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European integration and European identity: case study: the European dimension in secondary schooling

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

CASE STUDY: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION IN SECONDARY SCHOOLING

by

SANDRA BARKHOF

A thesis submitted to the University of Plymouth in partial fulfilment for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Politics
Faculty of Social Science & Business

July 2006
This thesis explores some of the issues concerning the concept of European identity. In particular, the aim is to assess how far school education is a suitable method to foster a European identity and support for European integration. In this context, the thesis aims to investigate whether the historic and more recent political and national developments in England and Germany have resulted in different attitudes to European integration, European identity and subsequently to a European dimension in education. The analysis also compares the general attitude towards national and European identity and European integration in England and Germany and assesses if different attitudes have resulted in a different implementation of a European dimension in education. To facilitate this analysis, the political and national development in England and Germany as well as the emergence of the European idea and the history of European integration will be discussed.

The assessment of a European dimension in secondary education in England and Germany includes an analysis of documentary material and selected curricula. In addition, a survey has been carried out among a sample of German and English head and subject teachers to explore aspects of the practical implementation of a European dimension. The findings show that there are significant differences between the two countries concerning their understanding and implementation of a European dimension in education. Many of these differences can be attributed to different attitudes to national and European identity and European integration.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables and Graphs</td>
<td>p.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>p.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>p.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author's Declaration</td>
<td>p.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>p.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims of the thesis</td>
<td>p.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of the thesis</td>
<td>p.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. State structure and development in Western Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Introduction</td>
<td>p.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Key concepts of the modern state</td>
<td>p.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sovereignty</td>
<td>p.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 State development in Germany and England</td>
<td>p.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 Medieval Feudalism and patterns of power</td>
<td>p.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Holy Roman Empire</td>
<td>p.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Centralised feudalism in England</td>
<td>p.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 The sixteenth century: Reformation and consolidation of political power</td>
<td>p.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3 The development of the modern state</td>
<td>p.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The rise of Prussia</td>
<td>p.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil War and the supremacy of Parliament</td>
<td>p.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.4 Germany in the nineteenth century</td>
<td>p.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.5 Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth century:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratisation, Decolonisation and Devolution</td>
<td>p.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.6 Twentieth century Germany: from Empire to Republic</td>
<td>p.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Weimar Republic</td>
<td>p.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Third Reich</td>
<td>p.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Post-war Germany</td>
<td>p.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Conclusions</td>
<td>p.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Nationalism, Nations and Nation states in Western Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction: Perspectives on Nations and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nationalism p.53

2.2 Nations and nationalism p.54

2.3 The origin of nations: modernism versus perennialism p.58

2.4 The nature of nations: primordialist or instrumentalist? p.62

2.5 The development of nationalism and the nation state in Germany p.66

- The Kultumation p.66
- National unity and nation state formation p.72
- The rise and decline of the national idea in the twentieth century p.76
- The Third Reich p.77
- Post-war partition and unification p.77

2.6 The development of nationalism and the nation state in England and Britain p.80

- The early nation p.81
- Tudor Protestantism and national sentiment p.83
- Englishness and Britishness p.85
- Redefining the nation p.88
- The twentieth century p.90

2.7 Conclusions p.92

3. The development of the European idea until the Second World War p.95

3.1 Introduction p.95

3.2 Sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe: the reinforcement of the European idea p.97

- European supremacy and European values p.97
- Early European integration schemes p.98

3.3 The eighteenth century: Enlightenment and secularisation of the European idea p.100

- European culture and civilisation p.100
- The influence of the French Revolution p.102

3.4 The nineteenth century: Romanticism and early
European federalists p.103
  • Romantic movement and political reality p.103
  • Popular Culture and democratic-federal European Schemes p.105

3.5 The European idea between the wars p.106
  • Kalergi and Paneuropa p.108
  • Pan-European movement and Franco-German relations p.108
  • The Briand Memorandum p.109
  • Mitteleuropa p.111

3.6 Conclusion p.112

4. European integration after 1945 p.114
  4.1 Introduction p.114
  4.2 General assumptions and limitations p.115
  4.3 Functional Federalism or federal Functionalism: European Integration from 1945 to 1960 p.116
    • The federalist idea ad post-war Europe p.116
    • Functionalism and neo-functionalism p.119
    • The Council of Europe p.121
    • The functionalist approach at work: the foundation of the ECSC p.123
    • From the ECSC to the EEC p.125
  4.4 The era of Intergovernmentalism: European integration from the 1960s to the mid 1980s p.127
    • Enlargement, Gaullism and the turn to Intergovernmentalism p.127
    • The Council of Europe and global Interdependence p.131
  4.5 European integration revival in the 1980s and 1990s: European Union and the Single Currency p.134
    • The Single European Act and the Single Market Programme p.134
    • The Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the
European Union p.138
  • The EU and the nation state p.139
4.6 The future of the EU p.140
4.7 Conclusions p.142
5. European identity p.145
  5.1 Introduction p.145
  5.2 European identity p.147
    • Definitions of political identity p.147
    • European identity, legitimacy and the democratic deficit p.148
  5.3 Approaches to European identity p.152
    • Cultural European identity p.152
    • Civic European identity p.155
  5.4 European and national identity in Germany p.158
  5.5 European and national identity in England p.160
    • Nation and sovereignty in England p.162
  5.6 Conclusions p.164
6. The European dimension in the school curriculum p.166
  6.1 Introduction: European citizenship, identity and education p.166
  6.2 Education and young people’s attitudes to Europe p.168
  6.3 EU policy and the European dimension in education p.173
  6.4 The European dimension in education in Germany and England p.178
    • Government guidelines in relation to the European dimension in education in Germany p.178
    • Government guidelines regarding the European dimension in education in England p.183
  6.5 The German school system p.189
  6.6 The English school system p.192
  6.7 The European dimension in the curriculum in Germany and England p.194
    • The European dimension in the German
curriculum

6.8 Defining the European Dimension p.208
6.9 Conclusions p.210

7. Implementing a European dimension in education p.213

7.1 Introduction p.213
7.2 Methodology p.214
7.3 Attitudes to European dimension in teaching p.217
   • Importance of a European dimension p.217
7.4 Implementing a European dimension p.227
7.5 Barriers to the implementation of a European dimension p.235
   • Channels of Implementation p.237
   • Training p.239
   • Knowledge p.241
7.6 The future of European education p.243
7.7 Conclusions p.248

8. Conclusions p.250

8.1 The EU and the nation state p.252
8.2 National and European identity p.255
   • Why a European identity? p.257
   • European identity creation p.259
8.3 European identity and education p.260
8.4 Further research and concluding remarks p.264

Appendix I Tables for Chapter Seven p.266
Appendix II Questionnaires p.273
   Subject teacher questionnaire p.274
   Head teacher questionnaire p.276

Bibliography p.278
LIST OF TABLES AND GRAPHS

Tables
Table 6.1 How well informed are pupils about Europe (in %) p.170
Table 6.2 Feelings of belonging to [own nationality] (in %) p.171
Table 6.3 Breakdown by country of how European pupils feel (in %) p.172
Table 6.4 Frequency of key points in the German curricula (history) p.198
Table 6.5 Frequency of key points in the German curricula (politics) p.200
Table 7.1 Response rate p.216
Table 7.27 Subjects most likely to include a European dimension p.234

Graphs
Graph 1.1 The nature and origin of nations p.57
Graph 6.1 The German school system p.189
Graph 6.2 The English school system p.192
Graph 6.3 Frequency of key points in the German curricula (history) p.198
Graph 6.4 Frequency of key points in the German curricula (politics) p.201
Graph 7.1 Importance of a European dimension in general (subject teachers) p.218
Graph 7.2 Importance of a European dimension in general (head teachers) p.219
Graph 7.3 Importance of a European dimension in the subject area (subject teachers) p.219
Graph 7.4 Importance of a European dimension at the school (head teachers) p.220
Graph 7.5 Reasons for the importance of a European dimension (subject teachers) p.221
Graph 7.6 Reasons for the importance of a European dimension (head teachers) p.225
Graph 7.7 Importance of a European dimension in teaching (subject teachers) Germany p.228
Graph 7.8 Importance of a European dimension in teaching (subject teachers) England p.228
Graph 7.9 European elements included in teaching p.229
Graph 7.10 Importance of a European dimension in teaching (head teachers) Germany p.231
Graph 7.11 Importance of a European dimension in teaching (head teachers) England p.231
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BKM</td>
<td>Bavarian Ministry of Culture (Bayrisches Kultusministerium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agriculture Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBEVE</td>
<td>Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfEE</td>
<td>Department for Education and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAT</td>
<td>European Association of Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>EES</td>
<td>Enabling Effective Support initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Exchange Rate Mechanism</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPIC</td>
<td>Education Policy Information Centre</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMK</td>
<td>Standing Conference of the Education Ministers (Kultusminister Konferenz)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Local Education Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
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<td>NARIC</td>
<td>National Recognition Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKM</td>
<td>Lower Saxony Ministry of Culture (Niedersächsisches Kultusministerium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>National Socialist Party of Germany (Nationalsozialistische Partei Deutschlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualifications and Curriculum Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTA</td>
<td>Teacher Training Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKCEE</td>
<td>UK Centre for European Education</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Graduate Committee.

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Paper submitted for publication in the conference proceedings

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Signed: ...........................................

Date: 24/04/02

14
Introduction

Background
European integration is not a new idea, although it only gained considerable momentum in the last sixty years. Most of Europe today is politically very different from what it was a hundred years ago, when it was dominated by largely undemocratic and often multi-national empires. Modern Europe is a community of interdependent states that are bound into complex European and global networks. Many European states are members of the European Union (EU), an integration project in progress where initially predominantly economic integration has more and more led to political co-operation in search of ‘ever-closer union’. The final political structure of the EU seems undetermined. It is frequently debated whether or not the EU is becoming a ‘super-state’, a federal construct or a more intergovernmental alternative. Although there is no general agreement, many politicians tend to favour a European Union that exists alongside nation states. As Jacques Chirac (2003:76) pointed out in a speech in 2000, neither Germany nor France is “…envisaging the creation of a super European State which would supplant our national states and mark the end of their existence as players in international life”. Similarly Tony Blair (2003:80) argued in 2000 that Europe should be “…a superpower, but not a superstate”. Although speculation concerning the future of the EU is not part of this thesis, one can probably agree with Rosamond (2002: p.510) that, in any case, “…just because the EU does not achieve the common attributes of nation-statehood, this does not mean that it has ‘failed’ as a project of integration”.

