaves, with restricted freedom of movement between and within them. The unequal interaction is further evident in the stark differential in water distribution between the two groups. While Palestinians use only 20 percent of the water from the Mountain Aquifer, they are denied any share of the Jordan River.

Today, the exploitation and fragmentation of the Palestinian territories has reached such a point, that an establishment of a viable Palestinian state seems to be unfeasible. The present state of the Palestinian territorial fragmentation derives partly from the structures institutionalised by the Oslo Peace Process. On entering the Oslo process, Palestinians hoped for an end to the Israeli occupation and a creation of a Palestinian state. Early on into the process, it became apparent that the Oslo process represented the continuation or even the solidification of Israeli control. The structural relationship between occupier and occupied, and the gross power asymmetries, were never addressed, but further reinforced. During the Oslo Peace Process, Israel strengthened its control over the geographical space of the occupied territories, and over the movement of Palestinian goods and people. During the seven years of the Oslo Peace Process, Israeli settlements almost doubled in number, Palestinian economic conditions
deteriorated, the policy of closures was institutionalised, and the Palestinian territories were further fragmented.

The ‘generous’ offer, Israel made to the Palestinians at the Camp David, did not include the complete withdrawal from the occupied territories, or a full relinquishment of its control over vital areas of Palestinian life. In practice, the offer was ultimately no return to the 1967 border, no dismantling of the settlements, no full sovereignty over East Jerusalem, no justice for the Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian state consisting of a series of small non-contiguous enclaves, separated from each other, with no sovereignty over its internal and external borders, airspace, sea access, or natural resources. In reality, therefore, the ‘generous offer’ meant the continuation of structural violence and the topdogs-underdogs structural relationship between the two people. What the Palestinians rejected at Camp David became a fait accompli with the construction of the wall. The wall, as the next chapter demonstrates, cuts deeply into Palestinian territory, annexing large areas of Palestinian land, where the settlements and vital resources are located. The route of the barrier, therefore, seems to defy Israeli security rationale and appears to be politically motivated. For the Palestinians, the wall, therefore, is just another example of structural violence in the long history of Israel’s use of violence.

Direct violence, according to Galtung, can be understood as a natural reaction to unequal relations in society, therefore used as a form of resistance, or an attempt to initiate social and political changes against exploitation and repression. The outbreak of the second Intifada is seen by the Palestinians as just that. As the peace process not only failed to address structural violence but rather deepened it further, direct violence was employed by the Palestinians as a form of resistance to the structural violence of the
Israeli ‘matrix of control’. With the outbreak of the *Intifada*, however, a new element was added to the violent structure: the wall. As the next chapter demonstrates, the wall has had a devastating impact on the Palestinian population in the West Bank and has further deepened the Palestinian insecurity.
PART THREE: CONFLICT DESPITE THE BARRIER
CHAPTER SIX: SECURITY FENCE AND THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: ISRAELI NARRATIVE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Over ten years has passed since the end of the second Intifada. The fence, built in the midst of the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign, as a ‘temporary obstacle’ to stop the attacks, firmly remains on the ground. The fence, as discussed in Chapter One, has attracted a wide international criticism and has raised many questions regarding the reasons as to its construction, its route, and its permanence. This chapter addresses these issues based on the Israeli narrative. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part of the chapter addresses the research questions: (1) what was the immediate reason behind the construction of the fence? (2) Why does the fence remain on the ground? The analysis of these questions heavily relies on my interview with Danny Tirza, the IDF's chief architect for the security fence and the security analyst. The interview illustrates well Israel’s rationale for the construction and the reasons as to the permanence of the fence. The chapter argues that, according to the Israeli narrative, protection of the Israelis’ security was the sole reason for the fence construction. As the security of Israel remains under threat, the fence is an essential security measure to protect Israel's citizens.

The second part of the chapter provides answers to the question: (3) why, despite measures such as the security fence, Israel maintains its presence in the West Bank? The chapter argues that according to Israeli narrative, the fence, despite being highly effective, it is insufficient to stop terrorists from entering Israel. Israel, therefore, needs

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60 As this chapter deals with the Israeli narrative, it refers to the barrier as fence or security fence.
to retain its presence in the territory to maintain security for Israeli citizens. Based on the data collection, four arguments have emerged as to this assertion. First, the protracted presence of Israel needs to be understood in the context of the lessons Israel has drawn from the events following Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. The chapter, therefore, examines the Israeli withdrawal and the dramatic escalation in violence against Israel following the disengagement. It is argued that without the Israeli presence on the ground in the West Bank, Israel may witness similar intensification in violence in the territory directed against its citizens.

Next, the chapter places this discussion in the context of the current state of Palestinian national leadership. It seeks to answer the question, whether given the opportunity for a state; the PA would be even able to provide stable and effective governance? It is argued that in light of the PA’s failing governance, a potential withdrawal from the area would repeat the 'Gaza scenario' and the territory would be quickly overtaken by Hamas. Third, the Israeli presence in the West Bank is then placed within a wider context of the current difficult strategic situation across Israel’s borders, and the plethora of potential threats Israel is currently facing. It is argued that the territory of the West Bank constitutes a ‘buffer zone’ between Israel and a number of non-state militant groups. The chapter argues that due to uncertainty in how the situation will unfold, Israel cannot afford to lose its defensible borders. The final part of the analysis of Israel’s assertion of its need to retain the fence and remain in the West Bank examines Palestinian cultural violence. The chapter argues that cultural violence poses a major stumbling block in the Israeli-Palestinian relations and provides another explanation for Israel’s reluctance to withdraw from the territory. This part of the analysis primarily relies on my interview with Itamar Marcus, the founder and director of the PMW, an Israeli research institute that studies Palestinian society from a broad range of
perspectives by monitoring and analysing the PA through its media and schoolbooks. The chapter concentrates on the PA’s official discourse and the PA formal system of paying salaries to the Palestinian involved in the attacks against Israel, arguing that they justify, rationalise and even glorify the use of direct violence against Israel. The analysis of all these factors is placed within the extended conceptualisation of violence and the framework of the cycle of violence. The chapter argues that, according to the Israeli narrative, Palestinian violence, in its direct and cultural form, explains and justifies not only the permanence of the security fence but also Israel’s protracted presence in the West Bank, thus the continuation of the conflict. Consequently, the chapter helps to understand the protraction of Israeli structural violence against the Palestinians.

6.2 SECURITY FENCE

For Israel, its national security and protection of its citizens from the Palestinian mass-scale terrorist campaign of the second Intifada constitutes the sole rationale behind the construction of the security fence. In fact, to emphasise this argument, Tirza, the architect of the security fence, began the interview by arguing that the fence had never been a preferred political solution for addressing Palestinian violence. However with the dramatic rise in a number of Palestinian suicide attackers entering Israel, the government was left with no option but to begin construction. My interview with Roy Dolphin, a barrier specialist at the UNOCHA, sheds light on the reasons for the initial reluctance of the Israeli government to build the barrier. He argues that initially, the Israeli government, led by Sharon, was opposed to the construction. Such a move, he continues, could be translated into a political message: the creation of an implicit border, leaving many settlements outside of the state’s boundaries. Consequently, as

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61 PMW’s major focus is on the messages that the Palestinian leaders, from the PA, Fatah and Hamas, send to the population through the broad range of institutions and infrastructures they control.
62 Dolphin has been covering the issue of the barrier since 2003. The opinion expressed in the interview is his personal opinion and he does not speak on behalf of UNOCHA.
some of the Israeli settlements would find themselves on the 'Palestinian side' of the fence, the government was opposed to its construction (Dolphin, 2014). The internal debate in Israel, Mark Heller, Principal Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, further explains in an interview, was framed in a very emotive way. As he argues:

The question was posed whether the blood of the Israeli settlers, who would find themselves outside the physical barrier, is worth less than the blood of others Israelis, and consequently, whether they are deemed inferior to Israel's security (Heller, 2015).

However, in 2002, Hillel Frisch, a senior researcher at the BESA, told me that, Palestinian terrorism reached such a high level, that if the Israeli government had not done anything, there would have been Israeli violence in the streets (Frisch, 2014). It was however, as Tirza explains, in the wake of the 'Bloody March' of 2002, in which 139 civilians died as a result of Palestinian terrorist attacks, that it became obvious that the government had to take any possible measure it could to stop the wave of the terrorism emanating from the West Bank (Tirza, 2014). For Israel, therefore, the construction of the security fence was an essential and legitimate tool to defend the security of Israeli citizens from the threat of the Palestinian terrorism of suicide bombing attacks. From that perspective, blame for the construction of the fence lies solely with 'the Palestinian Authority's failure to fulfil the commitments it made to fight terrorism', as discussed in the Chapter Four (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a).

The ICJ's 'Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory', as discussed in the introductory chapter, did indeed acknowledge Israel’s right to protect its citizens. It did however widely criticise

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63 Frisch is also Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Studies and Middle East Studies in Bar-Ilan University, Israel
the route of the barrier, going beyond the green line and annexing the Palestinian territory, ruling 'the construction of the wall, together with the associated gate and permit regime contrary to international law' (ICJ, 2002:63). Discussing ICJ criticism regarding the route of the fence, which mirrors Palestinian criticism (See Chapter Seven), Tirza emphasises that security, not a land grab, was the only motivation and the route of the fence, in fact, mirrors the security rationales behind its construction. First of all, Tirza stressed in the interview, the green line does not constitute a permanent political border. He argues:

It was just a military ceasefire line between Jordan and Israel drawn at the end of the 1948 war. This line does not exist on the ground anymore as Jordan left the area in 1967. The Palestinians did not have any border with us; they have claimed all the area [from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River], not only the West Bank. When we come to negotiations with the Palestinians, we will define a border between the sides (Tirza, 2014).

Secondly, and more importantly, he continued, in order to stop Palestinians suicide attacks, the route of the wall naturally had to go beyond the green line (Tirza, 2014). As he explains:

From the security perspective, building directly on the green line would not have addressed the threat. The green line runs down the hills, and of course, from a security point of view, hills dominate valleys [and] you always want to be in dominant areas, you want to see who is coming to you; you want to be sure that no one will shoot you from above. [...] Building exactly on the green line, therefore, would have left Israel in the same fragile security situation, and the purpose of the wall, of course, was to protect the Israelis (Tirza, 2014).

The official position of the Israeli government is similar. According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, constructing the fence only along the green line 'would be a political statement only, having nothing to do with the security needs of Israel's citizens' (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). The route of the security barrier, according to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, had to be determined, 'based on topography, population density, and a threat assessment of each area the fence was to
pass’ (Israel Ministry of Defence, 2007). Consequently, as there was no doubt that the route of the fence needed to deviate beyond the green line, it was clear from the start that the fence would have social and economic implications on the Palestinian population in the territory. When discussing the impact of the fence on the Palestinians (which will be discussed in details in Chapter Five), Tirza argued that the route of the fence constitutes a maximum compromise between Israel's security needs and the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians. However, he stressed that although the humanitarian impact of the fence on the Palestinians was an important factor in determining its route, with the level of suicide attacks on the rise, Israel's security was the primary concern. When he was instructed to build the fence, Tirza continued, the clear message from the government of Israel was that the fence constituted a temporary defensive line, not a border, and once the violence ceases and the negotiations with the Palestinians begin, everything would be open for discussion (Tirza, 2014). The decision to construct a security fence, going beyond the green line, was supported by 70 percent of Israelis. The number increased when asked specifically if Israelis felt the fence would enhance security and prevent terrorism (Kilroy, 2006:401).

As the above discussion demonstrates, for Israel, the construction of the fence along the green line would have merely constituted a political statement and would not have addressed the main purpose of the fence: the cessation of the Palestinian attacks against Israel. The fence, Shaul Shay, former deputy head of the Israel National Security Council, and former head of the IDF military history department claims, did precisely deliver that (Shay, 2014). When analysing the issue, he explained:

The violence now is relatively very low in comparison to the years of the second Intifada. We can see in the statistics that whilst the motivation of the Palestinians to carry out the suicide bombings remains very high; the capability to carry out the terror attacks has been drastically reduced. The ‘success ’ rate of
the Palestinian terrorist attacks has been very low. In 2007 we reached almost zero (Shay, 2014)

Similarly, discussing the effectiveness of the security fence in reducing terrorist attacks, Tirza argued, that 'there is no doubt that the fence has been a highly successful tool in both reducing and preventing the number of attacks from the West Bank' (Tirza, 2014). As Shay concluded, ‘no fence can guarantee 100 percent success, but when compared to the figures that we had before its construction, it is a great success’ (Shay, 2014).

6.3 ‘FENCE IS NOT ENOUGH’: THE REASONS FOR THE PROTRACTION OF ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE WEST BANK

The fence, as illustrated above, has constituted an effective tool in preventing Palestinian attacks against Israel. The question naturally arising from the discussion is why, despite the effectiveness of the security fence, Israel has maintained its presence in the West Bank? The chapter therefore now turns into Israel’s assertion of its need to retain its presence in the territory. The interviews with Tirza, Shay and Elkin illustrate well the Israeli view that despite the security fence, the presence of the IDF forces in the West Bank is essential to prevent Palestinian attacks, and to ensure Israel’s security in the absence of an overall peace with the Palestinians (Shay, 2014, Tirza, 2014, Elkin, 2014). Both Tirza and Shay, for example, strongly emphasised that whilst it is undisputable that the security fence has been one of the best tools to deal with the challenge of the Palestinian suicide attackers entering Israel, the fence, they argue, is one but not the only reason for the decline in the number of terror attacks against Israel (Shay, 2014, Tirza, 2014). For both, the full defence is a mixture of several factors: the presence of IDF forces in the West Bank, Israeli intelligence, the Israeli secret service, preventive arrest, the relationship with the PA, and the cooperation of security forces of
the PA (Tirza, 2014, Shay, 2014). But, the most important factor, according to Ze'ev Elkin, is the Israeli presence in the West Bank. As he told me:

Although the wall is a very important tactical measure to stop the terrorism, without Israeli forces operating on both sides of the fence that are in charge to prevent the crossing, the fence can be overcome. The solution to prevent terrorist attacks is to arrest the people who are trying to organise the terrorist attacks in different places and cities in Judea and Samaria. It is, therefore, not enough to build a wall because it is very likely they will find a way to jump over or go under it. The real way to stop terrorist activities, therefore, is to address the problem on the ground (Elkin, 2014)

Israel’s presence in the West Bank, along with its policies of closure that restricts movement within parts of the territory, is essential to prevent the terrorist attacks against Israel's citizens (Elkin, 2014). From a counterterrorism point of view, Byman argues, the policy of closure has made it hard for terrorist groups to carry an attack on Israel. Being encircled by IDF forces, and unable to move from place to place without fear of being arrested, Palestinian fighters have found it difficult to obtain weapons, conduct meetings, send messengers, and coordinate their activities (Byman, 2011: 158,163). Therefore, for Israel, whilst the fence has been an effective tool in the reduction of the Palestinian terrorist attacks, it cannot be considered as the only measure in curbing the attacks. Israel's presence in the West Bank is considered to be an important, if not the most crucial, factor to protect the security of Israel in the absence of the formal peace agreement with the Palestinians.

However, as it emerged during the data collection, the Israeli presence in the West Bank needs to be understood in the context of the lessons Israel has drawn from the events following Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, which will be discussed in the following section. The scenario that a withdrawal from the West Bank could lead to similar scenario constitutes another reason for Israel’s reluctance to withdraw from the West Bank. In light of this, the next section turns into the analysis of the events
following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and the lessons Israel can apply to what could follow a possible disengagement from the West Bank.

6.3.1 THE 'GAZA SCENARIO'

In September 2005, Sharon, then Israel's Prime Minister, evacuated all 8,500 Israeli settlers from 21 settlements and all the IDF forces from the Gaza Strip (Keller, 2014). For Israel, the withdrawal from the territory, one of the principal grievances raised by Palestinians, would lead to cessation of the violent attacks against Israel. What followed instead, was the exact opposite. When discussing the issue, Shay argued that it is particularly crucial to emphasise the fact that even before the fall of Fatah, and Hamas’s takeover of Gaza (see the next section), when the area was governed by the PA, under Abu Mazen, Hamas was already developing a huge rocket arsenal (Shay, 2014).

Without Israeli forces on the ground and their inability to enter Gaza, Hamas was able to build a military arsenal, supplied by Iran and smuggled through tunnels along the Sinai-Gaza borders. This subsequently led to an increase in attacks against Israel (Gold, 2014:19). For example, between 2005 and 2006, the number of attacks increased by more than 500 percent (Farkash, 2011: 69). Additionally, whilst prior to 2005 Palestinian organisations were using domestically produced rockets with a reach of 'only' seven kilometres, in the aftermath of the Israeli disengagement, they acquired the improvised Qassam rocket and heavy rocket fire, whose reach has extended to central Israel (Even, 2015:77, 80, Gold, 2014: 21-22). Despite three military campaigns in Gaza since the withdrawal, Israel has been unable to eliminate the threat of the rocket attacks (Tira, 2015:67). In July 2015, according to a survey carried out by the BESA, 63 percent of respondents in Israel said they had opposed the evacuation, while 51 percent say Israel should resettle the territory (Times of Israel, 2015b).
For the Israelis, therefore, the withdrawal from Gaza proved that, regardless of any territorial compromise, the Palestinians are still committed to armed struggle against Israel (Yaalon, 2014:11). What is more important, Shay argued, is that the Gaza disengagement provides a valuable lesson in what could follow a potential Israeli disengagement from the West Bank (Shay, 2014). Without Israeli military control on the ground, Shay argued:

I have no doubt that the future Palestinian state will be quickly overtaken by Hamas and turn into an additional terrorist haven or a mortar and rocket launching pad against Israel. They have the knowledge, and they have the capability to produce the same Qassam rockets in Judea and Samaria (Shay, 2014).

The fence, therefore, would be highly irrelevant if the threat of rocket attacks was to materialise in the West Bank. This scenario, Shay argued, has been clearly evident in the Gaza Strip. As he explained, in 1994 Israel built a similar fence on the borders between Israel and Gaza, which although proved to be a successful tool in preventing the suicide attackers entering Israel, in the absence of the IDF on the ground, the suicide attacks were replaced by rocket attacks against Israel. The security fence in the West Bank, therefore, Shay concludes, would become irrelevant if a sophisticated rocket system, similar to that in Gaza, was to be developed in the West Bank (Shay, 2014).

By taking the ‘Gaza case’ into consideration, according to Israeli narrative, Israel relies on defensible borders in the West Bank to protect itself against possible Palestinian rocket and other attacks. By withdrawing to the 1967 borders Israel's strategic position would be significantly weakened, posing a particularly serious threat due to the topography of the West Bank, which is characterised by high ground, virtually overlooking Israel’s major population centres from several thousand feet above (Yaalon, 2014:8, Dayan, 2011:26). This strategic position, Uzi Dayan explains, would allow 'an attacker clear advantages in terms of observation, fire, and defensive
capability against an Israeli counterattack' (Dayan, 2014:35-36). Therefore, if the Gaza situation was to repeat itself in the West Bank and terrorist forces were to employ fire rockets and mortars, with the range of more than 75 kilometres, as they have in Gaza, these attacks could strike the centre of Israel where more than 70 percent of the population resides, constituting an existential threat to Israel (Yaalon, 2014:12, 8). Therefore, many argue that, the presence of IDF forces in the West Bank, and especially in the Jordan Valley, is crucial to averting the smuggling of weapons and terrorists into the West Bank, as well as the introduction of mortars, rockets, and surface-to-air missiles in the area (Yadlin, 2014:17, Dyan, 2011:26).

