The governance of security in the revanchist city - The case of Cape Town, South Africa

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THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY IN THE
REVANCHIST CITY
-
THE CASE OF CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
by
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ABSTRACT

Till Frederik Paasche

The governance of security in the revanchist city- The case of Cape Town, South Africa

Much has been written on the revanchist city (for example Smith, 1996; MacLeod, 2002; Belina and Helms, 2003) and the reclaiming of space from so-called ‘undesirables’ through the means of the police. Here, the guiding ideas are policing strategies such as the ‘broken windows syndrome’ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) and ‘zero tolerance policing’ (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994; Beckett and Herbert, 2008; Herbert and Beckett, 2010). However, the role of private security companies in the reclaiming of public space remains under-researched. Using a case study in Cape Town this research gap will be addressed in this study.

Conceptualising the thesis through governance and territoriality, it will examine how revanchist ideas of reclaiming space from urban poor and street people lead to exclusionary processes in the quest for sanitised spaces. By taking private security companies out of the environment of mass private property in which they are most commonly studied (Shearing and Stenning, 1983; von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Wakefield, 2003), this thesis examines their role and impact on public spaces within the revanchist environment of Cape Town, South Africa. Here, fast and extensive developments in governance as well as in urban life, interwoven with exceptionally high crime rates, have created a flourishing market for private security companies.

In this context this thesis examines the case of private policing companies operating in the core public spaces of the city; the research reveals their social ordering function and powers are the same as those usually associated with the public police.
Drawing on these insights it is claimed that private policing companies manifest an evolution from private security companies towards the police, and that this continues the pluralisation of the policing landscape. By mapping the privately policed spaces within the case studies and analysing the functions the different governance actors carry out, this thesis also argues that social development actors become part of the policing landscape. Analysing the governance landscape and its close ties to private policing, it is argued that social development is becoming the softer side of policing. Combining effective private policing companies with social development in support of the state reveals that private governance actors are indeed powerful players in public spaces. Drawing on this governance of security and its associated power, the final argument will be that a different kind of public space is being developed. After consideration of the particular history of defunct public spaces in South Africa, it is claimed that no single public space exists anymore, but that we now face different public spaces, characterised through their different norms and rules, and the social groups that use them.
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress (main political party in South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BID</td>
<td>Business Improvement District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTP</td>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central business district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed-circuit television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>City Improvement District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Congress of the People (political party that split from the ANC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions (trade union and political power in traditional tri-alliance with the ANC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Community Policing Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIRA</td>
<td>Private Security Regulatory Authority South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIDSA</td>
<td>South African Intruder Detection Services Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Police (public police during apartheid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party (in traditional tri-alliance with the ANC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service (current public police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZTP</td>
<td>Zero tolerance policing</td>
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</table>
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Publications related to the PhD project:


Publications related to the PhD project currently under review:


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Town; School Earth and Environmental Science, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK


18 August 2011  Presentation: ‘The Softer Side of Policing’: Cape Town’s *urban ordering through social development*; International Conference of Critical Geography, Frankfurt a. M., Germany

08 July 2011  Presentation: ‘The Softer Side of Policing’: Social development *in the revanchist Cape Town*; RC 21 Annual Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands

25 May 2011  Forschungskolloquium: *Die sanfte Seite der Polizeiarbeit im revanchistischen Kapstadt*; Institut für Humangeographie, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt a.M., Germany

12 April 2011  Presentation: ‘The Softer Side of Policing’: Targeting *'others'* *in the Neoliberal Cape Town*; Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers, Seattle, USA

11 April 2011  Presentation: ‘The softer side of security’ Social development *in the revanchist Cape Town*; Pre-Conference of the Political Geography and Sexuality and Space Specialty Groups of the Association of American Geographers, Tacoma, USA
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Signed: Till Paschke

Date: 23.03.2012
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Few things determine urban life as strongly as security. If a space is not secure, or is perceived as insecure, we do not use it. If a city’s public space is insecure, whole new secure spaces are created and social life is re-configured around them. If, as a consequence, this means that public urban space declines, it might be reclaimed by applying a policing strategy that re-composes the social structure of urban public space. Although security, or the implementation of security over space, has a considerable impact on urban life, research on these issues is surprisingly limited. This is especially the case with private policing companies that, as this thesis will show, play an increasing role in various fields of policing urban life and in ensuring notions of social order and control.

Although forms of private security can be found in most places around the globe, this thesis will focus on what has been labelled the ‘Revanchist City’, in which space is being reclaimed for the elites from those seen as ‘undesirables’ (Smith, 1996). Of particular interest for this study is the pluralisation of governance, especially in relation to security. By examining governance structures, recent developments in the governance of security will be conceptualised, visualised and interpreted.

The research bridges urban geography, policing and security. However, a large section of the literature and the concepts that are the key to this study have been created by criminologists. The originality of this thesis is its examination of new developments in urban security through a geographical lens. While criminologists carry out valuable studies on security and policing, they sometimes lack a spatial perspective. By applying a geographical perspective, valuable nuances can be added to these ideas.

1.1 Site of study – Cape Town

The case study for this thesis is Cape Town, South Africa. To explain this choice of case study site, I must begin with a personal experience that not only captures my fascination for South Africa, but also explains its academic relevance, particularly in terms of urban security and policing. In late 2002, I visited southern Africa for the first time. Still suffering from a tropical disease I caught in Mozambique, myself and a friend arrived at Johannesburg’s (not Cape Town) central bus terminal after several days of travelling. Being a bit naïve at that time, we had not arranged accommodation and it was already getting dark so we called a few backpacker hostels to check availability.

As we described our situation, the woman on the other end of the line sounded slightly worried and told us not to leave the new secure terminal, as the surrounding area would be too dangerous for two white men with big backpacks in the dark. To make her point she explained that just a few days earlier a man had been killed in that neighbourhood for just 10 Rand (about £1). Scared and exhausted, we waited next to an international fast food restaurant that gave us a strange feeling of familiarity and security. About half an hour later our landlady for the night arrived.
and guided us to her car where she told us to lock all the doors and windows and told us about the ‘suicide tower’, the gangs, and the changes in the city’s face in the last few years as we drove through the downtown area, past run-down buildings and burning oil drums we had previously only seen in hip-hop videos.

When we made it to the backpackers’ neighbourhood, we had to pass a black security guard and then drive alongside a high fence for a couple of hundred metres. At the time we were quite surprised, as this was obviously not an upper-class neighbourhood and, from the appearance buildings and the cost of accommodation for backpacker, not even a middle-class one; nonetheless, the security measures we encountered were like nothing I had ever witnessed anywhere else.

This example shows the distinctiveness of the space in terms of its new forms urban segregation and the importance of private security within this segregated urban order. Therefore, when thinking about a possible case study for the project, South Africa came into my mind as it is still (and possibly will stay) one of the best places to go to study private urban policing. The two main factors that enable rich data sets are the extremely high crime rate and an underfinanced, understaffed public police service, incapable of controlling the crime. The combinations of these factors have created an ever-changing private security landscape that is far more developed than, for example, in Europe.

Having decided on the country, the next question concerned the city. Here the choice was between Cape Town and Johannesburg, as both places are synonymous with high, out-of-control crime and were therefore appealing for such study. The reason for deciding on Cape Town was that the kind of crime is different to Johannesburg, being less violent and dangerous, which makes research more feasible when it comes to issues of personal safety. Furthermore, the geography of the inner city is laid out
in a way that facilitates research. The Table Mountain and the sea have naturally created an area known as the City Bowl, which hosts the central business district CBD; most tourist attractions, including the historical city centre; and middle-class residential areas, all of which are accessible by foot. Furthermore the City Bowl borders both poorer and richer areas, with the majority-coloured suburb of Woodstock in the east and the white affluent suburbs of Sea Point and Fresnaye in the West. In other words, one finds a variety of different spaces in a small geographical space enclosed by mountains and the sea. For a similar sample of urban space it would be necessary to travel much more extensively in Johannesburg. All of this, combined with a personal affinity for the city, made a convincing case for it to be the case study.

However, the criteria for the case study did not only include the local conditions ensuring a rich dataset, but also criteria that made a case study relevant beyond its immediate boundaries. The idea was to take an extreme case in terms of security measures that is also embedded in much wider policies, and to learn from the researched example. As mentioned above, the policies relevant in this context are global, constantly-reproduced urban renewal programmes, critically summed up under the term ‘urban revanchism’ (e.g. Smith, 1996). On this, the mobile urbanism literature (e.g. McCann and Ward, 2011) argues that while the general ideas of programmes such as Improvement Districts are global, it is its the local changes and modifications which make in-depth studies interesting as we can learn from them. In this respect Cape Town achieves all the criteria. Besides the lack of policing and high crime that facilitates the growth in private security in Cape Town, as in other South African cities, the city hosts affluent individuals and communities that push urban renewal and global inter-city competition, which resulted, for example, in the
successful bid to host the 2010 football world cup. This combination creates an environment where urban developments are of relevance for researchers interested in rejuvenated urban spaces in different cities who are curious to see what is possible, where a trend goes, and what might occur in the future.

However, besides aspects of generalisability the research also appreciates the individuality of the case study and its specific history and geography. Departing from the case of Cape Town, a more wider discussion on the nature of (public) space can be pursued which is of relevance, not only for South African cities, but also for post-colonial cities characterised by past segregation and contemporary inequalities more generally. To conclude, combining the domestic conditions, such as the high crime rate and an understaffed public police; practicalities linked specifically to Cape Town, such as the geography of the city and accessibility from Europe; and the participation of parts of the city in the development of international policies, make it a case study that is well suited to the anticipated project.

1.2 Research questions

This thesis adds to discussions about urban geography and security. It contributes to theoretical debates on the nature and evolution of policing networks, as well discussions on the growing power and importance that private policing actors have over space and people. This will be achieved by answering four research questions, which emerge from the literature review chapters in the first part of the thesis.

The first research question considers spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space. Chapter 3 argues that although private security companies have been studied in private space, there has been little research on their role in public space. This chapter also suggests that
private security companies in public space take on different forms and functions than those in private space. Chapter 4 starts to reconceptualise private security companies by adding the dimension of space to the discussion. It concludes that the private security industry evolved in form and practices once it started operating in public space. This chapter also acknowledges the limitations of this approach and emphasises its need for grounded empirical measurements to support the argument. The first research question therefore examines spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space.

The second research question examines the impact of private policing on urban territories. The literature review considers how the pluralisation of governance and policing strategies are linked. As private governance actors cannot directly utilise the public police, they need their own force on the ground to implement their aims and objectives. This is where the private police come into play.

The third research question will examine the significance private policing networks have on social geographies and how the privatised revanchist city affects the lives of the ‘others’. Here the question draws on the idea of the extended policing family, as outlined in Chapter 2. In doing so, it not only examines the visible private policing agents, but also the role of more subtle forms of policing.

Taken together, the aim of these three research questions is to make a broader contribution to the conceptualisation of public urban space, its governance and social geographies. This forms a fourth, overarching research question.

To summarise, the four research questions of this thesis are:

1. What are the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space?

2. What is the impact of private policing on urban territory?
1.3 Chapter overview

This thesis comprises ten chapters. After the introduction, the following three chapters set out to frame the thesis and to address conceptual issues. In addition, they specify the research questions formulated in light of a review of the relevant literature. Furthermore, the space in which the research takes place will be introduced and the key historical and social issues addressed. After the methodological considerations, the specific case study and the research results will be presented in four chapters, which are subsequently put into the context of much wider discussions on the nature of public space in the conclusion.

Drawing on the concept of the revanchist city (Smith, 1996), Chapter 2 introduces urban renewal practices and policing strategies, such as the ‘broken windows syndrome’ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) and ‘zero tolerance’ (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994), and their consequences for space and society (Beckett and Herbert, 2008; Herbert and Beckett, 2010; Young, 1999; Sibley, 2003). By referring to Rose (1996a) and Shearing and Wood (2003), it is further argued that different ‘quasi-autonomous governance communities’ or ‘governmental nodes’ are implementing their power through having their own security or police forces on their territory. It is essential for a governance actor to take this step from a theoretical idea to actual power within the city’s space. Therefore, the consequence of a growing governance landscape (or the pluralisation of governance) is the pluralisation of security in the contemporary city. In short, governance actors either create their own security or
purchase the services of a commercial security provider, such as a private security company.

Chapter 3 narrows the scale by focusing on the particular spaces in which private security companies operate. In order to introduce the private security industry in the context of a geographical study, three main spaces, and with them the three main discourses of criminology, geography and urban planning, have been identified and are introduced. The criteria for the structure are the openness of spaces and their ownership. The categories in this section comprise of closed private spaces, addressing the issue of gated communities; open private spaces, dealing with the phenomenon of ‘mass private property’; and private security companies in public spaces.

Chapter 4 attempts to conceptualise the term ‘private policing companies’ in order to create a basis for this research on security companies in public spaces. The point of departure is the claim that while a general pluralisation of policing has been acknowledged, pluralisation within the private security companies has largely escaped the radar of academics. By adding a geographical perspective and a more rigorous analysis of space in the, mainly criminological, literature, it is claimed that as well as private security companies, private policing companies have also entered the scene in policing and that this should be acknowledged to produce a more nuanced picture of the security landscape.

Chapter 5 discusses and reflects on the fieldwork and methodology used during two fieldwork trips in 2009 and 2010. Besides a structured list of the research questions and considerations on positionality, the chapter has sections on each of the three methods used. Altogether, 49 semi-structured interviews were carried out. The
interviews were complemented by ethnographical observations as well as the aforementioned mapping of privately policed public spaces.

Chapter 6 introduces the case study of Cape Town, South Africa. To understand the research, it is important to be aware of the changes in urban geography and policing that have occurred in South Africa over the last three decades. Furthermore, the chapter places the research question that emerged during the three review chapters in the case study site where they will be addressed.

In Chapter 7, the presentation of the empirical findings begins. Over the course of the chapter, different security schemes identified as being used by private policing companies and their governing bodies are introduced. Using maps of the case study area, the security landscape (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003) is visualised and key information on the policing actors is provided. Here, the combination of maps and the daily policing tasks these actors carry out, as well as considerations regarding legality, show the importance that the governance of security has for the case study sites. By integrating territoriality into the consideration of issues concerning the exclusion of undesirables and, to a certain extent, the replacing of the public police, Chapter 8 builds on the previous chapter and deepens the scrutiny of private policing companies.

Chapter 9 focuses on the theme of making space through governance of security. The central argument of the chapter is that governing agencies have various tools available to them to produce a public space in their own favour. Besides the use of private policing companies, which have limits in terms of their efforts, this chapter also presents evidence that the social development sector also forms part of a revanchist policing project. Although it is not claimed that social development should be considered a new category in the policing network, it certainly contributes
to the production of spaces. In addition to private policing companies and parts of the social development sector, this chapter argues that the state actively supports this kind of politics. By considering the arguments on the ‘annihilation of people by law’ (Mitchell, 1997) and ‘lifestyle crimes’ (Belina and Helms, 2003), it is argued that the community court in charge of the case study site enables governance agencies to police more effectively, sanctioned by the law.

The conclusion (Chapter 10) will then address the question of how the governance of security spaces affects urban space and what the impact of security measures are for space and society. Engaging with past research on some of the case study sites, the idea of different public spaces is introduced, referring to the history of dysfunctional public space(s) in South Africa.
CHAPTER II: (PRIVATE) POLICING THE REVANCHIST CITY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sets the context of the thesis. Framed by considerations around the revanchist city, it will explore how new governance networks become involved in the politics of making and shaping space in order to create investment-friendly consumer-oriented territories. Having a variety of new governance actors changes ideas of community and citizenship towards a stronger responsibilisation of individual governance actors. Because the community is increasingly responsible for its own security, the number of different forms of non-state security agencies increases, simultaneously meeting demand and creating a pluralisation of policing. Here, policing strategies such as the ‘broken windows syndrome’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’ are being applied, which do indeed help maintain the mentioned spaces. However, by drawing on a substantial body of literature, it is argued that these strategies are, in fact, at the cost of the more socially disadvantaged minorities and subcultures that conflict with the governing communities’ norms and values of space. This results in urban exclusion and repressive policing measures against those groups, which are denied access to particular inner city spaces.

The chapter examines new forms of urban governance and how new governance actors are pursuing the ideas of urban revanchism. The chapter also introduces the policing strategies that characterise revanchism. However, the question of how private governance bodies in public space implement these ideals using private security agencies remains open. How do private policing companies contribute to the pluralisation of policing and the emergence of the ‘extended policing family’? (Crawford and Lister, 2004) What in turn are the consequences of these new policing networks on urban public space?
2.2 The revanchist city

Within the substantial literature on the neoliberal city, the idea of revanchism describes a particular movement of repressive and exclusionary politics and practices. While the neoliberal city describes the more general policy of capital accumulation and changes in urban governance (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Hubbard and Hall, 1998), the idea of the revanchist city attempts to explain how these ideas are being implemented on a street level through policing. In general terms, the neoliberal city describes a shift of urban governance to the ideas of the free market, meaning a ‘commodification of the city’ (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 161) and its ‘business-like’ governance (Hubbard and Hall, 1998: 2). In doing so, individual cities attempt to compete against each other, hoping to lure mobile capital to accumulate it within their boundaries and become a ‘world city’ (Harvey, 1989).

Within this rather general idea of the neoliberal city is the theme of re-generating (usually inner) urban spaces in order to promote business. This upgrading or re-generating of space is usually done by means of policing agents, which establish or spatially implement order according to the needs of their governing body. This process is referred to as the revanchist city, as famously explained by Smith (1996).

The literature on the revanchist city is closely linked to works on gentrification (Zukin, 1993; Smith, 1996; Slater, 2004; Visser and Kotze, 2008). Before starting, the two concepts will be delimited from each other. To Smith (1996: 75), gentrification is ‘the product of local housing markets’ and therefore concerned with issues such as increasing rents and the often aggressive upliftment strategies of whole quarters, which can make the place too expensive for the original population. Although this can result in substantial exclusionary processes (Zukin, 1993; Slater, 2004; Visser and Kotze, 2008), it is ultimately linked to property prices and rent
levels. The revanchist city however is concerned with wider policing practices, which may be connected with a gentrification process and may happen at the same time in the same place at a street level. However, while gentrification refers to a more indirect exclusion of the financially weaker, the revanchist city is concerned with implementing policing measures against groups and individuals that do not mirror the investment-friendly, upliftment ideas of space the various governing bodies have (Smith, 1998, 2001; MacLeod, 2002; Belina and Helms, 2003).

The clearest distinction between gentrification and revanchism is provided by Smith (1996) himself. Rather than seeing both applied at the same time he argues that the revanchist city follows a process of desegregation. Financial crises that affect the housing and real-estate market quarters can lead to desegregation and deprivation as the capital the segregated quarter needs to maintain its standard is not available. As a result the area becomes increasingly deprived. According to Smith (1996) a phase of desegregation (the flight of people from deprived neighbourhoods) follows an attempt to counter the development or reclaim the space again (describing the revanchist city). Although some of the literature does not divide so rigorously between gentrification and revanchism (Slater, 2004; Visser and Kotze, 2008), possibly because the term did not exist in this context when it was published (Zukin, 1993), this thesis will make this division; firstly to clearly place itself within the literature, and secondly to emphasise the focus on policing measures and not on the debates around changes in the housing market.

The term revanchism itself derives from the French word *revanche*, meaning ‘revenge’ (Smith, 1996) and refers to ‘a policy of seeking to retaliate, especially to recover lost territory’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2011). Smith’s (1996) central argument, which has been confirmed and developed further by others (see for example Johnsen
and Fitzpatrick, 2010; Slater, 2004; DeVerteuil, 2006) is based on his research in New York and the policy applied by the former mayor Giuliani. He claims that the city’s public space has been “stolen” from the white middle class by the urban poor, minorities, the unemployed, homeless, homosexuals, immigrants (Smith, 1996), squatters, panhandlers, prostitutes, squeegee cleaners, graffiti artists, unruly youth, ‘reckless bicyclists’, and anyone demonstrating in public spaces (Smith, 1998). It is up to the white middle class to ‘retake this urban frontier’ and to ‘reclaim’ this inner city space from these groups and so to contribute to its uplifting and capital accumulation. This reclaiming of public space is to be done by policing so-called ‘quality of life offences’ and a pre-emptive policing strategy, which will be introduced later in this chapter. Without foreclosing a more detailed discussion on policing, the following quote by Giuliani from 1994 hints at the philosophy upon which the revanchist city is based, namely a very authoritarian one:

What we don't see is that freedom is not a concept in which people can do anything they want (...) Freedom is about authority (...) Freedom is about the willingness of every single human being to cede to lawful authority a great deal of discretion about what you do (Giuliani in the New York Times 1994 in Smith, 1998: 4).

However, Johnsen and Fitzpatrick (2010) argue that the reality is often more complex than ‘just’ revanchism and that we therefore need a ‘much more nuanced, empirically grounded, approach’ (Johnsen and Fitzpatrick, 2010: 1718) to understand urban life and its policing. Furthermore, the concept is now well established and has been transferred successfully to other spaces and cities in order to make sense of urban changes and exclusion. MacLeod (2002) used the example of Glasgow to show that, although it is on a smaller scale than New York, so-called undesirables or others are being targeted for being a nuisance in the growth-orientated city. However, social exclusion and ‘institutional displacements’ are advancing and sharpen the social divide in the city (MacLeod, 2002: 602).
England, Johnsen and Fitzpatrick (2010) confirm a revanchist notion, but claim that when doing research on the ground the reality is more complex and coercive care can take place under certain circumstances. Focusing on Glasgow, UK and Essen, Germany, Belina and Helms (2003) also confirm the practices of the revanchist city, such as reclaiming space from undesirables, reproduced in both cities.

Tomic et al. (2006) and Swanson (2007) transferred the concept to countries of the global south. Tomic et al. (2006) argue that in Chile, modernity is being associated with cleanliness, while dirt is being associated with backwardness. To be part of a global city network, therefore, urban space has to be clean, which is commonly linked to the absence or exclusion of the present population, which is perceived as being dirty and seen as part of the backwardness. This backwardness is being tackled through ideas of urban revanchism. In the case of Ecuador, Swanson (2007) sees the Western concept being reproduced and visions of clean, sanitised urban space being applied. ‘Inspired by zero tolerance policies from the North, the cities of Quito and Guayaquil have recently initiated urban regeneration projects to cleanse the streets of informal workers, beggars, and street children’ (Swanson, 2007: 708).

2.3 Governance networks of the revanchist city

The reclaiming of public space, as described above, is often done by local authorities and a network of different actors besides the state, represented by the city and its mayor. This thesis will therefore be conceptualised through ideas on governance, as there are various institutions that authorise policing measures on the ground. It will start with a brief analysis of Foucault’s thoughts on governmentality before showing how his ideas have been applied and developed in contemporary theories and studies.
Besides other characteristics, Foucault (1991 [1978]: 102) defines governmentality as

[t]he ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatus of security.

According to Jessop (2007), who interprets Foucault, the state is only one form of governance, which means that there is space for other actors to participate in the governance landscape, meaning to exercise power over populations. In other words, governance can be carried out by various different actors or bodies.

The target of contemporary governmentality is the population. In fact, the population is the ‘ultimate end of government’ (1991 [1978]: 100); historically this was different as the sovereign’s territory was seen as more important. For Foucault (2007 [1978]), the control of territory itself (defined as empty space with clear boundaries, or ’surface areas’) is pointless. Instead he proposes ‘spaces of security’, which are spaces inhabited by the ‘mass of its [the territory’s] population with its volume and density’ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 104). Instead of seeing territory as irrelevant, Foucault redefines it. While the historical notion of territory referred to the space over which the sovereign possessed power, Foucault argues that territory is the space that holds the population, and so argued for a reconfiguration of the subject of territory from empty space to the ‘ultimate end of government’, or the population in a certain space. So territory is space ‘over which it [the population] is distributed’ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 104). One could say Foucault’s ‘spaces of security’ or notion of territory are the spatial implementation of governmentality or the geography in the concept (see also Elden, 2007a).
The next term that demands explanation in the definition of governmentality above is the *dispositif* [apparatus] of security. The ‘procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ can be, and are being, implemented through the ‘technical means apparatus of security’ or the *dispositif* of security (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 102). The control of the population and society is being exercised through the means of a security apparatus that includes, but is not limited to, the police (Elden, 2007a, 2007b).

Whilst ‘the police’ refers to a mere body pursuing or establishing security, Foucault (2007 [1978]) describes security itself as the planning of a milieu for events that are possible, that might occur or are uncertain. This planning, however, can be carried out by the police, as one of the most obvious bodies to do so, but also by various other entities. For Foucault (2007 [1978]), security is about preparing for the unexpected. In this context ‘milieu’ describes the multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live. What one tries to reach through this milieu, is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by these individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around them (Foucault, 2007 [1978]: 56), or the governed population within a territory, with consideration to the physical geography of the space.

The last open part of the definition is the ‘principle form of knowledge political economy’ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 102). By this he means that governance is not done for the sake of the governing body but for the ‘wealth of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.; (...) it is the population itself on which government will act (...)’, which is linked to the theme of biopolitics introduced below (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 100). In capitalist
societies a population’s wealth is commonly measured against economic conditions and inventions of governance bodies as they aim to increase economic wealth. Therefore, there are ‘[n]ew networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth’ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 101), something he calls ‘political economy’.

Therefore, in Foucault’s own words, governmentality is about controlling the population, the sum of people in the territory in which they live through the disposition of security and the preparation for the unexpected using agencies such as the police. Furthermore, the act of governance is to work for the population and only for the population, which implies the need to increase economic wealth, through which other conditions will be improved, including health care, education etc.

To complete Foucault’s thoughts on the issue of governmentality, the idea of biopolitics should be mentioned. By ‘biopolitics’ Foucault meant

the endeavour (…) to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race … We are aware of the expanding place these problems have occupied since the nineteenth century, and of the political and economic issues they have constituted up to the present day (Foucault, 1997 [1978]: 73).

On this, Elden stated ‘Biopolitics is the means by which the group of living beings understood as a population is measured in order to be governed’ (Elden, 2007b: 32).

This means that in order to govern, the governing body must use all sorts of statistical data about the population, such as crime data or trends on the biological mass, in order to determine what is needed, where problems might occur etc. (Murdoch and Ward, 1997); this is also something that influences intelligence-led policing. As mentioned above, this definition is only given to complete Foucault’s thought in this context and the concepts most used in this thesis will be governmentality or governance and territoriality, as described above.
Originating from these considerations, the idea of governance has been picked up and developed further. In more recent literature, governance is referred to as ‘modes of exercise of political power’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 173) or the ‘recalibration of powers and responsibilities across and between the state, market and civil society’ (Crawford, 2002: 2). Rhodes (1996) stated that the idea of self-organising networks can lead to ‘governing without Government’ (Rhodes, 1996).

As Foucault suggested, this means that the state or the government, which in the past was the exclusive governance entity, has to share its governing powers with various new entities that possess different powers on different scales or multiple levels. In short, political power has shifted from central government to the idea of a networked governance landscape (Jessop, 1997; Kearns and Paddison, 2000; Woods and Goodwin, 2003). While there are numerous publications on the issue of governance, one theory on nodal governance appears to be particularly useful to conceptualise the thesis.

The idea of a governance network is being formulated by Shearing and Wood’s (2003) influential paper on nodal governance, as well as Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) book on the same issue. Their key argument is that governance is carried out by three main nodes, all of which possess a similar degree of power. ‘Within nodal governance we may now speak of first (state), second (corporate or business), and third (non-governmental organizations) sectors’ (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 405). In this nodal landscape the state is only one, although still important, actor in the de facto governance landscape (Johnston, 2006). Although private governments are by now ‘ubiquitous’ and a ‘truly global phenomenon’, this is not sufficiently recognised by state representatives and others (Shearing, 2006).
Responding to this discrepancy in reality and perception, researchers following Clifford Shearing applied the theory in a number of different studies, many of which were based in South Africa and make the case for its validity (Marks and Goldsmith, 2006; Wood and Dupont, 2006; Marks et al., 2009; Marks and Wood, 2010; Shearing and Johnston, 2010; Wood et al., 2011). The central argument in this work is that in reality neither the state police nor the criminal justice system is able to cope with the high crime rates due to a lack of resources. However, this is a reality the state does not acknowledge in its policies. Furthermore, it is a fact that there is a variety of non-state policing actors active in the country, indicating the citizens’ response to the mentioned discrepancy between high crime and insufficient public police. However, this does not mean that the police force becomes irrelevant, but instead it becomes an ‘anchor in collective security provision’ (Marks and Goldsmith, 2006: 139), meaning it remains a key node in the country’s security provision. However, this would mean that the state has to acknowledge its above mentioned limitations in the provision of security and needs to restructure its policy, as well as giving up the policing monopoly, which in reality does not exist anymore anyway, reforming the police according to this reality and actively establishing a nodal security governance landscape (Shearing, 2006). This does not, however, only require a restructuring of the public police, but also an integration of non-state policing actors, such as private security companies, neighbourhood watches and vigilante groups, into the nodal security governance network or ‘polycentric, nodal security governance’ (Marks et al., 2009: 146), in which the police becomes the hub for all policing done (Marks and Wood, 2010).

While in reality this nodal governance landscape already exists in an unstructured, unorganised way, it needs to be formally acknowledged and integrated into the
policing landscape. This would also include mechanisms that ensure different actors act within the human rights framework and are monitored to keep it that way (Marks and Wood, 2010); in other words, they need to be embedded within a functioning legal framework (Shearing, 2006).

The reason for assessing whether the nodal governance theory is a useful framework within which to conceptualise this thesis is its ability to describe and capture the situation of the space in which this research will be set. While in the UK the relevance or legitimacy of non-state actors is still being discussed (see for example Woods and Goodwin, 2003, and Connelly, 2011), nodal governance captures the reality in cities of the global south. The weaker a government is (including its presence on the ground through its police force) and the stronger the pressure on the country through, for example, high crime rates, the more non-state forms of security governance will develop (Baker, 1999; Buur, 2003; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Dupont et al., 2003; Shearing, 2006; Marks et al., 2009; Marks and Wood, 2010).

As there can be various types of governance nodes, the theory will be complemented by ideas on the nexus of governance and community. Within a nodal governance network the community founded by citizens to govern (parts of) their lives is just one kind of node on which this thesis will focus. Particularly in their considerations on semi-autonomous communities, Rose (1996a, 1996b) and Rose and Miller (1992) provide a helpful framework for how to analyse changes in governance on a micro-level and within a particular node. These papers remain key references when it comes to the analysis of the community-governance nexus.

Again, the key assumption is that governance is being delivered not through the single unit of a state-focused society anymore. The central argument is rather that ‘the regulated choices of individual citizens, [are] now constructed as subjects of
choice and aspirations to self-actualisation and self-fulfilment’ (Rose, 1996b: 41). This means that individuals who are united by a certain criteria, such as a feeling of insecurity or an aspiration to foster economic growth, identify themselves as a community in order to govern. This could refer to neighbourhoods that organise a watch scheme together, or businesses in a particular area that decide to uplift the geographical area they are in. In this sense the community ‘has become a new spatialization of government’ (Rose 1996a: 327). The government, on the other hand, does not withdraw entirely but exercises its governing power at a distance and more indirectly, which is slightly different to the nodal governance theory above. This can be done either through a legislative framework or through other control mechanisms that regulate the different communities in the interest of the state or state bodies such as city councils.

What the different communities discussed in this thesis have in common is that certain groups of citizens possess considerable governing power over their space. However, although they can regulate behaviour, norms and values, in many aspects, with some individual exceptions, they can still be regulated by the state and existing legislations; therefore, the state is still governing at a distance, although these communities themselves are important governance actors spread over the urban landscape (Rose and Miller, 1992).

Another issue both nodal governance and autonomous communities bring to the discussions on governance is the idea of responsibilisation. As mentioned above, responsibilisation can be a planned and overseen governmental policy that reflects a wider neoliberal agenda, but it can also be a response to a perceived lack of state, especially when it comes to service delivery or crime control (Garland, 2009). The latter is strongly linked to general levels of state power and becomes more important
in countries of the global south (Baker, 1999; Buur, 2003; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Dupont et al. 2003; Paasche and Sidaway, 2010). Responsibilisation or active citizenship describes a process in which the individual, or the group of individuals that form a community, take on the responsibility for their space, such as their neighbourhood, when it comes to urban renewal processes or the provision of security. This process is therefore closely linked to the idea of privatisation, not only of former public space but also of functions that used to be public, here meaning state run, in the past (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Rhodes, 1996; Crawford, 2002).

Taking all of this into account, it shows that community increasingly supplements society as it becomes the community that citizens identify with (Rose 1996a; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003, Staeheli, 2008). While in the west this might be part of a planned neoliberal policy of outsourcing responsibilities (Garland, 2009), this is different in countries of the south, such as South Africa, where the citizens cannot rely on the state anymore (Baker, 1999; Buur, 2003; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Dupont et al., 2003; Pillay, 2008; Marks et al., 2009; Marks and Wood, 2010). In South Africa, communities are formed through state failure and as a response to policing policies that facilitate micro-governance structures, as outlined by Rose (1996a)¹.

The most obvious forms of micro-communities are the gated communities that determine the sense of community and belonging through walls and barbed wire (Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Lemanski, 2006a, 2006b). Other forms of community form in response to a lack in state service that causes the deterioration of business districts are business communities of individuals within a particular geographical

¹ As will be outlined later in the thesis, the reason for state failure in South Africa is not one of neoliberal politics, but a combination of this and the complex, pre-neoliberalism history of the country during apartheid.
area. They group together in order to organise a filling of the gap between existing state services in security, cleaning etc. and their perceived needs (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Samara, 2010a, 2010b).

However, state-failure-produced communities are not limited to the wealthy parts of the country. In the poor regions, especially the township areas, various forms of communities, in Rose’s (1996a) sense, have formed for the very same reasons (Madlingozi, 2007). Here, people have grouped together to respond to the service delivery crisis and the lack of fulfilment of basic needs, as promised in the constitution; in 2004/5 alone 6,000 protests for such needs were recorded (Pillay, 2008). Different ‘social movement’ communities unite the ones affected by an issue in order to solve the problem. In rural areas, increasingly the poor turn to non-democratic traditional authorities such as tribal chiefs to gain power (Koelble and Li Puma, 2011). Although the relations between traditional authorities and, in particular, the ANC are very complex and not without tension, as suggested here, the government has to support and ultimately respect the contact persons for the government since they are so powerful in the territories over which they rein (Koelble and Li Puma, 2011).

One of the more spectacular community forms that can be found in township areas is vigilante groups. In some poorer areas the population has lost complete hope and trust in the public police, and so the criminal justice system communities form their own vigilante groups (such as Mapogo a Mathamaga, PAGAD), or turn to powerful organised structures (such as minibus-taxi companies) not only to police their area but also to deliver justice, sometimes in the form of physical punishment (Minnaar, 2001; Sekhonyane and Louw, 2002; Oomen, 2004).
This thesis will draw on some of these nodal governance communities. While taking
the communities themselves as a given, the research focuses on the ways they
implement their governing power over their space or territory on the ground. In so
doing, the governing power of these communities, in contrast to that of other nodes,
will be revealed, confirming the nodal governance thesis.

2.4 Territories in the revanchist city

As the previous section has shown, the conceptual framework of nodal governance
and ‘quasi-autonomous’ communities is a useful concept by which to make sense of
the private security set-ups, as it enables the financing from the governing bodies that
pay the security company to police its space to be analysed. To facilitate research of
policing on the ground, governance will be linked to the concept of territory. As
mentioned above, to Foucault (2007 [1978]), territory, meaning the space that holds
the population, is of significant importance in studies on governmentality. It shows
the space in which the subjects of governmentality, namely the population, are set. It
is therefore not surprising that territory is key for any police work, when the police is
seen as an important part of the dispositif of security (Foucault, 1991 [1978];
Herbert, 1996a, 1997; Elden, 2007a, 2007b).

Territory is most commonly defined as a combination of space and power, or power
over space (Manzoni and Pagnini, 1996). For Sack, territoriality is defined as ‘the
attempt to affect, influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting
and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographic area’ (Sack, 1983: 55);
although dated, this is still a key reference on territory as claimed recently by both
Antonsich (2010) and Vollaard (2009). Similarly Herbert (1996a) and Storey (2001)
define the term as ‘spatial embeddedness of power’ (Herbert, 1996a: 567), or the ‘the
spatial expression of power’ (Storey, 2001: 6). Sack gives a helpful example of what that can mean: if x (e.g. business communities) wants to control y (e.g. undesirables) it can do it by ‘delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area’ (Sack, 1983: 56). In other words, territory is an ‘instrument for securing a particular outcome’ (Taylor, 1994) and to control people and groups within the territory (Storey, 2001).

As Elden (2010) and Antonsich (2010) confirm, Sack defines territory as a social construct, not just an empty space. Elden (2010: 811) adds that ‘[t]erritory can be understood as a political technology: it comprises techniques for measuring land and controlling terrain’. As mentioned above, the control of a populated terrain is foremost done by policing agents legitimised by their associated governing body.

Acknowledging this interrelation and the centrality of space in this analysis, Herbert designs his research on the police in North America around the concept of territoriality. In his argument, the police control social actions and public order by controlling or enforcing control over space, something that involves the creation of boundaries as well as exclusion from particular spaces (Herbert, 1997). ‘Territoriality, in other words, is a fundament of police power’ (Herbert, 1996a: 578; see also Fyfe 1991; Yarwood, 2007a). Like Rose (1996a, 1996b), Herbert (1996a, 1996b) bases his idea on Foucault’s work on governmentality and the central idea that power is established through exercising discipline. In opposition to that, Weber sees the state as the controlling entity over a clearly defined territory and that the exertion of cohesive force is used to establish and maintain a particular territory (Herbert, 1996a, 1997). Herbert (1997) suggests that Weber’s idea on the central power is too ‘formal’, not reflecting the current situation and all its subcultural notions sufficiently. Secondly, Herbert (1997) argues the boundaries the police produces are not long lasting, but only short lived. As the research will show, in the
case of private security companies that is very different. Here, territory is more than just an organisational unit, but is key to the entire private policing project.

A further new feature in the literature on territory, which corresponds positively with the mentioned ideas on governmentality, is the turn away from the Westphalian notion of a sovereign state territory towards a more ‘flexible’ idea of territory that resembles the ideas of nodal governance on a much larger scale, referring particularly to the EU as the geographical scale (Elden, 2010; Vollaard, 2009).

Boundaries do not necessarily seal off a political system, but rather function as filters to regulate access to and exit from a political system, often differentiating between members and non-members (Vollaard, 2009: 696).

Besides membership of a state’s territory as a citizen, people can have several, possibly overlapping memberships with different territorial units by belonging to different communities that exercise power over space, such as being a citizen of South Africa, a member of a vigilante group that polices a township section, and part of a social development community. The following section will outline the causal connection between the pluralisation of governance and the pluralisation of policing, as this is one of the most common ways used to implement the theoretical power of a governance agency over space. Territory and governance are mutually linked to policing, so it is essential to understand the pluralisation in the policing landscape when discussing these issues.

2.5 Pluralisation of policing

The pluralisation of governance has strong implications on the policing landscape as well. Linked to its monopoly on governance, the modern nation state also had a monopoly on policing (and violence) in the form of the public police force. The described pluralisation of governance, however, has changed the understanding of
the police as the only policing body. As a result, policing landscapes are now pluralised, enabling different governance bodies to introduce policing agents to implement their politics and power.

Today, policing bodies can be generally divided into three categories: the public police, voluntary organisations, and commercial private security organisations (Yarwood, 2007b). In this structure the public police are responsible for public space and usually have rather limited rights on private property (see Yarwood, 2007b, and Jones and Newburn, 1998, for examples in the UK)².

The second policing category is voluntary policing. Although historically the idea of regular citizens being involved in policing activities is not new, it was largely superseded by state authorities claiming a monopoly on violence in the modernity³ (Zedner, 2006; Garland, 2009). Nowadays, voluntary policing has undergone a revival as part of the mentioned idea of ‘responsibilisation’, where local communities take on the responsibility for their safety at a local level (Yarwood, 2007b). Examples of voluntary policing are the Neighbourhood Watches in North America and Europe (Yarwood and Edwards, 1995), or the voluntary patrols of Aborigines in their communities as part of a multi-agency network (Yarwood, 2007a, 2007b).

Finally, there is the whole sector of commercial private security. Commercial security encompasses all companies that offer security services on the market (note that here the focus is on private security companies, not private military companies that offer military services on the market, although the distinction can be fluid; Schreier and Caparini, 2005). Characteristically, the current forms of security

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² As the next section will be on the role of the police in the revanchist city and different policing philosophies, here the section on the public police will be kept to a minimum. The focus instead being on the network character that is linked to the changes in governance.

³ A classic example is the plot of many good Westerns where the Sherriff recruits the villagers to go after the bad guys. However, the introduction of the modern nation state introduced the idea that the state had a monopoly on violence, and this was something that was key to the idea of the state.
services offered by private security companies are linked to the protection of the private property of private citizens, something the police had only limited capabilities and/or authority to do. With a growing influence of private spaces in urban life, the number of private security personnel grew significantly. Today in most democratic countries private security is often larger than the public police force.

For example, the ratio of private security to public police in South Africa is 2:1 (Taljaard, 2008: 73), in Germany it is 1:1 (Eppler, 2002: 28) (although the size of private security has probably risen by now), in the United States it is 2.6:1 (Manning, 2006: 110), and in the UK it is 1.4:1 (Button, 2002: 98).

Although the categories of public, voluntary and commercial policing provide a good point of departure, it is argued that the actual policing network is more complex than this typology. In particular, the line between public police and private security can become blurred to a stage where the difference is almost impossible to discern.

Before going into further detail, a description of an imaginative walk Rigakos (2002) undertook in Toronto’s International Airport might help to develop a better understanding of what is meant by blurring lines:

As one enters Terminal 3 at Toronto’s Pearson International Airport, one notices the newness of the structures, the cleanliness of the walls and ceilings, and the brightness and bustle of the building. Passengers move along various queues for airline tickets, baggage checks, and car rentals. Perhaps less noticeable are two of Canada’s federal police talking to a pair of constables form the Peel Regional Police Service. After the discussion ends, the RCMP officers begin to patrol, nodding hello to two security officers from Excalibur Security making similar rounds. Further along, they watch two armed Brink guards carry money satchels from a nearby currency exchange kiosk. They wind by Commissionaires issues parking tickets and Group 4 Securitas security guards checking the luggage of passengers. On the lower level, Canada’s Customs agents spot a suspicious traveller and call for RCMP and an immigration officer. In a processing centre just down off the tarmac, security guards from Metropol Security meet with the Immigration officials while the detainee is handed over to the security firm for transport to the privately run Mississauga Immigration Detention Centre (MIDC) (Rigakos, 2002: 37).
When counting the different policing bodies around the airport carefully, one should have found three federal police forces and one municipal, one quasi-public security provider and four private security firms. This unclear intermingling of different policing bodies is a good example of multi-agency (Yarwood, 2007b) or plural policing (Jones and Newburn, 2002), which blurs the line between the public and the private. However, today it is not only the case that the public police force outsources policing jobs to private security companies. When Rigakos (2002) continues his account, he points out that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) continuously contracts out policing services. Quoting the Solicitor General of Canada in 1996, he states the RCMP’s annual budget was $1 billion, while their income from contracts was $700 million. This constitutes a ‘loss’ of only $300 million for the country’s most prestigious police force. ‘The long-term goal of RCMP contract policing is 100 per cent cost recovery’ (Rigakos, 2002: 47). Thus, in addition to contracting private security providers, a public police force also offers its services as a commodity, further blurring the public/private distinction (see also Loader, 1999, on the commodification of the public police in the UK).

In an attempt to structure this intermingling of public and private, Button (2002) introduces the term hybrid policing, which constitutes a fourth category in which to structure contemporary policing. ‘The central problem in classifying policing’, Button (2002: 16) argues, ‘has been the ‘hybrid’ policing issue: the agents and organizations that vary in their degree of “publicness” and “privateness” and that are not public police, private security or some form of voluntary initiative’. An example of hybrid policing is the British Transport Police (BTP). Although the BTP is publicly funded, it works on behalf of private railway companies on their private ground (Button, 2002). Therefore, in terms of its duties, the BTP resembles a security
company. However, if the state or a state symbol is seen as being under attack, such as during the protests at the Bank of England during the G20 summit in London in 2009, the BTP leaves no doubt that it is a public police force, with the author having observed its members serving in one line with the Metropolitan Police. On a continuum from public to private, hybrid policing bodies come somewhere in the middle of the spectrum and are difficult to place.

What this section intends to do is communicate an understanding of the different policing bodies and how they intermingle with each other, rather than to provide an all-encompassing account. Although much has been written on the ‘pluralisation of policing’ (Jones and Newburn, 2002; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Yarwood, 2007b), the key assumptions are always similar. With a pluralisation of governance comes a pluralisation of policing, as it is necessary to establish theoretical power over actual space. Furthermore, policing becomes both public and private, a matter of profit maximisation, or at least to cover the expenses invested in a police force. Having introduced the actors of the revanchist city and the policing tools they use to implement their spatial fantasies on the ground, the following sections will introduce policing philosophies and strategies through which the revanchist city can be established.

2.6 The ‘broken windows syndrome’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’

The policing philosophy of the ‘broken windows syndrome’ and the idea of the revanchist city are intrinsically tied together. What Smith (1996) and subsequently others called the revanchist city is the theorisation of the ‘broken windows syndrome’ and the associated ideas that Giuliani and his Police Commissioner Bratton had in mind. Since it is surprisingly rarely done, the following will sum up
the key points of the original broken windows paper. The fairly short article (the online printed version is only ten pages long without any references) with the title ‘Broken Windows-The police and neighborhood safety’ published in *The Atlantic Monthly* by Kelling and Wilson, the two ‘conservative criminologists’, as Belina and Helms (2003) call them, in 1982. The ideas outlined in the paper were picked up by the mayor of New York Rudolph Giuliani and his New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, who together translated the ideas of the paper into an applicable policing strategy.

The key point of the broken windows paper (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) is increased visibility of police officers in the form of foot patrols. Although they acknowledge that this increased visibility of officers might not have an effect on actual crime, it contributes to the subjective feelings of citizens in the area. This point is one of the fundamental aspects supporters as well as critics of the concept identify; it does not target crime, but the perception of it due to crime-associated ideas. The strength, its supporters argue, is the indirect positive effect on the crime rate, which has, according to the critics, devastating consequences for the social life in the city.

What the ‘broken windows syndrome’ intends to target instead of actual crime is the ‘sources of fear’ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) of the good citizens in a particular neighbourhood. According to the article, these sources of fear are ‘disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed’ as these groups created a feeling of disorder and caused the worry of being ‘attacked by a stranger’. Later in the article, Kelling and Wilson (1982) sum up these groups under the umbrella term of ‘undesirable persons’.
Another assumption Kelling and Wilson (1982) make by drawing on a psychological study is that if one window in a neighbourhood is broken and is not fixed right away, other windows will be broken soon after as a broken window invites vandals and looters to the neighbourhood. In other words, the ‘untendedness’ of space signals a ‘breakdown of community controls’ and therefore makes it ‘vulnerable to crime invasion’ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). One consequence of this is the increase in serious crimes, including violent attacks by strangers. The result is a process of urban decay (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). What is interesting is that the article very strongly brands certain groups of society as the root causes of the loss of control over space and urban decay. In this context, Kelling and Wilson (1982) criticise the limited legal framework for the police to deal with these groups that have been identified as the cause for the deprivation and fear. In areas where ‘disorderly behaviour’ is not being policed, ‘[t]he unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window’ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982).

The solution Kelling and Wilson (1982) suggests is visible foot patrols that check upon the identified nuisance groups and thus establish social order and indirect safety. However, another key aspect is that the community itself stays vigilant when it comes to suspicious strangers, meaning the above-mentioned groups. In this context, they argue for a certain amount of vigilantism, something that should be seen in the context of the abovementioned ideas of responsibilisation (note that the article was written before the neoliberal agenda had achieved the prominent status it holds today).