Both political and economic European integration are pressing forward with the recent completion of monetary union, at least in some countries, and the enlargement to the East. However, it must be noted that “…it is questionable whether the citizens of Europe are actually welcoming these changes whatever and wherever they may be” (Dunkerley et al 2002:4). Across Europe, both hostility towards and support for the EU and some of the proposed changes, such as the envisaged European Constitutional Treaty,
coincide with a general feeling of "...alienation, exclusion and powerlessness" (Dunkerley et al 2002:4). Surveys have consistently shown that European citizens complain about a lack of involvement in European affairs. Despite the right to elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and decide on important issues by referendum (in some countries at least), the majority of Europeans feel that their voice does not count. As this thesis will explore, it has therefore increasingly been argued that the largely elite-driven political and economic integration has to some extent resulted in a lack of popular legitimacy and a so-called democratic deficit at European level. Subsequently, in the last decades, some pro-integrationists and advocates of further political union have concerned themselves with the possibilities of cultural integration and the creation of a European identity in order to generate popular support and furnish the "...EU's institutions and emerging system of transnational governance with legitimacy" (Shore 2000:1). This, however, is easier said than done. As Shore (2000:35) points out, the "...absence of popular feelings of belonging to the 'European construction' [...] remains a crucial factor in explaining the difficulty of integrating Europeans".

The creation of a European identity, however, faces greater difficulty than the establishment of traditional national identities, which were often able to draw on or construct certain unifying agents such as for example a common history, shared culture and language. The EU however, does not have this advantage. As Shore (2000:64) explains "...the absence of a shared language, a uniform media and education systems and the 'political roof' of a central state may distinguish the EU from the nineteenth-century nation-state, but they also highlight the obstacles it faces in trying to build the new Europe sans frontières". Language, the mass media and mass education are often considered to be key forces in the processes of political socialisation, identity formation and reinforcement. For the purpose of this thesis, education has been selected for further examination as education has traditionally been one of the most important vehicles for identity creation. One might expect therefore that the extent to which a 'European dimension' is taught in schools will influence young people's attitudes towards the EU and European integration considerably, although, it must be admitted, "...awareness of
Europe and knowledge of its affairs do not necessarily entail support for it" (Convery et al 1997:xii).

Aims of the thesis

The aims of this thesis are therefore

i) to assess in how far school education is an effective method to
   a) foster European identity and
   b) support for European integration

ii) to examine aspects of the implementation of a European dimension at a sample of secondary schools in Germany and England

Another objective in this context is to analyse different theoretical concepts and understandings of European identity as well as the extent to which a European identity can be said to exist. European integration and identity cannot, however, be analysed or understood out of context and need to be assessed in relation to the existing political structure and political identities.¹ It is therefore necessary to understand the historic development of state and nation in Europe in general and in Germany and England in particular. The thesis will investigate whether different historic and more recent political and national developments in England and Germany have resulted in different attitudes to a) the European project in general and b) European identity in particular. The analysis will also compare the general attitude towards a) national identity and b) European identity and c) European integration in England and Germany. Furthermore, the study seeks to explore if and how these attitudes influence the implementation of a European dimension in education. Germany has been selected because opinion polls and studies have consistently shown a general pro-integrationist stance in relation to the EU, the opposite of which is true in the case of England. The study is limited to England, since the other parts of the United Kingdom differ to some extent in terms of both their national and political development as well as their education systems.

¹ Although the existence of sub-national and other political identities and structures is acknowledged, for the purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on the national level.
The implementation of a European dimension, however this might be defined, in education is an area for extensive research. As Convery et al (1997:3) point out, in general two broad approaches to the European dimension can be distinguished: while European, national and local bodies tend to follow a ‘prescriptive’ approach in the form of policy statements and other official documents; researchers in education and the social sciences usually prefer a more ‘explorative’ approach. Therefore, in order to provide a more inclusive assessment of the European dimension, this thesis will not only discuss relevant findings of previous research, but combine an evaluation of the European dimension as outlined in selected governmental policy documents and curricula with an analysis of an explorative case study. This case study has been carried out among secondary school subject and head teachers in the selected countries using semi-quantitative questionnaires in order to gain an insight into attitudes towards European elements in teaching. For the purpose of this thesis, the case study has been limited to compulsory secondary education in history and citizenship as Chapter Six will explain. The case study was combined with a curriculum assessment in the selected subject areas regarding the inclusion of European aspects.

It should be stated at the outset that the relatively restricted sample size does not allow to claim with certainty that the findings are representative of the attitude and perceptions of the majority of subject and head teachers in England or Germany. Instead, they reflect the opinions of the teachers surveyed at a given moment in time and are meant to provide an insight into the topic. There is a need for further research to update and supplement these findings. The survey begins by looking at the evidence that is available and by making tentative conclusions worthy of further investigations or which might indicate areas for future development.

Structure of the thesis
The thesis is structured as follows. The first two chapters will explore key aspects of the development of the state and nation in Germany and England. The approach is somewhat state-centric since an understanding of the state is crucial "...to understand the politics of Europe" (Rose 1996:12). The historical
development not only explains modern political concepts relevant to this thesis and national attitudes, but also informs and shapes general opinions about European integration and identity. In this relation, it is also important to note how the definition of ‘nation’ had an impact on concepts of citizenship. Both chapters will also highlight how events in the twentieth century have considerably altered approaches to national identity and European integration, especially in Germany; this will also be discussed in Chapter Five.

Chapter Three and Four will discuss the development of the European idea from theoretical European schemes to the actual post-war European integration in the twentieth century. Chapter Three will show how the European idea has emerged and developed over the last two hundred years up to the Second World War, although it must be acknowledged that there is no agreement “…about what the idea of Europe symbolizes” (Rose 1996:1). ‘Europe’ in itself is difficult to pin down; various definitions stress different combinations of geographical, cultural, linguistic, political, historic, socio-demographic, economic or religious factors. Depending on the definition used, the boundaries of Europe change and can refer to spatial or ‘imagined’ cultural frontiers, which also vary over time. The Eastern border of ‘Europe’ in particular has been and to some extent still is subject to considerable debate. There is also confusion between ‘Europe’ and the area of the EU. An equation of the modern definition of ‘Europe’ with the EU would be an exclusive definition, although few European states now remain outside this area.

Against this background, Chapter Three will highlight different European schemes from the sixteenth century until the Second World War. During this period, the most important European plans were arguably the Pan-European scheme of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi in the 1920s and the Briand memorandum at the start of the 1930s. While until the end of the Second World War the European idea was mostly restricted to intellectual circles, Chapter Four will show how, after 1945, it was put into practice. Different methods of European integration, namely neo-functionalism, federalism and intergovernmentalism will be analysed and a general overview of the development of the European Economic Communities (EEC), then the
European Community (EC) and finally the European Union (EU) will be provided. This is important background information for Chapter Five, which will examine European identity in relation to the so-called 'democratic deficit' and political legitimacy; the discussion of which, as Wiener and Diez (2004:4) point out, requires knowledge of the organisational structure, role and function of the EU, which in turn entails knowledge of European integration theory and history. Chapter Five will also examine different approaches to European identity with special focus on national attitudes to European integration and identity in Germany and England.

Chapter Five establishes the theoretical need for a European identity, while Chapter Six will explore why education is an important agent for the promotion of such an identity. Chapter Six will also examine and compare EU and national government policies regarding a European dimension at school by analysis of documentary material. It will assess the inclusion of European elements into the curricula concerning the selected subjects in both countries. Chapter Six will also highlight different approaches to the practical implementation as well as the difficulty of defining a 'European dimension in education'.

Chapter Seven will present the findings of the case study. The focus will be on teachers’ attitudes towards European aspects in teaching. The chapter will discuss which European aspects are considered to be important and which are included in teaching or offered by the school. Chapter Seven will also examine which problems are frequently encountered by the teachers when they try to incorporate European elements in teaching. Special emphasis will be on teacher training and knowledge as well as on the channels of implementation. The chapter will also discuss teachers’ opinions with regards to the future role of the EU especially in relation to educational policy. Throughout the chapter will highlight any differences between Germany and England and assess the reasons for such differences especially in relation to national identity and historic development.
Overall, this thesis is a comparative study investigating links and relationships between national and European identity as well as national-political development and attitudes towards European integration. It will show that, generally speaking, some feel that their nationality is threatened by ideas of European political union and European identity, while others, who may have a more troubled relationship with national identity, tend to welcome this development. This study investigates both the often historically-grounded reasons for the different attitudes as well as their manifestation in the form of educational policy and teaching approaches to a European dimension in education.
1. State structures and development in Western Europe

1.1 Introduction

According to Rosamond (2002: 509), one of the issues most often encountered in relation to the EU, both among politicians and the wider public, is the fear that the EU might develop, as a consequence of further political integration, into some kind of European super-state which might be “…draining the lifeblood from the European nation states via its relentless accumulation of powers” (Axford and Browning 2002:10). The structure and outlook of the EU is today far removed from the original set-up of the 1950s. The final aim of integration, however, remains unspecified. It almost seems as if integration has taken on a life of its own, migrating away from being a ‘method’, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, to being the driving force towards an unknown target. Still, integration continues to be determined by and dependent on the EU member states, which are its “…indispensable building blocks” (Hague and Harrop 2002:8). The member states decide through a variety of decision making procedures (which are largely characterised by incremental policy making and political interdependence, as will be discussed in Chapter Four) the direction and travelling speed of European integration, although EU citizens now play an increasing role.

Since the member states have a pivotal role in relation to the development of the EU, it is important to highlight the key features and developmental stages of states in Western Europe with particular focus on Germany and England (or Britain). It can be expected that variations in the historical development may account for some of the differences between the two countries with respect not only to their national identity but also their attitude towards the EU and a European identity. Therefore, this chapter will take a closer look at some features and the development of the modern liberal-democratic state in Western Europe, while the next chapter will focus on national identities.
1.2 Key concepts of the modern state

There are numerous interpretations of the state that reflect a variety of ideological understandings and conceptual associations. Although it would be quite impossible to discuss, as part of this thesis, the complexities of state theory or the variations in interpretation, it is vital to outline a selected few key concepts in order to create a basic theoretical understanding. First of all, the state itself must be defined. According to Heywood (2002: 87), on the most general level, a state can be defined as "...a political association that establishes sovereign [...] jurisdiction within defined territorial borders, and exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions". In turn, this sovereign authority is usually linked to the concept of legitimacy, which establishes a state’s rightful regime or rule that is recognised by the state’s citizens.