The strategic importance of retaining a military presence in the Jordan Valley has been emphasised by all Israeli governments since 1967 (Brom, 2001), and since then the area has become the most critical component in Israeli thinking about defensible borders (Dayan, 2011:26). In an interview with me, Omer Bar-Lev, a member of Knesset for the Zionist Union and a member of Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, emphasised the assertion of the necessity of retaining control over the Jordan Valley. Although he believes that the resolution of the conflict requires an agreement with the Palestinians that would lead to the creation of the Palestinian state, consequently calling for the partial withdrawal from the West Bank, he emphasised the importance of retaining Israel's control along the Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert. As he argued, 'the control of these areas is crucial in preventing the ammunition, missiles and terrorist smuggling in the West Bank as it happened along the Gaza-Egyptian border' (Bar-Lev, 2014). While the IDF's presence in the Jordan Valley is strategically vital for the security of Israel, it is just one of the three factors that the security of Israel is dependent upon. The other two, Bar-Lev argued, are the ability of the PA to rule in the West Bank

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64 See Dayan (2011) for the analysis of the strategic value of retaining the Jordan Valley, p. 26-32
65 According to his peace initiative "It's in Our Hands". Proposal of an Israeli Political Initiative (2003), about 60 percent of the West Bank will be under Palestinian control.
and the fence between Israel and the West Bank. Once these three parameters are in place, he concluded, the potential threat of terrorist attacks from the West Bank, although it will still exist, it will be much lower (Bar-LEV, 2014).

6.3.2 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

As the previous section has illustrated, Israel is concerned that withdrawal from the West Bank would lead to the dramatic rise of violent attacks against Israel from the territory as it has witnessed following the disengagement from Gaza Strip. To avoid such a situation, such a potential withdrawal, according to the Israeli narrative, would highly depend on the PA's ability to provide a stable government and an effective rule of law in the West Bank. The PA's performance, as discussed in the previous chapter, however, raises concerns regarding the issue, and raises the question whether given the chance to build a state, the Palestinian state would even function? In light of this, it is now necessary to address the current state of the PA. The analysis is critical, as according to Israeli narrative, the weak state of the PA’s governance constitutes another reason for Israel's need to remain in the territory.

During the Oslo period, as illustrated in the previous chapter, the Fatah-dominated PA failed to provide effective government and the rule of law. The PA, under Arafat’s leadership, was characterised by corruption, a neo-patrimonial style of governance and repressive policies towards Palestinian civilians. The new government, elected in February 2005, under Fatah's leader Mahmoud Abbas, Ghanem argues, has suffered from Arafat’s legacy of one-party rule, internal friction, and corruption (Ghanem, 2010:113). Despite the electoral victory of Fatah, there was an evident decline in Fatah’s popularity and, by the end of 2005, the friction within Fatah, between 'old

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66 He is also known as Abu Mazen.
guard' and 'young guard', intensified and the movement was entangled in an internal struggle (Ghanem, 2010:110, Shikaki, 2007:6). Whilst the PA had been increasingly seen as corrupt and inefficient, Ziad Abu-Amr claims, Hamas, with its social and charity services, was seen as ‘a movement of integrity and clean conduct’ (Abu-Amr, 2007:171). Popular frustration with Fatah’s continuous failure to provide good governance, and to end Israeli occupation, was channelled into the January 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (Butenschon, 2007:91). With the total voter turnout reaching 77.7 percent, the Hamas Change and Reform list won 74 seats, 56 percent of the total number of council seats (Ghanem, 2010:125). The new status of Hamas's popularity was not a sudden phenomenon, but the culmination of a long history of the organisation's social and charitable activities but also a clear opposition to Israel’s occupation. From the very beginning of the Oslo process, Hamas rejected the Accords and refused to operate within the framework of the PA (Sayigh, 2006:73). The eruption of the second Intifada, thus the failure of the Oslo Peace Process, marked the beginning of a dramatic shift in the rise of Hamas’s strength and popularity vis-à-vis the PA (Abu-Amr, 2007:171).

The 2006 elections, Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki argue, once again demonstrated the internal frictions within Fatah. The party was internally divided over policy towards Hamas, with most of the young guards, led by Marwan Barghouti, blaming Fatah's defeat on the corruption and incompetence of the old guards. They called upon Fatah to accept Hamas’s victory and to form a coalition with the organisation (Sayigh, 2007:15-16, Shikaki, 2007:8). In the end, however, Fatah, threatened with an international
boycott by the US, rejected Hamas Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh's offer to form a national unity government (Sayigh, 2007:16). Shortly after, Abu Mazen announced his decision to establish an alternative government, led by Salam Fayyad, in an attempt to curb the growing power of Hamas (Ghanem, 2010:143). The intra-Palestinian conflict took a more tangible form in late 2006 and in 2007; for the first time since the occupation, more Palestinians were killed by intra-Palestinian fighting than by the IDF\(^\text{70}\) (Ghanem, 2010:143, UNDP, 2010:75). Despite the reconciliation agreement, the Mecca Accords, signed in February 2007 between Abbas, and Khaled Mish’al, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, which resulted in a formation of the National Unity Government (NUG), the conflict resumed four months later and the violent confrontation between Hamas and Fatah members and their militias intensified (Ghanem, 2010:181, Shikaki, 2015:5). In June 2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, expelling Fatah. The Hamas takeover led to the dissolution of the NUG and the formation of an emergency government by Fatah, headed by Salam Fayyad. The authority of the government was limited to the West Bank. Consequently, the Palestinian polity was divided into two entities, one in the Gaza Strip, controlled by Hamas, and one in the West Bank, controlled by Fatah (Shikaki, 2015:5-6). The latest attempt to reunite the two politically occurred in April 2014. The two signed an agreement in Gaza that led five weeks later to the formation of a national unity government led by technocrats headed by Rami al-Hamdallah (Shikaki, 2015:3). Despite the establishment of a unity government, the enmity between Fatah and Hamas remained. Following the 2014 Israeli Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, the reconciliation agreement in effect collapsed due to unwillingness on both sides to implement it\(^\text{71}\) (Brom et al., 2015:27).

\(^{70}\) At least 500 were killed as a result of internal fighting while 394 died from IDF related activities (UNDP, 2010:75).

\(^{71}\) See Brom et al (2015) for the analysis of the reasons behind the collapse of national unity government, p.27
The current political split between Hamas and Fatah, described above, has prevented the development of a stable political leadership among the Palestinians. When discussing current Palestinian political scene, Menachem Klein, a senior lecturer in political science at Bar-Ilan University, and a team member of the Geneva Initiative negotiation of 2003, stressed in an interview, it not only remains divided into two separate polities, but the political leadership within the West Bank is severely fragmented. As he argued:

Today the Palestinian polity is destroyed, there is no national movement: neither Fatah nor the PLO function as a movement. The Palestinian society became not only very divided, but it remains very atomised. They lose energy, activism, collective will, falling into a desperate mood. There is no collective here, there are many different atoms, cities, NGOs, or hamulas, clans, each acting independently (Klein, 2014).

Assad Ghanem, head of the Government and Political Philosophy Department at the School of Political Science, University of Haifa, and head of the Board of Ibn-Khaldun Association, goes even further arguing that not only the Palestinian political leadership is fragmented, but the PA also constitutes a failed regime (Ghanem, 2014). As he told me:

The ministers of the PA do not genuinely care about the Palestinians [...]. Even if some of them are interested in the future of Palestine, being aware that the Palestinian state is not going to be established in the near future, they concentrate their effort on their own interest (Ghanem, 2014).

Ghanem's claim is mirrored in the September 2015 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in the West Bank. According to the poll, the Palestinians identified the spread of corruption (24 percent) and poverty and unemployment (26 percent) as two of the most serious problems confronting Palestinian society today, only second and third to the Israeli occupation and settlement activities itself (28 percent) (PCPSR, 2015:6). Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands
at 79 percent (PCPSR, 2015:3). Furthermore, according to the poll, the level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas is as low as 38 percent, and 65 percent of the public want him to resign (PCPSR, 2015:2-3). In September 2015 (at the time of writing this chapter), when asked if new presidential elections were to be held and only two candidates were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win 49 percent (compared to 46 percent three months prior to the poll) and the latter 44 percent (compared to 47 percent three months ago prior to the poll) (PCPSR, 2015:2).

For Israel, the failing nature of the regime and the Palestinian dissatisfaction with its rule carry significant implications for its protracted presence in the territory. When discussing the issue with me, Zach Levey, Professor of International Relations at Haifa University, argued that this begs the question, whether Fatah will even survive an IDF withdrawal from the West Bank. As he argued, ‘let’s say that Israel pulls out suddenly and inexplicably from the West Bank. The question is what would happen then? There is a great possibility, he suggested, that Palestinian society would implode in a power struggle and communal violence’ (Levey, 2014). Such a situation would effectively lead to an increase in violent attacks against Israel, therefore, directly threaten its security.

As illustrated, the PA, riddled with political fragmentation, internal factions and corruption, constitutes a failed polity. The weak nature of the PA's governance is closely linked with the argument that the possible withdrawal from the West Bank may result in the outbreak of internal communal violence, and a possible Hamas taking over the territory. Israel, therefore, must take into account the reality that a Palestinian state could end up being ruled by Hamas, as it happened following Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza Strip.
6.3.3 ISRAEL'S NEIGHBOURS

As the above discussion illustrates, the protracted presence of Israel needs to be understood and analysed in the context of the lessons Israel has drawn from the events following Israeli disengagement from Gaza. Furthermore, in light of the PA’s failing governance, it is feared that a possible withdrawal from the area would repeat the 'Gaza scenario' and the territory would be quickly taken over by Hamas. However, as it became apparent during the interviews, to further understand the importance of maintaining the Israeli presence in the West Bank, it is crucial to understand the current strategic situation of Israel in the Middle East. For example, as Shay argued:

The Israel-Palestine conflict is seen by Israel through the prism of the wider picture of what is happening in the Middle East. It would be a strategic mistake if we analyse it as a separate issue and only focus on the threat of Palestinian terrorism. Palestinian terrorism is one of the threats we face today; however, the diversity of the potential threats is almost endless (Shay, 2014)

Israel's current strategic behaviour and its strategic thinking on security have been influenced by the recent upheavals in the Middle East. In an interview, Ehud Eiran, a Board Member at Mitvim and Assistant Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Science, University of Haifa acknowledged that the conventional threat of the regular Arab armies' invasion of Israel that threatened Israel since its establishment has almost entirely disappeared, and in terms of conventional attack Israel is now probably the strongest it has even been (partly because all the neighbours are weaker than ever). He stressed however that the threat to Israel's security has been replaced by the threat of non-state or semi-state entities, and jihadist movements. Whilst, on its eastern border, Israel, as described above, is faced with the threat of Hamas’s rockets attacks, on its northern borders Hezbollah, with its advanced military capabilities, which include over 100,000 missiles and rockets, shore-to-sea missiles,
anti-aircraft missiles, and more than 15,000 armed and well-organized fighters, poses even greater threat (Eiran, 2014, Amidror, 2015b:33). In addition to the two entities, both opposing the very existence of the state of Israel, in the recent years, Israel has been surrounded by ongoing violence of an increasing number of jihadist groups across its borders with Syria and the Sinai Peninsula: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), aided by various Salafi jihadi groups in Syria, and radical Salafists and representatives of ISIS across its borders in the Sinai Peninsula (Dekel et al, 2014:128). Although, as Udi Dekel and Omer Einav argue, Israel has been relatively immune to the surrounding upheaval, Yossi Kuperwasser maintains, Israel cannot be certain this immunity will continue (Dekel and Einav, 2015:49,51, Kuperwasser , 2014:62). According to Dore Gold, the recent history of the Middle East demonstrates:

> It is hard to calculate the political situation in the region in the near or far future. Israel's long-term planning cannot be based on a snapshot of reality in a given year, but has to take into account different possible ways the military balance in the Middle East can evolve over time (Gold, 2014:22)

There are many possible scenarios, which although may seem unrealistic now, could materialise in the near future. The situation, Dekel and Einav suggest, may dramatically change in the case of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra successfully completing a takeover of Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, posing a direct threat to Israel (Dekel and Einav, 2015:49,51). Israel should also consider a scenario of the radical Islamic groups trying to destabilise Jordan or to exploit its territory as a launching pad for terror attacks and military operations against Israel via Palestinian territory (Yaalon, 2014:12). Additionally, according to Gold, Israel should take into account the eventual recovery of Arab states armies, which, according to him, are bound to rebuild their ground forces as a prerequisite for acquiring the capability to hold together multi-ethnic states with rebellious provinces (Gold, 2014:25). There is also uncertainty regarding potential
alliances and alignments that can emerge in the Arab world over the coming years (Dayan, 2014:38).

Furthermore, according to the Israeli narrative, the vulnerability of Israel's strategic position in the region, and the need for the defensible borders cannot be fully understood without analysing the potential threat of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although this thesis does not concentrate on Iran-Israeli relations and Iran does not border Israel, during the data collection, it had repeatedly been emphasised that Israel's strategic behaviour with regards to its security is highly influenced by Iran’s recent activities that have directly threatened Iran poses to Israel's security. This following section therefore briefly examines the 'Iranian factor' in the wider context of Israel's assertion of its need to stay in the West Bank.

Whilst writing this thesis, on July 14, 2015, Iran and the P5+1, the UN Security Council's five permanent members, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany, reached an agreement over Iran's nuclear programme. In short, the agreement aims to stop the Iranian nuclear programme, by placing limitations on the enrichment of uranium and on the plutonium path, thus preventing Iran from acquiring the fissile material needed for the production of a bomb. In exchange, the agreement lifts the economic sanctions against Iran\(^{72}\) (Foreign Policy, 2015, Evron, 2015:5-6). Following the announcement of the agreement, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, criticised the agreement, describing it a 'stunning historic mistake'. He further stated:

By not dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, in a decade this deal will give an unreformed, unrepentant and far richer terrorism regime the capacity to produce

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\(^{72}\) For the full text of the deal 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' see http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/read-the-full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-here/
many nuclear bombs; in fact, an entire nuclear arsenal, with the means to deliver it [...] (Netanyahu, in The Times of Israel, 2015a)

If Iran developed nuclear weapons, this would pose one of the greatest threats to Israel.

As Goren told me, 'practically, if Iran acquires a nuclear bomb, we will have a candidate who is able to annihilate the country. However, whether they want to do so, it is a different question' (Goren, 2014). For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis is limited to Israel’s concerns regarding the lifting of sanctions and Iran’s support of anti-Israel terrorist organisations. As Netanyahu stresses:

The elimination of some of the sanction posed on the country will provide Iran with a 'cash bonanza [which] will fuel Iran's terrorism worldwide, its aggression in the region and its efforts to destroy Israel, which are ongoing' (Netanyahu, in The Times of Israel, 2015a).

Six months since the framework agreement was announced in Lausanne and three months after the agreement was signed, Netanyahu seemed to materialise. In his October 2015 speech to the UN General Assembly, Netanyahu raised his concerns regarding Iran’s recent behaviour:

Iran boosted its supply of devastating weapons [and] soldiers of its Revolutionary Guard into Syria, [...] shipped tons of weapons and ammunitions to the Houthi rebels in Yemen [...]. Iran threatened to topple Jordan. Iran’s proxy Hezbollah smuggled into Lebanon SA-22 missiles to down our planes, and Yakhont cruise missiles to sink our ships. Iran supplied Hezbollah with precision-guided surface-to-surface missiles and attack drones so it can accurately hit any target in Israel. Iran aided Hamas and Islamic Jihad in building armed drones in Gaza. Iran also made clear its plans to open two new terror fronts against Israel, promising to arm Palestinians in the West Bank and sending its Revolutionary Guard generals to the Golan Heights, from which its operatives recently fired rockets on northern Israel. [...] Every few weeks, Iran and Hezbollah set up new terror cells in cities throughout the world. Three such cells were recently uncovered in Kuwait, Jordan and Cyprus (Netanyahu, in Haaretz, 2015)

Netanyahu concluded by saying, ‘now just imagine what Iran will do after those sanctions are lifted’ (Netanyahu, in Haaretz, 2015). The lifting of sanctions, is predicted to facilitate the immediate influx of more than USD100 billion to Iran, as well as
additional billions of dollars over the coming decade, is feared therefore to provide additional support for the anti-Israel entities (Yadlin, 2015:2). Amos Yadlin argues that 'just a fraction of this sum would be enough to triple the annual budget of terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad' (Yadlin, 2015:2). And indeed, since the deal was signed, Avi Issacharoff, and Shlomo Brom and Yoel Guzansky report, Iran has significantly increased its financial support for Hamas and Hezbollah (Issacharoff, 2015, Brom and Guzansky, 2015). According to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, in February 2016, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon announced Iran's plan to give financial support of USD 7,000 to the families of each Palestinian who died committing attacks in Israel, and an additional USD 30,000 to every Palestinian family whose house is demolished by Israel (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2016).

For Israel, the lifting of the sanctions and the increased support for the anti-Israeli groups is further troubling looking at the continuous Iran's messages of its commitment to eradicate Israel. Only two months after signing the agreement, the Times of Israel reported that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, wrote on Twitter that 'Israel will not survive the next 25 years', and that 'the Jewish state will be hounded until it is destroyed' (The Times of Israel, 2015c). Also, according to Netanyahu, Major General Salehi, the commander of Iran’s army, stated that: 'we will annihilate Israel for sure. [...] We are glad that we are at the forefront of executing the Supreme Leader’s order to destroy Israel' (Netanyahu, in Haaretz, 2015)

It is evident from the above analysis that, according to the Israeli narrative, Israel currently faces a large number of potential threats, and that the threat of Palestinian attacks against Israel constitutes an important, but not the only, rationale behind Israel's presence in the West Bank. Although it is hard to predict how the political situation across Israel’s borders will unravel in the long or even near future, according to the
Israeli narrative, Israel needs to take into account all the possible scenarios of potential threats transforming into actual, immediate threats across its borders. In such an uncertain situation, according to the Israeli narrative, Israel's security is entirely dependent on maintaining defensible borders. Withdrawal to the 1967 line, would leave Israel with a 'narrow waist' of eight miles (the distance between the coastal cities of its central region and the West Bank under Jordanian occupation), making Israel's position very vulnerable in case of invasion (Gold, 2014:19, Dayan, 2014:35). It is not an accident, Elkin told me, we refer to these borders as 'Auschwitz borders' (Elkin, 2014). Israel's presence in the West Bank, particularly in the Jordan Valley area, therefore enables Israel to prevent the infiltration of radical groups into the West Bank and weapons smuggling. Therefore, according to Israel's narrative, Palestinian direct violence against Israel, as well as the violence of semi-state and non-state radical groups, constitutes an explanation for the Israeli use of structural violence.

6.3.4 PALESTINIAN CULTURAL VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE OF WORDS

Another reason for the Israeli assertion of its need to maintain its presence in the West Bank is the continuous Palestinian cultural violence. For that reason, the chapter turns now to the examination of the PA's messages transmitted through the PA's official media and educational system, which justify, rationalise, and even glorify the use of direct violence against Israel. The analysis provides another explanation for Israel’s fear of relinquishing its control over the West Bank.

