THE VISIBLE INVISIBLE OBJECT: A PHOTOGRAPHIC ENQUIRY ‘RECORDING’ A LIVED LIFE

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2011

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First published, University College Falmouth incorporating Dartington College of Arts in 2011 by David Sullivan.

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The Visible Invisible Object:
A Photographic Enquiry ‘Recording’ A Lived Life

by

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A thesis submitted to the University of Plymouth
in partial fulfillment for the degree of

Master Of Philosophy

University College Falmouth incorporating
Dartington College of Arts

February 2011
Abstract

The Visible Invisible Object: A Photographic Enquiry ‘Recording’ A Lived Life

David George Sullivan

This practice-led research project is centred upon a photographic ‘recording’ of everyday ‘objects’, which has been built up since 2004. I have ‘recorded’ everyday ‘objects’ that I have experienced using the camera lens, selected because of the form of the ‘thing’ and to act as a vehicle to signify the ‘encounter’, or a related signified memory. The images act as signifiers. The aim of this practice is to ‘record’ ‘encounters’ and memories through the positing of ‘objects’; to make a selection from this body of work and consider the relation between images, between images and their subject, and between images and a lived life. This led me to a distinctive phenomenological approach to a photographic – based practice.

The sequence of chapters in the written thesis is intended to reflect the research process. It moves from a consideration of the individual photograph, to groups or suites of images, and thence to a larger body of work. In a series of parallel movements the act of taking the photograph, the consideration of images in relation to each other, and the relation between the image and possibilities of narrative become the focus of discussion. In each of these sections relevant examples from other practitioners and theoretical writings, strongly based in phenomenology contextualise specific aspects of my practice and my practical research.

The practical element of the project is represented by a portfolio presentation of a selection of my images at the beginning of the thesis along with their accompanying texts, and by an exhibition of a similar selection of images also with their accompanying texts taken from my body of work. Both of these presentations parallel the discursive structure of the thesis supporting the enquiry through performing or demonstrating aspects of individual images, groups of images and the story-telling or narrative capacities of the photographs. Extracts from personal narratives are presented alongside some of the photographs. In other sections, the importance of the word - image relationship is comparatively analysed by presenting a further set of artwork, which remain untitled, and without narrative.
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The Visible Invisible Object: A Selection Of Images and Accompanying Texts
A black haired doll sits on a windowsill inside a downstairs toilet; she's frozen in time and seems stuck in a lifelike model's pose. The purpose of the doll is to protect the toilet roll holder and she must have been like this for at least twenty years or more. The net curtains are thick with dust, whilst the sixties/seventies-style knitted clothes never seem to be out of fashion and that hat perched on her head always looks very chic. Her jet black hair is seductively covering her eyes and the light shining on her red lipstick gives the impression it's just been applied. Yet, I ignore everything and only see 'those blue eyes'.

Plate 2: *Those Blue Eyes* (2006)
The heart is broken and in need of repair, notice the red tape peeling from its centre, the out of place wrongly coloured unlit light bulb and the coincidence of the alarm case spelling 'defence'. Yet, the heart still beats above a florist shop on Valentine's Day and draws the customers in to buy more flowers whilst 'out shopping'.

My mother is downstairs in a makeshift bedroom in the front room, in a temporary bed. She is bedridden, unable to climb the stairs. She is terminally ill with stomach cancer. She is starving to death, and my dad is caring for her throughout the night. The doctor has advised us she could die any minute. I am lying on my bed. I wear earplugs to block out the cries of pain and frustration. I cannot sleep, so I play solitaire on the iPod. “We have a winner!” exclaims the screen, as I accomplish solitaire.

Plate 5: Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007)
A Russian doll sits inside a kitchen dresser on a packed shelf; to the right you can just about make out a glimpse of the beginning of her wooden family. The doll’s proportion is out of scale and the image is a close-up that concentrates purely on isolating the doll and totally ignoring its small scale and height.

In the centre of the doll’s hairline you can see a white light reflection, very similar to a burning ray of light from a magnifying glass, this gives the impression of another presence to the image. The black illustrated round head looks like its balanced on a tightrope in a surreal Humpty Dumpty way; and why the ‘smudged lipstick’?

Plate 6: Smudged Lipstick (2006)
You do crazy things when you're young such as getting drunk in the bath on thunderbird wine aged twenty one, and spilling water without knowing it through the floorboards onto the kitchen ceiling as you dance manically to a tape recording of The Stone Roses' "Stop The World I'm Getting Off" -ironically from an old stereo your girlfriend got you for Christmas, the same one that's just dumped you. It's then you realize how much you hate thunderbird wine.

If you look closer you notice that the bathroom lock is broken by a forced entry and you can see the hammer marks in the wooden doorframe where an attempt has been made to fix it. A forced entry made by your dad checking if, by the age of twenty one, you should have grown up by now. And even now, seventeen years later, the lock still remains the same.
Plate 8: I Fucking Hate You (2009)
Plate 12: Untitled (2007)
Acknowledgements

This fascination with the image was inspired by living above a dry cleaning shop on a busy road in West Ealing, London, where night after night I would watch the reflections of the light moving across the walls. A reflection resonated off the cars as the drivers paused from their journey at the traffic lights until it was time to move on again. These ephemeral moments would lead me to want to 'record' with the camera.

Also I would like to thank Robert Frank for displaying these words:

It is only with the heart that one can see rightly, what is essential is invisible to the eye. (De Saint-Exupéry, 2005: 63)


And finally to all the crooners in music such as: Nick Cave, Richard Hawley, Marc Almond and Roy Orbison for example. It goes without saying my acknowledgement to those artists, dreamers, misfits, rebels, non-conformists that make life interesting and struggle for what they believe in. Sometimes, you just have to believe that there is a pot of gold (not necessarily financial) at the end of the rainbow, and as Nick Cave suggests in the title of one of his compact discs, taken from the bible, you may well be:

Kicking Against The Pricks. (Cave, 1986)

14. And when we were all fallen to the earth. I heard a voice speaking unto me, and saying in the Hebrew tongue, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks. (Bible Quote From Acts 26:14 cited in Cave, 1986)
Author's Declaration

At no time during the registration for the degree of Master of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Graduate Committee.

Publications (or presentation of other forms of creative and performing work):


The Light Sale: Creative Journeys With The Image, Rhubarb-Rhubarb The UK’s Festival Of The Image, Curzon Street Station, 21 – 26 July 2007, Eastside, Birmingham.


Word count of main body of thesis: 29,795

Signed: 0.

Date: 04/04/11
Foreword

Throughout this thesis I am using phenomenology as a central concept or theoretical model. At times I have used the phrase 'phenomenology suggests' where it is based primarily around the point of view of the phenomenologist Robert Sokolowski. What is interesting, of course, about this point of view is that it is not solely Sokolowski's. He uses the terminology formulated by Husserl, which is standard practice, but insists that he does not trace the manner in which these and other terms arose in Husserl’s writing and in the work of Heidegger, Merleau Ponty and other phenomenologists. Instead, he uses the words directly because they still have life in them, and I believe, just as in the case of narrative, this is ongoing.

I have chosen to identify separate ‘recordings’ from my body of work as individual numbered Plates, and to make the distinction that images by other photographers are identified as individual numbered Figures to avoid confusion. Also, I have presented a selection of images with their accompanying text at the beginning of this thesis as a portfolio example, and to mimic a potential exhibition or book sequence of viewing.

Throughout this text I use single quotation marks around a number of words, this is a feature of the text where I have chosen to highlight particular words. For example both 'ways of seeing' and 'moments of time' were derived from my reading of John Berger’s books, but subsequently I have incorporated them within the text. I will not refer to Berger every time I use them. On other occasions the quotes refer to either philosophical, or more specifically phenomenological terms, and also because I find certain words within the traditional structure of language restrictive i.e. 'object', 'thing' and 'encounter' for example. It is worth noting here that, even with the Berger quotes, I would suggest that when the reader comes across these specific quotes, they do so with an open mind, and with an ability to question, reflect, and imagine the potential possibilities of 'ways of seeing'.
Research Process and Methodology

This practice-led research project is centred upon a photographic ‘recording’ of everyday ‘objects’. The aim of this practice is to ‘record’ ‘encounters’ and memories through the positing of ‘objects’ in sharp contrast to a more common usage of the camera lens to ‘record’ actual loved ones or to represent these ‘moments of time’. Over six years approximately four thousand images have been recorded and catalogued. Seventeen of these images have so far been exhibited.

Since 2004, I have ‘recorded’ a particular workplace, my home in Birmingham and the urban streets that surround it, a home in Devon, and in contrast numerous seaside towns and country settings. By ‘recording’ these indexical acts, that moment of a decision at a particular place in time, I have ‘recorded’ a lived life through the everyday ‘object’. I only use colour images. Each ‘object’ was taken ‘in situ’ with no artificial photographic lighting. It was ‘recorded’ using the close-up. My technique was self-taught. There are either single or multiple ‘recordings’ of the ‘object’. These images have been placed in relevant suites or juxtapositions either printed or saved as Jpegs with no post-editing. Subjective textual extracts, title, narrative and story, have also been ‘recorded’ alongside some of the photographs.

An objective of this research project was to make a selection from this body of work and consider the relation between images, between images and their subject, and between images and a lived life. The sequence of chapters in the written thesis is intended to reflect the research process. It moves from a consideration of the individual photograph, to groups or suites of images, to a larger body of work. In a series of parallel movements the act of taking the photograph, the consideration of images in relation to each other, and the relation between the image and possibilities of narrative become the focus of discussion. In each of these sections relevant examples from other practitioners and theoretical writings contextualise my practical research. Works by particular photographers are cited to articulate specific aspects of my work, the citation of these artists is not intended to imply or establish the field of practice in which I am situating my work.

The practical element of the project is represented by a portfolio presentation of a selection of my images at the beginning of this thesis along with their accompanying texts, and by an exhibition of a similar selection of images also with their accompanying texts taken from my body of work. Both of these presentations parallel
the discursive structure of the thesis supporting the enquiry through performing or
demonstrating aspects of individual images, groups of images and the story-telling or
narrative capacities of the photographs. Extracts from personal narratives are
presented alongside some of the photographs. In other sections, the importance of the
word - image relationship is comparatively analysed by presenting a further set of
artwork, which remain untitled, and without narrative. The production diary and
thumbnail portfolio are also available within the exhibition for viewing as a means of
setting the work in the wider context of its process.
Introduction

Centred upon the 'recording' of everyday 'objects using the camera lens, what became evident as the research progressed was the importance of a 'lived life' behind the lens, and how, each separate 'encounter' with its resulting image(s) provided potential new knowledge creation alongside the inevitability of further creations of the 'self'. Through the provision of text alongside certain images, either through title, narrative and story, I was able to extend this concept of the 'self' and image for a viewer. This creates a triangular conversation that includes the photographic image, the attachment of text and the inclusion of a potential viewer. I have presented a selection of images and texts as a portfolio at the beginning of this publication, to indicate the point that the practical research arrived at. The form of the thesis, however, as it progresses through the three main chapters attempts to record something of the journey of research and investigation over the time of this MPhil project. In the three chapters I examine the image on its own and in the context of the body of work. I consider it in terms of the images in relation to each other and the images as contributing to a larger narrative structure in an attempt to unravel this triangular conversation. I researched this project predominantly through theories of phenomenology; certain contemporary practitioners; various critical theorists; and with the use of the camera as an artist's tool. I briefly suggest some of the main points that occur within each chapter in this introduction, but do not give a detailed description. Also, I do not mention any specific examples taken from my body of work, as I prefer to keep these separate and let their 'meaning' unfold gradually as you read each chapter.

In Chapter One I discuss how each individual image of this project is an attempt to 'record' a representation of a close-up everyday 'object' 'in situ', as they appear in the viewfinder. Also, how each attempt potentially 'records' 'my way of seeing', albeit governed by the machinery of the camera, for it is the digital eye that 'records'. I simply attempt to use the camera as an artist’s tool and through this process become its 'operator'. This chapter attempts to explain why and how that might come about. It also identifies some of the 'things' that are actually at work, both in my operation, with the camera, and what is inherent within the photographic image. I will attempt to discuss how the isolated photograph is potentially an image on its own.

There may be a multiplicity of time values occurring within and outside of the image, and yet either in time or place the viewer cannot go beyond the edge of this image.
They can speculate, imagine, or fantasize, but still only have what's left within the frame.

Through a consideration of phenomenological perception I explain how 'things' 'appear' in my work. This chapter focuses upon Sokolowski’s interpretation of 'categorial articulation' in relation to Barthes’ notion of 'punctum' and 'studium', and my own primary and secondary focused 'way of seeing'. I use Barthes’ terminology to distinguish my 'self' as a photographic 'operator', as well as sourcing other critical theorists to discuss these lines of enquiry such as: Sontag, Berger and Benjamin. I cite practitioners such as: Stephen Shore, Richard Billingham, Eugène Atget, Nan Goldin and others to indicate similar and alternative working methodologies. What becomes evident is that the photograph is contingent i.e. something that occurs or exists only as a result of something else or that depends upon something else. This some 'thing' else being the initial 'object', and its luminous rays, that emit from its original context.

In Chapter Two I discuss how these close-up 'recordings' of everyday 'objects' have become part of a larger body of work. I consider how the images relate to each other, how this affects their being read, what the implications of this are for showing or viewing the work, in an attempt to answer the question whether the photograph does stand-alone. Temporality, memory, and the 'self' may be explained in numerous ways, however I have chosen in this chapter to focus on this through the discourse of phenomenology. There is a complex range of time contained within the body of work. Specific moments that I made the decision to 'record' have become an ongoing narrative, in which I am present as a photographer, a milkman and a member of a family. This creates more sub-divisions.

I discuss how my intention in each image is to exhibit (communicate) a subjective 'way of seeing' a particular 'object', and importantly a specific signified memory to the viewer. This memory may be either a memory of the 'encounter' with the 'object', or act as a metonym for a relational memory. These 'recordings' may be specific frozen 'moments of time', but each separate viewing creates a different 'encounter' with these particular 'objects'.

I discuss Berger's concept of 'the nexus of affinities' in an attempt to understand the reading of several photographs. I use the term 'suite' to refer to a way of grouping or understanding the images within the body of work as sets, and ask how they relate to Stewart’s concept of the collection and the souvenir. I find that the terms defined by Stewart do not fit exactly, however they do provide a set of possibilities for describing how the image is never on its own.
By attempting to represent a subjective meaning to the viewer, the ‘recorded’ image, can suggest that it has now become a parallel sign, a coded message that can be decoded. To regard the photographic image as a sign suggests an endless process of possibilities, specific parts within wholes relating to both subjective and objective interpretation. This is based upon the viewers’ own understanding, arrived at through their empirical, a priori, social, historical, aesthetic and cultural knowledge, and culminating in the sign itself being dissolved into its differences from other signs within a system of signs.

This chapter includes debate from critical theorists following these lines of enquiry, for example: Barthes, Sontag, Burgin, La Grange, De Saussure, Szarkowski, Benjamin and Berger. What I am attempting to explain here is the experiential impossibility of ‘encountering’ a pure image without any prior experience of seeing these ‘things’ in previous depictions and contexts. By way of contextualising this body of work I discuss how Walker Evans, William Eggleston, Eugène Atget and Martin Parr all deal with this notion of the artist’s work being categorised and grouped under the labelling of genre, and how they ‘record’ the everyday ‘object’, as well as citing Wolfgang Tillmans’ unusual way of exhibiting his artwork.

The issue of subject matter becomes fundamentally important within the body of work, and it is why it is so difficult to critique these ‘recordings’ as being purely subjective and isolated. I cite various examples of art anthologies and how they each provide different examples of grouping, suggesting that genre tends to become restrictive, or the body of work has to operate outside genre. What John Berger finally settles upon, in Another Way of Telling is that the photographic image is ambiguous, and therefore implies that the image is never on its own.

In Chapter Three I discuss how photography is a ‘live’ act, in the sense that the photographer performs an action in the moment of ‘recording’. It is also a ‘life’ act, in that it has its context in a ‘life lived’. This concept of a ‘self’ behind the lens becomes increasingly important, as does each new separate ‘encounter’ with the image. This is a ‘life’ that has duration and an accumulation of experience, of affecting and being affected, which is established through an interchange between perception and memory. This complex relationship develops between the ‘object’ and the ‘encounter’, and just as importantly, through each subsequent new ‘encounter’ with the image. Not only do I as the ‘operator’ attempt to posit a ‘way of seeing’ but I also attach a subjective narrative and story to specific ‘recordings’. In the case of other images, I allow them to float freer from interpretation and to behave more ambiguously than those images with text added. The concept of narrative extends beyond any one of the
images through the whole group, which is about the longer life elements i.e. this process of 'recording' the 'object' and as a 'way of seeing'. Importantly, the narrative is also by default this dissertation and the ongoing reading and writing linked to this, whereas when I use the word story I'm using something which is complete or that has a sense of finish or completeness.

Using phenomenology I discuss how 'truth' can or cannot be obtained from the combination of text and image. Sokolowski explains this through 'the truth of disclosure' and 'the truth of correctness' and the expanded terminology he develops from these. I only refer to 'truth' as a way of explaining a trace of a subjective experience of a 'moment of time'. In this sense the experiences cannot be verified. However, through the attachment of text, I do attempt to make it possible to show the 'inside', to posit a potential internal 'truth' through title, narrative and story. What becomes interesting is how both the image and the text suggest separate 'states of affairs'.

The 'encounters' with the 'recording', or the interchanges between perception and memory are connected to this transformation of the boundary. The 'self' extends back in time, or across space through the 'encounters' with the image(s). The act of photography removes data, literally through the boundary of the frame and viewfinder, and the frozen 'moment of time' that it attempts to 'record', whereas narrative enhances. It writes the image, including additional memory - a memory that I 'the operator' made the decision to share with you the 'other'.

I describe the positioning of an image alongside a story within the gallery and consider the phenomenological process of 'remembering' to the viewer. Furthermore, I suggest that the story is a parallel to phenomenological 'reduction' and discuss how this operates by citing Sokolowski's line of enquiry. By using Nan Goldin's work as an example of a visual diary, I discuss how the extension, supplementation, or completion of the image by the textual component develops the story and so offers a whole in place of, or alongside the partial image, whilst the image remains the same. Other examples of work by the practitioners Sophie Calle, Tracey Emin and Robert Frank also demonstrate how this line of enquiry can be presented.

Using Stewart's 'context of origin' I begin to question where this might be located within the text regarding the original 'object' which she refers to as a 'material referent' because the tendency of the printed word is towards abstraction as it escapes from a visible 'context of origin'. I stress the importance of attaching a 'recording' of the 'material referent' as photograph to displace some of the abstract quality of the text.
This potentially alters its interpretation by the viewer and allows a certain degree of closure. I point out that the photograph is also a quotation, and also abstracts to some degree; unless the photograph is itself the 'material referent' rather than what it represents, and purely acts as 'a way of seeing'.

I describe how I try to establish a triangular conversation between the image, the viewer, and context that is often provoked by the explanatory title, narrative and story. I discuss how the stories always refer to my life, whereas the interpretation of the titles I leave hanging between the viewer and 'operator'. They emerge from an abstraction of the story, which results in the possibility of the viewer becoming the 'operator'.

By presenting past writings and reflections upon initial 'encounters' I combine the pictoriality of the image and the actuality of its 'recording'. The written descriptions are bound up with the conception of time, both intratextual and extratextual. This culminates in the photographer's time, the viewer's time and the time of the caption or telling. Through this process I allow a certain level of ambiguity and interest to form around both the title and story.

I conclude this introduction by reiterating the point that the exhibition and portfolio at the beginning of this thesis present a selection of images and texts as a practical research outcome. Creating a triangular conversation with the inclusion of a potential viewer, this suggests how the thesis, which you are about to read, describes the link between a theoretical investigation of how the image works, of how the image is read, and is practically explored in the selection of images and text presented. This culminates in the conclusion of the research project, which is demonstrated in the work shown, that the image exists or is encountered in the various states of being alone, not alone and being extended, and that the practice continues to examine all these conditions.
Chapter One:

The Image On Its Own

Each individual image in the body of this project is an attempt to 'record' a representation of an everyday 'object' 'in situ', as they appear in the viewfinder. It also attempts to represent a subjective 'recording' of a 'way of seeing'. This chapter attempts to explain why, and how, that might come about and some of the 'things' that are actually at work, both in my operation with the camera, and what is inherent within the photographic image. According to film critic De Boully what is inherent will only ever be an unsubstantial bureaucratic 'recording' of 'things':

Neither reality nor symbol, a photo (the separate films of filmstock) which is dynamized in space-time through the succession of fixed takes or shots (the projected film) represents a bureaucratic recording of things, void of any nuance, any natural quality, any magical and revelatory power. The camera only records the superficial, photographable aspect of the visual image, which it overlays with an arbitrary sense of space and duration. (De Boully, 1993: 114)

De Boully condemns the photograph, but doesn't expand further about the (initial) 'encounter'. What is also apparent in De Boully's quote is the reference to the taking of photographs as 'recording' and not capturing. My understanding is that capturing implies getting a (complete) whole whilst with 'recording' you only get what you 'record'.

To understand how these 'things' can appear both subjectively and objectively in the 'natural attitude' through our own 'life world', I researched theories of perception through phenomenology. I will discuss these phenomenological terms in more depth in Chapter Three, when I discuss the importance of the 'self'. I initially also looked into phenomenalism, idealism and 'sense data', in particular through reference to the sections on Idealism and Phenomenalism in Chapter 8 of John Hospers's book An Introduction To Philosophical Analysis (Hospers, 1973), but disagreed with the point that the 'object' disappeared when you left the room, and all our perceptions were potentially 'sense data' only. For how could you prove this? Or more importantly, what about the world or the 'other'; are they purely 'sense data' as well? In order to understand phenomenology you must believe in the existence of the world, and that we are correlated to it. This is known as 'world belief'. Dermot Moran suggests that:

phenomenologists seek to overcome the traditional dichotomies of modern philosophies, especially the subject-object distinction of traditional
epistemology, with its attendant account of knowledge as a representation of the object immanent in the subject. (Moran, 2007: 2)

Phenomenology as an area of philosophy does involve a lot of discussion about subjective perceiving which, from my understanding, could still be defined as ‘sense data’, but insists that the ‘object’ exists independently through the subjective ‘evidencing’ of it. Sokolowski suggests that:

All such phenomena can be explored when we realize that consciousness is consciousness ‘of’ something, that is not locked within its own cabinet. (Sokolowski, 2007: 13)

I prefer to think that the ‘object’ does exist independently from us and is not purely locked in its own cabinet i.e. the mind, and the ‘recording’ of these images postulates this evidence, if only in a somewhat ambiguous way, as I will go on to discuss.

According to Dermot Moran phenomenology is, in a broad sense:

The unprejudiced descriptive study of whatever appears to consciousness, precisely in the manner in which it so appears ... Phenomenology is usually characterised as a way of seeing rather than a set of doctrines. (Moran, 2007: 1)

Importantly, its founder Edmund Husserl presented phenomenology as approaching “whatever appears as such”, including everything meant or thought, in the manner of its appearing, in the ‘how’ (Wie) of its manifestation” (cited in Moran, 2007: 1).

American phenomenologist and theorist Robert Sokolowski provides an example of how initially this subjective ‘evidencing’ occurs whilst perceiving a cube. In this example we see how simple continuous perception is defined and the specific phenomenological definitions of how ‘sides’, ‘aspects’, ‘profiles’ and ‘identity’ of the ‘object’ are formed:

(1) First, there are the sides of the cube, six of them. Each side can itself be given under different perspectives. If I hold a side directly before me, it is presented as a square, but if I tilt the cube away from me slightly, the side becomes given at an angle; it looks more like a trapezoid. The farther corners seem closer to one another than do the nearer ones. If I tilt the cube still farther, the side becomes almost like a line, and then finally, if I tilt it just a bit more, the side vanishes from view. In other words a side can be given in different ways, just as the cube can be given in different sides.