Weber’s (Hague and Harrop 2001:11) categorisation of authority is still regarded by many political theorists as the classic interpretation of this concept. Weber argued that the modern state is normally characterised by legal-rational authority, whereby the state’s legitimacy is based on an established and often constitutional set of rules and regulations that invests authority in a specific role or position but not in a person (Hague and Harrop 2001:12). While the notion of state power itself is somewhat diffuse, its exercise is normally effectively co-ordinated through the state apparatus and is clearly outlined and regulated through certain rules. In accordance with the principle of legal-rational authority, political power in modern states is therefore normally exercised by the members of the state in form of functions and offices (Poggi 1990:20). An often cited example of a state based on legal-rational authority is post-war Germany where the entire state’s apparatus and state administration is founded on and legitimised by the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Weber also pointed out the importance of the state’s monopoly on power and "legitimate violence" (Heywood 2002:87). In other words, within its designated territory, the state, as the only legitimate political source of power, has the sole ability to exercise force (Hall 1996, Poggi 1990, Held 1989).
Members of the modern liberal-democratic state are usually bestowed with certain rights and duties, which describe their status as citizens and their relation with the state. Again, there is a plethora of approaches to citizenship, but on the most fundamental level, citizenship defines the rights and duties of an individual, which make this individual a member of a certain state (Shore 2000:71). Every citizen of a state is subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the state. Non-citizens, who live within the state’s boundaries, usually do not enjoy the same rights and privileges. This relationship between a state and its citizens is normally permanent and compulsory. Moreover, citizens often have an emotional attachment to their state expressed in terms of loyalty or the willingness to defend the state (Heywood 2002:156). This emotional attachment, which expresses the relationship between citizenship and national identity, can be reflected in different understandings and acquisitions of citizenship, which has important implications for attitudes to EU citizenship and identity as will be discussed later on.

One key concept of political theory, and a recurrent theme in political discourse, is sovereignty, which is “...among the most complex and controversial concepts of the modern doctrine of the state” (D'Agostino 1993:111). It is worth examining this concept in further detail as the ‘traditional’ nation state sovereignty has undergone some changes in relation to supranational institutions such as the EU. Originally, “...the term sovereignty [...] expressed the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community” (Hinsley 1986:1). However, with the creation of supranational institutions such as the EU, which has “...led to a gradual erosion of ‘sovereignty’” (Barry 2000:64), this definition has been challenged. Most states now operate within a network of global organisations, institutions and agreements, which Hague and Harrop (2002:8) refer to as the “...realities of interdependence”. Further, “...nearly all states, within and beyond the EU, increasingly work through global and especially regional relationships that dilute the traditional strength of sovereignty” (Hague and Harrop 2002:8).

With regard to the EU alone, there are numerous debates concerning the extent, direction and desirability of the EU induced change to traditional
sovereignty. The degree of sovereignty 'erosion' or transfer would depend on the final structure and constitution of the EU, which, as pointed out above, is as yet unknown. As will be shown in Chapter Five, there seems to be an assumption and concern, commonly expressed by politicians, the media and the public alike, that this supranational authority would necessarily take the form and structure of a nation state thereby depriving its member states partly of their sovereignty. Alternatively, the development of regionalism within the EU has led many to question the 'super-state' design in favour of multi-level governance whereby decisions are taken at the appropriate level according to the EU policy of subsidiarity (see Chapter Four) (Rosamond 2002:510-11). Either model would involve a considerable modification to traditional nation state sovereignty and some degree of sovereignty transfer from the national to either the European or the regional level. It is therefore important to understand the key features of state sovereignty as well as the philosophical development of the concept. The following section provides a brief overview of both.

**Sovereignty**

As already pointed out, sovereignty is usually understood as the ultimate political authority whereby a state or other political body is “…fully sovereign if there is no higher or lower power” (Rosamond 2002:484). Sovereignty is normally divided into internal and external sovereignty (Held 1989:215). Internal sovereignty refers to the supreme power of a state within its territory, often described as the law-making power within a territory (Hague and Harrop 2001:7). External sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to act as an independent and autonomous actor in the international order (Heywood 2002:129).

Internal sovereignty can further be classified by the locus of sovereignty. The seat of sovereignty in post-war modern Germany for example is the constitution, which delegates the power from the people to the government. The German state is federal meaning that delegated power is executed at both territorial and national level thus creating a system of governance where shared sovereignty is a central feature. The federal
The structure in Germany is based on a tradition of regional autonomy and was institutionalised in the 1949 constitution granting each of the eleven (sixteen after the 1990 reunification) Länder its own constitution (Heywood 2002:161). As usual in federal states, the central authority is hierarchically superior to the territorial authorities as normally several major areas of policy, such as foreign policy, remain solely with the central authority.

Britain on the other hand has an uncodified constitution and is, unlike Germany, essentially a unitary state. A defining characteristic of unitary states is that sovereign power is vested in a single national institution, which is in the case of the UK the Parliament (Heywood 2002:165). However, through the process of devolution, as discussed later on, certain powers have been transferred from the UK Parliament to the new legislative institutions in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (Grant 2002:300).

The definition and understanding of sovereignty evolved over time and in close relation to the emergence of the modern state. In Western Europe, Jean Bodin (1530-96) was one of the first political philosophers to publish, in 1576, a discourse on sovereignty (The Six Books of Commonweal). Sovereignty, according to Bodin, was the constitutive power of the state (Bodin 1952:42). The state could then be differentiated according to the locus of power, the discussion of which was a central theme in Bodin's work. According to Bodin (1952:25-49) an absolutist regime was to be favoured as it concentrated the political power in one individual who could make the law but would not be bound by it. The benefit of such a system was the indivisibility of sovereignty as the absolute monarch would have final authority. Although Bodin delivered one of the first systematical approaches to the concept of sovereignty, he did not quite manage to integrate "the ruled" into the system despite being anxious so to do (Hinsley 1986:125). Bodin thought that sovereign power was of divine origin, thus giving the community no right to restrain sovereign power. The divine origin, however, also meant that the sovereign was bound by morals and religion and had to observe the laws of God, nature and custom (Bodin 1952:40).
The idea of a strong state was also favoured by Hobbes (1588-1679) who promoted in his *Leviathan* (1651) the idea that sovereignty was based upon the actual concentration of power, unlike Bodin who argued that the state's sovereignty lies within the final authority of the state's law. Like Bodin, Hobbes advocated a single social contract through which all individuals submitted to the state but in which the state as the sovereign took no part (Hobbes 1985:229). The state was believed to be essential for the welfare of human beings as they would, if left to fend for themselves, ultimately destroy each other in a constant power struggle and warfare (Hobbes 1985:223-225). Therefore the safety of the people could only be guaranteed if every member of the community surrendered their rights to the ultimate authority of the state. Although Hobbes acknowledged that the state could take a variety of forms, he preferred an absolutist monarchy. He believed that sovereign power could neither be divided nor limited but was omnipotent, meaning that the people could not act against the sovereign since the sovereign had no part in the contract and the community would not exist without the contract and the sovereign (Hobbes 1985:232). Acting against the sovereign, however, would not be an issue as "...whatsoever he [the sovereign] does, it can be no injury to any of his subjects" (Hobbes 1985:232).

Influenced by the Enlightenment, Rousseau (1712-78) had a very different understanding of the contractual relationship between community and state. Rousseau advocated in his 1756 essay *The Social Contract* (*Le Contrat Social*) that exclusive sovereignty remained with the community, which alone "...legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the most frightful abuses" (Rousseau 1993:194-195). Rousseau argued, somewhat contrary to Hobbes, that people in their natural state were compassionate beings (the happy savages) who were introduced to conflict and unhappiness through the process of civilisation (Rousseau 1993:182-189). To achieve freedom, Rousseau argued that

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2 An eighteenth century movement based on the belief in progress, the universality of reason and the power of scientific explanation whereby human emancipation was seen as a consequence of the spread of rational enquiry and decision making (Axford et al 2002:564). The Enlightenment was rooted in the sixteenth century scientific revolution and in seventeenth century pre-Enlightenment philosophers.
individuals needed to subject their individual wills to a general will by which he referred to the state. The people as a whole had the power to dismiss the government at any time should the social contract be broken. Rousseau, however, by equating the political community with the state, did not provide for an intermediate political organ such as a government capable of exercising power, which arguably is one of the practical problems with Rousseau's thesis (Hinsley 1986:155). Rousseau rejected the idea of a division of powers, as sovereignty in his opinion was indivisible.

John Locke's (1672-1704) theory proposes an alternative solution by dividing state and community in such a way that the community constitutes the origin of sovereignty, while the state is the designated executor of popular sovereignty. Locke argued in his Two Treatises on Government (1690) that sovereignty resides with the people advocating a system of limited government to provide protection for natural rights (Locke 1970: 169-180). Although supreme and undivided sovereignty was to stay with the community, the legislature would obtain full supremacy, following the necessary delegation of these powers, while the executive would have a limited authority (Locke 1970: 184-191). Thus Locke established a model, which is still valid in most modern western states whereby the state was given the right to govern and the people the right to hold political power accountable (Locke 1970:190). Locke's ideas were further developed by Montesquieu (1689-1775), who advocated a system of checks and balances whereby the execution of sovereignty is divided into legislative, executive and judicative. This system, as formulated in his work The Spirit of the Laws (1748), was incorporated into the American constitution in 1787 and has become one of the "...defining features of liberal democratic government" (Heywood 2002:8).

Although the above citations constitute only a small selection of the political theorists who have provided us with insights on sovereignty and political power, they nevertheless highlight the philosophical development of state theory, which should now be complemented with a brief overview of the actual state development in the two selected case studies of Germany and England, although where appropriate Britain as a whole will be discussed.
Although the focus will be on these two countries, it is important to bear in mind that they have not developed in isolation, but in relation to and under the influence of neighbouring states and political entities.