As shown in Chapter Four, Palestinian direct and cultural violence constituted the most important factor in the failure of the Oslo Peace Process and the outbreak of the second Intifada. The issue of incitement, as illustrated in Chapter Three, has been incorporated in the Oslo Accords, and since then the need for a complete cessation of incitement was
further emphasised in the Roadmap\(^7\), and in the 2007 Annapolis Agreement (Kuperwasser and Fredman, 2012:55). My interview with Itamar Marcus, the founder and director of the PMW, concentrated on the issue of incitement in the conflict and its impact of the intractability of the conflict. Marcus emphasised that despite Israel's continuous emphasis on the damaging impact of Palestinian incitement on Israeli-Palestinian relations, since its inception, and to this day, the PA has failed to deliver on its public commitments to stop incitement to hatred and violence against Israel (Marcus, 2014). The PA, he argues continues to convey messages to its public, containing three major themes, that fundamentally question its commitment to peace with Israel: the denial of Israel’s right to exist as a state, demonization and dehumanisation of 'the Zionist' Jews in general and Israelis in particular: and all forms of struggle, including terrorist attacks, are legitimate in principle (Marcus, 2014). The messages will now be analysed in more detail.

The denial of Israel’s right to exist as a state regularly features in Palestinian official rhetoric. In contrast to official PA statements delivered to the international public in English, recognising the state of Israel and its right to a peaceful existence, the PA and Fatah officials’ messages conveyed to the Palestinian public frequently deny Israel’s legitimacy, or Israel’s historical connection to the land, presenting the state of Israel as nothing more than a foreign colonial invasion. Not only has Israel no legitimacy in this land, the PA often denies Israel’s existence at all (Marcus, 2014). As Marcus told me:

The PA actively displays maps in PA officials’ offices, official events, education and official media, disregarding Israel's existence by showing the whole area between the Sea and the Jordan River as ‘Palestine’. We [the PMW] have documented hundreds of examples of official PA TV programmes for children, youth, and adults that present the world in which Israel does not exist. Israeli

\(^7\) A plan for the resolution of the conflict proposed by the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations),
cities, such as Haifa, or Jaffa, are presented as 'occupied Palestinian cities (Marcus, 2014).

Discussing the issue, Heller told me:

The domestic narrative, which is mostly in Arabic, and reflected in educational curricula of the Palestinian schools, and the content of the Palestinian-controlled media, signals the message of the traditional Fatah or the PLO position which is we are ready to make some kind of political agreement that gives us an independent state, but we are not really committed to that forever. And that is really a stage in the liberation of all of Palestine (Heller, 2014)

Any agreement with Israel, therefore, does not negate the legitimacy of the struggle, but merely constitutes a stage in a struggle for a total liberation of the land between the sea and the river. This, of course, according to Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik, has very serious implications. Instead of being educated to see Israel as a legitimate and permanent neighbour, young Palestinians learn to anticipate and envision the world without Israel (Marcus and Zilberdik, 2011:5).

The second theme that regularly appears in the Palestinian messages is the demonisation and dehumanisation of 'the Zionist'- Jews in general and Israelis in particular (Marcus, 2014). According to Marcus:

Weekly PA TV children’s programmes show children reciting poems that present Israelis/Jews as ‘enemies of Allah', ‘sons of pigs’, ‘raping women in the cities squares’, ‘most evil among Allah’s creations', 'wild animals', 'barbaric monkeys and wretched pigs', 'murders of Allah’s prophet's, or ‘the Zionist enemy’ (Marcus, 2014)

Not only are the Jews demonised and dehumanised, Marcus argues, the official PA’s public figures regularly disseminate libels and spread false messages about Israel and the conflict with the Palestinians. Israel has been regularly accused of acts, such as spreading AIDS, drugs and prostitution among the Palestinians, stealing organs from Palestinian prisoners, performing medical experiments on prisoners, murdering Arafat,
or that Israel is plotting to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Marcus, 2014). Marcus argues that the libels regarding Israel's plan to destroy the Mosque are particularly problematic. As he pointed out:

Let’s remember that the Second Intifada, which resulted in the death of thousands of Israelis, started over a claim that Sharon defiled the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Today, not a week goes by without some official spreading libels about Israel's intentions to destroy the Mosque. Only recently, Abbas said that ‘Israel is doing excavations on the Al-Aqsa mosque which will bring its collapse’, knowing full well that it is untrue. Other claims are that Israel is spreading chemicals at night and removing the traces throughout the day, or that the Israeli army built a replica of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and its surroundings so it can practice attacking it and destroying it over and over until they will get it perfect. So they [the PA] use this most sensitive issue, trying to stir religious hatred. And as we know from history, this hatred leads to violence (Marcus, 2014).

The third main message the PA is sending out, according to Marcus, is that all forms of struggle, including terrorist attacks, are legitimate in principle (Marcus, 2014). The decision as to which form to employ is made according to the circumstances (Kuperwasser and Fredman, 2012:56). Violence is not only legitimised, but it is actively encouraged (Marcus, 2014). Firstly, violence is promoted by the PA by depicting Israel as a danger to Palestinian culture, as illustrated above, and frequently terming them the 'enemy'. As Israel's alleged goal is to inflict harm and suffering on Palestinians, the obligation of Palestinians is to defend themselves against this 'enemy' (Marcus and Zilberdik, 2011:101). PA textbooks, for example, although they do not call directly for attacks against Israel or Jews, include numerous texts that present the armed struggle for Palestine in a positive manner (Kuperwasser and Fredman, 2012:57). Moreover, as Shamir told me, ‘terrorists’ who have fought against the 'enemy' are honoured and depicted by the PA as Palestinian heroes (Shamir, 2014). Terror glorification, Marcus argues, exists in countless contexts, including naming streets, sporting events, schools, or summer camps or ceremonies after different terrorists. In this way, the PA honours terrorists as role models for children and youth, and presents terrorism, not only as
legitimate but as a way to achieve high social status (Marcus, 2014). While describing
terror attacks as counterproductive and calling for popular nonviolent resistance,
Kuperwasser and Fredman report, on a number of occasions Abbas himself glorified
and praised terrorists (Kuperwasser and Fredman, 2012:56).

Secondly violence is actively encouraged by depicting the conflict as a religious battle
for Islam (Marcus, 2014). In recent years, PA political and religious leaders have
employed an Islamic ideology, previously associated exclusively with Hamas. It
presents the conflict with Israel as a Ribat, a mandatory religious war to defend and
liberate the land (including the land of the state of Israel) that is said to be Islamic
(Marcus and Zilberdik, 2010:101-106). Although Ribat can involve passive as well as
military means analysing the PA statements, Marcus argued, Ribat has been termed to
involve direct violence (Marcus, 2014). The depiction of the conflict as a religious
conflict, according to him, has very important implications:

It prevents any possibility of a political agreement with the Palestinians because
any agreement would only deal with the Palestinian nationalism. It does not deal
with the fact that the Palestinian children are being taught that they are involved
in one of the greatest of Ribats to liberate the land, that is already Islamic, and it
is being ruined by infidels that are controlling it. That does not go away even if
the PA signs a peace agreement because that cannot be long-term or lasting as
the land is not just “Palestine”; it is Islamic holy land, and Islam prohibits any
Muslim from leaving it in the hands of Israel. Even if the Palestinian nationalist
wants to accept peace with Israel, the Palestinian Muslims cannot (Marcus,
2014)

As demonstrated above, as far as the Israeli narrative is concerned, the PA's discourse
legitimates and encourages the use of violence against Israel, by denying Israel's
legitimacy or existence as a state, and presenting it as a threat, not only to the
Palestinians but also to Islam. Cultural violence then legitimises and justifies the use of
direct violence against Israel, making it acceptable or even glorifiable.
A more problematic way of promoting violence against Israelis, and glorifying the terrorism against the state of Israel, Elkin told me, is the PA formal system of paying salaries to the Palestinian terrorists and their families (Elkin, 2014). As he explained:

Today the most payable position in the PA is to be a terrorist held in Israeli prisons. The PA formally pays huge salaries to the families of Palestinian terrorists who carried out violent attacks against Israeli civilians. The amount of the salaries depends on how many people they ‘succeeded’ to kill (Elkin, 2014)

The process of awarding salaries, Edwin Black explains, is quite complex and involves PA senior officials studying details of each terrorist act before salaries are issued. The monthly amount depends on the length of Israeli jail sentences, which in practice depend on the severity of the crime and the number of people killed and/or injured (Black, 2015). In 2014, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that former prisoners who were imprisoned for more than 15 years receive grants of 2,000 USD per year of imprisonment, for a maximum amount of 50,000 USD. Additionally, those who served at least 25 years in prison will be awarded the equivalent rank of major-general in the security forces or of a deputy minister in the PA, both of which earn monthly wages of nearly 4,000 USD. Terrorists who were imprisoned for 15-25 years will receive over 2,800 USD every month (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a). The amounts of money being paid to the Israeli terrorists are particularly shocking, Elkin argued, when contrasted with the average monthly salaries of Palestinian workers in the West Bank, which, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2014 stood at 641 dollars (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a). As Elkin further discussed:

Five percent of the Palestinian budget is used for this purpose. It is a huge percentage comparable to the cost of the whole Israeli health system. Moreover, this sum is equivalent to 15 percent of international aid the PA receives. This, of course, means that the big part of the foreign aid money is going to the salaries for the terrorists, including suicide bombers (Elkin, 2014)
According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, providing financial support for Palestinian terrorists 'gives an official stamp of approval to terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians', and it 'encourages further terrorist outrages' (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a). As discussed in Chapter Three, cultural, structural and direct violence are interlinked. The underlying assumption here is that ‘violence breeds violence’, and the reaction to cultural violence is often structural and direct violence. Although cultural violence does not result in direct harm, it helps to rationalise the use of direct violence making it morally acceptable and justifiable. As discussed above, it is clear that cultural violence of glorification of violence, the messages of hate, and denial of Israel's right to exist based on religion or ideology conveyed in the PA' messages, encourages the use of direct violence. The violent rhetoric produces a culture of hatred, which in consequence provides fertile ground for Palestinian direct violence (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b:16). Cultural violence, therefore, plays an important role in understanding the protraction of the conflict as it makes the use of direct violence justified and rationalised in the Palestinian public consciousness.

Furthermore, Paul Shindman of the Israel Project, a nonpartisan educational institute, pointed out in an interview:

constant praise for anybody killed as a martyr in a holy war against Zionists, and the large amount of money paid to the families of suicide bombers, not only conveys a clear message to the Palestinians of all generations that violence against Israel is legitimate and endorsed by the PA, but it also conveys a clear message to the Israeli public that the Palestinians do not want peace with Israel (Shindman, 2014)

Palestinian cultural violence, therefore, not only stimulates Israeli animosity towards the Palestinians but makes it so much harder for the Israelis to conclude that once Israel withdraws from the West Bank, there will be peace between the two peoples. When discussing the issue in an interview, Shamir, posed a question: ‘how can the Israeli public trust that the withdrawal from the West Bank and consequently, the creation of a
Palestinian state, will bring peace between the two people when terrorism is being promoted in the PA's official media?’ This, he argued, raises the question whether a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, which would give Palestinians only 22 percent of what they consider being their homeland, would be acceptable to the Palestinian national movement, or simply would be considered as a temporary stage of liberation (Shamir, 2014). Discussing the issue, Elkin claimed that the withdrawal to the 1967 borders would undoubtedly lead to the former scenario. As he argued:

Any kind of agreement with the Palestinians will be only a new stage of the conflict, as the real reason for the conflict is the Palestinian problem of recognising the possibility of a Jewish state in any of this area. We were outside of Samaria and Judea and the half of Jerusalem until 1967, and still there was very tough conflict and violence. This begs the question: why? Because the issue is not the dispute of the territories, it is the issue of the possibility of the Jewish state here (Elkin, 2014)

Netanyahu shares the same view on the reason as to the protraction of the conflict. The messages the PA continues to convey, Netanyahu argues, provide an additional ‘proof that we are not talking about a disagreement over territory, rather about the rejection of Israel’s existence'. Therefore, the root of the conflict, according to the Prime Minister is 'the refusal to recognise – and educate for – the existence of the state of the Jews' (Netanyahu, in Gur, 2014).

When discussing the protraction of the conflict, Marcus argued that issues such as the security fence are only a small part of the problem but the problem is much deeper:

I think the ideologies that have been expressed throughout the official PA world are actually at the core of the problem. They are creating another Palestinian generation that will never want to make peace with Israel. If the Palestinians were complaining about the security fence, that would be a legitimate complaint. I disagree with it as Israel needed it because of the suicide bombings, but it is an absolutely legitimate complaint. However, what we document here is the endless demonization of Israel, false libels, denial of Israel's right to exist both on nationalistic and religious grounds, hate incitement and glorification of violence. These things are creating such a negative picture of Israelis and Jews that is not going to be erased by any territorial adjustment or even a change of wall (Marcus, 2014)
Therefore, as this suggests, for many Israelis, the Palestinian lack of acceptance of the state of Israel, seems to constitute the principal problem in the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, as it was the case with Palestinian direct violence, cultural violence should be seen in a wider context of the anti-Israel incitement in the region. As David Pollock, who has been studying the issue of the Palestinian incitement for several years, argues:

> Israelis are the targets of not only Palestinian animosity but also of anti-Israel incitement from across the Arab world; thus, the Palestinian polemic against Israel is viewed from an already defensive, sensitised perspective (Pollock, 2013:78)

Palestinian anti-Israel incitement, therefore, cannot be seen and interpreted as an isolated case study, but has to be seen in the context of a general lack of acceptance of the state of Israel in the region. As Tirza argued:

> They see us as a colonial project, and as colonialism is gone from all over the world, some Arabs believe that Israel will vanish from the area too. As they say, it will take sabr (‘patience’ in Arabic). But there are a lot of other Arabs who say ‘let’s help them go away’ (Tirza, 2014)

Israeli sensitivity on the issue of incitement, therefore, needs to be understood in the wider context of the anti-Israel rhetoric in the region.

To conclude, as the above sections illustrate, the study of Palestinian cultural violence provides (another) justification for Israel’s presence in the West Bank. Fear or the reluctance to withdraw from the area is largely rooted in lessons learned from past experience- the disengagement from Gaza- which led to the area becoming a launching site for Hamas rockets. For Israel, the argument that the same may follow a possible withdrawal from the West Bank is strengthened by the weak state of the PA’s governance and legitimacy. The defensive measures such as fence or the policy of closure, what the Palestinians see as the structural violence of the matrix of control, are
seen by Israelis as a reaction to Palestinian direct violence and cultural violence. According to the Israeli narrative, the Israeli presence in the West Bank, however, cannot be fully understood without examining the wider context of the volatile and unpredictable situation along all Israel's borders. All these factors, together with the troubled history of the state of Israel, and the history of the Jewish people, as analysed in Chapter Three, make the Israeli government reluctant and unwilling to risk the security of its citizens. For Israel therefore, the fence, although being over ten years old, still constitutes a temporary measure until the final Palestinian-Israeli agreement is signed and the situation in the region is more stable.

6.4 CONCLUSION

According to Israel's narrative, the fence illustrates the fact that, despite numerous attempts to reach peace with the Palestinians, the security of the Israeli citizens remains under the threat of Palestinian direct violence. The fence, therefore, has been a crucial security measure to reduce and prevent the Palestinian terror attacks against the state of Israel. The fence, however, as illustrated, cannot be considered as the sole measure to protect Israel’s security but only as one of many components of the Israeli security system, with the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories considered as the most effective. There are few factors, which over the years, has strengthened Israeli assertion of its need to remain the territory. First, the possible withdrawal from the West Bank, and the Israeli reluctance to do so, as illustrated, needs to be seen in a wider context of the lessons Israel can draw from the disengagement from the Gaza Strip. For the Israelis, the withdrawal demonstrates the fact that, despite the territorial compromise, such violence has not ceased, and despite three Israeli military campaigns in the area, Israelis still live under the threat of Hamas rocket attacks.
Another source of concern for Israel is the weak nature of the PA’s governance. Riddled with the problems of internal factionalism and corruption, the PA's status of a failed polity, fills Israel with a fear that, without the Israeli presence on the ground, the West Bank would quickly be overtaken by Hamas, and subsequently would become a launching pad for Hamas rockets, as it was the case in Gaza. In such a situation, the security fence would, therefore, be irrelevant considering the topography of the state of Israel. Moreover, Israel's assertion of its need to retain a presence in the territory has been strengthened by recent events across Israel's borders. Israel finds itself surrounded by a region in serious turmoil. The outcome and ultimately long-term effects of the current situation are impossible to predict. Whilst, the possibility of a military land-based attack from the eastern border, has diminished significantly because of the weakened military position of neighbouring regimes, the threat of border incursions by the semi-state actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and jihadist actors remains high. Israel’s strategic thinking has also been influenced by the 'Iranian factor'. It is feared that now relieved of international sanctions, Iran will soon be able to project more power across Israel's borders, and to provide even more economic and military support to two of Israel's other arch-enemies: Hezbollah and Hamas. The territories of the West Bank, especially the Jordan Valley, provide Israel with a strategic depth over its neighbours in case any of the potential threats were to materialise.

Lastly, the study of Palestinian cultural violence strengthens the Israeli conviction of its necessity to retain, not only the security fence but its presence in the West Bank. According to Israeli narrative, the PA’s official discourse, that has continued to deny the legitimacy of Israel, promote hatred of the Jews, and glorify violence against the state of Israel, provides additional proof that Palestinians reject a peaceful solution to the conflict. For Israel, such a violent rhetoric confirms the fear that a potential withdrawal
from the West Bank would only constitute a first stage in the Palestine struggle to liberate all of the historical Palestine, leading, therefore, to more violence in its direct form. If the violence is publicly glorified and financially awarded, the message the PA sends to its public is that direct violence is acceptable and justified. On the other hand, Palestinian cultural violence produces animosity towards the Palestinian population among Israelis and strengthens the belief that the Israeli presence in the West Bank is essential to protect Israel's security. All these factors need to be analysed concurrently to understand the Israeli protracted use of structural violence. According to Israeli narrative, Palestinian direct violence, and the wider lack of acceptance of the state of Israel in the region, therefore, is seen as a reason for protraction of the conflict.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE WALL AND THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: PALESTINIAN NARRATIVE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to provide Palestinian narrative on the purpose of the wall\textsuperscript{74}, the reasons as to its permanence, and the reasons for the continuation of the conflict. This is done by answering the same three research questions posed in the previous chapter: (1) what was the immediate reason behind the construction of the fence?; (2) Why does the fence remain on the ground?; (3) Why, despite measures such as the security fence, the conflict remains unresolved, and Israel occupation continues? The answer to these questions is based placed within the framework of Galtung’s (vicious) cycle of violence. The chapter is divided into three parts. It starts with an analysis of the Palestinian account of the reasons behind the creation of the wall. The chapter argues that, according to the Palestinian narrative, the wall has little or nothing to do with security. It is just the latest measure in the long history of the Israeli strategy of displacement carried out by structural violence of the Israeli matrix of control.