(2) Let us call each of the ways in which the side is given an aspect. A side has the aspect of a square when it faces us directly, but it has the aspect of a trapezoid when it is turned at an angle to us. As a cube appears to us in many sides, so each side can appear to us in many aspects, and these aspects, transitively, are also aspects of the cube.
I can view a particular aspect at a given moment; I can close my eyes for a minute, then open them again. If I had not moved, I will have the same aspect given to me again. The aspect itself can be given to me as an identity through a manifold of temporally different appearances. Let us call each of these momentary views a profile of the aspect; it is, transitively, also a profile of the side and a profile of the cube. A profile is a temporally individuated presentation of an object.

Ultimately, therefore, the cube is given to me in a manifold of profiles... When I see the different sides of the cube, when I experience various aspects from various angles and through various profiles, it is essential to my experience that I perceive all these manifolds as belonging to one and the same cube. The sides, aspects and profiles are presented to me, but in them all, one and the same cube is being presented. The layers of difference that I experience are played off against an identity that is given continuously in and through them. (Sokolowski, 2007: 19-20)

In his second example of perceiving a building, Sokolowski reiterates the point that a 'profile' is private and subjective:

I look at the front side of the building. I look at that side from a point of view a little to the left of centre: at that moment, I see one particular aspect of the front of the building. Suppose I say to you, 'This view of the building is very attractive; come and look at it from here.' As I move away from the spot and you move into it, you see the same aspect that I just saw, but you will be experiencing profiles that are different from the ones I experienced, because the profiles are the momentary presentations not the look or the view or the aspect that can be seen by many viewers. An aspect, a side, and of course the building itself are all intersubjective, but a profile is private and subjective. The profile may even depend on my disposition at the time and on the condition of my sensory organs; if I am ill or dizzy, the profile may be wobbly or greyish instead of being steady or blue. The relative and subjective character of profiles does not mean that the aspects or the sides or the things given through them are relative and subjective in the same way. (Sokolowski, 2007: 19-20)

What my images are attempting to represent, as a technological reproduction, are not only 'sides' and 'aspects' from the 'identity' of the everyday 'object', but also, more importantly, a subjective 'profile' 'recording' of my 'way of seeing'. Yet, my 'way of seeing' is being governed by the machinery of the camera. It is the digital eye that 'records'. I only attempt to use the camera as an artist's tool and through this process become its 'operator'. I will refer to myself as the 'operator' from now on as Barthes in Camera Lucida suggests that:

The Operator is the photographer. The Spectator is ourselves, all of us who glance through collections of photographs – in magazines and newspapers, in books, albums, archives. And the person or thing being photographed is the target, the referent, a kind of little simulacrum, any eidolon emitted by the object, which I should like to call the Spectrum of the Photograph, because this
word retains, through its root, a relation to "spectacle" and adds to it that rather terrible thing which is there in every photograph: the return of the dead. (Barthes, 2000: 9)

I am however an 'operator' who is self-taught, with no initial training and a desire for the work to be immediate, direct, intimate and self-expressive. And yet does the 'operator's' representational intent, style or content stop the image from being on its own? I feel quite clearly the answer is no. What Charlotte Cotton suggests is that:

The use of seemingly unskilled photography is an intentional device that signals the intimacy of the relationship between the photographer and his or her subject. (Cotton, 2004: 137)

Can there be intimacy with an everyday 'object'? The condition of having no training, or seemingly being unskilled, is not the same. It is an ambiguous claim, for Cotton's use of 'seemingly' implies a lack of authenticity. My understanding is this: Nan Goldin, Richard Billingham and Stephen Shore all began 'recording' without initial training, but I could well be wrong. I make this judgement based on my observation of their images, but how can you tell purely from viewing the image? All I will say here, and discuss later, is that by pressing the button I 'record' with the camera creating an image on its own; just as any other 'operator' does. In relation to this lack of training I would point to Susan Sontag's observation in Regarding the Pain of Others where she writes that:

Photography is the only major art in which professional training and years of experience do not confer an insuperable advantage over the untrained and inexperienced - this for many reasons, among them the large role that chance (or luck) plays in the taking of pictures, and the bias towards the spontaneous, the rough, the imperfect. (Sontag, 2004: 25)

In American Surfaces, 300 colour photographs are reproduced that were taken by Stephen Shore as he travelled around the USA between 1972 and 1973 (Shore, 2005). Fig. 1: Petersburg, 1972 is taken from this series. Shore's project can be seen as a visual diary, recounting the path of someone passing through the world, 'recording' what he sees, experiences, and does, and the people he 'encounters' along the way. It has been referred to as a photographic version of a road movie. In the introduction to American Surfaces, Bob Nickas suggests:

This book becomes a meditation on what it means to be in the world, on what it means to point a camera in one direction rather than another, and no matter what is being recorded, its subject is always photography itself. Like any road movie, there is a potentially endless cast of characters. (Nickas, 2005: 7)

Shore's constant 'recording' of the 'objects' are close to my work. There are no special effects; the images are taken by a 35mm Rollei. This process is described in Shore's own words:
I was recording my life. It was a visual journal of a trip across the country. When I started the trip I had many ideas about what I was going to do. I didn't want to do "Decisive Moments". Cartier-Bresson had used the term for a particular kind of visual coming together but I was interested more in the ordinary, of things happening in your life. I wanted to be visually aware as I went through the day. I started photographing everyone I met, every meal, every toilet, every bed I slept in, the streets I walked on, the towns I visited. Then when the trip was over, I just continued. (Shore, 2005: 8-9)

Similarly, in Richard Billingham's seminal work *Ray's A Laugh* he photographs his family situated inside their home in everyday situations. Importantly, Billingham's family were aware that they were being photographed but became oblivious to the process; it just didn't matter to them. Fig. 2: *Untitled (Jig Saw Puzzle)*, 1995 is an example taken from this series. Initially for Billingham this project of photography was begun as a way of 'recording' life subjects that he could draw or paint, to enable him to develop work for Art College. Charlotte Cotton writes that:

he was studying fine art (specializing in painting) at Sunderland Art College, and he had taken a series of photographs of his parents, Ray and Liz, and his brother Jason as 'sketches' for his paintings. (Cotton, 2004: 150)

Inevitably, this initial situation changes and the 'operator' gains technique through continuous use of the camera. I admit, after this period of time, that I now try not to eliminate camera shake, but whether the image is slightly blurred or not really doesn't matter. For, once again it will only ever be a representational image of the 'object' created by a machine. In the same way it may be 'seemingly' unskilled but it can never be separated from the machine; either in printing or 'recording'. In *Camera Lucida* Roland Barthes suggests that:

Technically, Photography is at the intersection of two quite distinct procedures; one of a chemical order; the other of a physical order: the formation of the image through an optical device. (Barthes, 2000:10)

In contrast to the random experience, and disposable camera, Eugène Atget was a role model in his approach to positioning the camera in order to 'record'. He had a daily routine of documenting the neglected 'objects' of Paris, and a simple cataloguing method. His biographer Belinda Rathbone writes that:

all of his [Atget's] latent instincts were combined: a straight cataloguing method imbued with an inscrutable melancholy, a long look at neglected objects, and an unerring eye for the signs of popular culture in transition. (cited in Sante, 2001: 8)

Through his images you can see how he painstakingly positioned the camera in different places. He 'recorded' every angle he felt the 'object' was worthy of, and, if this
was still not enough, he would then cut-up the negative to achieve a better composition by refining the image:

Every morning, getting up at dawn, he went everywhere, entered everywhere ... Paris and her old Churches, her monuments, her miseries and her treasures were photographed by Atget. (Harris, 2003: 8)

What becomes evident is that the photograph is contingent i.e. something that occurs or exists only as a result of something else or that depends upon something else. This some ‘thing’ else being the initial ‘object’, and its luminous rays, that emit from its original context. Photographs are not reality, they confirm reality exists. The chemical order still functions within the traditional format, but can be now updated to include a digital order. These so-called blurred ‘mistakes’, a programmed default in the machine, highlight exaggerated discrepant, ephemeral, ‘moments of time’. What I was trying, initially, was to attempt to ‘record’ exactly, what I saw, and found it frustrating that the camera could not do this.

I began by just wanting to ‘point and shoot’ what I was experiencing. With the advent of digital cameras this proved easier than I had anticipated. I use a Nikon D70 set to close-up to ‘record’ these ‘objects’. The camera, on this setting, ‘isolates’ and ‘dislocates’ the ‘object’. The prominent ‘object’ stands forth out of the background creating a depth of field, even this depth of field is artificial and synthetic, but more importantly the ‘object’ is still taken and shown ‘in situ’. I dislike the artificial light from the camera flash, and very rarely use it; once more I attempt to ‘record’ what my eyes see (the light included), but I am always at the mercy of the capabilities of the machine.

To attempt to represent my ‘way of seeing’ these images need to be in colour, not black & white, for we experience the world in colour and this is our natural habitat. As John Szarkowski comments:

Stephen Shore and others, accept colour as existential and descriptive; these pictures are not photographs of colour, any more than they are photographs of shapes, textures, objects, symbols, or events, but rather photographs of experience, as it has been ordered and clarified within the structure imposed by the camera. (Szarkowski, 2002: 9-10)

The insistence on ‘recording’ with the close-up further alters my initial perception. The lens is analogous to the magnifying glass creating both a miniature and gigantic ‘object’. The scale of the final image affects the viewer’s interpretation. A miniature, or gigantic, subjective ‘profile’ of the original ‘object’ will be represented or both i.e. a gigantic miniature will have been created inside the gallery. Therefore, the viewer’s view is a combination of private and public history. Susan Stewart writes that we “find
the miniature at the origin of private, individual history, but we find the gigantic at the
origin of public and natural history” (Stewart, 2007: 71). She further comments that:

A reduction in dimension does not produce a corresponding reduction in
signification [...] The more complicated the object, the more intricate and the
more these complications and intricacies are attended to, the larger the object
is in significance. (Stewart, 2007: 43; 89)

In addition, Walter Benjamin in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological
Reproducibility’ writes:

... technological reproduction is more independent of the original than is manual
reproduction. For example, in photography it can bring out aspects of the
original that are accessible only to the lens (which is adjustable and can easily
change viewpoint) but not to the human eye; or it can use certain processes,
such as enlargement or slow motion, to record images which escape natural
optics altogether. (Benjamin, 2006: 103)

The technical capabilities of the camera to ‘record’ a close-up offers my ‘self’ a unique
interpretation based upon my own ‘way of seeing’ the initial ‘object’, but importantly it
does not alter, or defer the point, that the camera image is still on its own, and cannot
escape the boundary of the frame in which it finds itself confined. Whereas, each
image in this project was, and is, ‘recorded’ for a particular reason, as I shall discuss
further in Chapters Two and Three, they are metonymic and signify specific — signified
subjective ‘encounters’ and memories. In this regard they are indexical and leave a
trace of my ‘self’ which as yet is unknown.

They also, just as importantly, highlight discrepancies within the ‘object’. After closer
inspection of the ‘recorded’ images and through this subjective ‘way of seeing’, I
became aware that I was becoming fascinated by these discrepancies in the ‘objects’.
This ‘way of seeing’ the ‘object’ becomes evident through a primary and secondary
focus of attention. I was subliminally evaluating what I chose to ‘record’. Now, I have
now become practiced, in some way, in noting or observing, and in taking the decision
to ‘record’ the ‘object’. I began by highlighting peculiarities, which might well have been
overlooked within their context for certain values, qualities or oddities that reside within
them; they go against the grain of accepted universal ‘ideals’.

For example if I consider the focus of attention in Plates 1 to 6 I can describe them in
the following manner:

My primary focus of attention for ‘recording’ Plate 1: Untitled (2004) is the
sentence ‘Keep Going’, whereas, the secondary focus of attention are the fact
that these words are written inside the cabin of a milk float.
My primary focus of attention for 'recording' Plate 2: *Those Blue Eyes (2006)* are those blue eyes, whereas my secondary focus of attention is the doll, albeit a toilet roll cover doll.

My primary focus of attention for 'recording' Plate 3: *Take The Long Black Train (2007)* is the damaged horse, whereas my secondary focus of attention is the amusement arcade sign.

My primary focus of attention for 'recording' Plate 4: *Out Shopping (2006)* is the brown light bulb, whereas my secondary focus of attention is the heart shaped sign.

My primary focus of attention for 'recording' Plate 5: *Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007)* is the sentence 'We have a winner!', whereas the secondary focus of attention is the i-Pod.

My primary focus of attention for 'recording' Plate 6: *Smudged Lipstick (2006)* is the smudged lipstick, whereas the secondary focus of attention is the Russian doll.

Plates 1-6 indicate how photography is a 'live' act that is a process of decision-making at a specific moment of 'recording', because it requires my 'self' as the 'operator' to be present in the situation with the camera at the moment from which it is 'recorded'. This is an important point and the 'live' act in relation to the 'lived life' will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

John Szarkowski in his book *The Photographer's Eye* suggests that:

The invention of photography provided a radically new picture-making process — a process based not on synthesis but on selection. The difference was a basic one. Paintings were made — constructed from a storehouse of traditional schemes and skills and attitudes -- but photographs, as the man on the street put it, were taken. (Szarkowski, 2007: 6)

In order to define this particular way of seeing individual elements, a 'part' from within a 'whole', phenomenology introduces a higher level of perception called 'categorial articulation'. Sokolowski explains this process of 'categorial articulation' by using the example of a car scratch:

(1) At first we just look at it in a rather passive way. Our gaze moves from one part to another, we go through the manifolds of sides, aspects, and profiles, we go through the colour, the smoothness, the shine of the surface, its feel of hardness and softness. All this is a continuous perception, all carried out on one level. No particular thinking is engaged as we continue to perceive. Furthermore, as we go through the manifolds of presentation, one and the same car is continuously given to us as the identity of the manifold.
(2) Now suppose that some abrasions on the surface of the car catch our attention. We zero in on them. We highlight this part of the car; not just this spatial part, but this feature, this abrasiveness, in the spatial part. This focus is not just more of the dawdling perception that preceded; this highlighting is qualitatively different from what had been going on continuously before. However, it is not yet the establishment of a categorial object. So far, we are at an in-between point: we continue to experience the appearances of the car, and we continue to recognize one and the same car in all the appearances, but we have now spotlighted one of the appearances and brought it to centre stage; it stands out from the rest. A part comes into the foreground against the general background of the whole.

(3) One more step is needed to establish a categorial object. We interrupt the continuous flow of perception; we go back to the whole (car), and we now take it precisely as being the whole, and simultaneously we take the part we had highlighted (the abrasion) as being a part in the whole. We now register the whole as containing the part. A relation between whole and part is articulated and registered. At this point we can declare, 'This car is damaged.' This achievement is a categorial intuition, because the categorial object, the thing in its articulation, is made actually present to us. We do not just have the car present to us; rather, the car being damaged is made present. What happens in this third stage is that the whole (the car) is presented specifically as the whole, and the part (damaged) is presented specifically as a part. The whole and its part are explicitly distinguished. A relation between them is distinctly registered. An articulation is achieved. A state of affairs clicks into place. We have moved from sensibility to intellection, from mere experiencing to an initial understanding. We have moved from the single-rayed intentionality of perception to the many-rayed intentionality of judgement. We have entered into categorial thinking. (Sokolowski, 2007: 89-90)

What Sokolowski is suggesting in this example is that these subjective 'parts' can then become 'states of affairs', and can be communicated to the 'other' through the 'truth of correctness', who, in turn, evaluates these as 'proposals', until 'truthness' is made evident. Sokolowski identifies two kinds of truth, either through the 'truth of correctness' or the 'truth of disclosure'. I will discuss these two types in more detail in Chapter Three when I introduce the importance of the attachment of text to the image. What I will say here is that the images in Plates 1-6 are, each, acting primarily as examples of the 'truth of disclosure', which Sokolowski suggests is simply the presencing of an intelligible object:

the truth of disclosure, is simply the display of a state of affairs. It is the simple presencing to us of an intelligible object, the manifestation of what is real or actual. (Sokolowski, 2007: 158)

Plates 1-6 are appearances that can be scrutinized with the knowledge they will never change. They are frozen 'moments of time', quotations taken out of sequence.
Barthes suggests a similar duality of 'categorically' 'articulating' a 'part' from within a 'whole', or my primary and secondary focus, with his specific 'way of seeing' a photographic image. He calls these dual aspects, or elements, the 'studium' and the 'punctum':

It is by studium that I am interested in so many photographs, whether I receive them as political testimony or enjoy them as good historical scenes: for it is culturally (this connotation is present in studium) that I participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the actions. The second element will break (or punctuate) the studium. This time it is not I who seek it out (as I invest the field of the studium with my sovereign consciousness), it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me [...] A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me). (Barthes, 2000: 26; 27)

I 'recorded' Plate 6 in 2006 and entitled it: Smudged Lipstick (2006). In the initial 'encounter' with the Russian doll, the potential 'studium' was the doll itself. For it serves as, and defines its cultural setting by its appearance and through the traditional Russian clothes depicted upon it. The doll wasn’t of great interest to me whereas the smudged lipstick was acting as my 'punctum' -my wound. It was this that pricked and poignantly moved me. Unlike Barthes, I am the 'operator', I am allowing you, the 'spectator', this insight into this initial 'encounter' which I could so easily have kept secret. This was my primary and secondary focus of attention and it was for this reason I made the decision to 'record'.

Of course, by giving it this title, Smudged Lipstick (2006), I emphasize this point. It is only after viewing the resulting image, both digitally on a computer screen, and after the printing and framing had occurred that I began noticing the white reflected dot at the centre of the doll’s forehead, more so through the exaggeration of scale. This development was unusual, for the dot usually represents a flash from the camera, whereas I choose not to use the flash purposely in an attempt to 'record' only what I see, which potentially prevents these exaggerated discrepancies occurring. The resulting 'white dot', became, and is, my subjective 'punctum' and it is this that pricks me every time I see this image. For this reason, it corresponds much closer to Barthes concept of 'punctum', because he is reading purely from the photographic image itself, albeit an ambiguous image, that is, if you agree with the suggestion by Dianne Arbus quoted in On Photography that:

A photograph is a secret about a secret, as Arbus observed. "The more it tells you the less you know." (cited in Sontag, 1979: 111)

The reflected white dot, as I have already mentioned, I could have easily chosen to keep a secret. It is worth reiterating the point that in this chapter I am only discussing
what is within the boundary of the frame, and what is disclosed. What will be made
clearer in Chapter Three is how the attachment of knowledge is formulated through the
addition of narrative, and in Chapter Two how the image is never on its own. These
areas do overlap as the viewer ‘encounters’ the exhibited work not in isolation, but also
with the title, narrative or story intact. For example, purely by divulging the information
that Plate 6 is entitled: *Smudged Lipstick* (2006) affects its ‘way of seeing’ and also its
way of telling.

Gary Winogrand disagrees with this position and argues that the only meaning to be
found is within the frame of the image, “an image can reveal any narrative depending
on the viewpoint of the viewer and the only meaning to be found is within the frame of
the image” (cited in La Grange, 2005: 119). Whether the ‘spectator’ makes this choice
of the ‘white dot’ becoming the ‘punctum’ is purely subjective. If the image was purely
my ‘way of seeing’, which in some ways it still is, I am the ‘operator’ and photography is
a ‘live’ act, then the smudged lipstick would still be its ‘punctum’. However, because of
this slippage occurring between ‘encounter’ and image, the ‘white dot’ became my
‘punctum’. It was therefore, according to Barthes, an involuntary feature as he further
suggests in relation to the ‘punctum’:

Hence the detail which interests me is not, or at least is not strictly, intentional,
and probably must not be so; it occurs in the field of the photographed thing like
a supplement that is at once inevitable and delightful; it does not necessarily
attest to the photographer’s art; it says only that the photographer was there, or
else, still, more simply, that he could not photograph the partial object at the
same time as the total object (how could Kertész have “separated” the dirt road
from the violinist walking on it?). (Barthes, 2000: 47)

In Plate 5: *Five Days Before My Mom Died* (2007) near the right hand corner is another
involuntary feature. On closer inspection of the image you can clearly see a human
hair. Perhaps, you can sense the difficulties in explaining these features. For, as I have
mentioned, it is impossible to ‘record’ exactly what I see. Therefore, the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary is unworkable or meaningless in purely viewing the
image because all the material is part of the image regardless. Barthes goes on later in
his text to say:

Last thing about the *punctum*: whether or not it is triggered, it is an addition: it is
what I add to the photograph and *what is nonetheless already there*. [...] When
we define the Photograph as a motionless image, this does not mean only that
the figures it represents do not move; it means that they do not *emerge*, do not
*leave*: they are anesthetized and fastened down, like butterflies. Yet once there
is a *punctum*, a blind field is created (is divided): on account of her necklace,
the black woman in her Sunday best has had, for me, a whole life external to
her portrait; Robert Wilson, endowed with an unlocatable punctum, is someone I want to meet. (Barthes, 2000: 55; 57)

The blind field of the ‘punctum’ corresponds to time. Whether the ‘punctum’ is involuntary, or not, it is still separating a ‘part’ from a ‘whole’. Therefore, surely, there is no limit to how many ‘parts’ could be acting as ‘punctums’. Just as in ‘categorial articulation’ the ‘part’ becomes its ‘state of affairs’, until another ‘part’ is identified as being significant, with the earlier ‘part’ fading into ‘hiddeness’ through a process of ‘sedimentation’. What Sokolowski suggests is that:

The original evidence becomes sedimented, as the phenomenological metaphor puts it. It becomes a hidden presupposition that enables something higher to come to light, but when we focus on that higher, newer evidence, the lower, more original one recedes into darkness. It ceases to be authentically articulated. (Sokolowski, 2007: 166)

This receding into darkness is not totally lost, only ‘sedimented’, ready to be recalled when required e.g. instead of a car scratch it could be a flat tyre that is now prominent in Sokolowski’s example. There is a multiplicity of time values occurring within and outside of the image, and yet, either in time or place, the ‘spectator’ cannot go beyond the edge of this image. They can speculate, imagine, or fantasize, but still only have what’s left within the frame.