To sum up, the general assumption is that disorder causes crime (Gau and Pratt, 2010). In other words, space and territory communicate with potential criminals. Broken windows, as well as graffiti, street people and panhandlers in a
neighbourhood, signal that a particular community is weak and not able to defend itself. Cleanliness and order, however, signal strength (Herbert and Brown, 2006). A community that is strong and capable of shielding off crime sees strangers as potential treats. This also draws on the notion that a fear of crime is being used to pursue revanchist ideas of urban space. As Shirlow and Pain (2003) and Gold and Revill (2003) argue, the fear of crime can be used politically to shape urban landscapes. “Fear” has been constructed in particular ways around certain groups, and widely used to serve certain political interests’ (Shirlow and Pain, 2003: 17).

On the basis of the broken windows article, New York’s former mayor Giuliani and New York City’s former Police Commissioner William Bratton formulated the infamous Policing Strategy No 5, which (refers to Kelling and Wilson’s (1982) work as a ‘ground-breaking article’. Here the arguments of the ‘broken windows syndrome’ have been translated into actual policing measures to reclaim space and stop the deprivation of the city (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994). Like the broken windows article, the policing strategy identifies certain groups of society as the root causes of a city’s problems. Although the Policing Strategy No 5 is regarded as the parent of ‘Zero Tolerance Policing’ (ZTP) and the implementation of broken windows strategies, the document is very rarely cited in the now extensive literature on ZTP (MacLeod, 2002; Wacquant, 2009; Herbert, 2008; Samara, 2010b, to name a few). Therefore the key arguments will be outlined before reviewing the critical literature on the issue.

The Policing Strategy No 5 starts off with an interesting depiction of the ‘decent society’:

A decent society is one where all people are free to pursue education, enterprise, and entertainment that create sufficient standard of living for themselves and their families and contribute to an atmosphere of mutual respect for their fellow citizens. A decent society is a society of civility.
New Yorkers have for years felt that the quality of life in their city has been in decline, that their city is moving away from, rather toward the reality of a decent society. The overall growth of violent crime during the past several decades has enlarged this perception. But so has an increase in the signs of disorder in the public spaces of the city.

Public spaces are among New York City’s greatest assets. The city’s parks, playgrounds, streets, avenues, stoops, and plazas are the forums that make possible the sense of vitality, excitement, and community that are the pulse of urban life.

Over the years, enjoyment and the use of these public spaces has been curtailed. Aggressive panhandling, squeegee cleaners, street prostitution, “boombox cars”, public drunkenness, reckless bicyclists, and graffiti have added to the sense that the entire public environment is a threatening place.

Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani has called these types of behaviours “visible signs of a city out of control, a city that cannot protect its space and children” (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994: 5).

After this, the Policing Strategy No 5 outlines how the identified undesirables will be ‘controlled’ by giving more rights to the local police. The reason for quoting the whole introduction here is that it sums up most of the issues that have become points of critique.

Firstly, undesirable groups are not part of the ‘decent society’; they are a nuisance to it. Broken down to the scale of the broken windows article, they are not part of a neighbourhood, but a threat to it. This is the main critique of Herbert (2001), Beckett and Herbert (2008) and Herbert and Brown (2006). Both introduced the concepts of certain groups that were identified as ‘other’ and alienated them from the rest of the decent neighbourhood. Combined with the idea of the vigilant middle class resident trying to reclaim the space, everyone outside the community’s norms and values is therefore a potential threat to the community, not part of it.

Secondly, many of the issues that are defined as disorderly are not criminal in nature, but are instead forms of behaviour that are seen as a nuisance or perceived as a threat. In the case of the mentally ill and various versions of the urban poor listed in the strategy, they are seen as social problems; however, these problems are
approached with the police and security, not with welfare. In fact, according to Smith (1998), the budget of the social welfare sector is being cut while the police force receives ever more freedom and resources.

Thirdly, the idea of society and freedom is associated with control over people and space, as Giuliani’s quote above has already suggested. Many have argued that this control leads to exclusion of the ‘other’ that does not conform to society’s rules and norms. Here the idea of increasing inequalities as well as exclusion is a prominent feature of the revanchist or wider neoliberal city in various spaces in which extensive research has been conducted. Trying to assess these two concepts, they do have a positive impact on crime and the economic development of the space in which they are applied. This will be discussed in greater detail in the empirical section of the thesis (Herbert, 2001; MacLeod, 2002; Samara, 2005; Herbert and Brown, 2006; Beckett and Herbert, 2008; Young 1999; Sibley, 2003; Garland 2009).

However, it should be emphasised that there are many other policing strategies besides ‘zero tolerance policing’, although this particular strategy is very influential in contemporary policing discussions (Fyfe, 2009). Other influential proactive policing strategies that, like the ZTP approach, aim to replace the reactive or ‘fire brigade-policing’ that only responds to crime, are community policing, problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing, or hot spot policing (Tilley, 2008; Braga and Bond, 2008). However, in the space under research, ZTP is the leading paradigm and so the focus will be on this particular strategy.

Consequently, the revanchist city is characterised by neighbourhoods governed by a network of public and private actors that reclaim urban space by the means of security and policing while displacing and excluding the socially weaker and the urban poor from these spaces. Some of the most influential accounts on this, besides
the cited works by researchers around Herbert, are provided by Young (1999) and Sibley (2003).

Young (1999), and the similarly influential Davies (2006) who has a stronger focus on class, describe an increasingly exclusive society in Western cities. It is important to note that the inclusive society is not glorified in any way. Instead Young (1999) describes it as a homogenous society, characterised by solid mass consumption. The exclusive society instead is much more individualistic, but at the same time hedonistic and preoccupied with risk. He goes on to explain that this period is characterised by downsizing jobs that lead to higher rates of unemployment, thereby creating marginalised groups and resulting in an increase of crime. On the basis of these inequalities and rising crime rates, the formerly inclusive society turns exclusive. Differences are being identified and segregated or managed through mental and physical barriers. He explains this leads to an increasing ‘othering’ of groups and people of a lower class (Young, 1999). In this environment a so-called criminology of intolerance is created that is not only perpetuated by individuals or certain groups, but by the state as a whole. Young (1999) describes a model that explains the structure of the late modern city: there is a core group of which the members are citizens with secure jobs, also known as the insiders. These insiders are also characterised by their fear of everyone outside their group and class, which leads to an increasing segregation of space and the privatisation of formerly public land such that it cannot be used exclusively by these groups. To commute between ‘their’ spaces, Young (1999) observes ‘cordons solitaires’ in the form of road networks and physical blocks that guarantee the exclusiveness of the space. Outside these spaces is the out-group, the part of the population that has been judged to be responsible for all the problems.
In contrast to Young (1999), who is a sociologist/criminologist and therefore looks at the exclusive *society*, Sibley (2003) is as a geographer more interested in the exclusive *space*. However, like Young, Sibley identified a socio-spatial exclusion and an increasing ‘othering’ of society using the example of hippies and new age travellers in the countryside being branded as dirty and identified as undesirables. He identifies certain spaces of exclusion, such as shopping centres that serve as recreational facilities for the usually white middle-class nuclear families. He claims that the dividing line between the insider and the outsider is consumption or the economic ability to consume. If an individual is not able to participate in this capitalist ideal, he or she becomes undesirable in the new private spaces and is therefore expelled from these spaces. However, in liberal democracies, policing strategies have to concur with the criminal justice system and be based on legal foundations; this is discussed in the following section.

2.7 *Translating policing philosophies into the criminal justice system*

When introducing new policing philosophies and strategies, they need to be translated into the criminal justice system to avoid unlawful and arbitrary arrests. As various academics have pointed out, these adjustments to the criminal justice system are not an attempt to slow this development down, but instead follow the logic of increasing police powers and the addressing of social issues by the police, representing the law.

Recently, Herbert, in cooperation with Beckett, contributed much work on this issue, particularly through his research in Seattle, USA (Beckett and Herbert, 2008; Herbert, 2008, 2010; Herbert and Beckett, 2010). The line of argument in these publications is that new laws, such as the banishment laws (Herbert and Beckett,
The new social control techniques [meaning the laws cited above] described above share a number of important characteristics. First, they tend to be quite explicitly aimed at spatial exclusion. Second, many of the new practices are hybrid in nature, combining elements of criminal, civil and administrative law and thus providing little opportunity for contestation. Third, despite their legally hybrid nature, they have significantly broadened the police’s discretionary authority to stop, question, and search urban residents. Finally, despite being promoted as alternatives to arrest and incarceration, these techniques have created a number of new criminal and administrative offenses, violations of which result in many court visits, administrative hearings, and short-term jail stays (Beckett and Herbert, 2008: 16).

These laws are tools of social control that provide the police with the means to carry out ZTP. Consequently they criminalise the space for undesirables (Herbert, 2008).

A very similar argument was made by Mitchell (1997) in his paper *The Annihilation of Space by Law*. On the example of anti-homeless laws that restrict sleeping, begging etc. in public space, Mitchell (2001) argues that in the United States space is increasingly being annihilated for these groups. Whereas public space used to be the space where the homeless lived, this is now changing in certain parts of the city under the new legislation that goes hand in hand with the revanchist reclaiming of space. Making life for homeless impossible is therefore part of the ‘annihilation of space by law’. As there are only limited alternatives to the spaces where these laws are enforced, Mitchell (1997) continues, leads consequently to the ‘annihilation of people by law’ as the space where the homeless can legally exist gets smaller and smaller. Backed by the law, cities become spaces governed not for people, but for ‘pleasure, consumption and accumulation’ (Mitchell, 2001: 14) according to the abovementioned ideas of revanchism. These laws, therefore

reflect a changing conception of citizenship which, contrary to the hard won inclusions in the public sphere that marked the civil rights, woman’s and
other movements in the past decades, now seek to re-establish exclusionary citizenship as just and good (Mitchell, 2001: 15).

Whereas exclusionary practices on private ground do not come as a surprise, the idea of creating sanitised spaces to attract investment and consumption is being increasingly applied in public space. However, as Mitchell (2001) argues, it is not just about exclusion, because where can someone in a public space be excluded to? It is actually an annihilation of space, made feasible by the full force of state institutions, such as courts, health departments and the police, as well as by private security. The state needs all of its own forces, as well as some additional forces, to play its role in neoliberal politics in the public space. A similar example of this from the UK is the anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) (Crawford and Flint, 2009).

However, these changes in the criminal justice system, which are linked to urban revanchism and neoliberal policies, refer to local laws that target particular groups, but also have wider effects and implications for society.

Extending the logic of broken windows and ZTP to police cultures and control mechanisms, Herbert (2001) and Herbert and Brown (2006) argue that what they have termed ‘hyperpunitivness’ helps the state to pursue neoliberal politics. According to Herbert and Brown (2006) this is part of the politics or controls that divide society along class lines and consolidates segregation in the interest of upper classes that drive the urban revanchism and ‘shore up neoliberalism’ (Herbert, 2001).

A similar picture of a revanchist, control-orientated criminal justice system and state is painted by Garland (1996, 2009). In his *Culture of Control*, Garland (2009) describes how the Western state outsources control mechanisms to private or public private governance bodies, following the logic of responsibilisation, active citizenship and public-private partnerships. This state-controlled policy fosters the growth of voluntary policing bodies, such as neighbourhood watches, as well as an

On the other hand, the state expands its strength and punishing powers not only in the form of police forces but through the criminal justice system as well (Garland, 2009, 1996; as well as Herbert, 1999; Singelnstein and Stolle, 2008), creating what Herbert and Brown (2006) called ‘hyerpunitivness’. The results are exploding incarceration rates in many countries, but especially the neoliberal heartlands of the USA and the UK. During the welfare state criminologists used to say that criminals were disadvantaged and in need of rehabilitation, so the solution was seen in the inclusive approach of the social welfare state; however, in recent years the causes of criminality are not seen as a consequence of deprivation but of inadequate control that ultimately ‘orientates towards punitive segregation’ (Garland, 2009: 17). In other words the state focuses on the consequences not the causes.

The open, porous, mobile society of strangers that is late modernity has given rise of crime control practices that seek to make society less open and less mobile: to fix identities, immobilize individuals, quarantine whole sections of the population, erect boundaries, close of access (Garland, 2009: 165).

What the idea of hyperpunitiveness means for the different governing bodies representing upper classes is an increase in their power due to the policy of active citizenship and responsibilisation. However, as in the West this is planned policy that is furthermore accompanied by a strengthening of punitive power, the state increases its control despite an increasing privatisation and commodification of former state assets (Herbert, 1999; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Singelnstein and Stolle, 2008; Garland, 2009).
2.8 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to show the connections between the revanchist city, new forms of space and the role of policing. Policing is the main tool used for reclaiming space for the middle classes from groups of ‘undesirables’. While in the past the idea was to approach social issues with social welfare, Giuliani and Bratton (1994) suggested that the police were the most appropriate body to produce clean and safe public space. Given their impact, the ‘broken windows syndrome’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’ models soon became part of many urban regeneration programmes and policing strategies around the world.

This chapter has also identified that the governance structure of the revanchist city is increasingly dominated by non-state actors. The theories that appeared most helpful in regards to the latter case study of Cape Town, South Africa, are the nodal governance theory by Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Shearing and Wood (2003) and Rose’s (1996a, 1996b) considerations on communities. The nodal governance theory conceptualises a governance landscape where all involved entities have similar degrees of power, with the state being just one node in this setup. Rose (1996a, 1996b), though, focuses on the importance of community. He defines community as a spatially consistent unit of individuals who are united by the fear of crime or the wish to foster economic growth and therefore move away from the state to build a semi-autonomous structure to implement their power over space.

Nevertheless, the question this review of the literature leaves open is how private governance nodes reclaim *their* territory in public space. Since the literature suggests that the police are successful in applying their zero tolerance approach, the question is how do private policing bodies have an impact on urban territory? How does a
territorialised private policing network affect the lives of ‘undesirables’ and the social geographies in those spaces?

The next chapter will focus on a more specific aspect of the revanchist city, namely private security companies and the kinds of space they operate in. In doing so, the chapter specifies particular and often referenced governance nodes, such as shopping malls or gated communities, thereby extending the discussion on consumer-oriented sanitised spaces and the notion of segregated urban space established through private security companies representing one particular actor in the new plural policing landscape. Through this, it narrows down the available literature and identifies more specialised research gaps on private security companies.
CHAPTER III: GEOGRAPHIES OF PRIVATE POLICING

3.1 Introduction

As the previous chapter has shown, research on broken windows and ZTP policing is usually concerned about the role the public police has on the ground. However, it has been argued that changes in governance are inevitably linked to changes in policing and the pluralisation of the policing network. Research on the revanchist city, meaning the reclaiming of urban public space, is almost exclusively concerned with the public police (although private security companies are being mentioned in the context of public-private partnerships they are only limited studied).

This chapter identifies the different spaces in which private security companies operate regardless if public or private. By mapping different spaces in which private security companies operate, this chapter will show that the influence of private security entities is not only substantial on private property but also increased significantly in public space.

Furthermore, using the concept of nodal governance and community as the conceptual framework for the thesis, the spaces identified in this chapter are the most common examples for these concepts. In fact has the nodal governance theory been developed from research on ‘mass private property’ which will find mentioning in the following (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1987; Stenning and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003).

In addition, it is almost impossible to introduce any work on private security companies without reviewing the vast body of literature on the various private spaces that increasingly dominate our lives. It is therefore that in due course the role private security companies play in today’s cities will be analysed. The chapter is divided into
three sections according to the geography of private policing that emerged during the review process. Here dividing factors are the legal ownership of the particular spaces and their openness to a wider public\(^4\). By identifying the different privately secured space the chapter reveals research gaps in the literature on private security companies which the thesis will then address in the empirical sections.

3.2 Private policing of closed private space

The first section focuses on closed private spaces in an urban environment mainly in the form of physically enclosed residential neighbourhoods. When academics such as Young (1999) and Sibley (2003) describe segregation processes as characteristic of the contemporary city, closed private spaces such as gated communities are the most vivid examples. These urban and suburban phenomena derive from the USA. Here the main issue was not necessary security, but lifestyle and a desire for exclusiveness (Blakely and Snyder, 1999). However, with a stronger focus on security they soon became a feature of cities in the global South that are characterised by strong inequalities and increasing crime rates, causing academics to talk about a fortification or militarisation of urban settings (e.g. Eick et al., 2007; Kempa and Singh, 2008). One of the best examples of these spaces is South Africa where the development of enclosed communities is much advanced\(^5\). Here Bénit-Gbaffou

\(^4\) As a general note to the thesis, the issue of CCTV does play an important role in contemporary policing including the following three examples. However, research on surveillance is a different body of literature this thesis will not draw on. Here the focus will rather be on the actual (security) officer on the ground. Nevertheless in instances CCTV will be mentioned but not analysed in greater detail.

\(^5\) In the context of South Africa, different forms of closed private spaces have been summed up nicely by Landman (2000b), who distinguishes between enclosed neighbourhoods, security villages and gated communities. Here enclosed neighbourhoods are spaces that have controlled access through gates or booms across existing roads. Many are fenced or walled off as well, with a limited number of controlled entrances/exits and security guards at these points in some cases. The roads within these neighbourhoods were previously, or still are, public property and in many cases the local council is still responsible for public services to the community within (Landman, 2000b: 3).
Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) and Kempa and Singh (2008) show that closed private enclaves can be found on former public land, which means that streets, parks etc. are being privatised by a neighbourhood community. This can involve a legal privatisation sanctioned by the city council or an illegal de facto privatisation tolerated by the city (Lemanski and Oldfield, 2009). This increasing privatisation of public land should be assessed as a different form of urban revanchism. It is, in a way, a reclaiming of space by those who can firstly afford it, meaning upper classes, guided by the fear of the, as dangerous, perceived ‘other’. In this sense, the barbed wire and walls of the gated community are the most obvious forms of urban segregation (Young, 1999; Sibley, 2003) one will encounter.

Most commonly forms of closed private space are privately secured by commercial companies (neighbourhood watches and the public police can be used on top of that in form of a strong security network but the core security is usually provided by a private security company)\(^6\). If no one controls the gate and the perimeter, directly or via several possible electronic surveillance measures, they would be useless when the leading paradigm is safety.

As said, gated communities are a prime example for urban segregation and the exclusion processes. The inhabitants of such places perceive their surroundings, security villages are planned as such right from the beginning and refer to private developments where the entire area is developed by a (private) developer. These areas are physically walled or fenced off and usually have a security gate or controlled access point with/without a security guard. The roads in these developments are private, and in most of the cases, the management and maintenance is done by a private management body (Landman, 2000b: 3).

However, both of these spaces are frequently combined under the term ‘gated communities’. According to Landman, ‘gated community’ is an umbrella term that is used for every neighbourhood that is privately secured and access is denied only to one that is not an inhabitant or a visitor of an inhabitant of the neighbourhood. A gated community therefore encompasses a physical area that is fenced or walled off from its surroundings, either prohibiting or controlling access to these areas by means of gates or booms. In many cases the concept can refer to a residential area with restricted access so that normally public spaces are privatised or use is restricted (Landman, 2000b: 2).

\(^6\) This refers to gated communities with the objective of protection and e.g. not, as Blakely and Snyder (1999) defined, “lifestyle communities, where, as the name says the idea is a particular lifestyle rather than concerns on personal safety”.

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public space, as hostile and blockadecommunities off. As Rose (1996a) argues, here
identity is being defined through a community that is part of the same class and
shares the same fears. Furthermore, gated communities enable their residents to
segregate themselves from the public space around and to govern themselves,
creating a new governance node (Shearing and Wood, 2003).

Therefore forms of closed private space such as gated communities, secured
apartment complexes etc. are closely associated with the recurring theme of
fragmented urbanism (Bénit Gbaffou, 2008b), fortified enclaves of privilege and
spatially implemented 'pools of capital'” (Kempa and Singh, 2008), or territorialised
security 'quilts' and 'patchworks' (Wakefield, 2003; Ericson, 1994). However, the
phenomena of clean and sanitis ed spaces have been increasingly transferred to other
form of private spaces which will be described in the following section.

3.3 Private policing of 'open' private space

Whereas private space was usually regarded as a clearly defined area that often
required permission to enter (‘my home is my castle’), in recent years a new kind of
private space has developed that is associated with the neoliberal city. The leading
paradigm of these spaces is to foster consumption through the creation of
consumption-friendly space (often on former public land). However, critics have
argued that shopping friendly in this context refers to the absence of ‘undesirables’
and the creation of a clean, controlled or sanitised space (Raco, 2003; Houssay-
Holzschuch and Teppo, 2009). These private spaces are relatively open as long as the
visitor is not part of a group of ‘undesirables’ in the eyes of its owner or according to
the definition by Kelling and Wilson’s (1982). Furthermore, these spaces are
characterised by their large size so they can be mistaken for public space and their
expansion into former public space. This makes it difficult to distinguish them from the surrounding public space and blurs the line between public and private (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1987; von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wakefield, 2003, 2008). They have been therefore labelled ‘mass private property’ (the most common example for new governance nodes) that “refers to private property that has developed features that make it appear very much like a ‘public’ space” (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 410). In fact, the nodal governance theory developed out of the original studies on mass private property (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1987). Similar to gated communities, it is widely agreed that there is a strong link between the growth of ‘mass private property’ with private security companies. As Jones and Newburn argue, “the more private spaces become, the more likely they are to be policed by private bodies” (1998: 245), which means that the private security industry is growing in proportion to the ‘mass private property’ and other similar private spaces (see also Wakefield, 2003; Kempa et al., 2004).

The most common examples of ‘mass private property’ are malls and shopping centres, usually policed by private security companies using CCTV and visible guards on the ground. Although examples from different countries show that governments promote a stronger liaison between private security and public police (see, for example, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in the UK (Wakefield, 2003; Noaks, 2008)) the level of co-operation between private and public forces is rather limited.

For urban life ‘mass private property’, especially malls, are of such importance that they became the main focus of academic discussions on private security in urban spaces (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1985, 1987; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; 2008). The reason for this
interest lays in the fact that ‘mass private property’ has become a socially important place, where a growing number of people spend their leisure time (Wakefield, 2003). Today’s malls are often much more than just shops under a roof. They can host cinemas, food courts, cafes, bars and pubs, and even small theme parks, which can make them the centre of life for many people. As Wakefield argues, the shopping centre “became the modern version of the public marketplace” (2003: 20). So besides spreading into the public sphere (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009) and privatising public land they have an increasingly social function.

Shearing and Stenning (1983, 1985), Shearing and Kempa (2000), Shearing and Wood (2003) and Johnston and Shearing (2003) compare the system of ‘mass private property’ with a medieval feudal order in which a landowner (the feudal land baron) reigns over their space. “These are spaces to which different sets of denizens\(^7\) have access, denizenship being in part defined in relation to those spaces” (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 410).

Von Hirsch and Shearing (2000) complement the discussion introducing the idea of “new emerging ‘common’ spaces” (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000: 80) found in North America and Western Europe. Historically, common spaces are not new; they existed long before the private-public divide and represented spaces that were, for example, under the king’s domain, and were “common to some but not common to all” (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000: 80). Later, common space was swallowed up into the public space. However, nowadays the common space is re-emerging in the form of privatised malls, residential communities, industrial parks or recreational domains (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000). Similar to the neo-feudal argument this

\(^7\) Shearing and Wood (2003) describe denizens as people who have more than just the state as a governance node in their life. The state governed citizen becomes the denizen with multiple governance nodes.
shows that ‘mass private property’ is not exclusive to recent urban changes, but has been around for much longer. However, the outlined theme of the revanchist city that drives exclusion form, for urban renewal and consumption-identified spaces, facilitates and fosters the growth of mass private property. Here shopping malls on former public land are the epitome of consumption-oriented space since this is their only purpose. In mass private property, the owner has the right to deny access to anyone who might disturb the created environment. In these terms the mall might well be the blueprint for revanchist policies in public space.

On the example of a shopping mall in Reading, UK, Raco argues that “[u]rban regeneration programmes in the UK over the past 20 years have increasingly focused on attracting investors, middle-class shoppers and visitors by transforming places and creating new consumption spaces” (Raco, 2003: 1869). These spaces require a new governance of policing that ensures “safe environments” where the consumer is not ‘molested’ by any disruptive group of individuals who could distract him or her from consumption (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003). The difference to public space is that the terms ‘safe’, in ‘mass private property’, does not only refer to actual threats, but also perceived dangers and as a threat not for safety, but consumption. The aim of policing in such places is to create sanitised spaces that are perceived as safe, where every person who could possibly cause disturbances is not only thrown out, but excluded right from the beginning. The general idea is to prevent crime or disturbance by reducing the opportunities (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Zedner, 2009).

Private policing bodies use a pre-emptive strategy, targeting, for example, beggars or the homeless, but possibly also groups of young people as well as ethnic minorities (Raco, 2003). Von Hirsch and Shearing (2000), who assess the practice of exclusion
and the erosion of public space rather critically, see the liberty-preserving functions that existed threatened. Whereas the public-private divide was essential for liberal democratic societies, it is now used to exclude some people from goods and services that make social life. However, as Cresswell (2006) showed, there are also exceptions to this idea such as Schiphol Airport near Amsterdam, where homeless are being tolerated in an attempt to mimic ‘real’ urban space.

As mentioned above, ‘mass private property’ is mainly policed by security companies. Although the verb ‘policed’ is used in this context, private security guards should not be mistaken for public police. Especially in malls, the differences between public police and private security are distinct, including in terms of responsibilities, competence, training or equipment (this difference between private security and the police will be discussed in Chapter 4 in much greater detail) (Wakefield, 2008). Nevertheless, in terms of governance, security companies police the particular space they are contracted for according to the expectations of their employer. This means that the increasing privatisation of space and changes in the governance structure leaves parts of societies being governed by private entities and policed by forces that act in the name of consumption and capital accumulation (Raco, 2003; Eick et al., 2007).

To close the section on the private policing of ‘open’ private space, Jones and Newburn’s (1998) critique of the ‘mass private property’ theory will be briefly outlined. Their argument is that the characteristics of ‘mass private property’ do not necessarily have to represent private property. Examples of spaces that have the same characteristics but are not private in nature but owned by the state are hospitals, university or college campuses. Although these spaces are under the public domain, they often appear just like mass private property and are commonly guarded by
private bodies and should be therefore assessed as hybrid in nature. Jones and Newburn (1998, 2002) therefore call these spaces ‘hybrid space’ and expand the mass private property idea.

3.4 Private policing of public space

According to Loader (1999), Eick et al. (2007), Eick (2007), Rigakos (2007) and Töpfer (2007) public space is part of a revanchist urban policy and the commoditisation of security in public space constitutes the logical next step in capitalist societies. In doing so not only is it possible to make money out of one of the most important public goods, the safety of the individual and society, but security companies also became an integral part of the urban security concept, contributing to an ’unbound spatial control‘ (Töpfer, 2007), the ’punishing state” (Brüchert, 2007), and ’militarised urban space‘ (Warren, 2007). The reason is a changing understanding of governance, responsibilisation and active citizenship where private governance actors resort to private security companies. Also it is a more cost effective way for the state to enhance its power. While the state increasingly outsources public police function to re-cover their costs, it also uses private security to save money as their services are cheaper for the state than a highly trained police force (Theodore et al., 2007; Minnaar and Mistry, 2004).

On this, one of the most detailed studies has been conducted by Rigakos (2002). He researched the Canadian company Intelligarde International, which operates on privately managed public (and private) housing estates. Between different sites, the company also has to transect through public spaces to supply backup for the various security officers on different sites in Toronto. However, when discussing private security companies in public space, Rigakos’ (2002) work is not the ideal choice
since it describes not quite the space that is associated with being public. The reason for drawing on this example is that it is one of very few empirical studies on the issue, already hinting at a substantial research gap.

Nevertheless, similar to Herbert’s (1996a, 1996b, 1997) work on the police force, Rigakos shadowed security guards during their work and gained valuable insights into the way they operate on the ground. His central argument is that Intelligarde carries out police-like tasks and forms part of the punitive, revanchist policing landscape. Rigakos (2002) claims that his findings suggest a closing of the gap between public and private policing that can be perceived in terms of duties, used by the force during their work, training etc. He therefore calls it the ’new paprapolice‘. At least Intelligarde International found his argument so convincing that, when they were accused by the state for the false usage of the term ‘police’, Rigakos was asked to testify as Intelligarde’s witness in court to make precisely this point (again, a detailed discussion on the difference between private security and the police will be held in the next chapter) (Rigakos, 2007).

In the context of the UK, Noaks (2008) provides an example of how private security companies are not only involved in the commodification of security and supplementing the public police force, but are starting to replace it. In Noaks (2008) study of Merryville, UK, an area that suffers from one of the highest crime rates in the country, a private security company has been contracted to carry out foot and motorised patrols by uniformed security officers and to provide a 24-hour accessible on-call service. Noaks’ (2008) findings show that the residents contracted a security firm not to replace the public police force but to get additional security in their community, which involves a partnership or co-ordination between the different policing bodies, to maximise security. This wish, however, is not reflected in the
daily policing activities. Neither of the policing bodies are pursuing active co-operation, which only consists of minimal communication. What has happened is rather the opposite. Noaks (2008) describes a kind of 'shadow co-operation', meaning that the public police reduced their presence in areas that are privately policed. Therefore, the result of this ‘invisible trade’ is not a supplement of security, but the tendency to replace the public police force with private policing, which the residents have to pay for themselves. With a change in the main policing body, Noaks (2008) observes that the Merryvillians start to directly compare the service of the ‘private police’ to the public one as a result of their disappointment with the public police force. In fact, some subscribers prefer the services of private security companies over the public police when they require an officer. Similar to the case of private space, a commercial security force that increasingly replaces the public police to bring law and order to the neighbourhood raises interesting questions on governance. As the citizens of this area pay the security company directly, they are the governing body that can decide (presumably within an existing legal framework) how the space should be policed. Regarding Noaks’ (2008) work, it should however be noted that the issue of private security in public space is not being conceptualised. Neither is the novelty of the researched space acknowledged. In other words, the geography is not being considered.

Crawford and Lister (2004, 2006) and Crawford et al. (2005) give a similar account of their more quantitative studies on public control in residential areas in the UK:

The very purchase of additional policing as a commodity seemed unwittingly to transform residents into consumers of a purchased good, thereby arousing heightened expectations over the provision of commercial forms of accountability and responsiveness to consumer demands in order to demonstrate “value for money” (Crawford and Lister, 2006).
The difference between Noaks’ and Crawford and Lister’s (2004, 2006), or Crawford et al.’s (2005) studies is that Merryville actually faced one of the highest crime rates in the country, while Crawford and Lister (2004, 2006) and Crawford et al. (2005) argue that it was the increased fear of crime that facilitated the growth in commercial security patrols. Their studies also showed that security companies themselves identified this kind of service as the future market into which the industry can expend. The inhabitants of the researched areas perceive a lack of visible policing and therefore turned to commercial security providers. According to the authors, this extension of the policing family (Crawford and Lister, 2004), or the mixed economy of visible patrols (Crawford et al., 2005), raises questions on the co-ordination and the distribution of policing in and around the privately policed areas. Effective plural policing is not only about increased ‘boots on the ground’, but co-ordinated patrols, shared intelligence etc. Similar to Noaks’ (2008) study, this is not the case. Although co-ordination might happen on an individual level, a framework that creates reliable procedures is still missing. Another point that Crawford and Lister (2004, 2006) make is about the spatial impact of private policing. Although they cannot prove it with their data, they suggest that uneven geographical policing can result in a “displacement of crime and fear of crime into neighbouring (non-patrolled) areas” (Crawford and Lister, 2006: 171) and that the benefits of some could possibly result in disadvantages for others.

Without emphasising it, Noaks describes a security setup in which new governance node, a community in Rose’s (1996a) sense, took on the responsibility for their wellbeing. A more typical example for this would be a form of private-public partnerships that Harvey (1989) identified as a key component of the neoliberal city.
A well-established example of these partnerships are the Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), or in the South African case City Improvement Districts (CIDs).

Although various authors mention the use of private security companies in the context of BIDs and CIDs (Samara 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Singh, 2008), a detailed study on the actual security on the ground has rarely been done. One of the exceptions here is Berg (2004), who studied Cape Town’s CIDs, that touches upon security companies. The main focus however is on the pluralisation of policing. She explains the policing network in the area and introduces the different policing entities that lead to an over-policing of the space. Similar to the other authors, who are all criminologists, the focus of the study is on co-operation, networking or governmental nodes, and the changes that have occurred in policing. Singh (2008) suggests that private security companies increasingly operate in public spaces of CIDs and what she calls “‘ordinary’ residential streets” (Singh 2008: 46) where they are involved in order maintenance. However the claim lacks empirical evidence to support it.

Nevertheless, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) see CIDs in Cape Town as the "most significant security scheme created in the postapartheid context" (2008: 695). Although they argue that these business communities claim a “right to exclude” and refer to urban exclusion processes and fiscal fragmentation, their focus on actual private security companies is limited and they are merely referred to as “quick fix solutions” without going into much more detail.

3.5 Conclusion

The chapter continued the ideas of the Chapter 2 and introduced different private governance nodes, including their link to the growth of private security companies.
The chapter furthermore explained the forms and functions of private policing companies in private spaces. In doing so it also revealed the limits of the literature on the issue of commercial private policing of public space. While the chapter showed that private security companies do operate in public space, it is not evident what the companies’ forms and functions are or how these vary over space. To address this gap, Chapter 4 reconceptualises security companies using spatial perspectives.
CHAPTER IV: THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE POLICING COMPANIES

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will make three claims:

- Firstly, new policing actors, private policing companies, have developed in recent years, supplementing the urban policing landscape.
- Secondly, these new actors are not equal to the police.
- Finally, although these companies are not the police, they are also different from the security guards found in a shop or a mall. Instead they are a hybrid of the two, reflecting significant changes in the form, function and geographies of the private security industry. This is done by applying a geographical angle to existing studies and common policing definitions.

This chapter will develop Yarwood’s (2007a) analysis of governance and policing. As Section 2.3 outlined, governance has seen a shift from the government as the exclusive governing actor to a landscape or network of multiple governing actors, that includes the government as well as neighbourhood communities, businesses, NGOs and others (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). This leaves a new landscape in which several new entities can govern the space themselves. Quoting Foucault, Yarwood suggests that governance can be ‘recognised as an assemblage of different knowledge, technologies and practices that seek to shape conduct in particular ways’ (Foucault, 1991 in Yarwood, 2007a: 341). In other words, governance is not only about political power, but also implies a reconfiguration of physical power on a street level to actively govern space. Indeed the monopoly of policing becomes an oligopoly, or even a market for policing that
mirrors the development of governance (Button, 2002; Yarwood, 2007a; Zedner, 2009, also Section 2.5).

For this reason many academics have termed this development of growing new policing agencies ‘multi-agency policing’ (Yarwood 2007b) or ‘the pluralisation of policing’ (Button, 2002; Crawford and Lister, 2004; Berg, 2004). However, within this pluralised policing landscape, the security industry has evolved over recent years, widely under the radar of academic attention. Instead there remains a common generalisation of private security companies that do not reflect this evolution and therefore oversimplify their role in the policing landscape. It is instead suggested that the private security industry should no longer be seen as one homogenous entity that is solely connected to spaces such as ‘mass private property’ or the security of other private spaces (see for example Shearing and Stenning, 1985; Rose, 2000, Wakefield, 2003, 2008; Button, 2003).

Corresponding with a growing potency of governing actors in public space, private security companies have evolved and adjusted to the demand. Indeed, Crawford and Lister (2004, 2006) and Crawford et al. (2005) quote a representative from a security company saying that patrolling public spaces is the future market that will drive the expansion of the industry. This change in space has a profound impact on the nature of private security companies. Therefore, this chapter aims to reconceptualise the all too general use of the term ‘private security’. In order to do so, the term ‘policing’ will first be discussed, especially under consideration of space, starting with an example of why geographical understandings are important to make the case for a more differentiated, nuanced terminology.
4.2 The missing geography

The following draws on two valuable ethnographical studies by criminologists that were mentioned in the previous chapter. The first study was done by Rigakos (2002) in Toronto, Canada, where he made extensive ethnographical observations on a private security company that polices council houses in the city. During their work, security officers were patrolling the houses themselves, the surrounding streets, empty houses used by squatters or drug-users, and even undergoing riot training. Drawing on his results, Rigakos (2002) claims that the division between the public police and what he calls the ‘new parapolicе’ becomes ‘less meaningful’ (2002: 43).

The second study by Wakefield (2003) is an intense ethnographical research of security companies in three shopping malls. Wakefield (2003, 2008) conversely describes the observed companies as low-scale security. Their main tasks are to create a safe, clean and shopping friendly environment, which involves housekeeping and customer care, leading to the conclusion that they are only a junior partner to the police.

The reason for choosing these two studies is that they use the same terminology for two very different spaces and not only come to different conclusions, but also refer to each other, suggesting that the other’s argument is not comprehensive. In a later article drawing on her original fieldwork, Wakefield states:

I would disagree with Rigakos (2002), therefore, that the ‘public and private police’ have similar roles, due to the vast differences in their organisation and objectives. Yet in terms of what they actually do, there are considerable similarities in their respective, heterogeneous functions, and valid places for both within the extended police family (Wakefield, 2008: 676).

Adding a geographical perspective to it would immediately show the differences in each researched space, suggesting that comparisons between might only be of limited value, at least from the applied angle. Both ethnographic studies show a clear line of
argument when read on their own. However, as Wakefield (2008) herself realised, they seem to contradict or disagree when read in comparison. The reason for this, as will be argued in the following section, is the lack of a cohesive spatial analysis when discussing public and private policing. It will be argued that with different spaces come different powers and social ordering functions. Securing a private mall is different to supplementing the public police in parts of the public space, although both will need to carry out some of the same tasks as the public police. To make this argument, policing and security must be conceptualised and defined considering space, functions and powers.

4.3 Conceptualising policing

Definition: Policing does not refer entirely to the police, meaning the state-run agency (Bowling and Foster, 2002; Newburn and Reiner, 2007). The police do policing but policing should not be mixed up with ‘a specific body of personnel’ (Johnston, 2000b: 8). As Rawlings defines it ‘[b]y policing is meant the maintenance of order, the control of disorder, the prevention of crime and the detection of offenders, and by the police is meant those officials concerned with policing matters’ (Rawlings, 2008: 47). Policing is therefore a social function that is these days carried out by various actors that have become ubiquitous in the urban landscape and who operate alongside to the public police force (Johnston, 2000a; Crawford and Lister, 2004, 2006; Yarwood, 2007a; Wakefield, 2008, 2003).

In order to define the complex term of policing, established criminologists associate two ideas with the term: social control and purposive action to establish social control (Shearing, 1992, in Johnston, 2000b; Reiner, 1997, in Johnston, 2000b). Here policing is used in an attempt to produce social control through ‘the creation of
systems or surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions’ (Reiner, 1997: 1005 in Johnston, 2000b: 9). These sanctions are meant to maintain an introduced social order. Or, to put it more simply, if a person breaks the law and is caught, he or she can be arrested or detained by a policing entity. Summing this up, Jones and Newburn (1998) came up with a useful comprehensive policing definition:

Those organised forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule of law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investigation and associated information-brokering - which may involve a conscious exercise of coercive power - undertaken by individuals or organisations, where such activities are viewed by them and/or others as a central or key defining part of their purpose (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 18-19).

Figure 4.1: Sum of all policing functions as carried out by the police


However, although policing is not always carried out by the police, the police as an institution is still the most advanced policing body in terms of functions,
responsibilities, training and legal powers. The police do perform all policing functions, although some are by now also being shared with other actors such as neighbourhood watches (as in Yarwood, 2007a) and private security companies (as in Wakefield, 2003), or are being carried out in different spaces, such as mass private property. In other words, the police are the sum of all policing functions, as outlined in Figure 4.1\(^8\), although some of these functions are also carried out by various other, more specialised actors.

However, in the context of mass private property, urban renewal programmes or the ‘broken windows theory’, issues around investigating powers, state and national security or crowd control are commonly neglected as they are seen as less important or are not relevant to this context (for example in Shearing and Stenning, 1985; Rose, 2000, Herbert, 2001; Wakefield, 2003; Belina and Helms, 2003). Here policing is limited to policing strategies in spaces such as on the street or in the mall, such as the strategies discussed in terms of the revanchist city. Acknowledging the very wide field of policing the police carries out, including issues of national security and investigative work, this thesis will focus on the street-level policing.

*Space:* Policing can be carried out in all spaces outlined in Chapter 3 and beyond, such as in the virtual worlds of finance or the Internet. However, different individual policing bodies have particular spaces designated to them. While the police and neighbourhood watches usually operate in public space and have restricted rights on private property, it is the opposite case with private security, as private security companies typically operate on private property commissioned by the owner of that space.

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\(^8\) The table is based on a list in Bowling and Foster (2002: 987). The list in Bowling and Foster (2002) is based on a variety of sources: Morgan and Newburn (1997); Neyroud and Beckley (2000); Johnston (2000); Home Office (1993), and HMIC (1999). An aspect of enforcing law under the point order maintenance has been added based on the discussion below, especially Herbert and Beckett (2010) and Beckett and Herbert (2008).
Function: When conceptualising policing, the most common attribute is its function of social control, which in its widest sense all the different policing entities try to establish or maintain (functions listed in Figure 4.1 are more specific and break down aspects of social control into more concrete aspects). Therefore, in order to define policing, it is important to understand social control. Generally, sociologists divide social control into formal and informal mechanisms. While informal social control refers to the direct ‘social pressure from those around us’ (Stark, 1998: 221), meaning social standards as well as notions of conformity, acceptable behaviour and norms (Stark, 1998; Wilson, 2006), formal social control is about the various actors that address illegal acts. In terms of the latter form of social control, the main actors in the formal social control landscape are the criminal justice system including the police (as outlined in Section 2.5 on plural policing or the extended policing family). These actors become active when the law is broken or an offence is committed. Focusing on these forms of social control, well established criminologists such as Jones and Newburn (1998) refer to Cohen’s (2001 [1985]) definition of social control, which defines it as ‘the organised ways in which society responds to behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable in some way or another’ (Cohen, 2001 [1985]: 1).

Herbert (2008, 2010), Beckett and Herbert (2008) and Herbert and Beckett (2010) are more concrete in their definition of social control and link the issue directly to specific laws and with the laws connected to policing strategies, as outlined in Section 2.7. To recapitulate their core argument: social control or disorder is recognised through a policing strategy or philosophy, of which the ‘broken windows syndrome’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’ are currently prominent in many cities. This idea of policing is then enabled through various adaptations and introductions of
civility laws. These laws are again implemented spatially by policing agents in an attempt to restore the social order. Here it is important to notice that violations to the social order, or better social disorder are personified and linked with particular individuals and groups that can be summed up under the umbrella term of ‘undesirables’ (to a neighbourhood, community, quarter, city of un-broken windows). In short, social order is regularly being translated into law. In return, laws such as the banishment laws or by-laws show the kind of social order ideas that prevail in the spaces in which they are policed. This means that in an urban environment the ‘organized ways’ in Cohen’s definition is the law, and the society that responds in Western democracies is the city council or some similar structure.

Engels (2003 [1884]) places an emphasis what the above implies, but does not clearly formulate, that social control is inevitably linked to the requirements of the state. The state, legitimised through society, has to use a public force financed through taxation to control the different classes within its territory. The order this public force pursues is aimed at the well-being of the state in general, but over time it becomes biased in favour of the upper classes. Social order is what is good for, or in the interests of, the state. What makes this idea interesting and a helpful tool to define social control is that since 1884 a new context of urban governance has emerged, as outlined in Section 2.3. Today, Engels’ nation state can be broken down to urban governance bodies and their individual territories, which use their own forces (private security companies), enabled through a taxation system (extra levies). Here social order is again what is best for the individual governance body. In other words, the agenda of the urban governance institution becomes social order for their territory. On the ground this means that private security implements this order against the, in the territorial hierarchy, lower classes or undesirables. Indeed, the idea
of having control over street people is seen as the equivalent of social control, which is nothing new. Rawlings (2008) argues from a historical perspective using the example of the UK that policing used to be about controlling the poor and street people, who were seen as the main threat to the social order, something that Herbert and Beckett (2010) and Beckett and Herbert (2008) have confirmed in a North American city very recently. As mentioned, the police have the full powers to enforce these laws, while other policing actors have fewer or no legal powers.

**Key points:** Summing up the above, the key attributes of what constitutes policing on a street level is the function of order maintenance, as outlined in the legal framework of the criminal justice system, and the power to sanction contraventions of this social order (meaning the law) in the form of arrests and other means. While this can entail the securing, installation or guarding of a state, or even private property (as seen in the recent UK riots), it is not limited to this (as shown in Figure 4.1). Furthermore, order maintenance and social control are mainly linked to public space, making space another characteristic of the policing definition, drawing on the case of the missing geography as outlined above. Also, the police undertake all policing functions and are the key actors in this field in terms of mandate, functions and powers. However, others are increasingly taking over some of the policing functions and therefore form part of the policing landscape. Different actors besides the police specialise in certain aspects and functions of policing. One of the most specialised functions of policing, namely security, will be outlined in the following section.
4.4 Conceptualising security

Definition: Conceptualising security, Zedner’s (2009) book with the promising title, *Security*, appears to be an appropriate starting point. Although hoping for a definition of the term ‘security’, the first sentence of the first chapter reads, ‘[s]ecurity is a promiscuous concept’, and later on the same page it states, ‘not only promiscuous but also inconstant’ (Zedner, 2009: 9). Trying to come to a definition of the term feels like holding sand; it constantly runs through the hand and is difficult to grab or pin down. Zedner (2009) consistently describes security as a rather abstract state of being safe that is trying to be achieved or pursued.

Figure 4.2: Highlighting security with the policing functions


However, Zedner (2009) also describes a second way to conceptualise security. On the street level in day-to-day operations, security has a much more concrete meaning.
Here it is not an abstract state of being, but the protection of property or, in the case of body-guarding, a person, and does not refer to a wider maintaining of order as policing does (Zedner, 2009; also Wakefield, 2003, 2008). This loss prevention is done through proactive measures, such as showing visibility at sites that need to be protected or guarded, i.e. private property such as construction sites and shops, and possibly also at state-owned sites. Proactive security can also involve the exclusion of groups and individuals that might cause trouble in some form. This is especially the case in mass private property where the owner has the legal right to exclude anyone he or she likes (Wakefield, 2003). Referring to South (1988), Fyfe (1995) and Shearing and Stenning (1983) confirm the public police versus private security dichotomy in terms of their objectives. While private security is concerned with loss prevention, the police maintain wider social order, which is different from the social order in mass private property.

As Figure 4.2 highlights, proactive security and guarding covers only a small aspect of policing. In order to structure different policing actors and to make sense of the complex policing landscape, this is labelled as security. It is a specialised part of the wider policing landscape, and to establish a clearer terminology it should be called ‘security’ not ‘policing’, as the latter term covers many other functions.

**Space:** Security and private security companies are most strongly associated with securing private space, as discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. As that chapter shows, the growth of private space in terms of quality and quantity correlates with the growth of companies focused especially on these security tasks, hence private *security* companies. Nevertheless, as Figure 4.1 shows, the police also do security; it is, however, only one part of much wider responsibilities.
*Function:* Security, meaning the task rather than the synonym for a security company, is carried out ‘to protect the company’s [here the mall’s] property’ (quote from an interview with the manager of the City Mall in Wakefield, 2008: 662). On this, Zedner (2009) states that private security is about guarding and *not* order maintenance and the upholding of norms. (Singh (2008) argues that there are exceptions in South Africa; however, as mentioned earlier, she does not substantiate the claim with empirical evidence or much insight). The purpose of such security is to identify opportunities for crime or wrongdoing to occur and to try to prevent further losses; this could be called a security measure using exclusion as the main mode of operation (Button, 2003). In gated spaces, as outlined in Section 3.2, this can be done very simply just by securing the perimeter. In mass private property and hybrid spaces, as outlined in Section 3.3, this is more complex. Here security companies establish a shopping friendly ‘order’ (Raco, 2003), through excluding potential shoplifters, vandals etc. as part of a proactive security regime⁹.