Secondly, the construction of the wall is placed within the wider context of the complex structure of Israeli control. It is argued that the wall needs to be understood as a part of the system of the Israeli matrix of control aimed at displacing and tightening its grip over Palestinians. The wall, it is argued, constitutes another example of Israeli violence, built into violent social and economic structures, manifesting itself as a deprivation of basic human needs, fragmentation and marginalisation. The third part of the chapter seeks to address the question why, despite measures such as the security fence, Israel

\textsuperscript{74} As this chapter deals with the Palestinian narrative, it refers to the barrier as wall.
maintains the occupation of the West Bank and how, despite wide international
condemnation, Israeli structural violence of occupation has continued uninterrupted and
its impact often been ignored, minimized and, to a certain extent, rationalized by a large
sector of Israeli society? The chapter employs the concept of cultural violence, and it
concentrates on Israel's public messages, transmitted through Israeli officials' statements
and the Israeli education system, which delegitimises and dehumanises the Palestinians,
and denies them their political and historical right to their land. These messages, it will
be argued, have helped to justify and rationalise Israeli structural violence in Israeli
public consciousness, making Israeli occupation look 'right' or at least acceptable. The
chapter decidedly relies on the interview with Nurit Peled-Elhanan, an Israeli professor
at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who over the past years has conducted extensive
analysis of Israeli textbooks.

7.2 WALL: THE LATEST ELEMENT OF THE ISRAELI STRUCTURAL
VIOLENCE

For Palestinians, the construction of the barrier has little or nothing to do with securing
Israel’s security. The wall constitutes just the latest measure in Israel’s quest for its
long-term strategy, discussed in detail in Chapter Four, of maximising the Israeli rule of
Palestinian land and tightening its control over the Palestinians. The annexation of
Palestinian land, not security, as Israel claims, was a primary reason behind the
construction of the wall. My interview with Jamal Juma, the head of the Palestinian
human rights organisation 'Stop the Wall', provides an insight into the Palestinian
perception of the purpose of the wall and the reasons as to its permanence. Juma started
his discussion on the wall by categorically rejecting two of the Israeli claims regarding
the fence. Firstly, he dismissed the Israeli claim of the wall’s temporary nature. As he
pointed out, anyone who travelled along the wall can see it is a permanent project
(Juma, 2014). The wall, according to B'Tselem, is the largest and costliest infrastructure
project Israel has undertaken since the construction of the national water carrier during the 1950s and 1960s (B’Tselem, 2012:5). The cost of construction and maintenance until the end of 2010, reached 9.49 billion shekels (some 2.5 billion USD) (B’Tselem, 2012:15). Secondly, Juma rejected the Israeli security rationale, as the sole motivation behind the construction of the wall (Juma, 2014). There is a consensus among Palestinians, as well as the Israeli peace activists, interviewed for this project, that security was a secondary reason for the wall, or perhaps even an excuse to justify the project. In an interview, Dolphin, a barrier specialist at the UNOCHA, argued that although the official justification for the construction was to provide security for Israeli citizens, he does not accept that security was the sole or main motif behind the construction. He further explained that it was a 'security plus' motivation. Sharon, he continued, initially fiercely opposed to the plans of the construction of the barrier, realised he could not withstand public pressure for its construction. Instead, he directed all his efforts to change the route to include as many settlements as possible on the ‘Israeli side’ of the fence (Dolphin, 2014). Similarly, Klein told me:

Whilst the Israeli centre thought about security only, what Sharon had in mind was the annexation of as much territory [of the West Bank] as possible. Security was only used as a phrase to market the concept to the Israeli public (Klein, 2014)

Sharon was granted an unprecedented degree of freedom in determining the route of the wall. According to Government Decision 2077, ‘the precise and final route will be determined by the prime minister and the minister of defence’ (Dolphin, 2006:51). As Klein further explained, Sharon worked personally on each kilometre of the route, with Danny Tirza, who became the head of the team building it, to maximise the amount of land he could annex (Klein, 2014). According to the official stance of the PLO, the wall, or, as it refers to it, the Annexation Wall, is the clearest physical example of Israel’s
system of colonisation (NAD-PLO, 2013:10). As Saeb Erekat, the Head of Negotiations Affairs Department PLO argues:

Both the settlements and the Wall are built for the same reason. But that reason has little to do with security and everything to do with Israel’s project of colonisation that aims at taking as much Palestinian land as possible while pushing Palestine’s people into ever-shrinking Bantustans (NAD-PLO, 2014)

For Palestinians therefore, the construction of the wall was part and parcel of a continued intentional strategy of seizing more Palestinian land. Although the route has undergone several changes (some of them as a result of the ICJ and/or the Israel’s High Court rulings based on its illegality under international law), some 85 percent of the barrier’s route runs inside the West Bank, rather than along the Green Line (B’Tselem, 2007:17, UNOCHA, 2014c:3). Despite Israel’s assurances that the barrier will not result in the annexation of any Palestinian lands, nor will it establish any borders, upon completion75, the wall will place 9.4 percent of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem on the 'Israeli' side of the wall. The inclusion of Israeli settlements behind the barrier is widely recognised as a major factor behind the departure of the route from the green line. The annexed area includes eight industrial zones and 82 settlements (B’Tselem, 2012:13). Once the wall is completed, over 85 percent of the total estimated 500,000 settler populations will be located on the Israeli side of the barrier, in the area between the green line and the barrier’s route (UNOCHA, 2013, Al-Haq, 2013:25). Like in the case of the settlements expansion, to secure the sufficient amount of land needed for the wall’s construction, Al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights organisation, reports, land appropriation and property destruction have been the modus operandi for the Israeli Ministry of Defence. The Israeli army seized 30,261 dunams76 of land in the West Bank (88 percent of that reported to be private lands belonging to Palestinian

75 At the time of writing this chapter, 60 percent of the barrier has been completed.
76 A measure of land area used in parts of the former Turkish empire. It is equal to about 900 square metres (Oxford Dictionary, 2016)
residents\textsuperscript{77}, destroying Palestinian houses and agricultural property (Al-Haq, 2013:28, B'Tselem, 2012:14, B'Tselem, 2006: 5). In addition to the destruction of Palestinian private properties, the construction of the wall annexed vital Palestinian water resources, actively destroying Palestinian wells, irrigation systems and natural drainage systems (Al-Haq, 2013:28).

As the above section illustrates, for Palestinians, the wall constitutes nothing but an intentional strategy of annexing Palestinian land and depriving Palestinians of vital resources. The impact of the wall, however, goes far beyond the confiscation of Palestinian land and water resources. This section, therefore, turns to an analysis of the further impact the wall has had on the Palestinian population of the West Bank. The analysis reveals similarities between the mechanisms of the wall to that of other elements of the Israel ‘matrix of control’, analysed in detail in the Chapter Five. The wall, consequently, can be understood as another mechanism of the system, and analysed as another example of Israeli structural violence. Although apart from the broad term-the state of Israel or the government of Israel-there is no identified ‘oppressor’, who directly harms, violence is built into the complex social, political and economic structure of the Israeli ‘matrix of control’, and clearly manifests itself as unequal power and resources distribution. Israeli structural violence produces a concentration of resources for Israelis, at the expense of the Palestinians, consequently giving rise to exploitation, fragmentation, marginalisation and needs deprivation, the major elements of structural violence. For that reason, it is argued the wall has to be understood in a broader context of the mechanism of the Israeli ‘matrix of control’.

\textsuperscript{77} 179 dunams (0.6 percent) are lands owned by Israeli citizens. The remainder, amounting to 3,460 dunams (11.4 percent of the land), is land that Israel has been declared as “state land” or that was registered as such during the British mandate period (B’Tselem, 2012:14)
As illustrated in Chapter Five, by 2000, the Palestinian territories were severely fragmented by Israeli settlements, with the associated social and security infrastructure, and the Palestinian freedom of movement severely restricted by the physical obstacles such as Israeli checkpoints. The construction of the wall has led to a further fragmentation of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank. It established two main enclaves, imposing further restrictions on the Palestinian freedom of movement between, and within them. The first main enclave includes the villages and farmland lying between the wall and the green line (B'Tselem, 2007:17). The majority of the area has been designated as a ‘closed military area’ or ‘Seam Zone’ (UNOCHA, 2010:4). Around 11,000 Palestinians, living in 32 communities, are located in this area. The residents of these areas are dependent on Israeli-issued permits or special arrangements, not only to access their workplaces and basic health, education and other services, or to visit family and friends on the ‘Palestinian’ side of the barrier, but also to reside in their own homes (UNOCHA, 2013). Moreover, access to these communities, including family visits or even essential service providers, such as ambulances and fire brigades, has been severely restricted. UNOCHA estimates that if/when the barrier is completed as planned, a further 25,000 West Bank Palestinians will be trapped between the Barrier and the Green Line (UNOCHA, 2014d: 6). Furthermore, the area includes farm land of approximately 150 Palestinian communities living east of the barrier, who are now separated from it. Their access is dependent on a gate and permit regime (UNOCHA, 2014d: 3). The permit application process is complex and arbitrary, with permit applications being regularly rejected on security grounds and/or on the grounds that farmers failed to prove their ‘connection to the land’ to the satisfaction of the Israeli authorities. Once a permit is issued, the duration of permit validity varies, typically for between two to six weeks (UNOCHA, 2010:4, Al-Haq, 2013:33). Access to agricultural land through the barrier is channelled through 74 gates along the total length of the wall,
52 of them only open between October and December during the olive harvest (UNOCHA, 2013). Not only are the majority of the gates opened only seasonally, but they also have irregular opening hours (Al-Haq, 2013:31). Restricted allocation of visitor permits, and the limited number of gates and irregular opening times have critically affected the agriculture-based livelihoods of thousands of families, which in turn, undermined the ability of these communities to earn a living (UNOCHA, 2010:4).

The second kind of enclave is comprised of villages that lie on the 'Palestinian' side of the wall, but are surrounded, on three or more sides, by either the winding route of the wall, or the settlers-only roads and/or physical obstructions connected to the barrier (B’Tselem, 2007:17). According to UNOCHA, based on the current route, if/when the barrier is completed, 31 communities will be surrounded on three sides and 9 communities surrounded on four sides by the wall, linked with the rest of the West Bank by a tunnel or road connection (UNOCHA, 2010:3). Qalqiliya City (Map 8), for example, was encircled by the wall in late 2003. The aim of the wall’s route, Dolphin argues, was to create contiguity between Israel and the settlements near Kedumim. The route divides the district, making access between villages and the commercial and agricultural centre at Qalqiliyah very difficult (Dolphin, 2006:77, B’Tselem, 2012:34).

Another area severely affected by the wall is the Jerusalem area. The barrier around the area measures approximately 142 kilometres, with only four kilometres of its completed length running along the Green Line (Map 9) (UNOCHA, 2011:4). The wall encloses the city, separating it from the rest of the West Bank. UNOCHA estimates that approximately four million Palestinians from the remainder of the occupied Palestinian territory are prohibited from entering East Jerusalem without Israeli-issued permits (UNOCHA, 2014b). The impact of this affects all aspects of the Palestinians' lives. As Juma told me:
The isolation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank prevents us from access to holy places. Moreover, East Jerusalem has always been the traditional centre, not only of Palestinian religious life, but also the commercial and cultural centre for all Palestinians (Juma, 2014)

Historically, Ibrahim told me in an interview:

Jerusalem was the market, the place where the Palestinian villagers from the north and the south used to meet to trade or to pray together. It was the place where Palestinians interacted socially and economically. Since the construction of the barrier, this social and economic interaction is gone (Ibrahim, 2014)

The wall, therefore, transformed the economy of East Jerusalem and the wider metropolitan area, as well as the social life of Palestinians living in the area. Neighbourhoods, suburbs and families have been divided from each other, and the urban centre and rural communities separated from their land in the Jerusalem periphery (UNOCHA, 2013). This has affected the daily life of thousands of Palestinians, Angela Godfrey-Goldstein, Co-director, Founder and Advocacy Officer of the Jahalin Association, told me:

When you go to a university or a hospital, and they [the Israeli soldiers] stop you for two hours, you will miss classes, lose hospital appointments. Al-Quds University, for example, has its main campus in Abu Dis, with additional campuses on another side of the wall in Jerusalem. There is no logic to this 'separation' (Godfrey-Goldstein, 2014)

In addition to the isolation of the cultural and educational services, the wall has affected Palestinian access to health facilities in the area, which include six non-government hospitals located in the area, which are the main providers of routine, emergency, secondary and specialized care, and are unavailable elsewhere in the occupied territories (UNOCHA, 2010:4). Whilst before the construction of the barrier, permit requirements were enforced at checkpoints, and access without a valid permit was still possible, with most of the barrier in the Jerusalem area completed, access for those without permits has been significantly reduced. In order to access East Jerusalem, West Bank residents
require permits, with entry restricted to four of thirteen checkpoints around the city (UNOCHA, 2014c:8). According to the Machsom Watch, the checking procedures are arduous and the waiting time can be long, particularly during rush hour, and the checkpoint, especially the larger checkpoints, including Efrayim/Irtach, Qalandiya and Bethlehem 300, are dangerously overcrowded and chaotic (Machsom Watch, 2015:3,7). As Dorit\(^78\), an activist of Machsom Watch, a human rights organisation of Israeli women who monitor the army's operation of the checkpoints in the West Bank, told me:

> It is hard to believe what takes place at the checkpoints. I watch daily how inhumanely, the Israeli soldiers treat the Palestinian children, old people, or women. The treatment is especially severe on ‘bad days', like for example we have seen recently following the kidnapping of the three Israeli yeshiva students. The soldiers bring fear and humiliation to the people they know are innocent. The reason for this is very simple; they want to punish all of 'them' for what has happened\(^79\) (Dorit, 2014)

Instilling fear and humiliation, both Dorit and Godfrey-Goldstein told me, is not only a side effect of the Israeli practice of checkpoints but a part of the intentional strategy of making Palestinians’ lives so unbearable they will leave the land. It is an essential feature of the Israeli system of control and a daily reality for the Palestinians (Dorit, 2014, Godfrey-Goldstein, 2014).

As illustrated, the construction of the wall has resulted in further fragmentation and enclavisation of the Palestinian territories, further diminishing the viability of a Palestinian state. Furthermore, the wall has led to the segmentation of the Palestinian people, and marginalisation and deprivation of the Palestinian basic needs, such as identity, survival, well-being and freedom needs. By restricting Palestinian freedom of movement and limiting their access to basic social services such as health and

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\(^78\) During the interview, Dorit requested partial anonymity and asked that I used only her first name.

\(^79\) Dorit refers to the abduction of three Israeli youths in Gush Etzion, an Israeli settlement in the West Bank on June 2, 2014 (discussed in Chapter One). The event took place a few days prior to the interview.
education, the Palestinian ‘actual’ level of needs satisfaction has been lower than the 'potential' symbolising the presence of structural violence. So far, the focus of this chapter has been on the impact of the wall on the Palestinians, however, according to Palestinian narrative, to understand that the wall is just one of the elements of the Israeli ‘Matrix of Control’, built into a violent structure of the economic and social inequalities between the Palestinians and the Israelis, it is important to examine the Israeli activities in the West Bank since the construction of the wall.

7.3 THE PROTRACTION OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

As illustrated above, the wall has severely affected Palestinian freedom of movement. Since its construction, however, Palestinian movement has been further restricted by several dozen internal checkpoints within the West Bank, with only a few of them being regularly staffed (B'Tselem, 2014c:2). In addition to the permanent checkpoints, there has also been an increasing number of ‘flying’ or random checkpoints: road barriers that are moved from road to road as necessary (Halper, 2008:162). As Dorit explained:

At the flying checkpoint, the Palestinians can wait half an hour in the queue, and all of a sudden the Israeli soldiers will close it without stating a reason. If I ask them why, they will tell me it is none of your business. So they have to find another way to get home just to find out that there is another flying checkpoint a hundred metres away (Dorit, 2014)

Although, as the UNOCHA reports, since 2008, whilst movement between Palestinian towns and villages has generally improved, operational checkpoints, along with other physical obstacles and permit requirements, continue to impede Palestinian access throughout the West Bank (UNOCHA, 2014c:78-79).

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80 For example, in 2013, UNOCHA reports 243 flying checkpoints a month across the West Bank (UNOCHA, 2014c:46).
81 See UNOCHA (2014c) for the details on what these improvements constitute, p. 58
7.3.1 AREA C

Palestinian movement has been especially restricted in Area C, which constitutes 60 percent of the West Bank (Map 10). Under the Oslo Accords, the area, as discussed in the previous chapter, was agreed upon to remain under Israeli control only during the Oslo interim period, until a permanent agreement was signed. Sixteen years later, the area remains under full Israeli control, and the Israeli hold over the area is stronger than ever. Although most of the Palestinians are confined to Areas A and B, in order to get from one area to another, often, they must go through Area C, which is sealed by Israeli checkpoints (B’Tselem, 2014c:4). Whilst Israeli settlers in the area, whose numbers have tripled since the accords, circulate freely between the settlements in the Palestinian territories, Palestinian movement is subjected to strict Israeli checkpoints. This is especially problematic for the estimated 300,000 Palestinians who live in Area C, but it has also had a severe impact on the residents of the Areas A and B (UNOCHA, 2014a).

Although the vast majority of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank live in Areas A and B, all the land, including privately owned land, required for developing their communities, remains in Area C (B’Tselem, 2014c:4). Due to the lack of adequate planning and discriminatory allocation of public land, it is almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits in most of Area C (UNOCHA, 2015a:1). Citing a variety of grounds, Israel has denied virtually all Palestinian construction and development in the area (B’Tselem, 2014c:4). As UNOCHA reports, 70 percent of the area is off-limits for Palestinian use and development, 29 percent is heavily restricted, and only approximately 1 percent has been planned for Palestinian development (UNOCHA, 2014a). The discriminatory planning regime is also evident in East Jerusalem. Under the Israeli zoning policy, Palestinians can build in 13 percent of East Jerusalem (Epshtain, 2012). In both cases, these areas are already heavily built-up areas.
In order to do so, Palestinians are required to apply for a permit from the Israeli authorities. It is reported that more than 94 percent of all Palestinian permit applications have been rejected in recent years (Epshtain, 2012). As Abu Zuluf explained to me:

Not only are permits almost impossible to obtain, but you also have to pay an extensive amount of money for the application. In East Jerusalem, for example, a permit will cost you more than the building of the house itself. As people cannot afford these costs, they have no other option but to build without a permit, living in constant fear of their houses being demolished (Abu Zuluf, 2014)

At the time of writing this chapter (September 2015), according to official data released by the Israeli authorities, over 11,000 demolition orders affecting an estimated 13,000 Palestinian-owned structures, including homes, are ‘outstanding’ in Area C (UNOCHA, 2015b:1). Similarly, at least a third of all Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lack building permits, which potentially places over 90,000 residents at risk of displacement (UNOCHA, 2014b). In September 2015, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), 81 percent of Palestinians are worried that they would be hurt by Israel, or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished (PCPSR, 2015:5).