Barthes search for the essence of photography in Camera Lucida, leads him to establish the term noeme, and conclude that its essence is of being some thing ‘that has been’:

There is a superimposition here: of reality and of the past. And since this constraint exists only for photography, we must consider it, by reduction, as the very essence, the noeme of photography. What I intentionalize in a photograph (we are not speaking film) is neither Art nor Communication, it is reference, which is the founding order of Photography. The name of Photography’s noeme will therefore be: “That-has-been,” or again: the intractable […] The important thing is that the photograph possesses an evidential force, and that its testimony bears not on the object but on time. From a phenomenological viewpoint, in the Photograph, the power of authentication exceeds the power of representation. (Barthes, 2000: 76-77; 89)

Barthes makes the point that it is the ‘object’ ‘recorded’ at a specific time and place that holds significance over its representation. Throughout this chapter, I have been attempting to discuss how neither an ‘object’s’ representation, nor the technique of the ‘operator’, can alter this fact. Time and space are crucial to my images, without either they would not exist as ‘recordings’.
A photograph, for Berger in Another Way of Telling, is regarded as a ‘moment of time’, an isolated appearance of a disconnected instant:

A photograph preserves a moment of time and prevents it being effaced by the supersession of further moments. In this respect photographs might be compared to images stored in the memory. Yet there is a fundamental difference: whereas remembered images are the residue of continuous experience, a photograph isolates the appearances of a disconnected instant. (Berger, 1982: 89)

He compares this appearance to the oracular and proposes another situation of ambiguity:

[Appearances in themselves are oracular. Like oracles they go beyond, they insinuate further than the discrete phenomena they present, and yet these insinuations are rarely sufficient to make any more comprehensive reading indisputable. (Berger, 1982: 118)

In an attempt to disentangle this ambiguity, Berger offers a way of understanding this cross-section of time:

The photograph cuts across time and discloses a cross-section of the event or events, which were developing at that instant. We have seen that the instantaneous tends to make meaning ambiguous. But the cross-section, if it is wide enough, and can be studied at leisure, allows us to see the interconnectedness and related coexistence of events. Correspondences, which ultimately derive from the unity of appearance, then compensate for the lack of sequence. (Berger, 1982: 120)

Is it possible fully to understand this interconnectedness? Susan Sontag has described photographs as being quotations. Whereas Cartier-Bresson states:

I prowled the streets all day, feeling very strung-up, and ready to pounce, determined to trap life – to preserve life in the act of living. Above all, I craved to seize the whole essence, in the confines of one single photograph, of some situation that was in the process of unrolling itself before my eyes. (cited in Brittain, 2000: 290)

Is this ‘decisive moment’ the culmination of the camera ‘recording’? Surely, once the button is pressed, every image is ‘a decisive moment’? Or, is it the point when visually some ‘thing’ is about to happen, so you anticipate this occurring, and rely on chance? If so how can you tell intention and chance apart? What Cartier-Bresson’s images allegedly propose are specific examples of an image on its own. They set up this possibility of a perfect ‘moment’, a perfect shot that is unique which may suggest no ‘punctum’ exists within the image or any bias toward primary or secondary focus. However, as I have tried to explain and discuss in this chapter each ‘recording’ is potentially always on its own. The frame limits and provides integrity but, essentially,
still requires an 'operator' to function which is indexical to this process. Does this therefore mean that the image is also always never on its own? I shall attempt to unravel this question in Chapter Two.
Chapter Two:

The Image Is Never On Its Own

Does the photograph stand-alone? There is a complex range of time already contained within this body of work. Specific moments in which I made the decision to 'record' have become an ongoing narrative where I am present as a photographer, a milkman and a member of a family. This creates more sub-divisions. I can establish certain boundaries from within the body of work, for I am the 'operator', and, to some extent, the collector. Some of these boundaries are formed by my methodologies and processes; others are more specifically related to how an exhibition or portfolio is curated. What I cannot do is prevent new experiences being formed that supersede those established in previous 'encounters'. I cannot pre-determine their meaning. These 'recordings' may be specific frozen 'moments of time', but each separate moment of viewing creates a different 'encounter' with these particular 'objects'. Each one potentially offers a new disclosure of knowledge creation.

Berger suggests, in Another Way of Telling, that this procedure may be called 'the nexus of relative affinities'. He makes the point that, across several photographs, contrasts and comparisons become much more complex:

Yet the very same discontinuity (of a photograph), by preserving an instantaneous set of appearances allows us to read across them and find a synchronic coherence. A coherence, which instead of narrating instigates ideas [...] Photographs can relate the particular to the general. This happens, as I have shown, even within a single picture. When it happens across a number of pictures the nexus of relative affinities, contrasts and comparisons can be that much wider and more complex. (Berger, 1982: 128; 281)

Temporality, memory, and the 'self' may be explained in numerous ways, however, I have chosen to focus on them through the discourse of phenomenology. In phenomenology, a central notion is 'the living present'; the full immediate experience of temporality that we have at any given instant. This instant is comprised of three inter-independent parts: primary impression, retention and protention. This continuous combination involves the 'past now' impacting upon the 'present now', which in turn becomes the 'past now' and so forth; a pattern described by Husserl as a comet's tail in The Phenomenology Of Internal Time Consciousness. "We characterised primary remembrance or retention as a comet's tail which is joined to actual perception."
(Husserl, 2007: 112) Thereby, the disclosure of knowledge through the 'encounter' with
the body of work occurs within a constant activity of 'the living present'. Each new
viewing of the image is embedded in this 'past / present / future now'. As Sokolowski
puts it, in order to explain our experience of time, there must be some overlap or trace
that carries from one moment to the next:

We tend to say that temporal experience is very much like a film being run, with
one exposure (one presence) quickly following another. One state of the object
impacts us after another. But our experience of temporal duration could not be
like this; if it were, we would never get the sense of a duration, of a continual
temporal process, because all we would have at any given moment would be
the frame in the film that is given at that moment. (Sokolowski, 2007: 134-135)

Each instance of my 'recording' could easily suggest a present frame, as for example
in Barthes' notion of noeme (something 'that has been'), and in Sontag's proposal that
photographs are 'quotations'. Initially, I 'recorded' each 'object' two or three times in a
schematic way. I did this in order to 'record' different 'ways of seeing' the same 'object'.
More importantly, I chose to 'record' very similar angles so that I could then sift through
the images, in order to distinguish which ones would be exhibited. This schematic
approach has now progressed into an attempt at 'recording' a specific 'way of seeing'
determined before using the camera. Subsequently, the images were assembled into
initial suites, groups for ease of categorisation, understanding and classification, with
each specific image given a working title. Following this, these initial groupings were
assembled chronologically. See Appendix 1: The Production Diary, which lists the
'recording' of specific 'objects', and specific places where they were 'recorded'. It is
also possible to see a pattern forming where I have 'recorded' specific 'objects' again
after a period of time; each new 'recording' representing a particular 'way of seeing',
often influenced by the preceding ones.

You might assume that the body of work, seen as sequences or suites, operates like
'moments of time'. They may operate like this, but can only ever possibly suggest tiny
fragments of 'the living present' for the comet's tail is too vast to imagine or potentially
recreate. Whereas, phenomenology, as represented by Robert Sokolowski, suggests
that each 'self' is 'a dative of manifestation', and through 'intersubjectivity' 'proposals' of
'states of affairs' can be communicated to the 'other', through the 'evidencing' of
'things' given to each 'self' to determine 'truth':

We are real as datives of manifestation, and what we do as such is to evidence
the truth of things [...] We evidence, then, in two ways: In the truth of
correctness and in the truth of disclosure. (Sokolowski, 2007: 161; 162)

Therefore this creates a paradox: can I or can't I offer a possible pre-determinate
meaning to the viewer through this body of work, and the possibilities of
connectedness between individuated and apparently isolated images. In Chapter One, I noted how Barthes ‘punctum’ and its relationship to ‘categorial articulation’ operates as a ‘way of seeing’ each particular image. This subjective ‘way of seeing’ can be communicated through ‘intersubjectivity’, through the ‘proposal’ of a ‘state of affairs’. This is expressed through language, either spoken or written, as title, narrative and story. What needs to be made clear is that there are two types of possible reflection according to Sokolowski in phenomenology, ‘propositional reflection’ and ‘philosophical reflection’ where ‘truth’ does not necessarily need to be verified. Sokolowski suggests that:

Propositional reflection is carried on in the interest of truth, in the interest of verification. Our overall truth interest is never neutralized when we shift into the propositional mode. Philosophical reflection, on the other hand, is not carried out for such pragmatic reasons. It is not done in order to verify or falsify a claim. It is more purely contemplative, more purely detached. (Sokolowski, 2007: 190)

This is an important distinction and I will discuss how a specific reflection upon a mode of behaviour in phenomenology is not altered, but ‘suspended’ through the ‘epoche’, and how the attachment of text to the image can indicate specific meaning in Chapter Three.

My intention in each image is to exhibit (communicate) a subjective ‘way of seeing’ a particular ‘object’, but just as importantly to communicate a specific signified memory to the viewer, in an attempt to dispel some of the ambiguity that Berger’s ‘nexus of affinities’ creates between the image and its subsequent suites. This memory is either a memory of the ‘encounter’ with the ‘object’, or acts as a metonym for a relational memory. In the case of metonymy, the ‘recorded’ image, can suggest that it has now become a parallel sign, a coded message that can be de-coded. The ‘object’ depicted already communicates meaning through its original ‘aura’, thus creating another paradox, for this essential appearance still remains intact, for without this, it would not be regarded as a metonym. Susan Stewart’s definition of the souvenir strongly resembles this metonymic sign characteristic:

The souvenir is by definition always incomplete. And this incompleteness works on two levels. First the object is metonymic to the scene of the original appropriation in the sense that it is a sample [...] Within the operation of the souvenir the sign functions not so much as object to object, but beyond this relation, metonymically, as object to event/experience. (Stewart, 2007: 136)

To consider a specific example from the body of work I will look at Plate 7: *Age Twenty One* (2005). In this image the lock is metonymic. Is it, therefore, a souvenir in Stewart’s terms? When I see the ‘recording’ now, it functions as a metonym for a ‘remembering’,
a phenomenological term I will explain later, of an adolescent event. It acts as a signifier for a signified memory of my 'self' aged twenty-one, drunk in the bath on Thunderbird wine and playing loud music. I had split up with my then girlfriend, and my dad had to kick the door in, as I couldn’t hear him calling me. He was trying to draw my attention to the fact that the water was dripping through the ceiling into the kitchen.

Plate 7: Age Twenty One (2005) also belongs to a suite of 'objects' that I 'recorded' in order to document the re-visiting, and moving back into my parent's home in Birmingham after a ten year absence living away in London and Devon. Therefore, this aspect of the 'object' is operating as its 'original aura' in combination with the metonymic sign. In this sense, the suite already forms a preliminary collection, a preliminary boundary within itself, just as my 'way of seeing' forms another boundary creating a different segment to this suite: the lock being my secondary focus of attention and my primary focus of attention being the repaired wooden architrave, its hammer marks, the split wood and the single nail fixing.

The photograph also operates as a 'recording' of the 'encounter' with the lock, which is, in a different temporality, acting as a sample from that particular whole. This supports Stewart's concept of the souvenir, but it is difficult to say whether the body of work is a collection or solely made-up of specific souvenirs of individual 'encounters'. The terms defined by Stewart do not fit exactly. However they do provide a set of possibilities for describing how the image is never on its own. According to Stewart the souvenir is always incomplete, its place of origin remaining unavailable:

The souvenir involves the displacement of attention into the past. The souvenir is not simply an object appearing out of context, an object from the past incongruously surviving in the present; rather, its function is to envelop the present within the past [...] The place of origin must remain unavailable in order for desire to be generated. All souvenirs are souvenirs of nature yet it is nature in its most synthetic its most acculturated sense which appear here. (Stewart, 2007: 151)

Whereas by Stewart's definition, the collection in contrast to the souvenir is self-enclosed:

[The collection offers example rather than sample, metaphor rather than metonymy [...] The collection seeks a form of self-enclosure which is possible because of its ahistoricism. The collection replaces history with classification, with order beyond the realm of temporality. In the collection time is not something to be restored to an origin; rather, all time is made simultaneous or synchronous within the collection's world. (Stewart, 2007: 151)
On one level this body of work may look like a collection, but in relation to Stewart’s concept of collecting it is different. For example, it is not the same as collecting beer mats or stamps, as she goes on later to suggest:

The collection is not constructed by its elements; rather, it comes to exist by means of its principle of organisation. If that principle is bounded at the onset of the collection, the collection will be finite, or at least potentially finite. If that principle tends towards infinity or series itself, the collection will be open-ended. [...] In the collection the threat of infinity is always met with the articulation of boundary. Simultaneous sets are worked against each other, in the same way that attention to the individual object and attention to the whole are worked against each other. The collection thus appears as a mode of control and containment insofar as it is a mode of generation and series. [...] The collector can gain control over repetition or series by defining a finite set (the Tiffany postal scales) or by possessing the unique object. (Stewart, 2007: 155: 159-160)

My activity of accumulating images is ongoing, and there is no finite boundary that encloses the body of work ready for completion; I am not searching for that missing piece that I already know exists. As long as I am capable of ‘recording’ then the possibilities I ‘encounter’ and the duration of this activity might be infinite. And yet this is where the ambiguity resides because I have formed these initial suites for ease of categorisation, understanding and classification they potentially supersede temporality and make all time simultaneous or synchronous. Whereas, what these ‘recordings’ fundamentally represent are traces of authentic experience. They represent everyday ‘objects’ through the combination of the photographic image acting, and operating, as a new ‘object’. Barthes asserted that the photograph was an image without code in Camera Lucida, but still agreed that certain codes do inflect our reading of it, and that nothing can prevent the photograph being analogical:

To ask whether a photograph is analogical or coded is not a good means of analysis. The important thing is that the photograph possesses an evidential force, and that its testimony bears not on the object but on time. From a phenomenological viewpoint, in the photograph, the power of authentication exceeds the power of representation. (Barthes, 2000: 88-89)

Plate 1: Untitled (2004) belongs to a suite of ‘objects’ that document the ‘recording’ of a fully working Dairy. This particular image refers to the initial ‘encounter’, that specific ‘moment of time’ of ‘recording’ the ‘object’, but does not intentionally operate as a metonym. The words ‘Keep Going’ correspond to my primary focus of attention and provide the reason for its ‘recording’. These two words also signify another temporality: the actual ‘moment of time’ in which these words were written. So in this regard, they are, by default, functioning as a quasi metonym or as a further trace of authentic
experience - albeit not mine. The words written in the truck can be read independently by the viewer of the image, and may have a common or universally agreed meaning.

I will discuss this possible use of a 'universal meaning' in written or spoken language in Chapter Three. Unlike the viewer, I perhaps know who wrote it, and more importantly, what it represents in its context as being part of a working environment, whilst the viewer may only guess at the motivation behind the words.

Phenomenology, as Sokolowski proposes, suggests that memory is identified as 'remembering', and is considered as a 're-enactment of an earlier perception'. That brings along its 'objects', i.e. the 'objective correlates':

In memory we reactivate not just an object but an object as presenting itself there and then, and yet presenting itself again here and now, but only as past [...] what we store up as memories is not images of things we perceived at one time. Rather, we store up the earlier perceptions themselves. We store up the perceptions we once lived through. Then, when we actually remember, we do not call up images; rather we call up those earlier perceptions. When these perceptions are called up and re-enacted, they bring along their objects, their objective correlates. What happens in remembering is that we relive earlier perceptions, and we remember the objects as they were given at that time. We capture that earlier part of our intentional life. We bring it to life again. (Sokolowski, 2007: 68: 67-68)

This opposes the concept that our memories are purely mental images. It is suggesting that the interplay that occurs between perception and memory establishes the 'self', through a displacement of the 'here and now' with the 'there and then' - that is, 'the remembered self' and 'the remembering self':

Just as the past object is brought to light again, so my past self as an agent of that experience is brought to light again. Through memory a distinction is introduced between the remembering self and the remembered self. We might be tempted to say that my 'real self' is the one here and now, the one doing the remembering. The reactivated self is only an image of sorts. But this would be inaccurate. It would be more appropriate to say that my self is the identity constituted between myself now remembering and myself then remembered. My self, the self, is established precisely in the interplay that occurs between perception and memory. This displacement of myself into the past introduces a whole new dimension into my mental or inner life. I am not confined to the here and now; I cannot only refer to the past (and to the future, as we shall see), but I can also live in it through memory. (Sokolowski, 2007: 70)

On the contrary, what I have attempted to do is posit a memory, a 're-enactment of an earlier perception' through a single image. By 'recording' the words 'Keep Going', in Plate 1: Untitled (2004), I am stimulating, provoking and forcing that way of seeing upon the viewer. My 'categorial articulation' and 'punctum' specify areas of importance
within each image. Barthes argued that a photograph was never in essence a memory, but a forced way of seeing:

Not only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory (whose grammatical expression would be the perfect tense, whereas the tense of the Photograph is the aorist), but it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory [...] The Photograph is violent: not because it shows violent things, but because on each occasion it fills the sight by force, and because in it nothing can be refused or transformed (that we can sometimes call it mild does not contradict its violence: many say that sugar is mild, but to me sugar is violent, and I call it so). (Barthes, 2000: 91)

The viewer can only guess at the motivation behind the words ‘Keep Going’, because through this forced ‘way of seeing’ nothing can be refused or transformed to alter meaning. In comparison, ‘picturing’, in phenomenology, suggests that pictures do act as signs for other ‘objects’, and therefore other ‘encounters’. Sokolowski writes:

We look at one object that depicts another. We look at this piece of canvas or that piece of paper, and in it we see something else: a woman, a rustic scene. (Sokolowski, 2007: 67)

‘Picturing’ is very similar to the operation of the signifier and the signified. La Grange referring to Saussure’s theory reminds us that:

In the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of language, a unit of language, a sign, is composed of two things: the signified, which is a mental component or concept and the signifier, which is a sound-image or written word. (La Grange, 2005: 244)

To regard the photographic image as a sign suggests an endless process of possibilities, specific parts within wholes relating to both subjective and objective interpretation. This is based upon the viewers’ own understanding, arrived at through their empirical, a priori, social, historical, aesthetic and cultural knowledge, and culminating in the sign itself being dissolved into its differences from other signs within a system of signs.

For example, Plate 10: Untitled (2004) is a ‘recording’ taken from the same suite as Plate 1: Untitled (2004). They both document the ‘recording’ of a fully working Dairy. On closer inspection of Plate 10: Untitled (2004) I recognise, as the ‘operator’, two electrical/mechanical devices. I know that one is an emergency stop button and the other is a speedometer. A priori knowledge identifies the speedometer and stop button to my ‘self’. I know what they are, but then again if they do something different, I have to re-think it. In the case of the speedometer, and emergency stop button, this a priori knowledge is not strictly ‘true’. For, my primary intention in ‘recording’ Plate 10: Untitled (2004) was in knowing that neither of these devices worked: the absurdity of a stop
button that cannot stop and a speedometer forever stuck on zero. As a compromise, I can declare that they were either faulty, or just not connected, but the viewer cannot deduce this knowledge purely from the 'recording' of Plate 10: Untitled (2004), unless I choose to reveal this, for the speedometer and stop button represent working models whose functionality cannot be verified purely from the 'recording'.

I find that a priori knowledge and empirical knowledge are deceptive terms. Surely, every 'thing' must at some stage have been evolved from empirical knowledge found out by a 'self'. Empirical knowledge is deduced from evidence and through constancies of pattern. It is the basis of most scientific knowledge (which implies a 'self' which is knowing). You prove that something 'is' empirically; you provide evidence of the same thing happening under repeated conditions. What the viewer sees in Plate 10: Untitled (2004) is not wrong, just another way of telling. As a historical document, it serves as a 'recording' of the inside of a milk float, and as a representation of a stop button and speedometer. In turn, the accompanying suite serves both socially and culturally as a 'recording' of a working environment, where electric milk floats are gradually being phased out.

What I am attempting to explain here is the experiential impossibility of 'encountering' a pure image without any prior experience of seeing these 'things' depicted. This is not primarily the sense of always 'encountering' the image as part of a pre-existing coded set of meanings or ways of understanding or ways of organising. It is that as well, but this project is focusing less on that semiotic and coding approach, and more on maintaining an attachment to the question of the 'encounter'. Phenomenology proposes a specific subjective 'encounter', and to some extent does not engage with a pre-existing or underlying code for reference, but instead through 'intersubjectivity', creates objectivity. Phenomenology tends to engage with the experiential or the so called 'intuitive' through 'intuition'. Semiology seems to refer more to a mechanistic mode of trying to explain 'things' through the underlying mechanics of how 'things' will work.

What these different terminologies create is a spiral affect that may, or may not, become closer to my intended meaning. Is this the ambiguity that Barthes objected to when he spoke about the image being without code? In his earlier work he somewhat contradicted this by talking about the rhetorical image, and the 'polysemic' character of a photograph. According to Allan Sekula:

Barthes calls the 'polysemic' character of the photographic image, the existence of a 'floating chain of signification, underlying the signifier.' In other words, the photograph, as it stands alone, presents merely the possibility of
meaning [...] Furthermore, it is impossible even to conceive of an actual photograph in a ‘free state’ unattached to a system of validation and support, that is, to a discourse. (Sekula, 1988: 91; 92)

Sekula in his essay On The Invention Of Photographic Meaning uses an example of Steiglitz’s work to conclude that some meaning other than purely visual needs to inform the viewer of the ‘operator’s’ intent:

Only if the reader has been informed that this is symbolist art or this photograph is a metaphor can he invest the photograph with a meaning appropriate to Steiglitz’s expectations. (Sekula, 1988: 100)

This is in sharp contrast to Walker Evans’ images. It has often been suggested that his images refuse to represent any ‘thing’ other than what they present. Luc Sante in the pocket book Walker Evans 55 writes that:

At his peak, Evans possessed a conjurer’s genius for making art that appears neither to be art nor to have been consciously made. His work embodies a way of seeing that at once is entirely Evans’ and stands independent of him. (Sante, 2001: 3)

When I view Evans’ work I see a detachment from the input of the ‘operator’. I experience the ‘encounter’ with the ‘object’ for the first time as a ‘way of seeing’. Evans seems to have wanted the photographer to be anonymous and freed from an aesthetic of a subject. In the introduction to The Hungry Eye, a retrospective of Evans’ work, Giles Mora suggests that in the photographs:

there is Evans’ perennial confrontation with the question of anonymity. It is an idea that runs as a continuous thread through his work, a ruthlessly exacting condition of what he glimpsed as the future of photography, freed from the aesthetic of a subject. (Mora and Hill, 2004: 11)

The term ‘vernacular object’ is often associated with Evans’ work, and in its implication of social and cultural status, suggests the ordinary, the mundane and the functional. These are everyday ‘objects’, that are, in some ways, overlooked from our day-to-day existence. Purely by ‘recording’ these ‘objects’ Evans, not only formally elevates some ‘thing’ that might be overlooked, but also elevates its status to a higher art form. According to Mora:

[Evans] focuses on the particular over the symbolic. He loathes the effect of art and art as effect, the “pretension to art”, against which he sets vernacular culture. (Mora and Hill, 2004: 12-13)

For example, Fig. 3; Tin Snips, $1.85 belongs to a suite of five images entitled: Beauties Of The Common Tool by Walker Evans. Its removal from context is rare in Evans’ work, but highlights this process of elevation of the overlooked. And in the
process, this supposedly “undesigned” form becomes equal to the status of high art. Evans attached a brief (ironic) foreword to this suite that began:

Among low-priced, factory-produced goods none is so appealing to the senses as the ordinary hand tool. Hence, a hardware store is a kind of offbeat museum show for the man who responds to good clear “undesigned” forms [...]. (Evans, 2009)

This concern to record the anonymous and the overlooked continued until Evans’ death in 1975. Mora writes that:

[Evans] died in 1975, worn out by illness and the long abuse of his body. His will directed that no memorial service be held. He could not have wished for a more perfect example of the anonymity he had sought in his photography. He had earlier sold the greater part of his prints to collectors, as if all that had no further importance for him. (Mora and Hill, 2004: 305)

Fig. 4: *Memphis, 1969* is a photograph by William Eggleston. It is a child’s tricycle ‘recorded’ in Memphis in 1969 and, belongs to the suite of work entitled: *The Guide*. It could be read as a presentation of an everyday ‘object’. Eggleston’s body of work though tends to be read for hidden intentions or hidden meanings. It is sometimes suggested that behind Eggleston’s work is an underlying sense of danger. Mark Holborn in the introduction to Eggleston’s *Ancient and Modern*, writes of Eggleston’s book *The Guide*:

Its subjects, on the surface, the ordinary inhabitants and environs of suburban Memphis and Mississippi -- friends, family, barbeques, back yards, a tricycle and the clutter of the mundane. The normality of these subjects is deceptive, for behind the images there is a precedent for David Lynch’s film *Blue Velvet* (1989), where the evidence of evil is hidden in the grass beside the sprinklers of suburban lawns, and where the emotional weight of the film is so dependent on the formal ingredients of color and angle. Lynch’s camera descended into the grass itself. (Holborn, 1992)

What becomes apparent is the unusual camera angle or ‘way of seeing’ these everyday ‘objects’. Due to Eggleston’s insistence on a non-traditional, even non-human, positioning of the camera this could possibly suggest potential danger. This is in contrast to Evans’ ‘way of seeing’, as Eggleston states:

If there was anything about Walker Evans’s work that I disliked ... it was his determination always to use that same, square, frontal view. I never cared much for any photographs with such frontal fields. (cited in Holborn, 1992)

In this way, then, does the tricycle in Fig. 4: *Memphis, 1969* imply a child’s view or even that of an insect? Eggleston told Mark Holborn:
Sometimes I like the idea of making a picture that does not look like a human picture,' he claimed. 'Humans make pictures, which tend to be about five feet above the ground looking out horizontally. I like very fast flying insects moving all over and I wonder what their view is from moment to moment. I have made a few pictures, which show that physical viewpoint. I photographed a stuffed animal in an attempt to make a picture as if the family pet were holding a camera--from a dog or cat's view. The tricycle is similar. It is an insect's view or it could be a child's view. (cited in Holborn, 1992)

This unusual angle or 'way of seeing' groups Eggleston's body of work together and distinguishes it from Evans. In the same way my insistence on 'recording' only with the camera set to close-up also forms another preliminary grouping regarding my own body of work. I will discuss this later when I look at photographic genre. I will only mention here that my images could easily be grouped with certain examples of Evans' work, either through the connection to the everyday 'object', or because of his practice of frequently cutting negatives with scissors to create enlargements. As Mora writes:

The very tight framing of his images, some of it achieved with camera position and some by the cropping of his negatives (which Evans frequently did by actually cutting them with scissors), showed the objects on a very large scale [...] Evans cut down the negatives and transparencies himself with scissors, as he had done from the beginning of his career. (Mora and Hill, 2004: 96; 258)

Walter Benjamin in his essay Little History Of Photography suggested that Atget had begun the peeling away of the 'object's' shell, which had brought about the destruction of the 'aura'. He suggested that:

The peeling away of the object's shell, the destruction of the aura, is the signature of a perception whose sense for the sameness of things has grown to the point where even the singular, the unique, is divested of its uniqueness --by means of its reproduction. Atget almost always passed by the "great sights and so-called landmarks." What he did not pass by was a long row of boot lasts; or the Paris courtyards, where from night to morning the handcarts stand in serried ranks; or the tables after people have finished eating and left, the dishes not yet cleared away --as they exist by the hundreds and thousands at the same hour; or the brothel at No.5, Rue -, whose street number appears, gigantic, at four different places on the building's façade. Remarkably, however, almost all these pictures are empty. Empty is the Porte d'Arceuil by the fortifications, empty are the triumphal steps, empty are the courtyards, empty, as it should be, is the Place du Tertre. They are not lonely, merely without mood; the city in these pictures looks cleared out, like a lodging that has not yet found a new tenant. (Benjamin, 2005: 519)

Is this 'aura' its own uniqueness? In phenomenological terms could it be similar to its 'essence', but an 'essence' not dependent on physical form but reliant upon a social and cultural understanding? Or does the peeling away of the 'object's' shell purely indicate its removal from its original context by the process of technological
reproducibility? Benjamin also suggested that Atget had begun the emancipation of 'object' from 'aura':

He was the first to disinfect the stifling atmosphere generated by conventional portrait photography in the age of decline. He cleanses this atmosphere — indeed, he dispels it altogether: he initiates the emancipation of object from aura, which is the most signal achievement of the latest school of photography...What is aura, actually? A strange web of space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be. While at rest on a summer's noon, to trace a range of mountains on the horizon, or a branch that throws its shadow on the observer, until the moment or the hour become part of their appearance —this is what it means to breathe the aura of those mountains, that branch. (Benjamin, 2005: 518-519)

'Emancipation' implies freedom and, suggests, an indication of another 'way of seeing'. In Atget's work, there is an eerie ghost-like silence to his 'recordings', as you can see from the first quote Benjamin also suggested that they are not lonely, merely without mood. The majority have the agent, the occupants or the people missing and it is this that cleanses the atmosphere and cleans it. Only a few differ because of their long exposures and the inevitability of the passer-by being 'recorded' within the 'moment of time'. In Fig. 5: Empty Circus Carousel, No. 7 Atget depicts an empty carousel. Here you can see the eerie ghost-like silence of an atmosphere cleansed, nothing looks dirty or out of place. The people are missing and the two carousel horses in the foreground are awaiting their riders as the carousel stands static preparing to revolve once more, not lonely, merely without mood. In this particular example the top left and right hand corners have a curved darkened imprint that form an implied circle. This for myself makes it even more intimate. I can imagine Atget peering through his lens attempting to 'record' this 'way of seeing'.

There is no denying that the image of the lock in Plate 7: Age Twenty One (2005) will always function as a signifier of a lock. Stewart suggests that:

It is not through any intrinsic quality of the sign but rather through the interpretive acts of members of a sign community that the sign comes to have meaning. Hence the transmutability of all signs, their capacity to serve as signified or signifier, independent of their physical properties. The semiotic universe is an abstract and interpretive universe constructed by means of social practices. (Stewart, 2007: 32)

This question of signification is ambiguous in relation to my body of work, because it is the intrinsic quality of the 'object' that I use to project meaning. Barthes' 'punctum' and 'studium', my primary and secondary focus, and 'categorial articulation' all separate 'parts' from within 'wholes' to identify the intrinsic quality of the 'object'.
Victor Burgin, in his essay *Photographic Practice and Art Theory*, discusses how visual and non-visual codes interpenetrate each other in very extensive, complex ways, and suggests that:

In the very moment of their being perceived, objects are placed within an intelligible system of relationships (no reality can be innocent before the camera). They take the position, that is to say, within an ideology. By ideology we mean, in its broadest sense, a complex of propositions about the natural and social world, which would be generally accepted in a given society as describing the actual, indeed necessary, nature of the world and its events. An ideology is the sum of taken-for-granted realities of everyday life; the pre-given determination of individual consciousness; the common frame of reference for the projection of individual actions. Ideology takes an infinite variety of forms; what is essential about it is that it is contingent and that within it the fact of its contingency is suppressed. (Burgin, 1988: 45-46)

Ideology may be understood as the means by which men and women contest and negotiate their social, economic and cultural positions in society. It is within this everyday society that I ‘record’ these ‘encounters’ of everyday ‘objects’. Therefore, if ideology is the everyday, does that mean my body of work is an ideological representation, and that it ‘records’, social, economic, and cultural positions in society? I will attempt to answer this question later when I discuss photographic genre.

In John Berger’s book *Another Way of Telling*, he discusses how appearances both distinguish and join events; he cites the artist Cézanne and his understanding of how ‘objects’ interpenetrate each other:

During the second half of the nineteenth century, when the coherence of appearance had been largely forgotten, one man understood and insisted upon the significance of such a coherence. “Objects interpenetrate each other. They never cease to live. Imperceptibly they spread intimate reflections around them.” Cézanne. (cited in Berger, 1982: 113)

It is unclear whether Cézanne’s reflections are in part, as implied by Berger, the reflections of the effects of light and a shared visual world, or their associative quality.

If these ‘intimate reflections’, suggested by Cézanne indicate that ‘objects’, do interpenetrate by association, then I suggest that by default they belong to the category of the souvenir. Susan Stewart defines two types of souvenir:

We must distinguish between souvenirs of exterior sights, souvenirs such as those MacCannell lists, which most often are representations and are purchasable, and souvenirs of individual experience which most often are samples and not available as general consumer goods. (Stewart, 2007: 138)
More specifically Cézanne’s intimate reflections relate to Stewart’s second type of souvenir. I ‘record’ everyday ‘objects’, that fall into both souvenir categories. This subjective experience that is attached to the souvenir creates the souvenir. The ‘object’ as Cézanne potentially suggests, never ceases to live, whereas Stewart disagrees, if the souvenir is no longer collected, then it is destined to be forgotten. Therefore, the attachment of the ‘self’ is crucial to the existence of the souvenir. Stewart explains that:

In fact, if it [the souvenir] could recoup the experience it would erase its own partiality which is the very source of its power […] Whereas the collection is either truly hidden or prominently displayed, the souvenir, so long as it remains “uncollected” it is “lost,” removed from any context of origin and use value in such a way as to “surprise” and capture its viewer into reverie […] The souvenir is destined to be forgotten; its tragedy lies in the death of memory, the tragedy of all autobiography and the simultaneous erasure of the autograph. (Stewart, 2007: 136; 150; 151)

If within my body of work the ‘objects’ depicted are individual souvenirs within a collection, then they can never be lost and also have the potential to be found. Concerning the body of work in its wider contextualisation in relation to art, Sontag suggests that:

To be legitimate as an art, photography must cultivate the notion of the photographer as auteur (author) and of all photographs taken by the same photographer as constituting a body of work. (Sontag, 1979: 137)

The suggested connections here begin to operate around the autobiography of the photographer and the possibility that the author will not be forgotten as s/he is collected up into and perpetuated by the body of work. The viewer ‘encounters’ subjects and content in the images, but in doing so and perhaps in spite of the inadequacy of the formalist explanation of photograph’s power or endurance, what the viewer sees is the photographer presented in his/her work; this would suggest that the ‘objects’ are displaced by the photographer, even when the photographer seeks to or claims to have effaced her/himself as in the case of Walker Evans’ seeking to withdraw as author, to be anonymous.

Given that my ‘recordings’ correspond to Sontag’s conditions then, of course, they are a body of work, and I am the author. I am therefore the author of the souvenir as well. Ashley La Grange in discussing Sontag’s essay Photographic Evangels, suggests that:

In photography, the subject matter has a greater influence on the final image than does the photographer. Even a distinct photographic style (Avedon, Atget) implies a similarity in subject matter. And it is this subject matter that determines the viewer’s preference when looking at photographs, not the formal characteristics of the photographer. (La Grange, 2005: 55)
La Grange then concludes by quoting Sontag: “The formalist approaches to photography cannot account for the power of what has been photographed” (cited in La Grange, 2005: 55), but he does not give the whole quote, which should read:

The formalist approaches to photography cannot account for the power of what has been photographed, and the way distance in time and cultural distance from the photograph increases our interest. (Sontag, 1979: 135)

This suggests an ‘encounter’ attached to some kind of cultural understanding that cannot be severed. This gives more importance to the subject matter than the fact of the author, or his/her role in ‘recording’ the image. This issue of subject matter is of fundamental importance within my body of work, and it is why it is so difficult to critique these ‘recordings’ as being purely subjective for they can be viewed as either symbolic or realistic. John Szarkowski suggests in the introduction to Eggleston’s Guide that, “In this peculiar art, form and subject are defined simultaneously” (Szarkowski, 2002: 7).

These ‘recordings’ are never on their own because of these two conflicting parts of symbolism and realism. If we use phenomenological terms, then, I suggest, these parts are ‘moments’. That is, non-independent ‘parts’ to each other that form the ‘whole’.

Once this confliction is accepted, they no longer need to be resolved, just as the body of work resembles both elements from the concept of the souvenir and the collection. Szarkowski goes on to dismiss questions around social or cultural attachment in Eggleston’s Guide:

For many excellent reasons, most of which involve the financial problems of book publication, it would be convenient if one could claim, or suggest, that this book of photographs answers, or contributes to the answer of, some large social or cultural question, such as, Whither the South? or Whither America? depending on one’s viewing distance. The fact is that Eggleston’s pictures do not seem concerned with large questions of this sort. They seem concerned simply with describing life. (Szarkowski, 2002: 12)

Fig. 6: *Craft Fair, Malvern, Worcestershire, from ‘The Cost Of Living.’* 1986-9 is a ‘recording’ made by Martin Parr. In this new ‘encounter’ with this image I see in the foreground a credit card logo or sign, which I understand, as referring to an Access Card. I have prior empirical knowledge of seeing my mother and father using this card when I was a child growing up. I specifically ‘remember’ an occasion in Birmingham where a school uniform was paid for by this method. I also have the a priori knowledge of media instances that advertised this brand. In an attempt to understand, more clearly, and to situate Parr’s work, I look for information on his work. Parr has an artist statement that attaches itself to him and his work, and which results in another form of
artistic packaging. For example, as an introduction to his CV, Parr uses a text written by Thomas Weski that is available online on Parr's website. Weski writes that:

Leisure, consumption and communication are the concepts that this British photographer has been researching for several decades now on his worldwide travels. In the process, he examines national characteristics and international phenomena to find out how valid they are as symbols that will help future generations to understand our cultural peculiarities. Parr enables us to see things that have seemed familiar to us in a completely new way. In this way he creates his own image of society, which allows us to combine an analysis of the visible signs of globalization with unusual visual experience. (Weski N.d.)

How do these themes relate to Fig. 6: *Craft Fair, Malvern, Worcestershire, from 'The Cost Of Living,' 1986-9* in a cultural and social context? I do not intend answering these questions here, as I feel this chapter is only raising issues of a potential discussion of how the image is not alone. What becomes interesting is whether my 'recording' of an *Access and Visa Card* in Plate 11: *Untitled (2007)* operates, or is perceived, as operating, in the same way as Parr's intention. For example, if Plate 11: *Untitled (2007)* was placed into a book of historical documentation, of Newlyn, Cornwall (because this is where it was 'recorded'), and the building displaying the Access Card sign now no longer existed, it would become defined culturally, and potentially read and understood in a different way than if it was placed within an art book next to Parr's image reproduced in Fig. 6: *Craft Fair, Malvern, Worcestershire, from 'The Cost Of Living,' 1986-9* discussing the impact of leisure, consumption and communication. The artist's work is categorised and grouped under the labelling of genre, resulting in the image never being on its own. This is one reason why I contextualise my body of work through citing examples by other practitioners, because my work exists in the context of other art. Weski suggests how Parr attempts to combat this:

The themes Parr selects and his inimitable treatment of them set him apart as a photographer whose work involves the creation of extensive series. Part of his unusual strategy is to present and publish the same photos in the context of art photography, in exhibitions and in art books, as well as in the related fields of advertising and journalism. In this way, he transcends traditional separation of the different types of photography. (Weski N.d.)

Roland Barthes dismissed photographic genres in *Camera Lucida*. La Grange discussing Barthes writing on photography writes: "Barthes realised that he did not like all the work of any single photographer. The artist's style, so useful in history, and aesthetics was of no use as photography is an 'uncertain' art" (La Grange, 2005: 101). Genre tends to become restrictive, or the body of work has to operate outside genre. I could claim that I have determined my own genre, but this would be only partially true. Thus, it is better to suggest that my body of work does form some kind of subjective
collection, whereas genre implies something that is collectively agreed between members and is transmissible. Part of their energy and power to the viewer is that my body of work, and each individual 'recording', functions both as document and art image. They cannot solely be assigned to one or the other without altering their meaning.

In undertaking this research, I have attended numerous group exhibitions and read various anthologies under the umbrella term of art photography, each displaying specific work from a selection of contemporary photographers. For example in the layout of *Art and Photography*, edited by David Campany the work is divided into eight sections: Memories And Archives; Objective Objects; Traces Of Traces; The Urban And The Everyday; The Studio Image; The Art Of Reproduction; 'Just' Looking; and The Cultures Of Nature (Campany, 2005). Whereas Susan Bright in *Art Photography Now* prefers her sections to be grouped: Portrait; Landscape; Narrative; Object; Fashion; Document; and City, whilst giving the disclaimer:

To try to follow the threads of influence that feed into contemporary art photography is an almost impossible task. It is too wide and varied, contradictory and elusive. Sucking its references from many rich springs, photography is the magpie of all artistic mediums, cherry-picking styles and theories from the other arts and turning them into resolutely its own. (Bright, 2005: 77)

Finally Charlotte Cotton in her book: *The Photograph As Contemporary Art* chooses: If This Is Art; Once Upon A Time; Deadpan; Something and Nothing; Intimate Life; Moments In History; and Revived and Remade. She also issues a disclaimer as well:

This book is at pains not to fetishize contemporary art photography into categories of style or photographic heritage. But it is important to recognize that the precedents and challenges set by such practitioners are the reference points within the history of photography that continue to resonate with particular force in contemporary practice. (Cotton, 2004: 11)

It is the nature of the photographic image that it can be used or repurposed in this way. In terms of Stewart’s concept of the collection, Cotton, Bright and Campany have all formed, even though some have issued disclaimers, their own collection, their own boundaries. It is quite possible to place my work into some of these frames. I could quite easily sort and sift my 'recordings' to fit, to place my body of work into someone else’s specific grouping would prove tiresome with no reward. This is my body of work. I will discuss in Chapter Three how by captioning using title, narrative and story, and organising the work into specific suites I have the potential to place contextual limits on these 'recordings'. What I cannot avoid is the image never being on its own.
Wolfgang Tillmans answers this question of grouping in an interview with Peter Halley, in *Wolfgang Tillmans*. He proposes exhibiting his work in an unconventional way:

‘Multi-vectored’ is the word I like to use. This way of hanging allows for each of these different vectors to have a voice, so that things are not exclusive. (Verwoert, Halley and Matsui, 2002: 33)

He pins photographic paper to the walls without frames and includes smaller images such as postcards to dramatically contrast scale. This removes any hierarchy between each image. Another mode of showing or grouping is the book of photographic images. Regarding Walker Evans work in *The Hungry Eye*, John T. Hill in his foreword suggests that:

Evans was one of the first photographers to grasp the potential of the book as an ideal vehicle for directing his audience. In his several books he explored the many possibilities of sequence, building phrases and stanzas from groups of pictures. By controlling the context he could alter the meaning of individual images and expand his vocabulary. (Mora and Hill, 2004: Foreword)

While, Mark Holborn, in the Introduction to *Ancient and Modern*, discussing Eggleston’s compiling of the body of work: *The Democratic Forest*, suggests that:

The series not the individual prints, constitutes the work ... [Eggleston] always thought of the sequences as symphonic in nature with quiet passages between grand themes. Radiating out from Memphis he could explore the whole world and encompass it all within *The Democratic Forest*. (Holborn, 1992)

I earlier wrote that part of the images’ energy and power for the viewer is that this body of work and each individual ‘recording’ functions both as document and art image. They cannot solely be assigned to one or the other without altering their meaning. It is worth mentioning how the subtle use of ‘document’ and ‘documentary’ suggests different ‘things’. I would suggest that my ‘recordings’ act foremost as ‘documents’, my ‘punctum’ and ‘categorial articulation’ specify areas of subjective importance within each image, and an attachment of a ‘self’ as a lived ‘life’ is present. To claim that they are documentary ‘recordings’, would lead to misinterpretation. They are ‘documents’ and not intentionally ‘documentary’. What John Berger finally settles upon, in *Another Way of Telling*, is ambiguity:

All photographs are ambiguous. All photographs have been taken out of continuity. If the event is a public event, this continuity is history, if it is personal, the continuity, which has been broken, is a life story. (Berger, 1982: 91)

What my group of suites or body of work does is to offer a new continuity of image to image – not quite an animation, but with the possibility of narrative – as I will describe in the next chapter.
Chapter Three:

A Life Lived: Narrative And Story

Photography is a 'live' act, in the sense that the photographer performs an action in the moment of 'recording'. It is also a 'life' act, in that it has its context in a 'life lived'. Not only do I, as the 'operator', attempt to posit a 'way of seeing' I also attach a subjective title, narrative and story to specific 'recordings'. In the case of other images, I allow them to float freer from interpretation and to behave more ambiguously than those images with text added. The distinction I make is that the story feels complete whereas the narrative is something that is ongoing. Therefore, when I'm talking about narrative I'm using it to refer to the ongoing elements of 'things' that are running through something. The narrative extends beyond any one of the images through the whole thing; which is about the longer life elements i.e. this process of 'recording' the 'object' and as a 'way of seeing'. When I use the word 'story', I'm using something which is complete or that has a sense of finish or completeness. Stories linked to particular images act as completed anecdotes referring to specific discreet elements that have a beginning, middle and end. For example, as recently as October 2009 I wrote a narrative that relates to the stretch of all the 'recordings': the various suites, and individual images I have made since beginning this research. This was an attempt to give a broad context for the whole body of work. I admit this is a somewhat tongue-in-cheek version with a dose of black humour, due to the unfortunate events and occurrences that had occurred in my 'life lived' in the process of doing this research. This is what I wrote:

I have moved back into my parents' family house in Birmingham after a ten year absence, and lived with my elderly Mother and Father, worked as a fulltime milkman for the first year of the research. I cared for my Mother who was diagnosed with terminal stomach cancer and died within six months. I suffered subsequent grief, moved to Devon, encountered numerous family upheavals, arguments over wills etc, witnessed the birth of my first son, experienced the break up of a relationship, moved back to Birmingham, and prior to this, visited numerous seaside towns on romantic breaks mainly out of season; and in which time both family pets died. (Sullivan, 2009a)

Importantly, the narrative is also by default this dissertation, and is therefore written in an academic, reflective or retrospective perspective on the work and events being discussed, and, as I shall discuss later, as a unique point of view written at a specific 'encounter' within a 'moment of time'.
Abigail Solomon-Godeau, in her essay: *Inside/Out* suggests that:

photography can only show the outside and cannot make visible the subjective and internal truth of the subject. (cited in La Grange, 2005: 128)

However, through the attachment of text either as title, narrative and story, I attempt to make it possible to show the 'inside', to posit an internal 'truth'. The written text, can then propose some 'thing' that is unseen. In contrast, the visual image depends upon the reflection of light from the 'object' to 'record' it and is therefore contingent.

In Chapter One I used phenomenology to identify 'a way of seeing' the image, and used the concept of 'categorial articulation' to specifically pinpoint 'parts' from within 'wholes', and considered how this related to Barthes 'punctum' and 'studium'. I also mentioned that Sokolowski identifies two kinds of 'truth', either the 'truth of correctness' or the 'truth of disclosure'. I gave this example as the 'truth of disclosure', which, as he suggested, is simply the presencing of an intelligible 'object':

the truth of disclosure, is simply the display of a state of affairs. It is the simple presencing to us of an intelligible object, the manifestation of what is real or actual. (Sokolowski, 2007: 158)

I will now add Sokolowski's interpretation of 'the truth of correctness':

We begin with a statement being made or a proposition being held. We then go on to verify whether the claim is true. We carry out whatever kind of experiencing is needed as a confirmation or a disconfirmation of the statement ... If the results confirm the assertion, we can say that the statement is true because it does express the way things are. (Sokolowski, 2007: 158).