As mentioned above, Shearing and Stenning (1985, 1987) and von Hirsch and Shearing (2000) use examples like Disney Land or Wakefield’s case studies to argue that private security companies create a certain order within these spaces through proactive exclusion. However, as Zedner (2009) and Wakefield (2009) argue, this order should not be mistaken for a social ordering that occurs in actual public spaces, and the reactive enforcement of laws, which is exercised to a far lesser extent. Therefore, security as a concept and security companies as actors have different functions to the police. In Wakefield’s (2003, 2008) context, the function of a private security company is literally to *secure*. Nevertheless, as Figure 4.2 shows, within the concept of policing, these kinds of security measures are part of a wider policing  

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⁹ Wakefield does however claim that the private security companies under research would respond to emergencies within the mall. What that entails and how much force they have to actually respond to fights is not explained in any greater detail.
network/patchwork and they will, for example, share CCTV images with the police if requested.

*Key points:* Security refers to proactive measures taken to prevent loss or damage. Although it can be found on state property such as courtrooms, it is most characteristic of private space. In some of the private spaces where it is applied, such as mass private property, security also involves creating an ‘order’ to facilitate consumption. However, established criminologists claim this is not a social order, as in enforcing the law. In addition, companies who carry out security functions have lesser legal powers that prevent them from enforcing the law in the first place. Nevertheless, here security is part of a wider policing landscape in which it is a small, specialised section (see Figure 4.2). Having tried to structure the by-now established order of the policing landscape, the following section will introduce the argument that a new policing body established in recent years disrupts the above outlined dichotomy.

4.5 The geographies of private policing companies

Returning to Rigakos’ (2002) and Noaks’ (2008) studies, they claim some private security companies are actually policing as they have increasing social ordering functions. This comes with the space they operate in, which are high-crime public spaces like estates and other partially-public spaces. It is not claimed that they are equal to the police, but that they sit somewhere between conventional security companies and the state police. As said in the introduction, these companies are established through the growth of private governments in public spaces; the high crime rates in these spaces lead the community to perceive the public police service as insufficient, so they call on private security (literally). Therefore, alongside loss
prevention and proactive policing (which remain elements of their work), the company Rigakos shadowed is concerned with making reactive responses to complaints, which reflects a social control function, as argued above. To a lesser degree this is confirmed by Noaks (2008), who suggests there are now overlapping responsibilities and tasks between private actors and the police.

This chapter therefore challenges Zedner’s (2009) and Wakefield’s (2009) general statement that private security is not responsible for order maintenance and upholding norms or social control. It is argued that private security companies can indeed hold up norms and be responsible for a social ordering by supplementing or even replacing the public police. The aims of these companies are not the prevention of financial loss due to shoplifting etc., but the maintenance of a wider social order through performing a task that used to be done exclusively by the police in a space that used to be exclusively occupied by the police. As the public police are perceived as not providing sufficient security, a security vacuum is being created that responsible citizens, and private agencies and governments have to fill themselves, often using private security companies (Garland, 2009).

Comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the argument that these are new private policing companies 10 is based on the fact that when patrolling in public and quasi-public spaces, targeting burglars, stopping-and-searching drug users and responding to calls, these companies are overtaking governing of security tasks that used to be in the realm of the police. In light of these functions, it is argued that private policing companies do not just perform proactive security and guarding, but are responsible for much wider functions. Therefore, the label ‘security’ fails. Instead the wider,

10 In the past South (1997) argued for private policing, but was referring mainly to security in mass private property. Also Berg (2007) refers to private policing without providing any empirical evidence for made claims.
more inclusive term ‘policing’ should be applied. Figure 4.3 shows that while security is a specialised aspect of policing and the police, not the sum of their functions, private policing companies now cover some important, but not all, policing functions. Above and beyond mere proactive security and guarding they also reassure the public through patrols and visibility, they respond to disputes, are responsible for order maintenance and keep the peace as far as they are able within their powers.

Nevertheless, although engaging in these functions makes them a policing actor, they have limits compared to the police in many aspects, including training and legal powers, as well as other functions. It should be emphasised that although private policing companies carry out many policing functions they do not engage in them to the same degree as the public police. Therefore, the term ‘parapolic’, with ‘para-’ meaning ‘beside’ (Oxford Dictionary & Thesaurus, 1995), as used by Rigakos (2002) is not being applied.

While for the sake of the argument the division between private security companies, private policing companies and the police has been clearly drawn, the dividing lines might be much more blurred in reality, especially between companies in mass private property and companies involved in urban regeneration schemes. Private policing companies employed by private governance actors might indeed be expected to establish spaces of consumption similar to a mall, which can blur a clear division. However, the kind of space and the associated policing functions differentiate them from mall security, which is something that needs to be acknowledged in the terminology.
4.6 Conclusion

It has been argued that private security companies, who secure private gated enclaves, should be differentiated from private policing companies, who work alongside the police in public spaces due to their functions. However, although sharing the same space and having similar objectives, private policing companies are not the police. At least in democratic countries, the police have more legal power, such as when it comes to arrests, the use of weapons, and investigative powers.

Looking at the governance of security as a continuum (Jones and Newburn, 1998), the police would be its most formal end, followed by private policing companies. The next actors in this continuum towards its informal end would be security companies providing security measures for various enclaves in the urban landscape (see Figure 4.4). Nevertheless, no matter how specialised their functions might be, all
of these agencies are part of a wider policing security network/patchwork (Wakefield, 2009) or multi-agency policing arrangement (Yarwood, 2007a) among other less formal actors, such as neighbourhood watches, that seek to establish the abstract state of being secure for as many inhabitants of the urban space as possible.

_Figure 4.4: Structuring different policing actors under consideration of space_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics:</th>
<th>Increasing Level of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercive force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public-ness of space</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policing bodies:</th>
<th>Private security companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private policing companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces:</th>
<th>Closed private spaces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass private property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University campuses, hospitals etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public space</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own figure.

It has therefore been argued that, at least for geographical work on private _security_ agencies, there is a possible new actor in the multi-agency policing network (Button, 2002; Yarwood, 2007a,) besides the police and private _security_ companies: the private _policing_ company. _Policing_ companies that operate in public spaces range between the police and _security_ companies, who operate strictly on private property and deal with loss prevention (see Figure 4.4).
What the literature also suggests is that in recent years these private policing agencies have gained more and more power, which invites geographers to conduct grounded studies on the issue. Private policing companies create social control in an organised way and hence are establishing an absence of danger that leads to a state of security. In opposition to that, secure private security companies create a consumer friendly environment and do not establish a social order. Nevertheless, these are theoretical observations and the differences that exist have been emphasised to make this argument. The realities on the ground or in individual spaces might often be not as clearly structured as the different lines in Figure 4.4 portrays them, but may in fact be much more blurry. There is therefore a need to examine this model and the spatialities of private policing in more detail. The following chapter describes the methods that were used to do this.
CHAPTER V: METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

This study is based on a case-study in Cape Town, South Africa. Specifically, it is based on the City-Bowl district and the surrounding neighbourhoods of Woodstock and Sea Point (see Map 5.1). This site comprises the centre of the city, including the CBD, the main tourist areas and important transport hubs. The first large scale private policing schemes originated here and, as the next chapter will outline, it has experienced a growth in private policing linked to the growth of an urban development programme based on revanchist public space. The site is also close to various residential suburbs hosting different classes (from middle- to upper-class), each with their own security schemes, as well as smaller sub-centres that have organised policing themselves, following the ideas of the centre.

Two extended field visits were made to Cape Town. The first trip, from July to October 2009, was for preliminary research, where the first data were collected and relevant actors identified. This trip was combined with a separate research project on urban security in Maputo, Mozambique (see Paasche and Sidaway, 2010 in Appendix F). The second fieldwork period, in which the main body of data was gathered, was from May to July 2010. By drawing on the contacts and preliminary findings from the first fieldwork trip, work could start immediately, enabling the collection of a rich and focused dataset that addressed the research questions. The findings of this thesis are based on 47 semi-structured interviews, 15 ethnographic structured non-participant observations and three cartography projects.
5.2 The case study approach

Yin (1994) and Bryman (2004) argue that the case study is the best research design when the ‘focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’ (Yin, 1994: 1). The case study enables the research of wider, general theories and ideas or hypotheses in a particular space, to see if they are being confirmed but also how they might vary or evolve. On the downside, case studies have the disadvantage of low external validity (Bryman, 2004; Schofield, 1993; Bailey et al., 1999; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In short, a small sample size makes more general comments beyond the immediate case study less academically valid as they lack the data, and therefore knowledge, to be supported.

Yin (1994: 10, 36–37), however, claims that the findings of a case study are generalizable, not to populations and universes, but, rather, to ‘theoretical propositions or theories that build on the gained insights’. Referring to Geerz (1973), and Lincoln and Guba (1985), Bryman (2004) presents the concept of transferability and states that by providing a ‘thick description’, which means ‘rich accounts of the details of a culture’ (Bryman, 2004: 275), it is possible to transfer findings to other, similar milieus. Behnke et al. (2006) put forward a similar argument when they claim that it is not possible to generalize a single case, but that a researcher is able to take a single case as an example for general connections. A single case, in combination with a general theory, can lead to a new general insight.

Local peculiarities notwithstanding, the case-study of Cape Town allowed theoretical departures to be made and, as Chapter 10 will outline, broader contributions to the understanding of urban space. In terms of its geographic scale, Cape Town was large enough to have a variety of security schemes, which enables some generalizable comments to be made. Equally, the site was small enough to allow a clear overview
Map 5.1: Boundaries of the case study site in Cape Town, South Africa
of all relevant actors. Thus, the case study of Cape Town allowed the four research questions outlined in Table 5.1 to be examined using the methodology outlined in the following sections.

Table 5.1: Research questions and main methods of instigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space?</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is the impact of private policing on urban territory?</td>
<td>Observations, also interviews in which observations were discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Assess the significance of private policing networks on social geographies.</td>
<td>Observations, also interviews in which observations were discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the consequences of private policing for Cape Town's public space and society?</td>
<td>Interpretation of the data in combination with the reviewed literature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 Methods

The methodology follows the logic of triangulation, or the multi-method research. Originally connected to the issue of validation, particularly of quantitative results (Punch, 1999; Flick, 2006; Cope, 2010), triangulation allows insights to be made on a research topic from different angles and strengthens the findings (Mason, 1998; Clifford et al., 2010). Applying semi-structured interviews enables an understanding of the different actors involved in the policing landscape. However, interviews are
likely to reflect a particular institutional perspective, so the observations were useful to supplement the interview findings. The mapping again shaped the understanding of the cases study site and strongly influenced the interview schedules and the conversations during the observations.

5.3.1 Interviews

It was decided to utilise in depth, semi-structured interviews with various organisations involved in the governance of security, as they allowed an exploration of the research questions in detail, including the possibility of following up on new or interesting themes. An interview schedule provided guidance to ensure that all the important issues were addressed and permitted the option to fall back on some pre-formulated questions if the interview dynamics were difficult, such as if a participant was not very communicative and needed to be prompted to collect the relevant information (Crang and Cook, 1995; Punch, 1999; Bryman, 2004; Longhurst, 2004; Cloke et al., 2007).

The key actors in the case study area were identified during the first explorative visit to the city. This group of participants is usually referred to as the elite or key informants (Scheyvens et al. 2007; Herod, 1999; Rice, 2010). This group comprised representatives of private governance bodies, member of the city council, members of different political parties, representatives of private security companies that operate in public space, members of the social development landscape and representatives of the criminal justice system. Furthermore, interviews with marginalised groups, such as squatters, homeless people and housing activists, were also conducted. Except for the last group, most of the people interviewed possessed a considerable degree of power or formal knowledge over the case study’s space, often
by being in some formal position. Existing contacts were utilised as gatekeepers (Cloke et al., 2007), which enabled snowball sampling (Crang and Cook, 1995) and access to participants who would be otherwise difficult to access, such as public servants of the court or large security companies.

In other instances, smaller security companies were identified through their signs on the street or from visible officers. Once identified, these companies were approached directly to schedule an interview, which was sometimes conducted on the spot. Other ways to set up interviews were to contact and meet journalists or organisations mentioned in the local paper (Crang and Cook, 1995). Furthermore, some interviews were carried out spontaneously, for example one interview took place with squatters after witnessing their eviction.

Setting up interviews: Although the literature suggests using a very formal method for setting up the interviews (see for example Crang and Cook, 1995), it was decided very early in the study not to adopt this approach. Experience taught that if a prospective participant was left in a position of control to take the next step, by replying to an email or returning a call, it rarely happened. Instead it was decided to go up to a company or organisation’s office and ask for the relevant person to meet them (known as ‘cold calling’). If this was not possible, a business card was left and a phone call made later, after being given a phone number, or a return trip would be made the next day. In other words, this ensured the initiative remained with me whenever possible. Although this was a time consuming process, it helped, except for two or three cases, to set up interviews with all the initially-targeted individuals and organisations.

Interview schedule: Before departing to the field, different general interview schedules were prepared for different groups who it was planned to target for
interviews. This included members of governance organisations, representatives of private security companies and politicians. Once an interview had been set up, the schedules were reworked to fit the individual interview using existing information on the particular participant or his or her organisation. All the interview schedules consisted of three main themes: how the issue of governance is linked to private policing and social services on the ground; what ideas of space exist and how they are pursued; and a third section on how the services (policing and social development) are offered (Longhurst, 2004; Cloke et al. 2007). Examples of the interview schedules can be found in Appendix A.

While the interview schedule was very formal at the beginning of the research, this changed gradually with time and increasing knowledge of the space. Once a general knowledge had been gained, the questions became more detailed, following the specific ideas and interests that were built on a wider understanding of private policing in the space. By the end of the research the schedule had morphed into a mere checklist of a few handwritten notes (Crang and Cook, 1995; Cloke et al. 2007). This was especially the case in follow-up interviews with the same participant, or when I was particularly interested in specific questions. Another reason for this change was an increasing confidence in conducting the interviews that came with knowledge and experience. However, the changing structure of the interview schedule also meant that the interview dynamics changed. While at the beginning it was attempted to cover all relevant themes to get a broad data set to work with, the atmosphere during the interviews became more relaxed towards the end of the research. The semi-structured interviews increasingly turned into narrative, unstructured interviews enabling a different kind of data that was less focused on facts but allowed the various themes that came up to be explored (Seale,
Letting participants talk more freely, having time to expand on what they considered as important or to integrate anecdotes into the conversation enabled a better understanding to be gained about the space and for issues to be explored that had not been considered before, as some information opened up new ways of thinking and seeing the researched space (such as the theme of social development that will be outlined in Section 9.4).

**Location and recording:** The majority of the interviews were conducted in the offices of the participants or in public cafes. At the beginning of each interview the participants were asked if they were happy for the conversation to be recorded. If that was the case, the interview was recorded on a digital recorder. All recordings have since been transcribed. In the cases where a recording was not agreed, notes were taken. The reason for this was usually a general discomfort with the microphone and issues of confidentially or the sensitivity of the data. If this was the case and information was shared off the record, the recorder was switched off.

In five instances a recording of the interview was not requested. These instances usually involved groups that can be called powerless. The reason for this was so as not to formalise the situation and to keep the atmosphere relaxed. In these instances the key issues were either written down directly afterwards or notes were taken during the interview. All notes taken have been transferred to a laptop and supplemented with other fresh memories directly after the interview. Ultimately, of the 47 informants 27 were not recorded.

**5.3.2 Ethnographic observations**

Following the logic of triangulation, ethnographic observations were unitised. While Cloke et al. (2007) and Crang and Cook (1995) argue that ethnographic observations
are suitable for building an understanding the lives of the people in a case study site in general, it has also been argued that they are particularly useful for researching the police. Punch (1993), Keith (1992), Holdaway (1982) and Herbert (1996b) are examples of where ethnographic observations provided in-depth insights into the life and reality of police forces that could not have been obtained without close observation of the daily work and the routines of police officers. As outlined in Section 4.2, Rigakos (2002) and Wakefield (2003) performed similar studies on the routine of private security companies.

Although there seem to be different opinions on what exactly ethnographic observations are (compare Cook and Crank, 1995, with Behnke et al., 2006 and Diekmann, 2002), three pairs of characterising features for ethnographic observations have been identified. These pairs are covert vs open observations (Walsh, 1998); participant vs non-participant observation\textsuperscript{11} (Punch, 1999; Diekmann, 2002; Behnke et al., 2006); and structured vs unstructured observations (Punch, 1999). As all the observations were done openly (since I am not trained as a security officer in order to participate covertly and to avoid complications regarding the ethics of covert observation), this will not be discussed in greater detail as it does not apply\textsuperscript{12}. The observations that were carried out were therefore either structured non-participant, or unstructured non-participant. All three kinds of observations will be outlined in the following section.

For the structured non-participant observations, permission was sought to go on patrol with the guards after an interview with a key actor in the individual site, such

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11} Here the grade of participation can be differentiated as well (Walsh, 1998; Punch, 1999), something ignored in this case.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{12} Here the question of open from what perspective arises. The observations were communicated openly from the perspective of the hosting security/governance body. However, from the perspective of, for example, a street person being approached by the patrols, I appeared like another white authority. On other occasions, such as friendly chats, I was introduced as a researcher. Consequently ‘open’ should be put in inverted commas, as real openness cannot be achieved in this kind of research.}
as a CID. This was granted in about half of the cases. The patrols had a very different character depending on the company and nature of the space. In some cases I walked alongside routine patrols with either a security guard or a CID manager. In others I sat on the backseat of the patrol car observing and chatting with the officer in charge. As the patrol guards often work 12-hour shifts driving up and down the streets, they were usually happy to have someone to talk to. In all of these cases the patrol had the character of an extensive narrative interview as there was talking most of the time.

Notes were not taken on any of the observations, except for an occasional quick note of a particular phrase or word that was used. While some argue for the ‘ethnographer’s bladder’ (Crang and Cook, 1995: 21-35), meaning using toilet breaks to take notes, others (such as Walsh, 1998; Laurier, 2010) suggest taking notes directly after the observation. In these interviews it felt inappropriate to take notes as the hope was to see the security in action. Since it was a common theme that I had to convince the participants that I was not a journalist (something most security companies are very careful about), I did not want to do anything that anyone could associate with journalists. It was felt that if they thought everything they said would be written down it could all too easily change their behaviour and jeopardise the observation. In retrospect there is still doubt if some of the statements, such as on bending the law, would have been made if the participants had seen that notes were being taken. Instead notes and impressions of the observed were taken directly after the observation in a notebook or directly onto a laptop. In terms of events, the patrols were very usually quiet and involved lots of chats with shop owners and vendors. Occasionally it could get a bit loud when drunken street people were involved, but it was rarely violent. Possible risks had been addressed beforehand in the risk assessment that can be found in Appendix B.
Two valuable points were made through following the patrols. Firstly, through being in the same space every day the patrols helped to improve my understanding of the space and I started to see the landscape through the eyes of the security patrols. It is the little things that show a sort of subculture of the revanchist city one usually does not see. For example, there are the so-called rent boys (underage male sex workers) who hide their belongings under the sewage drain covers, and that it is part of the daily routine of the security guards to keep street people or urban poor outside ‘their’ space leading to a constant struggle for every metre of a sidewalk that is being claimed and reclaimed over and over again, day after day. As Herbert (2000) argues, it is particularly through these small routine issues that a better understanding can be gained of other’s lives. While more spectacular events might have been better suited to making a point and capturing the reader’s attention (as in Herbert, 1996b), the smaller observations help to understand the researched cases better.

A number of perspectives, despite their differences, concur with the proposition that the link between macro-level social phenomena and micro-level dynamics represents one of the pivotal moments in social life. Here ethnography provides an important methodological way forward, because it enables an exploration of the processes and meanings through which everyday life is maintained. It therefore provides understandings of how daily life is connected to – or disconnected from – the broader structural imperatives that create the horizon of possibilities for human agents (Herbert 2000: 564).

Furthermore, the observations complement the interviews and put statements made in them in to perspective. In retrospect, it can be said that the results of the research would look very different if it had not been for the observations. Following Megoran (2006), the ethnographic observations become a counterpart to the interviews, which tend to be constructed in an artificial environment. As an example, the head of a larger security entity was interviewed and carefully outlined the legal limitations of the guards; a few days after the interview I sat in the backseat of a patrol car of the same company, and while the driver was repeating the legal limitations, his colleague
shouted to a ‘vagrant’ at the other side of the street ‘if I see you one more time I will lock you up’. Immediately, this one sentence put the whole idea around legalities into perspective, as the guard has no legal right whatsoever to lock anyone up for standing around.

However, for reasons unknown, many of the requested observations were not permitted by the governance body of the security companies themselves. If speculating, one reason for this could be the fact that the companies sometimes operate in a legal grey-area and do not want to be researched; this will be outlined further in the following empirical chapters. Therefore, the number of direct participant observations was fewer than hoped for. Nevertheless, as the following chapters will indicate, they did supplement the interviews and allowed valuable insights that would not have been obtained otherwise.

In addition, more natural unstructured participant ethnographic observations were performed simply by living in the space that is being studied. Here the researcher is part of the landscape (in this case the security landscape), by, for example, being a member of a gentrification process or the kind of individual that the local revanchist city or suburb targets (Walsh, 1998; May 2001; Cloke et al., 2007)13. While these unstructured, participant observations of ‘going native’ were originally applied in the context of ethnographers researching tribes in the bush or somewhere deep in the tropical rainforest, it now refers to a researcher living in case study sites and experiencing life first hand, in this case the governance of security.

[Ethnographic research has developed out of a concern to understand the world views and ways of life of actual people in the contexts of their everyday, lived experiences and the method of participant observation is the means by which ethnographers have often done this. In its basic form it can

13 However, as Laurier (2010) argues, this can be a participant observation as well, depending on the research question. When researching the sociology of people, living in a space can itself be the participatory element.
be described as a three stage process in which the researcher somehow, first, gains access to a particular community, second, lives and/or works among the people under study in order to take on their world views and ways of life, and, third, travels back to the academy to makes sense of this through writing up an account of that community's 'culture' (Crang and Cook, 1995: 21).

During the fieldwork the I lived in the case study site at all times, so during the banal activities of daily life such as running, going shopping or having a coffee in one of Cape Town’s street cafes, valuable observations could be made. They informed the research, even if just by helping me to understand the space better. When in later chapters the issue of exclusion of ‘others’ from the privately policed sites is being discussed, this is based on the interview data and participant observations. However, while living in a street just off one of the researched sites, meaning the space from which street people and urban poor are being excluded, urinating and defecating were constant issues. Furthermore, it was noticed daily how street people washed and dried their clothes just outside the CID boundary using the fences of my neighbourhood as their ‘washing line’. On other occasions it was clear when the CID security and the police had ‘cracked down’ on the street people, as they call it. On these occasions familiar street people would come to the case study site when friends and I were sitting outside, behind the wall to the street, and showed bruises while asking for cigarettes or some of the food that was cooking on the *braai* (Afrikaans for barbecue). These are all small observations that created an in-depth understanding of the space.

This section will discuss two issues linked to ethnographic observations and ethics; a discussion on the more practical side of ethics follows below. The first issue is the betrayal of participants, while the other communicates a potential source that can bias observations. Keith (1992) argues that for an ‘angry writer’, an academic who is driven by political motivation, ethnographic observations are ‘in part, an act of betrayal’ (Keith, 1992: 554). In his case he was coming from an anti-racist
background to research the institutionalised racism in the police force. In the progress of his research he felt that he was abusing every friendly relation he built with the police officers he was spending his days with in the name of his anti-racist research. Arguably this kind of research is undemocratic, exploitative and partially unethical, but the individual researcher has to decide if this is justified by a wider goal, in his case anti-racism. However, as Keith (1992) notes, this is not only a theoretical problem. Not agreeing with the fundamental viewpoints of the participants can put the researcher in a difficult position if, for example, one of the officers makes a racist comment. Should this be answered by the researcher jeopardising the good relationship with the policemen he is depending on? Keith gives an example where an ‘outing’ as a left-wing researcher bounced back negatively on him:

However, getting onto politics was a big mistake. Some interests might have been shared, but politics clearly were not and in the early hours of the morning silence followed a disagreement that was capped with the comment: ‘So what are you going to do once you have finished with us then? Write up your horror stories about the brutality of the police in London in a book then or just put them in stories in one of those left wing newspapers?’ (Keith, 1992: 554-555).

Nevertheless, Keith (1992) concludes that to most methodological problems there is no clear answer. The final decision has to be made individually by the researcher using the discussed examples only as reference points for their own considerations. Being rather critical on the issue being researched I encountered similar experiences during the fieldwork that were not easy to deal with. As a PhD student with funding that will run out after three years, there is a pressure to collect enough data to be able to finish the thesis within this time. Furthermore, it is a duty of social science to research issues that deserve critical attention. On the other hand the research has to be justified on an ethical and personal level. The solution for this conundrum has been two legged. First, I did not push the already difficult process of negotiating
access to a patrol once a dataset was perceived to be sufficient for an analysis. Secondly, the data used has to be judged in the particular context of Cape Town, South Africa. Here opinions on crime and policing are more extreme as they are linked to the security situation in the country and may possibly cause alarm to ‘western ears’. In various instances I myself reminded participants that the recorder was still running in cases where drastic opinions were being described, or I double checked if certain statements were still on-the-record to avoid possible misunderstandings later on. Although all were happy with this, I still did not use these extreme or direct statements in the thesis to avoid a possible ‘betrayal’ of the participants in Keith’s (1992) sense meaning to use them for my personal gain. The data provided in this thesis reflect or are exemplary of statements made by other participants as well and which are covered by the consent forms (see discussion below). No extreme quotes were used in order to ‘shock’ the reader or get more attention. In fact, by South African standards the data used is rather moderate in its language. As an example, statements made on exclusionary practices were not hidden but were openly communicated, and they are visible in public spaces anyway. Even heavy-handed security practices are often openly discussed as they can be seen as an indication that a security company is doing its job, and can be a sign of quality rather than something that has to be downplayed. In other words, security measures and the language about them come with the territory they are placed in. As the following chapter will outline, the territory in this case is rather extreme in its nature.

This leads to the issue of positionality. Referring to a quote from Punch (1979: 13) on police research, Fyfe (1991) cautions that observations on policing bodies can be biased by the politics of the institution, running the danger that the researcher is
being ‘used’ to communicate a certain picture of the organisation and their work. As one officer told Punch:

How much do you think you found out when you were with us? ... Well, we only let you see what we wanted you to see. You only saw about 50%. We showed you only half the story (Punch, 1979 in Fyfe, 1991: 261).

There is very little the researcher can do to avoid this, except for discussing this possible bias in the methodology section of his or her work. However, there was one instance during a patrol with two white senior officers of a security company where I got the feeling that they offered a very honest and unbiased picture of the South African revanchist city.

During the whole patrol the officers talked about weapons; fictive machinegun nests to take out the street people and skollies and so on. At some point the patrol went up a street that it is a popular place for street people to camp out. Soon the patrol found a group of teenagers sleeping in the sun. However, there was a gap between the street on which we were and the camp of the teenagers on the other side. Feeling safe from retaliation one of the teens made the mistake to show an officer the finger. Immediately the situation tensed and I had to run to the car which than started to speed over to the other side of the street. Once the teenager who showed the finger realised that he was in trouble he started running. By the time we made it to the other side he was gone so the patrol started searching for him calling backup via the radio. Soon one of the officers found the boy hiding under dirty blankets. Threatened with a 2.5 million volt electro shocker the boy took off again. However, before taking up the chase the white officers told their black backup that had arrived in the meantime to collect all of the boy’s belongings and to take them away. So while the teenager was watching from a distance, his belongings were loaded up into a van to be dumped somewhere out of his reach. To my relief we never caught up with boy later that day. This observation showed the full force that is being applied against the ‘others’. What I witnessed today were two highly trained security operatives (one of them ex-special forces) hunting down a street child who had dared to show the finger (Observation 03).

After this occasion we met up with the manager of the same company for a coffee. While his colleagues were telling him about the day, the manager got paler and paler, realising that his staff might have been too honest during their patrol, considering a researcher had been sat in the back of the car the whole time. Hidden in a joke he told me that he would deny everything when he read about it in the next day’s paper.
After assuring him that the researcher was not a journalist the conversation was ended. However, during later observations with that very same company it was felt that the officers had been ‘briefed’ before as they were less exciting, to say the least. As mentioned above, these are problems that come with ethnographic police research and may possibly bias the data set. Nevertheless, this occasional control of what was supposed to be seen, which can still only be assumed, does not influence the data to the extent that it is not representing the policing practices anymore for three reasons.

First, there is a notion of pride about policing measures as a counterbalance to the many and brutal crimes, which participants wanted to share and saw as a sign of quality. Secondly, I lived in the case study site and so was constantly observing the security. Over a period of nine months I was able to watch the security closely and saw their own idea of the policing landscape, which was confirmed by the observations. Thirdly, interviews were conducted with critics of private policing and the ones most affected by these measures in order to balance out possible bias in the ethnographic dataset.

5.3.3 Mapping

Criminologists have talked about the need to map differently policed spaces or zones of governance. “[T]here is much work to be done in mapping this changing morphology of governance and it is interesting to speculate on how the task of nodal cartography might develop” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 147). Furthermore, criminologists commonly use spatial ideas to visualise their arguments. As Zedner states:

Other observers see security itself as forming tangible new formations variously described by a series of graphic metaphors that include security

Although these concepts are indeed tangible, they principally stay as metaphors. In none of the criminological literature is the changing security and governing landscape actually mapped, as in producing a map of a space showing the different nodes. However, there are fairly clear guidelines that suggest how to identify a governance node through four characteristic points (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Burris, 2006; Wood, 2006; Shearing and Johnston, 2010).

\[M\]entalities (relating to how nodes think about security); technologies (relating to the methods they might use to facilitate it); resources (relating to the social, cultural, economic or other means they might deploy in its furtherance); and institutions (relating to the structures that enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies in pursuit of security) (Shearing and Johnston, 2010: 503, own emphasis).

This is further explained by Burris:

To be a governing node as this theory defines it, a node must have some institutional form. It need not be a formality constituted or legally recognized entity, but it must have sufficient stability and structure to enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time. A street gang can be a node, as can a police station or even a particular shift at a firehouse. A node like this may be primarily part of an integrated network, like a department in a firm; it may be linked to other nodes in multiple networks without having a primary network affiliation, like a small lobbying form; or may be what we call a ‘superstructural node,’ which brings together representatives of different nodal organizations (...) to concentrate the members’ resources and technologies for a common purpose but without integrating the various networks - a trade association for example (Burris, 2004, 341-342, in Wood, 2006: 219).

As Wood claims, ‘governance is never fully actualized by a single node’ (2006: 219), but shows different development in each of the defining characteristics.

Having identified the nodes, the aim of this thesis is to perform the step of taking the abstract description of governance nodes and security patchworks and putting them a map. When only talking about them theoretically it is hard to develop an understanding of their scale. One of the few existing examples is Bénit-Gbaffou
(2008b), an urban planner who integrated a map of road closures in Johannesburg into her paper. Looking at the closely woven net of closed formerly-public roads in a particular suburb, a statement such as the increasing problems for emergency services finding their way suddenly becomes stronger as the reader can see the maze of open streets between the net of closed ones. Another example is Nemeth’s (2010) and Nemeth and Hollander’s (2010) maps of security zones and the shrinking of public space. Using sophisticated GIS-based mapping, these studies show how public space is decreasing as post 9/11 anti-terror measures are on the rise. Here the map first allows the extent of security measures to be quantified through their exact geo-references, but secondly it visualises the spaces that enables the reader to grasp the highly spatial written facts better.

Nevertheless, problems that can arise from the use of a map have been taken in to account and acknowledged (Dorling and Fairbairn 1997; Crampton, 2001; Perkins, 2010). The most problematic issue is the one of generalisation. Introducing different governing bodies and policing philosophies in one category and map, it suggests that they are all the same, especially in terms of their power. To minimise this possible misconception, the different governance structures are introduced individually in the next chapter, while the maps are used to support the arguments and show the extent of space that is partially governed by private actors. Visualising an urban fragmentation supplements its detailed interpretation. Nevertheless, literature on the problems linked to mapping commonly refers to much more sophisticated projects in which an entire area is being mapped starting with a blank page.

The actual maps were drawn by James Quinn and Brian Rogers of the Cartographic Resources Unit, SoGEES, Plymouth University, using the data provided. The basic layer of Cape Town was extracted from the online resource OpenStreetMap.
layer was then partially re-digitised and re-labelled. New labels for main roads and some suburbs names were chosen for orientation purposes and to enable the reader to identify the areas that will be mentioned. In addition to that, various landmarks of either large private or non-residential spaces and mountains and hills have been labelled in order to point out the areas of relevant public space on the map.

To the basic layer, different governance and policing structures were added in additional layers, the sources of which are mentioned below. When acknowledging the non-relevant spaces of the harbour, the private V&A Waterfront shopping mall and the slopes of the Table Mountain National Park, Lions Head and Signal Hill, the vast amount of urban space affected and policed by private governance structures becomes clear.

To map private policing schemes in public spaces, the term ‘public space’ had to be defined first. The definition used is taken from the ‘By-law regulating to streets, public places and the prevention of nuisance’ (City of Cape Town, 2007) since most of the measures relevant to the thesis are based on this by-law and its definition of public space. Here public space is defined as

(a) a public road;

(b) any parking area, square, park, recreation ground, sports ground, sanitary lane, open space, beach, shopping centre on municipal land, unused or vacant municipal land or cemetery which has-

(i) in connection with any subdivision or layout of land into erven [erf is a South African term and refers to a mostly urban plot of land designated for building proposes], lots or plots, being provided, reserved or set apart for use by the public (...)” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1350)

Unless the term ‘public space’ is being discussed in a theoretical way, this is also the definition for public space in the empirical section of the thesis. The boundaries of the CIDs were taken directly from their homepages and transferred to the map. Some of the boundaries of the larger residential security schemes were shared during
interviews. In other instances they were mapped through observation of the patrolling guards and warning signs on the streets.

In the case of the smaller residential sites, they were mentioned during the interviews. I then asked for their exact location and if it was okay to visit the sites. Information on locations and the permission to visit them was granted in all cases. Additional sites were identified through making several walks through the case study. Since these sites are relatively small it is difficult to guarantee an entirely comprehensive map. Furthermore, the industry is highly mobile and one site can be gone in a street while a different site has been introduced around the corner. It is therefore not claimed that all the smaller sites have been mapped. It is, however, certain that examples of all the different kinds of security setup in public space have been mapped. Therefore the map categorises and visualises private commercial security setups in public spaces, stressing the importance of these policing entities, although ultimately there might be more sites than those mapped.

5.4 Analysis

Except for maps and images, all data were analysed using the NVivo 8 software. To do this, all interview transcripts and field diaries were coded for recurring themes. Using the software it is possible to structure different themes and to combine them in related nodes. Using thematic analysis the focus is exclusively on the identification, analysis and patterns (themes) within the data (Braun and Clarke 2006). In other words, the facts in the data are being filtered out, structured and prepared for interpretation. The data were analysed three times. The first time, wider themes were identified. Using this general structure a first draft of the empirical chapters has been laid out. During a second analysis, different specific themes (or nodes, as they are
called in the software) were identified within the main theme and internally structured. Once the thesis was written and the arguments made, the data set was examined again in order to rule out any missing or contradicting statements, or misinterpretations that might have occurred during the re-working of ideas.

However, when describing strategies for the analysis of data, Cope (2010) or Strauss and Corbin (1998) make it sound like the researcher is seeing the data (meaning the actual transcripts) for the first time. While that might be the case for some projects, in this case I lived within the case study for about nine months, so every time I left the house I was in a privately policed governance setup. I talked about the interviews and observations with friends, housemates and fellow researchers in the city. Furthermore, I transcribed the interviews and transferred the observation data from a notebook to my laptop. In addition to the interview schedule changing constantly while thinking about the findings so far and adjusting to new or reoccurring themes, follow-up interviews were conducted when I had the feeling that my understanding had changed or gaps in the knowledge had occurred. In other words, I was familiar with the data well before entering it into NVivo. I knew the general themes as well as what individual interviewees had said and where to find a strong quote to make a point. Using the analysis software certainly helped to structure the data, but the wider themes existed long before starting the analysis as a separate work process.

5.5 Positionality

Reflecting on one’s own positionality does not only pay respect to the hosting country, but is of importance as it almost influences the way people communicate with a researcher due to complex power reactions that can influence or bias the research findings (England, 1994, 2006; Blunt and Wills, 2000; Smith, 2004).
However, the difficulty with the positionality debate is that a lot of it is based on assumptions. In the field one does not know how far, for example, race is a factor or how far gender plays a role, at least in a research project where race or gender issues are not explicitly being examined. Therefore, this section will start with the known facts: I am a white male from Europe who was in his late 20s at the time of conducting the research, speaks English with a German accent, is doing his PhD, and is rather critical of neoliberal politics.

As mentioned above, in the actual semi-structured interviews a lot of participants were too professional to be distracted by issues such as gender or race. They had been working in the landscape of urban governance for years. During the observations this was slightly different. Here the issue of masculinity in particular played a role. Being male certainly helped to get a few ‘honest’, such as macho or sexist, comments out of the interviewees (e.g. ‘I would not mind to body search her…’). Nevertheless, how far this would have actually influenced the research findings negatively is guesswork. It is no secret that the military, police and security landscapes are macho and male environments, but women have successfully conducted valuable studies in this environment (Wakefield, 2003; Berg, 2004; Woodward, 2004).

In South Africa the most obvious issue would be the one of race or skin colour. Certainly, being white might have opened doors when working amongst people in this industry, many of whom were active in the apartheid forces (police, prison service or military) and who today see a black person in a predominantly white neighbourhood as a threat. So race in South Africa, and in the global south in general (Smith, 2004; Scheyvens and Storey, 2007), always has a strong impact on perceptions, but an assessment of its impact on the research would be guesswork.
What can, however, be assessed to some degree is the issue of my German-ness and privileged intellectual background. Being German or talking with a German accent arguably influenced the research positively. When talking to non-whites and security guards they felt less intimidated as in many cases English was their second language as well. Furthermore, many residents of the townships have positive associations with Germany; presumably the fact that many NGOs and development projects in the township are funded by the German government might be one of the reasons for this. In addition, the fact that Germany did well in the World Cup at the time and had played attractive football was a useful point of departure for many conversations on the street.

In interviews with white security representatives I had the feeling that in various instances my German-ness, or maybe non-British-ness facilitated the interview for historical reasons. Several times participants proudly pointed out their partially German roots. In addition to that, I had a very strong suspicion that the fact of I spoke English as a second language presented me as less of a threat and facilitated very open and honest conversations. Being ‘superior’ in terms of their English and talking to a non-South African, it was sensed that they somehow felt that they needed to explain things very carefully to make sure I had understood what they were saying or were not presupposing I had some information, something that facilitated a rich data set. Talking about this with a black South African journalist, he confirmed that he could have never have conducted such interviews, although being a journalist would have been a barrier to this as well.

On the issue of working in other cultures, I followed a pragmatic approach. Although relevant literature was studied (Smith, 2004; Scheyvens and Storey, 2007), the fact that the case studies were not the global south put their relevance under question.
Instead Sidaway’s (1992) guidelines (see Table 5.2 below) were taken into account; most of these issues are confirmed or also picked up by Smith (2004) and Scheyvens et al. (2007).

Table 5.2: Guidelines for the work in other cultures

- The researcher should not “violate fundamental ethical standards or cultural understandings” (Sidaway 1992: 406)
- “The ‘researched’ should also be informed of the general purposes and the funding of the investigation” (Sidaway 1992: 406)
- No risk or harm should be generated for the participants
- No false promises should be made
- The researcher should be aware of unintended consequences
- The results of the research should be shared
- “[T]he merits of research should be put into perspective” (Sidaway 1992: 406)

Source: Sidaway 1992: 406

Despite the case study not being in the global south, Moser (2008) brings an interesting aspect to the discussion on positionality. Unless a researcher brings any attributes to the field that disqualifies him or her completely in the eyes of participants, Moser (2008) argues that personality, meaning interest in what people say and think and social skills, can overcome positionality issues very quickly. With this Moser (2008) conceptualises what I sensed during most of the research. Here a bonding and understanding between a participant and myself was of more importance than the issue of attributes such as gender and skin colour.

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14 Here Moser (2008) mentions scholars of Chinese descent in Muslim Indonesia and their historical tension towards China. In this study’s context, Visser (2000) provides an example of how his identity as a white Afrikaans speaking male who studies in the UK created difficulties with most of the groups he encountered when returning to South Africa to research the post-apartheid city. White as well as Black participants perceived him with reservations for different reasons, while a white researcher with no Afrikaans background did not share his problems to such an extent.
5.6 Ethics

All ethical considerations follow the 'Statement on Professional Ethics’ as written by the Council of the Association of American Geographers (2009) and approved by the Faculty of Science, Plymouth University. These considerations included that

[t]he dignity, safety, and well-being of informants and local colleagues should always have precedence over the goals of the project. Informants and local researchers should be asked whether they prefer anonymity or recognition, and the project should be implemented and its results should be presented in keeping with these individuals’ preferences. Prior to participation, informants and local collaborators have a basic right to know the purpose of the project and the end uses of the information (Council of the Association of American Geographers, 2009).

These ethical concerns were assured by a used consent form that outlined the aims of the research project (the consent form used can be found in Appendix C). All participants were given a consent form signed by me that guaranteed anonymity unless stated otherwise and gave the option to withdraw from the study completely any time. This form was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Science, University of Plymouth. A second copy of this form was signed by most of the participants and returned to me. Some felt uncomfortable with signing a form but gave verbal consent and kept a version signed by me.

Although I had numerous chats with low-ranked security guards, urban poor and street people during the research, only the two longer ones formed part of the 47 interviews. One was a spontaneous interview with a group of squatters who had just been evicted and were sitting with all their belongings on the street. I started talking with a woman and explained my background as a researcher to her. She was happy talking about her situation while her friends were preparing lunch on the busy pavement. However, since the whole situation was rather informal and no consent form was signed, this interview was not cited. The reason for listing it amongst the
interviews is that it informed me greatly in my understanding of the space and should therefore be listed as a source.

Another interview was conducted with a group of street people. In a previous interview I had talked to a social development worker who had offered to set it up to give me a different perspective. After a couple of days the fieldworker was met again in the evening and we looked for a street person he knew that could usually be found in that area. When he found the person, the fieldworker introduced me and explained the situation. The street person agreed to being interviewed and invited the fieldworker and myself to his place the next day. Following the advice of the fieldworker, I bought a few Gatsby’s (a Cape Townian sandwich) and some soft drinks for a late lunch. During the conversation with the street people the fieldworker stayed in the background to give reassurance to all involved. However, these data are not cited in the thesis because interviews with so-called vulnerable groups were not covered by the ethics form for the project. As the benefits gained from such data did not outweigh the difficulties and issues of ensuring ethical research, as well as obtaining the ethical clearance from the Faculty of Science and Technology of the Plymouth University, it is not possible to use these interviews in the thesis.

Similarly the many conversations with low-ranked security guards are not cited directly to avoid possible negative consequences with their employees that could not be foreseen at that stage. This reflects their own concerns as well as the issues raised by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Science and Technology of the Plymouth University. Nevertheless, although not cited or referenced, data from these so-called ‘vulnerable groups’ influenced the research strongly in more indirect ways. It helped me to understand the space I was working in better. By listening to these groups my critical understanding was shaped which led to modifications of the interview
schedules with the more elite-level participants and shaped the critical interpretation of the findings. Since I believe that the thesis would look different if it were not for these conversations, they need to find mentioned at this point in order to be truly reflective.

5.7 Conclusion

Up to this point the thesis has worked out the gaps in the body of research and translated them into research questions. Furthermore, methods to answer these research questions have been introduced. Applying a triangular approach, semi-structured interviews, different kinds of observation and a mapping exercise were carried out. While individual methods have their weakness when being applied on their own, a combination of them aimed to minimise the downsides and to emphasise their advantages. Assessing the effectiveness of the methodology, it is not perfect and the problems have been outlined above. However, it can be claimed with confidence that it enables a solid foundation for the research underlying this PhD thesis.

Interviews, it has been argued, have the disadvantage of being vulnerable to the politics of the individual participants’ agendas. By relying on them, potential problems might be denied, taken into perspective or overemphasised by critics. On the other hand, the observations focus merely on the street level and the day-to-day policing. What they do not show are things such as the ideas and developments behind the actual policing and in whose interest the policing is performed. However, combined with the interviews they are a powerful method that complements the insights of the interviews. In various cases an observed incident was pointed out to an interviewee who would then make some remarks to put it into perspective or
would use the situation to make honest self-critical insights. The mapping, which started out as a supplementary method, became of increasing importance and established itself as a core element of the research. Inspired by the approach of psychogeography (Paasche and Sidaway, 2010), the maps aim to communicate how the security setups work and how dominant they are in the public spaces in central Cape Town.

Before analysing the results of these exercises in detail, it is necessary to consider them within the context of South Africa and its wider geographies of policing. The following chapter will outline some of the geo-political changes that have occurred in South Africa, particularly since the end of apartheid, and how these have affected the policing of its urban spaces.
CHAPTER VI: SECURITY AND SPACE IN SOUTH AFRICA

6.1 Introduction

It is the year 2020. Johannesburg has become a city of urban forts. These forts are scattered across the city, creating an intricate maze of illegible urban cells. Wealthy citizens live, work and play in these bastions of brick and iron. Many of these fortified buildings or protected enclaves are connected by enforced bridges across public throughways. However, when the residents of these enclaves are forced to leave their safety zones, they do so within the safety of their cars, dreading every moment they are ‘out there’, exposed to the mercy of the ‘criminals’ in the violent public realm.

These public areas are the war zones of the city – a den of deadly forces that threaten the very existence of those seeking safety in their private fortresses. They are also the living places of the urban poor who have to face the dangers of unprotected areas. These people are without any means or choice. They are the street people of the ‘dead-spaces’ – literally and figuratively. No longer are these public spaces used by and shared by all the urban residents as in times gone by. It is only those who do not have a choice that are left to live their lives in these derelict and dangerous areas. The city has been taken over by the many private micro-governments and the poor, the homeless and the unfortunate are left the victims of a system of enclosed fortresses for the privileged (Landman, 2000: 7).

This chapter will introduce the case study site of Cape Town, South Africa. In order to do so the relevant urban changes and changes in policing over the last three decades will be introduced at the national scale to provide a context for contemporary Cape Town and its policing landscape. It will argue that the post-apartheid city is characterised by new forms of urban segregation. The ones that can afford it withdraw to secured private spaces and the little public space that remains, as the quote above shows, is perceived as dangerous and hostile. The country suffered from high levels of segregation and racial discrimination during apartheid and now faces new forms of urban divisions that perpetuate old apartheid structures (e.g. Peyroux, 1996; Beavon, 2000; Samara, 2010a, 2010b) and create extreme examples of urban fragmentation and exclusion.

The growth of secured private spaces caused a boom of private security in the country, which, as Chapter 3 showed, was needed to secure urban enclaves, or ‘forts’
as Landman (2000: 7) called them. However, while private space was booming, public spaces, especially the inner cities, went into decline. However, this deprivation caused a countermovement whereby private governance structures were established to push the renewal of public space using ideas of the revanchist city (Smith, 1996, 1998; MacLeod, 2002; Atkinson, 2003; Swanson, 2007). This thesis focuses on one example of urban renewal and the use of private governance actors and private police to secure it. However, before focusing on Cape Town, the chapter outlines the broader social and political contexts in which these changes occurred. Only by understanding the racist segregation of the past, does private policing in the present make sense.

6.2 From the apartheid to the post-apartheid city

The transformation and democratisation of space and society after the extreme era of apartheid was, and still is, a slow and difficult process. While there are many aspects that could be looked at, this section will focus on key economic changes, the desegregation process and changes in the policing landscape. However, in order to understand the current policies of the South Africa in which the findings of the thesis are embedded, it is necessary to grasp some aspects of the nature of the apartheid state first. Although the most obvious feature was the racial segregation rooted in the racist and strange religious ideas of white superiority, the core of the apartheid state was a deeply capitalist agenda that used the vast non-white labour force, making up about 80% of the population, to the advantage of the white population. As Davies et al. describe:

Whites, or more especially the Afrikaans-speaking section of the white population, popularly known as Boers, are presumed to suffer from intense racial prejudice, and this system of racial discrimination is the result. It is
certainly true that most whites are highly racially prejudiced but this explains little. In our view, explanations which stress only the racial component of the apartheid system and fail to explain the historical development and current [note that year of publication was 1985] functioning of the system, are positively misleading. Such types of explanations actually conceal the most important elements of the system.