As Abu Zuluf told me, the demolition of Palestinian infrastructure is one of the strategies Israel use to make the Palestinians leave the area (Abu Zuluf, 2014). Palestinians, unable to build in Area C and East Jerusalem, are left with no choice but to relocate to Areas A and B (Epshtain, 2012). According to Juma, this constitutes part of the Israeli long-term plan. As he told me:

They want to uproot us and settle in our land, our home. By locking us into ghettos, or bantustans, under their control, they hope to make our lives so unbearable that we will leave. This is done systematically. When you go to places such as the Jordan Valley, you will clearly see that they destroyed whole communities in the Palestinian villages there to expand the settlements’ (Juma, 2014)
The vast majority of the Palestinians share the same view. According to a poll conducted in September 2015 by the PCPSR, 85 percent of the Palestinians believe that ‘Israel’s long-term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967, and expel their population, or deny them their rights’ (PCPSR, 2015: 6).

7.3.2 ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THE SETTLERS’ NEEDS

Despite the construction of the wall and allegedly 'separating' itself from the Palestinians, the appropriation of the Palestinian land for the purpose of settlements building continues uninterrupted. B'Tselem reports that the settler population in the territories is estimated to be around 531,000: 341,400 in the West Bank (late 2012) and 190,423 in East Jerusalem (late 2011) (B'Tselem, 2014c). Today, Levey told me, there is a powerful settler movement, and its support system within Israel, that has a lock on the Knesset. As he argued:

There is, of course, an irony regarding the settlements in the West Bank. Although the underlying theme behind the settlements is the ideology that Israel can and should rule over as much of its biblical, historical patrimony as possible, there is a very high percentage of the settlements in the West Bank that are not ideologically motivated at all. They are there because the government provides tax breaks; it is cheaper to live out there and the standard and the quality of living are better. For that reason, it is very attractive (Levey, 2014)

It is clear, Godfrey-Goldstein told me, that the Israeli strategy of generous subsidies has aimed to encourage a large number of the Israelis to Judaize the West Bank. By providing heavy subsidies, she continued, they legitimise the process:

They do not tell the people we [Israel] are deliberately forcing the Palestinians out who live there, but the majority of people think that if the government is encouraging that, then it is fine [...]. The majority do not even think about themselves as settlers. So it is very subversive, I don’t think a majority of Israelis even want to know (Godfrey-Goldstein, 2014)
Regardless of the motives of individual settlers, and their awareness of the serious implications the settlements building in the West Bank, for the Palestinians, the ongoing settlements expansion further fragments the territory and constitutes nothing more than establishing facts on the ground that neutralise any chance for creating a viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity. The settlements have been allocated vast areas, far exceeding their built-up sections. These areas have been declared closed military zones by military orders and are off limits to Palestinians, except by special permit (B’Tselem, 2012). Territorial fragmentation has reached such a point that a majority (65 percent) of the Palestinians believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion (PCPSR, 2015:5).

Travelling to the West Bank, or by simply looking at a map (Map 7), it is indeed difficult to envisage an Israeli withdrawal from the area, and the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Some of the West Bank settlement blocks, such as Ariel, Ma'ale Adumim or Gush Etzion, are small cities with sophisticated social infrastructures and adjacent industrial zones, linked together by a massive system of 29 highways and bypass roads, incorporating the settlements into Israel’s national highway system (Halper, 2008:168). The Israeli road network, secured by a 50–75-metre buffer zone on each side of the road and controlled by the Israeli army, is designed in such a way that it bypasses Palestinian towns and villages (Le More, 2008:49, Agha and Khalidi, 2006:92). Not only is the road network inaccessible to the Palestinian citizens of the West Bank, but Palestinians are also forbidden from any construction in the buffer zones surrounding the roads. Whilst the Israeli settlements with its entire infrastructure has been expanding, cutting off Palestinian villages from their central towns, the Palestinians are being confined to small non-contiguous territorial ‘islands’ with the movement between them severely affected (Juma, 2014).
Settlement expansion, however, goes beyond the annexation of Palestinian land and the consequent expulsion of people living there. Those who find themselves residing next to Israeli settlements are often subject to direct violence from Israeli settlers and the Israeli soldiers protecting them. The violent attacks carried out by the Israeli settlers include intimidation and physical attacks on Palestinians, their livestock, agricultural lands and property (NAD-PLO, 2013:11). In his speech at the 2015 UN General Assembly, Abbas stressed the problem of so-called "price tag" attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian people and their property, ‘all under the sight of the Israeli army and police, who do not deter or punish, but rather provide them with protection’ (Abbas, in The Jerusalem Post, 2015). According to B’Tselem, ‘the undeclared policy of the Israeli authorities in response to these attacks is lenient, […] and perpetrators are rarely tried, and in many cases are not investigated at all, or are closed with no operative conclusions’ (B’Tselem, 2015). For example, between January 1, and September 8, 2013, almost 700 separate acts of settler violence had been recorded. 91.5 percent of these cases were closed without indictment (as compared to a 99 percent conviction rate for Palestinians) (NAD-PLO, 2013:11).

7.3.3 WATER

The structural violence of fragmentation of the Palestinian territories, and enclavisation of the Palestinian people, is accompanied by the exploitation of Palestinian resources. The violence is evident in the unequal distribution and consumption of water. Over the past decade, while the Palestinian population has grown, total Palestinian water consumption has decreased (Human Rights Watch, 2010:18). Based on World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendations, each person should receive the minimum of 100 litres per capita daily. As B’Tselem reports, while the average Palestinian in the West Bank utilises approximately 73 litres a day, well below the WHO

82  The figure does not include domestic agriculture, livestock and losses.
recommendation, the average Israeli, according to the Israeli Water Authority, uses 183 litres of water a day, more than twice the corresponding consumption in the West Bank (B’Tselem, 2014a). In some rural communities, Palestinians survive on far less than the average 70 litres, in some cases barely 38 litres (the Jenin area) (B’Tselem, 2014b), or 20 litres (in most herding communities in the Jordan Valley area) (UNOCHA, 2012).

Whilst Israelis benefit from unlimited running water all year round, and at any time of day, the water supply for the Palestinians constitutes a small fixed amount (B’Tselem, 2008, B’Tselem, 2014a). There are regular water shutoffs, which last for days, and sometimes even weeks at a time. Consequently, many Palestinians are forced to purchase additional supplies from mobile water tankers at much higher prices, without a guarantee that the water is from a safe source (Amnesty International, 2009b:3). Furthermore, as road access is controlled by the Israeli army, often many roads are closed or restricted to Palestinian traffic, forcing water tankers to take longer tours, which significantly increase the price of water (Amnesty International, 2009a:2). The water shortage, however, is especially hard on some 113,000 Palestinians living in about 70 villages in the West Bank, who are not connected to a water network at all (B’Tselem, 2014b). They rely entirely on collecting rainwater in cisterns close to their homes. Once the collected rainwater runs out, they must rely on water from nearby springs and/or purchase from vendors of private water trucks at the high cost of at least 30 NIS (approx. 9 USD) per cubic meter (B’Tselem, 2014b). Furthermore, Israel has control over ‘the collection of rain or spring water throughout most of the West Bank. Rainwater harvesting cisterns are often destroyed by the Israeli army’ (Amnesty International, 2009a:2).

As illustrated, despite the wall’s construction, the Palestinian territories are subjected to Israeli policies of land confiscation and large-scale house and infrastructure
demolitions. Likewise, the Palestinian nation is severely fragmented, with Palestinian freedom of movement impaired by the Israeli policy of closure and the wall. Whilst Israel is exploiting more and more resources (land and water), fewer resources are left available for the Palestinians, affecting the viability of the creation of the Palestinian state. The Palestinians' basic human needs, such as well-being, freedom and survival needs, are therefore marginalised. Under International Law, Israel, as the occupying power, has a legal obligation to protect the Palestinian civilian population in the West Bank, and to administer the territory for their benefit. Israel is also prohibited from the forced transfer, or displacement of Palestinian civilians, and the destruction of their private or public property, as well as, from the transfer of its population into occupied territory (UNOCHA, 2014b:6). Israel, as the above discussion illustrated, has been violating these provisions, keeping the violent structures intact or even strengthening them. The question arises, how, despite continuous international condemnation, has Israeli structural violence continued uninterrupted and its impact often ignored, minimised, and to a certain extent, rationalised by a large sector of the Israeli society?

To answer the question, the next section applies the concept of cultural violence and concentrates on Israeli officials' statements and the Israeli education system, which delegitimises and dehumanises the Palestinians, and denies them their political and historical right to their land.

7.4 ISRAELI CULTURAL VIOLENCE

The study of cultural violence, as discussed earlier, helps to highlight the way in which the act of direct violence, and the facts of structural violence, are legitimised, and thus rendered acceptable in society (Galtung, 1990:292). Culture, normative beliefs and practices, can be seen as a source of violence by allowing the dehumanisation and delegitimisation of a certain group (Pilisuk and Rountree, 2015:49). Based on the
interviews conducted for this project, this section will illustrate elements of Israeli official discourse, which delegitimise and dehumanise the Palestinians and deny their political and historical ties to the land, which in turn, leads to normalisation or naturalisation of the occupation, thus providing a justification for Israeli protracted use of structural violence.

7.4.1 DELEGITIMISATION AND DEHUMANISATION

Since the beginning of the conflict, Palestinians have been fighting the common Zionist narrative that Palestine was an 'empty land': ‘a land without people for people without land' (Murphy, 2005:275). During the early Zionists discussions in Europe, the land was presented as *terra nullius*, a land empty of people and civilizational achievements (Yiftachel, 2006:54), 'neglected by the nomads and peasants who facelessly lived on it' (Said, 2000:187). The main idea, as Edward Said argues, 'was to not only deny the Palestinians a historical presence as a collectivity, but also to imply that they were not a people who had a long-standing peoplehood' (Said, 2000:187). Over the years, the Palestinians have been labelled as 'Arabs', 'an undifferentiated mass of any other national Arab group in the Middle East' (Jawad, 2006:73, Klein, 2014, Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005:121). The Israeli denial of Palestinian identity, with its catchy slogan 'there is no Palestinian people', having been continuously repeated throughout generations, has prevailed in the Jewish consciousness and Jewish modern history. Over the years, Halper argues, no Israeli government has ever recognised the Palestinians as a distinct people (Halper, 2005:5). For instance, in 1969, Israel's former Prime Minister Golda Meir famously stated: 'it was not as if there was a Palestinian people in Palestine and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist' (Gazit, 2003:331). Similarly, former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin rejected a distinct Palestinian identity. In a Knesset speech in 1975,
he stated: ‘there is no Palestine here, and therefore there is no entity, no identity, no
nation that is called Palestinian’. At best, Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman argue, the
Palestinian national identity was recognised, but only as an integral part of the
Jordanian-Palestinian nation, or having Jordanian-Palestinian ties (Bar-Tal and
Teichman, 2005:136-137). Peled-Elhanan, who conducted an extensive analysis of
Israeli textbooks, argued in an interview with me that this is also evident in the Israeli
textbooks. Palestinians in the occupied territories, she claimed, are seldom depicted in
Israeli textbooks at all, but in the very few cases when the Palestinians are represented
as human beings with faces, they are depicted either as face-covered terrorists, primitive
farmers, or cartoonlike ‘Arabs' wearing Kafieh and being followed by a camel.
Whenever the word 'Palestinian' is mentioned, it has a connotation of terror; otherwise,
they are called Arabs, or the Arabs of the Land of Israel. By calling them Arabs, Peled-
Elhanan argued:

   The Palestinians are no different from the rest of the Arab world. Consequently,
   the message the Israeli students get is that they have 22 other Arab countries
   they can go to, so they do not need to be here (Peled-Elhanan, 2014).

This narrative, of course, Godfrey-Goldstein argues, carries serious political
implications. With national identity denied, so are national or even individual rights of
the Palestinians.

The delegitimisation of the Palestinians has been accompanied by their dehumanisation,
evident in different forms of Israeli public discourses. As Abu Zuluf argues:

   If we are speaking only in terms of rhetoric, racist statements are regularly made
   by Israelis politicians, the people inside the Israeli army, and even Israel’s chief
   rabbis. There are dehumanising statements, accusing us of being like animals
   (Abu Zuluf Jai, 2014)
Over the years, there have been a number of statements made by Israeli government officials, dehumanising the Palestinians and comparing them to many species of animals. Menachem Begin compared them to ‘beasts walking on two legs’; Ehud Barak compared them to ‘crocodiles’; Yitzhak Shamir, stated that they ‘would be crushed like grasshoppers’; Moshe Dayan said that ‘you [Palestinians] shall continue to live like dogs’; and Netanyahu compared them to ‘wild beasts’ (Doyle, 2014, Sheety, 2013). In 2013, for example, discussing the resumption of peace talks in a radio interview, Eli Ben Dahan, the then Deputy Religious Affairs Minister and now Deputy Defence Minister, stated: 'to me, they are like animals, they are not human' (Pileggi, 2015).

Ayala Brilliant, Youth Leadership Director of One Voice Movement, told me: ‘we observe dehumanisation of the Palestinians every day. Anyone following Israeli media outlets, she continued, ‘sees that Palestinians are portrayed as monsters, animals and terrorists’. The purpose of the government for such a portrayal, Brilliant concluded, is to justify their agenda: the occupation. It needs to justify the budget they give to the IDF (Brilliant, 2014).

The more serious consequence of Israel's delegitimization of the Palestinian peoplehood, Ibrahim argues, is the Israeli denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination, a crucial component of Palestinian national security (Ibrahim, 2014). Since the beginning of the conflict, the traditional Zionist narrative has presented all Palestinian acts of resistance and self-determination against, first the Zionist presence in Palestine, and later, the occupation of the Palestinian territories, solely as acts of terrorism. As the Zionist return to their homeland was seen as just and moral, Pappé argues, any Arab resistance to the Zionist project, such as the Arab Revolt, or the Palestinian rejection of the UN partition resolution, was viewed as an act of terrorism (Pappé, 2009:131-132). Palestinian ‘terrorism’ continued after the establishment of the Israeli state. Regardless of whether the Palestinians, who attempted
to cross Israel’s borders after 1948, were Palestinian refugees looking for lost herds, uncollected crops, and abandoned properties, or PLO members, they were put in the same bracket and labelled as ‘terrorists’. The PLO continued to be epitomised as terrorists even after the PLO agreed to abandon the armed struggle in 1988 (Pappé, 2009:36). The status of the PLO as terrorists ceased with the signing of the Oslo. As Pappé discusses, for the first time in its history and the history of Palestinian nationalism, the PLO was ‘de-terrorised’ and treated as a legitimate political partner.

Seven years later, however, with the outbreak of the second Intifada, the whole Palestinian nation was once again labelled ‘terrorist’. As the second Intifada coincided with the American war on terror, the PLO was portrayed as part of the al-Qaeda network of terrorism (Pappé, 2009:140) and Arafat quickly became Israel’s Bin Laden (Sharon was reported to use these exact words to Colin Powell) (Halper, 2008:188). Ibrahim told me that the same logic applies to Israel’s justification for the construction of the wall. According to him:

> Israel is presenting itself to the Western public as the representative of the Western civilisation among the wild Arabs in the Middle East. Building the wall, Israel has sent the message that 'we are behind the wall, standing in the front line to protect you and your culture, and the one on the other side is a threat to our shared values. And this is the border between the two worlds [...]. And again they are using the security rationales because 'the animals are attacking us and we are trying to protect ourselves and you from wild Arabs (Ibrahim, 2014)

This narrative, he argued, became widely accepted, especially after 9/11:

> What they [Israelis] are doing in Palestine is their share in a global war against terrorism. When they have started building the wall they were sending the message that all the people on the other side are the terrorists. It is not the matter of some small groups. They are creating an image that in the mind of the people, we are all terrorists (Ibrahim, 2014)

According to Palestinian narrative, the delegitimisation and dehumanisation of the Palestinians and the depiction of them as terrorists, thus the threat to Israel’s security,
has served not only to justify the construction of the wall but also the occupation of the Palestinian territory.

7.4.2 ‘OWNERSHIP’ OF THE LAND

Another Israeli narrative that the Palestinians have been faced with since the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank involves the legal status of the occupied territories. Since 1967, the government of Israel has claimed that the West Bank is not an occupied territory, but rather a disputed or administered territory; thus Israeli presence is not an occupation but an administration (Elkin, 2014). Elkin told me:

> The Palestinian state was never established, even in the time between 1948 and 1967, when Jordan and Egypt controlled the territories [...]. From an international law point of view, you cannot take a part of a state, but it was not a Palestinian state, it was a disputed territory, as Egyptian and Jordanian presence on this land was illegal. If the Palestinian state was established in 1947-8, and they would have sent Arab leaders to agree with the decision of the United Nations like Israel did, then we could talk about a Palestinian occupied land. The West Bank, therefore, is a disputed territory because you cannot occupy a land that does not belong to anyone (Elkin, 2014)

The origin of this claim goes back to the early days following the 1967 war, when Meir Shamgar, Israel’s then Attorney-General, and later President of the Supreme Court, formulated a policy that rejected the applicability of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, a humanitarian law related to the occupation of conquered territories and the rights of civilian population in those territories. Shamgar’s rationale was that the term ‘occupation’ only applies to a territory when a sovereign state is conquered by another sovereign state. Since Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950 was illegitimate, and widely regarded as illegal (only being recognised by the UK, Iraq and Pakistan), and Egypt never claimed sovereignty over Gaza, the territories had never been an integral part of a sovereign state. Adopting the principle of “a missing sovereign”, Shamgar maintained that the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be
considered “disputed” rather than occupied territories (Halper, 2008:146, Gordon, 2008b:26). Although Israel refused to be seen as an occupier, the government of Israel, advised by Shamgar, pledged to respect the humanitarian provisions on a *de facto* basis.