In Chapter Two I wrote that phenomenology, as represented by Robert Sokolowski, suggests that each 'self' is 'a dative of manifestation' and through 'intersubjectivity' 'proposals' of 'states of affairs' can be communicated to the 'other' through the 'evidencing' of 'things' given to each 'self' to determine 'truth'. Now, with the addition of text it is easier to explain how the 'truth of correctness' operates alongside the 'truth of disclosure', and how they overlap when my 'recordings' are perceived as 'states of affairs'. Sokolowski distinguishes between these two kinds of 'truth':

The truth of correctness depends on the truth of disclosure; the latter can serve as the intelligibility that confirms or disconfirms a claim. What the true proposition 'matches' or blends with or is measured by is not an inert entity, but a thing being disclosed. The propositional claim is disquoted in favour of a direct display, which is recognised as being identifiable with the claim whose truth was being disclosed ... Our experience begins with the direct display of states of affairs, of intelligible, categorical objects. This display involves the truth of disclosure. The domain of the propositional comes into play when we become sophisticated enough to take some states of affairs as being merely
proposed by someone; they become propositions, claims or judgements, they become senses or meanings. It is these propositions, these states of affairs as proposed, that become candidates for the truth of correctness, and they acquire such truth when they are seen to blend with what is given, once again, in the truth of disclosure. The truth of disclosure, therefore, flanks the truth of correctness. It comes before and after. (Sokolowski, 2007: 159)

This concept of 'truth' is both simple and complex. I am only referring to 'truth' as a way of explaining a trace of a subjective experience of a 'moment of time'. These 'recordings' can only disclose what they disclose, i.e. what is present within the boundary of the frame. In this sense they cannot be verified.

I also mentioned in Chapter Two that there are two types of possible reflection according to Sokolowski in phenomenology: 'propositional reflection' and 'philosophical reflection' where 'truth' does not necessarily need to be verified:

Propositional reflection is carried on in the interest of truth, in the interest of verification. Our overall truth interest is never neutralized when we shift into the propositional mode. Philosophical reflection, on the other hand, is not carried out for such pragmatic reasons. It is not done in order to verify or falsify a claim. It is more purely contemplative, more purely detached. (Sokolowski, 2007: 190)

Only if the text corresponds to the image in a somewhat unusual way can the text be a proposition that could be refuted, otherwise the text and the image are both accepted as acts of disclosure not necessarily as acts of correctness. Therefore, they do not need any further verification other than what is given through the word or image that is on display within the gallery. What is interesting is how both the image and the text suggest separate 'states of affairs'. I will discuss latter how a specific 'philosophical reflection' upon a mode of behaviour in phenomenology is not altered but 'suspended' through the 'epoche', and how a triangular conversation occurs between the viewer, the image, and the text, and also how this process suggests or parallels the sequence of disclosure-correctness-disclosure and so forth. What does occur is that, by including a written subjective experience, I further identify my 'recordings' as possibly belonging to Stewart's concept of the souvenir. My 'recorded' everyday 'objects' still fall into both souvenir categories but it could now be suggested that they seem to fit closer to the second type: the souvenir of individual experience with the 'souvenir' being the experiential title, narrative and story. I provide evidential examples, 'states of affairs', of my personal 'life lived' behind the lens. It is a life that is ongoing, but inconclusive—at least while we are living it. A life has duration and an accumulation of experience, of affecting and being affected, which is established through an interchange between perception and memory. This relationship develops between the 'object' and the 'encounter', and, just as importantly, through each subsequent new 'encounter' with the
'recording' (image). Stewart even goes as far as saying that narrative transforms the very boundary of the 'self'. In On Longing she identifies three meanings of longing, for the third meaning she suggests:

> The third meaning of longing, "belongings or appurtenances," continues this story of the generation of the subject. I am particularly interested here in the capacity of narrative to generate significant objects and hence to both generate and engender a significant other in the formation of an interior. Here we might remember the meaning of appurtenance as appendage, the part that is a whole, the addition to the body which forms an attachment, transforming the very boundary, or outline of the self. (Stewart, 2007: xi)

The 'encounters' with the image, or the interchanges between perception and memory, are connected to this transformation of the boundary. The 'self' extends back in time, or across space through the 'encounters' with the image(s).

The act of photography removes data, literally through the boundary of the frame and viewfinder, and the frozen 'moment of time' that it attempts to 'record', whereas narrative enhances. It writes the image, including additional memory - a memory that I, 'the operator', made the decision to share with you the 'other'. The formation of a supplementary interior occurs through the attachment of the text. This process of sharing occurs through the reading of this dissertation narrative, and through the viewing and reading of each specific story inside the gallery. This does not necessarily imply the same 'self', and we cannot assume that it is specifically the same 'other' doing the 'reading' in both cases. As I write this document, what becomes evident is that a distancing occurs between my 'self' writing the thesis now with an academic, reflective, or retrospective perspective on the work and events being discussed. Later on in this chapter I will discuss how this affects my reading of Plate 5: Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007), and how my 'self' can be considered at different stages of development. I am not the same for with each displacement and identification made through 'remembering' my 'self' alters. This inevitably alters the way I perceive my body of work and also other practitioners' work. In contrast a viewer will only have what I provide as 'evidence' to disclose the identity of my 'self'.

The interplay between the extended or altered boundary of the image (through adding the caption) and the extension of my 'self' through work (recording; writing) and the extension of the audience or first viewer through 'encounters' with the image (phenomenological extension) develops the potential meaning and interpretation of my body of work. I will attempt to unpack this complex set of perspectives and examine how this conversation operates. Necessarily the body of work is always extended once
it is seen, identified and understood by a ‘self’, not necessarily always by my ‘self’ but also by the ‘other’.

Sontag suggests in Regarding The Pain Of Others that:

all photographs await to be explained or falsified by their captions [...] Whether the photograph is understood as a naïve object, or the work of an experienced artificer, its meaning – and the viewer’s response -- depends on how the picture is identified or misidentified, that is, on words. (Sontag, 2004: 9; 25-26)

Sontag’s views are similar to those of Walter Benjamin. In his essay: Little History Of Photography, Benjamin suggested that:

The camera is getting smaller and smaller, ever readier to capture fleeting and secret images whose shock effect paralyzes the associative mechanisms in the beholder. This is where inscription must come into play, which includes the photography of the literarization of the conditions of life, and without which all photographic construction must remain arrested in the approximate. (Benjamin, 2005: 527)

In another essay: The Author As Producer Benjamin suggested:

What we require of the photographer is the ability to give his picture a caption that wrenches it from modish commerce and gives it a revolutionary use value. But we will make this demand most emphatically when we –the writers- take up photography. (Benjamin, 2005: 775)

Not only do inscriptions allow the possibility of photographs to be torn away from fashionable clichés (modish commerce) as they become associated with those ‘meanings’ I discussed in Chapter Two, they also prevent the formation of coincidences and limit Berger’s ‘nexus of affinities’ in the process. What my suites do is to offer a new continuity of image to image – not quite an animation, but with the possibility of narrative. Stewart’s concept of narrative in On Longing is also seen as a structure of desire:

Narrative is seen in this essay as a structure of desire, a structure that both invents and distances its object and thereby inscribes again and again the gap between signifier and signified that is the place of generation for the symbolic. Therefore my reader will discover that I am particularly interested in the social disease of nostalgia as I examine the relations of narrative of origin and object, and that herein lies the reasons I have chosen a kind of ache as my title [...] the direction of force in the desire narrative is always a future past, a deferment of experience in the direction of origin and thus eschaton, the point where narrative begins/ends, both engendering and transcending the relationship between materiality and meaning. (Stewart, 2007: ix; x)

My understanding of Stewart’s ‘context of origin’ is that it simply implies original context, I choose to relate it to my practice of everyday ‘objects’ being ‘recorded’ in
situ'. I will discuss this later when I refer to 'the material referent' and the abstract quality of narrative, as I feel they are all interlinked with the phenomenological 'reduction'. Stewart suggests three possibilities of a 'point of view': partial, complete and blindness:

Out of these landscapes, the distinction of point of view. In a world where access to speed is access to transcendence, point of view is particularly a narrative gesture. The point of view of landscape is no longer still, is instead a matter of practice and transformation. Modernism's suspicion of point of view can be seen as a critique of omniscience, but a critique rooted in a self-consciousness that proclaims an omniscience of its own ontology, its own history. Point of view offers two possibilities: partial and complete. What remains silent is the third and anonymous possibility – blindness, the end of writing. (Stewart, 2007: 3)

What I would propose in relation to my body of work is that there is only one 'point of view'. This is an ongoing partiality accumulated through each 'encounter' and the affects of this accretion. This is seen in the separate entries that I have written about the image(s), and how through the passing of time they begin to resemble diary entries. In Plate 7: Age Twenty One (2005), the 'recording' acts as a metonym for a 'remembering' of an incident of my 'self aged twenty one. If I had titled Plate 7 'Untitled' then this would have signified a subjective boundary of intent and disclosure that places the emphasis purely upon the visual. In 2006, I exhibited seventeen images from this research including Plate 7: Age Twenty One (2005). Each image on show was accompanied by a written story. This is what I wrote in 2006 for this particular 'recording':

You do crazy things when you're young such as getting drunk in the bath on thunderbird wine aged twenty one, and spilling water without knowing it through the floorboards onto the kitchen ceiling as you dance manically to a tape recording of The Stone Roses' 'Stop The World I'm Getting Off' -ironically from an old stereo your girlfriend got you for Christmas, the same one that's just dumped you. It's then you realize how much you hate thunderbird wine. If you look closer you notice that the bathroom lock is broken by a forced entry and you can see the hammer marks in the wooden doorframe where an attempt has been made to fix it. A forced entry made by your dad checking if, by the age of twenty one, you should have grown up by now. And even now, seventeen years later, the lock still remains the same. (Sullivan, 2006a)

What Stewart suggests is, that through narrative, language gives form to our experience:

Language gives form to our experience providing through narrative, a sense of closure and providing through abstraction an illusion of transcendence [...] This privileging of origin, of "original" context, is particularly manifested in the
I attempt to use text to give additional representational form to my experience. The story attached to Plate 7: *Age Twenty One* (2005) offers both a reflected self-narrative of ‘remembering’, and ‘a way of seeing’ the ‘recording’. I have explained in Chapter Two that phenomenology suggests that they are both the same, as we ‘remember’ through a ‘re-enactment of an earlier perception’. By positioning an image alongside a story within the gallery I suggest this process of ‘remembering’ to the viewer. Furthermore, I feel the story parallels phenomenological ‘reduction’. To understand how ‘reduction’ operates, phenomenology splits it into two attitudes or perspectives. The first is ‘the natural attitude’ which could be easily explained as our worldview, and the belief that we, as ‘selves’, are correlated to this world with our ‘world belief’, and that this is our everyday environment.

Sokolowski suggests that:

> The natural attitude is the focus we have when we are involved in our original, world-directed stance, when we intend things, situations, facts, and any other kinds of objects. The natural attitude is, we might say, the default perspective, the one we start off from, the one we are in originally. We do not move into it from anything more basic. (Sokolowski, 2007: 42)

Secondly ‘the phenomenological attitude’ which is sometimes called ‘the transcendental attitude’. Sokolowski suggests is:

> the focus we have when we reflect upon the natural attitude and all the intentionalities that occur within it. It is within the phenomenological attitude that we carry out philosophical analyses. The phenomenological attitude is sometimes called the transcendental attitude. (Sokolowski, 2007: 42)

Therefore, the phenomenological attitude is where we reflect upon the ‘natural attitude’ and all of the ‘intentionalities’ that have occurred within it, and that crucially we never alter. This type of reflection refers to ‘philosophical reflection’ and not the propositional type that needs verification. Finally Sokolowski explains ‘intentionality’:

> The term mostly associated with phenomenology is ‘intentionality’. The core doctrine in phenomenology is the teaching that every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have, is intentional: it is essentially ‘consciousness of’ or an ‘experience of’ something or other. All our awareness is directed toward objects. If I see, I see some visual object, such as a tree or a lake; if I imagine, my imagining presents an imaginary object, such as a car that I visualize coming down a road; if I am involved in remembering, I remember a past object; if I am engaged in judging, I intend a state of affairs or a fact. Every act of consciousness, every experience, is correlated with an object. Every intending has its intended object. (Sokolowski, 2007: 8)
For example, 'intentionalities' could be:

> If it is a perceived object, we examine it as perceived; if it is a remembered object, we now examine it as remembered; if it is a mathematical entity, we consider it as correlated with a mathematical intention; if it is a merely possible object, or a verified one, we consider it as the object for an intentionality that intends something only possible, or an intentionality that intends something verified. (Sokolowski, 2007: 49-50)

To make this shift clearer is to understand that 'the transcendental attitude' becomes 'the phenomenological reduction', or even the 'transcendental reduction', which is shortened further to purely the 'reduction'. The way I prefer to understand 'reduction' is as a freezing of specific 'moments of time' and everything that had occurred within it. Coincidentally, this is what the camera does, because of its ability to present a boundary through the frame, or is the text, through its abstraction better suited to provide a clearer definition? Sokolowski describes this change and also introduces the notion of the 'epoche':

> The turn to the phenomenological attitude is called the phenomenological reduction, a term that signifies the 'leading away' from the natural targets of our concern, 'back' to what seems to be a more restricted viewpoint, one that simply targets the intentionalities themselves [...] When we enter into this new viewpoint, we suspend the intentionalities we now contemplate. This suspension, this neutralization of our doxic modalities, is also called the epoche [...]. (Sokolowski, 2007: 49)

The 'epoche' is the neutralising of natural 'intentions' that must occur when we contemplate those 'intentions'. Sokolowski also uses the term 'bracket' or 'bracketing', which is used to isolate a specific 'intentionality' to be analysed but not altered from its 'doxic modality'. I will attempt to consider 'doxic modality' with Plate 8: I Fucking Hate You (2009), shortly. These terms do seem complex and sometimes interchangeable with the 'epoche' seemingly implying the same thing as 'reduction'. Therefore, through the 'epoche' I can 'bracket' those 'intentionalities' that I wish to highlight by neutralising them, and offer proposals of rationality and reason to my 'life lived'. By juxtaposing the 'recordings', narratives and stories they become representations of my 'truth' of what is given from the 'object'; the 'how' of its manifestation. This is how I perceive 'truth', rather than as a moralistic, judgemental action that needs verification.

This 'bracketing', through the use of the title of Plate 8: I Fucking Hate You (2009), is of crucial importance as it 'suspends' my conviction of hatred towards my ex partner and mother of my new born baby son, of what occurred in a specific moment, and therefore does not alter it. Just as the title of Plate 7: Age Twenty One (2005) refers to that 'remembered' time as an adolescent, the title of Plate 8: I Fucking Hate You (2009)
expresses an extreme state at that specific time of writing -- which is not necessarily always at the same time of the 'recording'. The preliminary suites or collections all have working titles that are, and become, different to those exhibited. These indicate a different time scale of an 'encounter' to the 'recorded' image of which the viewer may be unaware. Plate 8: *I Fucking Hate You (2009)* operates as a metonym and this is the reasoning behind the title. This is what I wrote in a document as recently as 2009 as an explanation of the Toy Soldier 'recording', it is a combination of a narrative and a glimpse of a story:

I now propose that the figure was brought from a charity shop (which it was) for its comic value, and, through 'remembering' (a re-enactment of an earlier perception) of 'there and then' of it being placed inside a house in which I lived with my newborn baby son (and his mother), and being told to leave. The anger I felt at that time is reflected in the title with 'the here and now' 'displacement' and dissatisfaction, it is still only a 'proposal' by my 'self' and could be completely false. (Which it's not). (Sullivan, 2009a)

There was an interval between the writing and the 'recording' of Plate 8: *I Fucking Hate You (2009)*. I 'recorded' the Toy Soldier on May 13th 2009, whereas the writing was completed on October 9th 2009. How long it took to write is unclear as it belonged to a larger document. It may well now be the case that I no longer feel the same anger that I did when writing the title for Plate 8: *I Fucking Hate You (2009)* in 2009, but as a 'disclosure of truth' at a specific 'moment of time', it is acting as a fact taken from a 'life lived': a particular opinion and modality arising from a fresh 'encounter' with the image, as much as from the 'object' because of this displacement in time.

In *The Ballad Of Sexual Dependency*, a body of work by photographer Nan Goldin, she describes it as: "The Ballad Of Sexual Dependency is the diary I let people read" (Heiferman, Holborn and Goldin, 2001: 6). What is important is that the project is a way for Nan to remember 'an earlier re-enactment of perception' and a fresh 'encounter' with the image. In the narrative, which she wrote in 1986, she concludes that:

When I was eighteen I started to photograph. I became social and started drinking and wanted to remember the details of what happened. For years, I thought I was obsessed with the record keeping of my day-to-day life. But recently, I've realized my motivation has deeper roots: I don't really remember my sister. In the process of leaving my family, in recreating myself, I lost the real memory of my sister. I remember my vision of her, of the things she said, of things she meant to me. But I don't remember the tangible sense of who she was, her presence, what her eyes looked like, what her voice sounded like. I don't ever want to be susceptible to anyone else's version of my history. I don't ever want to lose the real memory of anyone again. (Heiferman, Holborn and Goldin, 2001: 9)
 Whereas, some ten years later, she wrote:

I don't believe photography stops time. I still believe in photography's truth, which makes me a dinosaur in this age. I still believe pictures can preserve life rather than kill life. The pictures in the Ballad haven't changed. But Cookie is dead, Kenny is dead, Mark is dead, Vittorio is dead. So for me, the book is now a volume of loss, while still a ballad of love. (Heiferman, Holborn and Goldin, 2001: 146)

It is clear through these narratives how the photographic image remains the same. Whereas its subjective meaning and knowledge creation alters with the potential disclosure of new 'encounters', both from the presentation of text and from the image itself. The extension, supplementation, or completion of the image by the textual component develops the story and so offers a whole in place, or alongside the partial image. Specifically in Goldin's case the death of loved ones serves to highlight a discontinuity of some 'thing' that is lost, and how change is inevitable, even in the process of preserving it.

Fig. 7: Exquisite pain (details), 1984-2003 is another example of a visual diary, but this time the textual content is equally proportionate to the photographic image. It is by the French artist Sophie Calle both a photographer, writer and performer. It proposes 'states of affairs' relating to the twenty-eighth day after unhappiness. And belongs to a further sequence of images and texts that signify the days and events that correspond to the before (days to unhappiness), and the after (days after unhappiness) of the break up of Calle’s relationship with her then boyfriend. This example is taken from the installation and was shown at The Paula Cooper Gallery, New York, May 7 – July 22, 2005. It suggests that the work is autobiographical and therefore not only acts as a 'truth of disclosure', but potentially through the 'truth of correctness' could be verified. Although, Calle – being a writer- has been linked with the term auto-fiction, which implies it may have factual content but is woven together through a fictional narrative and story.

What is interesting is how Calle uses Fig 8: January 25, 1985, 2 a.m., room 261, Imperial Hotel, New Delhi to represent the single ‘encounter’ and returns to this image over and over again after the break-up to present a new ‘encounter’ and ‘remembering’ defined by the different text accompanying it. Through narrative and story she explains the events that occurred at that exact ‘moment in time’ now past. She attempts to pinpoint the exact day, moment and space that the relationship ended. This is seen in the title of Fig 8: January 25, 1985, 2 a.m., room 261, Imperial Hotel, New Delhi. And is what Calle uses to caption the photographic image in the book. The red telephone
signifies the conversation on which she heard the relationship was over and the hotel room is where she stayed.

To further enhance this notion of returning either to the red telephone image or this ‘remembering’ - this earlier re-enactment of perception- she creates diptychs that juxtapose each of these ‘encounter’s’ with accompanying text, against another fresh photographic image that illustrates stories from both friends and chance encounters in response to the question: “When did you suffer most?” Fig. 7: Exquisite pain (details). 1984-2003 is one of these examples. The methodology behind this questioning was, as Calle explains:

I got back to France on January 28, 1985. From that moment, whenever people asked me about the trip, I chose to skip the Far East bit and tell them about my suffering instead. In return I started asking both friends and chance encounters: “When did you suffer most?” I decided to continue such exchanges until I had got over my pain by comparing it with other people’s, or had worn out my own story through sheer repetition. The method proved radically effective. In three months I had cured myself. Yet, while the exorcism had worked, I still feared a possible relapse, and so decided not to exploit this experiment artistically. By the time I returned to it, fifteen years had passed. (Calle, 2004: 202-203)

How Calle also indicates this passing of time, until she feels that she is cured of the affects of the relationship breakdown, is by gradually making the white lettering of the words of her story shorter and to fade into the black background that she has chosen by slowly getting darker. In contrast the other juxtaposed stories of suffering are placed onto a white background and the lettering is black, which remains constant. This is how the book is published whereas in the installation she reiterates this point by using embroidered linen; dark grey for Calle’s own stories with thread that gradually darkens and white linen with black thread for the anonymous ones that stays constant.

Calle’s reluctance to return to this piece of work for fear of a possible relapse, only reiterates the point that it serves to highlight a discontinuity of some ‘thing’ that is lost, and how change is inevitable even in the process of preserving it. Irrelevant whether they fade into the background or not, her textual sequences merely indicate each ‘state of affair’ of a new ‘encounter’ – a re-telling. Suggesting they are separate from the individual photographic image that remains the same. This begins to make me question where Stewart’s concept of ‘context of origin’ is located regarding the original ‘object’. It appears not to be implying a static original context as I first thought. The tendency of the printed word is towards abstraction; as it escapes from a visible ‘context of origin’, Stewart suggests that:
The printed word always tends toward abstraction, for it escapes both the necessity of a material referent and the constraints of an immediate context of origin; it is always a quotation. (Stewart, 2007: 22)

Stewart suggests how in the quotation we see two primary functions of language:

(1) ...to make present what can only be experienced abstractly,
(2) ...to textualize our experience and thereby make it available for interpretation and closure. (Stewart, 2007: 19)

In my work, by attaching a 'recording' of the 'material referent' as photograph, I displace some of the abstract quality by only using a singular textual 'encounter'. This alters its interpretation by the viewer and allows a certain degree of closure. Importantly the photograph, as I've previously suggested, is also a quotation and also abstracts to some degree; that is unless the photograph is itself the 'material referent' rather than what it represents, it is purely acting as 'a way of seeing'. This, as we have seen in Chapter Two, is an ambiguous process as it is in constant flux between being a representation of both realism and symbolism.

The fact of the materiality of the photograph is important and is extended by the words on display alongside it. Stewart suggests that, in the act of writing, the body and what the body knows disappear. Tactile and aural knowledge of lived experience disappear along with the visual. Does the photograph compensate for this missing quality? It may exaggerate and manipulate the scale of what is given. What I try to establish is a triangular conversation between the image, the viewer, and context often provoked by the explanatory title, narrative and story. The conventional structure of language is just as ambiguous as the photographic image. A particular word may suggest a range of agreed meanings. Debate about whether a 'universal' can exist with or without the 'object' occurs when we consider if the blue sky, the blue swimming pool and the blue felt tip pen are required in order to distinguish blueness? Or is blueness a separate entity? I attempt to play subtle games with the titles I choose blurring the distinction between the subjective and the objective.

The stories I attach to the 'recordings' always refer to my life, whereas the titles I prefer to leave hanging between the viewer and the 'operator'. They emerge from an abstraction of the story, which results in the possibility of the viewer becoming the 'operator'. I do not alter these stories, as in 'reduction' I 'suspend' their modality, but what I attempt to create is ambiguity through the title, narrative and story. For example, in Plate 9: Broken (2009) I have chosen this word 'Broken' because of its ambiguity and 'universal' potential, and at the same time because it relates to a particular specific 'object'. The word, I believe, is also operating as a metonym along with the 'recording'.

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The (hidden) story behind the image is that it is a small miniature Badger figure that I found in a charity shop on sale for a nominal fee. It was, to say the least, the worse for wear. It is faded and has one eye missing; usually it stands upright and is Blu-tacked to the base of the Mac computer. In this specific ‘encounter’ it had fallen over and I made the decision to ‘record’ it and to give it the title: Broken (2009), in the same ‘moment of time’. The ambiguity is formed through its objective meaning. Does Plate 9: Broken (2009) relate to the Badger falling over, its one eye missing, and unkempt demeanour, or does it signify sadness and the broken man, as this was at the time in my life when I was being prevented by my ex partner from seeing our newborn son? Plate 9: Broken (2009) is both open and closed for my ‘self’ and the viewer in its ambiguity and consequently drifts between its meanings.