The approach (…) assumes from the outset that the various changing historical forms of national oppression and racism in South Africa are organically lined with, and have provided the fundamental basis for, the development of a capitalist economy in that country. In other words, the various complex and intersecting class struggles through which capitalist forms of production and relations of productions were developed and consolidated under colonialism in South Africa, themselves generated racist ideologies and a racial structures hierarchy or economic and political power. The national oppression of black people in South Africa is a product of, and was indeed the necessary historical condition for, the development of capitalism in that country.

Apartheid, then, is more than a system of intense racial discrimination. Fundamentally it, like that segregationist policies which preceded it, is a system of economic, social and political relations designed to produce cheap and controlled black labour, and so to generate rates of high profit (Davies et al., 1985: 2).

O’Meara (1983) makes similar arguments for the period from 1934 to 1948, in which Afrikaans’ identity was consolidated. Although there is racism involved, the national identity served to mobilise the whites for a capitalist agenda of accumulation. This meant that apartheid was not only about racial segregation but was also an inherently capitalist project, or volkscapitalisme as O’Meara (1983) calls it, which mobilised the Afrikaaner identity and racial segregation for economic growth. To understand post-apartheid politics, it is important to be aware of the strong capitalist history of the country, as it explains not only the power and unequal distribution of wealth, but also the political changes occurring within the ANC, which again heavily influenced the urban policies.
6.2.1 Urban geographies

The apartheid city was characterised by its tremendous level of segregation. Every aspect of social life, from public toilets to whole quarters were segregated and designed according to the idea of keeping the non-white population apart from the Whites in everyday life. The segregation was not complete in all areas however, as there was an interaction between races on economic and labour levels. Here the non-white population was used as a cheap labour reserve to work in the factories and mines of the white\textsuperscript{15} elite, or as servants in white homes. The apartheid system further segregated the non-white population according to their origin, into Blacks, Coloureds and Asians (usually meaning Indians). At some point the level of segregation among the urban population reached over 90\% and the small percentage that lived outside their racially-designated zones were often servants or employees of the white elite (Christopher, 1997). What has to be emphasised is that apartheid was a major governmental project that was initiated by the white minority that used all its power and repressive force to maintain it. In this context, two pieces of legislation are of special importance. The Group Areas Act (1950), which was the heart of apartheid’s urban planning, and the National Key Points Act (1980), which allowed the South African Police (SAP) to give up certain duties, such as the protection of strategic installations, to private security companies whose growth the government actively facilitated (Baker, 2002; Goldberg, 2001; Christopher, 2005; Donaldson and Kotze, 2006)\textsuperscript{16}. Figure 6.1 shows Davies’ (1981) model of the old apartheid city.

\textsuperscript{15} The terms Coloureds, Asians and Blacks refer to the majority of the population. Undeniably there were townships where Coloureds lived under very poor conditions. However, at the same time there was a wealthy Black elite that actively continued the inequalities in the country.

\textsuperscript{16} Even before that, private security already played an important role in South Africa as the police was not centralised until 1913 and different security companies were therefore employed for various reasons, one of which was for protection of the diamond mines (Baker, 2002).
In the 1980s, however, the government started to change the apartheid system. What first appeared to be a loosening of the government’s tight grip turned out to be an attempted modernisation of the system to keep it running for further decades. However, instead of securing the state’s position, it created new tensions with the new black middle-class over the means of production (Simon, 1989). From that point onward the resistance against the apartheid system grew and finally ended in the repeal of the Group Area Acts in 1991 and the first free elections in 1994 when apartheid legally ended (Donaldson and Kotze, 2006).

Figure 6.1: The apartheid-city

Source: Davies 1981 in Landman, 2006: 4
Although officially overthrown, the apartheid order is still deeply rooted in urban planning, economic power relations and in society itself. Using census data from 1996, Christopher (2001) argues that five years after the repeal of the Group Area Act, de-segregation had advanced very little, which is something he confirms again later with data from the 2001 census (Christopher, 2005). The post-apartheid city is instead characterised by new forms of segregation along class lines that correspond with the old race lines, linking the issue to the mentioned volkscapitalisme. The strong capitalist apartheid project used racial divisions to maintain a cheap labour force. With the end of legal racism this class structure still remains and is deeply rooted in the society and economy of the country. As Christopher explains, de-segregation is more a re-composition of race according to class, which is the new dividing factor in the post-apartheid city (see also Beavon, 2000; McDonald and Smith, 2004; Samara, 2005; Miraftab, 2007).\footnote{This section uses the racial apartheid terminology to refer to the four groups of Blacks, Coloureds, Asians (manly Indian) and Whites. Although the author personally does not agree with using race as a demographic indicator, this is the common terminology used to analyse the contemporary post-apartheid city as many problems inherited from apartheid are based on these racial divisions.}

In the post-apartheid urban order, class has displaced race ‘as the determinant of residence’ (Christopher, 1997). Having a large, poorer, mainly black underclass that builds a surplus labour reserve is one of the characteristic features of capitalism that appears in the implementation of neoliberalism on both global and national scales (Harvey, 2007). The group of Coloureds and Asians became the new middle-class, which had existed to a much lesser extent during apartheid, while the Whites were able to defend their position as middle- and upper-class. This new, but at the same time very old, social order describes the paradox facing the government in that on the one hand it has to satisfy the main tax-base, meaning the rich elite, and on the other
hand it has to meet its obligations towards the poorer majority of the population (Turok, 2001).

6.2.2. Neoliberal Shift

After the end of apartheid the new ANC government inherited these high levels of racial and class-based segregation. Nonetheless, the ANC gradually gave up the more socialist ideas of the Freedom Charter, as seen in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), which finally made room for a neoliberal agenda. About two years after the general elections in which the ANC was voted into power, neoliberal ideals were increasingly being applied (Magubane, 2004; Hanson and Hentz, 1999; McDonald and Smith, 2004; Richard, 2002; Bond, 1996; Cheru, 2001). In particular, Trevor Manuel, the minister of trade and industry at that time, has been identified in the literature as one key actors in pushing these policies (Hanson and Hentz, 1999).

As Manuel himself explains:

The RDP is the embodiment of the commitment of this government to the elimination of poverty in a rapidly growing economy and in the context of an open, peaceful and democratic society. For this vision to materialise, policies must be oriented towards the provision of basic needs, the development of human resources, and a growing economy capable of creating sustainable jobs. The success of the RDP is inherently bound by our ability to generate this developmental and redistributive thrust within a sound fiscal and macroeconomic framework.

To give effect to the RDP in the context of a rapidly globalising and highly competitive international environment requires a significant change in the path of economic growth and development. The challenge to Government is to align economic policy in a way that will ensure an acceleration of economic growth and a substantial improvement in job creation by the turn of the century. The policies set out in the GEAR programme are designed to achieve these objectives.

The GEAR strategy is an economic reform programme directed towards: a competitive fast growing economy which creates sufficient jobs for all jobseekers; a redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor;
a society capable of ensuring that sound health, education and other services are available to all; and
an environment in which homes are safe and places of work are productive.
(…) So yes, investment is important. Sustainable job creation requires a steady stream of capital investment. (…) For all these reasons, it is imperative that we take stock of the disciplines of the global economy. We need to examine continually how we integrate into that economy without sacrificing our fundamental and implacable commitment to social transformation (Manuel, 1997).

For someone who had originally wanted to become ‘a revolutionary with a big beard and a big gun’ (Time Magazine, 2009), this is a clear commitment to forces of the free market. Nevertheless, to implement this kind of policy needs more than one person to apply an economic shift down to local councils (McDonald and Smith, 2004).

There are several reasons that can be identified for the neoliberal turn. One common factor identified is the international pressure the country faced in the first post-apartheid years. In particular, the international financial institutions prescribed neoliberal reforms for South Africa that were linked to their financial aid. At the World Economic Forum in Cape Town, the former liberation movement broke with the socialist bottom-up ideals in favour of Western economic ideas, in a decision described by Hanson and Hentz (1999) as the neocolonialisation of the country by international financial institutions. However, it was not only institutions from the outside that were building up pressure. Richard (2002) describes the academic-institutional-media complex, both inside as well as outside the country, as a powerful actor whose campaigns increased the pressure for neoliberal changes. The hegemonic discourse originating in elite places produced ‘policy prescriptions, position papers, press releases, popular columns, commentaries and programmes, news bites, expert interviews, and a vast panoply of well-written, illustrated books, reports, and articles’ (Richard, 2002: 58) to keep up the pressure. Ultimately Richard concludes that this
pressure led to the neoliberal politics that are again responsible for the inequalities resulting in the high crime rates South Africa faces and the decreasing power of unions, among other effects. He therefore concludes his article with the strong statement ‘What terror on Robbens Island could not do to Mandela, the Davos culture could’ (Richard, 2002:79). Bond (1996) and Cheru (2001) came to a similar conclusion when analysing the ideological shift from the RDP as the ‘social justice conscience’ of the ANC toward neoliberal programmes such as the GEAR strategy, which was in favour of free-market and free-trade politics. Similarly, Richard (2002), Bond (1996) and Cheru (2001) see a betrayal of the old ideals and the ‘surrender on the economic front’ as the foundation for class-based urban segregation.

However, there is a tendency in the literature cited not to take the capitalist history of the country into account. Above it has been said that apartheid South Africa was a deeply-rooted capitalist society, and not a system in which the nation state owned all the assets, such as its mineral resources; instead these were held by private companies. The new government had to deal with the structural inequalities based on class and indirectly race as best as possible. This should not be read as an attempt to justify the policies of the ANC, but rather as an additional comment on the literature cited above.

6.2.3 Policing in South Africa

During apartheid the SAP applied a colonial-style policing concept, which means that the police were linked more closely to the military in terms of tactics and equipment than, for example, police forces in Western democracies (Bowling and Foster, 2002). One example of this is how the use of live ammunition was the standard tactic to disperse crowds in certain periods (Brewer, 1994), which leads
Cole (1999) to argue that the colonial police often had paramilitary characteristics. Therefore apartheid policing, as well as colonial policing, was characterised by violence and the use of strong force to ensure order, maintenance and internal security (Brogden and Shearing, 1993; Cole, 1999; Rauch, 2000; Bell and Ntsebeza, 2003). Right from the beginning of apartheid, the SAP’s policing strategy was shaped by the Whites’ fear of the swart gevaar (black danger), and later by cold war rhetoric, which influenced the panic about the communism the apartheid regime saw approaching the northern borders.

The focus of the apartheid government in policing tactics was, besides regular policing of white areas, mainly to police the boundaries between townships and the white quarters, leaving the non-white parts under policed (Brewer, 1994). Here the apartheid regime followed the so-called ‘own area’ strategy, which means that every ethnic group was policed by officers of the same ethnicity. One outcome of this approach was, contrary to the misconception of a mainly white apartheid police force, that about half of the apartheid police was non-white in terms of relative numbers (Davies et al., 1985; Brogden and Shearing, 1993; Brewer, 1994; Rauch, 2000). Indeed, the SAP always had problems in recruiting enough white officers, for a variety of reasons, leaving the police understaffed for wide periods (Brewer, 1994). In fact SAP was never an overly strong police force in terms of numbers, especially considering its authoritarian nature. With 1.4 police per 1,000 population, the ratio was lower than the contemporary South African Police Service (SAPS), as well as being lower than many liberal democracies\(^\text{18}\) (Brewer et al., 1988).

\(^\text{18}\) For comparison: Police per 1,000 population in South Africa in 2002 was 2.24; in England and Wales in 2001 it was 2.09; in Germany in 2002 it was 3.03; in Canada in 2002 it was 1.86; and in the Netherlands in 2002 it was 2.12 (UNODC, 2011).
The fact that SAP did not focus on community policing and crime investigation in non-white areas, but rather on internal security and maintenance of order, led to increasing crime rates within the townships that in the period between 1946 and 1959 faced an unemployment rate of up to 80% amongst the youth. Soon after apartheid policing was introduced, gangs and vigilante groups were ruling the townships instead of the police, which by then was mainly concerned with the dispersal of crowds etc. In African townships the tsotsi had control over parts of the territory, while in Coloured townships it was the skolly (Brewer, 1994). Resulting from this, Brewer argues that in townships law abiding citizens were caught between ‘the evil twins of the gangsters and the police’ (1994: 335-336). Furthermore, this allowed so-called Street Committees to establish the more traditional justice of elder councils to control space socially. Later, the anti-apartheid struggle advocated a policy of making the townships ‘ungovernable’ for the racist regime, installing alternative criminal justice and policing bodies, such as the People’s Courts (Burman, 1989; Schärf, 1989; Seekings, 1989, 1992). All of this could only happen due to the absence of actual state policing in these areas.

With the continuing of apartheid, the resistance against SAPs grew, which in turn led the police to apply more aggressive tactics (Brewer, 1994). In the 1960s and the early 1970s, torture and massacres became common, the police became more military-like and the state fell back on the army for policing and internal security as well (Brewer, 1994). In the period between 1976 and 1984, SAP killed 1,764 non-whites compared to 28 Whites. In this situation ordinary crime went relatively ignored, both in terms of police resources and effort. Conversely, when it was dealt with, the police tended to use paramilitary, colonial-style methods as if ordinary crime was an extension of guerrilla insurgency (…) The policing of ordinary crime in the Black townships was amongst the lowest priorities of all (Brewer, 1994: 258-259).
Only towards the end of apartheid did de Klerk, who saw the end of his regime coming, introduce reforms and start to demilitarise SAP while shifting its focus onto the policing of ordinary crime and to communicating with the different parties in the struggle.

Although industry started to boom after the end of apartheid, the private security industry had already existed during apartheid, resulting from a South African tradition of decentralised security bodies (Baker, 2002). Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, SAP needed the support of commercial security due to increasing security problems, resulting in the National Key Points Act in 1989 that enabled private security companies to protect, for example, strategic installations (Baker, 2002).

Reading through a manual for the South African security industry from 1981, Vogel gives evidence about the seriousness of the security industry’s involvement in the prevalence of the status quo, which includes managing aspects of security such as ‘emergency security and terrorism’, ‘crisis management and urban terrorism’, or ‘protecting vital industries’ through private security.

Nevertheless, despite all the para-military policing, the general elections of 1994 ended the authoritarian apartheid regime, requiring a transformation of the repressive police force to an accepted police service; changing from SAP to SAPS; a very difficult endeavour:

It never occurred to the leaders and members of the African National Congress (ANC) – the main democratic opposition party – that the police, who had been so ruthless effective against them, would be any less effective against criminals in the new era. However, coping with the political transition and adapting to policing in a democratic society have been difficult for the police service (Rauch, 2000: 119).

The transformation from colonial policing towards community policing involved many symbolic changes. This included changing the name of the new police force and restructuring the military hierarchies to civilian ones, for which the British police
model was used (Rauch, 2000; Shearing and Kempa, 2000). However, despite all the changes, there is still a certain level of mistrust in the police rooted in the apartheid period that still prevails today.

6.3 From the post-apartheid city to the neo-apartheid city

Soon after the official end of apartheid, the country faced high crime rates linked to inequalities and continuing segregation processes. In 2007/2008 there were 4,456 murders per 100,000 nationwide and 8,557 murders per 100,000 in Cape Town (Gie, 2009). Although high crime rates are a common phenomenon of young democracies (Shearing and Kempa, 2000), they soon became so pressing and prominent that they started transforming the geography of the cities. In a situation where life is increasingly dictated by the fear of crime (see Figure 6.2), Hook and Vrdoljak (2002) suggest that people decide between emigrating or ‘gigging-in with style’, referring to the creation of a new kind of security-led architecture, the ‘architecture of fear’ (Lemanski, 2004). Although it can be certainly argued that neoliberalism creates or perpetuates inequalities and does not necessarily help to lower the crime rates, its roots have to be sought in the apartheid segregation and the volkscapitalisme favouring the white ruling class (O’Meara, 1983; Davies et al. 1985). Due to an almost containment-like policing of the townships, gangs and unofficial policing structures could flourish, and still exist to the present day. Furthermore, apartheid allowed an atmosphere where the personnel or vigilante style settling of disputes became common. Shaw (1997) argues that this resulted in a society in which ‘violence became endemic’.
Besides changes in urban geographies, this led to a situation where the police again could not handle the situation alone anymore, and created what academics (Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Minnaar, 2007; Zedner, 2009) called a ‘security vacuum’, which was filled by various security companies, leading to a boom in the industry in South Africa. While the ‘others’ were contained during apartheid (Brewer, 1994), today’s urban landscape is characterised by the voluntary segregation of the elite in private spaces in order to avoid public space (Camerer et al., 1998; Lemanski, 2004, 2006a, 2006), as described in Landman’s (2000) graphic depiction at the beginning of this chapter. When looking for a set of research questions on the issue of private security companies, this portrays an urban landscape of privately-secured urban enclaves and a dangerous, potentially under-policed public space.

6.3.1 Urban geographies of the post-apartheid city

Although apartheid was officially dismantled, segregation still exists. Income and the distribution of wealth in particular are major dividing factors. As the wealthy elite is mainly white and the poorer groups mainly black, segregation still has strong racial
connotations. K’Akumu and Olima claim that for Africa in general ‘it is impossible to think of residential segregation without going back to the colonial past’ (2007: 89). Amongst the white minority, a fear of the black ‘others’ is ever present and fuels the segregation. As Beavon argues in his work on Johannesburg, the city faces a ‘white flight promoted by white fright’ (2000: 7). This fear does not necessary refer to the actual crime numbers. Instead it stands for the ‘old desire for privacy, and the new suburban reality of the fear of crime that provides the impetus for the growth of this phenomenon’ (Luymes, 1997: 190). However, one should keep in mind that statistics show that whites are less likely to be victims of serious crime than other groups who cannot afford extra security. Gie states that in Cape Town (2009: 17):

Out of the 58 police districts in the city, five police districts account for over 44% of murders, Nyanga (13.18%), Harare (in Khayelitsha) (8.67%), Khayelitsha (8.47%), Gugulethu (7.58 %), and Delft/ Belhar (6.1%).

All of these areas are non-white. Furthermore, the biggest part of the police force is stationed in and around the white parts of the cities. Despite this, what can be observed in white areas is the phenomenon that once someone has barricaded him or herself against the public sphere, the ‘outside’ seems to become increasingly dangerous, even if there is no actual threat. Kempa and Singh explain this noting that ‘[i]n this process [of segregation], powerful groups’ perceptions of non-white racial identity are aligned with characteristics deemed to be undesirable, inferior and less worthy in the market value system’ (2008: 344). Although today’s segregation is strongly influenced by income and class, the dividing line often runs between black and white due to sociological and historical reasons (Spinks, 2001; K’Akumu and Olima, 2007). There is therefore a trend towards the fear of the black ‘others’ that evokes racism. The difference is that this kind of racism is not led by the idea of a superior race, but of inequalities and an increasing divide between rich and poor because statistically black equals poor. Therefore, even over a decade after the
official end of apartheid the fear of the *swart gevaar* (black danger) and the *skollie menace* (scoundrel coloureds) is evident. It is this renaissance of racism that reinforces the argument that South Africa is facing a neo-apartheid regime (Beavon, 2000; Lemanski, 2004; Landman, 2006). Although now slightly dated, Cheru exemplified the inequalities with the following statement: ‘If “white” South Africa were a separate country, it would rank 24th out of 180 countries, while “black” South Africa would rank 123rd.’ (Cheru, 2001: 505).

In this situation the neoliberal politics being applied and the abandonment of social ideas have perpetuated the inequalities, creating a dangerous social mixture that has exploded in unacceptable high crime rates (Landman, 2000; Baker 2002; Lemanski, 2004; Lemanski and Oldfield, 2009) or the recent violence against refugees and migrant workers (Mail&Guardian-Online, 2011). The result is a general withdrawal from the public space by everyone who can afford it. Today, cameras, guards and new fences dominate the picture in wide parts of South African cities and have shattered the dream of a post-apartheid rainbow society. The wealthier part of society increasingly hides behind modern barricades, while the poor have to organise their security in alternative ways, which can result in vigilante structures that still police the townships (Schärf, 1989; Seekings, 1989, 1992; Shaw, 1997; Kinnes, 2000; Minnaar, 2001; Schärf, 2001; Gottschalk, 2005; Samara, 2005).

Throughout the literature that describes these changes, the new development is described as a new- or neo-apartheid, as the most characteristic features of the actual apartheid period are being re-invented (Beavon, 2000; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Spinks, 2001; Lemanski, 2004; Landman, 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b). However, it should be clarified that this chapter does not argue that all inhabitants of gated communities are racists. Instead, Lemanski and Oldfield (2009) portray these citizens
as regular people who simply want the maximum protection for their families and are in the fortunate position to be able to afford this kind of security. Although the post-apartheid city was able to manifest itself successfully in some regional and local cases (Donaldson and Kotze, 2006), the project as a whole has been unsuccessful so far. Instead, old apartheid divisions are being perpetuated along class lines, as mentioned above.

Using Figures 6.1 and 6.3 as their point of departure, the following will now outline the changes in South Africa’s urban geography, starting at the CBD and inner city high street and then moving outwards to the newly established suburbs that can be found around the bigger cities. As discussed in the previous chapter, today’s cities compete against each other to attract capital and investments (Mitchell, 2001; Samara, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Miraftab, 2007; Kempa and Singh, 2008; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008). In order to participate in this competition, groups and individuals who do not fit into the picture of a safe, clean sanitised space are being repressed and moved away by the full power of the state. Whereas private security companies were mentioned in the policing chapter as just one tool to remove the unwelcome without giving further details, their presence in South African city centres is highly evident. Using the example of Cape Town, Miraftab (2007) describes how the colonial notion of a fear of disease is used to create sanitised spaces and reform Cape Town’s centre. It is the same kind of perceived threat of contagious disease and ‘un-cleanliness’ that led the apartheid and colonial powers to create buffer zones between the white and non-white populations (Maylam, 1995; Christopher, 1997; Miraftab, 2007). The first victims of these politics are the city’s street kids. Miraftab (2007) reports that security companies who police parts of the public space, often on behalf of shop-owners, round these
kids up in trucks, drive them out of the centre and hand them over to NGO facilities, who thus have become part of the neoliberal security network (Baker, 2002; Miraftab, 2007).

Moving further away from the centre, one will recognise an increasing number of enclosed neighbourhoods. In Johannesburg alone 300 legal and illegal road closures have been counted since 1996 (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b). Continuing further outwards into the formerly undeveloped areas, one can see big security villages that were built over the last decade and are still increasing in numbers. In between the CBD and the suburbs, privately-secured malls, leisure centres and office complexes can be found in which the citizens of the gated communities work, shop and spend their leisure time. Although the police have a strong presence around these quarters, commercial companies provide the most proximate security. This has two main causes. First, the general trust and confidence in the SAPS throughout the population is low, and the majority of the people believe that the SAPS is unable to provide the constitutional right to freedom and security (Baker, 2002). *The Economist* (2011) recently confirmed that the police are not able to control crime. Secondly, during apartheid the white elite was in control of the police force, which policed the space according to its needs and wishes. Today’s elite is not in that position anymore, so private security is being bought in and can be governed directly according to their own needs. As outlined in Chapter 3, the growth in private governance and spaces such as gated communities and shopping malls require private security to exist as such spaces are outside the public police’s jurisdiction and, therefore, responsibility.

When comparing the model of the apartheid city (Figure 6.1) to the neo-apartheid city (Figure 6.3) the changes are more obvious. The apartheid city shows a clear divide between different quarters of the model city with buffer zones between the
white and non-white groups. Furthermore, the ethnic groups are mainly subdivided along arterial roads. The clear centre of the apartheid city was the large CBD. In the neo-apartheid city, however, some of these spatial features persist, but there are also the vast new features that were mentioned above. Especially when looking at the micro enclaves, segregation happens on a much smaller scale.

Furthermore, the labelling of the quarters has changed from racial to a more class-based terminology. As Lemanski and Oldfield (2009) describe, African became synonymous with low income, Asian and Coloured with middle-class, and White with middle- or upper-class, keeping features of apartheid alive. As Figure 6.3 shows, the informal settlements have spread into the suburbs, into former white areas, and around the CBD, which has shrunk drastically compared to the apartheid city. Instead, several large business and industrial nodes have emerged along the arterial roads that link them to the different gated communities, mainly in the former White quarters. New suburbs have developed outside the outskirts of the apartheid city, while inside the city’s territory numerous enclosed neighbourhoods and other secured residential areas have been erected on formerly public space. In the CBD and the former non-White quarters, the map shows several secured high-rise apartments have been built that mainly host non-White parts of the population seeking more protection for themselves and their families. In between the numerous private enclaves, informal settlements flourish, contributing to the perception of public space as hostile. Again, the comparison between the maps confirms the notion that public space is decreasing (shrinking CBD, widespread informal settlements) as private spaces boom (various micro-enclaves).

19 In one context of the apartheid era, one has to be careful with the term ‘public’ as different quarters were divided. If one part of a city was publicly accessible for a certain group, it does not mean that it was the same for a different part of the population.
The key notion of the neo-apartheid city is the move towards private space, which is perceived as being safe. Public space, however, is in a process of decay. As the
introductory quote describes, it is often seen as hostile and to be avoided (also Camerer et al., 1998). Therefore the literature indicates that South African cities are on the way to becoming ‘urban forts’ and public areas the ‘dead-spaces’ of the cities (Landman, 2000). The literature communicates a picture in which the people who can afford to do so retreat behind gates and walls and where public space is avoided when possible.

This chapter suggests that the new apart-ness of the post-apartheid city constitutes a danger for the South African society. Here Rose’s (1996a) ideas on the end of the social and the importance of community help to understand the situation. Those who leave the public space enter a vicious circle of mistrust and fear, while those left out are ‘aligned with characteristics deemed to be undesirable, inferior and less worthy in the market value system’ (Kempa and Singh 2008: 344). In other words, the divided, exclusionary city that is maintained by private forces, as described by Sibley (2003) and others, is very real and visible in South Africa. This chapter therefore intends to show the strong notion of the deprivation of the city’s public space and the flight to private space. As Houssay-Holzschuch and Teppo (2009: 367) argue, enjoying a safe public space is ‘a rare treat in Cape Town’. In these terms, Landman’s (2000) depiction of the future of South African cities does not appear too farfetched.

6.4 Counter movement to urban decay

So far the chapter has shown how public space has decayed in South Africa. From 1999 onwards, business communities started losing profits because of the general avoidance of their public space (Rose, 1996a). To reverse this trend the business communities formed governance nodes (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003), the most significant examples of which include City Improvement
Districts (CID) (Shearing, 2006, Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 2007) and residential security schemes or ‘extreme neighbourhood watches’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b).

*Figure 6.4: Case study site in the model of the post-apartheid city*

Source: Own figure based on Landman, 2006: 13
The spaces in which this private counter movement to crime and decay is researched is highlighted in red in Figure 6.4. It places the case study side (see Map 5.1) in the model of the post-apartheid city.

Here the case study site represents a section of the city containing lower-middle- to upper-class suburbs, the city centre and sub-centres. Since private policing schemes require a certain amount of disposable income and wealth, these sites are the most relevant for the study and they are different to more impoverished spaces. In addition, these factors also enabled the researcher to live within the studied site, which strongly facilitated the research.

6.4.1 City Improvement Districts

CIDs are most commonly defined as urban renewal or regeneration setups that originate from North America, where they are known as Business Improvement Districts (Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Samara, 2010a, 2010b). Once introduced, CIDs take over functions that were previously performed by the state in order to govern space; these functions include, but are not limited to, security, social development and urban management, i.e. street cleaning and the maintenance of parks. As academics working on the issue of CIDs in South Africa widely agree (Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Samara, 2010a, 2010b), these private governance institutions (Shearing, 2006) almost became synonymous with neoliberal urban change in terms of a growth-orientated, entrepreneurial agenda, as outlined in Hall and Hubbard (1996) and Harvey (1989), and the responsibilised community as outlined by Garland (2009).

Samara (2010a, 2010b) argues that they turned ‘what should be public space into literal or de facto private, heavily policed enclaves’ (Samara, 2005: 227). This
assumption is based on the observation that the private governments of the Improvement Districts identify certain people and groups as ‘undesirables’ or counterproductive to the investment-orientated ‘world class city’ and exclude them from these spaces. In Samara’s case the focus is on the criminalisation of street children, who have been declared ‘public enemy number one’ (Samara, 2005). In his papers Samara confirms for Cape Town’s CIDs what others have argued in the past for the global North and described with concepts such as ‘urban revanchism’ (Smith, 1996), the exclusionary society (Young, 1999) or ‘geographies of exclusion’ (Sibley, 2003). Setting his findings in the particular local context, Samara (2005), like Miraftab (2007), draw parallels between the space CIDs produce and the racial and class segregation that occurred during the apartheid regime, as well as the continuing of features of apartheid policing that aim to defend the neoliberal world class city (Samara, 2010b), re-establishing an ‘exclusionary Cape Town’ (Miraftab, 2007: 607).

6.4.2 ‘Extreme neighborhood watches’

The non-closed but privately secured residential areas or ‘extreme neighbourhood watches’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b) are less directly linked to the entrepreneurial city than with a notion of insecurity and the desire for exclusiveness, as explained by Garland (2009) on the issue of a neoliberal responsibilisation. Here neighbourhoods that do not, for one of a number of various reasons, erect a boom on their street, will club in and contract the services of a private security company, similar to the CID security to patrol the public streets monitoring suspicious or unwelcome persons.

In terms of exclusion Bénit-Gbaffou (2008a, 2008b) and Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) make a similar argument as the above, although they do not refer only to CIDs in
Cape Town and Johannesburg (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008), but also to the cases of ‘extreme neighbourhood watches’ in Atholl, Johannesburg (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b) and residential CID in Cape Town’s suburbs (Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008). The latter two security schemes describe public spaces that are tightly policed by private security in a similar way to the CID in Cape Town. These studies come to similar conclusions as Samara (2005, 2010a, 2010b), namely that these spaces conflict with the idea of an equality-based post-apartheid city, constitute state failure when it comes to the protection of its citizens, and therefore facilitate private governance structures that result in an urban fragmentation along race and class lines, similar to the apartheid spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008). However, again these spaces are being compared to actual gated enclaves that together form part of the apartheid-like urban fragmentation.

In more detail, Bénit-Gbaffou (2008a) compares closed roads and non-enclosed neighbourhoods in Johannesburg’s suburbs with each other suggesting that ‘in non-enclosed neighbourhoods, such human rights are often violated [meaning the exclusion of mainly black people and/or urban poor] in very similar ways (except the barriers are not so visible)’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a: 98).

6.5 Conclusion

Over recent years, there has been a counter-movement in South Africa against crime and urban decay, expressed through a desire to create a world-class city. Although many papers refer to private security companies as being the tool through which these governance communities operate, detailed studies on their operations have yet to be undertaken. Previous work focuses on the general objectives of the governing
actors and their practices, such as the displacement of ‘undesirables’, rather than the mechanisms by which private security companies operate.

To examine these issues in detail, the thesis presents the results of an empirical study of Cape Town. Chapter 7 will identify the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space. It identifies different policing and security schemes and how they operate across different public spaces and their associated governance communities. Chapter 8 focuses more specifically on private policing companies, which are most strongly associated with the development of public space in CIDs. It examines their impact on shaping urban territory and the lives of ‘undesirables’ living in public space.

Chapter 9 will then assess the significance of private policing networks on the social geographies of Cape Town. Without anticipating the results too much, it will show that although powerful, private policing companies do have limits when it comes to the ordering of space. However, to compensate for the short comings of private policing companies, their governing communities have introduced a policing network that is much more sophisticated than one might suspect on first view. The conclusion will then address the final research question concerning the consequences of private policing for Cape Town’s public space and society.
CHAPTER VII: THE SPATIAL VARIATIONS IN PRACTICES OF PRIVATE POLICING COMPANIES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will introduce different governance nodes and how they implement power in their public spaces. In doing so, the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies are identified and mapped. Two different kinds of space are identified that are privately policed in different ways. The first space consists mainly of commercial areas and is governed by City Improvement Districts (CIDs), the South African equivalent of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). The second is purely residential in nature and is governed by associations of residents. Mapping those private security schemes is an attempt to chart the qualitative as well as the quantitative growth of private security companies in public space, and will contribute to an understanding of the revanchist city.

Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the legal limitations private policing agents face and how the security industry addresses or avoids them. It will show the power of some companies in maintaining social order, supporting the argument of the emergence of private policing companies.

7.2 Private policing of City Improvement District

The most visible governance communities in Cape Town’s greater centre are the CIDs. Originating in North America, where the concept is known as Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) (Morçöl and Zimmermann, 2006: 12), they were first introduced in Cape Town in 1999 and are regulated by the City Improvement District
By-Law (City of Cape Town, 2003). The idea of these institutions is to top-up a perceived lack of governmental services and to shape space in particular ways (Interview 20\textsuperscript{20}). CIDs are financed by an extra levy that is paid by the businesses within their territory in order to facilitate their community. As the CIDs are strongly supported by the state, represented by the City of Cape Town, a by-law has been introduced that commits all businesses and property owners to pay this extra levy if at least 51% of the businesses have voted in favour of a CID (Peyroux, 2006; City of Cape Town, 2003; Interview 35\textsuperscript{21}). All CIDs are non-profit organisations financed by the mentioned levies. Aside from that, it is up to the management to generate more income through various enterprises, such as paid parking lots, deals with gardening schools to save costs for the maintenance of parks etc. (City of Cape Town, 2003; Interview 31\textsuperscript{22}). An overview of the CID structure is outlined in Table 7.1.

\textit{Table 7.1: Structure of the CIDs:}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Each CID has to be approved by the City council only after a detailed procedure of meetings and advertisements.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>To approve a CID over 50% of the future rate payers have to approve the plan (‘Rateable property’ means immovable property on which a rate may be levied in accordance with the Constitution or any enabling legislation)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CID also needs a managing body that manages “for the purposes of managing and controlling the implementation of the City Improvement District plan” (City of Cape Town, 2003: 15). Furthermore the managing body runs the day-to-day business of the CID, such as organising security schemes, street cleaning etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once this has been set up and approved, the City (meaning the City of Cape Town) collects the levy from the rateable properties. Here levy is defined as ‘an additional rate’ on top of regular taxes. The collected money is then paid to the CID after their budget is approved (“The management body must provide the Council with its audited financial statements for the immediately preceding financial year, within 3 (three) months of the end of each financial year” (City of Cape Town, 2003: 16)).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{20} Representative of social development sector  
\textsuperscript{21} Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security  
\textsuperscript{22} Representative of CID
However, this does not mean that the city turns a blind eye to the problems. Instead it is a politically-motivated shift of responsibilities and priorities regarding what happens in a chronically underfinanced and understaffed city such a Cape Town. As a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security explained (Interview 35),

only about 35% of the city’s population meaningfully contributes to the rates base, which have to be enough to keep the whole of Cape Town running. The entire funding model for local government throughout South Africa is heavily dependent on cross-subsidisation. While everybody accepts that this must be so, it does make it very challenging to provide the levels of services to rich and poor that they expect and need and presents a very different level of challenge that cities in well-developed and more affluent countries have to face. We have to establish services for the people who have been left behind by the former apartheid government or who have migrated to the urban areas rapidly and in high numbers in a short time-span, while not allowing the existing infrastructure and services to fall apart – this is very challenging.

Under such constraints the city council’s focus moves towards areas where there are no CIDS or other comparable private governing bodies. Although the city is far from withdrawing entirely, this supports the argument that community bodies (Rhodes, 1996; Rose, 1996a; Kearns and Paddison, 2000; Woods and Goodwin, 2003) have become full-grown partners in the governing of space interacting with the city council (Shearing and Wood, 2003).

In the case study area, CIDS (see Map 7.1) were introduced in a manner that mirrors Smith’s (1996) original argument on the revanchist city and how exactly it came about. These governance setups are a response to the increasing (one could say dramatic) process of urban decay. Here businesses and property owners that suffered financial losses due to the abandonment of public space have identified themselves as a geographically-consistent community with the aim of stopping the economic decrease and to re-establish their territory on the map. Here the honest mission
statements of the CIDs confirm Smith’s (1996) argument that they are an economic-growth-orientated urban renewal project to foster investment (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Aims and targets as outlined by City Improvement Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Improvement District</th>
<th>Aims and Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Woodstock Improvement District:** | “The increased demand on municipalities for infrastructure and services has not been matched by incoming revenue. In many cases this has led to reduced services on the ground which, if left unchecked, would ultimately lead to degeneration and urban decay; clearly an unacceptable situation for property owners. Its core responsibilities are:”
| | - *To supplement and enhance the basic services offered by the City of Cape Town*
| | - *To facilitate a cooperative approach between the city and private sector in the provision of municipal services*
| | - *To facilitate the upliftment of distressed business and mixed-use areas*
| | - *To promote economic growth and sustainable development*
| | - *To facilitate investment*” (Woodstock Improvement District, 2011a) |
| **Central City Improvement District:** | “The Cape Town Partnership is a collaboration between the public and private sectors working together to develop, promote and manage Cape Town Central City. The Partnership was formed […] to address issues of urban degeneration and disinvestment in the Central City and related social problems” (Central City Improvement District, 2010a) |
| **Green Point and Oranjekloof Improvement District:** | “To be the City of Cape Town’s leading supplementary service provider for nurturing a safe, clean, attractive and accessible business and residential environment” (Green Point and Oranjekloof Improvement District, 2011a) |
| **Sea Point Improvement District:** | “The aim of the CID is to manage and maintain the public environment at a better and superior level to that provided by the local authority. The [sic] establishment of the CID is to ensure a more effective management of public areas, address issues of crime and grime, promote business confidence and play an all-embracing role in the promotion of the designated CID area. (...) To be an integral part of a world class city” (Sea Point Improvement District, 2010) |
Map 7.1: City Improvement Districts

[Map showing City Improvement Districts in Cape Town with labels for Sea Point, Green Point, Central City, Oranjekloof, and Woodstock.]

Own graphic. Source: Central City Improvement District, 2011; Green Point and Oranjekloof Improvement District, 2011b; Sea Point Improvement District, 2010; Woodstock Improvement District, 2011b.
To tackle urban deprivation, all five CIDs in the case study area have two core responsibilities: cleaning (called urban development) and security. As senior representatives of all five CIDs explain, to make the space successful in economic terms it has to be safe and clean so that people and investors will perceive it as a positive and vibrant space. In return it is hoped that the local economy will prosper and property values will increase (Interview 07\textsuperscript{23}; Interview 13\textsuperscript{24}; Interview 14\textsuperscript{25}). Although it comes through in the mission statements and the fact that the main tasks are security and cleansing, the emphasis on safety and security became much more evident during the conversations.

There were a lot of office blocks springing up all over outside the city centre […] And what was happening, business was moving out of the city, because as I said it was run down, it was perceived not to be safe and it wasn’t a good place to be […] The city was just losing its feel and was becoming a rundown place and business got together […] (Interview 05\textsuperscript{26}). Cape Town had a bad rep[utation]. There was no control, the area was dirty and the businesses in the city said we can’t let this happen; we need to do something to stop this and turn it around. (…) So they formed a partnership amongst all the businesses and went to the city council and said we know that the council has a tight budget and they can’t cope with everything (Interview 07\textsuperscript{27}).

The described idea of space is encouraging people to come to the CID by creating an environment that is clean and secure (Notes taken during the interview 13\textsuperscript{28}).

These statements illustrate the governance structure of the CID (Harvey, 1989, Garland, 2009; Rose, 1996a) and confirm the aims and objectives of the creation of a revanchist city (safe and clean space) (Smith, 1996) in central Cape Town, as others have also suggested (Berg, 2004; Samara, 2005; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou \textit{et al.}, 2008). Within this structure it is important to consider how private security companies are used on the ground to implement and maintain these

\textsuperscript{23} Representative of CID  
\textsuperscript{24} Representative of CID  
\textsuperscript{25} Representative of CID  
\textsuperscript{26} Representative of social development sector  
\textsuperscript{27} Representative of CID  
\textsuperscript{28} Representative of CID
revanchist ideas, and whether policing philosophies such as the ‘broken windows syndrome’ and ZTP are being exercised by these actors. The following section will start mapping the data for the individual CIDs and the ways they utilise private security companies for their gains.

As the chapter will show, according to the characteristics previously outlined to identify governing nodes, the CIDs tick all the required boxes. They have a clear mentality to govern, and in fact that was their purpose in the first place. They also have a sophisticated institutional structure, as well as the technologies and resources required, as the following section will outline in detail.

7.3.1 Practicalities of CID Policing

The security department of the largest CID in the City Bowl area employs around 220 people, although the numbers in smaller CIDs are significantly lower and range around 20. The number, appearance and equipment of guards depend on the size and geography of their territory and the threats they are facing (together with the philosophy of the individual CID managements).

The key to all CID security is the deterrence of crime in a proactive manner and public reassurance, including active contact with community members. The element of a proactive crime deterrent is achieved through maximum visibility, often involving bright vests and constant visible patrols all day and all night (Interview 04\textsuperscript{29}; Interview 07\textsuperscript{30}; Interview 10\textsuperscript{31}; Interview 13\textsuperscript{32}; Interview 14\textsuperscript{33}; Interview 25\textsuperscript{34};

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[29] High ranking Metro Police officers
\item[30] Representative of CID
\item[31] Representative of security company
\item[32] Representative of CID
\item[33] Representative of CID
\item[34] Representative of security company
\end{footnotesize}
Interview 43; all observations). Proactive deterrence and public reassurance through visibility is ensured firstly through the uniforms:

We wanted a visible policing presence so that people feel safer. (...) So it is a perception change. I mean look at the bright bib [pointing at a vest]. I mean how can you miss that. So we made the guys [private policing officers] as visible as possible. (...) And that’s how I want them. I want them like Christmas trees you must see them so you must go to them and ask for help when you need it (Interview 07).

It also involves constant presence in the community’s space. In a different CID it was explained that the private officers act as public-relations officers or ambassadors for the area (Interview 13). Everyone sees them, criminals and the public, and feel safe or approach them for advice and help; this was confirmed by Metro Police:

“Uniforms inhibit crime, this includes private security. (...) Additional uniforms are a plus and it needs to be capitalised on that” (Interview 43).

Also CID security pushes active engagement with the community. Most CIDs have placed books that officers on patrol have to sign in the various shops along the patrol route. This way the officers have to enter the shops to see or ask if everything is in order. In particular, senior CID staff are also in constant communication with the community, chatting and discussing everything from CID-related issues to the weather (Observation 04). Here the CIDs are pursuing an agenda that makes them the first port of call for anything related to security, complaints etc., trying to become the central node of the community (Interview 14; Interview 10). To guarantee the anonymity of all participants of the study (e.g. through cross-referencing with later sections) all interview numbers in sections on specific locations have been removed.

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35 Senior Metro Police officer  
36 Representative of CID  
37 Representative of CID  
38 Metro police is the police of the municipality not the state. The state run police is SAPS.  
39 Senior Metro Police officer  
40 Representative of CID  
41 Representative of security company
7.2.2 Woodstock Improvement District

Within the greater City Bowl area, Woodstock is the least affluent quarter. Although gentrification processes have started (Visser and Kotze, 2008), Woodstock has a reputation of being more dangerous than the rest of the case study areas and has a visibly poorer appearance in terms of the poor condition of the buildings, litter on the streets, etc. However, information on the effectiveness of the policing setup in terms of crime reduction could not be obtained.

There has been a number of incidents where our guys have almost been injured. From various incidents, from XYZ street behind me that used to be a hotspot. That was a very violent gangster road, you must remember, there is a lot of gangsters (Interview with representative of CID).

As the map suggests, the territory of the CID is a patchwork of residential and commercial areas. Although the residents do not contribute financially towards the CID, the residential area has to be policed as well since the boundaries between residential and commercial spaces are too blurred to differentiate. This puts more constraints on the CIDs budget than the manager would like.

A: Ok, let me get the map … [points at the map] This is my area. From here that’s just outside of town (…) And now if you look at it there are business here, residents, residents, residents, residents, residents, residents, residents, business, business, residents…(…) I cannot take my cleaners and let them clean up a business and then airlift them ten houses [the same goes for the security]. (…) I would love to, absolutely. Because then I got the residents off my back. See the problem is that I have tried convincing them to start paying towards our service. But they have been receiving it for free for the last three to five years (…). And bear in mind that a lot of them don’t have money to spare. They do live hand into mouth (Interview with representative of CID).

This combination of topography, built environment (referred to by the participants of the study as the ‘geography’) and higher crime-levels determine the policing measures and equipment of the security officers.

Woodstock Improvement District (WID) contracts the local company, Orbis Security. The security contract is financed out of the security budget of the WID,
which is again financed by the local businesses through an extra levy that is collected by the city and then given to the WID. Although details of (non) accountability are discussed below in greater detail, in simple terms the company is, as long as it conforms with the law, only accountable to the governing body, the WID, and to the ‘Private Security Regulatory Authority South Africa’ (PSIRA), although this power is only theoretical since PSIRA has no resources to exercise its control (Interview with researcher; Interview with local politician). This system of accountability and finance of the security companies applies to all CIDs.

Figure 7.1: WID patrol car with holding facility

![Image taken by the author, July 2010](image-url)

The security on the ground wear what Wakefield (2003) would call ‘military style’ uniforms, exemplified by black army pants tucked into combat boots. They are equipped with tonfa batons (a tonfa baton is one of the most powerful batons one can
find; it is commonly used by riot police in Germany due to its effectiveness), pepper spray and two-way radios. The officers patrol on foot and in vehicles that look remarkably like police vans, including a holding facility in the back (see Figure 7.1) (During one interview I called it a cage, something the respondent did not like at all, responding ‘It’s a lock-up facility, not a cage. A lock-up facility!’). Although the exact numbers of officers were not communicated, they patrol 24 hours a day, seven days a week checking in at about 20 clock points during their patrols. The control room is also staffed all of the time.

However, they do not carry firearms. According to a CID representative this would endanger them instead of providing protection”

You must bear in mind that for my guys to walk around with a gun makes them a target. Because now you are not only attack them out of pure frustration, you are gonna attack them because you want that weapon. (Interview with representative of CID)

For the guards’ security and the policing of the territory, the CID instead falls back on the wider policing network, including the public police. As Map 7.1 indicates, there is a gap between the WID and the next CID, the CCID. As parts of this area have been identified as crime hotspots, the WID has extended its area and, together with CCID officers, bridges the gap along the road that connects the two CIDs. Again, no actual crime statistics could be obtained; however, when talking to a representative of the CID he stated that major crimes had dropped, although petty theft was still around (Interview with representative of private security company)

42 Clock Points are spread strategically over the territory to control the productivity of the guards. Clock points record the time and date a guard is checks in with a handheld device he or she carries all the time. When reading out the data the supervisor of the guard can see how long it took the guard to travel between the individual points, whether it was according to schedule etc. A detailed description of this control of security personnel can be found in Rigakos (2002).
7.2.3 Central City Improvement District

The Central City Improvement District (CCID) was the first and largest of the CIDs in Cape Town. It includes the city centre and most of the main tourist destinations, including Long Street, Companies Garden and several museums. It also includes the CBD, the train station and the central mini-bus and taxi rank. In other words the CCID covers one of the busiest areas in Cape Town. While the contract used to be with G4S, the new security contract for the CCID went to two local companies, Illisio and Alexa Security; the reasons for the change in security providers are unknown. Between them, the two companies detach about 220 security officers for the CCID. Of all the CIDs, the CCID has one of the most advanced private security forces in town. According to their own account, ‘the crime rate has dropped significantly and many incidents are prevented from happening’ (Cape Town Partnership, 2011). In 2008 a newspaper stated that the ‘Central City Improvement District (CCID) has managed to reduce crime by 28 percent’ (Iol News, 2008). Furthermore it refers to a statement by the CCID chair at the time claiming that the crime rate of the past five years (before 2008) has ‘come down by more than 60 percent’ (Iol News, 2008).