Although the international community has overwhelmingly rejected this interpretation and has regarded the West Bank and Gaza Strip (until 2005) as occupied territories, Shamgar’s understanding of the legal status of the Palestinian territories has prevailed in Israel’s government till today (Gordon, 2008b:26). As Laura Wharton, Jerusalem City Councillor and Representative of Meretz, told me, most Israelis believe this interpretation:

> In a political and geographical sense, there is Jordan, and there is Israel, and in the middle, there is some kind of border. They see it as settling land that does not belong to anyone. According to Israeli Law, although it is violated all the time, the land that belonged to the Jordanian government was turned over to the Israeli government, so now the Israelis are settling the land. They are settling an empty land as far as they are concerned (Wharton, 2014)

The dispute over the ‘ownership’ of the West Bank goes beyond the legal status of the territories. The Israeli sense of entitlement to the territory has been based on the religious claim to the land: the *Eretz Yisrael*, a Promised Land, given by God to Jews. Following the capture of the West Bank and Gaza, Menachem Begin stated:

> The Land of Israel is not annexed. She is liberated. She is returned to her rightful owner, the Jewish people […]. We dare not speak of the possibility that even one inch of our land…go to any foreign ruler (Landman, 2010:135)

Despite the fact that Zionism was primarily a secular movement, the religious claim was incorporated into Zionists’ claim to Palestine, and ever since the creation of Israel, the covenant has been integrated into the national narrative (Halper, 2008:71, Masalha, 2007:16). The claim, Levey states, is not only an integral part of the religious ideology but also a crucial part of the secular right-wing ideology (Levey, 2014). As he explains,
The claim comes in different shades, but it is basically the same phenomena. It is the determent view that Israel can, and should, rule over as much as of its biblical, historical patrimony as possible (Levey, 2014)

In the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Jewish claim to its total entitlement to the Land of Israel raises a couple of problems. Firstly, as Murphy argues, it elevates a religious text containing an uncorroborated account of the words of God, in promising the land to the Jews, to the status of ‘fact’ (Murphy, 2005:270). The Bible, for Nur Masalha, 'has been used as history rather than theology, or a source of belief’ (Masalha, 2007:16). As Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi argues:

Most Israelis today [...] regard the Bible as a source of reliable historical information of a secular, political kind. The Zionist version of Jewish history accepts most biblical legends about the beginning of Jewish history, minus divine intervention. [...] The historicization of the Bible is a national enterprise in Israel, carried out by hundreds of scholars at all universities. [...] The Israeli Defence Ministry has even published a complete chronology of Biblical events... Claiming the ancient mythology as history is an essential part of Zionist secular nationalism, in its attempt to present a coherent account of the genesis of the Jewish people in ancient West Asia (Beit-Hallahmi, cited in Masalha, 2007:21-22)

As a result of this, the majority of Jews in Israel, and a significant segment of the political system perceive the West Bank as liberated, belonging exclusively to the Jewish people (Halperin, et al, 2010:33-34). The claim of the exclusive Jewish right to the land, Murphy argues, deprives Palestinians of any right and affinity to the land. This version of truth prioritises the experiences of one people over others within the historical narration [...]. They (the Palestinians) are observers of, or even obstructions to, Jewish history, but have no history of their own that recognises their fundamental connections to the land (Murphy, 2005:270)

This, Peled-Elhanan argued, has been mirrored in Israeli textbooks (Peled-Elhanan, 2014). The ideological basis of geography teaching in Israel consists of the Zionist message of the exclusive historical rights to the Land of Israel. The state of Israel was not established in 1948, but re-established. The Jewish homeland was therefore redeemed and resettled after 2000 years of exile. The history of 2000 years of Jewish
absence, including the Palestinian presence in the area, is not mentioned (Peled-Elhanian and Yellin, 2009:182). As the Jews have rights over the Land of Israel, Israel and the West Bank are considered as one geographic entity. Within this entity, there is a state of Israel, which is presented as incomplete and temporary, or on the way to completion. The ‘redemption’ of the whole land is therefore presented as a historical right legitimised, both in the political and in the educational discourse, by the Bible and the insertion of (irrefutable) biblical phrases (Peled-Elhanan 2008:80-81). Simply speaking, as Peled-Elhanan explains, 'the state of Israel is represented as one part of the Land of Israel, which is 'ours', as we have a 'proof' of historical rights to it, namely the Bible. The state of Israel is something temporary, not a permanent situation' (Peled-Elhanan, 2014).

The argument of Jewish exclusive right to the land been continuously repeated by a number of Israeli politicians, most recently by Uri Ariel, Minister of Agriculture, stated 'there will be just one state between the Jordan River and the sea, and that is the State of Israel’ (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2015). Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin ‘the land is ours in its entirety’ (Newman, 2015), or Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely:

[…] all of the land belonged to the creator of the world and when he wanted to, he took from them and gave to us. We sought to present arguments that would play well diplomatically, but currently, it’s important to be right. We need to get back to the basic truth of our right to this land. It’s important to say [that] this land is ours. All of it is ours’ (Ravid, 2015)

Such a narrative, of course, Hiba Husseini, who chairs the Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis, told me, carries serious implications. As the government of Israel sees the whole land as its own land, 'our presence in the land is an invasion, or at best, inconvenient for them’ (Husseini, 2014).
According to Palestinian narrative, the claim of its exclusive right to the land therefore further legitimises the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.

It needs to be highlighted, however, that certain elements of the Israeli narrative, discussed above, are not unique to Zionism. Rather they are epiphenomenal with regards to nationalism. All nationalist movements construct founding myths in their nation and state-building projects. Founding myths, Beverly Milton-Edwards argues, ‘forge much needed unity-often where none was previously present’. Such myths, she continues, ‘bind people together in a ‘collective’ experience and allow the often unpalatable truths behind modern state construction to be ignored until a time when a nation feels secure enough in its stability and identity within the borders of a state to revisit such events’ (Milton-Edwards, 2009:17). Nationalists invent and distort the past in order to legitimise their political projects. It can be argued that this is a deliberate misinterpretation of history to fit the contemporary reality. Founding myths, therefore, constitute a standard practice of nationalism. Although I acknowledge that the above analysis fits into nationalist nature, it needs to be stressed however, this is not a thesis on nationalism. More importantly, however, during the data collection, the above discussed elements of Israeli official discourse emerged as the most critical themes in the Palestinian narrative to the analysis of cultural violence.

7.4.3 GEOGRAPHICAL ‘NATURALISATION’

Israeli presence in the occupied West Bank has been further 'normalised' by the official language the Israelis use to refer to the land. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Likud

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83 For example, the doctrine of terra nullius, discussed above, was integral to European colonial, and indeed post-colonial politics. It became discredited only from the 1960s. Similarly, the depiction of the West Bank by Israel as administered territory, rather than disputed, is not unique. For example, the Kurds in Iraq employ the same language with regard to swathes of Iraqi territory that are under Kurdish control but are claimed by Arabs (e.g. the cities of Sinjar and Kirkuk).
Government actively sought to erase the distinction between Israel and the occupied territories from Israel’s collective psychology. Following Begin's electoral victory, he issued a ban on the terms 'occupation' and 'occupied territories' in the state-owned media, and since that time they have rarely been used (Halper, 2008:150). In government publications and documents, as well as in official announcements, the term 'the West Bank territories' was replaced by 'Judea and Samaria', the biblical term, and the term 'settlement' changed from a neutral word to one evocative of Biblical claims of 'redemption' (Tenenbaum and Eiran, 2005:173). This has led to the integration of the territory of the West Bank to the state of Israel in the Israeli consciousness. The sense that the West Bank is a separate entity, Eiran argued, almost completely disappeared (Eiran, 2014). As Peled-Elhanan told me:

The green line had ceased to exist a long time ago. There are three generations of Israeli students now who do not know what the internationally recognised borders constitute. You cannot find one map, including the leaflets for supermarket chains in Israel, (and I collect them all) with the Green Line. Even daily evening news' weather forecasts show a map without any borders, and the settlements cities are marked as if they are a part of the state of Israel. It is all ours. There are no Palestinians, no Bethlehem, no Nablus, no Jericho; there are non-existent (Peled-Elhanan, 2014).

Most school books, even geography books, have a tendency of erasing Palestinian life from the Israeli scene. Whilst the Palestinian territories are presented as part of the Land of Israel, the inhabitants of these same territories are portrayed as non-Jews, foreign labour, host workers, that are coming to Israel to work, or they are not represented at all (however, as Peled-Elhanan points out, the readers may not be aware of this peculiarity because the occupied territories are not marked as Palestinian areas) (Peled-Elhanan, 2011:121). The Palestinian inhabitants are missing from maps, photographs and graphs (Peled-Elhanan 2008:104). As Peled-Elhanan concluded, deleting the other from the map is an epitome of cultural violence (Peled-Elhanan, 2014).
Furthermore, as Juma argued, not only was the representation of the West Bank changed, the government of Israel has done everything in its power to conceal the occupation. Discussing the wall, he argued:

When you drive by the wall on the Israeli side, on the road number 6, it is a drive along the Green Line. In many sections, you do not see the wall. When the wall was built, they planted trees to conceal it. Now the trees are very high, and you do not see the wall when you are driving. This has been done for psychological reasons. They do not see us living in ghettos. If they do not see the occupation, they can continue to live normally, leaving 'the problem' for the military to deal with (Juma, 2014)

The wall, therefore, according to Juma, is just a physical manifestation of the psychological disconnection of Israeli society from the conflict and the occupation. It also constitutes structural violence in its psychological form: isolation or marginalisation of the Palestinians. It can be, therefore, understood as both a physical and psychological border. This, as Dolphin has argued, however, has serious implications for relations between the two sides. He continued:

For the last ten years, there are fewer Palestinians who are going to work in Israel, and fewer Israelis are going to the West Bank. Before people used to see and meet each other and interact with each other. Even if one had a negative perception of the other, at least when they met at a human level, it was easier to change your perception about the other. Today, because you do not see the Palestinians for the most parts, it makes it easy to forget about them in the sense that it is not really a problem anymore (Dolphin, 2014)

The repeated statements such as ‘there is no Palestinian people’, ‘the Land of Israel is a Jewish homeland’, and ‘the West Bank is not occupied’ have been built into Israeli national narrative and accepted by the majority of the Israeli society. In light of these prevailing views, and with the West Bank resembling a distant district of Israel, rather than an occupied land, it is hardly surprising that the structural violence against the Palestinians continues uninterrupted. Furthermore, the dehumanisation and delegitimisation of the Palestinians, evident in the Israeli official discourse, creates an
image for the Israeli society that the Palestinians not only do not have rights to the land, but they pose a threat to Israeli security. Portraying any Palestinian resistance activities as terrorism, and the whole nation as terrorists, creates justification for the Israeli government to maintain the wall and its control over the West Bank. As Galtung argues, a ‘major form of cultural violence, indulged in by ruling elites, is to blame the victim of structural violence who throws the first stone, not in a glasshouse but to get out of the iron cage, stamping him as an “aggressor”’ (Galtung, 1990:295). Today, as Ibrahim argued:

Even non-violent kinds of resistance are seen by Israel as terrorism. For them, even if we are not shooting, we are bothering them with demonstrations or writing. Even when we are raising our flag, this is seen as terrorism. They are using now a very funny concept, ‘non-violent Palestinian terror action’. The fact that I am sitting with you and smiling, I am resisting, because their target is to push me to leave the land. It is resistance to keep my home, trees, my family, food, songs. This is my Kalashnikov. For them, it is terrorism (Ibrahim, 2014)

Similarly, Israel, presenting the wall as the reaction to Palestinian terrorism, he argues, masks the real reasons for the protraction of the conflict: the Israeli occupation. Instead, Israel presents to the world that the occupation exists because of Palestinian terrorism (Ibrahim, 2014). The Israeli occupation, therefore, is legitimised and justified in the Israeli consciousness. Furthermore, the study of cultural violence is crucial to understand the protraction of the conflict as the causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence can be identified. The protracted use of cultural violence, which legitimises the use of structural violence, Galtung argues, is generally followed by the eruptions, ‘the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage and counter-violence to keep the cage intact’ (Galtung, 1990:295). The more the Palestinians are subjected to structural violence, the greater is their grievance, and consequently, they are more likely to resort to the use of direct violence in the form of resistance, to get out of the ‘iron cage’, or to get back at the society that put them there. For the Palestinians therefore, direct violence is a symptom of oppression, which can
only be addressed if the underlying causes of the conflict, the Israeli occupation, with all its matrix of control, are eliminated. In his most recent address to the UN General Assembly, Abbas confirmed this:

> the culture of peace and coexistence between our people and in our region, cannot be achieved with the continuation of the occupation, settlement colonization, the wall, the burning of people, places of worship and homes, the killing youth, children and infants, the burning of crops, and the arrest and detention of people without charge or trial (Abbas, in The Jerusalem Post, 2015).

Only if groups are protected from the threats of direct and structural violence, can conflict be resolved (Schnabel, 2008:87). With the protraction of structural violence, it is therefore not surprising that the Palestinian level of support for a return to an armed Intifada has risen sharply, with a clear majority in favour (PCPRS, 2015).

### 7.5 CONCLUSION

The wall is a visible demonstration of the protraction of the Israel-Palestine conflict. It symbolises, however, different realities to each party. As this chapter has demonstrated, for the Palestinians, the wall has little, or nothing, to do with Israel’s security. It is just the latest added measure to Israel’s ‘matrix of control’. The mechanism and impact of the wall are very similar to those of other elements of the matrix. The wall further annexes Palestinian land and further fragments the Palestinian territories into three main enclaves-East Jerusalem area, the territories between the green line, and the territories on the 'Palestinian' side-making travel between different parts of the West Bank extremely difficult. This, as discussed, has had a direct effect on the physical and psychological well-being of Palestinian individuals and communities. The wall violates the basic human needs of the Palestinians, survival, well-being, identity, freedom, and deprives Palestinians its basic rights to freedom of movement, health services, family life, education, or an adequate standard of living.
Encircling East Jerusalem, the wall has not only impaired access to essential health services in the area but also made access to the Palestinian holy sites extremely difficult.

With the severe restrictions on Palestinian movement between the two sides of the wall, reinforced by the checkpoints, the social ties between Palestinians have been eroded, affecting the social fabric of Palestinian society. Moreover, the fragmentation of the West Bank and the segmentation of the Palestinians have critically undermined the viability of the potential future Palestinian state.

According to the Palestinian narrative, the wall, however, cannot be analysed as a separate measure, but just one example of structural violence built into the violent structure of the Israeli-Palestinian relations, visible in social inequality and inequality in resources distribution, water and land, and consequently, unequal life chances. Despite Israel 'separating' itself from the Palestinian 'terrorists', structural violence has continued uninterrupted. Whilst the settlements have been allocated vast areas, off-limits to Palestinians, they, the Palestinians are subjected to Israeli policies of permit restrictions and house demolitions. Left with no option, Palestinians are forced to move to small territorial enclaves of the Area A and B, or to build without a permit, facing the constant threat of their houses being demolished. Similarly, whilst Palestinians struggle to move around an increasing number of obstacles, Israeli settlers are free from the closure policy or checkpoint procedures.

Despite widespread international criticism, Israel's occupation is entering its forty-ninth year. The study of Israeli cultural violence, as illustrated, helps to understand how Israeli structural violence has continued uninterrupted and its impact often ignored, minimised and, to a certain extent, rationalised by a large sector of Israeli society.
Israeli messages, transmitted through Israeli officials' statements and the Israeli education system, which delegitimize and dehumanize the Palestinians, and denies them the right to their land, have been integrated into the Israeli national narrative. The lack of past political sovereignty in Palestine has been used to refute contemporary Palestinian territorial claims. Israel's government has questioned the very fact of occupation, arguing that the territories of the West Bank are 'disputed' or 'administered', rather than occupied, thus their presence in the territories is not an occupation but an administration. The denial of Palestinian affinity with the land goes, however, beyond questioning the legal status of the land. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Palestinians have not only been denied their historical presence in the land of Palestine, but their peoplehood has been rejected. The land was presented as terra nullis, an empty land waiting to be resettled by the Jews, and 'the people' they encountered, reduced to the status of non-Jewish communities in the Land of Israel, or an undifferentiated mass of Arabs. As there is no Palestinian nation, the right to self-determination has no application, thereby denying the right to collective national security. Palestinian acts of self-determination have been portrayed as nothing more than acts of terrorism against the state of Israel. All these elements, constantly repeated through official statements and the educational system, have been accepted by large sections of the society. In consequence, the Israeli occupation has become legitimised and justified in the Israeli consciousness. The rationalisation of the Jewish presence in the land, thus the 'naturalisation' of the occupation, has been further reinforced by the physical changes on the ground. Israelis are able to travel freely through a sophisticated highway system, linking the settlements with Israel, without even realizing they are entering occupied territories. With the disappearance of the internationally recognised borders on the ground and no recognised boundaries supported by Israeli official documents, the West Bank more resembles just another district of the State of Israel,
rather than an occupied territory. For the Palestinians, Israeli structural violence, fuelled by cultural violence, stands at the core of the conflict and consequently explains the protraction of the conflict.
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1 THESIS AIMS AND ARGUMENTS

The aim of the thesis has been to contribute to the discussion on the intractability of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In order to do that, as outlined in Chapter One, the thesis employed the conceptual framework of structural violence cast in the wider theoretical framework of Johan Galtung’s cycle of violence. As violence constitutes a characteristic feature of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the thesis has argued that it is crucial to have a comprehensive and systematic approach to capture it in all its forms. The employment of an extended conceptualization of violence, which includes direct, structural and cultural violence, has allowed for developing a theoretical framework to analyse the ‘interrelationship’ between the three types of violence (how one type of violence fuels the use of another), and the impact of these acts of violence on the intractability of the conflict. The thesis has therefore centred on four main theoretical questions: 1) How does structural violence lead to direct violence?; 2) How does direct violence lead to structural violence?; 3) How does cultural violence justify and legitimise the use of structural and direct violence?; 4) What aspects of culture are used to legitimise the use of violence? The shift in focus to include structural and cultural violence, therefore, has allowed for providing an empirical analysis of violence going beyond its direct manifestation. The thesis has argued that all three types of violence are interlinked and symbiotic in nature. The continuing failure to address all forms of violence as well as omitting or minimising the importance of one of the ‘angles’ of the violence triangle prevents the possibility of resolving the conflict, and thus has contributed to the protraction of the conflict.
As violence has been an omnipresent feature of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the thesis has focused specifically on the case study of the barrier, analysed as an example of structural violence. It has posed three main empirical questions: (1) What led to the construction of the barrier?; (2) Why does the barrier remain on the ground?; (3) Why, despite the barrier, does the Israeli occupation continue? The answers to these questions have been cast within the theoretical questions outlined above. In order to provide both Israeli and Palestinian contributions to these questions, the thesis has been divided into two accounts: Palestinian narratives and Israeli narratives. As explained in the introductory chapter, the history of the conflict and the reasons for its longevity have been the subjects of contrasting narratives. Similarly, the account of violence in the conflict, and consequently the answers to the research questions, has proved to show the same contestation between the narratives. The thesis has therefore investigated the cycle of violence in the conflict, and its impact on the intractability of the conflict, as seen by both parties. The empirical analysis of violence in the conflict, based on the two narratives, has revealed a complex cycle of violence in the conflict and has demonstrated the interconnection between the three types of violence.

The first part of the thesis, ‘Historical and Conceptual Background’, has provided the historical background to the research on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the conceptual and methodological framework for studying violence in the conflict. The thesis began with a literature review of the historical overview of the conflict. It placed the study of the barrier within a historical context. The protraction of the conflict has often been attributed to the very nature of the struggle: a contest between two peoples, each pursuing an incompatible goal: ownership of the same piece of land. Chapter Two, ‘Understanding the Israel-Palestine Conflict’, therefore, focused on the main parties and the main developments of the struggle. It reviewed the literature on the origin of the conflict, focusing on the emergence of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, Jewish
migration to Palestine, international support for the creation of a Jewish state, the establishment of the state of Israel, along with the resulting 1948 war, and the development of Palestinian leadership. It then reviewed the main scholarly arguments on the 1967 war, and the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation, in the form of the first and the second Intifada, the Oslo Peace Process, and the construction of the barrier. The accounts of these events contrast greatly depending on the two narratives; the chapter, therefore, provided an analysis that took into consideration the narratives of both sides. This has provided an essential historical background for the main area of concern for the thesis: the study of violence in the conflict. Without their examination, empirical analysis of structural, direct and cultural violence, provided in the following chapters, would have risked being analysed out of historical and thematic context. The purpose of the chapter was, therefore, to introduce a reader to the main historical junctions as they have constituted the basic historical framework for the thesis.