I ‘recorded’ Plate 3: Take The Long Black Train (2007) because of its primary and secondary focus: the carousel horse being in need of repair. The ‘encounter’ occurred on a windy Blackpool day, near the seafront, out of season, in April 2007. I subsequently gave it the title: Take The Long Black Train (2007), importantly, sometime after this initial ‘encounter’. The title was inspired by listening to the Richard Hawley song Long Black Train, taken from his compact disc: Richard Hawley: Late Night Final, 2001, Sentanta. My association with this image through this particular song prompted me to relate, as recently as 2009, that I wanted it to express melancholy and romanticism. More specifically: the carousel that doesn’t work, the misfit, the seaside resort out of season, the sadness, the seediness, the happiness and fun of Blackpool on a windy day, operate through the comparison with a long black train entering a dark tunnel that takes you home. What I have found out is that this title: Take The Long Black Train (2007) now restricts my own subjective interpretation of this particular ‘recording’ every time I choose to view it again. Similarly, this narrative that you are now reading, only occurs because I have decided to share this previous intention, and previous ‘encounter’ with the image with you, and by so doing possibly altering your interpretation.

It seems not to matter whether we choose to call ‘reduction’ either the ‘phenomenological attitude’, or the ‘epoche’, but what is crucially important is not to forget that the ‘natural attitude’ remains in place. The world keeps turning. Therefore, my ‘self’ continues to experience further ‘encounters’ with potential ‘objects’, and ‘recordings’, which potentially will, as I have shown, alter their original modality. However, I may be able to judge my own convictions from previous ‘reductions’, by assessing them without changing them, and, by doing so, this may prevent my ‘self’ from forming any new interpretations. What the ordering of the images into preliminary
suites or sequences offers is a narrative for the viewer and reader. Plate 3: *Take The Long Black Train* (2007) already belongs to a narrative of ‘recording’ ‘objects’ in Blackpool. So it offers the possibility of a move from separate images to a whole story. There is also, just as in the Nan Goldin and Sophie Calle text, an extension, supplementation, or completion of the image by the textual component that develops the story alongside the partial image. The title, *Take The Long Black Train* (2007) is not literal. There is no ‘recording’ of a black train evident within the image. It does not conjure up a significant ‘encounter’ to be given an attached story as a metonym. It is my imagination that is being presented in Plate 3: *Take The Long Black Train* (2007) through the act of the collection, by default, forming a boundary.

Plate 3: *Take The Long Black Train* (2007) is a unique example of a ‘recording’ that I titled after the preliminary title of *Carousel* and now I have my doubts on whether this is what I intended it to depict. This particular association is not very strong and highlights, as I have attempted to explain through ‘reduction’, which, importantly is also an ‘encounter’, how similarly, a title can alter proposed meaning even to my ‘self’ as the ‘operator’, and the potential changeability of this meaning through subsequent ‘encounters’ with the image. What is occurring is that this process of explanation is becoming difficult, and more complex, purely because the ‘reduction’ is everything, whereas in an attempt to distinguish purely the writing of the title I fail. Even if I ‘suspend’ (‘bracket’) an ‘intentionality’ I ask how do I make the distinction, for now as I write this I am only relying upon a ‘remembering’ that is too vague to choose. Or, is the ‘intentionality’ purely that of ‘remembering’? This displacement and layering of time complicates the situation or makes it difficult to decide on the answer.

Sokolowski suggests that language has a three level structure in meaning. He uses this to discuss how in ‘the truth of correctness’ “we begin with statements or propositions and attempt to verify whether they are true or false. In dealing with such truth it is important to distinguish three levels of structure that can be found in propositions” (Sokolowski, 2007: 168). The three levels of structure in meaning suggested are:

> The first level deals with the kinds of syntactic combinations that yield meaningful propositions [...] Once we have reached syntactically meaningful propositions, however a second level of structure arises that is related to the consistency of propositions [...] The third level of structure, however deals with the content of what we say. It deals with the coherence of the statements we make. (Sokolowski, 2007: 169; 170)

This model can be condensed to the three terms ‘meaning’, ‘consistency’ and ‘coherence’ in order to discuss them more tidily. What is important, within the titles, is
the way I organise ‘meaning’ through the placement of the ‘syntax’, the logical grammar and connective tissue, and the ‘content’, which does not link other words, but expresses the ‘things’ or ‘aspects’. Do these titles; therefore act as proposals, by default, because of the decision I make in this assembly? The titles of the Plates I have already discussed: Plate 7: Age Twenty One (2005) and Plate 9: Broken (2009) are intentionally abstract, not sentences, only fragments. In comparison Plate 3: Take The Long Black Train (2007), may be a sentence, but does not summon up a specific subjective experience, for anybody could suggest that. In the same way Plate 8: I Fucking Hate You (2009) does the same thing. What Sokolowski suggests is that ‘syntax’ and ‘content cannot be separated as sheer syntax or sheer semantics, for it is an impossible task:

Such a projection into sheer syntax and sheer semantics as totally separated from one another is purely imaginary [...] every word that we use has some syntax, and almost all words have some semantics attached to them; the two features are moments to one another, not pieces that can be detached. Still, it is legitimate to distinguish between the syntax and the contents as two dimensions of propositions and words. (Sokolowski, 2007: 169)

By parallel they mimic the task of conceiving each image as being isolated, where in fact they have relations between them, and this relates once more to this argument of realism versus symbolism as discussed in Chapter Two. Throughout my body of work there are other examples of how I have used syntax for an effect. For example, Plate 5: Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007) is a ‘recording’ of a blue i-Pod that displays the words: “We have a winner!” The story behind this particular image is both a painful and poignant one. Straight away it becomes evident from this title that it is a subjective experience, especially with the syntax ‘My’ being placed adjacent to ‘Mom Died’. Alternatively it can suggest objectivity, as we all have mothers, and we all use the word ‘My’ to point to them, and furthermore they will, sadly, five days after this occurrence of pointing, all die. The juxtaposing of the i-Pod displaying “We have a winner!” against the title mixes discourse and flaunts ‘incoherence’. For who does the ‘We’ correspond to, or even more subjectively the ‘a’ in the case of ‘a winner’, when your mother is about to die in five days time. Of course, as the ‘operator’ I intended this irony to occur and is the reason why I ‘recorded’ this particular ‘encounter’. Whether it is a metonym is debatable as it implies an imaginative ‘anticipation’, through the title, of my mother dying. The initial ‘encounter’ was exactly how I felt then, and, therefore through the ‘title’, implies that moment of actuality.
In a document, as recently as 2009, I wrote this story as a 'remembering' of this initial 'encounter', and as a fresh 'encounter' with the image. This has subsequently become part of the image and will be displayed alongside it in the gallery:

My mother is downstairs in a makeshift bedroom in the front room, in a temporary bed. She is bedridden, unable to climb the stairs. She is terminally ill with stomach cancer. She is starving to death, and my dad is caring for her throughout the night. The doctor has advised us she could die any minute. I am lying on my bed. I wear earplugs to block out the cries of pain and frustration. I cannot sleep, so I play solitaire on the i-Pod. "We have a winner!" exclaims the screen, as I accomplish solitaire. (Sullivan, 2009b)

Alternatively, how does this syntax operate when I become the viewer and not the 'operator'? Fig. 9: Mabou, 2001 an image by Robert Frank. I 'encountered' it first in an exhibition at Tate Modern, London in 2005 entitled: Robert Frank: Storylines. Subsequently another 'encounter' occurred when I purchased the catalogue and discovered the plate was entitled: Mabou, 2001. I will discuss it shortly, but for now in Fig. 9: Mabou, 2001, the grouping of the words: 'THE SILENCE THE SUFFERING' point to nowhere specific. Which returns us to this concept of the 'universal' and the questioning of whether it is a separate entity? By using an example of a specific building, The Buritt Hotel, that is located in a specific place, Sokolowski suggests that, phenomenology denies that the positing of an image occurs when we interpret words. Instead he suggests that:

The 'arrow' of the signitive intention goes right through the perceived word toward the real Buritt Hotel, not to an image. (Sokolowski, 2007: 78)

It is only when they become resolved by the placing 'OF PABLO' near the bottom edge of the image (and in the darkness) that the text in the Robert Frank photograph begins to tell a subjective story. Similarly, instead of placing The Buritt Hotel in Sokolowski's example, as a viewer of Fig. 9: Mabou, 2001, I attempt to 'intend', make 'Pablo' present in his absence. In phenomenological terms, the 'word' corresponds to the 'intentionality' of 'signification' and the 'image' to 'picturing'. Each one separately 'intends' the 'object' with a different directional arrow. Sokolowski suggests that:

In signification the 'arrow' of intentionality goes through the word to an absent object. It is outward bound. It goes away from me and my situation here to somewhere else. In picturing, however, the direction of the arrow is reversed. The object intended is brought toward me, into my own proximity; the presence of the object is embodied before me on a panel of wood or a piece of paper. (Sokolowski, 2007: 82)

The photographic image appears to have no equivalent to the 'signitive' and therefore, remains always pictorial. It always has some framing, some selection and conditionality
to it. In Fig. 9: *Mabou, 2001* therefore, the two directions of the arrow are at work within this image; they bring 'Pablo' to my 'self' as the viewer, and point to a memory or story of 'Pablo' elsewhere, and to the life behind and around the image. Through a priori knowledge I 'remember' a story of Frank's son Pablo committing suicide in a mental institution. What I see is a combination of emptiness within the image. There is no Pablo. The box and wooden fish, I remember, were referred to in an interview with Robert Frank as being part of his son's possessions.

These two 'objects' are placed upon the chair. I infer that these 'things' being disclosed relate somehow to 'THE SILENCE THE SUFFERING', and may imply the dark despair of a mental illness and the resulting loss of a son. Not only does the word 'intend' Pablo, or the image as a whole, but also, more specifically, it intends the separate 'objects'. This corresponds closely to how my body of work operates. Importantly, Frank's decision to use these words, and their corresponding 'meaning', indicates through them some 'thing' about his 'self', just as my choice of words indicates some 'thing' about my 'self'. What Sokolowski suggests is that:

Meanings are presented especially in words. Through language it becomes possible for us to express the way things are and to convey this mode of presentation to other people and to ourselves at other places and other times. The words we exchange capture the way things have appeared to us, and if we are authoritative in our disclosures they capture the way things are. At the same time, the words are flavoured by the style with which we have disclosed the things in question, so they indicate to the reader or listener something about ourselves as well. (Sokolowski, 2007: 157-158)

Fig. 10: *My Father's Coat, N.Y.C., 2001* is another image by Robert Frank. I 'encountered' this particular image in the same exhibition and catalogue as Fig. 7: *Mabou, 2001*. Once again you can see the importance of the use of title, syntax and the word 'MY'. Both Fig. 10: *My Father's Coat, N.Y.C., 2001* and Plate 5: *Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007)* use this particular word to imply a family member that is either dead or is going to die. The story behind this Frank image is that the coat is what's left of his late father's possessions. The triptych in Fig. 10: *My Father's Coat, N.Y.C., 2001* is torn between emphasizing this concept of 'consistency' of proposal and being 'in-consistent'. Each separate image in the triptych reveals a slightly different 'way of seeing' the coat, but shares the same title - albeit in a different colour ink and handwriting. However, on this occasion, each image appears separate with a separate title, the title appearing 'in-consistent' because each image is different but with the same title.
In Plate 1: Untitled (2004) the writing inside of the milk float, ‘KEEP GOING’, belongs to a particular ‘encounter’ and image. If I make the decision to repeat it and title it ‘KEEP GOING’, it creates a context that associates itself through the image with this phrase. It attempts to make it singular and specific. This seems to be what Frank is doing in Fig. 10: My Father’s Coat, N.Y.C., 2001, but we can see two other versions of it that seem to be in contradiction. In Plate 4: Out Shopping (2006), there is a depiction of a heart upon a wall. I chose not to title it either ‘Heart’ or ‘A Heart’. This is the story I attach to the ‘recording’; it once again offers both a reflected self-narrative of ‘remembering’ and ‘a way of seeing’ the ‘recording’.

The heart is broken and in need of repair, notice the red tape peeling from its centre, the out of place wrongly coloured unlit light bulb and the coincidence of the alarm case spelling ‘defence’. Yet, the heart still beats above a florists shop on Valentines Day and draws the customers in to buy more flowers whilst ‘out shopping’. (Sullivan, 2006b)

If I had chosen to write as a title ‘Broken Heart’, instead of Out Shopping (2006), because of the brown light bulb out of place, or even ‘Broken Hearted’ would this imply anything different to the way that Plate 9: Broken (2009) is operating? It would, of course, open up a whole trove of meaning.

What I attempt with the use of text in combination with the image is to try to prompt ‘feelings’ within the viewer. Plate 5: Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007) is an extremely sad and poignant image for my self to reflect upon. In this sense is it melancholic to the viewer as well? I empathise with Frank’s loss of his son, but Fig. 9: Mabou, 2001 does not move me as much as Plate 5: Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007). In fact, Fig. 10: My Father’s Coat, N.Y.C., 2001 moves me more. Melancholia is a sense in which there is an artful sadness, partly prompted by novels or images, or an awareness of pose; these include a combination of story and narrative. In their essay Melancholy As An Aesthetic Emotion, Emily Brady and Arto Haapala suggest that melancholy is:

a complex emotion with aspects of both pain and pleasure which draws on a range of emotions - sadness, love and longing - all of which are bound within a reflective, solitary state of mind. (Brady and Haapala, 2003)

I have revealed to you that my mother died of stomach cancer in 2007. She was only diagnosed in February 2007. I slowly watched her starve to death as a result of an induced diamorphine (heroin) coma in the family home we shared with my father in Birmingham, and not in a hospice. In 2007 I wrote about the ‘recording’ of the ‘objects’ in my parents’ home, which I had began in 2004, as a reflection with my mother close to dying. This is what I wrote:
I moved back home to my parent's house in Shard End, Birmingham after a period of ten years away living in both London and Devon. I began by devising a methodology of wanting to record 'objects' that had long since been a memory for me as a child growing up there. These 'objects' were being ignored, becoming fragile and eventually being disposed of. Each room of my parent's house held a significant memory that I couldn't extinguish from my mind. The poignancy of watching my parents growing old through this re-visitting was forming questions in my work and making me dependant on this notion of age. The cracks on the walls were recorded. I became obsessed with decay, peeling wallpaper, stains on the carpet, and outdated furniture began looking chic again. My parents were people that didn't follow fashion. A home in there eyes was meant to be somewhere you felt at home in, not a show home where you felt embarrassed if you dropped a crumb from eating a biscuit. Or had to change the décor every six months because the colour brown was no longer in vogue.

I began by remembering the significance of these 'objects' and the loving time spent with them. I didn't need a photograph of a member of my family holding them up in order to see and identify there meaning. By themselves you could sense the poignancy and importance of the figures. If I photographed a piece of wallpaper where my head use to lie as a child, there was no need to go further and literally show an image of my head against the wall. The wallpaper was enough to signal this intent, and the more outlandish the pattern so much the better. The ornaments on top of the pelmet in the office upstairs covered in dust reminded me of a snow scene. A bathroom in lurid pink could have been straight out of a catalogue from the seventies. Or the wooden panel doors to the shower unit felt like stepping into a cowboy saloon from the Australian outback. I was bombarded everywhere I looked and still am.

There was no sadness or neglect intended in what I captured, although at times the images do look painfully sad. When you unintentionally neglect something you expect it to take on a melancholic effect. Perhaps, I'm wrong and at times I became depressed and this became apparent through my work, but much of what I was doing was highlighting the black humour. A plastic doll dressed in a woollen outfit guarding the toilet paper is kitsch and fun to still have around. I prefer to think I was re-presenting a loving environment where nurturing and support had grown up.

I was also identifying with a place that was part of my history that I couldn't change, a place that was accessible enough for others to remind them of their own experiences of 'home'. The way the furniture and specifically the ornaments had been laid out got me thinking about randomness and order. I recorded the position of things without intentionally moving anything for a better angle. My methodology was to never rearrange the 'objects' I wanted to capture. The dualism between chaos and order manifests itself throughout my
work. I became fascinated with the order of other peoples things and just as importantly how I arranged my own possessions. I’d leave things intentionally around and then notice how I grouped certain things together through choice. (Sullivan, 2007)

This acts as a ‘remembered’ narrative. The document was required for an October submission as part of this research project. She would sadly pass away on 10 August 2007. At that time of writing my mother was still alive, of course we were only given an approximate time of how long she had left remaining to live, we knew her cancer was terminal, there was no cure. It is also worth stating that between the dates of 9 June – 12 August 2007 I had scheduled my first major exhibition of this body of work, and which went ahead. Upon my own admission, after this, I fell apart and unusually found solace in Lowry’s work. I do not want to discuss Lowry here, other than to say within his artwork I found melancholia, but did I? This comment is only an attempted reflection upon how I felt ‘there and then’ compared to how I feel ‘here and now’. A further displacement of time that forms the ‘self’. What Brady and Haapala suggest is:

When mourning transforms itself into melancholy, when the desperation of a loss has calmed down and is mixed with pleasurable memories, then we have an instance of melancholy, which in itself seems to create an aesthetic context of its own. (Brady and Haapala, 2003)

This implies that when I viewed Lowry’s work I was suffering from grief, or sadness of the loss and not melancholia. Melancholia does involve the contemplation of loved ones, but importantly in a somewhat therapeutic way, that dare I say it, is perversely uplifting. How Brady and Haapala suggest this pleasure from reflection is:

melancholy is not such a debilitating mood, rather it involves the pleasure of reflection and contemplation of things we love and long for, so that the hope of having them adds a touch of sweetness that makes melancholy bearable (while misery is not). Its reflective or thoughtful aspect also makes it somehow productive. Melancholy is something we even desire from time to time, for it provides an opportunity for indulgent self-reflection. We enjoy this time out for reflection, but the pleasure is also connected to recollecting that which we long for, where this reflective element can be even exhilarating or uplifting. (Brady and Haapala, 2003)

What impression does this reflected narrative create now? Does it illustrate a melancholic mode of writing and its relation to the ‘objects’ or images? One of these ‘objects’ ‘recorded’ at this time is Plate 12: Untitled (2007). I have, as yet, given it no specific title or story other than what is inferred throughout this whole document which is acting as another caption that you’re reading. My mother had no choice than to move downstairs to sleep. Once the cancerous tumour became aggressive and made her weak, she could no longer climb the stairs back to her bedroom. The clown in Plate 12:
**Untitled (2007)** was situated on a pelmet above her window, in the bedroom she shared with my father. You can see how much dust became attached to it. Is this melancholic, or plain ironic, as in the tears of a clown? Or just a piece of harmless kitsch, a clown pincushion that's in need of a clean. In fact, the dust encrusted upon the clown is similar to a veil of snowflakes but snowflakes that seem to keep the clown warm. It is reminiscent of how a pigeon puffs out his feathers on a cold day. One thing is for certain, it is not as sad for my 'self' as the blue i-Pod depicted in Plate 5: *Five Days Before My Mom Died (2007)* with the words: "We have a winner!"

This issue of melancholia or sadness and the re-visiting of a past 'object' I found present within Fig. 11: *May Dodge My Nan 1963-93*, by Tracey Emin. The work involves mixed media and significantly moved me the first time I 'encountered' it. It is both different to what I do, but also very similar. I give this example as a contrast as a way of literally reading the exhibited relic 'object' out of its context alongside, and as a subjective 'recording'. Each piece of memorabilia Emin uses is because of a sympathy and empathy that she has for these 'things'.

These 'recordings' suggest fragmented 'moments of time' through the photographic image, text and the two-relic 'objects'. The actual 'object' removed from its context has now been cleansed, and provided with an abstract aura. Therefore, it appears to correspond more with Stewart's concept of the collection. There are five individually framed different elements. Which appear to have no hierarchy between each one and act as a grouping. Emin attempts to display the essence of her deceased Nan, May Dodge as an 'encounter' to her 'self' now past, through a reflective narrative and story, but also 'here and now' with the 'recordings' on display. It is in this slippage that they appear to my 'self' to be a homage referring to tender love. And once more blur this souvenir and collection definition. It is only when the work is presented in book format that Emin's hand written text becomes a more substantial element of the work.