When asked what their duties were, the person in charge replied “Jeez, we do everything”, although their core objective is crime prevention through visibility (as with all other CIDs). They have achieved this with 80 officers on the streets at all times. If one stands on the corner of a main street, one can literally see (if traffic allows) three officers: one close by, one at the corner further down, and another one even further up the same street. At night the security setup changes and officers are pulled together around the bars and clubs on Long Street, with fewer officers deployed in the centre. The officers on foot or bicycle are backed up by five vehicles
with holding facilities. As already mentioned, their duties have become more complex over the years. A person in charge adds “[s]o yes, we do everything. We are doing by-laws from illegal dumping to drinking in public to graffiti to illegal posters... We basically police across the spectrum across the city.” A representative from a contracted security company was also very proud of the fact that they do a similar job on the ground as the police, with whom they co-operate very closely and have good working relations.

The security officers are monitored by ‘notebooks’ that have been strategically placed all over the territory in for example shops or backpacker hostels. The officers will sign in, noting the time and a short statement of the situation, and check if everything is in order (see Vignette 8.1). Furthermore, the officers have certain targets for arrests. During the first fieldwork period a representative of the CCID stated that they have a rough target of around 20-30 arrests a week by each individual officer. During the second fieldwork period the same person explained that they have now changed their strategy and today it is all about getting the statistics down (Interview with representative of CID (follow-up)).

Nevertheless, if all security officers carry out about 50 arrests per week over the course of a year, this would make about 2,600 arrests in this CCID alone. In its 2008 annual report (the last report that lists these specific numbers), the CCID states that their security assisted in 9,570 arrests during the year (Central City Improvement District, 2009), showing a much higher number. Like the WID, CCID security wear military-style uniforms including tonfas, pepper-spray, handcuffs and a two-way radio. Some of the supervisors carry firearms, or (so-called) non-lethal guns (see Figure 7.2).

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43 The issue of law enforcement through CID security is being discussed below in greater detail.
7.2.4 Oranjekloof and Green Point City Improvement District

Although the Oranjekloof City Improvement District (OK CID) and the Green Point City Improvement District (GK CID) are by name different CIDs, they are run by the same manager and security company. They also share the same website and are therefore introduced together in this chapter. The security contract for both CIDs went to Vetus Scholar, which in this case is policing mixed neighbourhoods of
businesses and residential areas. In the GP CID six security officers patrol are backed up by officers in a vehicle with a lockup facility. There are four separate foot patrols and two vehicle patrols in the OK CID. A shift manager for the security company also patrols both CIDs in mid-class cars, one of which states ‘crime prevention team’ on the side, referring to the idea of visible patrols as a deterrent (see Figure 7.3); senior staff of the security company patrol the area whenever their schedule allows it. According to the security manager and a senior representative of the CID, the crime rate has dropped by a high percentage due to the efforts of the policing network active in the area (Interview with representative of security company; Interview with representative of CID). On their webpage, the CIDs claim that “[s]ince July 2001 crime has dropped by some 65%, according to the South African Police Service (SAPS)” (Green Point and Oranjekloof Improvement District, 2011). Like the WID, the GP CID has been extended in form of the ‘Green Point Median Upgrade Initiative’ along Summerset Road, which passes by the World Cup stadium and various associated shops, cafes and restaurants, ending where the next CID, Sea Point Improvement District, begins.

In contrast to the previous CIDs, the security officers wear non-military uniforms. Instead they wear suit trousers and a white police-style short-sleeved shirt or rain jackets with their badges, which reflects their claim of lower crime rates in the middle-class neighbourhood. This less aggressive uniform reflects the perceived lower crime rates and a desire for more proactive policing. The deterring character of the uniform and equipment has always been carefully measured against the existing threats of the area and the safety of the officers. However, the guards in the OK and GP CIDs still carry tonfas, pepper-spray, handcuffs and two-way radios to stay in contact with their control room.
Figure 7.3: OK/GP patrol car

Picture taken by the author, July 2010

7.2.5 Sea Point City Improvement District

The security contract for the Sea Point City Improvement District is also held by Vetus Schola, who therefore police a considerable geographical area that is newly contiguous due to the aforementioned ‘Green Point Median Upgrade Initiative’ (see Map 7.1). Although the Sea Point City Improvement District hosts affluent residents, especially towards its south end, several years ago Sea Point was known as a prostitution and drug hotspot. Nigerian gangs\textsuperscript{44} gave the suburb a bad reputation. As a response, the businesses introduced the Sea Point Improvement District, which showed quick results. Although there are a handful of sex-shops and an occasional prostitute on the street, Sea Point’s main street now presents itself as a vibrant place.

\textsuperscript{44} Throughout the study ‘Nigerian gangs’ were used as an exemplar for the ultimate criminal. However, it is not known if all members of the so-called Nigerian gangs were indeed Nigerian citizens or of Nigerian descent.
with mixed stores that reflect the gay and Jewish communities that live there. After having ‘cracked down’ on prostitution and drugs, the suburb faces low crime numbers (although unfortunately no crime statistics have been shared and this statement is based on statements by two senior staff of the CID) and is safe enough for security officers to wear non-military uniforms and not carry batons. All the officers carry are their two way radios and pepper spray.

Due to topography as well as the built environment of the CID, which is one long stretch along the main streets, it is easy to police. During the day, six officers patrol on foot and there are two vehicle patrols with a lock up facility. At night, four officers patrol in the two vehicles. According to the CID, officers can respond within two minutes after being called by the control room.

7.2.6 Policing Networks in CIDs

Unlike Wakefield’s example in the UK, the policing network or multi-agency policing within the CIDs presents itself as being very elaborate, especially from the CID security’s point of view. Something all CID actors confirmed is the notion of close cooperation with the police. This occurs on a daily basis, through regular meetings or operations that are being carried out together (Interview 04; Interview 08; Interview 10; Interview 13; Interview 14; Interview 16; Vignette 8.1).

[R]emember the CIDs were all designed as top up services. We are not the primary service provider. The police, Metro, law enforcement, they are all the primary guys. (...) Our guys must rather go in a more supportive role. Go
meet up with the police. How can we assist you? How can we support you? (Interview 15\textsuperscript{50}).

We have weekly meetings with SAPS, where we chat and say right hotspot last week was there. (…) From that perspective, we work very close with them, we do a lot of what we call VCPs, visible checkpoints, roadblocks, stop-and-searches that sort of thing we do with them. However, when it comes to going into a drug house and looking for ammunition, arms, drugs, or whatever, we pull back because that is not our mandate (Interview 14\textsuperscript{51}).

Due to the shortage of police officers, all related policing bodies have to dispatch some of their staff before larger operations, something all CIDs have confirmed as well. So when planning an operation they show a ‘united front’ (Interview 14\textsuperscript{52}).

To sum up, the CID security works closely with the police as a partner in the policing network. Due to staff shortages, the police will request resources from the CIDs to carry out larger operations. Also the police share confidential information with the CIDs, and vice versa, to be more effective. However, in contrast to Shearing and Wood’s (2003) argument of equal security nodes, all the key actors in the CIDs emphasise their junior role in the multi-agency setup. Talking about this issue, one of the interviewees described the relationship using the following example:

Because we have good relationships with the police. We then say: Look there is something there, you need to do something [in this case a drug house]. They trust the information is true. They obtain the search warrant and they raid. We go with them and we assist. They do the actual raid, we will cordon off the street to make sure nobody comes there and disturbs. But yes, that’s the intervention that we play (Interview 07).

However, the police (here represented through high ranking Metro Police officers) are more sceptical about this relationship. During a focus group they confirmed that the CIDs ‘talk to them’ (Interview 04\textsuperscript{53}) and confirmed cooperation in times of limited resources. For the same reason they appreciate the additional uniforms as, according to them, all uniforms inhibit crime, something Crawford et al. (2005: 45)

\textsuperscript{50} Representative of CID (follow up)
\textsuperscript{51} Representative of CID
\textsuperscript{52} Representative of CID
\textsuperscript{53} High ranking Metro Police officers
have termed ‘cross-fertilisation’. However, the police would prefer to work with trained officers rather than security guards as they feel that security guards lack training, exclude people and overstep legal boundaries (this latter point will be discussed more fully later). In addition to these networks that are part of the plural policing landscape, the CIDs have a weekly meeting where they discuss issues and strategies amongst themselves (Interview 05\textsuperscript{54}; Interview 07\textsuperscript{55}; Interview 15\textsuperscript{56}). The good working relationship claimed by private policing agents also applies to the residential security schemes that will be discussed in the following section (Interview 09; Interview 25\textsuperscript{57}).

**Table 7.3: Overview of different identified CID security schemes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Company</th>
<th>City Improvement Districts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WID</td>
<td>City Improvement Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Company Orbi Orbis Ilisia Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OK/GP CID Mixed commercial and residential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea Point CID CID runs along the Main St. with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WID</td>
<td>Orbi Ilisia Security, Alexa Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open parts of the inner city suburb of Woodstock. The CID includes the two main roads (Albert Rd and Victoria Rd) where most of the shops are located and the residential area in between.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encompasses the city centre of Cape Town including the CBD and many tourist attractions such as Long Str. or Company’s Garden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed commercial and residential neighbourhood. Many shops are situated within the residential area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CID runs along the Main St. with almost all of the shops. It is therefore possible to exclude the non-paying residential areas from the CID.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of area</th>
<th>Of all the CIDs, the WID is the poorest and most run down one. It also has high crime rates.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Busy, bustling centre of the city. As it is most central it attracts all classes, leaving the security busy maintaining order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealthy area with several shops on the higher-end of the scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The area used to be known for prostitution and drugs but is now middle-class and connects affluent areas with each other.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{54} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{55} Representative of CID
\textsuperscript{56} Representative of CID (follow up)
\textsuperscript{57} Representative of security company
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appearance of security officer</th>
<th>‘Army-style’ uniforms including combat boots and tucked-in army pants</th>
<th>‘Army-style’ uniforms including combat boots and tucked-in army pants</th>
<th>‘Civilian-style’ uniform. Black shoes, suit pants, uniform shirt or rain jacket with the company’s logo and a badge.</th>
<th>‘Civilian-style’ uniform. Black shoes, suit pants, uniform shirt or rain jacket with the company’s logo and a badge.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Patrolling the territory, checking on suspicious persons and ‘others’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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7.3 Residential Policing

This section will analyse the two residential security schemes that have been identified and mapped, in addition to having a section on armed response. In contrast to the CIDs that are embedded in detailed and extensive discussions on the revanchist, neoliberal city, gentrification and urban renewal programmes, the residential security schemes are surprisingly simple. They are about personal safety and are a response to people’s worries about their lives in a high crime environment.

In the past similar residential security setups have been called ‘extreme neighbourhood watches’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b).

Although the residential security schemes are not about attracting capital (although this is indirectly the case due to increasing property prices) or about public-private partnerships in commercial centres and BIDs (Harvey, 1989), they are inevitably linked to the idea of urban revanchism. As Chapter 6 argued, on the one hand public space is being avoided as far as possible because of high crime rates and the public police’s, and ultimately the state’s, failure to protect its citizens sufficiently (Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Dupont et al., 2003; Gie, 2009; Paasche and Sidaway, 2010; Baker 1999). On the other hand, Section 6.2.2 argued that South Africa faced a political turn away from a socialist/nationalist agenda towards a more neoliberal one. Based on work by Garland (2009), Shearing and Wood (2003) and Rose (1996a,
1996b), Section 2.3 explained that this involves a reconfiguration of citizenship; here
the key factors are ‘responsibilisation’ and ‘active citizens’.

The combination of those two points caused parts of the citizenry in the case study to
organise their own additional safety so they did not have to rely on the police, even
replacing the police when it came to their immediate safety. On a small residential
scale they reclaim space so they can use it free from worrying about their wellbeing.
The private policing officer’s boots on the ground are implementing revanchist
urbanity in central Cape Town’s suburbs; only the detailed mapping of private
policing schemes reveals this transfer of wider discussions on urban change.

The organisation and sophistication of these schemes is considerably less than those
described in the previous section. However, the schemes discussed here are part of
the security governance landscape and play their role in the reshaping of space. It is
important to understand their role as part of a more nuanced interpretation of policing
and security companies. However, it should be said that armed response companies
and static security schemes are forms of security rather than policing. In the case of
the bobby-on-the-beat scheme, this is more akin to policing due to its wider
functions. However, compared to the CID policing schemes their policing functions
are limited, especially since the bobby-on-the-beat officers do not police by-laws.

As Chapter 3 has shown, the attention of academics has been on privatised or private
spaces that are characterised by actual gates or booms. Residential areas in central
Cape Town differ from Johannesburg’s or Cape Town’s suburbia for two reasons.
Firstly, the geography of the city bowl and parts of the Atlantic seaboard, locked
between the sea and the mountains, limits new gated developments. Where enough
privately-owned space is available, gated complexes have been introduced. In streets where houses are built along public roads, however, this is difficult\(^{58}\).

Secondly, the legislation and the city are stricter on the barricading of streets using barriers (or booms) and fences (something commonly referred to as the ‘booming off’ streets \textit{a la} Johannesburg). If a neighbourhood wants to erect a boom barrier in a street and \textit{de facto} privatise it, the legislation says that the particular community has to take on responsibility for the whole street, including everything that lies both underneath it and above it (e.g. gas and sewage) as the city will not be responsible for it anymore. Due to the high costs, therefore, the gated community or boomed off street is not common in the case study site. The practice of booming off streets is also politically disputed. In the example of one neighbourhood in the case study area, the member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security in charge physically tore down a boom using the city’s police force. However, this does not mean that residents in the case study area relinquish private security measures and rely for their personal safety on the police. Different concepts have been identified that show innovative ways to get tight residential security without having to erect booms and fences. Again, an overview of the findings is provided in Table 7.4.

\textbf{7.3.1 Armed Response}

Although the armed response services are only of limited relevance for the private policing of public space, they should be mentioned as they are omnipresent. Wherever one goes, the signs of an armed response service will be there. However, saying that they are of no relevance is not quite right. Indirectly they do play a role in the private policing of public space as they cooperate with the mapped schemes and

\(^{58}\) It has to be emphasised that this refers explicitly to a form of community. Individual houses commonly do have gates, walls and/or electrical fences.
function as their backup. Either way, due to their presence as well as the fact that they are under-researched, armed response services will be discussed in this section.

In residential areas the numbers of houses without a visible armed response sign are the clear minority, and in many cases the absence of a sign will mean that it has been stolen; at the same time this means that some houses with a sign may not actually have a contract with an armed response provider, but instead use the sign as a deterrent. The reason for the wide spread of armed response services is the limited trust in the police. Although a high ranking Metro officer spoke about the ‘myth of slow response times’, at a later point in the focus groups several officers explained that they use the service of an armed response themselves (Interview 0459). However, as will be outlined below, armed response companies do not play a role under the research questions being examined as generally no community or governance setups contract them for the policing of public space. They are highly individual security setups, only for private space. However, in combination with some of the schemes that will be discussed below, this changes and they do become an actor of the policing of public space, which is why they are being discussed here.

The basic armed response service costs about 230 Rand (£20) per month and entails an alarm system, including a panic button that is linked to the control room of the armed response company. Furthermore, the client can call the company if something does not seem right or if he or she wants protection from the car to the door, for whatever reason. An additional service offered by the companies is an increase in patrols of the property while the residents are on holiday. Larger apartment complexes might have more complex contracts. Usually, one area, such as the neighbourhood of Sea Point, will have two armed response providers that share the

59 High ranking Metro Police officers
contracts between them. This guarantees enough competition to keep the costs stable, but at the same time the numbers of clients in one area is high enough that the companies can dispatch at least one car to keep the response times down. Although this is the norm, one does occasionally find sign for a third company sticking out. However, they are often, as one of the participates who is an expert in the armed response industry calls them, some ‘Mickey Mouse company’ that will have response times that might be too long in the case of an emergency, and in South Africa long response times can result in the violent death of the client. Throughout the research in Cape Town and occasional visits to other cities, one of the two companies is usually a multinational security contractor such as ADT or CUBBS Security (surprisingly, only rarely was it G4S). In the case study site the dominant multinational company is ADT. The second prevailing company is usually a local security provider that specialises in one small area. Examples in the case study are City Bowl Armed Response, Avenue Response Fresnaye, or Avenue Response Green Point. While ADT gets clients through their size and dominance in the industry, the local providers in the case study site advertise their local knowledge of the area and a concept they call ‘area-bound-security’. Area-bound-security means that a response car is dispatched in one zone within their relatively small area. This means that the geographical area they operate in is subdivided into several smaller zones which the dispatched response car is not allowed to leave. In their words, this enhances the quality of their service as, unlike the ‘CHUBBs and ADTs’ who might leave their zones, the client is always covered and safe. While industry associations demand a maximum of a 15 minute response time, the local providers promise between three and five minutes. Although it has not been empirically tested, the researcher’s experience from incidental false alarms confirms the short response times.
The armed response providers arguably carry out a classic security function, which is personal safety and loss prevention on private property, as outlined in Section 4.4. Although crossing through public space to get there, there are elements of a policing function as well. While foreign tourists will occasionally mistake the armed response cars for police patrols, the city’s criminals know the difference. Therefore the armed response patrols offer some deterrent but do not keep the criminals out. Also their key function is armed response; if they become involved with harassing street people and an emergency call came in they would not be able to respond so quickly, which they cannot afford.

In practice, the armed response patrols have no powers in public space that are different to those of any other South African citizen. This means that they can carry
out a so-called citizen’s arrest if they witness a Schedule 1 Offence\(^{60}\); aside from that their hands are bound. However, as this chapter shows, the security industry is very creative in evading their legal boundaries, or in some cases even breaking them. In this case they might ask a suspicious person what they are doing in the area. If the suspect does not answer, which he or she is not obliged to, the armed response will follow the person and call in SAPS via their operations room to check out the person, following the motto ‘If you are not doing anything wrong, why will you not talk to us?’. Nevertheless, the actual policing function of the armed response is limited. Their main mandate is to arrive at the client’s place as fast as possible to carry out a security function and to be a possible deterrent. To live up to the idea of security and to meet the demands of the residents, two residential security concepts have been introduced that supplement the armed response service.

7.3.2 The Bobby-on-the-Beat

One of the armed response companies and a security company in the case study site offer a ‘bobby-on-the-beat’, a term that has been adopted from one of the security companies offering this scheme. Here a particular neighbourhood (see Map 7.2) receives a complex additional private policing setup to increase their security and so not having to rely on the police for anything except carrying out an official arrest after a suspect has been detained.

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\(^{60}\) “Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, in respect of the following offences: Public violence, murder, culpable homicide, rape, indecent assault, robbery, assault (when a dangerous wound is inflicted), arson, malicious injury to property, breaking or entering any premises with intent to commit an offence, theft and escaping from lawful custody” Department: Justice and Constitutional Development. Republic of South Africa. 1977. Subordinate legislation in respect of the criminal procedure act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2002).
The idea of this concept is crime prevention through visibility and public reassurance, which Crawford and Lister (2004: ix) described as the ‘mobile scarecrow’. However, if a crime is witnessed the guard on patrol will act, possibly supported by an armed response officer; alternatively an armed response officer may need to deal with ‘undesirables’ but also needs to be able to respond to emergency calls. Like the CID, the officers have no formal legal powers. However, as they do not police the by-laws, the legal limitations are not a major obstacle. In residential areas the problems by-laws address, such as informal traders and street people, are either not an issue or the available means are sufficient to deal these problems. The
mandate of the officers on patrol is to show a presence and to watch out for suspicious behaviour.

The foot patrols are ‘deadly’. They are quiet, they are swift guys. You know, criminals in the middle of the night for instance can see a patrol vehicle coming along, they can hear a vehicle coming along, but a foot patrol ... they don’t smell it. (...) You observe more, being on a bicycle or walking patrol than in a vehicle (Interview with representative of security company).

However, if they spot suspicious behaviour they have two options: first to ask the suspicious person if they can search them. If the person replies no, the person in question becomes more suspicious and the officer will call in the police to perform the search.

If it’s suspicious behaviour you can’t arrest a person for suspicious behaviour. (...) But at the moment you have got the same powers of arrest as average Joe citizen on the street. The police service obviously have the right to stop-and-search, I know we do it too and generally the criminals comply with us, you know if you see a guy carrying a bag around we have stopped plenty people in the past, you know at four in the morning why are you looking into cars with a bag that contains screwdrivers and other ... what are you up to? What are your intentions? So generally we notify via radio from that suspicious person that we observe, they would speak to our control and generally notify the South African Police Service (Interview with representative of security company).

The second option is to watch a suspicious individual until they commit an actual crime or Schedule 1 offence. In this case the officer can execute a citizen’s arrest, just the same as anyone else.

So I rather wait for that guy to almost to break a window and then arrest him than ... at least you got you a good arrest, because to stop a guy when he has got a screwdriver in his bag and everything else, tools that implement to be used for criminal activity ... you can’t really charge him for being in possession of a screwdriver, it’s not a law. Whatever his intentions were it will not stand up in court (...). So we rather wait until the guy committed a criminal offence and then there is no excuse, we’ll catch the guy in the car. We had that plenty. We wait to the point where ... if you can’t take the guy now, yes you will prevent ... taking him too early the guy is gonna ... it will prevent that crime from happening and he will leave the area and he will walk down the road and he will be gone. In 20 minutes he could be in another street doing exactly the same thing. That is what he is there to do. And you can see these criminals (Interview with representative of security company).
The areas where this concept applies are marked by large signs with the company’s logo saying ‘This area is protected by X’, warning all potential criminals about their presence (see an example on Figure 7.4). Furthermore, the companies have camper vans in their company colours and with their logos. The camper van is parked around crime hotspots in accordance with the city as an additional deterrent and is used by the guards during their breaks.

The actual area where the concept applies has clear geographical boundaries and the patrolling security officer is not supposed to leave them. His patrol route is checked using electronic clock points. The officers patrol either on motorcycles, Segways or bikes (see Figure 7.5). As mentioned above, the armed response market is saturated, so providers need additional services in order to gain contracts. In this case extra patrolling is a free service that is offered if the client cluster in a neighbourhood is high enough. The geographical area for the bobby-on-the-beat usually encompasses a few blocks, depending on client density, the crime rate and the geography of the area. Depending on these conditions, security officers will be dispatched and will patrol 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

This setup constitutes a win-win situation for all parties concerned. While the crime rate in the area will drop, the residents get the service for free, which might motivate potential new clients to sign up with the company or to change their provider. The armed response company, on the other hand, increases their reputation through offering a free extra service and low crime rates in their core areas.\(^{61}\)

The security officers patrol an area of several blocks and although mobile, they cannot be everywhere at once and residents, especially those in very affluent areas of the case study site, prefer more policing, even if this means extra costs. Again, the

\(^{61}\) This was not confirmed for one site where extra levies might apply for this service.
bobby-on-the-beat scheme ticks the boxes for playing a governance node. Having a professional security company organising the scheme, they not only have the same mentality, because the governance of security is all they do, but they also have the institutional structure that is required. Drawing on a large pool of experienced security officers as well as the company’s infrastructure, cars, motorcycles, bicycles and armoury, they also have the technologies and resources to govern their designated space. Overall, the bobby-on-the-beat schemes have enough policing power to keep a neighbourhood safe, to become the first port of call for residents in need, and to allow the police to remove their resources from these spaces (Interview with representative of security company).

7.3.3 Static Security

Of all the policing schemes identified, static security is the smallest in size and has an organisational community structure behind it. These setups commonly entail a cul-de-sac or a section of a residential street between two junctions. In these cases the governing body behind them is the residents of the particular block who want an extra bit of additional security and a guard that patrols the section of their public street 24/7 (see Figure 7.6). Wealthy residents who feel a need for extra protection may hire these officers\(^{62}\) or residents along one street will club together and contract a security company to patrol the area. In the case study site this kind of setup appeared in the affluent neighbourhoods of the south-western edge of the City Bowl and on the Atlantic Sea Board up from the north end of Sea Point (see Map 7.3).

\(^{62}\) In these cases the requirements of insurance companies play an important role as well as only sufficiently secured property and positions will be insured.
Map 7.2: Bobby-on-the-beat policing
Arguably, of all the forms of policing setups, static security shows the fewest features of policing and the most of a mere security task. Its focus is proactive crime deterrence and reassurance for the residents, while aspects of order maintenance on a wider community level are mostly irrelevant due to the small size of the schemes. A representative of a security company explains that their main purpose is the deterrent of crime.

My idea of security is that security … we are not there to arrest people; even though we do, that’s not our job. Our job is to deter the crime. If the crime takes place on our premises than we have already failed in our primary task of being proactive. The police, it’s their job to catch people and convict people and all these kind of things. It’s not our job (Interview with representative of security company).

This deterrence is done through a security officer being visible in the same street 24 hours a day seven days a week; additional signs are also used as a signal of the additional policing service (see Figure 7.8). The only element that associates the scheme with other private policing companies is its positioning in public space. As mentioned earlier, this scheme is almost irrelevant because of its small size when it comes to the actual policing of urban space, as Map 7.3 shows. However, it does contribute to the fragmentation of space and differs from actual gated complexes, and so needs to be mentioned.

The idea of static security itself is rather simple. The contracted security company dispatches an officer to the site. For his breaks and some shelter the company provides a hut and a mobile toilet so he does not have to leave the site during his shift (see Figure 7.7). The officer is equipped with a baton, pepper spray, possibly an electroshock or a non-lethal gun, and a torch. For communication with the residents within the street he will carry a mobile phone, and a two-way radio for communication with his control room. With the radio he can also contact the control room of an associated armed response company (see Vignette 7.1), so there is an
element of rapid response to the scheme. In some cases he might also carry a panic button that allows immediate contact with the armed response company who will locate the button when it is pressed and send their vehicles. In other words, there is a private security setup in place that entirely replaces the police as a first call of action.

*Figure 7.6: Static officer*

Once the immediate threat is under control, or if the private forces are insufficient, the security companies will contact the police to officially arrest the possible intruders to the public properties.

So if we see a suspicious person or suspicious car, bang, get it on the radio, White Corolla, sierra registration one two three just coming in our area, not happy with it, please advise. Bang, the armed response company comes along
checks it out, if necessary calls the police because they are involved in the situation and the whole process, so they would come along and check the vehicle out. It has now left our area, it’s going towards your area; police will monitor the vehicle and see what is going on. Get description to the people to get as much information across as you can. Just make it uncomfortable for them [the people identified as a threat to the safety of the policed site] (Interview with representative of security company; the used excerpt is from a site outside the case study and includes a boom. However, it reflects the situation especially in the cul-de-sac).

The objectives of the security officer are regular patrols of the public space, using electronic clock points to give justice to the expectations of their supervisors and the financing bodies. If residents return home or have to leave in the dark, they will call their officers to wait at the gate so no one can linger there to hijack the car or to intrude the property while the electrical gates are opening and closing. Furthermore, suspicious behaviour will be observed and reappearing cars noted. As always, the geography of the area determines the policing. On a street in the middle of Fresnaye, for example, it is more difficult to control the people and cars, as there is the normal urban traffic (see Le Sueure Ave. or La Croix Ave. in Fresnaye). However, in the case of a cul-de-sac that goes up the mountain, such as Nettleton Rd, tight policing measures are much easier. Here the control of every car or person is in the interest of the residents, their governing body. As no one other than the residents or people associated with the residents will come to these secluded streets, the surveillance of the street will stay legally unchallenged.

[W]e put a permanent team on site so they know the residents, they know who the contractors are, the cleaning companies that come in, the gardening companies that come in, the painting companies et cetera. So if there is anybody else, they stop him and say ‘good morning, can I help you?’ ‘Yes I come to number 3 bam bam bam’ ok. He will have a sheet so he knows exactly who the residents are ‘so you come to see Mr Jones. Ok, thanks you very much’. And when he goes on his patrol, he pops past and makes sure that they are at M Jones’s and they are doing their thing et cetera. And at night it is purely a deterrent, patrolling. So we have our guys literally just patrolling (…) [I]f we are not sure of who you are, we will ask you and sign the visitor register. If you do not wish to sign in, we can’t force you to sign in but now immediately the alarm bells are going. Who are these people … So we will find our closest vehicle in the area, send him back and go and watch
and see what the hell is happening. So it’s just a proactive approach, because our aim is to make him go somewhere else (...) (Interview with representative of security company; the used excerpt is from a site outside the case study and includes a boom. However, it reflects the situation especially in the cul-de-sac).

*Figure 7.7: Street with static security including hut and toilet*

![Street with static security including hut and toilet](image)

Picture taken by the author, July 2010

Another issue is street people and the urban poor. In paying for this additional policing, the financing or governing body, i.e. the residents, expect no street people to settle in the street. As these setups are in residential areas and not on main routes, as well as being fairly small in size, vagrancy is not a big problem. If street people show up, the security officer will ask them to leave, which is described as not a problem (see Vignette 7.1). If the person does not want to move on, ‘more forceful arguments might be applied’; what ‘more forceful’ means exactly was not outlined in greater detail, but from the context it can be assumed that it refers to some form of
force which would not be within the limits of the law and has therefore not been explained in greater detail.

Vignette 7.1: Observation on static security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation number: 13; Objective: Static guarding of public space between two junctions in residential area; Position of participant: Basic security officer; Duration: 2 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On all four sites the security officers welcomed me very friendly after I had introduced myself. On each introduction I gave my business card to the officer and showed my University of Plymouth student card, which has my picture on it. I explained that I had talked to their boss, who had given the OK for me visiting and that they should feel free to call their control room to check the information. Furthermore I ensured them that I was in no way interested in any kind of sensitive or operational information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our conversations we talked about their job and what they do if suspicious individuals or groups, or cars show up. What constitutes a suspicious person could not be established, but has been described as something you learn during the job. If street people show up they would ask them to move on, as they are legally not allowed to do much more. Usually this is no problem, although one officer claimed that the street people can sometimes ‘be a bit bully’. If they cannot handle the situation or feel under threat they can call backup from the armed response and via their own control room. All officers are in contact with an armed response company in case backup is needed. On a different radio frequency the officers were also in contact with their own control room. Altogether the encounters were very friendly and I felt that the officers on site enjoyed bit of change to their routine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this kind of security has its downsides as well. As most of the companies, as well as their associated armed response companies, will confirm, people in Cape Town are not willing to spend a lot on security; a number of interviewees said, ‘Cape Town is not Johannesburg’. However, not paying a lot has to be seen as relative. The average resident in this scheme will already be paying for an armed response service, electric fences and electric gates, and the static security officer (see Figure 7.8). To keep their additional costs for the extra service down, security companies have to respond with, for example, limited training of their personnel. As the head of such a company explains:
The problem with that is that it’s a cut-throat business. If I come and offer you a guard and charge you 18,000 Rand, and another guy comes and charged you 14,000 rand, you don’t really know the difference. That my guys are better trained, all you want is a guy in a decent uniform, patrolling, looking like he knows what he is doing. So that is at the end of the day is what security is. It’s a perception. It’s really not … you are not getting what you are thinking you get… security. Ok, and I tell people this and people hire from us … you are not getting Jean Claude van Damme Bodyguard. You are getting a security guard. At best he is going to warn us if something is happening. You know. Or deter something by his presence. But further than that … we are not capable (Interview with representative of security company).

Figure 7.8: Different warning signs that communicate with potential criminals
Nevertheless, considering the legal and geographical limitations to boomed off streets, the concept of static security is the closest alternative and offers the tightest security, besides an own guard on the property or close protection, one can buy. As outlined in the example of the bobby-on-the-beat, these schemes fulfil the criteria required to be classified as a governance node with two professional security companies behind them organising the scheme; namely the company that provides the static guard as well as the cooperating armed response company. However, in terms of their policing functions, static security is limited to crime deterrence and elements of rapid response, although operating in public space, it should therefore rather be called a security setup rather than a policing one.

Table 7.4: Overview of different identified residential security schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Company</th>
<th>Armed Response</th>
<th>Bobby-on-the-beat</th>
<th>Static security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainly ADT, City Bowl Armed Response, and two local Avenue Response companies</td>
<td>Armed response company and a security company</td>
<td>Security companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Scale | Encompasses the entire case study site | Includes large section of residential areas. Between four and ten blocks | Micro-scale of only one residential street between two junctions. Total length of about 50-100m |

| Kind of area | Heavily present all over the case study site, encompassing residential and commercial areas of all classes. | Middle to upper-class residential areas. | Used by affluent households. |

| Appearance of security officer | ‘Army-style’ uniforms including combat boots and tucked in army pants, reflecting the idea of crime deterrent through visibility. | ‘Army-style’ uniforms, including combat boots and tucked in army pants, reflecting the idea of crime deterrent through visibility. | ‘Army-style’ uniforms including combat boots and tucked in army pants, reflecting the idea of crime deterrent through visibility. |

| Objective | Showing presence by circling the territory they are dispatched to. Main objective is to respond to private alarm calls. | Patrolling the territory, checking on suspicious persons and ‘others’. | Patrolling the street and checking on suspicious persons and vehicles. Being on stand-by to protect residents when accessing their house. |
Map 7.2: Static security
7.4 Legal limitations for private policing companies

The legal limitations as well as the (non-) accountability of private security companies, which will be discussed in the next section, are of importance as they reflect the de facto power these companies have on the street, although de jure they are rather limited. This is again of importance as it supports the claim that these are private policing companies. It has been argued that policing is about controlling social order and that social control is being translated into laws, especially by-laws. In so far as private security companies are able to police laws, it is therefore important that policing companies exist. The following two sections will show the de facto power of private security companies.

Legally, private security officers have no more rights than any other citizens; however these are considerable and include the arrest of a person suspected of an offence (Berg, 2007)\(^63\). On this Singh explains:

‘[P]rivate persons’, [and] security personnel are empowered to arrest, without a warrant, anyone seen to be engaged in an affray and anyone ‘reasonably’ believed to have committed any offence and who is fleeing a pursuing individual who ‘reasonably’ appears to be authorized to effect an arrest for particular offence. The term ‘reasonably’ is open to wide interpretation. (Singh, 2008: 50, emphasis in original)

However, as various participants outlined, an arrest for an actual crime, especially Schedule 1 offences\(^64\), is legally more effective. In that case private policing officers

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\(^63\) Citizen powers: “Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
In South Africa, the private security industry derives its powers mainly from the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977), allowing private security personnel as ‘private persons’ to:
• arrest persons without a warrant on the basis that the person committed, or was suspected of committing, an offence;
• pursue that person;
• break open premises in order to effect the arrest;
• use force – even deadly force – to effect the arrest should the person offer up resistance, and
• seize articles from that person (as long as they are delivered to a police officer as soon as possible).” (Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 42(a)(b)(2); section 48; section 49(2)(a)(b)(c) in Berg, 2007: 8)
have the power to arrest and the obligation to contact the public police to exercise the formal arrest. In the case of a citizen’s arrest by a private policing officer, the arrested is only allowed to be detained in the lock-up facility for the time it takes the police to arrive. However, the following section will show that private securities in the case study site have managed partially to move beyond these legal limitations on two levels. First, they found gaps in the legal texts that they use for their advantage, and secondly, they have become such important actors in the policing network that they appear to be tolerated by the state, represented by the city, and the public police if they stretch or even break the law in certain situations (Interview 04\textsuperscript{65}). Although the police and city representatives would not agree with that notion in the interviews (Interview 04; Interview 35\textsuperscript{66}), the self-understanding of the security guards throughout the observations suggest they take certain liberties, for example, when it comes to stop-and-searching of suspects as outlined below.

Table 7.5: List of relevant by-laws regulating public space

| By-laws relating to streets, public spaces and the prevention of nuisances | “No person shall in a public place—
(d) bath or wash himself or herself, except—
(i) in a bath or shower” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1351) |
|---|---|
| Illegal to bathe or wash oneself in public space | “No person shall in a public place—
(c) urinate or defecate, except in a toilet” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1351) |
| Illegal to urinate or defecate in public space | “No person shall in a public place—
(I) start or keep a fire” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1351-1352) |
| Illegal to make a fire in public space | “No person shall in a public place—
(m) sleep overnight or camp overnight or erect any shelter” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1351-1352) |
| Illegal to sleep over night in public space |  |

\textsuperscript{64} Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, in respect of the following offences: Public violence, murder, culpable homicide, rape, indecent assault, robbery, assault (when a dangerous wound is inflicted), arson, malicious injury to property, breaking or entering any premises with intent to commit an offence, theft and escaping from lawful custody” Department: Justice and Constitutional Development. Republic of South Africa. 1977. Subordinate legislation in respect of the criminal procedure act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2002).

\textsuperscript{65} High ranking Metro Police officers

\textsuperscript{66} Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illegal to play music that can be heard from the neighbouring property</td>
<td>“No person shall in a public place-cause or permit to be caused a disturbance by shouting, (a) screaming or making any other loud or persistent noise or sound, including amplified noise or sound” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal to wash clothes in public space</td>
<td>“No person shall dry or spread washing, bedding or other items in a public place or on a fence on the boundary of a public road except where conditions in an informal settlement are such that it is not possible to do otherwise” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal to skateboard in public space</td>
<td>“No person shall- (a) on a public road skate on roller-skates or a skate-board or similar device except where permitted by the City” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One has to follow the instruction of a peace officer or can be fined otherwise</td>
<td>“Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this By-law or disobeys any instruction by a peace officer or a member of the Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, enforcing this By-law, shall be guilty of an offence and with the exception of a contravention of sections 2(3)(g), (h), (i), (j) and (k), where there is a maximum penalty as provided for in analogous national legislation, be liable to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or to both a fine and such imprisonment” (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1355)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informal trading by-laws

The by-law refers to trading in any kind of public space | “Informal trading may include, amongst others:-street trading; (...) trading in public open spaces (...)”(City of Cape Town, 2009: 6) |

To trade informally one needs formal permission from the City of Cape Town | “Informal trading is permitted in any area within the jurisdiction of the City, subject to any trading plans adopted by the City, the provisions of this By-Law and any other applicable law” (City of Cape Town, 2009: 7) |

The required trading plan must, among other things, define its geographical boundary (see Figure 05) | “A trading plan must: define the geographic boundary of the trading area; and demarcate informal trading bays and markets where informal trading permitted, outside of which informal trading shall be prohibited in that trading plan” (City of Cape Town, 2009: 7) |

The city had to consult with the role players in the affected area | “Before adopting a trading plan, the City is obliged to- consult with interested and affected role players including the informal and formal sectors with the view to compiling a draft trading plan” (City of Cape Town, 2009: 9) |

The informal trader has to pay a fee to the city. | “The City is entitled to charge a par-holder a trading fee; an applicable; and an additional fee or tariff, which is to be determined by the City in its sole discretion, in respect of additional costs incurred or services provided by the City, including but not limited to circumstances were the permit-holder trades within the market” (City of Cape Town, 2009: 11-12) |

Anyone not complying with the by-law can be fined up to R5,000.00 or three months in prison. | “Any person who – contravenes any provision of this By-Law (...) is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R5,000.00 (...) or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 (...) month (...)”(City of Cape Town, 2009: 22-
Dealing creatively with the legal limitations is a phenomenon exclusive to the CIDs. The territory of residential security schemes is usually much smaller than one of the CIDs and they generally face problems of a different nature; generally residential security either witnesses a Schedule 1 offence and apprehends the suspect themselves, or the companies involved, being more secluded from the public eye, have other methods to deal with problems such as vagrancy, something that will be discussed later in this section. CIDs, however, deal not only with Schedule 1 offences but also police by-laws. In these cases their jurisdiction is limited to detaining a suspect, possibly using the lock-up facility of the mobile, while waiting for a peace officer or police officer to take over. This is of importance as the CIDs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graffiti by-law</th>
<th>23)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is illegal to paint graffiti on public and private property</td>
<td>“Any person who intends applying a mural or any one of or a combination of any inscription, word, figure, letter, sign, symbol, sketch, picture, drawing or design to any natural surface or man-made surface on any property, which will be visible to a person from a public place, must apply in writing to the authorised official for a permit to do so” (City of Cape Town, 2010: 1095)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Not complying with the by-law can lead to fines of up to R15,000.00 or three months in prison. | “11. (2) Any person convicted of an offence in terms of this By-law shall—
(a) upon conviction for a first offence be liable to a fine of R15 000 or 3 months imprisonment;
(b) upon conviction for a second offence or subsequent offences, be liable to a fine of R30 000 or 6 months imprisonment, or to both such fine and such imprisonment.
(3) In addition to a penalty contemplated in subsection (1), the convicted person may be liable—
(a) to pay an amount equal to the cost or estimated cost of removal of the graffiti from the affected property, and where the cost of removal of the graffiti from the affected property has been borne by the City or by the owner of the property, to pay the amount so ordered to the City or to the owner, as the case may be” (City of Cape Town, 2010: 1096) |
have made an agreement with the City of Cape Town to get either a Metro, Law Enforcement or Traffic Officer dispatched to them (SAPS is not under the authority of the municipally, but is a national body). The agreement is that the CID pays the city the wages of particular officers for them to stay in the area.

Council passed a resolution that Law Enforcement and Metro officers and Traffic officers could be contracted out to specific organizations. They still fall directly under the command control of their division, which is either law enforcement or traffic under city council, but they operate always there; the service agreement was paying the contract fees. So in other words it’s a force multiplier for the city, without them having financially contribute to it. (…)

Q: So you pay the council their salary and they kind of …
A. Operate in our area of jurisdiction.
Q: And you can put them of shifts as well …
A: We negotiate the times. Look when I contacted the city council, I said I would like so many people to work these hours and those days. And they have to be deployed at the guys in that area on those times and those days which I have requested. So we have a formal contact with the city (Interview 15).  

As mentioned in the excerpt, the officers are legally still under the city’s command. Observations of CID managers, however, have shown that the power relations are very much top-town in favour of the CIDs. It is argued that in reality the hired Law Enforcement officers work for the CID.

During the walk several people have been greeted, including many street people. They know all the street people by name and can send them away. He also directed guards and Law Enforcement to a group of street people. When confronted with a large group of street people a discussion started with the street people arguing that they [the CID] do not have the right to send them away. After a while the manager went and told the Law Enforcement officers to start fining them because of disobedience of an authority (so it was told me), with fines of R150. The result was that the people moved outside the CID area (Section from the field notes; Observation 07).

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67 Representative of CID (follow up)
68 Foot patrol in CID
When a CID authority orders Law Enforcement to act, they will\textsuperscript{69}. The Law Enforcement is essentially on standby to back-up the guards who are spread strategically over the territory. As soon as any offence is witnessed, they can detain a person and call in ‘their’ peace officer to make the arrest. Having a Law Enforcement officer in the car also enables the mobile units to bring suspects directly to the police station. This scheme enables the CIDs to police their territory very effectively at a minimal cost. Crawford \textit{et al.} (2005) describe the support of the police force in Wales and England by Community Support Officers, but here it is the other way around; in this case public Law Enforcement supports the private \textit{policing} entities.

Arguably this is the reintroduction of the ‘rent-a-cop’ system that was in place in the post-1994 years but was later dismantled (Berg, 2004). However, as the legalities are not as direct as the \textit{de facto} practice, this seemed to happen with very little public attention.

In a way it’s the most dangerous because it is insidious. You are actually privatising a function of the state without any accountability, without any public interest debate. And because you might live in Cape Town, but you are not asked is it OK for us to buy up policemen basically. Because that means that you as a private citizen have your own policeman, who has all the powers of another policeman, but you can instruct them what to do. It’s totally outrageous. It’s completely undemocratic and it’s dangerous. I know there was a huge uproar when they introduced, what they called the rent-a-cop. Very dangerous (Interview 24\textsuperscript{70}).

I look at all this private security and I think our rent-a-cop scheme has been a big success. That’s where we take law enforcement, traffic or Metro police members, we rent them out to these CIDs and they remain under the normal command and control because you cannot have private militias, and they then partner with the private security so they have the power of arrest and to be able to give tickets and stuff\textsuperscript{71} (Interview 35\textsuperscript{72}).

\textsuperscript{69} Green Point and Oranjekloof CID do not use their Law Enforcement officer for issues around nuisance and vagrancy but only property issues and parking (Interview with representative of CID).

\textsuperscript{70} Local politician

\textsuperscript{71} In a email from the 28th January 2012 the wording ‘and stuff’ has been clarified and unpacked in the following way: “[T]he Law Enforcement officers have the power of arrest and search and seizure and that when they work closely with the private security employed by the CIDs it has the very positive outcome that we see reduced complaints of brutality or abuse by street people and other people in the area. The standards they set as properly trained staff that are subject to disciplinary procedures and
The reintroduction of a system that has been abandoned by the city in the past for not conforming with existing legislation (Mashele, 2009) demonstrates both the private and political will to introduce this kind of neoliberal spatial order entity.

Part of the private security’s job in public spaces is to stop-and-search suspicious individuals. Although having asked different security employees what makes a person suspicious, no clear answer could be obtained. It seems to presents itself as a combination of dress, behaviour (i.e. looking into different cars), appearing out of place in a particular area, or skin colour. Ultimately the identification of suspicious people is a practice security actors acquire over time and it cannot be described in words. One obvious indicator, however, is a shopping trolley that is not filled with shopping bags but with the belongings of a street person. So if a suspicious person or a street person with a trolley enters the territory of a private security officer, he will stop-and-search him or her for stolen goods, drugs and such like. Using the example of the trolley, the officer has the option to open a case of theft, which is a Schedule 1 offence, because trolleys are marked by the different supermarkets and can be traced back; he could therefore execute a citizen’s arrest. Mentioning this option can be enough motivation for a street person to move on.

However, if a direct offence is not witnessed then answering to questioning or allowing stop-and-search is voluntarily. However, security companies use the argument used to introduce many security measures, ‘if you have nothing to hide, why would you not allow us to search you/video tape you/surveillance you?’.

Consequently this makes anyone who does not agree to a search or who does not answer the questions suspicious, and once you are suspicious they will call in SAPS

effective oversight means that the private security improve their enforcement as well and behave more ethically”.

72 Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security
to do it for them. This consequently provides the security with the *de facto* power to question or stop-and-search whenever they deem necessary (various structured and unstructured observations). Furthermore the power relations, especially between security officers and ‘others’, are distinctly top-down, which means that on the streets the whole part of threatening to call the police can be skipped and they can just search the person. In some of the interviews this has been presented as something that is being done normally, without mentioning SAPS at all (Interview 13; various structured and unstructured observations). Here Berg (2007) refers to the ‘façade of power’ and a general misunderstanding of the law.

The by-laws (City of Cape Town, 2010: 1096) have a clause making noncompliance with a law enforcement officer an offence. Besides the fact that private security officers are no law enforcement officers and therefore have to legal grounds for these actions, they would ask homeless people to move on (based on the researcher’s various observations). If they do not follow the order, they would hassle them for not complying with an authority, something which is of questionable legality since Cape Town has no anti-loitering laws. In other words, private security agents have found a way to become *de facto* policing bodies by policing the laws and therefore social order effectively.

7.5 Accountability

The legality of private security, especially their interpretation of the legal limitations, raises the question of accountability. Again, in combination with the *de facto* power to police the by-laws, a lack of accountability makes the case for the power these companies can exercise on the street, since the security industry is widely

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73 Representative of CID
unregulated and complaints can only be dealt with by an overburdened public police force in cases where a law has actually been broken (The Economist, 2011).

Although the Private Security Regulatory Authority South Africa (PSIRA) supposedly regulates the industry and communicates the potency of the state on the issue, in reality it is toothless and very limited in its actions unless it develops its capabilities according to Interview 34 with a local ANC activist and Head of the Secretariat for Community Safety in the Western Cape Department of Community Safety and Interview 33 with a researcher who critically watches the security industry, as well as Berg (2007). Therefore, both the interviewees make their claims on the basis of some authority.

Members of the private security industry will refer to voluntary membership organisations, such as the South African Intruder Detection Services Association (SAIDSA) or the aforementioned PSIRA. When asking the same question of politicians, Metro police or researchers, they all agree that there is no actual oversight.

SAIDSA is a voluntary organisation within the industry and is therefore unsuitable as a controlling body. On PSIRA, a researcher explained that it has no capacity to investigate or control security companies (Interview 33). This means that the regulations of the industry refer only to the companies who comply with the law in the first place by registering with PSIRA. Nevertheless, when it comes to claims of abuses, there is no oversight body. Again, representatives of the industry would claim that anyone can file a complaint against the police, but, as one interviewed researcher says, particularly for the street people and urban poor who are most likely

74 Researcher
to become the victims of abuse, it is difficult to challenge the security officers. In a follow-up interview, a Metro director states that:

the problem with CID security is that they can infringe the constitutional rights of others, and it might cause a conflict of interest between the objectives of Metro and the ones of private security. There are legal boundaries that might not been known or followed by private security, relating also to the lack of training. If the legal boundaries are, however, being followed under the guidelines of Metro, they can be useful considering a lack of resources by the police and crime situation. (...) However, the coordination needs to be right and it needs to be coordinated by Metro. At the moment they work in isolation, they train in isolation. This relates back to the way they have been introduced without consultation with Metro (...). They can also abuse their power. Private security needs to be remained of its limits75 (Excerpt from interview notes. Interview 43).