Chapter Three, ‘Moving towards a Better Understanding of Violence: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework’, has put forward the conceptual and theoretical framework of the thesis. The chapter has illustrated the limitations of the traditional conceptualisation of violence. The chapter has argued that the lack of the traditional criteria of violence does not mean violence is absent. Not all acts of violence are visible as action; not all have an identifiable perpetrator who can be held responsible for an act of violence, and not all acts of violence result in killing or injuring. An act of violence can be invisible, hidden into violent structures, where the 'oppressor' can be unidentifiable or 'faceless'. This, consequently, results in many forms of violence not being registered, as they do not meet the criteria of the traditional conceptualisation of violence, and their consequence easily ignored. The analysis of the limitations of the traditional concept of
violence served as a justification for the rejection of the traditional category of violence and the employment of Johan Galtung’s extended definition of violence.

For Galtung, violence is 'present when human beings are being influenced, so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations’ (Galtung, 1969:168). Violence, therefore, is exercised whenever the potential is higher than the actual, and when it is avoidable, and yet still happens. In his triangle of violence, he identifies three types of violence: direct, structural and cultural. Direct violence is visible as behaviour. It involves the use of physical force, such as shooting, stabbing, torture, or beatings. Structural violence is an indirect form of violence built into a violent political, economic and social structure, and although not visible in specific events, its effects are most clearly observable at the social level, manifesting itself in the deprivation of basic human needs such as survival, well-being, identity and freedom needs, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible, and resulting in the repression, penetration segmentation, marginalization and fragmentation of one group at the expense of other. Accordingly, violence can then be understood as the avoidable deprivation of human needs. Cultural violence refers to any aspects of culture, such as religion or ideology that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence, and thus making it look right or at least acceptable and unobjectionable.

The chapter has argued that as violence can take many forms, it is imperative to have a comprehensive concept of violence to accommodate its various facets. Galtung’s approach, therefore, as the chapter has argued, offers a more comprehensive framework to access and analyse different levels of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and to understand the interconnection between them. Violence can start in any corner of Galtung’s violence triangle. Structural, direct and cultural violence are not contradictory or mutually exclusive; they are strictly interlinked. In order to understand the protracted
cycle of violence, thus the durability of the conflict, the analysis must be directed
towards the identification and characterization of all forms of violence.

Galtung’s approach, however, not only constitutes a powerful rhetorical weapon to
challenge the traditional understating of violence but also represents a political tool to
assess acts of violence that otherwise would not be registered as violence, as they do not
meet the conventional criteria of violence. The definition one employs when discussing
violence may reflect a political rather than ontological position. The employment of a
particular definition of violence may, therefore, depend on the interests of those
employing them. Subsequently, discarding structural accounts of violence can be
interpreted as a political act, as it excludes the accounts of those who are subjected to
structural violence, consequently naturalising exploitative social relations.

Reframing the notion of violence to include structural and cultural violence, as the
thesis demonstrated, reveals a complicated and vicious cycle of violence in the Israel-
Palestine conflict. Part Two, ‘Underlying Causes for the Construction of the Barrier:
The Cycle of Violence’, consisting of Chapters Four and Five, has addressed the first
research question: what led to the construction of the barrier? Chapter Four, ‘The Cycle
of Violence before the Construction of the Fence: Israeli Narrative’, has put forward
Israeli narrative regarding the reasons as to the construction of the barrier. The main
findings of this chapter demonstrated the following arguments. First, according to the
Israeli narrative, to understand the Israeli decision to build the fence, the analysis needs
to take into an account the incessant Palestinian violence since, and even before, the
establishment of Israel. The security fence, according to Israel, should be seen as an
obvious reaction to decades of unprecedented and continuous Palestinian violence
culminating with the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Palestinian mass violence
against the state of Israel. Palestinian violence, as the chapter has demonstrated, has
been an omnipresent feature of Israel’s existence, claiming the lives of thousands of
Israelis. Over the years, the Palestinians have employed abundant forms of violence against Israel: guerrilla warfare, border insurrection, rocket attacks, hostage taking, stabbing, and shooting among others. Regardless of the method, for Israelis, the Palestinians’ intention has been clear: the destruction of the state of Israel.

Secondly, the threat of Israel’s destruction has, respectively, constituted the core of both the PLO’s and Hamas’ charters. The Palestinian violent rhetoric, a central component of cultural violence, repeatedly emphasised the only ‘solution’ to the conflict: an armed struggle for a total liberation of all parts of Mandatory Palestine thus the total annihilation of the state of Israel. Cultural violence encouraged, legitimised and glorified the use of direct violence against Israel. With the overwhelming level of Palestinian direct and cultural violence against Israel, the chapter has argued, ensuring security for Israel's citizens, based on retaining the defensible borders, thus the presence in the West Bank, had become a raison d'être for Israel.

Thirdly, for the Israelis, the Oslo Peace Process demonstrated that the Palestinians are not interested in a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Oslo Accords, as the chapter has argued, not only failed to form positive peace, essential for the resolution of the conflict, but it failed to establish negative peace. The elimination of direct violence, the minimum requirement for the peaceful solution of the conflict was not met. For Israelis, as the chapter has demonstrated, the ‘age of peace’ quickly turned into the ‘age of terror’: a period of an unprecedented level of violence that left thousands of Israelis dead, and culminated in the outbreak of the second Intifada. According to Israeli narrative, the territory that was placed under the PA control, was used as an arms dump, and a launching pad for attacks against Israel. Arafat, not only failed to stop the violence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad but, as the chapter has argued, he also actively participated in developing military and terrorist capabilities in the territory. In addition, as the chapter has argued, violence also became a tool of the PA system of governance.
Despite achieving limited authority over Palestinian land and people, the PA's leadership failed to transform itself into an effective government, essential for the establishment of a viable state. According to the Israeli narrative, the political entity, Arafat established, was based on a complete hegemony of Fatah and characterised by corruption, clientelism and the neo-patrimonial distribution of resources. Arafat marginalised a popular ‘young guard’ leadership, appointing people loyal to him, creating internal tensions. Whilst 'buying' the support for the government, the opposition was silenced by intimidation, harassment and arrests. For Israel, this proved that the PA is unable to build a stable and secure state that is ready to live in peace next to Israel.

The escalation of direct violence against Israel, as the chapter has illustrated, was accompanied by the intensification of cultural violence. Despite public assurances of Palestinian dedication to peace, Arafat's messages to the Palestinian public indicated a different resolution for the conflict: that of armed struggle. The violent rhetoric seriously questioned the PLO’s leadership’s peaceful intentions, but more importantly, it served to strengthen the belief of many Israelis that Oslo constitutes the 1974 'Phased Strategy'. The violence, in both cultural and direct manifestation, and the absence of visible action by the PA to counter it, eroded domestic support for negotiations with the Palestinians. For the Israelis, the final demonstration of the Palestinians’ lack of interest in a peaceful solution to the conflict was Arafat’s rejection of Barack’s offer at David Camp, offering virtually everything Palestinians had asked for. With the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Palestinians have been proclaimed 'no partners for peace'; the narrative has been unchallenged within Israeli society since then.

The outbreak of the second Intifada brought terrorism on a large scale. Hundreds of Israelis were killed, and thousands wounded in suicide attacks. With the close proximity of the territories of the West Bank to Israeli population, the Palestinians were able to
access Israel easily to apply terror. To stop the terror, the chapter has argued, Israel was left with no other option than to erect a fence. The fence, therefore, is a natural 'product' of the years of Palestinian violence and the Palestinian rejection to accept the existence of the Jewish state, culminating the mass scale violence of the second Intifada.

Chapter Five, ‘The Cycle of Violence before the Construction of the Wall: The Palestinian Narrative', has put forward the Palestinian narrative with regards to the research question of what led to the construction of the barrier. The main findings of this chapter demonstrated the following arguments. First, according to the Palestinian narrative, the Israeli decision to construct the barrier needs to be understood and put in the context of a long history of Israeli structural and direct violence: the displacement of Palestinians. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Palestinians have been subjected to the Israeli policies of fragmentation, marginalisation and exploitation; first carried out through direct violence of mass expulsion in 1947-1948 and in 1967, and since the beginning of the occupation, the structural violence of the Israeli 'matrix of control'. The Israeli settlement activities, the chapter has argued, have constituted one of the main elements of the matrix. To facilitate the expansion of the Israeli settlement enterprise, Israel has relied on seizing Palestinian land and large-scale demolitions of Palestinian houses, forcing many Palestinians off their land. To further accommodate the needs of the settlers, Israel took near complete control over all water resources, diverting Palestinian water into Israeli settlements. Israeli exploitation of water resources, as the chapter demonstrated, is clearly visible in the discriminatory permit system and highly unequal division and distribution of resources between the Palestinians and the Israeli settlers. By the early 1990s, the West Bank had been severely fragmented by Israeli settlements; and the Palestinian people segmented and fragmented into numerous enclaves, deprived of their basic survival, well-being, identity and freedom needs.
Secondly, for the Palestinians, the Oslo Peace Process constituted a great opportunity to end the Israeli violence. Right from its onset, as the chapter has demonstrated, it was clear that the process was not between two equal parties. The power asymmetries between the two and the unequal nature of the Oslo Accords guided the process throughout. Israel was able to dictate all the terms and conditions of the process. Whilst, as established in Chapter Four, Israel claims that Palestinian violence was the major reason for the failure of the Oslo Peace Process, the chapter has demonstrated that during the Oslo period, Israeli violence not only did not cease, but it significantly intensified. The Oslo peace process, according to the Palestinian narrative, formalised structural violence of the Israeli ‘matrix of control’. Instead of creating a viable political and territorial entity for the Palestinians, Israel retained total control over the majority of Palestinian territory, with its vital resources, formalising the fragmented landscape of the Palestinian territories. The strategy was similar to that of the pre-Oslo era: to get a maximum amount of strategic land, with a minimum number of the Palestinians, and ensuring minimum responsibility for their welfare. After seven years of Oslo, the Palestinians’ dreams of ‘peace, coexistence and equal rights’ turned into years of subordination and inequality. The social and geographical fragmentation was institutionalised and accompanied by the economic marginalisation and exploitation of the Palestinian market. Whilst the number of the Israeli settlers in the West Bank doubled and able to move freely within the West Bank, the Palestinians were subjected to closures, restricting their physical and economic movement. Similarly, the inequalities in water distribution and consumption were further formalised. For the Palestinians, the ‘generous’ offer, proposed at Camp David, was far from generous and, if accepted, would have institutionalised the social and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian territories, with Israel maintaining its control over the Palestinian state’s internal and external borders, airspace or water resources. According to the Palestinian
narrative, the wall, therefore, as the chapter has argued, needs to be understood in this wider context of the Israeli strategy of Palestinian displacement.

Although apart from the broad term the ‘state of Israel’ or the ‘government of Israel’, as the chapter has demonstrated, there is no identified ‘oppressor’ who directly harms, the violence is built into a violent socio-economic structure of the ‘matrix of control’ and clearly manifests itself as a deprivation of basic human needs: survival needs, well-being needs, freedom needs, identity needs. The violation of these needs resulted in the exploitation of Palestinian resources, fragmentation and segmentation of Palestinian land and people. Although often, structural violence is seen as an unintended form of violence, or ‘an unintentional side-effect of specific policies’, these structures, as the chapter has demonstrated, are clearly created and authorised by the government of Israel and reflect its interest. According to the Palestinian narrative, the ‘matrix of control’ is an intended ‘strategy’. By creating structures that lead to a violation of every single human need, Israel’s intention was to make Palestinians’ lives so ‘miserable’; they will eventually ‘leave’ the land. According to the Palestinian narrative, the second Intifada was a natural reaction to the seven years of Israeli violence against the Palestinians under the banner of ‘peace’.

Part Three of the thesis, ‘Conflict Despite the Barrier’, consisting of Chapters Six and Seven, has sought the answers to the research questions: what were the immediate reasons behind the construction of the barrier?; Why does the barrier remain?; and why, despite this security measure, the occupation continues? Chapter Six ‘Security Fence and the Cycle of Violence: Israeli Narrative’ has provided answers to these questions based on the Israeli narrative. The first main finding is that, according to Israeli narrative, the outbreak of the second Intifada left Israel with no choice but to resort to the construction of the fence. For Israel, the fence was not a preferred solution, but a complete necessity in the face of the dramatic rise of Palestinian violence. Secondly, for
Israel, the only way to effectively stop the attacks, meant its route had to deviate beyond the green line due to the typography of the territory of the West Bank (situated higher than Israel). Otherwise, the fence would have constituted merely a political statement without addressing the threat. The humanitarian impact of the fence, according to the Israeli narrative, the chapter argued, was an important consideration, but with the level of Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis rising dramatically, Israel's security was ultimately the primary concern. Indeed, according to the Israeli narrative, the fence has provided the desired protection. It has reduced the number of Palestinians carrying out, or attempting, attacks against Israel.

The chapter has then put forward Israeli narrative to the question: why despite the barrier Israel remains in the territory? The chapter argued that according to Israeli narrative, the fence, despite being a highly effective security measure, is not sufficient to maintain security for Israel's citizens, and the Israeli presence in the West Bank is essential. Three arguments have been presented to demonstrate this assertion. First, for Israel, the 2005 Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, and the events that followed the withdrawal provide valuable lessons as to what could follow the potential withdrawal from the West Bank. Even before Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, when the territory was under the rule of Fatah, the chapter has demonstrated, Hamas was able to acquire more sophisticated mortars and rockets with their range extended now to central Israel. Only a year after the withdrawal, Hamas took over the territory, and Israel witnessed a fivefold escalation of rocket attacks against its population centres. Despite three military campaigns in Gaza aimed at addressing the threat, Israelis still live under the risk of rocket attacks. Israel fears, therefore, that withdrawal from the West Bank would lead to similar events to those that followed disengagement from Gaza: Hamas’s takeover of the territory, and consequently, the development of a similarly sophisticated rocket system in the area. Due to the typography of the territory of the West Bank,
characterised by high ground, virtually overlooking Israel’s major population centres, Hamas's rocket attacks would constitute an existential threat to Israel. The retention of the Israeli presence in the West Bank, especially in the territory of the Jordan Valley, is essential in preventing this threat.

Second, the chapter has argued that the weak state of the current PA’s governance constitutes another reason for Israel's need to remain in the territory. According to the Israeli narrative, the Palestinian leadership constitutes a failed regime, suffering from severe political fragmentation, internal friction and corruption. The chapter has argued that without the Israeli presence in the territory, the Palestinian society could implode in a power struggle and communal violence, and a possible takeover of the territory by Hamas. In such a scenario, Israel would be surrounded on its eastern and western borders by the threat of rockets and border infiltration. For Israel, its presence in the territory is, therefore, to ensure that the 'Gaza scenario' would not repeat itself in the territory.

Third, according to Israeli narrative, Israel's presence in the territory needs to be taken into a wider context of the current strategic situation in the Middle East. Currently, Israel finds itself surrounded by semi-states and non-state entities, Hamas and Hezbollah, and an increasing number of jihadists movements active across its borders with Syria and the Sinai Peninsula. Although Israel's borders have so far been free from the border infiltrations of these jihadist organisations, the situation has had an impact on Israel's decision to retain its presence in the West Bank. Israel’s strategic behaviour has been further influenced by the political activities of Iran. Iran, now freed from international sanctions, has increased its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, offering to finance Palestinians in the West Bank who are willing to carry out attacks against Israel. The chapter has concluded that according to the Israeli narrative, Israel's presence in the West Bank, especially in the Jordan Valley, enables Israel to prevent weapons
smuggling and the infiltration of jihadists. According to the Israeli narrative, the withdrawal from the West Bank, therefore, would seriously endanger the security of the state, leaving Israel with the so-called ‘Auschwitz borders’.

The final finding of the chapter has demonstrated that, according to Israeli narrative, continuous Palestinian cultural violence has served to strengthen the Israeli assertion of its need to remain in the territory. The PA’s official discourse, which has continued to deny the legitimacy of Israel, and has promoted the denigration of Jews whilst glorifying violence against the state of Israel, has strengthened Israelis’ fear that the ultimate goal of the Palestinians is the total annihilation of Israel. According to the Israeli narrative, the use of violence is not only publicly justified and glorified, but also financially awarded. For Israelis, a withdrawal from the West Bank would, therefore, only constitute the first stage in the Palestine struggle to liberate all of the historical Palestine, leading, therefore, to more violence in its direct form. The chapter has concluded that for Israel, its presence in the West Bank remains essential for the security of Israel in the absence of the formal peace agreement with the Palestinians. For the Israeli government, the use of structural violence is justified as a necessary tool to secure the safety of its citizens.

Chapter Seven, 'Wall and the Cycle of Violence: Palestinian Narrative' has put forward Palestinian narrative to the three research questions outlined above. The main findings of the chapter are the following. First, according to the Palestinian narrative, the primary reason behind the Israeli decision to construct the wall was the annexation of Palestinian resources: land and water. The claim, according to the Palestinian narrative, is clearly manifested in the route of the wall, the majority of which runs inside the West Bank. To accommodate the construction, the chapter has illustrated, Israel appropriated a large amount of land, demolishing Palestinian houses and agricultural property, irrigation or drainage system, forcing Palestinians to relocate. Secondly, for the Palestinians, the
consequences of the construction, however, go beyond the annexation of the Palestinian resources and the destruction of Palestinian property. The wall has further fragmented the territory into a series of enclaves, trapping Palestinians inside and keeping them away from each other. The wall severely restricts their freedom of movement, preventing them from accessing roads, schools, hospitals, places of employment, and severing their ties to neighbouring Palestinian communities. It separates Palestinians from the religious, cultural and social centre-Jerusalem-preventing social, cultural and economic interaction. Those who found themselves on the 'Israeli' side of the wall have been trapped, with access to their families, places of employment, education and commerce conditional upon the Israeli permit regime. Although violence cannot be traceable to an individual ‘oppressor’, it clearly manifests itself in the deprivation of Palestinians’ basic human needs: survival, well-being, identity and freedom needs and fragmentation, segmentation, marginalisation: the main mechanisms of structural violence.

Third, the wall, according to Palestinian narrative, cannot be seen as a separate phenomenon, an isolated example of Israeli structural violence but a part of the wider structure of Israeli control, and as such, a part of the whole occupation regime. Despite the construction of the wall, and allegedly ‘separating’ itself from the Palestinians, Israel has continued its ‘matrix of control’ in the territory. The ongoing settlements activities have further fragmented the territory, punctuating the land and severely affecting territorial contiguity necessary for the creation of a viable state. Whilst the settlements have been allocated vast areas, far exceeding their built-up sections, and Israeli settlers move freely between/within the settlements in the West Bank and Israel, Palestinians are increasingly being confined to small non-contiguous territorial ‘islands’, with the movement between and within them severely affected by internal, permanent and flying, checkpoints, particularly with regard to the residents of Area C.
Next, according to Palestinian narrative, along with the denial of their freedom needs, Palestinian well-being and survival needs are affected by the systematic denial of their right to build in the area. The discriminatory house permit regime methodically prevents Palestinians from building in the Area C and East Jerusalem. Being left with no options, Palestinians are forced to build without a permit, living under constant threat of their houses being demolished. Palestinian well-being and survival needs are further violated by the exploitation of Palestinian water resources. Whilst Israeli settlers enjoy an unlimited supply of water, Palestinians water consumption is severely limited, falling below WHO recommendations. The wall, the chapter has concluded, cannot be seen as a separate phenomenon, but rather a part of the wider system of an Israeli strategy to make the Palestinians’ lives so difficult or even uninhabitable, they will eventually leave the land.