1.3 State development in Germany and England

1.3.1 Medieval Feudalism and patterns of power

The Holy Roman Empire
The era commonly referred to as the Middle Ages was characterised by a political system that had emerged approximately in the eighth century AD, and would dominate continental Western Europe until the sixteenth century (Poggi 1978:16). In Europe, feudal systems of personal bonds developed under circumstances, which would have made any other form of rule very difficult to maintain, as communications were time-consuming and a non-monetary economy resulted in the impossibility of raising taxes to create a central administration and ruling centre (Poggi 1978:19). The resulting system of governance operated through a patchwork of political stakeholders such as independent cities, monarchs, territorial rulers, empires as well as the Catholic Church (Hague and Harrop 2001:6). The latter’s role arose because in the Middle Ages, “…political authority was inextricably bound up with religious authority” whereby one of the Church’s roles was to guarantee the legitimacy of the political system (Rieu 1993:27).

The Holy Roman Empire covered a large area in continental Europe, although its boundaries were never clearly defined and its inner area was fragmented into smaller territories with an elective emperor as the superior authority. Feudal society was hierarchically stratified in form of a pyramid based on personal relationships between feudal lords and their vassals, while the majority of the population constituted the bottom tier as serfs and other commoners. Thus social, cultural and political life was concentrated with the aristocracy (Fulbrook 1992:24) whereby political power was an expression of social superiority and a prerogative of the privileged (Poggi 1990:20). Sovereignty and political power co-existed in a confusing and complex
system, whereby political rule was determined by powerful, often temporary alliances and by military strength based on feudal relations. In contrast to modern states, "...central authority was limited and notions of citizenship and legal rights applying to all did not exist" (Hague and Harrop 2001:7).

Feudal allegiances were subject to frequent change, thus the territories were subject to frequent shifts and changes of borders (Anderson and Hall 1986:27). Although originally fiefs were not hereditary, over time many fief holders managed to turn their territory into hereditary fiefs which led to the emergence of a group of intermediate rulers (collectively referred to as territorial rulers or territorial princes) between the emperor and the population (Fulbrook 1992:19). The authority of the emperor was further weakened by the elective nature of the office, which hindered the establishment of a strong and effective government (Hughes 1992:3). As a result, power and authority in the Holy Roman Empire were separated whereby the emperor was the political sovereign or authority without much actual political power, while the territorial rulers exercised a great deal of power in their territories, over which they formally had no sovereignty. Thus, in Germany, the foundations for the modern federal structure, and indirectly therefore for the German understanding of sovereignty and sovereignty sharing, were laid early on.

The dualism between the emperor and the territorial rulers started to be institutionalised by the Imperial Reforms at the end of the fifteenth century. In 1489 the procedures of the Reichstag (Imperial Diet) were further regularised. The Reichstag consisted of three chambers (curia): the electors, the other territorial rulers (both clerical and secular) and finally the free imperial cities (which however had no vote until 1648) (Hughes 1992:26). A similar structure operated at the territorial level in the Landtage (Territorial Diets). Other Imperial Reforms included the establishment of an Imperial Court (Reichskammergericht) as well as the creation of a regular imperial tax and a number of administrative Imperial Circles (Reichskreise). At the same time, in 1486, the title of the empire was formally changed to 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation' (Hughes 1992:19).
Centralised feudalism in England
The political development of medieval England was somewhat different. Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, King William implemented a version of feudalism that sought to avoid a concentration of power at territorial or baronial level. As royal power was largely determined by independence of revenue, King William kept ownership of the most prosperous manors and had them managed by royal bailiffs, while any fiefs granted to the nobility were scattered in order to avoid the consolidation of power by the vassals (Rayner 1949: 34). This system of rule was consolidated under Henry I (1100-1135) who founded the royal court (curia regis), which was comparable to a royal cabinet composed of a group of royal specialists who advised the king, settled disputes between feudal lords and the king and collected the royal dues from the sheriffs (Rayner 1949: 35).

Despite the efforts of the English monarchy to consolidate central rule, the nobility demanded more political power. In 1215 King John was forced to sign a Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, an essentially feudal document, which granted the barons certain privileges including important legal reforms such as the right of Habeas Corpus. The document also established that the king was not above the law and provided for a committee of barons, the predecessor of the House of Lords, to monitor the king and approve taxation (Lee 1998: 88). Therefore the Magna Carta established a dualistic system at least partly similar to that of the Holy Roman Empire whereby the king remained the sovereign, but elements of political power were transferred to the nobility.

In 1258 the nobility, led by Simon de Montfort (1208-1265), aimed at increasing the feudal barons' control of the king through the Provisions of Oxford, which proposed the sharing of political power between a Council of Fifteen (the Parliament) and in the king (Lee 1998: 94-96). Ensuing civil war made de Montford effectively ruler of England in 1264 (Lee 1998: 96). Although de Montfort's 'reign' did not last very long, it unintentionally laid the
foundation for the House of Commons as Edward I (1272-1307) continued to implement Simon's reforms (Rayner 1949:62). The resulting political system would effectively remain the same until the sixteenth century.

1.3.2 The sixteenth century: Reformation and consolidation of political power

The sixteenth century marked in many ways a departure from medieval structures and culture. The Renaissance spread from Northern Italy and was characterised by a re-discovery of Roman and Greek law and society in combination with a scientific revolution in an age of discovery. For example, Roman law and the Roman notion of citizenship were studied at European universities. Intellectuals learned that Roman state power and authority was largely based on the law, whereby the corpus iuris established the notion of sovereignty as the ultimate law-making power (Held 1989:217). Under Roman law, the exertion of authority and power was legitimate as the law was perceived to have originated from the people in the first place (Anderson 1986:3), a concept that would later inspire political philosophers such as Locke. Politically, there was a general trend in many parts of Western Europe towards a consolidation of central power, thus laying the foundations for the emergence of the modern state. In the Holy Roman Empire, on the other hand, it was the territories and not the empire that started to evolve into something "...recognizable as the modern state" (Hughes 1992:17).

At the same time, the Protestant Reformation, although rooted in medieval attitudes, "...acted as a modernizing force in social, political and intellectual life" (Hughes 1992:30). Previously, the Catholic Church wielded considerable political power in the Holy Roman Empire, especially since many of the territorial rulers were members of the clergy and three electors were archbishops (Hughes 1992:31). The secularisation of politics, which followed the Reformation, was a major prerequisite for the modern state as it removed the Church's share of sovereignty (Held 1989:218). Within the empire, many

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3 The 1295 Model Parliament summoned by Edward I consisted of two knights from each county, two burgesses from each borough and two citizens from each city
territorial rulers converted to Protestantism, often for political and economic reasons. As Protestants, they did not have to allow papal jurisdiction and taxation and could secularise church property (Fulbrook 1999:43). Following a period of religious unrest, the 1555 Peace of Augsburg granted the territorial princes the right to determine the religion in their territory (*cuius regio, eius religio*), which reinforced their political powers and further consolidated their territories.

In England, the Tudor monarchy, which commenced with the accession of Henry VII in 1485, represents a break point. The Tudors established a strong monarchy with absolutist features that dominated the English political structure until the seventeenth century. In Tudor England, "...all authority derived ultimately from God" whereby to challenge "...the royal supremacy was to challenge the will of God" (Loades 1997:10), although authority was shared to some extent with Parliament and the Church. The Tudor monarchs, however, managed to avoid Parliament and effectively established "Tudor despotism" by governing with the Privy Council alone (Rayner 1949:237). They were able to do this as, in peacetime, the monarchy was financially independent of Parliament, which was usually only summoned when the monarch needed a special tax.

Henry VIII (1509-1547) permanently changed political and social life when he broke with the papacy. In the 1535 Act of Supremacy Henry VIII declared that the king and not the pope was the supreme head of the Church of England. He ordered the dissolution of the monasteries and the confiscation of much of the Church's wealth. Many rich urban merchants and lawyers were able to buy former church estates thus greatly increasing the rural gentry class. As in the German territories, the religious orientation of society was largely determined by the monarch's religion. Catholicism was violently suppressed making Protestantism an essential feature of the English state and also of the English nation as Chapter Two will explain.
1.3.3 The development of the modern state

The appearance of the continental absolute state in the seventeenth and eighteenth century is often equated with the start of the modern era (Anderson 1986:2). Absolutism refers to governments (usually a monarchy) with unlimited power based on a claim to unlimited right to rule rather than "...in the exercise of unchallengeable power" (Heywood 2002:28). Absolutism was a key element in Western Europe in the transition from feudal to capitalist-industrial states by introducing a centralised state apparatus and a standing army with the only legitimate use of force within the state territory (Anderson and Hall 1986:21). The formation of absolutist states led to the creation of a geographical map of Western Europe consisting of a relatively small number of sufficiently large and independent territories, which interacted with each other in a competitive power struggle (Poggi 1978:60). As in Tudor England, absolute rule was usually legitimatised through the doctrine of the divine rights of kings giving the monarch the absolute sovereignty in his territory without any legal constraints (Hague and Harrop 2001:32). The monarch's will was the law by authority of the ruler's divine appointment. Absolutism is reflected in Bodin's writings on sovereignty, although Bodin, as discussed above, limited absolutism with the notion that the ruler was still bound to natural and customary law.

At the same time, the social structure of the 'subjects' in general changed due to a variety of developments such as increased trade and the onset of the industrial revolution. The emerging bourgeoisie of capitalist entrepreneurs perceived themselves both as a class and as more modern than the traditional estates. The nobility, however, retained its privileges and was still characterised by traditional features such as non-mobility (belonging by birth) (Poggi 1978:79). Although the emerging middle class constituted a new actor in the political system and was engaged in intellectual political discussions, it had no access to noble privileges such as political representation (Held 1989:218).
The rise of Prussia

The political dualism in the Holy Roman Empire was finally decided in favour of the territorial rulers after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), which was concluded by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This settlement provided the empire with a basic constitution until its abolition in 1806 (Fulbrook 1992:60). The territorial rulers gained the right to conduct foreign policy independent of the empire thus confirming the territorial rulers possession of “...free exercise of territorial sovereignty” the so-called Landeshoheit (Hughes 1992:94). The emperor only retained his limited jura caesarae reservata (exclusive rights) in his role as feudal overlord (Hughes 1992:95). Catholicism, Protestantism and Calvinism were ratified as the three official religions of the empire while the principle of cuios regio, eius religio was upheld. Furthermore, the Treaty made some major territorial changes, enlarging some of the territorial states such as Brandenburg-Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. The empire nevertheless remained important. Its protection made the survival of many small principalities possible, which would have been otherwise submerged into larger units (Fulbrook 1992:70). Within the consolidated territories, absolutism became the dominant form of rule whereby the territorial rulers attempted to centralise their states although not many “...had the resources to act as European or even German powers” (Hughes 1992:115).