This is what she wrote:

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May Dodge –My Nan she's 92 I call her Plum she calls me Pudding-
She made me the most beautiful baby clothes –white crocheted.
She made them for me a few years ago –she said at the time
'I've made them for you now because –by the time you have a baby-
I'll be making clothes for angels.'
Dear Nanny I'm not afraid anymore –
Life's fantastic – who'd have thought
I could make angels –
For you –
There waiting.
xxx. (Freeman and Honey. 2006: 98-99)
```
Emin not only describes the actions of her Nan towards her, through the tender use of pet names, the crocheting of the baby clothes, presented through the 'object', textual extract and photograph as evidence, but additionally offers a response:

Life's fantastic – who'd have thought
I could make angels –
For you –
There waiting.
xxx. (Freeman and Honey. 2006: 98-99)

This is something that I do not do. In my accompanying text I only attempt to describe and present a specific 'moment of time' or modality - as I have already explained - and not to comment within it. This suggests that Emin combines 'encounters' within a singular text, just as the photographic image potentially operates as a metonym with the original 'encounter' still intact, but this is only a suggestion, for without verification through 'the truth of correctness' it is a 'truth of disclosure'. In this chapter I have attempted to discuss different 'moments of time' in relationship to the body of work. I have attempted to examine certain specific 'recordings', and in doing so to suggest an account of others. The simplest way to do this was through the presenting of past writings and reflections upon initial 'encounters', considering both the visuality of the image and the actuality of its 'recording'. These selections of 'moments' correspond to a layerings of time. What subsequently occurs is that these written descriptions are intimately bound up with the conception of time, both intratextual and extratextual. This culminates in the photographer's time, the viewer's time and the time of the caption or telling. Michel Butor, in discussing the position of the reader suggests that:

As soon as we can speak of a literary "work", and hence as soon as we approach the province of the novel, we superimpose at least three time sequences: that of the adventure, that of writing it, that of reading it. The time sequence of the writing will often be reflected in the adventure by the intermediary of a narrator. (cited in Stewart. 2007: 9)

Within this dissertation, I am the narrator, author and 'operator', whilst at other times I become the reader, the viewer and the 'other'. What Stewart suggests regarding a literary work is a further distinction:

Thus we can further distinguish between authorial time (time of writing) and reader's time (time of reading the text) as extratextual temporalities, and the narrator's time (time of the storytelling) and the time that is portrayed through the text's representation (time of depicted events) as intratextual temporalities. (Stewart, 2007: 9-10)

In captioning my images I allow a certain level of ambiguity and interest to form around both the title and story. Often, of course, title and story work in tandem, and, when a potential reader and viewer is included, they also operate in a triangular relationship
alongside the image. I do not literally explain in the accompanying text all the 'meaning' I have of the 'recording'. I allow a level of 'hiddleness' to remain and only specific 'sedimentation' to be excavated. I prefer only to offer an insight and leave the rest for the formation of imagination, anticipation and for ambiguity to surface. This is because in each new 'encounter' with these 'recordings' a new 'remembering' of an earlier 're-enactment of perception' that I had forgotten is triggered. The gathering, sorting, sifting and accumulation of text offers an infinite array of possible further information, as does the body of work as both collection and souvenir, offering further potential insights into the 'life lived'. Also I prefer to hold certain things back, I am a defensive person, and to lay my 'self' open to criticism of my 'self', and my 'life', I would find too intrusive. As with Goldin's Ballad, the photographs are her visual diaries whereas her written ones are private. I do not want to glorify or glamorise some 'thing' which is, in essence, an everyday 'object'. I prefer to allow the reader and viewer an opportunity to empathise with how the body of work is activated in a particular way which gives to the 'other' the opportunity to become the 'operator'.

There is no 'truth' needing verification in these images only a disclosure of knowledge and knowledge formation. This body of work does not require an explanation. I will only acknowledge here that the works are neither inauthentic or shallow, nor are they presented as examples of sentimentality in art. They are my manifestations of 'how' the 'object' presented itself to my 'self'. A displacement of the 'here and now' with the 'there and then' is continually operating. This thesis narrative will date along with the 'recordings' but not necessarily at the same rate. This document becomes, by default, another diary entry, just as the exhibition and portfolio example of a selection of the images will provide another new 'encounter'. Another knot created in the piece of string in the duration we call a 'life lived'. As Susan Stewart writes:

[We can see the many narratives that dream of the inanimate-made-animate as symptomatic of all narrative's desire to invent a realizable world, a world which "works." In this sense, every narrative is a miniature and every book a microcosm, for such forms always seek to finalise, bring closure to, a totality or model. (Stewart, 2007: xi-xii)]

And that 'model' being a representation of my particular 'life lived' while undertaking this research project. Some 'thing', as Barthes' noeme identified, now becomes 'that has been'.
Conclusion

In the last three chapters I have examined the image on its own and in the context of a body of work. I have considered it in terms of the images as isolated; the images in relation to each other; and the images as contributing potentially to a larger narrative structure. I have revealed my 'self' here, as a worker, as a member of a family, as a drunken twenty-one year old, as a father, a son anticipating his mother's death, and as a body angry at a Toy Soldier moneybox and 'recording' a fallen-over Badger.

This notion of an extension of the 'lived life', of how within this there is some 'thing' about the connectedness of 'things' present within both the 'object' and each 'recording', has proved an important feature of this research. The intrinsic quality of each different 'object' was my motivation to begin 'recording'. I have identified my concern with primary and secondary focus, the relevance of Barthes' 'punctum' and 'studium' and the usefulness of Sokolowski's definition of 'categorial articulation'. Perhaps my fascination with 'uniqueness', the going against the grain of the perfect 'ideal' and the overlooked discrepancies of the everyday 'object' became a subjective 'way of seeing', and an unintentional homage to the legacy of Evans' 'vernacular object'.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the continued formation of the 'self' through interchange between perception and memory allows for the possibility of a body of work to become infinite and for the continued formation of new 'selves' to arise. In this sense, as Stewart suggested, it is a collection – albeit one that ends when I say stop. As long as I am still able to pick up the camera the body of work will continue to develop, to grow, and has the potential for endless new 'encounters' that will continue to attach themselves to each other, extending my 'self', as they attach to my 'self' in time, backwards to memories and childhood, and on to more recent and future memories as yet unknown.

The triangular conversation I discussed in Chapter Three has the potential to predetermine 'meaning' for the viewer and to offer an internal 'truth' as in Berger's 'nexus of affinities'. This concept of 'truth' becomes overly ambiguous, ambitious and open to possible questioning in terms of its authenticity. Especially in the case of Calle's work where the acknowledgement that she is a writer brings into question the 'truth' of an autobiographical piece. It is a something of a red herring. To distinguish 'truth' now seems a pointless exercise, as I attempted to explain in Chapter Three, as my 'truth' is only a reference to a way of explaining a trace of subjective experience of
a 'moment of time'. A specific 'reduction' is difficult to successfully establish, to pin down, and unfortunately as we experience specific 'moments of time' we cannot 'record' every possible detail that we as 'selves' either perceive or 'remember'. 'The living present', as a comet's tail pattern of temporality, is far too infinite to recreate either as a single image or as a set of images. It is in constant flux between past, present and future occurrences.

We may exist in 'the natural attitude', but unfortunately so does 'the phenomenological attitude' through which we attempt to unpack this. The world just keeps on turning as we keep on changing our 'identity'. What I have shown with each 'recording' is that, in an attempt to potentially compensate for this lack of ability to recall every possible detail contained within an experienced 'moment of time', there is a need for the addition of text to accompany the photographic image. This may simply be by the addition of the title 'Untitled', and the possibility of further philosophical reflection through subsequent 'encounters' with the image to trigger further knowledge creation, for example, with the changing and altering perspective that occurred between Nan Goldin's separate 'encounters' with her own visual diary. This supposes a dependency upon a 'recording' made by a digital eye that 'records' differently from our eyes and is increased in my body of work with the formation of an image that has qualities of both the miniature and the gigantic through my insistence upon 'recording' in close-up.

The attachment of text to an image presents its own difficulties. As an abstraction, its 'context of origin' and 'material referent' is missing. In Chapter Three, using Stewart's notion of 'context of origin', I began to question where this might be located within a text related to the original 'object' (material referent), because the tendency of the printed word is towards abstraction as it escapes from a visible 'context of origin'. By attaching a 'recording' of the 'material referent', as photograph, I, in turn, displace some of the abstract quality of the text. This potentially alters its interpretation by the viewer and allows a certain degree of closure. Importantly, the photograph is also a quotation and also abstracts to some degree. Alternatively, the photograph is itself the 'material referent' rather than what it represents and purely acts as 'a way of seeing'.

Initially in the beginning of the research I added the text to accompany the photographs (acting as a 'material referent') in order to highlight discrepancies, and to pinpoint a subjective 'way of seeing' the recordings. I was afraid that the viewer would not interpret them in this specific way without this textual component included.

As the research progressed, and it is worth re-stating that it was a six-year period of study, certain photographs became metonyms and I lost this insecurity. What has
occurred is that I now pre-dominantly use the text only to tell stories based upon the ‘encounter’, or only show the image with an title giving greater emphasis upon the viewer to decide upon their ‘meaning’ and potentially become the ‘operator’, as I will discuss shortly.

Throughout the thesis I have used the term ‘title, narrative and story’ to comment upon the textual component, this was for consistency purposes. I attempted to make a distinction between narrative and story in Chapter Three. I can comment now, as with the tricky issue of ‘truth’, that this difficult definition fails. A story may have a beginning, middle and end, or may not, but still requires a narrative intact running through it. And any veering away from the story implies a greater emphasis upon the narrative. Specifically in the Tracey Emin example I raised the question suggesting that she responds to the text within the text, which implies a 'philosophical reflection' upon a ‘modality’, and so creates a structure that combines narrative with story. Successfully doing so with the introduction of dialogue, and yet this is still acting as a ‘reduction’.

Not only is the printed word an abstraction but there is also a slippage occurring between the restrictive and ambiguous ‘meaning’ of words. In Chapter Three I discussed how I play upon this ‘meaning’ through the attachment of title, and in the process create the possibility of the viewer becoming the ‘operator’. This questions, once again, the subjective and objective ‘meaning’ of ‘truth’, this time both written and spoken, and the concept of a ‘universal’ as a transcendental form - albeit one with an ambiguous quality. For example in Plate 9: Broken (2009), does the title signify the broken man or the broken miniature Badger figure? Sokolowski’s concept of a three level structure in language: ‘meaning’, ‘consistency’ and ‘coherence’ only offered a brief explanation. Our language and vocabulary constantly evolves alongside the evolvement of the ‘self’ with specific words becoming associated with different ‘meanings’.

What has now become evident through this research project is that Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as approaching “whatever appears as such”, including everything meant or thought, in the manner of its appearing, in the ‘how’ (Wie) of its manifestation” (cited in Moran, 2007: 1) may be understood in my context as a triangular conversation that includes the photographic image, the attachment of text and the inclusion of a potential viewer all with a dependency upon the ‘whatever’.

In the preface of the book: Sophie Calle: M’as-tu vue Alfred Pacquement writes:

Sophie Calle’s texts are not easily pigeonholed within a genre. Above all – and this is as well to bear in mind -- they contain the distinctive feature of being
bound up with photography, be it in her books or in her installations. In most instances text is associated with image, in a kind of dialectic about issues to do with the visible and the expressible (in words) — the sayable, otherwise put. "I see what I don’t say and I say what I don’t see" is a dialectic that seems to be a central one ... (Pacquement, 2010: 21)

This is an important point on which to conclude. The sequence of chapters in this written thesis were written and intended to reflect the research process. The presentation of work at Falmouth was a point where I received valuable feedback and this contributed to the consideration of the work in the final version of the thesis. It raised the question that the text on display becomes bound up with the photographic image immediately to the 'other', whether viewed either inside an exhibition or in the portfolio example at the front of this thesis, just as each separate 'recording' belongs to a larger body of work.

This potentially suggests that where I have mentioned image, it may have been better suited to have stated image and text inclusively where appropriate. Yet, this still doesn’t remove these 'moments' (non-independent 'parts') from within their 'whole'. for the image is on its own, the image is never on its own and the image is an extension of a 'life lived': narrative and story. More importantly the image transcends the subjective and enters into the objective. The title in French of Calle’s book, M’as-tu vue, translates as: "do you see me?" For I, or the 'other', do not purely, "See what I don’t say and say what I don’t see" more correctly, I reiterate the conclusion that, "I 'encounter' through phenomenology 'whatever' is included and appears as such."
Appendix 1:

Production Diary

Please note

In this production diary the images have working titles only.

Some titles relate to individual images whilst others relate to suites of work only.

The places 'recorded' and the time taken of each image are specific and organised chronologically.

I have alphabetically categorised each title and place at the end of each year to highlight similarities and to identify patterns.

Also, I have added some important dates that further help to contextualise my life behind the lens.
2004

**Birmingham (Home)**

Living Room - Fire Place. (12/10/04)

Table Mat, Clock, Plant. (13/10/04)

**Birmingham (Garage)**

Scrap - Metal. (14/10/04)

Transport - Van. (14/10/04)

**Birmingham (Local Shops and Neighbourhood)**

Neighbour - Scrap Car, Towing Truck. (14/10/04)

Litter - Beer Can, Burnt Rubbish. (14/10/04)

**Birmingham (Work Place)**

Milk Yard - Barbed Wire, Milk Yard, Battery, Black Seat, Broken, Cab Wheel, Crate, Cupboard, Dials + Switches, Electric, Floats, Metal Cab, Mirror, Paint, Roof, Signs, Walls, Wheel. (20/10/04)

**Birmingham (Home)**

Bathroom - Toilet Girl. (03/11/04)
2004 Working Titles/Suites/Images

Aerial, Barbed Wire, Battery, Beer Can, Black Seat, Broken, Burnt Rubbish, Cab Wheel, Clock, Crate, Cupboard, Dials + Switches, Electric, Fire Place, Floats, Table Mat, Metal, Metal Cab, Milk Yard, Mirror, Paint, Plant, Roof, Scrap Car, Signs, Toilet Girl, Towing Truck, Van, Walls and Wheel.

2004 Places

Birmingham

Birmingham (Garage), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Local Shops and Neighbourhood), Birmingham (Work Place).
2005

Dartington College
Lecture Room - College Wallpaper, Trapped Flies, Wall Socket. (28/01/05)

Birmingham (Shops)
Shard End - Alive, Bold, Front, Bollard, Camera, Church, Closed, Damage, Doors, Fence, Graffiti, House Number, Lamp Post, Library, Neighbourhood Office, Open, Trunking, Phone Mast, Psychic, Satellite, Tanks, Toilet, Vicarage, Church Cross. (08/05/05)

Birmingham (Home)
Bedroom - Guru Door, Plug Extension, Shadow, Wall Cracks 1. (02/08/05)
TV Big Brother, TV Cricket, Light Shadow. (4/08/05)
Wall Fire, Wall Paper, Wall Cracks 2. (08/08/05)
Downstairs Toilet - Spider, Toilet Sign. (08/08/05)
Back Garden - Bird Bath, Garden Badger, Garden Duck, Garden Flowers, Knicker Line. (08/08/05)

Birmingham (Grave Yard)
Granddad's Grave - Grass, Trees, Stones, Twigs, Flowers, Graves. (23/08/05)

Birmingham (Home)
Bedroom - Money. (03/09/05)
Back Garden - Garden Cat, Old Cat, Satellite, The Blue Chimney, Blue Garage. (04/09/05)
Bedroom - Drunken Glass, Pills And Alcohol. (06/09/05)
Bathroom - Lock, Bathroom 3. (27/09/05)

- QUIT FULL TIME MILK ROUND JOB (24/10/05) -

Bathroom Window. (30/10/05)
Bedroom - Candle. (30/10/05)
TV Red Light. (06/11/05)
Candle, Wooden Monkey. (20/11/05)
Peeling Wall Paper, Poster (29/11/05), Lampshade Shadows. (30/11/05)
Mirror 2. (02/12/05)
2005 Working Titles/Suites/Images


2005 Places

Birmingham
Birmingham (Grave Yard), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Shops).

Devon
Dartington College.
2006

**Birmingham (Home)**

*Kitchen - Green Flowers. (15/01/06)*

*Bedroom - Light Shadow. (29/01/06)*

*Back Garden - Milkman Jacket. (Battery Ran Out) (03/02/06)*

*Bedroom - 1930s Diary Girl. (03/02/06)*

*Back Garden - Milkman Jacket 2. (04/02/06)*

*Drive - Telegraph Pole. (04/02/06)*

*Bathroom - Bathroom, Bathroom Window, Bubble Bath Blur. (04/02/06)*

*Landing - Landing Lights. (04/02/06)*

**Birmingham (Shops)**

*Hurst Lane - Red Heart. (14/02/06)*

**Birmingham (Industry)**

*Gas Works - Red Gasometer. (19/02/06)*

**Birmingham (Home)**

*Stairway - Red Stairs. (20/02/06)*

*Landing - Mattress. (21/02/06)*

*Living Room - The Window. (12/03/06)*

*Downstairs Toilet - Green Toilet Girl, Toilet Window, Toilet Wall, Bear Loo Roll. (25/03/06)*

**Birmingham (Industry)**

*Electric - Power Station 1, Power Station 2, Power Station 3, Pylon Nail Pole, Pylon. (02/04/06)*

*Factory - Chimney. (02/04/06)*

**Birmingham (Gambling)**

*Star City - Casino. (01/05/06)*

**Paignton**

*Street - Bowling Club, Shop Window, Level Crossing. (12/05/06)*

**Arcades**

*Monkeys, Arcade Machines, Magic Roundabout, Spongebob. (12/05/06)*

**Seafront**

*Red Lights. (12/05/06)*

*Pier - Seaside Lady Signs, Pier Shadow, Bird Shit. (12/05/06)*

**Dartington (Home)**

*Hallway - Door Stop. (17/05/06)*

**Paignton**

*Seafront - Beach Huts. (17/05/06)*
Shops -Toilet Signs. (25/05/06)

Dartington (Home)

Kitchen -Flour Men. (25/05/06)

Living Room -Tight Ladder, Lamp Shadow. (27/05/06)

TV Girl. (28/05/06)

Plymouth

Street -Railing Shadow. (29/05/06)

Lighthouse -Smeaton’s Tower. (29/05/06)

Dartington (Home)

Kitchen -Smudged Lipstick. (03/06/06)

Bedroom -Star Light, Frog, Xmas Dec’s. (03/06/06)

St Ives

Shops -Gnomes, Shop Front, Car Game, Camp Pipe Men, Woolworths, Road Sign. (07/06/06)

Dartington (Home)

Road -Slow. (08/06/06)

Dartington (Home)

Living Room -TV Frame. (11/06/06)

Garden -Men At Work Road Sign. (11/06/06)

Paignton

Seafront -Sea Deck Chair. (14/06/06)

Pier -Teddy Bears, Fun, Rubbish Bin, Sea Food Hut, Pier, JCB Cat, Lights, Hole In Fence, Security, The Clown, Uncle Sam, Horses, Rubber Ducks, Toy VW Car, Palmistry, Pier Spikes, Shop Fronts, No Bicycles, Pier. (14/06/06)

Beneath Pier -Cunt Graffiti. (14/06/06)

Street -Car Sign, Sea Gull. (14/06/06)

Birmingham (Home)

Living Room -Mirror, TV Queen. (20/06/06)

Totnes (Home)

Kitchen -Robot, Bat. (07/08/06)

Birmingham (Shops)

Castle Bromwich -Zebra Crossing Light. (03/09/06)

Birmingham (Home)

Office -Dogs (04/09/06)

Totnes (Home)

Kitchen -Figures, Indian. (09/09/06)
Lyme Regis
Beach - Buried Treasure. (09/09/06)

Appledore
Boat - Pink Wheel. (11/09/06)

Exhibition Totnes
Dartington Gallery - 'The Visible Invisible Object.' (16/10/06 - 20/10/06)

Dartington
College - Street Light. (24/10/06)

Birmingham (Local Area)
Playground - Slide, Sea Saw, Roundabout, Swing, Bench, Litter Bin, Sign. (19/11/06)
High Rise - Flats. (19/11/06)
Pub - Angles, Signs, Lounge, Manor House, Green, Metal Pane, Wall Paper, Smashed, Dented, Open, Bay, Tyres, Shed. (19/11/06)

Torquay
Hotel - Hotel Signs. (26/11/06)

Paignton
Hotel - Hotel Signs. (12/12/06)
Street - Traffic Lights. (12/12/06)

Birmingham (Home)
Shed - Net Curtains (05/12/06)
2006 Working Titles/Suites/Images


2006 Places

Birmingham
Birmingham (Gambling), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Industry), Birmingham (Industry), Birmingham (Local Area), Birmingham (Shops), Birmingham (Shops).

Devon