The second part of the chapter has put forward Palestinian narrative to the question: how has the structural violence of the Israeli occupation continued uninterrupted and has become rationalised, naturalised and, to a large extent, acceptable by a large sector of the Israeli society? To address this question, the chapter has employed the concept of cultural violence. It concentrated on one of the aspects of cultural violence: language. According to Palestinian narrative, some of the elements of official Israeli discourse, transmitted through Israeli officials' statements and the Israeli education system, have delegitimised and dehumanised the Palestinians, which in turn, has led to the rationalisation and legitimization of the Israeli occupation in the Israeli consciousness.

First, since the beginning of the conflict, Palestinian identity has been systematically rejected, and the Palestinians denied their political rights and historical affinity to the land. Second, the continuous dehumanisation of the Palestinian people has contributed to a situation where the Palestinian rights and needs are considerably diminished for the Israelis. With their status reduced to that of terrorists, Palestinian acts of self-
determination have been portrayed as nothing more than acts of terrorism against the state of Israel. Finally, the denial of the Palestinian right to land, and their right to resistance against the occupation have been further accommodated by the Israeli repeated narrative based on the legal argument that the territories of the West Bank are not occupied but ‘disputed’ or ‘administered'. The dispute over the ‘ownership’ of the land, as the chapter has discussed, goes beyond the legal status of the territories. An apparent religious claim, the land was given to the Jews by God, has been incorporated into Israeli official narrative, and it has served to further deprive Palestinians of any right and affinity to the land. All these elements have been consistently repeated through official statements and the educational system, making Israeli occupation legitimised and justified in the Israeli consciousness. Furthermore, as the chapter has argued, with the physical changes on the ground, the West Bank resembles more the adjunct territory of Israel rather than a separate political entity, further ‘naturalising' the occupation. The Israeli cultural violence has served to justify the Israeli structural violence, making the Israeli acts against the Palestinians acceptable, or not seen at all. For the Palestinians, therefore, Israeli structural violence, fuelled by cultural violence, stands at the core of the conflict and consequently explains the protraction of the conflict.

**8.2 THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE**

It has been over fourteen years since the construction of the barrier commenced. Despite the physical barrier on the ground 'separating' Israel and the West Bank, direct violence between the two peoples has continued uninterrupted. At the time of writing this conclusion, the recent outbreak of the new round of violence, often referred to as the third Intifada, mini Intifada, enters its seventh month, claiming dozens of victims on both sides. In the midst of the Palestinian attacks against Israelis, in February 2016,
Netanyahu pledged his dedication to completing the construction of the unfinished parts of the barrier to protect Israel from terrorist infiltration of Palestinian 'beasts' (Keinon, 2016), and whilst writing these lines, it has been reported that Israel did, in fact, began building a new section of the barrier near Beit Jala, south of Jerusalem, close to Bethlehem (Middle East Eye, 2016). From the Israeli perspective, as this thesis has argued, the fence, a part of the wider security system, is an essential defensive mechanism to protect the security of Israel's citizens against Palestinian terrorism.

For Israel, the Oslo ‘Peace’ Process and the events following the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip provide valuable lessons around what can be expected after withdrawal from the West Bank. Despite significant concessions, in both cases, the Palestinians resorted to violence. For Israelis, the conclusion is simple: the Palestinians are not interested in a peaceful solution to the conflict. In addition to the lessons learnt, the withdrawal from the territories is further problematic when observing the unstable nature of the PA’s governance, riddled with internal fractions and corruption. The departure or demise of Muhammad Abbas (who is 83 years old) may further weaken the PA. Drawing lessons from the history of the Palestinian governance, the possible scenario may involve internal competition within the Fatah and the PA for the leadership evolving into chaos and the possible dissolution of the PA. In such a situation, the scenario of Hamas takeover of the West Bank not only cannot be excluded, but it has to be seriously taken into account. Withdrawal is further problematic, as the thesis has argued, when the current volatility of the overall region is taken into account. Ayelet Shaked, Israel’s Minister of Justice, recently summarised Israel’s position in the region by arguing, ‘all the countries around us are collapsing, and there is a huge battle in the Middle East between the Shia and the Sunnis, and there are terror organisations all over. Israel really is like a villa in the jungle’ (Foreign Affairs, 2016). Israel is surrounded by militant groups, many of whom share the same goal: the very destruction of Israel. Faced with
the uncertainties regarding how the situation across its border will unravel, Israel relies on its defensible borders.

When discussing the Palestinian violence and the current situation in the region, Tirza, concluded his interview by saying:

We look forward to a future when there is no need for measures such as the fence. We will be glad to tear down the fences and live in peace with our neighbours. But until that time comes, we are determined to carry through with this defensive project (Tirza, 2014)

There is nothing wrong with building a ‘defensive project’. In fact, it is a duty of Israel to secure the safety of its citizens. The problem, however, is that security for the Israelis has been built on, and ensured through, violence against the Palestinians. The barrier, along with other elements of Israel's occupation, violates Palestinian basic freedom, well-being, survival and identity needs, constituting nothing but violence. When the construction of the barrier began, its impact on the Palestinians’ lives was described by Israel as a ‘temporary and reversible inconvenience’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). For the Palestinians, however, the statement does precisely encapsulate the problem of Israel's security reasoning. Violence breeds violence, and the Israeli deaths can only be ceased by the very elimination of this 'inconvenience': structural violence. The impact of structural violence, therefore, cannot be minimised or ignored. Although structural violence operates at a slower pace, it does have the same ability to harm. All types of violence must, or at least should, be seen to have equal value in terms of its importance.

Structural violence has stood at the heart of Palestinian insecurity for over five decades. The wall has left the Palestinians displaced and fragmented into small enclaves, separated from each other, with their needs marginalised and their resources exploited. For the Palestinians, the wall, however, constitutes just the latest element in a long and
ongoing Israel’s strategy of displacement of the Palestinians. As I write this concluding chapter, Haaretz reported Israel seizing 579 acres (234 hectares) of land in the West Bank near the Dead Sea and the Palestinian city of Jericho, the largest land confiscation in the West Bank in recent years (Haaretz, 2016). Whilst Israel is forcibly transferring the Palestinians out of the land; it continues transferring Israeli citizens inside the West Bank. In the same month, March 2016, PLO Secretary-General Dr Saeb Erekat reported Israel's latest plans to build 900 settlement units in the illegal settlement of Pisgat Ze’ev, between East Jerusalem and Ramallah. To accommodate the needs of settlers, Israeli continues its discriminatory water politics. Whilst writing this conclusion, it has been reported that Israel has cut off the water supply to large areas of the West Bank, leaving tens of thousands of Palestinians without access to safe drinking water. The office of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah released a statement accusing Israel of ‘waging a water war against the Palestinians’. Israel, the statement continues, ‘wants to prevent Palestinians from leading a dignified life and uses its control over our water resources to this end; while illegal Israeli settlements enjoy uninterrupted water service, Palestinians are forced to spend great sums of money to buy water that is theirs in the first place’ (Aljazeera, 2016). The houses demolition, another aspect of the Israeli ‘matrix of control’, continues at unprecedented speed. According to Oxfam, from January 2015 to February 2016, 226 homes and humanitarian structures have been demolished, affecting 4659 people, half of them children (Oxfam, 2016). Visiting Khirbet Tana, one of the Palestinian communities affected by the most recent demolition84, the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian and Development Activities (UNCHD) for the occupied Palestinian territory, Robert Piper stated: ‘It’s hard to see

84 On 23 March, the Israeli authorities demolished 53 structures in the community, including 22 homes, leaving 87 Palestinians homeless, nearly half of them children.
how demolitions like the ones in Khirbet Tana are about anything other than pushing vulnerable Palestinians out of certain parts of the West Bank’ (UNISPAL, 2016). For the Palestinians, Israel's intentions are precisely that: a strategy of pushing them off their land. At this point, the fragmentation of the Palestinian territories is so severe, it is actually quite difficult to envisage the creation of a viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity.

The theoretical hypothesis, which assumes that structural violence leads to direct violence, is clearly reflected in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Being subjected to structural violence for over five decades, the Palestinians have resorted to the use of direct violence in the form of first and second Intifadas, and more recently in the outbreak of so-called mini Intifada. For them, direct violence has been an expression of deprivation of their basic needs, humiliation, frustration and anger. As the construction of the barrier continues and other elements of Israel's occupation remain in place, more Palestinian violence can be expected to 'get out of the structural iron cage'.

As Ibrahim told me:

> No walls can protect people; the protection will come when there is justice with the others. Maybe you minimise the number of attacks, but as long there is an occupation nothing will protect you (Ibrahim, 2014)

The barrier may have provided Israel with greater short-term security, reducing the numbers of terrorist attacks inside Israel (and, as the thesis demonstrated, it initially did) but only to undermine it over the long-term, as we observe now. And the fact is that, according to the Israel Democracy Institute poll, when asked ‘To what extent do you fear that you or one of the people important to you will be harmed in the current wave of terror attacks?’, the majority of the Jewish public in Israel, 64 percent, responded that they greatly or moderately fear it (The Israel Democracy Institute, 2016)
Israeli security is a critical factor in the resolution of the conflict, and it has to be addressed for the conflict to be resolved. Yet as long as any peace agreement is linked only to the elimination of direct violence, it effectively and significantly impedes its progress. The barrier can, therefore, be seen as the physical manifestation of an approach that has failed to address all forms of violence. A solution to the conflict requires positive peace: peace where all three types of violence are eliminated. Breaking this cyclical relationship hinges on the ability to ensure security for both people without relying on violence. The case put forward in this thesis should be read as a critical reflection on the grave impact of structural violence on the protraction of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

8.3 CONTRIBUTION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis has contributed theoretically and empirically to the existing literature on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Theoretically, it has proposed a new theoretical and conceptual framework for explaining the intractability of the Israel-Palestine conflict, arguing that in order to understand perpetual violence and the continuation of the conflict, a comprehensive analysis of violence, which includes the three types of violence, is required. The three types of violence, the thesis has argued, are symbiotic in nature. Direct violence leads to structural violence, structural violence to direct violence, and cultural violence serves to justify and legitimise the (other) two. In order to examine this assumption empirically, the thesis analysed the three types of violence in the conflict as seen by the two peoples: Palestinians and Israelis. The empirical analysis, the majority of which was based on the original date collected in the region, has revealed the enduring cycle of violence exercised by both Palestinians and Israelis. The extended conceptualisation of violence allowed analysing acts of violence, which otherwise would not be considered as violence as they do not meet the criteria of the traditional
The fluid dynamic of the Israel-Palestine conflict poses a challenge to writing on the issue of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, with no signs of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, I risk the statement that even with the passage of time, the debate on violence will remain relevant in the study of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The analysis, therefore, constitutes the first part of the author's investigation of
violence in the conflict. As the thesis has argued, the resolution of the conflict is highly dependent on addressing the cycle of violence, in which cultural violence creates the preconditions for direct and structural violence by promoting exclusion, hatred, and delegitimisation. A further investigation into the dynamic and the role of cultural violence will benefit the analysis on the importance of this type of violence in the protraction of the conflict. Discourse, it has often been emphasised during the data collection, can be presumed to be a result of the reality. In other words, with the elimination of structural and direct violence, cultural violence can be expected to disappear gradually. It is, however, of great interest to the researcher, to investigate further to what extent, the discourse and the narrative, which dehumanise the Palestinians and delegitimise their right to land and self-determination, led to the naturalisation of the occupation. Whilst writing this conclusion, the most recent poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (April 2016), demonstrated that more than two-thirds of Jewish Israelis (71.5 percent) do not consider Israel’s control of the West Bank an “occupation” (The Israel Democracy Institute, 2016). It is in the researcher's interest to investigate the possible impact of cultural violence behind such a high number.

As the thesis has argued, the Oslo Peace Process collapsed because it failed to address structural and cultural violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. To further establish the impact of structural and cultural violence on the intractability of the conflict, it would be beneficial to investigate the main peace proposals since the Oslo Peace Process, such as Taba (2001), the Arab Peace Initiative (2002), the Roadmap (2003), Geneva Accord (2004), Annapolis (2007) and Washington (2010), and analyse to what extent structural and cultural violence has been addressed. Such analysis would contribute to the empirical analysis of the importance of addressing all types of violence in the peace-making efforts, whilst further demonstrating how omitting or minimising the
importance of any of the 'angles' of the violence triangle can contribute to the failure of the peace process, and consequently, the protraction of the conflict. This would also contribute to the development of the theoretical framework of violence and positive and negative peace.

Finally, as mentioned above, the construction of new elements of the barrier has begun in the West Bank. The investigation into the route of the new parts of the barrier, and the possible humanitarian implication of the construction, could reveal whether Israel has continued the construction to annex more land and more resources, or whether it has found an appropriate balance between security considerations and the rights and needs of the Palestinians. The analysis would further uncover whether the barrier continues to constitute structural violence, a part of an intentional strategy of displacing the Palestinian population from the territory of the West Bank.

International Relation theories, both traditional and critical, continue to focus on direct, physical violence, often equated with military force (Thomas, 2011). The restriction of the conceptualisation of violence to acts of physical violence, as this thesis demonstrated, is inadequate for the task of explaining violence in conflicts. Understanding violence in conflict is a necessary condition for preventing it, therefore the traditional approaches to violence need to be changed if the violence is to be reduced. Acts of structural violence, such as unequal group access to economic, political and social resources, deprivation of human needs, and cultural violence, such as the demonisation and dehumanisation of certain groups reflected in language, ideology or art, should be seen as just as important as the damage done by direct, physical violence. Thus, the analysis of conflicts should go beyond acts of direct violence, and also focus on structural and cultural violence. As the findings of the thesis suggest, they may constitute underlying causes of protracted conflicts.
A more interdisciplinary approach to the study of violence, integrating political, sociological, economic and psychological theories of conflict would be desirable. Particularly, the importance of violent elements of culture needs to be recognised, and the interrelationships between different elements of culture violence made more apparent. Of particular importance is the use of narratives or language that dehumanise and delegitimise one group, and consequently legitimising the use of direct and structural violence against this group. This could contribute to improving the policy impact of conflict research. This could lead to a closer monitoring of the school curriculum in conflict areas and a wider supervision of the school education system, and textbooks in particular. The donor policies that are intended to promote conflict resolution may increase the funding to promote such change. The thesis findings suggest that such change is fundamental in order to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict. As the thesis has argued, all three types of violence are symbiotic in nature. Once cultural violence, the ‘legitimiser’ for the use of direct and structural violence, is removed, this may lead to questioning the legitimacy of direct and structural violence, carried out by both peoples, and consequently, its gradual elimination.
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252


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259


261


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268


## APPENDIX

### Appendix I: List of Interviewees

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Date of the interview</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nidal Abu Zuluf Jai</td>
<td>Manager of the Joint Advocacy Initiative (JAI) of the East Jerusalem YMCA and the YWCA of Palestine</td>
<td>10/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omer Bar-Lev</td>
<td>Member of Knesset for the Zionist Union and a member of Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee</td>
<td>07/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Daniel Bar Tal</td>
<td>Professor of Research in Child Development and Education at School of Education, Tel Aviv University</td>
<td>11/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayala Brilliant</td>
<td>Youth Leadership Director of One Voice Movement</td>
<td>27/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray Dolphin</td>
<td>UNOCHA’s Barrier Specialist</td>
<td>17/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorit</td>
<td>Activist of Machsom Watch</td>
<td>27/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Johan Galtung</td>
<td>Principal founder of the discipline of peace and conflict studies.</td>
<td>27-29/11/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Asad Ghanem</td>
<td>Senior lecturer at the School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa</td>
<td>02/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angela Godfrey-</td>
<td>Co-director, Founder and Advocacy Officer of the Jahalin Association</td>
<td>06/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldstein</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Nimrod Goren</td>
<td>Founder and chairman of Mitvim</td>
<td>07/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Edmonds</td>
<td>Member of the ICAHD</td>
<td>12/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ehud Eiran</td>
<td>Board Member at Mitvim and Assistant Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Science, University of Haifa</td>
<td>01/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ze’ev Elkin</td>
<td>Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and now Minister of Immigration and Absorption and Minister of Jerusalem Affairs and Heritage</td>
<td>13/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Hillel Frish</td>
<td>Senior researcher at the BESA and an Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Studies and Middle East Studies in Bar-Ilan University.</td>
<td>03/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Mark Heller</td>
<td>Principal Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies</td>
<td>01/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiba Hussein</td>
<td>Chairs the Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis</td>
<td>28/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassar Ibrahim</td>
<td>Political analyst and a member of the AIC</td>
<td>28/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamal Juma</td>
<td>Director of the Palestinian human rights organisation ‘Stop the Wall’</td>
<td>19/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Keller</td>
<td>Co-founder and spokesperson for Gush-Shalom, the Israeli Peace Bloc</td>
<td>18/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Menachem Klein</td>
<td>Senior lecturer in political science at Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem</td>
<td>17/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Micha Kurz</td>
<td>Co-founded “Breaking the Silence” and a co-founder of “Grassroots Jerusalem,”</td>
<td>16/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Zach Levey</td>
<td>Associate Professor at the University of Haifa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Itamar Marcus</td>
<td>Founder and director of the PMW</td>
<td>14/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Nurit Peled-Elhanan</td>
<td>Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem</td>
<td>05/07/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Jonathan Reynhold</td>
<td>Senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) and director of the Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeremy Saltan</td>
<td>Knesset Insider, campaigner and leading political analyst.</td>
<td>21/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Eitan Shamir</td>
<td>Former head of the National Security Doctrine Department in the Israel Ministry of Strategic Affairs and an expert on insurgencies and combat doctrine</td>
<td>23/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Shaul Shay</td>
<td>Former deputy head of the Israel National Security Council, and former head of the IDF military history department</td>
<td>24/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meir Sheeitrit</td>
<td>Member of the Knesset for Hatnuah. Former Minister of the Interior, Minister of Housing and Construction, Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, Minister of Transportation and Minister of Education, Culture and Sport.</td>
<td>25/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Shindman</td>
<td>Member of the Israel Project</td>
<td>09/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Gerald Steinberg</td>
<td>founder and president of NGO Monitor and professor of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University.</td>
<td>26/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danny Tirza</td>
<td>The architect of the barrier</td>
<td>30/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michel Warschawiski</td>
<td>Founder of the AIC</td>
<td>26/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Laura Wharton</td>
<td>Jerusalem City Councillor and Representative of Meretz</td>
<td>05/06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Yaacov Yadgar</td>
<td>Professor of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University</td>
<td>05/07/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Said Zeedani</td>
<td>Associate Professor of Philosophy at Al-Quds University, and the former Director General of the Independent Palestinian Commission for Citizens’ Rights</td>
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Appendix II: Settlements and settlers in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem), 1967-1993

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Source: B’tselem (2010) *By Hook and By Crook Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p. 9-10
Appendix III: Settlers in East Jerusalem, 1967-1993

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Source: B’Tselem (2010) *By Hook and By Crook Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p. 10
Appendix IV: Settlements and settlers in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem), 1993-2007

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Source: B’Tselem (2010) *By Hook and By Crook Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p. 9-10
Appendix V: Settlers in East Jerusalem, 1993-2007

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Source: B’Tselem (2010) By Hook and By Crook Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank, p. 10