One of the more resourceful and as such successful states was Prussia, who emerged from the seventeenth century onwards as one of the most important territories in the Holy Roman Empire. The rise of Prussia created a new dualism between Prussia and Austria, who competed with each other for supremacy within the empire. In 1653 Frederick William of Prussia established a small standing army and an elite army corps, which offered status and prestige to nobles thereby incorporating the aristocracy into the state apparatus (Fulbrook 1992:77). In 1701 Prussia was granted a royal title. Eighteenth century absolutist Prussia was largely characterised by its militaristic bureaucracy (Polizeistaat) based on appointed civil servants (Beamte) who received a fixed salary. Sovereignty in Prussia was anchored in the office rather than the person of the king, thus laying the foundations for the German legal-rational system of authority. Prussian absolutism, however,
also retained feudal features. Political power was still a prerogative of social status. Although Elector Frederick III (1688-1713, from 1701 Frederick I King in Prussia) had a policy of employing non-nobles, his son Frederick II reversed this policy, "...convinced that the nobility had to be preserved as natural officers and administrators" (Hughes 1992:144). The privileged and unchallenged status of the nobility would lead in the nineteenth century to considerable discontent, especially among the middle classes.

Frederick II (1740-86), who saw himself as the first servant of the state, was an advocate and promoter of enlightened absolutism. Enlightened absolutism did not involve a change in the form of government as such but reason and law gained in importance, while the divine royal rule lost somewhat in significance (Hughes 1992:146). Governments were now regarded as "...having a duty to promote the happiness of their subjects as well as security and order" (Hughes 1992:146). As Schulze (1995:81) put it "...the absolutist state was well on the way to being turned into an enlightened welfare state- everything for the people, but nothing by the people". Frederick also implemented a range of socio-economic and legal reforms such as the codification of civil law (Allgemeines Landrecht, published 1794). The civil code regulated the relationship between the state and the 'citizens' although it remained a somewhat feudal document that allocated rights by social class and retained the privileges of the nobility. As Hughes (1992:148) summarises, enlightened absolutist Prussia "...typified the partial modernization characteristic of enlightened absolutism. In general, reform at the top did not deeply affect the corporate structure of society and the old pre-absolutist institutional structures were not destroyed".

Civil War and the supremacy of Parliament

England in the seventeenth century was dominated by conflict between the absolutist tendencies of the monarchy on the one hand and the strive for more parliamentary power on the other. Both James I (1603-25) and Charles I (1625-49) were convinced absolutists. Their relationship with Parliament continued to be one of mutual dependency whereby the king needed Parliament to approve special taxes, while Parliament could only meet when
summoned by the monarch, who could also dissolve it at any time. Parliament, being elected only by rich property owners, was therefore neither democratic nor a real political power.

Charles I had dissolved Parliament and tried to rule by raising and extending unapproved taxes. When he had to summon Parliament again in 1640, Parliament immediately passed two important acts: first that Parliament could not be dissolved without its consent and second that elections to Parliament should take place at least every three years (Lee 1997:212-214). In 1642 civil war broke out between supporters of Parliament and those of Charles. After the execution of Charles, in January 1649, England became a republic while the old feudal-royal institutions, the monarchy, the Anglican Church and the House of Lords, were abolished (Lee 1997:228). Considering that the republic was very much linked to Cromwell, the Lord Protector, it is perhaps not surprising, as Lee (1997:234) put it, that "...the great experiment, the Commonwealth, the Republic, died with Cromwell" although Cromwell’s son took over as Lord Protector in 1658 until 1660 when the monarchy was finally restored under Charles II (1660-85).

The role of Parliament was finally strengthened, not by the failed republic, but when a constitutional monarchy was established in 1689 after James II (1685-88) tried to re-establish absolutist rule and convert the country to Catholicism. William of Orange, married to James' Protestant daughter Mary, landed in England, invited by conspirators against James. William emerged victorious and, in 1689, a Declaration of Rights offered the crown to William and Mary. This Bill of Rights established a constitutional monarchy and created a new sovereign ‘the King in Parliament’ (Schauer 1996:99). It was now illegal for the monarch to suspend the law, to collect taxes without parliamentary permission and to keep a standing army in peacetime. The 1694 Triennial Act ensured regular parliamentary elections (Black 1993:10). The new constitutional monarchy was still by no means democratic and the franchise would remain heavily restricted until the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, by the end of the seventeenth century, some essentially modern features had been established such as the right of Parliament to
control the sovereign. This incorporated the idea, as expressed by Locke, that state institutions and actions have limits and boundaries.

The question of why a constitutional monarchy was established in England at a time when the majority of western European states were still ruled by absolutist monarchs, seems to be at least partly answered by economic circumstances. By the end of the seventeenth century England had an extensive land market, waged-labour, commercialised farming and a concept of private property in addition to the early establishment of a mercantile-capitalist middle class profiting from trade with the colonies (Anderson and Hall 1986:37-38). Mercantilism, in the form of economic state protection policies, was a feature of many continental absolutist states in the seventeenth century, but was not employed by the English government. State regulations were only favoured in case that they actually served the market and the individual profit (Cochrane 1986:69). One could in fact argue that absolutism was short lived in Britain because early forms of industrialisation demanded political changes and a more liberal economic approach. Hall (1984:9-10) claims that "...it is under this constitutional system that industrialization occurred. [...] the state was forced into a more liberal and constitutional path by the demands of the rising classes associated with these economic developments".

Shortly after the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, the Act of Union in 1707 created Great Britain, joining Scotland with England and Wales (Rayner 1949:349). In 1708 a new Parliament of Great Britain abolished not only the Scottish Privy Council but also the Scottish Parliament (Black 1993:13) thus establishing a centralised unitary state, which was expanded through the Act of Union 1801 to include the Kingdom of Ireland. The relatively early establishment of a unitary state with centralised institutions would become an important cornerstone of British national identity as Chapter Two will explain. In 1776 Britain lost its main colony when the former North American territories declared their independence. This was followed by the French Revolution in 1789. The new states, the USA and the French Republic, were inspired by the ideas of Rousseau and Montesquieu and
established popular sovereignty and representative democracies with
governments based on the idea of separation of powers. At first, the British
government seemed to welcome the French Revolution which it was assumed
would turn France into a constitutional monarchy. Similarly to the rulers of
German territories, the British Parliament saw no danger that the revolution
might spread to Britain (Lee 1997:460). The French Revolution was largely
thought to be a consequence of Louis XVI's incompetence (Hughes
1992:175). Opinions changed, however, especially when the French
Revolution was followed first by the Revolutionary and then the Napoleonic
Wars.

1.3.4 Germany in the nineteenth century

In the course of the Napoleonic Wars, large parts of the Holy Roman Empire
were invaded. As a consequence, in 1806 the empire was abolished and a
German Confederation under French protection as well as a number of
French satellite states were created in its place. Many of the smaller and
medium sized territories were reorganised into larger units. During the French
period, the states were modernised and the power of the established
authorities was strengthened. This period can not be regarded as liberal as
such, but as a period of transition when important foundations for the later
liberal-constitutional movement were created (Hughes 1992:184). Some
territorial states introduced constitutions and parliaments and there was even
an increase in popular participation (Hughes 1992:184). At the same time
some feudal class restrictions were lifted in many states, for example in
Prussia, which meant that nobles could now engage in middle-class business
and middle-class members could buy noble lands (Fulbrook 1992:99). The
French occupation therefore had a much greater impact on the German states
than the French Revolution itself. Increased social mobility would be essential
for further economic and industrial development. The nobility, however, still
retained many of its privileges.

The Congress of Vienna in 1815, following the defeat of Napoleon,
tried to restore order in the states of the former Holy Roman Empire. A
German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) was created on 8 June 1815 as a counterweight to Prussia and Austria. The Bund is best described as a very lose confederation of thirty-nine states with a federal diet, which was basically a permanent congress of diplomatic representatives. The constitution followed the established practice of the Holy Roman Empire and further cemented the tradition of shared political power and shared sovereignty, which would come to shape twentieth century attitudes to the EU as Chapter Five will explore. The constitution of the Bund (*Deutsche Bundesakte*) implemented a system of shared sovereignty whereby each member of the community was independent with full internal sovereignty while the Confederation was in charge of external sovereignty. Internally, most states subscribed to enlightened absolutism although the *Bundesakte* contained a non-statutory article urging all member states to grant constitutions. The few states that obliged granted its citizens some civil liberties, but no (or heavily restricted) political rights.

Civil liberties and liberal rights were also at the heart of the 1848/49 revolutions, which took place in many European cities and states including most of the states of the German Confederation. The main causes of the revolutions were middle class discontent as well as a widespread economic and agricultural crisis. Liberal governments were installed in some states and in May 1848 a National Assembly (*Verfassungsgebende Versammlung*) met in Frankfurt (Fulbrook 1992:120). The aim of the Assembly was to draw up a constitution for Germany but its weaknesses became soon apparent. Apart from factional squabbles, the Assembly was essentially powerless and had to rely on Prussian and Austrian support, which was not exactly forthcoming. Eventually, the Assembly decided on the creation of a *Deutsches Reich* (excluding Austria) with a parliamentarian constitution. The imperial crown was offered to the King of Prussia who promptly declined the "...crown that was made of 'muck and mire'" (Kitchen 2006:87). By the end of 1849 many rulers had regained power in their states and the National Assembly was dispersed. Schauer (1996:31) attributes the failure of the revolution, to some extent at least, to the continued conservative-monarchist attitude of large parts of the population who preferred the existing state structure to that of a
unified German state. The liberal movement only represented a small faction of the population and failed to address for example working class or peasant issues. The whole approach was too theoretical and lacked clear leadership as well as actual political power and authority.