Cape Town’s politicians critically observe the issue as involving a lack of accountability for private security companies as well. Here a member of different oversight committees of the police states:

“I think one of the problems with private security is that of accountability. I think that in the main that they are only accountable to those who pay them. They are compliant with the regulator as far as certification of the company and personnel is concerned and for their legitimacy in as far as meeting the requirements for their legal existence, but that is where accountability and legitimacy end. That they need to register with PSIRA, train people to a certain level, have compliance certificates et cetera, are conditions that can be easily met. But beyond that they are not accountable, in the geographic sense, to a community where they operate. Maybe to the specific community, e.g. a business entity who pays them, but not to people who occupy the space they are securing. So if you take Long Street as a case in point, a security company is paid by the city. The city municipality is supposed to look after the interests of the business and the broader community in that geographic space, whether they are visitors to the city, transitional communities, displaced (homeless) people or residents in the city – not only the business community whose interest trumps everything and everyone. So accountability of private security on the payroll of municipalities and government, provincial or national, should be held to account by government and not only serve business interest (Interview 3477).

75 The officer raises the issue of lacking training that influences the issue of overstepping the legal boundaries. Although a valid point, issues around training will not be followed up in greater detail in this study.
76 Local politician
77 Local ANC activist and Head of the Secretariat for Community Safety in the Western Cape Department of Community Safety
Despite this, a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security plans to give full law enforcement powers to the private security commented:

All of this [shows a pile of papers]. Is about … when these homeless people complaining about being victimised or bullied … a lot of that is actually the private security. Their complaints really are primarily about private security, particularly in the Cape Town CID. So I have observed over time how disciplinary process against those staff members and the ability to identify them for them and for there to be legal consequences are weak. Against our own members we can take far more effective action. We have a proper internal affairs department that runs with clear scrutiny, there is an agenda, there is a civilian oversight committee that looks at it, which monitors it, which looks at these agendas, it looks at exactly who’s in trouble for doing what and monitors and makes sure what is being done with all the grievances, that monitors and makes sure that these cases are being attended to, they check to see what the outcomes of these cases are and that’s their primary function.

Q: Who is doing something similar for private security?

A: Nobody. That’s the problem. It is unregulated. You rely on the management of that private security company to be conscientious. If they have a good security guard, it is difficult to replace him, so they just won’t sack him; at best they move him to another area. Whereas government is governed by legislation and civilian oversight and the criminal procedure act and internal affairs department which has a turnaround time of 6 to 36 days in this city for a disciplinary complaint. If a guy is accused of something, there is going to be some kind of consequence.

Q: With no oversight over private security, you can have extreme cases where for example a reputation for being a very violent company becomes …

A: … a plus.

To sum up the issue of accountability up, private security companies in reality police parts of the public space that are privately governed. Although they are exercising police functions, they are not accountable to or controlled by anyone (Interview 08).

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has mapped the various spatial forms and functions of the most significant private policing and security companies. It has been shown how these companies exercise power which can be, depending on the size and sophistication of
the security scheme, substantial. The role and function of policing and security companies is to create space according to the aims and objectives of their governing bodies.

The chapter also analysed the de facto and de jure legal situations and the limited oversight mechanisms for private policing companies. It showed that if required, and depending on the geography of the setup, private companies can police the law. Having this power to police by-laws, the legal translation of social control, they exercise control over space and become, according to the policing definitions outlined in Section 4.3, policing agents. The argument that private security actors have started to become serious policing agents has therefore been confirmed, and this argument will continue to be developed in the following chapters. However, it also shows that there still are important differences with the public police in terms of their de jure powers, which, as the following chapters will show, might change in the future, as well as their equipment and weapons. However, it already appears that some private policing agencies do exist and that they have a considerable influence on the formation and power in public space.

Charting the various forms of private security and policing companies showed that the degree and level of power and policing functions varies strongly with the size and type of space. The CID which are not only the largest schemes in size but also operate in the busy commercial areas have the highest degree of power and policing functions. To order space they do not only need a strong presence on the ground but they have to police the by-laws as well.

This is not an issue in the bobby-on-the-beat sites. They are in residential areas and here the problems faced by the CID do not occur to the same degree. For example, if homeless try to settle they can simply be sent off using pressure such as calling the
police or utilising the physical strength of the officers through actions such as speaking loudly or shining a strong torch in their eyes (Observation 02). In the case of the armed response companies and the static security schemes the policing functions are very limited. Instead they should be assessed as ‘classic’ private security companies, as outlined in Section 4.4.

Because this research as most interested in private policing companies in public space, the following chapters will focus on private CID policing. However, as this chapter has shown, this does not mean that other security schemes are irrelevant in any way. They too are under-researched, but contribute strongly to issues of the segregated, exclusive, or enclave city.

To summarise this chapter on the various spatial forms and functions of private policing companies and private security companies, Map 7.4 shows all the schemes identified. As Section 5.3.3 has already argued, key public spaces are occupied and policed by commercial private agencies, including, with only minor exceptions, all commercial areas as well as wide residential neighbourhoods. Here the shear extent of occupied space suggests the power these private agents have.

Having identified spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing companies in public space, the following chapter will go on to examine the impact these companies have on urban territory. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, urban revanchism is characterised by the desire of sanitised, consumer-friendly spaces. To achieve this desired space, groups who do not fit in with the image of the space are being excluded or pushed out. In this case the governance nodes involved occupy a clear cut space or territory they feel responsible for. How this strong sense of territory combines with the exclusion of ‘undesirables’ will be outlined in the next chapter.
Map 7.4: All private policing schemes
CHAPTER VIII TERRITORY AND DISPLACEMENT

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter structured the different community nodes and gave an account of the different policing schemes. It also analysed the ways the security industry deals with its, in theory, tight legal limitations that, together with inefficient oversight structures, have made companies in this industry such powerful policing entities. This chapter will continue the argument that a strong private police force exists. More specifically, it will deal with the issue of territory. The research has shown that private policing is characterised by a strong sense of territoriality. Measuring success in the client-customer relationship of governing bodies and policing companies is linked to the state of the client’s territory; is the territory safer in terms of measurable crime numbers? Are there more arrests, or less visible urban poor? It is therefore not surprising that a strong territoriality fosters a policing that involves the exclusion of undesirables to spaces beyond the individual territory. Furthermore, the chapter will argue that strong territorialised policing not only displaces undesirables and crime, but indirectly replaces the actual police as well. Through this, the impact of private policing on urban territory will be analysed.

8.2 Policing territory

As Map 7.4 suggests, private security schemes have clear-cut boundaries. These fixed boundaries are of fundamental importance in the researched cases, as securing the territorial boundaries are the only reason for the ‘privates’ to be there in the first place. Their financing governing bodies have little concern about what happens outside their space, even if it is just a few metres away. Therefore, the security
company only polices its designated space as that is what it is contracted for. In other words, they ensure that the financing bodies of the particular areas get value for their money. Moreover, each of the privately policed units has a centralised, governing power and is the financing body and these entities expect the money they pay to be spent within their territory, for their benefit. Only the social development projects that will be introduced later are not bound to a territory, which can happen when different organisations come together to co-finance a fieldworker, or when it has a positive impact on the situation within their boundaries (Interview 15\(^{78}\), Interview 31\(^{79}\)).

As has been explained, officers are free to move around creatively within their space, and to avoid routine and the same routes to stay ahead of the criminals (Interview 10\(^{80}\); Interview 30\(^{81}\)); however, they are never permitted to leave the space on their patrols. In other cases the ‘invisible boundary’, as it is called by the security, is much stricter. On several occasions the researcher witnessed how ‘undesirables’, such as street people, rent-boys or groups of young males, had to leave the privately policed territory. In most cases it was enough if the removed went only a few steps back until he or she crossed this invisible boundary that marks the officers’ territory. Many examples showed that if a troublemaker moved step-by-step backwards, out of the territory, at some point the security would be content as they had done their job, excluding a targeted person from the territory, even if the person is only metres outside it on the other side of the invisible boundary (see Vignettes 8.1 and 8.2).

However, some CIDs also dispatch security personnel outside their territory when it comes to larger operations with different partners in the policing network, as they

\(^{78}\) Representative of CID (follow up)  
\(^{79}\) Representative of CID  
\(^{80}\) Representative of security company  
\(^{81}\) Representative of security company
cannot afford to isolate themselves and have to tackle some issues with a wider network of partners, such as comes to the larger operations described in the previous chapter (Interview 3182). There are also exceptions in emergency situations where security officers will either step in themselves or will contact the police via their control room. In the case of an emergency or a tense situation the officers may respond outside their territory or leave their post to cross a street. An example of this was made through an observation, although not one of a particularly academic nature, in which the researcher and a friend were approached by two gentleman who, at first politely, requested money. When the situation became tense and the use of blades was threatened, the researcher, by then an expert on the private policing in that area, signalled a nearby-stationed officer that his authority would be welcomed. After registering the carefully placed nod, the officer ran across the street, resulting in the immediate retreat of the suspects. In this case, leaving the territory to clear the situation was natural for the officer.

As described in the previous chapter, the idea of contracting private security is to establish clean and safe spaces by introducing maximum control over the territory, either by reinventing the law creatively or by stretching, if not breaking, their legal restrictions. In this context, the boundary is of importance because its geography defines the space that has to be created and maintained (Sack, 1983). Therefore the abstract issue of the boundary becomes a core idea in daily policing practice. This is also why the theme of the invisible boundary is closely linked to issues of displacement of crime and people.

At this stage the question would be whether the policing schemes work in terms of crime reduction, and if there are any statistics available to prove this. While there are

82 Representative of CID
statistics, they have unfortunately not been published publicly. The only information available therefore comes from newspaper articles and the statements of the policing actors involved, as referenced in the previous chapter, which indicate that crime has dropped substantially. The only publicised statistical data do not give much insight into the crime situations and trends in the precise case study sites. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the amount of unreported crime remains very high, with Camerer et al. (1998) claiming that only half of all crimes are being reported; this is especially true in South Africa where confidence in the police is low (Shaw, 1997). In addition, there is a difference between reported crime numbers and convicted crimes which can distort crime statistics substantially since a reported crime might turn out not to be a crime after being addressed by the criminal justice system. Another problem is the phenomenon that additional policing does not necessarily decrease crime rates, but can cause an increase as arrests and reported cases die to the higher level of policing.

Within the CID\textsc{s}, the SAPS unfortunately uses absolute crime numbers that make comparison impossible and show only crime trends. Furthermore, the sites for which the crime statistics apply were not the exact case study sites, but much larger spaces. However, a broad picture can be portrayed using the published crime data in order to give context to the study. Statistically Cape Town is a high crime city, with crime rates nearly twice the national average. In 2008 the total of all crimes per 100,000 population were 4,456 nationwide, and 8,557 in Cape Town. Similar trend are seen in both the murder rate, which in 2007/2008 was 39 nationwide per 100,000 and 60 in Cape Town, and drug related crimes, which in 2007/2008 was 228 per 100,000 nationwide but 830 in Cape Town (Gie, 2009).
However, within Cape Town crime is very unevenly distributed. Consulting the crime statistics per police district in 2007/2008, the township areas with little commercial activity reported murders between 74-153 and 154-383 (Gie, 2009). In contrast, the police stations in the case study site, which is key commercial areas around the inner city, reported murder numbers between 0-11 and 12-30. In the case study areas, the rate for reported drug-related crime is between 234-483 and 483-974 while in poorer precincts the numbers are between 483-974, 975-1908, and a staggering 1909-5121 in Mitchells Plain, a known drug centre. In reported business crimes, central Cape Town, an area that includes the three case study sites, leads the league with 834-1581 cases (Gie, 2009), while, with exceptions, it is much lower in many poorer areas where one finds less commercial activity.

The SAPS has released data on two individual areas in which some of the case study sites are located, namely Sea Point and Central City. However, again the data are given as total numbers and so it is not possible to put them into context with the rest of the city or with national data. In addition, the data does not correlate exactly with particular case study sites, so these are the figures being outlined here, rather than specific date for, for example, the Sear Point Improvement District. Nevertheless, the crime trends do give at least some evidence on the effectiveness of private policing on particular crimes. While full details can be found in Appendix D, in summary it can be said that the crime trend is decreasing or stagnating in both Sea Point and Cape Town central. Numbers that stick out in Cape Town Central are the decreasing murder rate and the decreasing number of cases of assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. Also decreasing are non-residential burglaries and theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles (South African Police Service, 2011a). In Sea Point a positive trend can be seen in the decrease in various contact crimes, such as assault
with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, common assault and common robbery, as well as robbery with aggravating circumstances. On the increase however are drug related crimes and commercial crimes as mentioned already above (South African Police Service, 2011b).

In Woodstock, various forms of murders and attempted murders, assaults, robberies, thefts, burglaries and carjacking have decreased substantially while drug-related crimes, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and shoplifting have increased (SAPS, 2011c). This could, however, be related to stricter controls linked to increasing security, and could therefore actually indicate their effectiveness.

Interestingly, everyone encountered during the research, including actors, critics and people not linked to the study at all, stated that the schemes do work in their own right, although no one has actually seen clear numbers. Spending money on advertisements, modern websites, and shiny brochures, CID s sell their space as a success, whether based on statistics or not.

Vignette 8.1: Observation in City Improvement District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation number: 04; Objective: Routine patrol of CID on foot; Position of participant: CID representative; Duration: 3 hours</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the patrol we covered most of the CID’s territory. Unlike other observations the patrol was very relaxed and ‘de-militarized’, meaning no uniforms were worn and no weapons carried, at least not openly to my eyes. Only a radio was carried to stay in touch with the control room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The objective was to check in on the guards, to talk to the various shop owners that form part of the CID, and to keep an eye on the ‘others’ as well as being additional ears and eyes for the police. During the walk I was shown different ‘hot-spots’ that attract criminals and street people, and from where these groups were removed in the past by the CID security and the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throughout the patrol he emphasized the importance of territory and that they were not to act outside the CID’s territory. If they witnessed a crime outside they called SAPS. When being asked if the ‘others’ know the boundaries, he confirmed they did. The street people and urban poor are left alone</td>
</tr>
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</table>
as long as they behave within the boundaries. If not they are removed, which usually means that they cannot break any by-laws. He also emphasized that it is important to keep the ‘others’ moving because otherwise they settle in and use the time to observe until they see an opportunity to commit crime (although this contradicted the previous statement).

When talking about the by-laws he described the kind of ‘zero tolerance approach’ found in the literature without actually using the term. Using the by-laws it is possible to maintain a very specific image of the territory. This means, for example, that tables on the sidewalk can be removed or people arrested when urinating or defecating on the streets. When asked about the lack of public toilets and the fact that the by-laws enable a kind of annihilation of space, he kind of agreed with the contradiction, but also said that toilets would soon become places for the sex trade and drug users and would therefore need to be secured as well, something no one would finance.

Indeed, soon after this conversation we encountered three ‘rent-boys’ hiding all of their belongings in a gully in just a few bags. I was surprised that this was not pursued but realized that this had happened just outside the territory of the CID. Later in the office, he showed me the folder with the identities of all known street people and urban poor. This included pictures and details taken from their ID cards. The folder was introduced in case someone gets mugged so the victim can possibly identify the faces. I was astonished about this, as this is classically police work and in Europe can only being done after a person has committed a crime, not vagrancy.

Talking about the ‘others’, he told me that he knew the whereabouts of several people. He pointed out different ‘others’ on the street and told me their names, sleeping places and stories. He confirmed that if they were being looked for he could find them right away. His security guys also know their ‘clients’ well, often by name. While local street people and urban poor are not hassled as long as they ‘behave’, new ones are identified and asked to continue on their way to outside the CID.

Back in the office the fieldworker had three guys with her that were being photographed and identified for the book mentioned above. He said that photographing helps to scare them and to make sure they don’t think about committing a crime. He also explained that dealing with the ‘others’ is ‘like table tennis’, as they keep excluding them from different CIDs and constantly send them around. Talking about policing and security, he agreed that they do policing as one actor in a wider network. As they are un-armed they rely on SAPS. However, in the case of a crime or problems the CID security are generally first on the scene.

He emphasized that cleaning and security in a CID go hand-in-hand, although security might be slightly more important. A dirty environment attracts urban poor. A lack of security also attracts criminals. If both are tight, it is a good mixture.

During the walk we also check in using the books the security officers have to sign. These books are placed in various shops along the way. In these books the officers sign in and report what has happened during the patrol. With this system they can prove to their governing body that they have been doing their job. He calls the checking of the signatures and signing it himself the ‘double checking of the double checking’. Along the way we also chase some guards if it is felt that they are ‘lazy’, or spend too much time talking to female shopkeepers.
When talking about the responsibilities of the city, he agrees that the city should do it but they have no money or manpower. One has to make his peace with the situation and sort out the problems as best as possible themselves. Altogether the day was exciting and provided valuable information on the space. We talked for about three hours and clarified everything that I could think of. The situation was very friendly; I shook a lot of hands and got introduced to several people along the way.

8.3 The displacement of people and crime

This section describes the displacement from designated public spaces for urban renewal, as outlined by the literature on the revanchist city (Smith, 1996; Belina and Helms, 2003; Visser and Kotze, 2008; Fyfe, 2009). That there is a general displacement of undesirables and groups that have been identified as criminals was confirmed by most of the participants from both sides (the ones displacing and the ones being displaced) and through the observations. The difference is, however, in terms of the importance this aspect has in the different security schemes. The formula is that the smaller and more secluded a site is, the less important the issue of vagrancy and petty crime becomes. To give two examples, while a residential static security setup around a cul-de-sac on the slopes of the mountain has little to no problems with these issues, the Sea Point CID, especially in an area around cheapish supermarkets and budget liquor stores, constantly struggles with groups of street people occupying the sidewalk and petty crime in the area. An example of petty crimes is the so-called smash-and-grabs where someone sees objects of value left in a car, breaks the window and runs off with the goods.

Although no detailed actual crime statistics have been shared, for the reasons mentioned in the previous chapter, none of the 47 interviewees doubted the

83 This chapter does not want to equate street people with petty criminals in any way. Although this connection has been repeatedly made by participants of the study, no data have been collected to explicitly prove or challenge this perception. However, accumulations of ‘others’ and an area in which many street people settle seems to create an environment that might foster the presence of criminals as well, whether they come from inside or outside these groups cannot be determined in this context.
efficiency of the private security schemes. All participants saw a positive correlation between the presence of guards and the absence of crime as well as a regeneration of the areas in which the scheme has been applied. A provider of a static security scheme explained that crime and vagrancy would move to residential areas without any additional private policing. According to this person, crime would than cumulate in the spaces without these setups and the problems in their areas would increase until the residents there become ‘clever enough’ to introduce similar schemes (Interview 25), something confirmed by most CIDs as well (Interview 08; Interview 31).

As the head of a security company working for a CID explains on the issue of displacement and borders:

If you go there late afternoon, pardon me, early evening, depending whether it’s winter or summer, just on the other side of X Street you will see where they have their sleeping places and stuff like that cause they know on this side of the street they are going to be picked up. So now they go just … we can see them stand there … ‘cause they know there they are safe (Interview 0).

On the case of the CIDs, Metro Police confirms this and worries about this development:

[I]n terms of the cons of private security, is that just if we like have an operation in an area, you kind of displace that crime to another area. Sometimes the affluent areas suggest going to not so affluent areas. You got your private security there that does have an impact on your crime whether you want to acknowledge them or not, but all it does basically, is push that crime to less privileged areas that cannot pay for the security, which aggravates the situation on that side. That’s also another con of it as well (Interview 04).

For Metro (one of the public police forces) this means that they have to follow crime patterns and end up being reactive instead of doing proactive policing (Interview 43).

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84 Here the question is instead how much this costs and what it means for wider society.
85 Representative of security company
86 Representative of CID
87 Representative of security company
The CIDs themselves make no secret of this either. Here they state that ‘unfortunately this is just par for the course (...) You’re never ever gonna alleviate the crime throughout’ (Interview 1488). Instead of regretting the issue for other, possibly less privileged areas, they argue in the way Garland (1996) and Rose (1996a) describe in their work, with a shifting of responsibilities toward the communities. If you do not want crime, vagrancy etc. in your area, come together and organise instead of waiting for the state in the form of the police to solve it.

I mean in the areas where we don’t have CIDs … we have a system with volunteers, the community police forums where Cape Town used to have nothing (...) Now we have seven registered neighbourhood watches in our area. And this is also where private people, people that are living in the areas come together and they start taking care of the areas. So yeah there is a definite shift into people taking more responsibility for their area (Interview 1589).

Another head of a CID confirms that they are only responsible for their own area and cannot respond to calls outside their area, causing a constant displacement of crime and problems. In their case they get people from other CIDs and then displace them again (Interview 1490). In fact on one of the observations it was explained that the constant displacement is an integral part of crime prevention; if you keep ‘them’ moving, they do not have the time to plan their next theft (Vignette 8.1; Vignette 8.2).

Map 7.1 shows that the CIDs cover wide areas of Cape Town’s centre. Organised displacement strategies therefore have wider implications on urban space than simply a removal beyond the CIDs’ boundary. Ultimately the data suggest that there is rather a drift of people towards the poorer areas west and northwest of the centre.

The first CID was the CCID, right in the centre of Cape Town. From there, the displacement moved groups of people outside their boundaries causing increased

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88 Representative of CID
89 Representative of CID (follow up)
90 Representative of CID
numbers of ‘undesirables’ and a possible increase in crime. As a reaction they might, for example, introduce a CID themselves to counter this development. This could be mapped in concentric rings of private policing schemes, the most prominent of which are CIDs, around the epicentre, the CCID. A CID’s head of security describes it as a ‘vicious circle’ which prompts the introduction of new CIDs. Another CID’s head of security explains:

(…) crime is never eradicated. You displace it (…). And I have seen a lot of times where we were very successful in the city that you could see that the displacement was better than all the crime dots all around us and then we started assisting all our neighbours and those dots spread even further into the next policing area and not into our area. (…) Like you know the kids that I found begging and snatching changed here in Cape Town, I’ve just seen them in Claremont again. Why are they in Claremont? Because they are not being given the right to be in Cape Town. Cape Town is too strict. Cape Town is arresting them or catching them or preventing them. So obviously they’re gonna go somewhere else where they might get it right (Interview 07).

Staying with the example of the City Bowl, the head of a security company that offers the bobby-on-the-beat schemes notes the following, using the example of Cyclops:

Cyclops, they monitor for the police. So what in theory that has done is displaced all the crime from the centre of town. I’m not saying that there is no crime, but it has displaced crime a lot from the centre of town to the periphery. So we are picking up a lot of it here … there is an element hanging around … I saw it today six or seven guys really not up to good, guys at the crossway. Instead of the walking to town and robbing tourists and everything they kind of wait on the peripheries where the cameras don’t cover. So it has effect, that definitely has an effect on where crime transpires (Interview 09).

When leaving the case study site, there are about 26 CIDs and other private policing schemes, all of which were introduced within the last ten years. Looking at the developments west of the CCID, it is not only the WID that has been introduced. Outside the case study site it continues with the Observatory CID, a new CID that is

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91 The CCTV project run by Cyclops is spread over parts of the case study site, mainly the commercial areas. Cyclops is liked up to all relevant private and public security providers on public space; this way response times are low, arrests can be coordinated and fleeing suspects quickly arrested.
being introduced by the University of Cape Town to bridge the gap to Claremont CID, followed by the Wynberg CID and so on.

As mentioned before, the CIDs and a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security see this development as a natural process, in Garland’s (1996) and Rose’s (1996) meaning. As the member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security points out, the displacement is an integral part of the CIDs’ crime prevention scheme alongside issues of social development, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Without going into too much detail and to avoid being drawn into the Western Cape’s party politics, it should at least briefly be noted that representatives associated with the ANC, SACP (South Africa’s Communist party which is in a historically grown tri-alliance with the ANC and COSATU, the biggest union) and COPE all see this development with scepticism. In an interview a critical local politician argued that Johannesburg has been liberated since the anti-apartheid struggle, while Cape Town has been lost, linking this to issues around displacement.

It is totally different with Cape Town and other towns. Cape Town is still a no-go area for the poor. I am not saying for the white or black, because they are affording black people who stay in town (…). The black poor, the white rich (…) If you compare it with Jo-burg [Johannesburg]. In Jo-burg, the town, you will see a lot of black faces. Because in other towns where this development with malls and all that, they abandoned towns. The bourgeoisie, the capitalists, they have abandoned the town substituting them with malls. (…) But in Jo-burg the town is still a working class town. In Cape Town, it is a totally different situation (Interview 26).

As outlined in greater detail in the previous chapter, in the case study different residential and business communities have organised themselves and clubbed together to introduce governance structures that control their community’s space/territory (Rose, 1996a, Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003). As a result, positive effects in terms of the appearance of these areas as well as dropping crime rates soon materialised, and this needs to be acknowledged. In fact
the researcher profited from this development when staying in the suburb of Sea Point during the second fieldwork period. Being part of a gentrification process it was possible to live in a nice property in a prime location while the rent was still affordable. This was due to the fact that it is only in the last few years that the Sea Point Improvement District had been introduced and made the area (by displacing criminal elements) safe enough to have relatively safe living.

Having argued for the effectiveness of private policing of public spaces, their impact on the space should also be put into perspective. The researched spaces are not gated communities with three-metre-high walls and electrical barbed wire on top. As the maps have shown, they cover some of the busiest parts of the inner city. Even with a strong and strategically-placed private police force, exclusion and control is, according to the governance bodies, done in the pursuit of an ideal state. Massey and Jess (1995) have theorised on the porosity of boundaries and territories, which means that the space is constantly negotiated, challenged and enforced.

As mentioned, I lived just outside Sea Point CID during the second fieldwork trip to the city. The corner of that block and the edge of the CID was populated by a group of one male and two female street people. Just outside, the three street people would hide their belongings between two walls or in water drains, drying their clothes on the residential barbed wire fences etc. However, they spent their days on the invisible boundary of the CID. On uncountable occasions the foot patrol sent them out of the territory, just a few metres into the residential street so they were not a problem anymore. The male in particular would relocate the box he was sitting on to observe the busy street back over the line into the CID, just to be sent away a few minutes later when the next patrol walked by. There are several such observations that could be listed here, which all exemplify the continuing struggle for space and the porosity
of the boundary. The clean and sanitised space of the revanchist city is always an ideal in the research area, but it does not exist as there are too many urban poor in Cape Town as a whole, including the vast township areas with millions of people. What it does, however, is create a space that comes closer to a sanitised space and does not have to be avoided because of fear of crime. The constant displacement and control of urban poor enables a space in which ‘they’ (using ‘they’ to convey the idea of the ‘other’ as has been used in the literature review) do not take over and space can be populated by all without fearing crime, and actually enjoying the public space. Nevertheless, displacement and negotiation of space does reduce population of visible street people (Vignette 8.1; Vignette 8.2). It also makes a tight network of policing companies more difficult. This has implications on the police force, which is driven by statistics, hotspot mapping etc., and which is chronically understaffed since lower crime rates in one area demand a lower public police presence there. In the following case an example of this will be given for the Metro police.

Referring back to the wider debates on the ‘othering’ of undesirables (Sibley, 2003; Young, 1999; Herbert and Brown, 2006), the section on territory and exclusion confirms this notion and shows how private policing agents contribute to it. The emphasis on geographic areas especially where the spatial divide coincides with socio-economic and apartheid legacies combined with current economic exclusion leads to a racial and class profiling (Interview 3492). As a commander of Metro police said angrily, he was once targeted by a residential, in this case police, patrol when he was running in a nice affluent neighbourhood in his tracksuit to stay fit (Interview 0493). A member of a police oversight committee and another Metro

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92 Local ANC activist and Head of the Secretariat for Community Safety in the Western Cape Department of Community Safety
93 High ranking Metro Police officers
commander complain that the strict private residential patrols make it almost impossible for residents of the townships to enjoy the fruits of freedom and crime reduction when trying to spend leisure time in nice parts of the city, hinting at a further perpetuation of apartheid segregation given the spatial legacies of racial separation (Interview 3494; Interview 0495).

**Vignette 8.2: Observation in City Improvement District**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation number: 06; Objective: Mobile patrol in CID territory; Position of participant: Head of security; Duration: 1 hour</th>
</tr>
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| Today I am shadowing a mobile patrol with the head of security. The idea of the patrol is to show presence and to enhance the visibility of the CIDs security. Soon we stop at a store that is known for attracting urban poor, who we spotted right away. As soon as they saw our car pulling up, they walked away from the CID territory. This chasing away of the ‘others’ was the only purpose of the stop. On continuing, we contacted the next foot patrol to keep an eye on the corner when he gets there to establish our presence. Again, the importance of territory was obvious. As it is explained to me, when, for example, drug dealers are in the area, they might just send them into the club they are lingering in front of. ‘Go in there, then it is not my problem’.

Talking about drug dealers, he also explained that years ago they had massive problems with them and got involved in fights. Now this has been taken care of and the area cleaned of dealers. When following the story up, he stated that they had moved to spaces which had no CID in the past. Now there is a CID there as well because of the crime, hinting at the issue of displacement of crime. When they ‘clean up’ the dealers might come back to our CID. When the dealers come back, they would organize an operation with SAPS to take them out again. He argued that as a guard in charge you need some kind of reputation: ‘I warn only once’.

About the social programmes for the urban poor, he states that there are almost useless. They come back anyway, because they prefer living on the street and that is where they make a living. When he followed this up, he states that some residents pity them. They complain about the street people, but if they try to move them they pity them. They also feed them or give them money (I did not tell him that my housemates do the same).

Talking about the local street people and the foreign ones he confirmed that the local street people know how to play the game. They do not carry weapons etc. because they know that they will be

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94 Local ANC activist and Head of the Secretariat for Community Safety in the Western Cape Department of Community Safety
95 High ranking Metro Police officers
searched regularly. The foreigners are different; they should be prevented from settling down. Often they are on the run etc. It is all about keeping control over the ‘others’.

During the drive up and down the territory we checked on the foot patrols by signing off the little books they carry around. He described this as looking at the wider picture of what’s going on in the space from his car he uses to keep an overview. Finally, when I finally asked if the job was dangerous, he said that it is because they are always the first ones on a crime scene and someone might pull a blade etc. I got the feeling that he was glad to carry a firearm, something the foot patrols did not.

8.4 The ‘displacement’ of public police

The title of this subsection is deliberately provocative. By using the term ‘displacement’ in the context of the police, the power of the governance bodies as policing actors is being underlined. Like the displacement of ‘others’ the police have a tendency to re-locate their resources away from the privately policed areas. No private security agent in Cape Town will completely supplement the police; however, indirectly, it will be argued, this is the case. Producing lower crime rates through displacement practices and social development, the CIDs and other privately-policed areas demand less public policing (Interview 43). Metro police is mainly complaint driven, which means that their mode of operation is to respond to citizens, and so they follow the crime patterns to areas outside the private security spaces, while CIDs and others are evolving to become the first port of call for any complaints for businesses at the same time. A member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security:

“What happens at least from the Metro Police’s perspective is that it leaves the City free to concentrate on the higher crime areas. We constantly adjust our policing resources to where the highest crime rates are and in response to new crime patterns and trends. As the areas within the CIDs see reduced crime we are then able to reduce our resource allocation to that area, which might not be a popular thing to admit to, but it is true. Obviously we give less energy to an area where the crime rate reduces and this is not due to the fact

96 Meanwhile, the first port of call in emergencies for most residents and business are the private armed response companies (see Section 7.3.1)
that they pay for additional policing services so that we can then remove the police they are entitled to, but rather it is a decision that is made consciously as an operational decision: once crime has been stabilised in an area, the staff resources can be prioritised in other areas. You don’t sit somewhere and say, this staff member gets removed from this area and get sent there. It happens as an automatic feature of deployment through joint planning with SAPS, through the automatic prioritisation that happens through the response to complaints and emergencies from the call centre and through ongoing planning by police management. You have within a district a certain number of staff deployment and I can show you the full district model and the breakdown of staff. The Metro Police use a ‘soft border’ approach and aren’t tied to a specific police station like SAPS and a lot of their time is spent responding to complaints, but this also allows them to plan saturation operations and focused operations in which the staff can target different areas of their deployment in different operations as the crime patterns dictate. In other words calls that come in to the Metro Police call centre to which they respond. If they are tied to a whole area, and this portion of the area is generating fewer complaints because there is an effective city improvement district there, or some other private security arrangement, they spend more of their time in the outlying areas. And we do start getting complaints from an area where Metro Police are not currently active, because their time is now addressing complaints in other areas. So as an automatic feature of who picks up the phone and calls, you have reactive dispatching”.

When crime rates drop and/or criminals are being displaced outside the privately policed spaces due to their strong presence and exclusion policy, the police follow the crime, while the private policing companies keep maintaining order only on their territory. This notion is confirmed by Metro police as well. While a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security describes it in the light of the realpolitik of what can be called a policing crisis, Metro also emphasises problems around the consequently perpetuated divisions of urban space and leaves no doubt that they would rather see more of their officers on the street than all the private security.

It is not, however, only the public side that confirms the observation of an indirectly ‘displaced’ public police, but different private security entities as well. A representative of a CID argues idealistically for the positive effects of this replacement.

Q: Is there a danger, that for example poorer areas [referring to townships] have less protection or less policing?
A: No, it’s a case of these actual cops are maybe freeing up other cops to go to that these poorer areas. You must remember. Like you said earlier, could elevate certain people and they could say look we used to have 500 police there, now because there is a joint partnership we don’t need 500, we could do with 400. That now 100 could go to the poorer areas where nobody is paying (Interview 07\textsuperscript{97}).

Although this might overemphasise the effectiveness of ‘his’ CID as well as its advantages for the poorer communities, it confirms the general notion that by displacing people and crime through strong private policing, the police follow the crime and/or need fewer resources in the privately policed areas. Having a chronically understaffed police service, this is the logical response. In other words the formula is: effective private policing in one space limits or displaces crime into other spaces. An understaffed police force cannot afford to dispatch the same number of officers when crime is down, but follows the crime patterns to spaces with no private police force. As a Metro commander admits:

If you really want to be transparent, none of my members patrol residential areas. They don’t because I can’t afford to let them patrol residential areas. And I don’t think that there is anybody here [referring to the rest of Cape Town’s Metro commanders] that with a clear conscience can say that they have daily deployment in residential areas. You [referring to the researcher] made an example yourself earlier, in fact you see one police van you see two private security. That’s the reality. So ideally … it would be ideal to have enough policemen so we would not need private security, but that comes with a lot of financial implications. Myself as a prime example, at my residence I have got an alarm which is serviced by a private security company, and I am sure that there are many people around this table that have the same [later on the Metro chief confirmed that he has a contract with a private security company as well] (Interview 04).

This suggests that private policing contributes to a ‘displacement’ of the public police and therefore possesses considerable power when policing their territory. At the same time they become the guarantor for order maintenance in their territories, which are key public spaces. However, it has to be kept in mind that the governance body of this very private police force is a private one. These governance bodies are

\textsuperscript{97} Representative of CID (follow up)
not elected, nor do they have to care about anyone else except for themselves and so they can pursue their own agendas. It should also be noted that the above describes a trend and does not mean that there are no public police in the privately policed spaces anymore, which led Berg (2004), taking the example of the CCID, to make the statement that the space is being ‘over-policed’.

8.5 Conclusion

The exclusion of undesirables and the strong working relationship with the police both support the claim that private companies have a policing function. Indeed it appears that private policing agents strongly interfere with the politics of public space and maintain a social order that forces some people to partially retreat to areas with higher crime rates, possibly on behalf of the police. If private companies effectively displace crime, the under-staffed police have to dispatch fewer resources in these spaces. This leaves increasing power and responsibility with the private policing companies.

Furthermore, the strong sense of territory distinguishes private policing bodies from the police. Although the police do have a territorialised structure (Herbert, 1996a, 1997), it is not about excluding people from it in the ways described here. The observed exclusion strategy instead gives evidence of the selfish objectives of their governance bodies and even shows parallels with security tactics one expects in a mall. However, this displacing of ‘undesirables’ is what the private governments expect them to do as it creates and maintains the desired ‘clean and safe’ space (clean referring to the absence of street people and urban poor). Displacing urban poor and street people is, next to the policing of law, another role and function of private
policing companies in public space. Thus the impact of private policing on urban territory has been outlined.

Having introduced the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space (Chapter 7) and analysed the impact of private policing on urban territory (Chapter 8), the next chapter continues to explore the increasing power over space private governance communities or nodes have, through using their private police force as well as through other means. Here the significance of private policing networks on social geographies will be assessed.
CHAPTER IX: PRODUCTION OF SPACE THROUGH ‘HARD’ 
AND ‘SOFT’ POLICING

9.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have shown the power private policing companies have in public spaces. This chapter will focus on the increasing power private governance nodes have above and beyond private policing companies. Thus, the significance of sophisticated private policing networks on social geographies will be assessed. This chapter argues that governance nodes not only draw on direct power in form of private policing agents, but that governance communities have established a private policing network that extends far beyond the visible private policing officers on the ground. This represents less direct, more subtle ways of shaping space to their interests.

This chapter then goes on to argue that private policing companies are powerful actors in the reclamation of public space. However, the chapter also identifies shortcomings of this type of ‘hard’ private policing. As a response to these shortcomings, governance communities have invested in social development projects and workers in order to close the gaps private police cannot fill. Furthermore the chapter shows how the institutions of the criminal justice landscape are being utilised by private governments in order to establish the desired sanitised ‘safe and clean’ spaces. By unveiling these private policing networks, their significance on the on social geographies of central Cape Town will be introduced.

This chapter will argue that social development has become a part of the policing landscape, drawing on the tight nodes between many social development bodies and the private governments of the revanchist urban landscape. The argument will be
framed by Cohen’s (2001 [1985]) ‘visions of social control’ and his ideas on supplementing the formal hard social control landscape, such as policing and criminal justice, with a soft end that includes, but is not limited to, social work.

Samara stated ‘police and private security become front-line “social development” workers, because they are the ones who enforce the quality of life by-laws through which urban space is reclaimed and renewed’ (Samara 2005: 224). He goes on to argue that repressive forms of policing still exist (referring to forms of colonial policing), targeting the poor in an attempt to create ‘sanitised spaces’ for consumption. As the main actors to police and maintain these urban renewal programmes he identified the state police as well as private security forces employed by the business communities (Samara, 2005).

Agreeing with the notion of the security officer becoming a frontline social development worker, this paper will expand the argument to the social development sector becoming part of the policing landscape as a response to the limits of actual policing or social control. Furthermore this chapter will explore how community-based legal institutions, such as community courts and community service, have become enrolled into a criminal justice system that criminalises poverty, building on Mitchell’s (1997) annihilation of urban space and Wacquant’s (2001, 2003, 2009) work on the punishment of the poor. However, as said in Section 7.6, the smaller the governance node in size, and therefore the security unit, the less complex this setup is. For instance, in the example of static security, the focus would merely be on the direct policing, as this would be sufficient to implement the governance body’s expectations.
9.2 Private policing companies or hard policing

The research confirmed the argument made in Chapter 4 that some security companies in the case study site are indeed better described as private policing companies. They carry out social control and urban ordering functions through their widespread presence and crime deterring function. They do not only contribute to perceived feelings of security, but are also of assistance when someone requires help. At the same time, they are most likely to be the first on the scene when a policing body is required. By following the aim and objectives of their governance bodies they have a strong social control and urban ordering function, especially when it comes to urban poor, informal traders or any contravention against the comprehensive by-laws (see Table 7.5). In combination with the ‘rent-a-cop’ scheme outlined in Section 7.4 and their ability to call in back up in the form of foot and mobile patrols, they possess considerable coercive force and power to uphold the law. Irish (1999) and Berg (2007) claim, without going into much detail, that the boundaries between police and private security get blurred as they each have increasingly overlapping tasks.

Returning to the argument of Chapter 4, by carrying out these roles in combination with a withdrawal of the police from these territories (Chapter 8), the private securities become increasingly a de facto private police force on the ground. In the case study area private policing has become not only one of the primary physical security providers, but in many instances also police the norms and regulations of the city and the neoliberal society. By finding ways to avoid their legal limitations, or even breaking them as described in Section 7.4, as well as establishing a network with other security companies, these agents have a power that exceeds their guidelines on paper. Although the work also entails pro-active security elements, at
the same time the officers have many other functions that exceed the specialised field of security but are much wider. To sum up the empirical evidence of this argument:

- **Crime reduction through pro-active displacement of persons identified as problems (urban poor and street people)** (see Chapter 2).
- **Operate often in key public spaces** (see Map 7.4)
- **Visible patrols as public reassurance** (everyone setting foot in the mapped spaces will see the officers right away) and ‘community ambassadors’ (Interview 0498; Interview 0799; Interview 13100; Interview 43101).
- **Contact with the community through constant checking in at shops, hotels etc.; chats especially held by patrolling senior staff.** Furthermore, private governments are establishing themselves as the main organisational nodes and the first port of call for the community (Interview 10102; Interview 14103; Observation 04; as well as many unstructured observations).
- **Rapid response to disputes through strategic placement over the territory** (car, foot, possibly bicycle or motorcycle) and most prominent policing actors in terms of numbers (Interview 07104; Interview 14105; Interview 27106; Observation 06; Observation 08; as well as many unstructured observations).

**On this Minnaar and Mistry argue:**

> In South Africa, members of the public are more likely to come into contact with a private security officer than a member of the South African Police Service (SAPS). In their areas of operation, private security companies are generally able to respond faster than the SAPS to calls for assistance from the public. (Minnaar and Mistry: 38)
- **Order maintenance through de facto enforcing law (see Section 7.4).** As Singh (2008) correctly observes, using the considerable powers private security personnel (here meaning private policing personnel) have, makes them a policing actor.

Fulfilling the listed functions arguably makes these companies actual policing actors; however, they are not to be mistaken for the police. There is still a vast difference between those two bodies in terms of legal powers and status, training and equipment. As all the interviewed representatives of the security industry suggested or confirmed, they either work below the police or are their junior partners, and therefore still depend on the police.

Nevertheless, as a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security explained, there are plans to extend the powers of private policing bodies to give them full law enforcement powers:

And you can guess what I am gonna do with that [referring to the Law Enforcement Reservist Policy, which since been adopted by the City Council]. You don’t need to be a rocket scientist to see where I am heading with it [pause in which the researcher is reading]. So that I can give law enforcement powers and the power to enforce our by-laws, to private citizens in neighbourhood watches, just like the South African Police reservists, with the difference that the law enforcement Reservists will patrol with their local neighbourhood watch so that they do not have to travel to volunteer (which is a big issue in poorer communities as travel is costly) and so that they can be more efficient through the excellent knowledge of the local area. We will start with the neighbourhood watches and with some of your civic bodies (not all neighbourhood watches take the traditional form, but we may well be able to draw volunteers from various civic bodies as well which may deal with other safety needs, such as reserve traffic wardens that help out at school crossings, etc.) You will have to be a registered neighbourhood watch; you have to be a registered member of a registered neighbourhood watch in good standing. You won’t be allowed to have a criminal record or be under investigation for a pending offence. A criminal record check will be performed through the fingerprints of the applicant. You will have to go through the same training that the normal policing staff of the City go through. You have to wear a uniform, clock in normally as the other staff, you do fingerprint clock in and clock out. You are subject to the same laws and same code of conduct and police procedures and same disciplinary measures. And you will work a
designated shift. And those shifts coordinate with your neighbourhood watch. But you can go out with your neighbourhood watch as a peace officer patrolling in uniform like a police (SAPS) reservist. But your focus is those petty thefts, those by-law offences and the quality of life complaints that we receive most commonly. And eventually when I am finished with that experiment, if it works, the City might extend it to some of the private security. That is where I am heading” (Interview 35).

By taking this step, private security would not only be a de facto, but a de jure private police, including receiving advanced training. To make the point once more, not acknowledging the de facto policing role and the position these companies occupy in the policing network is a misjudgement of existing urban power structures. Nevertheless, as has been argued, private policing companies already have a considerable degree of power that enables them to shape space, even though private policing also has its limits when it comes to certain problems. Private governments have to acknowledge that not every issue can be solved only using hard policing, which is an argument that will be expanded below.

9.3 Limits of private policing companies

Implementing the ideas of sanitised space as described above and in Chapters 2 and 3, the CIDs rapidly became potent actors in the policing network (Berg, 2004). In the interviews, both CID representatives and a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security underlined the success the implementation of the ‘broken windows syndrome’ had in Mayor Giuliani’s New York and claimed that its implementation had proven to be successful in Cape Town as well (Interview 07; Interview 20; Interview 35). In the case study area, the focus is on nuisance behaviour and people that the city, as well as the CIDs, had decided were not to be tolerated in their

107 Representative of CID
108 Representative of social development sector
109 Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security
spaces, reflecting the ‘zero tolerance policing’ approach. As Chapter 8 outlined, on the street this means that ‘others’ are being pushed out of the CID to where they do not disrupt the spatial order (see Figure 9.1 suggests the power relations at work here). The result of this policing strategy is a constant displacement and arresting of street people and urban poor from the territory. On this, Samara (2005) described how street children in the city have become ‘public enemy number one’. If a new street person turns up, the security can send him or her away and he or she will then appear in the territory of a different CID. This policy repeats itself over and over again until the person ends up outside the areas being policed by private governments.

Figure 9.1: Security guard in conversation with ‘others’

However, at some point, the persons involved realise that the constant displacement and arrests of street people is not a sustainable solution to the problem. In fact, it
becomes a routine in which the same ‘others’ and the same security guards or law enforcement officers play cat and mouse every day, but it does not solve the problem as the urban poor keep coming back. As a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security in charge openly admitted, this is not only unsustainable but also frustrating for all involved and can ultimately end in a dark backstreet where a security guard or police officer might manhandle a suspect (Interview 35\textsuperscript{110}). A CID representative describes it as follows:

There are numerous violations that these guys were doing. And it was easy just to pick them up and to arrest them [‘others’]. But is that the solution? That’s not the solution what are we doing? We are perpetuating a circle […] I cannot police this issue; I can’t police a homeless man away. Cause I end up playing […] chase with him. I chase him from this corner to that corner to that corner back to that corner. That’s all I am doing with him […]. So I stressed that we need a social intervention and I also said that we need to look at strategies, long term strategies […] (Interview 07\textsuperscript{111}).

The response to this limit in hard policing measures was twofold. Firstly, the CIDs and other private governments, such as the Community Policing Forums (CPFs) started to put social work, or soft policing on their agendas. Secondly, private governments utilised the city’s criminal justice system to their advantage. Both points will be examined in the following sections.

\textit{9.4 Social development or soft policing}

This section will show how social development became the soft side of policing, complementing the hard policing and therefore addressing the limits private policing companies have when it comes to the establishment of sanitised spaces. Until this point, social control had been defined in a very formal structured way, as is common in the literature on policing and security (see Chapter 4). To define the idea of social

\textsuperscript{110} Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security

\textsuperscript{111} Representative of CID (follow up)
control, Cohen’s work has been used, as others did before (Jones and Newburn, 1998). However, in his main argument on the ‘visions of social control’, Cohen (2001 [1985]) is actually less concerned with the formal end of the social control landscape and its agencies (police and security etc.), which are something he almost takes for granted, but instead he is interested in the plethora of new forms of control he sees establishing themselves beside the criminal justice and policing landscape. While the conventional social control system remains powerful and expands, which is precisely what the previous chapters have argued, new actors appear to complement the conventional system. As one example of these new social control actors he repeatedly mentions the social development sector (Cohen himself used to work in this sector before turning to academia).