Appledore, Dartington, Dartington (Home), Dartington (Home), Dartington (Home), Dartington (Home), Dartington (Home), Lyme Regis, Paignton, Paignton, Paignton, Paignton, Plymouth, St Ives, Torquay, Totnes (Home), Totnes (Home).
2007

Birmingham (Home)

Mom and Dad’s Bedroom - Name Plates 1, Name Plates 2, Lampshade 1, Lampshade 2, Table Lamp, Cats, Clock Radios, Electric, Tights, Cupboard, Bed, Door, Dressing Table, Pelmet 1, Glass Couple, Girl Pin Cushion, Boot, Ornaments. (20/02/07)

- MY MOTHER DIAGNOSED WITH STOMACH CANCER (20/02/07)

Living Room - Pipe Rack, Doorbell. (20/03/07)

Upstairs Landing - Economy 7. (20/03/07)

Front Room - Mouse, Bonnet 1, Brass Bell, Light Fitting, (20/03/07)

My Old Bedroom - Air Vent. (11/04/07)

Bathroom - Censored, Toilet Roll Holder, Heater, Cupboard, Towel Rail, Tiles, Tooth Brush, False Teeth, Air Vent, Taps, Bath Mirror, Toilet Doll, Toilet Handle. (11/04/07)

Office - Donkey, Air Vent, Light Switch. (11/04/07)

Shower Unit - Shower Doors, Basin, Lights, Tiles. (11/04/07)

Blackpool

Hotel - Hotel Light, (15/04/07)

Hotel Light Off. (16/04/07)

Illuminations - Illuminations 1. (16/04/07)

Arcades - Light Bulbs, Skulls. (16/04/07)

Pleasure Beach - Gorilla, T-Rex. (16/04/07)

Sea Front - Disco Ball. (16/04/07)

Arcades - Colour Bulbs, Joke Shop, Super Bikes. (17/04/07)

Illuminations - Figure Head. (17/04/07)

Sea Front - Curtain, True Love Graffiti, Palm Tree, No Fouling, Lamp Posts, Tram, Street Signs 1. (17/04/07)

Pleasure Beach - Roller Coaster, Track Shadows, Reflection, Reflection 2, Smiley Face, Sheep, Lion, Junk Robot, Noah’s Ark. (17/04/07)

Arcades - Cake Bulbs, Peeling Paint Bulbs, Lamps, Carousel, Parrot, King Kong. (18/04/07)

Illuminations - Illuminations 2, Illuminations 3. (18/04/07)

Sea Front - Betty Boop, More Windows, Street Signs 2, Demolish, Demolish 2, Obscure Buildings, Speed Camera, Lamppost 2, Jesus. (18/04/07)

Beach - Repair Work. (18/04/07)

Pier - Wooden Panels, Pier, Coffee Shop. (18/04/07)
The Winter Gardens - Panda, Neons, Ceiling Paint, More Light, Wall Paper, Wall, Figures, Chandelier 1, Themed Rooms. (18/04/07)

Arcades - Heads, Squashed Toys, Fun Palace. (19/04/07)

Sea Front - Yellow Tram. (19/04/07)

Tower - Rock Star, Sweets, Toy Car, Clown Head. (19/04/07)

Pier - Shoot Out, A Horse, Postcard, Dodgems. (19/04/07)

Beach - Quick Sand, Repair Work. (19/04/07)

The Winter Gardens - Wall Figure 2, Ornate, Gold Fancy Light, Chandeliers 2. (19/04/07)

Western Super Mare

Shops - Hotel, Window. (21/04/07)

Street - Train. (21/04/07)

Seafront - Pagoda, Lights, Frog Bin. (21/04/07)

Birmingham (Home)

Office - Dog, Pencil Holder, Cabinet, Mirror, Air Vent, Wallpaper and Nets, Fan, Santa, Lamp Shade, Witch, Teddy Bear, Letters. (25/05/07)

Front Room - Bonnet 2, Clown Clock, Award, Dry Flowers, Light Fittings, (25/05/07)

Office - Air Vent 2, Light Bulb, Stripped Wall, Floor Boards. (02/06/07)

Bathroom - Toilet Doll 2, Bath Mat. (02/06/07)

Upstairs Landing - Floor Boards, Birds on Wall. (02/06/07)

Exhibition Birmingham

(Mac) Midlands Art Centre - 'The Visible Invisible Object.' (09/06/07 – 12/08/07)

Birmingham (Home)

Back Garden - Satellite Dish, Empty Basket, Old Wheel, Gates Lock, Line Holder, Bitten Flowers, Water Butt, Green House. (28/06/07)

Shed - No, Ash Tray, Light Switch, Kettle, Wire, Air Brick. (28/06/07)

Bedroom - Red Car, Red Doll. (10/07/07)

Office - Ice Cream Van. (13/07/07)

Totnes (Home)


Front Room - Circuit Board, Light Switch, Ceiling Hook, Heart. (17/07/07)

Stairs - Docs, Window, Wall Paper. (17/07/07)

Hallway - Door Lock. (17/07/07)

Back Garden - Bucket, Pink Bow, Shed Window. (17/07/07)
Bathroom - Black Duck, Dinosaur, Air Vent, Red Trainers, Cob Webs. (17/07/07)

Office - Pelham Puppet, Small Draws. (17/07/07)

Bedroom - Old Photo, Old Figures. (17/07/07)

Penzance
Cottages - Pulleys, Lights 1, Lights 2, Lights 3, Chimney, Brown Window, Window Flag, Wall Lights, Wall Figure. (18/07/07)

Shops - Weather Vane, Church Vane. (18/07/07)

Factory - Green Door. (18/07/07)

Beach - Shopping Trolley. (18/07/07)

Pub - Ship Figure Head, Lion Head. (18/07/07)

Indoor Market - Soldier, Bingo Sign, Red Balloons. (18/07/07)

Exhibition Birmingham
Curzon Street Station - 'The Light Sale: Creative Journeys With The Image', Rhubarb-Rhubarb
The UK's Festival Of The Image. (21/07/07 - 26/07/07)

Birmingham (Home)
Down Stairs Bedroom (Front Room) - Bed 1. (23/07/07)

Bed 2, The Brass Bell. (27/07/07)

Drive - Car Spider. (27/07/07)

Kitchen - Cactus. (27/07/07)

Back Garden - Knickers On Line, Aeroplane. (27/07/07)

Front Room - Cats, Woodchip. (27/07/07)

Mom and Dad's Bedroom - Door 2. (30/07/07)

Birmingham Cancer (Home)
Hallway - Shoes. (02/08/07)

Down Stairs Bedroom (Front Room) - Commode, Bucket, Tissues. (02/08/07)

Syringe. (04/08/07)

Bedroom - Solitaire. (05/08/07)

Downstairs Bedroom (Front Room) - Slippers, Commode 2, The Notes, Bucket 2, Bedside Table. (06/08/07)

Heroin, Medicine Bag, Sun Flowers. (08/08/07)

Heroin Boxes, Forsips, Anniversary, Propad Cushion, Panic Button, Comb. (10/08/07)

- MY MOTHER DIES OF STOMACH CANCER (10/08/07)

Hallway - Final Clothes. (12/08/07)
Bedroom - Funeral Flower Cards. (15/08/07)
Back Garden - Birds in Bush. (15/08/07)
Front Garden - Funeral Flowers. (20/08/07)

Birmingham (Funeral)
Grave Yard - Empty Grave, Flowers On Grave. (20/08/07)

Birmingham (Home)
Mom And Dad’s Bedroom - Empty Coat Hangers, Left Over Clothes, Final Bags, What’s Left? A Reminder. (22/08/07)

Birmingham (Home)
Bedroom - Furbys 1. (09/09/07)
Furbys 2. (10/09/07)
Computer Top. (18/09/07)

Birmingham (Industry)
Jewellery Quarter - Chimney, Old Building. (24/09/07)

Birmingham (Home)
Bedroom - Mirror Photo. (27/09/07)
Bathroom - Side of Bath, Side of Bath 2, Toilet Doll. (27/09/07)
Bedroom - Cats. (28/09/07)
Monkey. (29/09/07)

Birmingham (Shops and Religion)
Temple - Buddha, Small Buddha, Dragon, Lamp Shade, Alter, Paintings. (02/10/07)
Church - Jesus Sign. (02/10/07)
Shop - Shop Cake. (02/10/07)

Birmingham (Home)
Bedroom - Shop Picture. (10/10/07)
Office - Books. (26/10/07)

Newlyn
Tower - Clock Tower. (16/11/07)
Cottages - Electric, Chimney. (16/11/07)
Seafront - Sea. (17/11/07)
Jubilee, Wet Path. (18/11/07)
Shops - Cigarettes, Ice Cream, Drum Soldiers, Quay Shop. (18/11/07)
Cottages - 47, Guttering. (18/11/07)
Toilet - Syringe, Viewpoint 1, Viewpoint 2. (18/11/07)
Street - Visa/Access, Weight. (18/11/07)

Factory - Rusty Lock, Wooden Door, Old Light, Lorry, In Prison, Stairway. (18/11/07)

Harbour - Doreen (MOTHER'S NAME) Rosa, Wire. (18/11/07)

Newlyn (Home)

Front Room- Widow Sill. (18/11/07)
2007 Working Titles/Suites/Images

47, Aeroplane, Air Brick, Air Vent, Air Vent, Air Vent, Air Vent, Air Vent 2, Alter, Angel Wings, Anniversary, A Reminder, Ash Tray, Award, Basin, Bath Mat, Bath Mirror, Bed, Bed 1, Bed 2, Bedside Table, Betty Boop, Bingo Sign, Birds in Bush, Birds on Wall, Bitten Flowers, Black Duck, Bonnet 1, Bonnet 2, Books, Boot, Brass Bell, The Brass Bell, Brown Window, Bucket, Bucket, Bucket 2, Buddha, Cactus, Cake Bulbs, Carousel, Car Spider, Cats, Cats, Cats, Ceiling Hook, Ceiling Paint, Censored, Chandelier 1, Chandeliers 2, Chimney, Chimney, Church Vane, Cigarettes, Circuit Board, Clock, Clock Radios, Clock Tower, Clown Clock, Clown Head, Coffee Shop, Colour Bulbs, Cob Webs, Comb, Commode, Commode 2, Computer Top, Cupboard, Cupboard, Curtain, Demolish, Demolish 2, Dinosaur, Disco Ball, Docs, Dodgems, Dog, Donkey, Door, Door 2, Door Lock, Doorbell, Doreen Rosa, Dragon, Dragon, Dressing Table, Drum Soldiers, Dry Flowers Cabinet, Economy 7, Electric, Empty Basket, Empty Coat Hangers, Empty Grave, False Teeth, Fan, Figure Head, Figures, Final Bags, Final Clothes, Floor Boards, Floor Boards, Flowers On Grave, Fly Paper, Forsips, Frog Bin, Funeral Flowers, Funeral Flower Cards, Fun Palace, Furbys 1, Furbys 2, Gates Lock, Girl Pin Cushion, Glass Couple, Gold Fancy Light, Gorilla, Green Door, Green House, Guttering, Heads, Heart, Heater, Heroin, Heroin Boxes, A Horse, Hotel, Hotel Light, Hotel Light Off, Ice Cream, Ice Cream Van, Illuminations 1, Illuminations 2, Illuminations 3, I Love Cheese, I Love U, Indian Goddess, In Prison, Jesus, Jesus Sign, Joke Shop, Jubilee, Junk Robot, Kettle, Knickers On Line, King Kong, Lampshade, Lampshade 1, Lampshade 2, Lampshade, Lampposts, Lamppost 2, Lamps, Lanterns, Left Over Clothes, Letters, Light Bulb, Light Bulbs, Light Fitting, Light Fittings, Lights, Lights, Lights 1, Lights 2, Lights 3, Light Switch, Light Switch, Light Switch, Lion, Lion Head, Line Holder, Lorry, Medicine Bag, Mirror, Mirror Photo, Monkey, Mop Bucket, More Light, More Windows, Mouse, Old Figures, Old Light, Old Photo, Ornate, Name Plates 1, Name Plates 2, Neons, No, Noah's Ark, No Fouling, The Notes, Obscure Buildings, Old Building, Old Wheel, Ornaments, Pagoda, Paintings, Palm Tree, Panda, Panic Button, Parrot, Patio Doors, Peeling Paint Bulbs, Pelham Puppet, Pelmet 1, Pencil Holder, Pier, Pink Bow, Pipe Rack, Postcard, Propad Cushion Pulleys, Quay Shop, Quick Sand, Red Balloons, Red Car, Red Doll, Red Trainers, Reflection, Reflection 2, Repair Work, Repair Work, Rock Star, Roller Coaster, Rusty Lock, Santa, Satellite Dish, Sea, Shed Window, Sheep, Ship Figure Head, Shoes, Shoot Out, Shop Cake, Shop Picture, Shopping Trolley, Shower Doors, Side of Bath, Side of Bath 2, Skulls, Slippers, Small Buddha, Small Draws, Smiley Face, Soldier, Solitaire, Speed Camera, Squashed Toys, Stairway, Street Signs 1, Street Signs 2, Stripped Wall, Sun Flowers, Super Bikes, Sweets, Syringe, Syringe, Table Lamp, Taps, Teddy Bear, Themed Rooms, Tights, Tiles, Tissues, Toilet Doll, Toilet Doll, Toilet Doll 2, Toilet Handle, Toilet Roll Holder, Tooth Brush, Towel Rail, Toy Car, Track Shadows, Train, Train, Tram, T-Rex True Love Graffiti, Viewpoint 1, Viewpoint 2, Visa/Access, Wall Figure, Wall Lights, Wall Paper, Wall Paper, Wall, Wall Figure 2, Wallpaper and Nets, Water Butt, Weather Vane, Weight, Wet Path, What's Left? Window, Window, Window Flag, Widow Sill, Wire, Wire, Witch, Woodchip, Wooden Bird, Wooden Door, Wooden Panels, and Yellow Tram.
2007 Places

Birmingham
Birmingham (Funeral), Birmingham Cancer (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Industry), Birmingham (Shops and Religion).

Cornwall
Newlyn, Newlyn (Home), Penzance

Devon
Totnes (Home)

Lancashire
Blackpool

Somerset
Western Super Mare
2008

Exhibition Stafford
Shire Hall Gallery - 'Platform One.' (12/01/08 - 09/03/08)

Totnes (Home)
Bathroom - Back Washer. (18/02/08)

Birmingham (Demolished and Derelict)
Factory - 1889 Office, Nechells. (24/02/08)
Pub - Moby Dick. (24/02/08)

Newlyn (Home)
Stairway - Little China Man. (07/03/08)

Penzance
Shops - Pasty, Sea Café, Quay Shop, Ice Cream. (07/03/08)

Paignton
Shops - Rundown Shop, Grim Monkeys, Car Park Sign, Sex Shop. (23/03/08)
Snooker Club - Pot Black. (23/03/08)

Birmingham (Homes And Authority)
Police - Police Station, Police Signs, Doors, Van. (13/04/08)
Buildings - Hovels. (13/04/08)

Totnes (Home)
Shed - Shed Key. (25/04/08)

Birmingham (Home)
Upstairs Landing - Lampshade. (12/05/08)

Birmingham (Home)
Bathroom - Pull Switch, Radiator 1. (13/06/08)
Dad's Bedroom - Bed Cover. (13/06/08)
Bedroom - Mom's Picture. (13/06/08)
Cats. (16/06/08)
Hallway - Wall Paper, (17/06/08)

Totnes (Home)
Kitchen - Fish Bras, Watering Can. (19/06/08)

Bathroom - Mirror. (23/06/08)

- DEFERRED RESEARCH FOR ONE YEAR (23/06/08) -

Birmingham (Home)
Back Garden - Grave Plague, Bird Box. (03/07/08)

81
Bedroom - Polish Police Car. (03/07/08)

Front Room - Bookshelf. (26/07/08)

Bathroom (Home)
- Radiator 2, Door Stop, Door Latch, Tiles (Holes), Bath Crack. (15/10/08)

Upstairs Landing - Landing Cupboard, Cupboard Cracks, Door Magnets, Door Shuts. (15/10/08)

Stairway - Stairway Pictures, Shower. (15/10/08)

Bathroom - Bathroom Lino, Bathroom Lock Repaired. (15/10/08)

Bedroom - Monkey & Cats. (15/10/08)

St Ives (Chalet Home)
- Clock, Signs. (24/10/08)

Hallway - Coat Pegs, Bathroom, Kitchen. (24/10/08)

Bathroom - Sink. (24/10/08)

Totnes (Home)
- Stairway - Morning Lights. (12/12/08)

Birmingham (Home)
- Bedroom - Speaker Dust. (28/12/08)

Living Room - Chair Shadow. (29/12/08)

Bedroom - Bin, Mattress. (29/12/08)

Back Garden - Dust Bin, Butterfly, Back Door Locks, Fence Hinge. (29/12/08)
2008 Working Titles/Suites/Images

1889 Office, Back Door Locks, Back Washer, Bath Crack, Bathroom, Bathroom Lino, Bathroom Lock Repaired, Bookshelf, Bed Cover, Bin, Bird Box, Butterfly, Car Park Sign, Cats, Chair Shadow, Coat Pegs, Clock, Cupboard Cracks, Doors, Door Latch, Door Magnets, Door Shuts, Door Stop, Dust Bin, Fence Hinge, Fish Bras, Grave Plague, Grim Monkeys, Hovels, Kitchen Sink, Lampshade, Landing Cupboard, Little China Man, Ice Cream, Mattress, Mirror, Moby Dick, Mom's Picture, Monkey & Cats, Morning Lights, Nechells, Pasty, Pull Switch, Quay Shop, Rundown Shop, Police Signs, Police Station, Polish Police Car, Pot Black, Radiator 1, Radiator 2, Sea Café, Sex Shop, Shed Key, Shower, Signs, Speaker Dust, Stairway Pictures, Tiles, Van, Wall Paper and Watering Can.

2008 Places

**Birmingham**

Birmingham (Demolished and Derelict), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Homes And Authority).

**Devon**

Paignton, Totnes (Home), Totnes (Home), Totnes (Home), Totnes (Home), Totnes (Home).

**Cornwall**

Newlyn (Home), Penzance, St Ives (Chalet Home)
2009

Totnes (Home)
Bedroom - Wooden Heart. (12/01/09)
Front Room - Robot. (12/01/09)
Back Garden - Dog Toy. (12/01/09)
Bedroom - Mobile, Ghost Lights, Rabbit, Cot, Flower, Bouncer. (10/02/09)
Bathroom - Sink. (13/03/09)

Dawlish
Pier - Post. (15/03/09)
Seafront - Plastic Containers. (15/03/09)

Totnes (Home)
Bathroom - Radiator, Wooden Floor Hair. (16/03/09)
Bedroom - Cot 2. (15/04/09)

-BABY SON BORN (05/04/09)-

Birmingham (Home)
Bathroom - Tooth Brushes. (28/04/09)

Totnes (Industry)
Dairy Crest - Meter Cupboard, Chair, Shed, Building. (09/05/09)

-TOLD TO LEAVE HOME IN DEVON (09/05/09)-

Birmingham (Home)
Bedroom - Toy Soldier 1, Smiling Plug Socket 1. (13/05/09)
Hair Dryer Cable. (17/05/09)
Aerial Cable. (19/05/09)
Smiling Plug Socket 2. (23/05/09)
Toy Soldier 2. (05/06/09)
Switch. (21/06/09)

-DEFERRED RESEARCH FOR ONE YEAR ENDS (23/06/09)-

Hi Fi Screws. (15/07/09)
Bat Man, Brown Car. (21/07/09)
TV Natalie Sawyer. (25/07/09)
Hell Is Round The Corner. (28/07/09)
Mistletoe, Don't Look Back In Anger, Orange Through The Window. (01/08/09)
Toy Soldier 3. (12/08/09)
Music Box. (16/08/09)
Badger. (17/08/09)
Noddy Car, Frank Lampard, Printer Shadow, Green Bag Shadow. (23/08/09)
Spider. (28/08/09)
Bunny Munro. (02/09/09)
Angel or Devil. (06/09/09),
Badger (Broken). (12/09/09)

Birmingham (Home)
Living Room - Beer. (30/09/09)
Bedroom - RDC2 Weight. (15/10/09)

Birmingham (Local Shops)
Building's - Butchers, Old Launderette, Old Hairdresser's, Old Home's. (18/10/09)

Birmingham (Home)
Back Garden - Repaired Windmill. (18/10/09)

Birmingham (Hospital)
Stroke Ward - Bedside Table. (03/11/09)

Birmingham (Home)
Office - Office Leak. (22/12/09)
2009 Working Titles/Suites/Images

Aerial Cable, Angel or Devil, Badger, Badger (Broken), Bat Man, Bedside Table, Beer, Brown Car, Bouncer, Building, Bunny Munro, Butcher's, Cot, Cot 2, Chair, Dog Toy, Don't Look Back In Anger, Flower, Frank Lampard, Ghost Lights, Green Bag Shadow, Hair Dryer Cable, Hell Is Round The Corner, Hi Fi Screws, Meter Cupboard, Mistletoe, Mobile, Plastic Containers, Music Box, Noddy Car, Office Leak, Old Hairdresser's, Old Home's, Old Launderette, Post, Orange Through The Window, Printer Shadow, Radiator, RDC2 Weight, Repaired Windmill, Robot, Rabbit, Shed, Sink, Smiling Plug Socket 1, Smiling Plug Socket 2, Spider, Switch, Tooth Brushes, Toy Soldier 1, Toy Soldier 2. Toy Soldier 3, Wooden Floor Hair, TV Natalie Sawyer and Wooden Heart.

2009 Places

Birmingham

Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Local Shops), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Hospital), Birmingham (Home).

Devon

Dawlish, Totnes (Home), Totnes (Home), Totnes (Home), Totnes (Industry).
2010

**Birmingham (Home)**

Bedroom – Taxi. (05/01/10)

**Birmingham (Demolition)**

Shard End Houses – Sign (Gym). (24/01/10)

Garretts Green College – Work Shop (Goodbye Mr Walker). (24/01/10)

**Torquay (Bed & Breakfast)**

Bedroom – Zippy, Artwork + TV (Culture). (31/01/10)

**Birmingham (Home)**

Bathroom – Door (Tea Stains). (03/03/10)

**Birmingham (Street)**

Path – Floor Signs. (14/03/10)

**Birmingham (Home)**

Kitchen – Whiskey Bottle (Alcoholic). (23/03/10)

Bedroom – Parcel. (29/03/10)

Robot (Out Of The Box). (11/04/10)

Shadows (Shadow Boxing). (18/04/10)

Old Bedroom – Sign (Gentlemen), Toy Box, Toy Cars (In The Fishtank), Nail Holes (Severe). (03/05/10)

Chinese Cat (Right Handed). (04/05/10)

Bedroom – Drawing Pin. (19/05/10)

Back Garden – Bird Box (Jabberwocky Hut). (07/06/10)

Bedroom – Mat, Drawing Pin, Light Switch (A Record), Zippy (Bling). (09/06/10)

Bathroom – Flower Tile (Beating Depression). (09/06/10)

Hallway – Sea Horse (The Oracle). (09/06/10)

Bathroom – Toothpaste. (09/06/10)

Bedroom – Ceiling Monkey. (15/06/10)

Bathroom – Architrave. (21/06/10)

**Dartington College Of Arts**

Office – Roger’s Filling Cabinet. (29/06/10)

**Birmingham (Home)**

Bedroom Ceiling Monkey, Plugs, Flasks, Zippy, Cross, Figures, Time, Light, Shadow Play, All Sorts, Shadows, Zippy 2, Light 2, Badger 2, Duck. (08/07/10)

Bathroom – Tiles (Piss). (14/07/10)
Torquay (Bed & Breakfast)

**Bedroom**  - TV + Artwork (Culture), Sink, Mirror (Culture Reversed), Window Cable, (15/08/10).

**Bedroom**  - Light Fitting, TV. (16/08/10)
2010 Working Titles/Suites/Images

All Sorts, Architrave, Artwork + TV (Culture), Badger 2, Bird Box (Jabberwocky Hut), Ceiling Monkey, Ceiling Monkey, Chinese Cat (Right Handed), Cross, Door (Tea Stains), Drawing Pin, Drawing Pin, Duck, Figures, Flasks, Floor Signs, Light, Light 2, Light Fitting, Light Switch (A Record), Mat, Mirror (Culture Reversed), Nail Holes (Severe), Parcel, Plugs, Robot (Out Of The Box), Shadow Play, Shadows, Shadows (Shadow Boxing), Sign (Gentlemen), Sign (Gym) Sink, Taxi, Tiles (Piss), Time, Toy Cars (In The Fishtank), Toy Box, TV, TV + Artwork (Culture), Flower Tile (Beating Depression) Sea Horse (The Oracle), Toothpaste, Roger’s Filling Cabinet, Whiskey Bottle (Alcoholic), Window Cable, Work Shop (Goodbye Mr Walker), Zippy, Zippy, Zippy (Bling), Zippy 2.

2010 Places

Birmingham
Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Demolition), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Street), Birmingham (Home), Birmingham (Home).

Devon
Torquay (Bed & Breakfast), Dartington College Of Arts, Torquay (Bed & Breakfast).
Appendix 2:

Exhibition Disc

1.) David Sullivan: The Visible Invisible Object, Dartington Gallery, 16–20 October 2006, Totnes:
   File: Dart 1 (12th October 2006) 12 Jpegs
   File: Dart 2 (14th October 2006) 19 Jpegs
   File: Dart 3 (20th October 2006) 12 Jpegs
   File: Dart 4 (28th October 2006) 19 Jpegs
   File: Dart 5 (Date Unknown) 6 Jpegs

2.) David Sullivan: The Visible Invisible Object, Midlands Art Centre, 9 June – 12 August 2007, Birmingham:
   File: Mac 1 (4th July 2007) 29 Jpegs
   File: Mac 2 (25th July 2007) 2 Jpegs
   File: Mac 3 (12th August 2007) 10 Jpegs

3.) The Light Sale: Creative Journeys With The Image, Rhubarb-Rhubarb The UK’s Festival Of The Image, Curzon Street Station, 21 – 26 July 2007, Eastside, Birmingham:
   File: Curzon Street Station (26th July 2007) 3 Jpegs

4.) Platform One, Shire Hall Gallery
   12 January – 9 March 2008, Stafford:
   File: Stafford Gallery (7th February 2008) 20 Jpegs

   File: The Poly 1 (2nd November 2010) 6 Jpegs
   File: The Poly 2 (3rd November 2010) 45 Jpegs
Works Cited and Additional Bibliography:


Figures

Fig. 1: *New York September, Petersburg, 1972.*
By Stephen Shore

Fig. 2: *Untitled (Jig Saw Puzzle), 1995.*
By Richard Billingham
Fig. 3: Tin Snips, $1.85, from ' Beauties Of The Common Tool ', 1955.

By Walker Evans

Fig. 4: Memphis, 1969.

By William Eggleston
Fig. 5: Empty Circus Carousel, No. 7. N.d.

By Eugène Atget

Fig. 6: *Craft Fair, Malvern, Worcestershire,* from 'The Cost Of Living,' 1986-9.

By Martin Parr
28 days ago, the man I love left me.

For three months I'd been looking forward to that day. It was January 25, 1983. I was at room 261 of the Imperial Hotel in New Delhi. A spacious room with a gray moth-eaten carpet, blush wallpaper and own bed. I was sitting on the one to the right, holding the telegram telling me to call my father because M. had had an accident. He had left France some two days earlier and we were supposed to be meeting up at New Delhi airport on January 26. He was coming from Paris and I was coming from Tokyo. Then this message. Hours of imagining the worst went by before I got through to my father. He hadn't heard anything. So I tried to call M. He was at home — stupid but true. And the accident was an absurd. I realized that he was leaving me. He wanted to make it less painful. He said he wanted to take me in his arms and explain a few things. Except that he didn't. Ignition, concessions, or plain lies? And the best he could come up with was this childish excuse, this infected finger, using my own father as a medical alibi. I hung up. I sat there for hours on the bed, staring at that damned phone. That old phone.

It was on a Friday afternoon in July 1981, around the 20th. In the cemetery of a small village, forty kilometers from Limoges. Following a coffin in which there was nothing, nothing left of her. She had jumped from the sixth floor and was smashed to a pulp. There were four of us to bury her. Four people who hadn't spoken for years. On one side: her mother and I. On the other, her half-brother and her father. I was the only one who could communicate with them all. Totally distraught, not knowing what to do with myself, I went from one person to another. On the way home, I looked up as I walked — I couldn't stop looking at all the sixth floors. And then, I saw my name written in her handwriting on the mailbox. But the worst moment was when the coffin arrived. When I pictured my first real love, the person who for me was beauty incarnate, smashed to a pulp.

Fig. 7: Exquisite pain (details), 1984-2003.

By Sophie Calle
Fig. 8: January 25, 1985, 2 a.m., room 261, Imperial Hotel, New Delhi.

By Sophie Calle
Fig. 9: *Mabou*, 2001.

By Robert Frank

Fig. 10: *My Father’s Coat, N.Y.C.*, 2001

By Robert Frank
May Dodge – My Nan she's 92 I call her Plum she calls me Pudding –

She made me the most beautiful baby clothes – white crocheted.
She made them for me a few years ago – she said at the time

'I've made them for you now because--by the time you have a baby-
I'll be making clothes for angels.'

Dear Nanny I'm not afraid anymore –
Life's fantastic – who'd have thought
I could make angels –
For you –
There waiting.

xxx

Fig. 11: May Dodge My Nan 1963-93.
By Tracey Emin