In the following decades, the Prussian Prime Minister Bismarck, using a mixture of planned policy, manipulation and use of circumstances, eventually orchestrated the establishment of a unified German Empire in 1871. By 1866 the German Confederation had in effect ceased to exist with the commencement of the Austro-Prussian war. Following Prussian victory, a new Prussian led North German Confederation was established while Austria had to renounce any influence on German affairs. As before, shared sovereignty and political power was institutionalised as the new confederate constitution gave the Prussian king responsibility for foreign affairs and the army, while the territorial rulers were allowed to look after their internal affairs. The Confederation had a Reichstag, elected by universal male suffrage, while the territorial rulers and governments formed an Upper House (Bundesrat), with a presidential committee and a Chancellor (Bismarck) as executive (Kitchen 2006:113). Although the legislative powers of the Reichstag were limited, the introduction of universal male suffrage\(^4\) established for the first time a link between political participation and the state, between citizenship and political power, which provided an important stimulus for the development of a political public and popular political culture.

Following Prussian victory over France in the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1871) the South German states acceded somewhat unwillingly to the Confederation and the second German Empire was proclaimed in January 1871 with the Prussian king as its hereditary emperor. Politically, the new empire was largely based on the structure of the North German Confederation and was the result of a number of somewhat uneasy compromises between liberal nationalism and authoritarian features (Kitchen 2006:121). The empire was a federal organisation, with several political organs at national level. The

\(^4\) Although the Reichstag was elected by universal male suffrage, the Prussian Diet continued to be elected by a three-class voting system.
legislature took the form of a Parliament (*Reichstag*), which was directly elected by universal male suffrage. The *Reichstag*, however, had few real powers apart from the right to approve the budget and new laws, although any new law also needed the approval of the Bundesrat and thus in effect the approval of the emperor, the Chancellor, who was appointed by the emperor, and Prussia (Kitchen 2006:123). It was supplemented by a federal council (*Bundesrat*), composed of delegations from the different states but dominated by Prussia. Executive power was concentrated in the hands of the emperor and the Chancellor with the Cabinet of Ministers. Nevertheless, the new German Empire, despite its seemingly liberal-democratic features, was in effect a constitutional monarchy “…comprising a loose federation of quasi-independent states, the whole dominated by the Prussian military state” (Kitchen 2006:121).

1.3.5 Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth century: Democratisation, Decolonisation and Devolution

The mid nineteenth century was, according to Budge et al (2001:34) a critical period for the British constitutional monarchy as “…various developments came together to shape modern Britain”. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution had created a largely urban working class with about half of the population living in urban areas that had no political representation (Budge et al 2001:34). The change in class structure, population size and concentration demanded a change in the franchise, which had been virtually unchanged since the fifteenth century. A series of reform bills in the nineteenth century transformed large parts of the population gradually into politically active citizens, rather than mere subjects, further linking the state and political participation as well as national identity as Chapter Two will explain. The first Reform Bill of 1832 enfranchised middle-class men and changed the election boroughs towards a more representative system in terms of actual population density (Colls 2002:69). So far, the highly populated and industrialised towns such as Manchester had no or only one seat in Parliament while some scarcely populated rural boroughs had two or more seats. The Reform Bill abandoned most of the rotten boroughs
redistributing the seats to the large towns (Budge et al 2001:35). The right to vote was extended to male heads of households, who paid £10 or more annual rent (Bloy 1997:1). This still excluded the vast working class, but now included the upper middle classes.

A second Reform Bill was passed in 1867, which further increased the number of voters. Male workers were for the first time included in the franchise although this was made subject to property values (Colls 2002:110). A Third Reform Act in 1884 extended the urban franchise and gave the vote to agricultural labourers (Budge et al 2001:35). After the First World War, in 1919, the franchise was extended to include all adult males and women over thirty, which was changed in 1928 when all adult women were granted the vote (Budge et al 2001:35).

The nineteenth century reform bills also prompted a concern to ensure that those, who would now participate in political power through the educated suffrage, would be adequately educated. Until 1870, elementary education in England was provided on a voluntary basis and was largely organised by Churches and the National Society (Sanderson 1983:23). The state’s involvement in education was largely limited to an annual £20,000 grant from 1833 onward (£30,000 from 1839) to stimulate school growth and building. This was gradually increased to include grants for equipment, teacher training and running costs (Sanderson 1983:19). In 1856 a new Education Department was established, but it was not until 1870 when the Elementary Education Act “...formed the watershed between mere State assistance and State provision of elementary education” (Evans 1975:28). The 1870 Act essentially was designed to fill the existing gaps as by 1870 39% of children aged three to twelve were still not at school (Sanderson 1983:23). The new education legislation came into force for a variety of reasons including the concerns raised by the 1867 Reform Bill and the dangers of an illiterate electorate. Interestingly, the recent Prussian victory over Austria in the Seven Weeks War was commonly linked to the Prussian elementary and secondary education provision, which was thought to be beneficial to national power and military strength (Evans 1975:29). Nevertheless, it was not until 1902 that a
national education system was established by the 1902 Education Act. This act reformed school administration by creating a countrywide network of Local Education Authorities, which were also empowered to expand and improve secondary education, although this was not a mandatory obligation (Lawson and Silver 1973:371-373).

At the same time, as previously aristocratic political and educational privileges were gradually extended to all, the power and status of the English or British nobility gradually declined from the 1830s to the 1930s at the same time (Colls 2002:75). In the second half of the nineteenth century, the political public expanded and middle-class values were more widely disseminated throughout society due to the rise in literacy rates and the emergence of a national mass press (Budge et al 2001:39). By the 1870s both the Conservative and the Liberal Party had established themselves on a countrywide basis and became the strongest parties, which was reinforced by the election system (First Past the Post in single member constituencies) that favoured large parties with strong regional support (Budge et al 2001:41). Although Labour eventually replaced the Liberal Party as second strongest party, the party and election system has effectively continued largely unchanged until the present day (Budge et al 2001:40-41).

The second half of the nineteenth century also saw a new wave of imperialism and empire creation. The British Empire, although not unproblematic and expensive in terms of colonial defence and administration, was important for the British economy, “...providing food and raw materials, markets, investment opportunities and destinations for migrants” (Wardley 1994:59). In the early twentieth century, the British Empire included almost a quarter of the globe. After 1945 the process of decolonisation began whereby former colonies were given independent status (Budge et al 2001:557). The process of decolonisation, largely complete by the mid 1960s, transformed the empire into the Commonwealth (Rubinstein 2003:243). Both the empire itself and the process of decolonisation had a considerable impact on national identity and nationalism as will be shown in the next chapter.
Finally, no assessment of the development of the British state would be complete without highlighting at least briefly the impact of late twentieth century devolution. Devolution refers to the "...transfer of power from central government to subordinate regional bodies, without (unlike federalism) leading to shared sovereignty" (Heywood 2002:422). Without transforming a unitary state into a federal system, devolution allows some degree of decentralisation, often to reflect "...growing regional and sometimes nationalist pressures" (Heywood 2002:167). In the UK, devolution was put back on the political agenda in the 1960s following a revival of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, although devolved assemblies were not established until 1999 (Heywood 2002:168). The new regional assemblies, however, were not granted the same political status. The Scottish Parliament received tax-varying powers as well as primary legislative authority in domestic policy areas; the Northern Ireland Assembly has some primary legislative powers, while the Welsh Assembly is limited to secondary or 'subordinate' legislation (Budge et al 2001:148-167). In contrast to the Westminster Parliament, the new regional assemblies are elected by proportional representation. Heywood (2002:168-9) describes the UK as having now a 'quasi-federal' character since the new regional assemblies enjoy democratic legitimacy and as such have political entrenchment unlike the EU as Chapter Five will discuss. The process of devolution also has some important implications especially for British national identity, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

1.3.6 Twentieth century Germany: from Empire to Republic

In the twentieth century, Germany's political structure changed considerably. The First World War was concluded by the Treaty of Versailles which came into force in 1920. Germany lost around one tenth of her territory including Alsace-Lorraine, parts of West and East Prussia and all of her colonies. The economically important Saarland was made a temporary League of Nations mandate and the Rhineland was demilitarised. Germany's military was limited in size while any form of war preparation was forbidden. Reparation payments were to be made based on the infamous Article 231 which stated that Germany and her allies were solely responsible for the war (Kitchen
The importance of the war and its concluding treaty for the future political and national development of Germany can hardly be underestimated. As will be illustrated below and in Chapter Two, both world wars in the twentieth century had a significant if not cataclysmic impact on German political structures as well as the fundamental underlying attitudes to political concepts (such as sovereignty and citizenship) and national identity, which would significantly inform post-1945 German attitudes to European integration, as Chapter Five will discuss.

The Weimar Republic

The Treaty of Versailles was signed for Germany by the recently established Weimar Republic. It had been declared on 9 November 1918 in Berlin amidst a revolution that had started in October 1918 as a navy mutiny, although mass strikes and demonstrations had already taken place throughout the last years of the war. The new republic was largely a creation of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and was, at least to some extent, a counter measure to alternative plans for the creation of a socialist republic. In fact, the first years of the new republic would be riddled with high levels of political violence, assassinations, coup attempts, strikes and demonstrations. The republic was under threat from both the right and the left. The left wished to establish a Soviet type state and criticised the SPD for working with the old elites. The right was preoccupied with a struggle to revise the Versailles Treaty, which was simultaneously a struggle against the Weimar Republic, as the followers of the republic were blamed for accepting the treaty (Kitchen 2006:223)

The constitution for the Weimar Republic was proclaimed on 11 August 1919 (Fulbrook 1992:160). It opted for a mixed parliamentary and presidential governmental system. It relied heavily on the 1848 constitutional proposals and even adopted the 1848 black, red and gold German flag in a bid to artificially create historical continuity and appeal to national sentiment. The Reich was to be a federal state whereby the old territorial structure remained largely intact, although the republic was far more centralised than the old empire (Kitchen 2006:223). To secure political unity, the reserve rights of the
states were ended and the Reich's rights to raise direct taxes were strengthened. The Parliament was to be elected by universal suffrage, which was now extended to include women. A pure proportional election system was chosen, which led to a high proportion of small parties in Parliament.