To describe the changes in social control, Cohen (2001 [1985]) uses the analogy of a fishing net. While previously the net had large holes to catch only the biggest fish (actual criminals), today the net of social control is very fine, catching more and more fish that used to be left out before (such as mental patients and street people). Furthermore, the net is now more difficult to spot as its boundaries become blurry. What this describes is a control landscape where policing agents can now address a problem, issue, targeted person or groups either by traditional means, such as arrest, or by diverting them to various programmes, including social work. In return, this integrates social work agencies into the social control network where they address groups who previously ‘slipped the net’ but are now in it.

[T]hese diversion clients [target groups] might not have committed any offence at all. The ideology of early intervention and treatment and the use of psychological or social-work selection criteria, allows diversions to be incorporated into wider preventive strategies. Legal definitions and due

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112 Social control is ‘the organized ways in which society responds to behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable in some way or another’ (Cohen, 2001 [1985]: 1).
process give way to low visibility, ‘discretionary decision making’ by administrative or professional agencies. The drift is to work with parts of the population not previously reached, variously defined as young people ‘in trouble’, ‘at risk’ or ‘in legal jeopardy’, ‘pre-delinquents’ or ‘potential delinquents’. These trends are not primarily a widening of social control into ‘empty’ spaces, but an intensification and formalization of previous methods. (Cohen, 2001 [1985]: 53).

On the example of addressing young people, Cohen (2001 [1985]) shows how various agencies are being ‘co-opted in to the criminal justice system’ and deliberately blurring the boundaries between formal social control and social development. As an outcome of this process, he classifies social work as the soft end of social control.

[T]he hard end [the criminal justice system] and soft ends [agencies such as social work] are symbiotically related to each other. The hard end is the backup – to reassure the public, to serve as a deterrent to trouble-makers in the soft end, to be a dumping ground for its unamenable clients, to serve status degradation functions by emphasising the boundary between good and bad (Cohen, 2001 [1985]: 99).

This means that through this setup, the good intentions of social work become corrupted and form part of the social control system, or as Cohen (2001 [1985]: 99) says ‘[t]he devil lies in the machine’.

The following will translate Cohen’s (2001 [1985]) arguments onto the case study to explain the data. Social development in Cape Town is a complex issue involving various organisations characterised by a network of co-financing and mutual financial support. Furthermore, even social development representatives describe the complex network of different governing bodies as being confusing (Interview 44). Although a detailed structure cannot be given, the non-transparent social development landscape already exemplifies some of the arguments that will be made below. The complex network of fieldworkers and the possibility of co-financing make a stage for various non-state governing nodes with individual, usually

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113 Representative of social development sector
territorial, interest to get involved in the sector and to link certain expectations to their support. Referring to the limited number of fieldworkers employed by the state, represented by the city and its limited budget, gives evidence for the planned outsourcing of social development issues, but also opens up the sector for various governance bodies to get involved. As has been confirmed by employees of the City of Cape Town, they heavily rely on other governance partners. For example, the state does not run any shelters for the homeless, but co-operates with NGOs specialised on this (Interview 19\textsuperscript{114}; Interview 37\textsuperscript{115}). In return a representative of an NGO who runs several shelters throughout the city described that financial support of the City of Cape Town was given in return for their work. Other governance bodies besides the various NGOs are CIDs, Community Policing Forums (CPFs) and Neighbourhood Watches, who either have their own fieldworker and/or support fieldworkers or social development projects financially. While the state and NGOs have been active in social development in the post-apartheid city for a long time, the private policing bodies became active in recent years as a response to the above mentioned limitations of hard policing. Using the example of the first and largest CID in the case study, it was established in 1999 with a focus on security and cleaning, after acknowledging its limitations, in 2005 a social department was introduced (Interview 05\textsuperscript{116}, Interview 07\textsuperscript{117}). This has been seen with other CIDs and policing communities, such as CPFs. Nevertheless, compared to security, social development plays a more marginal role in the priorities of the CIDs as the spending of the annual budget of the CCID, the largest of the CIDs, reveals. While security is allocated 51\% of the resources, the social development section has to work with only 3\%, which is

\textsuperscript{114} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{115} Representative of social development sector (follow-up)
\textsuperscript{116} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{117} Representative of CID
linked to the costs of the high number of security staff (Central City Improvement District, 2010b: 14).

The central argument of this chapter is that communities such as the CIDs and CPFs are concerned with a territorialis ed form of governance community to maintain spaces in a secure and investment-friendly way. However, the presence of street people, seen as dirty and dangerous, conflicts with this notion. As they ‘can’t be policed away’ (Interview with representative of CID), community organisations have invested (literally) in social development, using similar territorial ideas to get street people, the identified problem, out of the way. The actual argument that social development bodies have become part of the policing landscape will be laid out in two sections. While the first section describes the daily operational routine of fieldworkers, the second will refer to a much wider bias in the whole setup of social development in the researched sites.

Daily operational routine: Besides specialised NGOs who, for example, run shelters, the fieldworker’s task is to assist homeless people. This can be in the form of emergency interventions and diversions in cases of substance abuse, mediating shelter space, the creation of jobs, or re-unifications with their families. Furthermore, they run public awareness and education campaigns (e.g. the ‘give responsibly’ campaign) to stop tourists from giving money directly to homeless and instead to channel it to, for example, shelters. Fieldworkers will spend time in their allocated area contacting the homeless, talking to them and checking if they are okay.

In this daily routine there is a strong cooperation between fieldworkers and security as well as the police. To stay on top of the street people population, the security forces of some CIDs would let the fieldworkers know when a ‘new face’ shows up in their territory. This person will then be approached by a fieldworker and in some
cases be taken to the police station, potentially in a security van, to have their criminal record checked (Interview 16\textsuperscript{118}). Furthermore, some CIDs might take a photo and ID details from the new street person so they know who they are dealing with and to be able to show the database to the potential victim of a crime in order to identify the perpetrator (Vignette 8.1).

Due to the close links or dependencies between social development and CIDs and others, the territorialised aims and objectives of the governing bodies have to be incorporated in the fieldworkers’ operational practice. As outlined above, this means getting street people off the street, and so out of the territory. This can happen by convincing a person to move into shelters (which are all run by NGOs) or by reuniting people with their families. Although re-uniting people with their families is generally nothing to criticise, it appears that the pressure to produce a safe and clean space goes into the cost of sustainable social development, and sometimes even has a repressive, potentially dangerous movement to it. There is a pressure to produce statistics that show so-called success stories (Interview 20\textsuperscript{119}; also see Vignette 8.1).

To quantify the social deployment work with numbers from the CCID’s annual report 2010, as the only CID that is communicating these numbers, ‘36 adults have been placed in a shelter; 35 adults have been reunified with their families; 26 children returned home’ (CCID, 2010: 28).

While there are some natural overlaps between social development and the security concerns of the CIDs, there is a pressure from governing bodies to produce a desired space. As a CID representative explained, the fieldworkers have the same goal as the security and law enforcement, namely a territory with a limited presence of street people, but they approach it from a different angle (Observation 08). As Cohen (2001

\textsuperscript{118} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{119} Representative of social development sector
[1985]) argued, and participants in this study confirmed (Interview 20\textsuperscript{120}), the line between security and social development gets blurred. Another fieldworker stated on this issue that her work, social development, can be seen as the ‘softer side of security’ (Interview 16\textsuperscript{121}); again, this statement could have been taken directly out of Cohen’s (2001 [1985]) ‘visions of social control’.

Nonetheless, despite the critique outlined above, most of the individuals involved came across as very helpful, engaged people who want the best for their clientele, the street people, and this needs to be stressed. In fact, some fieldworkers describe their role as being a counterpart to the security to avoid potential violent assaults against the homeless population, or they push a process of sensitising the security staff toward street people (Interview 18\textsuperscript{122}). However, although not all fieldworkers actively contribute to the ‘softer side of security’, because they are placed in an environment that is dominated by territorialised ideas of cleanliness and security and where security remains the leading paradigm, and this puts pressure on the CIDs’ employees, not only the security, but the social development actors as well.

\textit{Structural bias in the social development setup or the devil in the machine:} This section argues that although a social development worker might not actively contribute to the ‘softer side of security’ in his or her daily operations, their work nonetheless becomes part of a policing landscape, referring to a structural bias in Cape Town’s power and governance landscape. To make this point, a common line of argument, as taken from an interview with a representative of the social development sector, will be used.

\begin{quote}
It [the city] means to be a place for all the citizens and that includes to some extent our homeless and destitute people (…) part of our role is also to
\end{quote}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Representative of social development sector
\item \textsuperscript{121} Representative of social development sector
\item \textsuperscript{122} Representative of social development sector
\end{itemize}
educate homeless people to what is socially acceptable behaviour within the city, they need to adhere to the bylaws. (…) your behaviour needs to be such, there are not sufficient toilets, public toilets in the city, but you can’t urinate and defecate on the streets. (…) That needs to be an understanding which we have in empowering homeless people, to know what their own rights are, but on the other hand there also needs to be acceptable behaviour that goes with it (Interview 05123).

As argued during the interview, the city is there for everyone including, ‘to some extent’, homeless and destitute people, but, as is emphasised, they have to comply with ‘socially acceptable behaviour’ – referring to the issue of social control, norms and values. As she herself says, this refers to the by-laws. Herbert and Beckett (2010) and Beckett and Herbert (2008) outlined in the case of North America that ‘socially acceptable standards’ are commonly being translated into laws that address quality of life offences, such as banishment laws or, in the case of Cape Town, the by-laws. That laws such as by-laws are being used to create space has been outlined by Mitchell (1997) and Wacquant (2009) in the past. Using these by-laws can make it impossible for some to exist in spaces where these laws are being policed. Possibly incidentally, the interviewee cited above uses the infamous example of urinating when there are no toilets around without being able to answer this conundrum herself. Looking at the by-laws that apply in the case study site, it is impossible for a homeless person to exist (see Table 7.5)124. Indeed, they apply de jure for every citizen. However, de facto they target urban poor (Mitchell, 1997, 2003; Wacquant, 2001, 2003; Beckett and Herbert, 2008; Herbert and Beckett, 2010; Herbert, 2010).

Returning to the argument above, once the socially acceptable standards/by-laws are violated, social development turns into a policing issue, and in the CID, the main security body on the ground are the fieldworkers’ own colleagues. In central Cape Town, the issue of by-laws and the annihilation of people and space by law

\[123\] Representative of social development sector

\[124\] To recapitulate the key points of Table 7.5: it is illegal in public space to: sleep overnight; urinate and defecate; wash oneself; clean clothes; make a fire; beg aggressively.
(Mitchell, 1997) have to be seen in the context of the social development programmes. In this setup, participating in a social development programme is not a voluntary act. If not participating, a targeted homeless person just has to be watched long enough until he or she has to violate a by-law and the matter becomes a policing issue, or, as Cohen might say, the smaller holes of the net capture the ones who would previously have escaped the social control system.

This connection between social development on the one hand and the rule of law/policing on the other is called the ‘carrot-and-stick approach’ (Interview with local politician; also Interview 07\textsuperscript{125}; Interview 19\textsuperscript{126}). Social development agents, likely to be paid by a CID, will offer their assistance to mediate shelter places and reunite people with their families, which will get a person out of the space; in other words, they offer the carrot. However, if the ‘carrot’ is not accepted, the ‘stick’ can come into play. While in the past the ‘stick’ could literally mean a stick, such as a baton, the system to put pressure on street people is nowadays more sophisticated. With the support of the City of Cape Town which introduced a variety of by-laws, security possesses more powerful tools to create a willingness to participate in social development programmes. Watching one of the ‘others’ long enough with the strategically-placed security personnel, he or she will eventually violate one of the by-laws. In this case an arrest can be made and the person will be processed in the new community court, which will also be discussed below. In short, social development and security, or the ‘soft side of security’ and ‘hard security’ measures complement each other, confirming Cohen’s (2001 [1985]) argument.

This setup, as schematised in Figure 9.2, describes a win-win situation for private governance structures, as both approaches create space with fewer street people. In a

\textsuperscript{125} Representative of CID
\textsuperscript{126} Representative of social development sector
governance landscape where powerful private bodies pursue their ideas of space and
social development, it is not a voluntary offer but part of a wider policing concept; it
then becomes the ‘softer side of security’.

Discussing this with a member of the Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security, he
confirmed that besides displacement, social development has become a part of the
security landscape. Here it is being called a holistic approach in order to get street
people out of certain spaces, ultimately contributing to the territory’s understanding
of safe and clean.

“The sad truth is that the bulk of social development has been supplied and
paid for by the so-called ‘bad guys’ as some NGOs might describe them (the
City Improvement Districts which used to be often criticised as being
insensitive towards the poor and homeless into their pursuit of urban
renewal). Their actions might not always be for noble reasons – but they end
up doing the right thing for their own selfish reasons; they have realised that
the policing approach does not work. It is only a small part of the solution.
And they have funded, very substantially, the social work and social
development projects, which government should be doing and which
government does not do adequately […] Yes, it is the soft side of policing.
Social development programmes should not have to depend on CIDs for their
survival, but in the last five years Council and provincial government have
started making much larger contributions and giving more support.”
(Interview 35).

When private bodies become one governance actor, inheriting key functions from the
state and supported by the state through the introduction of by-laws, social
development becomes part of the policing landscape. In the eyes of a critical
gerographer, this shows a bias in the governance landscape, while in the eyes of the
governance bodies involved it is presumably just right. However, it is not only the
soft side of policing that that facilitates the urban revanchism; in addition to that,
private governments are able to utilise parts of the criminal justice system for their
own gain to make space.
9.5 Community courts

While literature often focuses on the role of by-laws as an example for urban revanchism (Mitchell, 1997; Belina and Helms, 2003; Samara, 2010a), this thesis will extend the argument to the role of the criminal justice system, and particularly the model of community courts. As Figure 9.2 shows, community courts are the next step after being caught for the violation of a by-law. Therefore the analysis of a community court in the case study site not only exemplifies the state’s support for this governance and policing setup, but it is also important to fully understand the powers of the private governing bodies, despite them not having any jurisdiction in the court. It will be argued that in the case study site the community court tries people for being a nuisance to the space in the eyes of the governing bodies.
Therefore, the court has the tendency to serve the interest of the governing elites and does not represent the community as originally intended.

When introducing by-laws, a court system is needed to address the issue appropriately, otherwise there could be an arrest without trial, something that contradicts the constitution (Interview 35\textsuperscript{127}). The community courts have been introduced because South Africa’s juridical system is struggling under its workload due to high crime rates. This idea goes back to an initiative launched in 2004 by the former president Mbeki, who demanded at least two community courts in each province (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2006). In the greater Cape Town area three community courts were set up in 2006. Using the Hatfield Court in Pretoria as its role model, minor offences are prosecuted within days of the arrest and in the community in which the crime was committed. The idea is to introduce the approach of restorative justice, meaning that if one breaches the rules of the community, one has to make up for it in the form of community work (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2006; Interview 21\textsuperscript{128}; Interview 47\textsuperscript{129}). The courts' sentencing options are being carried out in conjunction with different NGOs and entail diversion programmes to intervene with repeat offenders using social services instead of fines and imprisonment (Interview 17\textsuperscript{130}; Interview 21\textsuperscript{131}; Interview 38\textsuperscript{132}; Interview 42\textsuperscript{133}). However, interventions are currently limited through a lack of, in particular, financial resources, as stated by senior members of the community courts as well as

\textsuperscript{127} Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security
\textsuperscript{128} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{129} Participant associated with community court
\textsuperscript{130} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{131} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{132} Representative of social development sector (follow-up)
\textsuperscript{133} Representative of social development sector
by other researchers who have assessed the state of the courts (Lue-Dugmore et al., 2005; Interview 36\textsuperscript{134}; Interview 47\textsuperscript{135}).

Of the three community courts in Cape Town, it appears that the idea of restorative justice is working well in the two courts situated in Cape Town’s townships of Mitchell’s Plain and Fezeka (Gugulethu). An researcher interviewed on the issue states that here the community is being represented and the issues concerning the people are being solved (Interview 36\textsuperscript{136}). This is supported by an evaluation of the three community courts. In Fezeka and Mitchell’s Plain, the offences the court deals with represent problems facing the communities, including shoplifting, assault, invalid/no driver’s licence or possession of dagga (marihuana) (Lue-Dugmore et al., 2005).

However, although valid for all courts, the commitment of the community courts to urban revanchism becomes most obvious in the case study site. It is the declared aim of the community courts to prevent urban decay and it refers directly to the broken windows. In the ‘Guidelines for the establishment and functioning of Hatfield-type community courts’ it states:

The court follows the ‘broken windows’ principles, a philosophy that addressing petty crimes serves as an important deterrent to more serious crimes. While improving community confidence in the criminal justice system, which is seen to be active in improving quality of life on the streets for residents (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2006: 56).

In the case of the Cape Town community court, which is situated in the case study site, the situation presents itself differently. In addition to 12.3% of offences which are unrecorded, 83.6% are breaches of “By-law regulating to streets, public places and the prevention of nuisance”, as outlined above (Lue-Dugmore et al., 2005). As

\textsuperscript{134} Researcher
\textsuperscript{135} Participant associated with community court
\textsuperscript{136} Researcher
this evaluation shows, the homeless population and its behaviour and "lifestyle crimes" that contribute to urban decay’ (Lue-Dugmore et al., 2005: 33) are targeted by the court. This is why the guidelines cited above note that ‘[t]o justify prosecution of by-law offences such as urinating in public, adequate public facilities should be provided’ (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2006: 50). If this is not the case, as in the case study site, the private policing of the by-laws becomes questionable. Agreeing with this, a researcher on the issue explains that it appears that the Cape Town community court does not represent the community, but instead mainly targets the homeless population as a social problem with the result that people get ‘punished for being homeless’ (Interview 36\(^{137}\)).

Therefore, arguably the ‘revanchist city’ (Smith, 1996) does not end with an arrest, but affects the parts of the criminal justice system outlined above. Here, a system of non-elected communities governs the territory of their financing bodies without being responsible for wider society. Having accumulated a lot of power and being set in a political environment that fosters this development, individual institutions, such as social development bodies, start to participate in it, possibly involuntarily and sometimes without even realising they are doing so if they do not assess the new *de facto* governing landscape. The coordinator of the community court reflects on the statistics on by-law offenders and argues:

> I agree that a lot of homeless people that went through those courts but not because of the fact that they are homeless, because the idea is not to criminalise poverty, the idea is to talk to those people who are contravening by-laws (Interview 47\(^{138}\)).

Again, this argument is similar to the one above: there is no arbitrary, unlawful targeting of homeless. This, however, is not what is being claimed. The argument is

\(^{137}\) Researcher
\(^{138}\) Participant associated with community court
rather that there is a bias in governing bodies that uphold the law, but this appears not to be the point of the critique, at least not openly. Although de jure the law applies to everyone, de facto it does not, and instead it serves the short-term interests of the governance bodies. To create space it is not necessary to break the law, instead governing bodies just have to follow it. Drawing on Mitchell’s (1997, 2009) arguments, someone who is not homeless is less likely to have to wash their clothes in public, to light a fire in the city, or to defecate in a public space. Making this illegal without offering alternatives and supporting an, at least during daytime, almost omnipresent private police force, makes life in the community’s territory very difficult, and even annihilates the people from these spaces (Mitchell, 1997). Therefore, de facto poverty as a social problem is being criminalised although de jure Justicia is still blind to this. Arguably this will remain the case until the community court acknowledges the governing power of the CIDs in its jurisdiction in terms of policing power.

The community court that is situated in the case study area tries offenders arrested in four police stations (three of which are in the case study area), which are all characterised by either a CID and/or a well-organised community policing forum (often the two overlap in terms of personnel). As argued above, both governing communities have the aim of maintaining a particular kind of space by using security and fieldworkers, as well as developing the legal framework to do so. A legal researcher who was interviewed described the current situation as the processing of homeless, arrested for by-law offences, through the legal system (Interview 36139). It is argued that private community organisations, although without any direct jurisdiction in the court, use the community court as yet another tool to come closer to their idea of space. Equipped with the by-laws, the CID’s security force, as the

139 Researcher
most visible policing actor in their territory, can supervise arrests for quality of life
offences that are then addressed in the community court. In this context the idea of
being from the community for the community is biased, as the typical client of the
court is not the average resident of the individual neighbourhood, but instead a
member of its street people population, which is targeted for being a nuisance. Like
social development bodies, the community court becomes part of a sophisticated
policing landscape that private governance bodies can use to create space. The next
section will integrate the social services into the considerations on urban revanchism.

9.6 Social service

Social services are part of the community courts and criminal justice system. As
mentioned above, the idea of the community court is that the defendant, if guilty,
pays the community back for the harm committed against it. However, practically
‗paying the community back‘ involves an organisational structure that supervises the
convicted person during community service. Besides Metrorail, a railway company
that uses convicts to clean their carriages from time to time, two NGOs are the main
recipients of people convicted by the community court in the centre of Cape Town.
One of these organisations carries out diversion programmes at their own cost and
deals with fewer people (Interview 42\textsuperscript{140}); the second NGO, an Evangelical Christian
organisation, plays a more significant role, managing to offer cleaning and basic
gardening services through a system of rotation (Interview 17\textsuperscript{141}; Interview 21\textsuperscript{142};
Interview 38\textsuperscript{143}). Having fewer staff and overhead costs, they can offer a service that
is cheaper than commercial service providers. Here the forced labour of the

\textsuperscript{140} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{141} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{142} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{143} Representative of social development sector (follow up)
convicted competes on the open market. The main customers for their services are CIDs, especially the ones close to the centre who use them alongside commercial cleaning providers (Interview 21\textsuperscript{144}, Interview 38\textsuperscript{145}).

In this case the idea of cleanliness has a double meaning in the eyes of the private governing. Firstly, it refers to the obvious, such as the removal of litter off the streets and the maintenance of public parks. In a second interpretation, however, it has the notion of clearing the homeless that are seen as a nuisance to public spaces off the streets. In the case of the convicted, who are there involuntarily, this system appears almost cynical. Possibly having been arrested under supervision of a CID security guard, they now have to work for the very same organisation, possibly clearing the semi-hidden belongings of other street people from drainpipes to throw them away. These cleaning groups’ members are accompanied by a supervisor with a CID vest and security guards who keep an eye on the convicted (Interview 21\textsuperscript{146}; Interview 38\textsuperscript{147}). In other words, CIDs arrest people who break the rules of the community and who then end up cleaning for the community while being off the street at the same time, and all of this for relatively cheap labour. Although the applied practice does not have the exclusionary character described above, it complies with the same goals of getting closer to a clean, controlled territory. Being under supervision of two authorities, one from the NGO and the security from the CID, and being clearly marked as service providers through their vests (see Figure 9.3), the convicted are not visible as ‘others’ anymore.

\textsuperscript{144} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{145} Representative of social development sector (follow-up)
\textsuperscript{146} Representative of social development sector
\textsuperscript{147} Representative of social development sector (follow up)
Ultimately the role of the state is characterised in a twofold manner. First, due to a lack of resources the state would rather spend its resources in areas where no private community structures take the lead. Secondly, the city/state provides the basis for the politics described. Furthermore, the state applies a policy of outsourcing existing funds to NGOs and other private entities\(^\text{148}\) (Interview with local politician; Interview with representative of social development sector), opening the stage for private interests that are not necessarily for the wellbeing of the city in general, but for their own community.

\(^{148}\) The outsourcing of state or municipality functions have to be seen as part of a wider neoliberal turn that occurred in South Africa in the post-apartheid area (Bond 1996; Samara, 2005, 2010).
9.7 Conclusion

This section has shown that private governments possess a powerful policing network to shape the social geographies. The chapter revealed the *de facto* policing landscape and unmask the powers of private governments that are not usually discussed, at least not openly, between the actors involved, and which are not directly visible. It has been shown that private governments do not only rely on private policing bodies, which are still powerful, but use more sophisticated methods, supported in part by the state.

Framed by Cohen’s thoughts on social control, it has been shown how social development bodies morph into actors of the policing landscape. Led by territorialised ideas and a biased governance setup, they become the soft side of policing, complementing the hard policing applied by their colleagues from the private policing companies. This chapter has also argued that this sophisticated ‘soft and hard’ policing network can only exist if facilitated by the local government, not only in terms of the introduction of the by-laws, but also of the community court and social services that deal with those arrested by private policing officers. Once uncovered, these extended policing networks should indeed be assessed as they have a significant on social geographies because they not only impact on the policing landscape, but also on social development and the criminal justice system. Here private governance nodes have reconfigured urban power relations that impact on urban space as well as society, something that will be outlined in the following Conclusion.
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION

10.1 Research findings

This conclusion will begin with a summary that answers the first three research questions based on the empirical findings. The second section will then discuss the final open research question, the consequences of private policing for public space and society. Once all the research questions have been answered, the limitations of the research and possible future projects will be outlined, followed by a final section sketching out the relevance of the research beyond the immediate issue of private policing companies in central Cape Town.

To start with the first three research questions:

1. What are the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space?

The spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private security companies in public space have been demonstrated, mapped and discussed.

CID policing: The largest and most prominent privately policed sites are the five CIDs that promote urban renewal programmes. Their policing includes foot patrols, cars, bicycles and, possibly, stationed campervans or booths (Section 7.2). Here, it is not only the sophistication of their force that suggests they are an actual policing body, but also several of the functions that come with the territory in which they operate. This supports the argument of Chapter 4. Besides their hard line against ‘undesirables’, they also act as ‘community ambassadors’, helping to make the space appear as safe and as welcoming as possible for visitors. Another part of this public reassurance function is the close contact of the CID’s policing companies with the community. Senior members of staff are regularly in touch with community
members to strengthen this connection. This close community contact is pursued as the private governments (CID and residential community structures) have a policy of establishing themselves as the main organisational node and the first port of call within their community. For basic officers, public reassurance and community contact is achieved through constant checking in at shops, hotels, etc. to sign the stored logbooks stored along the patrol routes.

Private policing companies are the most likely to be the first to arrive on the scene of an accident, crime or dispute, or any other situation in which a policing body is required. With their control room and car, foot, and possibly bicycle or motorcycle backup, they can either respond themselves or delegate issues to more suitable agencies. These rapid response capabilities should be emphasised as they characterise a shift in policing.

However, one of the strongest arguments for private policing companies in the case of the CID is their ability to enforce law, a fundamental order maintenance characteristic and part of most policing definitions (Section 4.3). The policing of law transpires in two ways. Legally, private policing companies have no more power than any other citizen; however, when it comes to the regulation of the urban poor, informal traders or any contravention against the comprehensive by-laws, policing companies fall back on an established customary law that provides them with the power or authority to act. In addition, private governments are able to ‘rent-a-cop’ or law enforcement officer from the city with full powers of arrest if they are required by a private policing officer (Section 7.5). Figure 10.1 compares the forms and functions of private CID policing to the public police and confirms their strength by indicating the various overlaps between the two policing bodies. The empirical data
shows that the CID policing companies have advanced beyond a simple security function.

*Figure 10.1: CID policing functions*


*Bobby-on-the-beat policing:* The second largest policing setups are the residential bobby-on-the-beat sites. Here policing companies patrol designated areas to provide additional safety, but also encourage the urban poor to move on, or out of the area. PatROLS are carried out using foot patrols, bicycles, Segways, and cars (Section 7.3.2). In terms of their role, they have less policing functions than the CID policing companies (see Figure 10.2). The key difference here is the missing law enforcement function of the bobby-on-the-beat policing, as this is something that is not necessary in those sites. Since the bobby-on-the-beat schemes operate in residential areas, issues such as vagrancy or traders, which in the CIDs are controlled through by-laws,
are not relevant. Therefore the bobby-on-the-beat police do not have to consider enhancing their law enforcement capabilities beyond the ones outlined in Section 7.3.2. If ‘undesirables’ appear they can simply send them away by playing out the physical strength and dominance of the bobby-on-the-beat officers. However, as Figure 10.2 shows, bobby-on-the-beat officers still have more functions than a security guard, and are therefore also labelled as private policing companies.

Figure 10.2: Bobby-on-the-beat policing functions


Static security: The smallest schemes are the static security setups where a guard, backed up by an armed response unit, patrols one small stretch of a public street for the residents, providing extra safety (Section 7.4.2). The guard is linked up to a control room and an associated armed response company that is capable of providing backup. Compared to the other two sites, the static security officers have almost no
policing functions (see Figure 10.3) and resemble much more a ‘classical’ security company, as outlined in Section 4.4. Besides the immediate community, which only encompasses the residents in a short stretch of street and their rapid response function (something basic armed response services offer as well) their main purpose is crime reduction through visibility. Since the space they police is so small and in residential areas issues such as vagrancy are not a problem. In summary that means static security officers not much different to mall security.

*Figure 10.3: Static security functions*

2. What is the impact of private policing on urban territory?

Chapter 8 showed that the impact of private policing on urban territory is considerable. Although their success cannot be measured in terms of numbers and crime statistics (since they are not public), their impact on their space is significant. While in the cited literature (Chapter 6) public space was condemned to deprivation, the counter-movements researched did turn this trend around. Instead of a continuing downward spiral, public space investments are being made again, the FIFA world cup was successfully hosted, people are back to consume, and even street cafes are being opened since the constant ‘harassment’ by urban poor is less significant. The successful impact is also being confirmed in the fact that the public police, to some degree, have withdrawn resources from privately policed territories; this indirectly suggests dropping crime rates, as the private actors cover many of the policing functions in these spaces, as the first research question established (Section 8.4).

The policing strategy used to achieve this is the displacement of people and crime. Through their widespread presence and the displacement strategy, these companies help reassure the public in spaces that used to be regarded as too dangerous to make much use of them. In the policing schemes various companies have specialised in the strategy of laying out a tight net of officers patrolling and watching the space closely. Without exaggeration it can be said that in the CID s one will most likely see a private policing officer within the first minute of entering their territory. In the case of residential areas, the police confirmed that on one police patrol they will see at least two armed response vehicles, and that is without considering the bobby-on-the-beat or static policing schemes. Here as well, one will encounter officers patrolling very soon after entering the territory. Without having access to the exact figures, there are about 150 private policing officers patrolling the fairly small case study.
sites during daytime. Numbers like this cannot be matched by the public police. Therefore, private policing companies are able to impact successfully on urban territory.

3. Assess the significance of private policing networks on social geographies?

Private policing companies are key in the *de facto* private policing landscape. Their considerable power and influence over space is outlined in the first two research questions. However, despite their power, private policing companies have limitations to their effectiveness, as not all problems can be solved through hard policing (Section 9.2.1). The above-mentioned displacement is not sustainable when applied on its own, as the displaced are likely to return eventually (maybe a week later, maybe as soon as a private policing officer turns his back). Therefore, the private policing landscape has been developed further to approach the issue of ‘clean and safe’ space in a more holistic way. Today the so called ‘carrot and stick’ approach is being applied using the ‘softer side of policing’ to complement the ‘hard policing’ strategies of the private policing companies (Section 9.4). These sophisticated private policing networks have started to shape the social geographies of the case study considerably.

In recent years private governments have invested in social development to work alongside the private policing companies (‘the stick’). Here social development actors, especially field workers (‘the carrot’), will offer assistance to the urban poor and street people. If they accept the assistance they will ultimately leave the space by, for example, being reunited with their families or moving into homeless shelters, just as intended by the private governments. If street people and the urban poor do not accept the help from the social development programme, the matter of an
‘undesirable’ in a space designated for urban regeneration will be referred to ‘the stick’, or the private policing company. Being able to apply a number of comprehensive by-laws that make the existence in spaces where they are being policed impossible, the private policing companies can target the ‘undesirables’ that do not comply with the offer of help from the social development bodies. Again, the targeted person(s) will ultimately be removed from the space. In this situation, participating in a social development programme is not a voluntary act, but serves an ‘out-of-space’ strategy. Social development becomes the ‘soft side of policing’ as it complements the private policing companies or the ‘hard side of policing’, describing a sophisticated de facto policing landscape.

Map 10.1: All private policing schemes

Own graphic
The argument on the policing landscape was then extended to the community court in the centre of Cape Town (Section 9.4). The point being made is that after an arrest for violating a by-law, a trial in the court follows. However, it appears that the court does not consider the privatised power relations and the impact of private governments to be within its jurisdiction. A large percentage of the crimes addressed by the court are arrests for violating the by-laws. Although being *de jure* right, the community courts *de facto* facilitate the outlined ‘carrot and stick’ approach and support the clearing of the urban poor branded as a nuisance. In other words, the social geographies have been successfully turned to support the revanchist city.

10.2 Creating parallel public spaces through private governments

This chapter addresses the last remaining, but fundamentally important, question:

4. *What are the consequences of private policing for Cape Town’s public space and society?*

This section interprets the empirical findings on private policing companies and related actors and places them in the context of the wider debates on South Africa’s public spaces and their changing nature. It explores how the new policing landscape impacts space and society in a city where considerations and worries around the use of public spaces determine life so fundamentally. Section 6.4 referred to work that has been done either in parts of the case study site (Samara, 2005, 2010a; Bénit-Gbaffou *et al.*, 2008) or in similar spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b). Departing directly from ideas on urban fragmentation and exclusion, this work is very critical of what has been called governance of security. To recapitulate some of the key arguments: Samara (2005, 2010a) talks about a social ordering of space and the exclusion of ‘undesirables’, namely street children, from the CCID in Cape Town, a
claim this study fully confirms. However, he then continues to describe CIDs as a concept that ‘turns what should be public space into literal or \textit{de facto} private, heavily policed enclaves’ (Samara, 2005) and that racial governance reproduces apartheid inequalities (Samara, 2010a). Bénit-Gbaffou takes her critique on CIDs (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008) and residential spaces in Johannesburg (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a), which correspond to the bobby-on-the-beat scheme of this thesis, a step further. Here both kinds of space are compared to gated communities, and it is argued that the grade of urban fragmentation echoes the apartheid city (Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008: 709). Although agreeing with some of their lines of argument and, to an extent, with their findings, this thesis contests the conclusions Samara and Bénit-Gbaffou draw.

At several stages this thesis has claimed that a more nuanced interpretation of space is needed to give justice to the complexity of fragmentation and governance. To give a blunt example of what is meant by this, white or middle class-friends of the researcher who do not look at every security sign or uniform they encounter do not notice the exact boundaries of the researched cases; they do, however, notice a boom in their way that stops them from continuing.

As mentioned before, security in the researched cases can never be as closed as in a fenced private property. If one just transfers through the sites, even as one of the class of ‘undesirables’, it is unlikely that the security will approach you right away. The security setups and exclusionary practices described are instead a constant struggle towards a clean and safe kind of space. Due to the busy nature of the space, they should not be compared to an actual gated community, which is comparably easy to secure (Zedner, 2009). To give another example (also see Vignette 7.1 and Vignette 8.1):
During the research I lived just outside a CID so several times a day I had to cross the boundary of my residential (non-CID) area and the CID where the mini-buses left, the shops were, etc. Having developed a routine of drinking a morning coffee whilst reading the papers in one of the cafes on the corner of the CID and residential area, I could observe the daily ‘cat-and-mouse’ game between the urban poor and the security guards. When a guard on patrol passed by he would chase the usual suspects away (usually street people have spots where they spend the day and where they sleep, so when living in an area one will know the street people population after a few weeks and vice versa. The reason for chasing them away is in these cases often not based on any legal grounds but a constant procedure that has developed. Here the customary law explained in Chapter six comes into play). However, literally as soon as the guard turns, the street people come back. This game repeated itself day after day unless either there was a crackdown by police and security, which occurred at periodic intervals, or a social worker intervened.

The reason for offering this anecdote is that, as long one behaves according to the standards and norms of the space (not violating a by-law), one is likely to pass or at least transect through the space un-harassed. So, as argued before, there is still a difference between a heavily fortified private enclave or a gated-community-like space (Samara, 2005; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008) and an exclusionary governance of security as researched in this thesis.

While this thesis agrees with the fragmentation rhetoric in general (Kempa et al., 2004; Wakefield, 2003; Ericson, 1994; Rigakos and Greener, 2000; Crawford and Lister, 2004) and in South African cities in particular (Kempa and Singh, 2008; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002, Lemanski, 2006a, 2006b; Landman, 2006, 2008; Beavon, 2000), it questions the equivalence of these spaces with gated enclaves for two reasons: first, the levels of segregation and exclusion are not the same compared to gated enclaves. Secondly, by drawing on an interesting twist in the ‘end of public space’ discussion, these spaces can become more public than they were before, thus differentiating them significantly from gated forms of space, possibly with the exception of some shopping malls (Wakefield, 2003). Instead a more differentiated terminology for new formations of post-apartheid fragmentation is suggested that argues for the existence of parallel public spaces,
referring to the century-old history of dysfunctional space in South Africa (something Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008: 709, very briefly refer to as well). Drawing on this, the final argument will be that a variety of public spaces that exist in parallel, instead of the one universal public space and a strict public-private dichotomy. These parallel public spaces are being policed and maintained by the researched private policing companies.

10.2.1 The end of public space

This section argues that privately governed and policed public spaces are far from being enclaves (as in gated communities), but can in fact be more open and public. To make this claim, some of the fundamental ideas on public space will be recaptured in order to develop a grounded foundation for the following arguments. Commonly, public space refers to streets, squares and parks one can use in an unrestricted way (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009; Collins and Shantz, 2009). However, when analysing the very nature of public space the arguments have to be based on the theoretical discussion of public space as defined by Mitchell (2003) and Mitchell and Staeheli (2009). Here, public space is that space where ‘the public’ is formed, and thus the social and cultural rules that govern public behaviour predominate. In this sense, public space is definable in part only through comparison with more private spaces, or the spaces over which individual or small group sovereignty reigns (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009: 511).

Following these thoughts on the nature of public space, Young (1990) idealises public space as an open, democratic space in which social interactions are possible and urban life is created (here city life means being together with strangers; Young, 1990: 237). For Young (1999), public space and city life is characterised by places
where differences can be lived without exclusion, that attract and draws people out of their homes, and publicity which makes a space accessible for everyone. However, she acknowledges the reality of public space that is better described through deprivation, segregation and the ‘ugliness of the city’ that makes her ideals seem ‘laughably utopian’ (Young 1990: 241). Similarly, others describe the idea of ‘true’ (in the sense of open and democratic) public space as theoretical and always under threat. Referring to the various changes in urban space, such as the rise of privatisation processes, increasing private power, semi-private space or mass private property, all of which can be summed up under the revanchist city (Smith, 1996; Atkinson, 2003; Swanson, 2007), prompts the question of whether it signals the end (Mitchell, 1995), or at least the shrinking, of public space (Nemeth and Hollander, 2010; Nemeth, 2010). Therefore, Mitchell and Staeheli (2009) as well as others (Goheen, 1998; Madden, 2010) argue that public space is often a political space as it is contested not only by groups that occupy that space and make it unusable for others groups, but also by the state and private interests who try to construct space around certain ideas that might again exclude particular groups.

In South Africa public space was to be avoided if possible during the first few years after 1994 due to the high crime rates and urban decay. This resulted in a situation in which private citizens grouped together and re-claimed their public space with the outcome that ‘others’ - street vendors, urban poor, street people - were excluded, or, if they were there or had used the space before, pushed away (Miraftab, 2007; Peyroux, 2006; Samara, 2010a, 2010b; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b). This arguably contests the nature of public space (Mitchell, 2003; Goheen, 1998; Madden, 2010; Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009) and led Samara and Bénit-Gbaffou to the conclusion that it has become privatised space due to the lack of openness or loss of parts of its
public identity. However, their argument neglects the fact that in the first years of the post-apartheid city, where private governance was not exercised, public space was also of an exclusionary nature, although no formal exclusion was exercised; but due to the crime rates and deprivation no one wanted to use it if it was not necessary. So, with all respect to their critique, for the most part the grade of exclusion in reality did not change much. What did change was the body or mechanism of exclusion.

From a gender perspective this has long been acknowledged (Hubbard, 2004; Day, 1999; Pain 2001; Goheen 1998; Nemeth and Hollander, 2010). Having a truly open public space can possibly exclude the elderly or women from it, and in the case of South Africa this would apply to most of the middle class, even though there might be no formal restriction in the form of a police force or private security excluding certain groups. As Pain (2001) argues, the fear of crime has a significant impact on the use of space. If one group enjoys an open public space, such as a park, this group might at the same time restrict it to themselves for their own recreational use. Taking private spaces, such as the already outlined mass private property into consideration, Day (1999) claims that ‘public spaces are not necessarily public’ (Day, 1999: 159, emphasis removed) and so private space is not necessarily private. Day (1999) examines the issue from a gender perspective and claims that the fear of crime, and therefore indirect exclusion from parks and other spaces, can make a mall more public for women than an actual public space; again, in South Africa this would apply to most of the middle classes. In this case public space is being defined as an open, recreational space (Day, 1999). Following this idea, the researched cases might even be more public in their current form than they were before, as many people certainly prefer the current state of being to the previous crime-ridden urban space.
As has been said before, finding a ‘free and safe urban space for all’ is a ‘rare treat in Cape Town’ (Houssay-Holzschuch and Teppo, 2009: 367).

This is in line with Madden’s (2010) ideas, which bring an interesting twist to the argument of the ‘end of public space’ thesis in the context of New York’s Bryant Park. While agreeing with the end of public space in general, he suggests that ‘[s]ome spaces are becoming more public in a formal sense but in the process they become more tightly bound to dominant forms of power. This is not privatisation but the transformation of the urban public itself’ (Madden, 2010: 202). A similar observation has been made by Paasche and Sidaway (2010) in the case of the privately secured Jardim do Professor in Maputo. What is being described in both cases is a situation in which a public space, here a park, represents an antagonism between the *de jure* ownership and its *de facto* use. While the park was owned by the public *de jure, de facto* it belonged to criminals and drug users, making it a space to be avoided by the public. Once it was governed by a BID, the North American counterpart of the CID, and therefore quasi-privatised according to many observers (Samara, 2010a; Collins and Shantz, 2009; Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009), it became open for the general public, meaning a wider intersection of the citizenry of the city; in other words its *de jure* privatisation enabled a *de facto* use by the wider public. Therefore, while some criminals and drug users are being excluded by the strict governance and policing, other, potentially more consuming, citizens can now use the space as a ‘public’ park. As suggested above, this mirrors very much what has happened in this case study as well.

Discussing ‘privately owned public spaces’, Kirby (2008) applies a similar line of argument. His main theme is that a privately-owned space can hold a public function depending on its use. Here Kirby (2008) draws on the idea of a pre-industrial café-
house and salon culture that are the spaces for social and intellectual encounters. In this sense, several of today’s private spaces can be places where people come together to interact and exchange, corresponding with Young’s (1990) idea on the democratic public space. Addressing the issue of revanchism and homelessness, Kirby (2008) argues that this is not an issue of a public space, but one of a socially-responsible city and affordable housing.

Therefore, despite Mitchell and Staeheli’s (2009) definition about the theme of openness, a relatively sovereign elitist group actually ensures a certain public-ness that was not there before. However, what does this show in this context? First it shows that what determines public space cannot be clearly defined and that there might be spaces in which a clear public-private dichotomy might not work (Mitchell, 1996). Comparing privately-policed public spaces to gated enclaves, the difference is striking. Although both are privately governed, public space becomes more public, while gated enclaves are as private as it gets.

Bénit-Gbaffou (2008b) in particular continuously draws parallels to apartheid exclusion, hinting at similarities of space during this period and the current setups. This thesis agrees with this, and indeed there are certain parallels one can observe in the context of spatial exclusion. However, Bénit-Gbaffou and Samara do not acknowledge the fact that, although grades of segregation were incomparably higher, space was not seen as private space. Otherwise all ‘group areas’ and hence most urban space would have been private space. Instead the country has a tradition of public but segregated space. In fact it has never known anything else since the Western ‘colonial’ understanding of private property arrived with the Dutch East India Company.
Since its colonisation in 1652 with the landing of Jan van Riebeeck in what later became Cape Town, South Africa has arguably never experienced public space as known in the West and referred to in the common literature on the issue cited above. In the pre-1948 colonial state, crude ideas of white superiority prevailed in the Segregation City (Davies, 1981), which had its own agenda of inequality and unjust spatiality; however, the argument here departs from the more recent history of the apartheid state/city since 1948. By drawing on the apartheid government’s urban planning, the argument of different, parallel existing public spaces will be made and used to explain the current situation of public space in Cape Town.

As Christopher puts it, the imposition of apartheid by the National Party was ‘one of the major social engineering experiments of the twentieth century’ (1997: 311). It was the declared aim of the apartheid state to create a complete separation of the different ethnic groups, as defined by the state. One of the core pillars of the apartheid policy was the Group Areas Act of 1950, which was the guiding legal framework for the ordering of public space until 1991 (Goldberg, 2001; Christopher, 1997; Davies: 1981). Goldberg sums up the key points of the act:

1. A residential race zone or area [exists] for each racial group.
2. Strong physical boundaries or imagined barriers [...] serve as buffers between human constructions, like a park, railway line, or highway.
3. Each racial group should have direct access to work areas (industrial sites or central business district), where racial interaction is necessary, or to common amenities (like government bureaucracies, airports, sport stadiums) without having to enter the residential zone of another racial group. Where economics in furnishing such common access necessitate traversing the racial space of others, it should be by ‘neutral’ buffered means like railways or highways.
4. Industry should be dispersed in ribbon formation around the city’s periphery, rather than amassed in great blocks, to give maximal direct access at minimal transport costs.
The central business district is to remain under white control (Goldberg, 2001: 76)

Although total apartheid, including the ideas on independent Bantustans, was never fully achieved, the regime came astonishingly close to it. Noteworthy exceptions to the group areas were non-white domestic workers in white households or black workers living in so-called hostels. To establish this segregation, the regime used different forms of removal of people and settlements, often involving violence. The best known example countrywide was the case of Sophiatown, a multicultural suburb of Johannesburg that was forcefully removed by the police with its former inhabitants resettled to the township of Soweto (Themba, 2007). The most prominent example in Cape Town was the removal of District Six, a culturally vibrant multiracial quarter that was re-designated as a white suburb with all non-white inhabitants being removed to townships in the periphery of the city (Christopher, 1997; Davies, 1981). Within the non-white group areas, the population could govern itself to a certain extent. This included policing, a criminal justice system and the organisation of community life (Smith, 1992; Cook, 1992; Brewer, 1994; Burman, 1989; Schärf, 2001; Seekings, 1992).

As Maylam argues, ‘[s]egregation was essentially a form of spatial control over residential space’ (1995: 29). Because the majority of the population was forced into segregation, parallel societies were established and with them different kinds of public space. Indeed, Bénit-Gbaffou sums up apartheid arguing that ‘society was characterised by political fragmentation based on the ideal of separate societies managed by separate jurisdictions’ (2008a: 96), as well as a cultural segregation (Welsh, 1972).

This reading of apartheid is confirmed by Smith (1992) and Robinson (1992). The idea not only of segregated space, but also of parallel societies is precisely what this
section is trying to establish. There was a continuum of separate, parallel spaces and societies that characterised the apartheid city. Having a separate space and society in which public life happens and a public is formed in return meant that there was a continuum of parallel existing public spaces that fulfilled both criteria in the definition cited above at the same time.

The reason for highlighting this is to show that several public spaces had already existed in South Africa for decades. When Young (1999) argues that different classes are increasingly being divided by features such as highways, they have long been built in South Africa and continue to be built. The society that Rose (1996a) suggests has come to an end never existed in the first place, and the different societies or the community of one’s own race have always been the points of reference in South African cities. Within the different separated communities, individual norms, cultures, music and fashion developed in parallel. What was acceptable in one community might be completely different in another. In his written account, Otter (2008), a white journalist who moved into Cape Town’s largest black township, Khayelitsha, repeatedly mentions the cultural differences as well as the advice of his new friends to change his way of thinking as he was in their world where he was the other. The reason for pointing this out is that, even since the end of policed apartheid, these differences in society and space still exist as they are deeply rooted after centuries of segregation. In 1998 the deputy president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who later became president, made this point when he gave a speech on the failed nation building in the country in which he talked about two nations living in parallel to this day:

A major component part of the issue of reconciliation and nation building is defined by and derives from the material conditions in our society which have divided our country into two nations, the one black and the other white.

We therefore make bold to say that South Africa is a country of two nations.
One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure (...) The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor (...). This nation lives under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure (...) And neither are we becoming one nation. Consequently, also, the objective of national reconciliation is not being realised (Mbeki, 1998).