The bicameral Reichstag was the legislative of the new republic and was the representative organ of the sovereign people. Therefore, unlike the previous system, the Weimar constitution was inspired by the democratic ideas of Rousseau and created citizens, who not only participated in, but were the de facto owners of the democratic process. Consequently, the new constitution also guaranteed certain minimal education rights including equal access to education, free education for eight years, compulsory attendance for the first four years of elementary schooling, access to secondary education based on ability and the obligatory introduction of Staatsbürgerkunde (civics lessons) (Hahn 1998:55-56).

The executive of the new republic, consisting of the president, the Chancellor and the cabinet, was made responsible to the Reichstag. The president was directly elected every seven years and had considerable political power (Fulbrook 1992:60). He had the supreme command of the armed forces and the power to appoint and dismiss governments as well as the right to dissolve the Reichstag (Bessel 1997:241). Most crucially, the president could make use of the Notverordnungsrecht (emergency power) of Article 48, which could operate as a substitute constitution. As the large number of small parties made the formation of clear parliamentary majorities impossible, the governmental power was increasingly executed via the Notverordnungsrecht by the president. This provision would prove to be a decisive reason for the eventual failure of the republic. The constitution also included a catalogue of basic rights, although not directly binding in law.

Although the republic apparently stabilised in the second half of the 1920s, these 'golden years' were of short duration and rested on shaky foundations (Bessel 1997:249+252). At the start of 1930s, two main processes occurred simultaneously, the collapse of the Weimar democracy
and the rise of the National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP). The Weimar Republic had struggled with problems from the start. It was burdened with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, its legitimacy was contested and attacked from both left and right. It was also trying to cope with severe economic problems. The eventual collapse of the system can be attributed to a unique combination of circumstances. For example, some of the constitutional provisions of the political system were inherently flawed. The extensive use of Article 48 resulted, after 1931, in an almost complete replacement of parliamentary sovereignty by presidential authoritarianism (Fulbrook 1992:173). In addition, the population had not entirely been “…converted to the republican cause” (Bessel 1997:249).

The Third Reich
In January 1933 Adolf Hitler, was appointed Chancellor. In March 1933 the so-called Enabling Act was passed, a constitutional amendment that allowed Hitler to pass laws without parliamentary approval. Subsequently, all other parties were either outlawed or disbanded themselves while the formation of new parties was forbidden, thus creating a one party state (Fulbrook 1992:180). At the same time, the state was centralised as state governments were given the right to pass legislation without having to consult regional parliaments, which commenced the process referred to as Gleichschaltung (Kitchen 2006:262). This process also included a comprehensive programme of co-ordination, including for example the re-organisation of all societies and associations under party control (Kitchen 2006:264). The result of was an authoritarian dictatorship, whose ideology shall be examined in the following chapter. The dictatorship was complete when Hitler was appointed “Führer and Reich Chancellor” in 1934 (Kitchen 2006:270). Although no further investigation of the Third Reich shall be made here, it should be noted that in 1938 Austria was included (Anschluß), followed by an aggressive foreign policy with regards to Czechoslovakia and Poland, which eventually led to the Second World War in 1939.
Post-war Germany

After the Second World War, in 1945, Germany lay in ruins, both literally as well as economically and politically. Germany was occupied by the allied victors who agreed in theory on a general policy of denazification, demilitarisation and democratisation (Carter 1997:436). Germany lost over 20% of her territory, especially in the East, while the occupied zones gradually developed into two separate German states. By 1949 the Soviet Zone had undergone major political, economic and social changes and was under Communist control (Fulbrook 1992:207). The Western zones retained a capitalist market economy and benefited substantially from the US Marshall Aid for political and economic reconstruction, which was a successful attempt to transform Western Germany into a democratic ally (Fulbrook 1992:209-210). In 1948 negotiations were launched for a new constitution for a new state in Western Germany, which came into being in the form of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in May 1949 while the (East) German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded in October 1949 (Fulbrook 1992:210-11).

Although 1945 is often labelled ‘zero hour’ (Stunde Null), Kitchen (2006:318) points out that there were invariably elements of continuity. The West German constitution, for example, was “…remarkably similar to that of Weimar” (Roseman 1997:368) although it was designed not to repeat some of the previous mistakes. The constitution was called the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and was committed to eventual reunification (Fulbrook 1992:211). West Germany was to be a federal representative democracy with a president (indirectly elected and restricted to representational functions) and Chancellor (appointed by the Bundestag) as well as free general elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag), which also had a regionally based Upper House (Bundesrat) (Roseman 1997:368). As Fulbrook (1992:219) points out, the democracy of the Federal Republic (and that of the united Germany after 1990) had some unique constitutional features. The election system is a mix of proportional and first-past-the-post features with a 5% threshold, which has consistently provided stable coalition governments. The Basic Law also contains unalterable essential freedoms and human rights (Kitchen 2006:324). The new Federal Republic was at best semi-sovereign
with the Allies retaining control over certain areas such as foreign policy (Roseman 1997:369). In 1955, the Federal Republic regained (almost) full sovereignty when she became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Fulbrook 1992:211). From the start, the FRG was firmly committed to western integration as will be shown in Chapter Four. The constitution itself became the nucleus of German national re-invention as Chapters Two and Five will explain.

East Germany on the other hand was based on Marxist-Leninist principles of ‘democratic centralism’ with effective control in the hands of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) (Kitchen 2006:325). The government and state apparatus of the GDR were organised hierarchically with the Council of State as the ceremonial head and the Council of Ministers having governmental power (Fulbrook 1992:224). The Parliament met infrequently and basically served the purpose of ratification of centrally determined decisions (Fulbrook 1992:225). The split between the two states attained gradually a more permanent character with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the fortification of the rest of the frontier. In 1973 both states became full members of the United Nations (Fulbrook 1992:216).

German re-unification followed a series of transitions in 1989 that had initially started in recently reformed East-Central European states such as Hungary, where East Germans were able to cross borders into the West or seek refuge in Western embassies (Fulbrook 1992:241-42). Within the GDR demands for debate and reform led to weekly mass demonstrations resulting in limited reforms from above (Osmond 1997:461-463). On 9 November 1989, the border at the Berlin Wall was opened (Kitchen 2006:384). Subsequently, further attempts were made to reform the GDR with elections in March 1990 and a change in leadership, although at the same time the economy and administration continued to collapse (Fulbrook 1992:246). In July 1990 a currency union preceded German unification in October 1990, whereby the newly reconstituted East German Länder were incorporated into the Federal Republic and the pre-1990 West German constitution (Osmond 1997:466-467). Some modifications to the Basic Law, however, were made including...
provisions “...for the Federal government to hand over certain sovereign rights to the European Union” (Kitchen 2006:398) thus underlining the German commitment to European integration.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how the creation of international and supranational networks such as the EU has started to challenge some of the established political concepts. Since the EU has acquired a certain share in sovereignty, at least in some policy areas, the traditional role and function of the state has been eroded to some degree and the concept of sovereignty had to be redefined, at least theoretically, in terms of multi-level governance.

This chapter has also illustrated a number of important differences in the state development between England (or Britain) and Germany. Feudalism and the subsequent political development in Germany have resulted in permanent accumulation of political power on territorial level, as expressed in the federal structure of modern Germany. The UK on the other hand has traditionally been one of the most centralised unitary states in Europe, although recently some power was devolved to regional assemblies (Heywood 2002:165-168). The differences in state structure and development have therefore resulted in different attitudes to shared or multi-level sovereignty, which impact on attitudes to European integration as subsequent chapters will show. Whereas Germany has a tradition of shared sovereignty, which also became part of the traumatic political re-invention after 1945 in Britain, national sovereignty is an integral part of the political system as well as of emotive concepts such as nation and belonging, as will be discussed below.

This chapter has illustrated how England started to develop as early as the thirteenth century into a parliamentary monarchy whereby the supremacy of Parliament over the king was established in the seventeenth century. Germany, on the other hand, remained an assortment of loosely grouped territorial states until the end of the nineteenth century, when a united federal
constitutional empire emerged. The modern British political system is a result of a long gradual development and has not been radically modified. By comparison, since unification in 1871, Germany had a political development marked by revolution and radical changes whereby the recent system is an allied creation, the result of the traumatic experiences of the Third Reich and the Second World War. Potential consequences of this different political development, especially in the twentieth century, for attitudes and policies towards European integration will be analysed in subsequent chapters.

Socially, British society was transformed by the early industrial revolution in the seventeenth century into a more mobile, class-based society, while in Germany numerous internal frontiers and the rigid medieval feudal-social structures hindered the economic and socio-cultural development until the nineteenth century. In general, the transformation into a more modern capitalist society in Western Europe was accompanied by an awakening of a political public and the search for new political ideas and concept more fitting to the modern society. As early as in the sixteenth century philosophers developed modern political concepts including notions of sovereignty and citizenship, which developed over time into a public demand for democratisation. In Britain and Germany the democratisation of the political system started in the nineteenth century with the gradual extension of the franchise, which was accompanied by the gradual improvement in education provision. This process lasted well into the twentieth century. This social and political development was also closely linked to the development of national identity and nationalism which will be the focus of the following chapter.
2. Nationalism, Nations and Nation states in Western Europe

2.1 Introduction: Perspectives on Nations and Nationalism

Having examined the development of the state and the political system in Germany and England it is now time to turn to the theme of nationhood. It is important to consider the development of nations and nationalism with regards to the thesis as European integration is taking place within the framework of the European nation states. European attitudes, identity and citizenship are intrinsically linked to national attitudes and identities. Any discussion of the future of European integration must be related to speculations about the future of the European nation states (Dunkerley et al 2002:6). As Shore (2000:33) points out "...theories of nationalism shed light on European integration in two ways". The first is by explaining the role of the intelligentsia in precipitating the rise of nationalism, which might provide a relevant comparison to European integration, which is also often described as elite-led, as will be explored in later chapters. Secondly, theories of nationalism often relate the rise of a national consciousness to the development of communication technologies or advances in the cultural domain. Such theories of nation state formation (for example by Gellner or Anderson as discussed below), can again be related to and help explain the processes of European integration (Shore 2000:33-34). On the other hand, the ongoing debate about the implications of European integration for the nation states and the controversy surrounding European identity vis-a-vie national identities, shows that nation states and national identity are concepts that are still very relevant to European governments and peoples. It is therefore important for this chapter to discuss in further detail the origin and nature as well as the historical development of nations, nationalism, nation states and national identity.