Although directly about public spaces, this supports the argument that there are parallel spaces in which the two nations exist. This chapter is set against this tradition of a defunct nation and spaces existing in parallel. A local ANC activist and Head of the Secretariat for Community Safety in the Western Cape Department of Community Safety adds another key component to the argument, the different norms and values in the different societies:

[I]f you look at normal township areas people live in very close proximity, share common economic status, and possibly common social and cultural norms, you would find the order and rhythm of that township to be very different to the leafy sheltered, spacious suburbs. So an example of that could be that in that typical township area for a group of guys to be kicking a ball around at the corner of a street would be normal, for people to be playing music loudly would be normal, for people to be playing music for everyone in the street could be pretty normal, for dogs to be barking at any time of the day and night is pretty normal. Take all of those same examples and you transfer that to a middle, to upper-middle class suburban area protected by private security companies and you would have a totally different response. Would a young people kicking a ball at street corner be considered normal? Would it be tolerated? Probably not. They would be regarded with suspicion; a nuisance at best and a danger to society. Why don’t they go play in a designated area like a soccer field because those areas have such resources. There are recreation facilities for young people in the more wealthy suburbs. If you take the case of young people playing loud music - of course that would be a great nuisance to the order and rhythm of those communities and wouldn’t be tolerated in suburbs, but in townships that same behaviour would be the order of the day and an acceptable norm. So who regulates social behaviour and by what norms and standards? It is no wonder therefore that security companies protecting the interest of their more wealthy clients would be targeting young black males engaging in any of the activities above, as targets for their attention. So what is normal and what is to be tolerated in different communities have a certain connotation, one which is translated into race and class. You can’t separate it from socio-economic conditions or assume that there are generally accepted norms and values and that the same order can be imposed on everyone. This should be negotiated and facilitated through dialogue and conflict dispute resolution. Private security companies are not equipped to respond to these challenges. They continue therefore to do
what they do best – target those who do not ‘fit’ the order from the perspective of their paying clients. And so divisions are perpetuated, normal behaviour of young black males (in the main) are criminalised when practiced in leafy suburbs and a different sets of behaviours are policed based on geographic location (Interview 34).

Key to the argument of different spaces is the idea that they are characterised by different norms and values.

10.2.3 From public space to public spaces

This section will outline how private policing companies create parallel public spaces and through these means heavily influence the nature of the post-apartheid space as well as recomposing social life. Instead of describing the privatisation of space, it might be more suitable to pick up the point of different public spaces, defined by different norms and values, and to apply this to the case study site as well. In this dysfunctional society, different public spaces serve different, possibly parallel existing, communities, whilst potentially excluding each other by applying different sets of rules and norms. While the idea of one public space might be sufficient to describe a relatively homogenous society, at least in comparison to a South African city, this is not accurate in South Africa. As shown above, this is certainly the case between a white suburb and a black township, but also between the spaces ruled by private governments and complex security governance and the surrounding areas without such schemes.

The chapter agrees thus far with Samara (2005, 2010a, 2010b), Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) and Bénit-Gbaffou (2008a, 2008b) and others (Miraftab, 2007, Peyroux, 2006), as these spaces are too different from the actual public space in terms of policing and ideas of social order to be the same. Here space is being ordered and regulated by private governments with the desire to ‘socially sanitise public space’
(Miraftab, 2007: 608) and not only to exclude the homeless, street children and sex workers, but also street vendors and unofficial parking marshals (Miraftab, 2007; Peyroux, 2006).

Throughout the study, the exclusionary notion of and control over street people of private governments and their private police became obvious. Not only was this confirmed by the private governance actors themselves (Interview 13149; Interview 14150), but also by city officials, local politicians associated with the different political parties (Interview 24151; Interview 26152; Interview 34153; Interview 35154), a local journalist (Interview 02155), and high ranking Metro Police officers (Interview 04156; Interview 43157).

Furthermore, there is a desire to create space above and beyond the immediate problem of ‘undesirables’, which contradicts the image of a successful clean space. All larger private governments, such as CIDs, also have their own urban management sections which contract companies to clean the street. Also issues such as informal street vendors are highly regulated (City of Cape Town, 2009) and policed by the CIDs (Observation 08). In this way, private governments try to implement the particular image of space they have in their mind (Vignette 7.1 and Observation 12). Emphasising the difference from the surrounding areas, the CIDs and financially comparably potent actors have to spend their money within their territories (Interview 05158). Throughout the study, none of the participants, neither supporters nor critics, questioned the success of governance structures in terms of

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149 Representative of CID  
150 Representative of CID  
151 Local politician  
152 Local politician  
153 Local politician  
154 Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security  
155 Journalist for regional paper  
156 High ranking Metro Police officers  
157 Senior Metro Police officer  
158 Representative of social development sector
achieving their goals to create space. By doing so, a different set of rules, norms and values prevail that make them distinctly different to their surrounding public space.

Whilst achieving this, private governance creates a spatial segregation that is divided along class lines, something confirmed by many participants, which in the contemporary South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the old apartheid divisions. Therefore Samara (2005) argues that old apartheid fears are being perpetuated, which he explains with the idea of ‘moral panics’. Without these policing schemes, the wider middle and upper classes would not make use of public spaces at all. In these terms, the old segregation order is not only evident in the gated community and the shiny mall, but also in public spaces with private governments as well, while on the borders the excluded ‘undesirables’ accumulate.

It is also correct that many of these spaces serve the purpose of consumption. However, this does not change the impression that more or different people and groups use them compared to before, confirming what Madden (2010) argued using the example of New York’s Bryant Park. In a violent city, space becomes usable through exclusion and repression. The disposable income needed to consume a drink in a cafe makes space public again for middle classes as they are otherwise perceived to be too dangerous or exhausting to be in, in terms of the various aggressive begging practices or a constant feeling of worry.

These urban fragments are then surrounded by ‘more open’ or ‘truly public’ spaces, as Bénit-Gbaffou and Samara might possibly argue. Here one might find a different social order. Excluded groups might accumulate, crime rates are possibly higher, and space looks more deprived. Referring to the literature presented, this will exclude the majority of residents and tourists and cause them to spend their leisure time in mass private properties, such as Century City or the V&A Waterfront; alternatively, as
happened in the last ten years and is continuing, the affected community of residents starts exercising a governance of security themselves. By introducing a space, similar to the researched cases, they now start excluding groups and people themselves in order to take over, or take back, their space.

In the researched cases the norm and values that have been called socially acceptable (Herbert and Beckett, 2010; Beckett and Herbert, 2008) are controlled by having translated them into actual law and policing them with private agents in the name of private micro-governments. However, this does not make them private in general, just very different from the ‘truly’ public spaces surrounding them. Thus they are neither private enclaves, as has been argued (Samara, 2005; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008), nor are they as public as they used to be and the surrounding spaces still are; they are just different, but here different becomes the norm.

Having made the argument that these spaces work in Cape Town, one could almost read it as a case for privately policed public spaces; this is not the case. It is simply a logical development of a dysfunctional (neoliberal) society where ubuntu, the philosophy of human interconnectivity and relation, is not being practised outside the borders of the community. The shifting towards a patchwork of different public spaces and the state's support of this describes a securitisation of social problems and a continuum of defunct space in a country that has never experienced anything different. One of the most pressing issues in South Africa is social inequality, which is part of the cause of high crime rates, which is rooted in apartheid and its segregated or defunct spaces. However, instead of tackling these issues sustainably on the level of one society, which would mean channelling funds into the township areas to tackle the root causes of inequality, the city has outsourced the responsibility
to private governance agents, such as the CID. Instead, structures which are naturally concerned for their own benefit, rule over the different spaces and sort out problems according to their territorialised logic of spatial exclusion and private policing. In other words, a country that never had a society or a public space does not appear to be changing this. Instead the current development is continuing this tradition and the urban poor are being left in their space.

So yes, these spaces are part of an urban fragmentation, but this urban fragmentation consists of different kinds of spaces including, but not limited to, private enclaves, as the literature suggests. Nevertheless, the parallel public spaces discussed here, namely CID and ‘extreme forms of neighbourhood watch’, contribute to this fragmentation, despite being more public in a way and contradicting the notion of an equal post-apartheid city. Also these spaces show parallels with the apartheid city. While arguments about private enclaves such as gated communities blithely refer to the theme of exclusion on a small scale level, privately governed public spaces perpetuate the apartheid city to an even larger extent as they do not just exclude people from private space, but try to sort people in public spaces according to status, race, and class. Although many, including myself, contribute to the researched urban renewal efforts and are able to use public space, possibly again due to the racist apartheid order, this development is seen as problematic and as a threat to freedom and democracy. In short, this thesis suggests that social problems should not be addressed through the means of security and policing. The research showed that the benefits some gain from private governance of security in the revanchist city are gained at the cost of other, weaker groups in society, which is something that needs to be emphasised and ultimately criticised.
10.3 Limits of the research and possible future research

During the research, three interesting themes emerged which could not be explored within the scope of this thesis. A fourth issue, which is discussed below, is more an outline of possible future projects departing from the thesis and combining the aspect of alternative policing as a subject with observation as the key method (Section 5.3.2, Vignette 7.1, and Vignette 8.1) that is promising and well worth exploring.

First: The thesis studied the daytime security. At night all policing schemes change; space is re-negotiated between policing officers and the urban poor; under the shadow of darkness criminals come back into the case study sites and the consuming part of the population conglomerates on the small strips where the bars and pubs are located. The private policing agents gather there as well, making sure no one gets harmed, leaving the dark surrounding streets unprotected. Having stayed on the slopes of the Table Mountain during my first research trip, I could literally see these bright busy ‘party’ enclaves lightening up the night sky while the rest of the City Bowl laid in darkness. Studying these night-time policing setups would greatly complement the thesis and provide further interesting insights into the private policing schemes.

Second: Although the thesis was committed to grounded ethnographical research, security/policing officers are analysed in an abstract and impersonal way. They are seen as an institution with a function rather than as individuals. It would be interesting to break with this and to see the individual guard who is juggling between two very different worlds, an urban renewal designated revanchist inner city he, and only very rarely she, secures versus most the township space he is most likely to live in. Theoretically, such a study could be approached from a Marxist perspective in terms of ideas about the reserve labour force. Being able to fall back on the vast
number of unemployed urban poor from the townships, which were built during *volkscapitalimse* (O'Meara, 1983) and the later ongoing capitalist project (Davies *et al.* 1985), responsible communities, in Rose’s (1996a) and Garland’s (2009) sense, can maintain a cheap, but sufficiently large private police force to create and maintain space, as described above. In return this means that the guard on the ground is in the schizophrenic situation of defending a space against the community he is, figuratively speaking, part of. Several conversations with individual security guards have shown that this job is often their last resort. As the pay is low and the risk high, many South Africans refuse to work in the security industry. In return, immigrants from countries such as the DRC, Zimbabwe or Mozambique, see no choice other than to take such jobs. This takes place against a background of increasing xenophobia in South African townships, which fuels existing animosity within the officer’s neighbourhood, leaving the guards marginalised within their home community. This creates a difficult situation for some private policing personnel, which is a situation that deserves academic scrutiny.

*Third:* A theme that came up occasionally, especially in the context of residential security, is the impact and role of the insurance industry. Within the scope of the thesis it was not possible to answer this question or to follow it up. The strict requirements of the insurance industry are strongly linked to the shaping of the built environment and are a driving force behind a number of walls and gates, as well as guards. In contrast to the common perception, individuals might not necessarily be as afraid of crime as is often assumed. Visible and invisible security measures can often be the product of the preconditions of the insurer, as the insured would otherwise not be covered by the policy.
The insurance industry has also introduced standards on alarm systems, response times, etc. Section 7.5 demonstrated that an effective regulatory regime for the private security/policing industry does not exist; this might have to be reconsidered in light of the regulations of the insurance industry. Only insurance industry-accredited companies are accepted by the insurers. Since the private security industry is a highly competitive market, an armed response company cannot afford not to be accredited. This makes the insurance industry a sort of guarantee or quality assurance body, which is an issue that is widely neglected in the literature.

*Fourth*: The thesis has successfully combined ethnographical observations with the study of alternative policing regimes. Since observations as a method and alternative policing regimes as a theme are both still under-researched, this combination presents itself for future studies. Here the context of countries in transformation are interesting places to conduct such a study with regard to the combination of a lack of state policing/control/legitimacy, often a high crime rate, and a history of violence. Staying with the example of Cape Town, a study of the less formal vigilante township policing would complement this thesis, which focused on formal, state-sanctioned forms of alternative policing regimes. Inhabitants of the impoverished areas of the same city do not have the financial means to hire the services of private policing companies. Often in such spaces a variety of alternative policing agencies operate that are based on self-organised community structures and are established as a response to flourishing gangsterism and crime. These alternative policing setups in reality govern the lives of approximately a million people every day and exercise social control through an unofficial mandate given to them by the community, almost unnoticed by the academic world. Other spaces that come to mind include Cambodia, with a now more advanced transition or post-transition (Springer, 2009), or northern
Iraq, which is controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government and is currently in the process of transformation.

Another interesting approach to utilising a theme and method would be to follow one international company to different spaces and cases around the world. The most interesting would be G4S, which is not only the largest security company worldwide, but, with 625,000 employees, is also the world’s second largest private-sector employer (G4S, 2011; The American Prospect, 2009). Following G4S to different case study sites could be an interesting case study that would reveal the power and dominance of just one non-state actor over people, and often vital institutions and infrastructure.

10.4 Relevance of the research on private policing companies

This leaves the final question on the assessment of the researched policing companies and if they really matter, as well as their relevance for the scholarly world. So, if they did not exist, could the police still do their job? The South African police has proved over decades that it is very capable of segregating and excluding the larger proportion of the citizenry successfully. However, in a democratic nation such policing strategies are impossible. No police force could dispatch comparatively high numbers to elitist territories while leaving other areas dramatically under-policed, or contain citizens in deprived areas, as was common practice under apartheid. In these terms, it can be argued that the researched governance schemes are only realistic when utilising private forms of policing, such as the ones researched here.

Taking this into account, the governance situation would presumably be different and a reclaiming of space might not happen as is currently the case. In fact, the situation
could possibly be even worse, with a continuing decrease in public space to a degree where Landman’s (2000) scenario, as outlined in Section 6.1, might become true. Is this development, therefore, being assessed as positive? No, it is not. The research has shown how the city’s vast class differences and the problems arising from poverty are being securitised instead of solved. Social problems are being addressed through sophisticated policing machinery, sanctioned at the highest levels. However, it appears that the better it works the more it is being applied. In other words the problems are being moved out of sight, displacing them from the city’s centre while leaving riot squads of state police to deal with the displeasure of and the protests by the poor, which occur on a regular basis in the townships (Samara, 2010b).

However, before entering the field of guesswork at the end of a grounded study, it should be said that a clear answer cannot be given. As long as private governance actors have this liberty, this kind of politics and policing will continue and presumably advance. This raises the question: what will ultimately happen if the actual problems are not being addressed? Might the country ultimately implode? In the meantime, private governance nodes such as the ones described above form spaces in their own interest and become so powerful that the state has to withdraw its forces, leaving key spaces increasingly under the sole control of these private groups. Although the state is aware of this development it is actively supporting it by following an agenda of neoliberal politics and pacifying the taxpaying financial elite at the cost of democratic ideals. However, if the extent of these powers develop to a point of no return, it raises the question of whether this situation can still be called democratic, and whether it is neoliberal policies and responsibilisation or not. Private police subject to limited oversight functions should not be mistaken for so-called
force multipliers, but they are part of an increasingly anti-democratic process in which parallel public spaces are being created within the realm of the state.

In terms of its contribution to the literature or its interest to scholars beyond the immediate case studies, this thesis caters for different interest groups: scholars interested in criminology, policing, and the nature of social control; academics researching the revanchist city and urban renewal in the global North, including the transfer of these ideas; and scholars interested in inequalities in cities of the global South.

*Contribution towards criminological thoughts:* Most of the points concerning this aspect have been made in the course of the thesis. The key point is the research on the private security industry and its evolution under considerations of space, something that is still heavily under-researched. This applies in a very similar way to the combination of social control and social development. Although Cohen (2001 [1985]) first published his thoughts on this in the mid-1980s, it has not been picked up in policing studies. However, as the thesis showed, a connection between social development and policing does exist and has an impact on life in an urban space. Therefore, it should be acknowledged or considered when researching policing and social control. While it does not claim to have conclusive answers to these questions, this thesis does intend to raise some thought provoking questions.

*Relevance for research on the revanchist city:* The different researched sites are part of urban renewal strategies and policies that do not belong uniquely to Cape Town. Robinson (2011: 15) argued that they are ‘more or less ubiquitous’ around the globe. However, the local characteristics and forms of these global phenomena are distinct. The different regeneration models and forms of urban revanchism keep changing, so discussions in one place are of interest to researchers working in very different
spaces, regardless of whether they are in the global North or South (McCann and Ward, 2011; Ward, 2011; Robinson, 2011). In particular, the idea of Improvement Districts and policing strategies are being transferred around the world and adapted to local situations.

The global diffusion of the Business Improvement District programme since the mid 1990s has involved a number of transfer agents. As it has been moved around the globe from one place to another, so it has been subject to a number of changes in its institutional DNA. As it has been territorialised – embedded in particular socio-spatial relations – so certain elements of the programme have been emphasised, while others have been downplayed (McCann and Ward, 2010: 178).

While the general mobility of urbanism has been established, it is its local modifications and adaptations that make the issue interesting. In Cape Town, the local specifics that influence these modifications of the international models and policies are the high crime rates, inequalities, and the lack of policing. Consequently, this causes these mobile models not only to emphasise security but also to advance it in innovative ways.

In the case of the thesis, the common ‘ubiquitous’ standard forms of policies and practices are private governments and BIDs/CIDs, by-laws and forms of residential security, all of which have been outlined in the review in Chapters 2-4. The empirical chapters then focus on the specific innovations and modifications to those core structures. New developments that have been identified are the private policing companies, the ‘soft side of policing’, advanced sophisticated residential policing schemes, and a community court outfit that supports private governments in their revanchist efforts.

After the core idea had found its way to Cape Town it underwent significant changes in ‘its institutional DNA’ (McCann and Ward, 2010). These changes will now be of interest for other cities from both the North and South where they will again be
modified to make them fit the specific place. Having been on the demand side before, Cape Town’s governance actors might now be supplying their ideas and introducing them on various platforms, such as urban renewal associations, planning conferences and expert visits (Ward, 2011).

However, while these revanchist ideas circulate between spaces, so should critical thought. In this sense, new developments in one space are of interest for researchers working on the issue in other spaces where ideas of urban renewal are being applied. Therefore, research on specific changes is of interest for a wider audience working on urban revanchism, governance and policing, regardless of whether they are in the global North or South, referring to Robinson’s (2008) ordinary cities.

Relevance for research on urban transformation in the global South: While the North-South, rich-poor divide is less relevant from the urban revanchist perspective, this is somehow different from the perspective of inequality in southern cities and weak or failing cities. Cape Town, like other cities in the global South, is struggling with combining urban growth and participating in inner urban competition alongside the need for reducing poverty at the same time. Using the example of Johannesburg, which is seen as an example for many cities in the global South, Parnell and Robinson (2006) and Beall et al. (2000) argued that there was no ready solution for this dilemma. Therefore, innovative security and renewal schemes, whether for good or bad, are of interest for scholars researching similar urban spaces as there might be interesting ideas arising, or problematic schemes may emerge that should be watched critically as they can be transferred from city to city. Although the thesis did not directly study inequalities between the wealthy and the township spaces, it did identify recent changes to public space as being highly unequal. Although the apartheid city was segregated to extreme levels, the colonial city was generally...
characterised by cultural segregation (Christopher, 1992). The theme of the unlawful body in parallel, ‘extraterritorial’ spaces (Coutin, 2010) therefore appears to be relevant for research into many poor post-colonial cities.

### 10.5 Summary and concluding remarks

While this research analysed the spaces of security governance, this chapter has attempted to discuss the researched spaces in the context of wider urban changes. Although it has been strongly argued that they are not private spaces for all sorts of reasons, it has been acknowledged that the researched spaces are also significantly different from the surrounding public spaces as well.

A possible answer to this question has been found by drawing on the history of public space in South Africa. It has been argued that the country has a tradition of parallel existing public spaces, each characterised by its own set of social norms and values. In terms of consequences for space and society, the research has shown there is a continuum of dysfunctional space. Particular ideas of space are being applied to distinguish and conceptualise them from their immediate surroundings. Again, the emphasis is on the prevailing norms in the different spaces.

However, this does not necessary mean that the public-ness of space is suppressed by the presence of private policing actors; in fact they can foster it. The post-apartheid city has shown that completely open public space used to be highly exclusionary for the majority of the people (Chapter 6); only after private bodies took over the governance and security of the space did people start to use it. However, instead of seeing this as advocating this kind of space, it should rather be interpreted as a logical consequence of a society and speciality that has failed. It should be read as an
argument that Cape Town is a city, possibly like most other contemporary cities, that has no society and therefore no solidarity.

This also means that these spaces are not only areas that are privately policed, but represent a much more complex cartography that shows space, next to the many gated enclaves, which is only usable for the public that can afford a cappuccino (Atkinson, 2003) whilst reading the Cape Times and enjoying public life and bustling streets again, even if it is at the cost of others.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Examples for interview schedules

Interview schedule: Private Security Companies

Services
How does a regular working day of a security officer look like?
What services do they offer?
What are the most requested services?
How do I have to understand this service?
- What does it exactly entail?
- What are they exactly doing?
- What are the legal limitations?
Do they work only for private clients or the state or the city as well?
How dangerous is the job?
- How do they protect themselves?

Space
What kind of space do they secure/police?
- Is the difference between public and private space always clear?
- Is there an intermingling between public and private?
Do they work or collaborate with the police?
- If they secure a particular space, does the police still come there as well or do they focus on other spaces if they know that a security firm is already there?
What is the difference to the police?
- Is the city’s space divided between you and the police?
What is the difference between the provision of security and policing?
Are they providing security or are you policing?
- Is the answer he gave his opinion or what he is obliged to say?
What would you say is your role in for Cape Town’s security?
- How important are security companies for the urban changes?
Where will this development go to in the future?

Governance
Who is usually paying you?
Who is telling you what to do secure/police?
Can the client decide how you have to secure/police the space?
- Can it happen that there is a conflict between the wishes of the client and your legal restrictions?
What if the clients' needs conflict with the law?
- What is for example with the case of semi-legal road closures?

Who is evaluating your service?

**Interview Schedule: CID Security**

Why was the CID introduced in respect to security?

Public-private partnership that secures the downtown area with a private company, what was the reason for this?

What is the role of the City Council/the City of Cape Town in the city?

Why is a privatization of these functions necessary?
- Core functions of the state are privatized.
- Is this kind of public-private partnership necessary or a political will or decision?
- Is this an act of responsibilisation?

Policing

What is the CID's security job?

What changes have occurred in the policing network?
- What are the new actors in this network?

What is the relation between SAPS and private security of the CID?
- How does a division of labour look like?
- What rights does the CID have?

What is the difference between SAPS and private security?

What is the difference between policing and security?

Do the shopkeepers contribute to the CID and therefore have less own security in front of their shops?
- This system has strong parallels to the police as it is a core state function.

Why is there such a demand for this kind of security?

Space

What area is policed by the CID?

How has the character of space changed in the last decade?
- How does the city council assess the increasing privatization?
- Can the privatization be controlled?

Example of glue sniffing kids seven years ago. What is the objective of this kind of policing?
- Does the security of tourists include the exclusion of street-kids, homeless?

Where do they think does this development go in the future?

Do they see problems as well if public space is privately policed?
Do they think that the slogan “A city that works for you” really portrays the actual situation?

**Interview schedule: City Council**

**Policing**
- What changes have occurred in the policing network?
- What are the new actors in this network?
- How does the city of Cape Town assess this development?
- Do they use private security?
- What is the relation between SAPS and private security?
- What would the council like the relation to be?
- What is the difference between SAPS and private security?
- What is the difference between policing and security?

**Space**
- How has the character of space changed in the last decade?
- How does the city council assess the increasing privatisation?
- Can the privatisation be controlled?
- In what spaces does the city of Cape Town use private security?
- Do they use them on property that is owned by the council?
- Do they use them in public space?
- Where do they think does this development go to in the future?

**Governance/Legislation**
- Does the council assess the existing regulation of private security as sufficient?
- What could be optimised?

**Interview schedule: Metro Police**

- How does the police assess the increase of private security companies operating especially in the public space?
- What are the advantages?
- What are the problems?
- Are there no hard feelings when private companies start doing the same job?
- Where do they see the reason for this development?
- Is there a lack of trust in the police?
- Is the police overstretched?
- Who do the people call first in a case of an emergency?
- Are the different objectives of private companies a problem?
- Could the same service not be done by the police?
  Do they see an increasing fragmentation?
- What do they think of urban enclaves?
- What is the role of private security companies in this fragmentation process?
  What is the relationship between the SAPS and other actors?
- Is there a division of labour?
- What if the SAPS knows that a particular space is privately secured, do they still patrol there to the same extent?

Public vs. private space
- To what extent can they police private space?
- Is there an intermingling of different spaces?
- Is it always clear if a space is public or private?
  What is the reason for the high crime rate?
  Do they agree that the term poling is used correctly in the context of private security?
- What is the difference to security?
  Where do they think will the development go in the future?
- What about the crime rate?
- What about the growing number of private security?
  How has the policing network changed during the last decade?
- What are the new actors in the network?
- What are all of the actors?
  How has Cape Town (the urban space) changed in the last decade?
- Is there an increasing privatization of space?
  How does the police deal with this new situation?
- Does it make the policing easier?
  Do they divide urban space between different policing actors?
  Do they see a problem in the fact that PSCs are privately governed and therefor have different objectives e.g. policing only for clients?
- Does it matter if there are different objectives?
  Do they have control over PSCs?
  How is the police governed? Who is deciding what your aims and objectives are?
  Is a security company always the same for them?
- Are there differences in quality and trust?
Interview schedule: Armed response companies

Services
How does a regular working day of a security officer look like?
What services do they offer?
How do I have to understand this service?
- What does it exactly entail?
- What are they exactly doing?
- What are the legal limitations?
Do they work only for private clients or the state or the city as well?
How dangerous is the job? How do they protect themselves?

Space
What kind of space do they secure/police?
- Is the difference between public and private space always clear?
- Is there an intermingling between public and private?
Do they work or collaborate with the police?
- If they secure a particular space, does the police still come there as well or do they focus on other spaces if they know that a security firm is already there?
What is the difference to the police?
- Is the city’s space divided between you and the police?
What is the difference between the provision of security and policing?
Are they providing security or are you policing?
- Is the answer he gave his opinion or what he is obliged to say?
What would you say is your role in for Cape Town’s security?
- How important are security companies for the urban changes?
Where will this development go to in the future?

Governance
Who is usually paying you?
Who is telling you what to do secure/police?
Can the client decide how you have to secure/police the space?
- Can it happen that there is a conflict between the wishes of the client and your legal restrictions?
What if the client’s needs conflict with the law?
- What is for example with the case of semi-legal road closures?
Who is evaluating your service?
Interview Schedule: Social Development Actor

What is the role of the City Council/the City of Cape Town in the city?
- Why is the city not doing this job?
Why is privatization of these functions necessary?
- Core functions of the state are privatized. Safety and security, quality urban management (cleaning), social development, competing for investments.
- Is this kind of public-private partnership necessary or a political will or decision?
Is the goal to run the city like a company?

Social Aspect
On the services offered by the CIDs? Safety and security is clear. Quality urban management or cleaning makes sense. Why social development?
What is social development?
In own words, what does the social work of the CID entail?
What is the motivation behind this program?
- Responsibility of the civil society
- To attract investments homeless and street kids need to be off the street
What is the role of NGOs in this social network?
What do the programs look like? How do I have to imagine them?
How do the reintegration programs for homeless without jobs look like?
Are they sponsored by companies?
- I remember having seen something like this on the back of their vests.
What is the role of private security companies in the shelters etc.
- What is their objective?
Is the slogan “a city that works for you” correct?
### Appendix B: Risk assessment form

**FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**  
**SCHOOL OF GEOGRAPHY, EARTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES**  
**GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM**

**SPECIFIC AREA/ PROJECT/ INDIVIDUAL BEING ASSESSED**  
Till Paasche, Fieldwork in Cape Town/South Africa on private security from March 2010-September 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REF</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>HAZARDS</th>
<th>PERSONS IN DANGER</th>
<th>PROBABILITY</th>
<th>SEVERITY</th>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>CONTROLS IN PLACE/ ACTION TO BE TAKEN</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | Residence in Cape Town | Safety and security such as assault, violent crime | Researcher        | 2           | 2        | 4    | Find accommodation in a ‘safe’ part of Cape Town  
Do not walk around at night outside those areas  
Carry a local mobile telephone at all times and have the emergency telephone numbers accessible. | Always be cautious and alert  
Being ‘white’ often equates with being wealthy. Be aware of this and do not flaunt wealth.  
Carry details of travel insurance all the time  
Follow local advice at all times |
| 2   | Travel              | Road safety                                       | Researcher        | 1           | 1        | 2    | Make certain to have return travel arrangements booked  
Use public transport during the day  
Identify three reliable licensed taxi services, which are generally available at all times  
No use of buses or minibuses in the city at night, instead use reliable taxis |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fieldwork (Interviews with key informants of the security and related institutions in their offices)</th>
<th>Personal safety</th>
<th>Researcher</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make certain to leave an up-to-date itinerary with somebody reliable (hotel, friends, housemates etc.). Always make sure to be expected when going to a certain place Carry a mobile telephone Take local recommendations as to the safety of a visit and its location. Check all locations prior to travel with local contacts</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fieldwork (Ethnographic observations)</th>
<th>Personal safety in threatening situations</th>
<th>Researcher</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When conducting ethnographic research with a security company make sure to consider all local risks and security issues when planning the fieldwork Critically evaluate the dangers that come with ethnographic fieldwork in South Africa’s security industry Will avoid situations that are too dangerous or uncontrollable such as observations in armed response cars Observations only with registered companies Conduct research in safe low crime areas in daytime e.g., city bowl</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss all possible risks with the supervisor of the security company and the guards in the field and follow their advice all the time Get a feedback for the supervisors if any questions about the own security cannot be answered alone or when uncertain if a possible risk is too high. Observations will be stopped immediately when situations seem to become uncontrollable</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health risk</td>
<td>Health risks such as country specific diseases and climate</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Working alone</td>
<td>Problems related to long period of working abroad</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessed by** Till Paasche

(Signed)  
(Date) 11.02.2010

**Approved by**

(Signed)  
(Date)

Academic supervisor  
Manager  
Head of School

**PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE**  
Probable = 3  
Possible = 2  
Unlikely = 1

**SEVERITY**  
Critical = 3  
Serious = 2  
Minor = 1

**RISK FACTOR**

1 - 3 LOW RISK  
4 - 5 MEDIUM RISK  
6 - 9 HIGH RISK

**REVIEW OF ASSESSMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVIEW DATE</th>
<th>ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES?</th>
<th>ANY NEW CONTROLS OR ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN?</th>
<th>ASSESSED BY</th>
<th>APPROVED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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THIS IS A WORKING DOCUMENT. KEEP IT WITH YOU OR BY YOUR WORKPLACE. ACADEMIC SUPERVISOR OR MANAGER SHOULD RETAIN A COPY. REVIEW REGULARLY (Page 2) - AT LEAST ONCE PER YEAR OR IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

1 The Risk is the product of Probability and Severity. The Probability of Occurrence is based on the situation after the controls are in place or action to be taken is allowed for.

2 As stated in the School Safety Handbook, a high risk activity has no place in our School and will not be sanctioned.
Appendix C: Information for participants and consent form

Till Paasche
School of Geography; University of Plymouth; Plymouth, PL4 8AA
+44 (0)1752 585995; +27 (0)72 2543329; till.paasche@plymouth.ac.uk

Supervisors: Dr. Richard Yarwood, Prof. Dr. James Sidaway

Changes in Cape Town’s Urban Landscape and Policing Networks

Background

In the last few decades, South Africa’s urban landscape has undergone significant changes. As a reaction to the increasing crime rates, wide parts of the urban population are retreating from public into private spaces or the character and the security within public spaces changes increasingly. This means that due to an increase in crime, and consequently a fear of the public, the urban landscape is reshaping increasingly. At the same time the policing network has undergone a transformation. As the public police service struggles with high crime numbers, people are increasingly relying on private security. It is argued that it is only because of private security companies that today’s growth in secure private space is possible. As a consequence, private security companies that offer a wide range of services have become an essential part of the policing network.

Aims and Objectives

The research project aims to analyse the changes in the urban landscape and the policing network. As such, the project seeks to find out how security networks work and how private security companies negotiate security issues with the contracting entities as well as with the public police forces. Different security arrangements in the urban landscape will be identified in order to map the changes. Furthermore it is often argued that, especially in a South African context, public police and private security have become increasingly similar; this statement will therefore be analysed, evaluating the kinds of spaces that are privately secured and by assessing current policing practices.

Confidentiality

This project is part of a PhD research at the University of Plymouth, UK. The research is being conducted independently of any third party interests that could endanger the project constructing certain pictures of private policing in general and the security industry in particular. The research is being supervised by three academics and will be examined by two independent researchers to ensure that all the results and conclusions are academically justified and based on grounded facts. Also, it will be ensured that all data is treated confidentially and all participants will be anonymous unless explicitly stated otherwise when signing the attached consent form. In no way does the research ask for any confidential information from individuals or clients of security companies. The information gained from the interviews will be used for a PhD thesis as well as possible publications, such as articles that could result from the thesis. All interview data will be transcribed as soon as possible after the interview and made anonymous. The original data will be then destroyed/deleted.
UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH

FACULTY OF SCIENCE

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT

Till Paasche, School of Geography, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, PL4 8AA
Contact details: +44 (0)1752 585995; +27 (0)72 2543329, till.paasche@plymouth.ac.uk

Name of Principal Investigator

Changes in Cape Town’s Urban Landscape and Policing Networks

Title of Research

The research project intends to gain insights into policing networks in general, and private policing in particular. Therefore, the focus of the research is on urban space and how urban space is changing through new modes of policing.

Brief statement of purpose of work

The objectives of this research have been explained to me.

I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my data to be destroyed if I wish.

I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.

Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research.

Name: ........................................ Company: ...................................

Position: ....................................................

Signature: ............................................... Date: ...................................

Signature of researcher: ................................. Date: ..............................
### Appendix D: Crime statistics from the South African Police Service

**CRIME INFORMATION MANAGEMENT - SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE**

Crime in Cape Town Central (WC) for April to March 2003/2004 to 2009/2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTACT CRIME (CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sexual Crimes</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murder</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common assault</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>694</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common robbery</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery with aggravating circumstances</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>488</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROPERTY-RELATED CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malicious damage to property</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>1,217</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>642</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CRIME HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON POLICE ACTION FOR DETECTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug-related crime</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>1,475</td>
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<td>Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>268</td>
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<td><strong>OTHER SERIOUS CRIME</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All theft not mentioned elsewhere</td>
<td>7,264</td>
<td>7,709</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>6,391</td>
<td>6,014</td>
<td>5,218</td>
<td>5,017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commercial crime</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>1,030</td>
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<td>Shoplifting</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>1,315</td>
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<td><strong>SUBCATEGORIES FORMING PART OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY ABOVE</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carjacking</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck hijacking</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery at residential premises</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robbery at non-residential premises</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td><strong>OTHER CRIME CATEGORIES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Culpable homicide</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Public violence</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime in injuries</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect and ill-treatment of children</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

310
## Crime in Sea Point (WC) for April to March 2003/2004 to 2009/2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTACT CRIME (CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sexual Crimes</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murder</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common assault</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common robbery</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robbery with aggravating circumstances</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONTACT-RELATED CRIME</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malicious damage to property</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPERTY-RELATED CRIME</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary at non-residential premises</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary at residential premises</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>434</td>
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Appendix E: ‘Observation: USS New York’

Observation

THE USS NEW YORK

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The USS New York

The USS NEW YORK (LPD 21) (...) was commissioned in New York City on Nov. 7, 2009. At approximately 8:00 a.m., on November 2, the USS NEW YORK came to a standstill across from the World Trade Center site, dipped her flag, and delivered a 21-gun salute. Members of the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, Port Authority Police, members of the families of 9/11 victims and veterans gathered on the shore at the North Cove in the World Financial Center to return the salute. (USS New York LPD 21, 2009a)

The *USS New York* will soon be defending freedom and combating terrorism around the globe, while also ensuring that the world never forgets the evil attacks of Sept. 11 (...) (New York Gov. George Pataki quoted in USS New York LPD 21, 2009b)

The following is about a ship, more precisely a war-ship, the *USS New York* (see figure 1). We claim that the *USS New York* is being used to popularise an ideology (Chomsky, 2001) that exploits the tragedies of the terror attacks for advancing a militaristic agenda. However, although the ship is a good example for this militarised discourse, we see it in a line of events and reports that communicate what Gregory (2004) has called the colonial present\(^{159}\). It is therefore that the *USS New York* is not only an extraordinary example as it might first appear, but that through a constant reproduction of the discourse, of which the *USS New York* is part, we now face what James Sidaway (2001, 2003, 2008) has termed banal geopolitics:

> War and a plethora of new strategies, military technologies and security procedures have become everyday and ordinary. War is more or less taken for granted as the norm, fed (especially in the United States) by a daily media coverage about “terrorism”. (Sidaway, 2008, p. 2)

Drawing on Sidaway’s work, Merje Kuus describes processes of banal militarisation and banal imperialism in her work on NATO’s eastern enlargement (Kuus, 2007,

\(^{159}\) By ‘colonial present’ Gregory (2004) describes a situation where Washington, London, and Tel Aviv position the “West” as the victimised target of terror attacks to emphasise *our* (the West’s) difference to *them* (the terrorists in the former colonies). Having established this difference, military actions, occupations, or a continuing colonial present/presence on *their* territory is then legitimised as part of the wider “war on terror”.

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Describing the processes of imperial subject-making in Central Europe (i.e. only through subscribing to NATO’s agenda do Central European states become recognised and accepted “Western” states), Kuus (2007, p. 269) illuminates “the practices through which military force and military solutions are associated with moral good. These practices are central to the militarization of social life today”. The processes of militarisation lead, according to Kuus (2007), to the production of a “normative space of imperial right” through which an imperial agenda is sought to be morally legitimated and advanced. In this context, Kuus (2008, p. 627) argues elsewhere that the practices of civic militarization are essential for global empire-building. They habituate electorates to the business of the military-industrial complexes and thereby make these complexes appear natural components of world affairs. In so doing, they erode the distinction between wartime and peacetime and legitimize the global state of imperial war.

Fundamental to both Sidaway’s and Kuus’ arguments (see, in this context, also Gregory and Pred, 2007; in particular the contribution on banal terrorism by Cindi Katz, 2007) is an alarming reminder of the growing (and constructed) normalcy of various forms of militarism. In this intervention we use the extraordinary example of the *USS New York*, to remind us as well as the reader to raise awareness to this, by now, ordinary or mundane politics. Precisely *because* we see it every day, this intervention highlights the importance of critical reflection upon such mundane practices of the demonstration not only of military force but also the militarisation in everyday life. Through such practices, militarisation often turns into what Cynthia Enloe (2000, p. 3) describes as a ‘pervasive process’ that is so “hard to uproot, precisely because in its everyday forms it scarcely looks life threatening” and therefore runs danger of being forgotten or becoming ‘banal’ (Kuus, 2007, 2008; Sidaway, 2001, 2003, 2008).
Figure 1: The USS New York

The USS New York is dedicated to the victims of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, made from the steel of the World Trade Center (although more symbolically as only 7.5 tons were actually used for the bow, which is about a thousandth of the actual weight), and built near New Orleans by workers who survived hurricane Katharina. The USS New York relates directly to two of the biggest catastrophes on US American soil and demonstrates the world that their nation arises from it even stronger. The USS New York epitomises resurgence of the United States of America after humiliation through terror as well as a natural and (partially self-inflicted) social catastrophe. It embodies dominance and strength. It rose phoenix-like from the ashes of New York, destined to hunt the ones responsible for the 9/11 attacks but also overplays the direct aftermath of hurricane Katharina when the state’s failure in dealing with a natural disaster, that ultimately also unveiled a social disaster with military strength (Katz, 2008). To continue with Katz’s thoughts, here the terror, including natural disasters, is being mobilised to “solidify a porous nation” within, as well as to justify the geopolitical agenda outside the homeland (Katz, 2007, p. 355).

As the retired governor George Pataki said: “On September 2001, our nation’s enemies brought their fight to New York (...) The USS New York will now bring the
fight to our nation’s enemies well into the future” (Quotes in USS New York LPD 21, 2009a).

In terms of post-9/11 ideology, the USS New York is a highly interesting case, not least for the kind of ship chosen to play this prominent symbolic role. In general, for symbolising issues of dominance and power one might expect such a strong symbol to be a big new destroyer. This is, however, not the case; the USS New York has only four smaller guns for its self defence. It is an “amphibious transport dock of the San Antonio class” (USS New York LPD 21, 2009b), a troop carrier for amphibious landing operations (see figure 1). The choice of ascribing such symbolism to this kind of ship indicates a shift in the nature of sable-rattling away from the demonstration of brute firepower to more flexible intervention capabilities. Clausewitz’s army-against-army wars appear outdated (Kaldor, 2007, Ó Tuathail, 2000), whilst at the same time the challenges of so called asymmetrical warfare against criminal organisation, insurgents and different terrorist groups loom large. Destroyers are of limited value to this kind of conflict. Instead, highly trained mobile commando units, such as the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) based onboard the USS New York, become of increasing importance. The crew of the ship are only 360 sailors but additional 800 marines from the ‘Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 26’ that are stationed on board with their associated gear including heavy Abrams combat tanks, helicopters, and landing crafts. As they advertise themselves, MEUs are flexible multi-purpose units that are supposed to be able to react to all challenges this century might offer (Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 26, 2009). In other words, the USS New York is US America’s answer to future challenges. It is a way to reassert the US’ ability of global power projection.
However, examining the underlying ideology of war campaigns, there is more to the ship than just its well chosen type. The website of the *USS New York* (yes, the ship has its own website: www.ussnewyork.com) opens with the line: “Out of the ashes of 911 comes a ship forged from the steel of the World Trade Center”. The website has a strong focus on the victims of the terror attacks using songs, videos, speeches, and poems. Figure 2 shows the kind of mood and atmosphere that is being evoked; the United State’s heraldic animal, the bald eagle, is crying over the burning twin towers (USS New York LPD 21, 2009c). More evident is a certain theme of revenge when reflecting on the motto of the ship ‘never forget’. Everyone who has lost a loved person knows the idea of never forgetting. Never forget what a great person he or she was; never forget the happy times we had. Onboard a warship that epitomizes an ideology which creates a dichotomy between our victims and the ones who are responsible for it and who attacked us on ‘our own’ (Western) soil.

*Figure 2: The crying eagle*

New York and New Orleans: two cities representing the “free America” (Wall Street, the Broadway, the ‘Big Apple’ and the French Quarter, Mardi Gras, leisure culture respectively) had come under attack as sites of US vulnerability and failure, but are
thus being morphed again into symbols of strength and power. Furthermore, these tragedies are used to justify the use of force and to attain public support by inducing emotional heroism and patriotism; always remember our victims. The event was not only covered in a vast media campaign, involving all major US news stations. There are also some 300 videos when searching for USS New York on YouTube. The USS New York also has its own Facebook site displaying numerous enthusiastic comments. Together with other examples such as the ego-shooter computer game ‘America’s Army’ – developed, constantly updated and offered for free download by the US military (CNN Money, 2002) – or an own department that liaises with Hollywood to represent the armed forces in their interest (The Guardian, 2009), the USS New York communicates a ideology that is highly likely to continue well into the future. Therefore it is not only the United States’ army that has adjusted to the 21st century warfare; it is a widely produced ideology in “a time of crisis” and a trial “to mobilize the population for the same course” (Chomsky, 2001) that seek to justify US/western imperial presence (Gregory, 2004).

In such critical terms the ship has received very little attention amongst academics, political commentators and in the wider public. Does this suggest that the case of the USS New York is not the extraordinary event as which it has been described above. Contrarily, we argue that it is another (although remarkable) example for what has been termed ‘banal geopolitics’ (Sidaway, 2008) or in this case better ‘banal imperialism’ (Kuus, 2008). Rather than qualifying Gregory’s and Chomsky’s arguments, it builds on and emphasises them. The ship and the ideology it represents simply appear mundane, showing how advanced the ‘colonial presence’ has become. Through a constant reproduction of the discourse it developed into an omnipresent companion, at least in the Western news-landscape, to a stage of its banality.
In countries such as the US, the UK or Germany pictures of soldiers (such as the mentioned MEUs) in combat, possibly departing from ships like the *USS New York*, kicking in doors in dusty cities or the greenish blurry videos of ‘smart’ bombs hitting their targets have ceased to be horrifying or shocking. They became a daily routine of news coverage - on the ‘war on terror’, the ‘war on drugs’ and all the other wars that are supposedly being fought at the moment and thus serve to popularise a respective agenda.

In 2001, Chomsky pointed to a silent process of mobilising the population for the ‘same course’. In 2011, we are beyond that stage. We have become ‘mobilised’ to an extent where we accept the necessity of combat and war – routinised through daily visualisation – as a component of our globalised lives. In fact, the banality of the ‘colonial present’ reached a stage at which the “normative space of imperial right” (Kuus, 2007) becomes the plot for our entertainment on rainy weekends when we watch movies such as ‘The Hurt Locker’ or ‘Green Zone’ with a supersize container of popcorn. Because we face this banal imperialism, as critical geographers as well as citizens, we need to get the banality out of this kind of geopolitics and all the (constructed) wars currently being fought. Although these ideas are not new, we argue that we must remind ourselves of this “civic militarisation” (Kuus, 2008) and use our privileged position as academics to question these practices (Chomsky, 1967/2011) and offer (freely accessible) thoughts of awareness. We hope that this observation will form part of this process.

**References**


01/02/2010.


Appendix F: Transecting security and space in Maputo

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Transecting security and space in Maputo

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Abstract. Over the past four decades, the Mozambican capital city of Maputo has undergone rapid changes. Although still governed by the (formerly socialist) party that inherited the city from a collapsing Portuguese colonial state in 1975, postsocialist Maputo recasts disparities in class and power. This paper negotiates these fractures, based on two walking transects through the central areas of the city conducted by the coauthors. Initially informed by ‘psychogeography’ literatures on negotiating and representing cities, these were supplemented by and enacted through a focus on security and policing. While the state uses police to secure vital interests, other sites and spaces experience limited policing. To bridge this security gap, commercial and ad hoc security providers are contracted to secure private homes and enterprises. We describe an increased and uneven commoditisation of security. The security landscape of central Maputo thus comprises a complex patchwork of privately secured micro enclaves that relay and rework enclaving on larger scales.

“Just as ‘democracy’ today has become a common idiom of political parlance, so too might ‘socialism’ be considered for Africa an idiom of the 1950s to the 1980s. During that time, no fewer than thirty-five countries out of fifty-three proclaimed themselves ‘socialist’ at one or other point in their history.”
Anne Pitcher and Kelly Askew (2006, page 1)

Introduction
Prominent amongst these socialist regimes in postcolonial Africa was the one in Mozambique that came to power after the collapse of Portuguese rule in the mid-1970s. This paper negotiates the Mozambican capital city of Maputo, two decades after the revolutions of 1989 swept away the Eastern European and Soviet role models that had (along with Maoism and the Cuban experience) informed socialist strategy in postcolonial Mozambique. It does so through the means of two walks from central Maputo conducted by the coauthors and supplemented with readings, conversations, and interviews with informants who we approached along the way. We are mindful of sociospatial transformations, especially as these are mediated through practices of securing space. In their article on African socialisms and postsocialisms, Anne Pitcher and Kelly Askew (2006, page 3) go on to note how the socialist moment in places like Mozambique is fading from accounts even though the moment does significantly, as in Mozambique, deeply shape the present. Thus:

“Instead of ‘postsocialism’, the language of ‘neo-liberalism’, ‘democratic transition’ and civil society’ dominates discussions of Africa’s recent transformations. It looks

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