Despite the vast number of publications on nationalism and nations, there is a persistent confusion regarding terminology and definition. This
confusion is mainly due to the variety of perspectives applied to the study of nationalism (Herb and Kaplan 1999:13), something that Brown (2000:4) refers to as “conceptual ambiguities”. Brown (2000), as well as for example Hutchinson and Smith (1994), provide useful categorisations that attempt to order and group the plethora of theories on nations, nationalism and related concepts. A similar simplified theoretical overview is attempted below whereby the selection of included theories is based on their general prominence in the literature and their relevance for this study. This theoretical discussion will be followed by an examination of the development of nations and nationalism in Germany as well as England and Britain as a whole.

2.2 Nations and nationalism

Nations are usually defined in close relationship to the state and the principle of sovereignty, as discussed in the previous chapter, whereby the nation is considered to be a politicised entity, which has the common goal or destiny to preserve its unique character. For example, Herb (1999:16) defines a nation as an entity actively seeking independence as it can only in its own state deal with its own affairs independently. If successful, the resulting political entity is normally referred to as a nation state, as discussed in Chapter One. This is not to say that the territory of the state necessarily matches that of the nation and vice versa, however both influence and condition each other (Wintle 1996b:17).

Thus, nations are often regarded as having a distinct territorial aspect. Hastings (1997:4) agrees by defining a nation as an entity that possesses or claims the right to political autonomy and identity as a people, together with the control of a specific territory. In addition to the original characteristic of territory as living space for a community, the national territory “...creates a collective consciousness by reinventing itself as a homeland” (Herb 1999:17). Other communities or nations are usually perceived on an ‘us-them’ basis, distinguishing insiders from outsiders. Smith (1991:14) expands this definition by describing a nation as “…a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”. For the purpose of this thesis, Smith’s explanation will be used as a working definition of the nation.

Definitions of nationalism are equally problematic. Dann (1996) distinguishes between patriotism, national movement and nationalism. Central to his theory is the role of society in the nation formation process, although a certain state influence is not ruled out. Dann (1996) believes that a political nation develops with the formation of a collective political national consciousness [Nationalbewusstsein] within a population or ethnicity by discovering common traditions and interests. This may be described as the development of an ‘us’-consciousness, often in contrast to other groups and communities. Nation formation is thus primarily a process of social integration and the result, national identity, is neither absolute nor exclusive (Dann 1996:15). Dann (1996:15) argues that the values and symbols of national identity are usually taken from the, often romanticised, past of this particular group of people. Nation formation is also to some extent elite driven and never affects all strata of a society at the same time. Similar to Gellner (1983), Dann (1996) claims that politically non-privileged social strata were only then incorporated when education, popular political culture and emancipation were extended to these strata from the eighteenth century onwards. As already pointed out, this elite-centred model may also be applied to the process of European integration and the formation of a European consciousness as will be explored further on.

Dann (1996) identifies the rise of patriotism in the eighteenth century as another important factor in the process of nation formation. He defines patriotism as “...social-political behaviour, which focuses not on individual self-interests but on the bonum commune or bonum patria. Patriotism is an expression of a special political culture and education” (Dann 1996:16, own translation). Dann distinguishes between patriotism and national movements. Whereas patriotism could focus on any political community, such as the German territorial states, national movements had the distinct aim of nation state formation (Dann 1996:18). Therefore a national movement is defined as
an "...organised movement of a nation or of national-conscious social strata, with the goal to achieve political autonomy within their territory" (Dann 1996:19, own translation).

Dann's definition of a 'national movement' is largely synonymous with what is in Anglo-American literature usually referred to as nationalism. Although, as Hutchinson and Smith (1994:4) point out, there are "...important differences in ways of defining the concept, some equating it with 'national sentiment', others with nationalist ideology and language, others again with nationalist movements", there seems to be nevertheless an important difference between post-war German and the Anglo- American literature on nationalism. Whereby all the different perspectives mentioned by Hutchinson and Smith (1994) tend to be collectively known as 'nationalism' in the Anglo-American literature, post-war German literature has a tendency to follow Dann's example and distinguish between 'national movements' (value-free) and 'nationalism' (negative connotation). Dann (1996:20) for example defines nationalism as an aggressive political behaviour, which perceives other nations as enemies or as inferior, whereby organised nationalism as a political movement was often paired with anti-democratic and anti-social tendencies. By contrast, in the Anglo- American literature, nationalism at the most general level is value-free and often referred to as the right to national self-determination or as "...a sentiment felt by a human group which identifies itself as a nation, [which] may find practical expression in an historical movement and a political programme" (The Open University 1988:9). This difference in definition is based to a large extent on the German experience with nationalist ideology in the twentieth century, the devastation of both world wars and the subsequent re-evaluation of nations and national identity, which also had an impact on attitudes to European integration, as will be discussed later on.

In any case, there are countless schools of thought that have developed an understanding of nations and nationalism as well as theories concerning their origin and development. The variety of perspectives is often simplified and grouped in two or more major categories that are frequently
perceived as opposing and contradictory. For instance, Herb and Kaplan (1999:14) distinguish between the primordialist (or essentialist) and the modernist (or constructivist- instrumentalist) perspective. This differentiation is somewhat misleading as it compares two different principles: primordialism is concerned with the nature of nations and nationalism, while modernism is primarily concerned with the origin of nations and nationalism.

Smith (2000:2-4) offers a more detailed categorisation. He developed two pairs of opposing perspectives: primordialism versus instrumentalism and modernism versus perennialism. The first pair is concerned with the nature of nationalism. Primordialists argue that the nation is essentially organic, while instrumentalists argue that the nation is voluntary and contractual. Organic nations are often described as cultural nations, whereas voluntary nations are frequently referred to as civic nations, a distinction that was first proposed by the German historian Friedrich Meinecke in 1907 (Kumar 2003:21). The second fundamental debate, between modernists and perennialists, is concerned with the origin of nations opposing a modern origin with one in antiquity as shown in the graph below:

Graph 1.1 The nature and origin of nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURE OF NATIONS</th>
<th>ORIGIN OF NATIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumentalism</td>
<td>Modernism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(voluntaristic)</td>
<td>(origin in modernity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primordialism</td>
<td>Perennialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(organic)</td>
<td>(origin in antiquity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is evident that the nature and origin of nations are strongly related. In fact, according to Smith’s (2000) theory, the modernist approach is so closely
related to the instrumentalist perspective that both approaches are often (con)fused into the modernist approach. The same applies to the primordialists and perennialists. This fusion is not necessarily correct as, for example, many would argue that some 'organic nations', such as the German nation, developed in relation to modernity as will be discussed below. Although other authors such as Brown (2000) have put forward different categorisations and conceptual models, the above will be used in the following discussion of some of the predominant and often contentious issues relating to the origin and nature of nations.

2.3 The origin of nations: modernism versus perennialism

A vast quantity of the relevant literature is concerned with the origin of nations. Perennialists, who believe in the antiquity of nations, argue that the understanding of "...nations and nationalism will only be advanced when any inseparable bonding of them to the modernisation of society is abandoned" (Hastings 1997:9). Perennialists believe that the roots of nations extend back well into the past whereby the focus can be on continuity (continuous perennialism) or on recurrence (recurrent perennialism) (Smith 2000:34-35). Some perennialists argue that, when nationalism started to spread on the continent from the eighteenth century onwards, it was an importation of an already existing idea (Greenfeld 1994:168). According to Hastings (1997), nations are based on pre-existing ethnicities or proto-national bonds, which develop into a nation upon production of a written vernacular and, once they start to pursue political objectives, the creation of a nation state. Hastings (1997:3) regards ethnicity as the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, whereas nations themselves are more self-conscious and can consist of one or more ethnicities that have a literature of their own. Hastings (1997:21) agrees with Greenfeld that one of the first ethnicities to turn into a nation through a written vernacular was the English, but he also acknowledges that it needed the French Revolution to fully actualise itself. According to Kumar (2003:29), many theorists who believe in the "...more or less continuous history of national expression from earliest times, do not at all
deny that something new was introduced around the time of the French Revolution”.

The perennialist perspective has received considerable criticism from modernists such as Kedourie (1960). Modernists believe that nationalist ideologies, nations, national identities and nation states are modern both in date and character and a result of modernisation and modernity. As such they are a product of the accompanying structural change, which refers to the effects of industrialisation and advanced capitalism on society, transforming mediaeval feudal communities into class-based societies (Smith 2000:28). Similarly, Gellner (1983) argues that modern nations and nationalism are the consequence of this socio-structural change, which led to a new form of social organisation based on education-dependent high cultures.

Kedourie (1960) claims that the assertion that nation states have formed since the sixteenth century is a confusion that arises from the usage of nationalist categories in historiography. According to Kedourie (1994:53) the “inventors of the doctrine [primordialism]” attempted to prove the natural division of human beings into nations by appealing to linguistics, history and anthropology. Kedourie (1960), however, argues that there is no convincing reason why people who speak the same language or belong to the same race should be entitled to their own exclusive government. According to Kedourie (1994:53), the confusion between ‘state’ and ‘nation’ was generated through the particular existence of a “…European society of states in constant intercourse and conflict, who regulated their relations, however unwillingly and imperfectly, by a universally acknowledged jus gentium”.

Similarly, Anderson (1991), in his seminal study on nations, argues that nations are mainly modern in essence and the product of print capitalism, that is the rise of the capitalistic mode of production and distribution of printed materials to the masses. Anderson (1991) defines a nation as an imagined community that is created through an active process. All communities should therefore be assessed not by their genuineness but by the style in which they are imagined (Anderson 1991:6). Historically, the possibility of imagining
nations arose, according to Anderson, when three important concepts of life lost their influence. The first concept was the idea that only a script-language (Latin) offered privileged access to truth. The second was the hierarchical feudal organisation of society and the third the idea of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable (Anderson 1991:36). Under the impact of economic change, scientific and social discoveries and the development of more rapid communications, a decline in these certainties and a search for new concepts was initiated.

Printed material played hereby a crucial part in the search for new concepts. In the Middle Ages, the market for printed material consisted mainly of the scholarly elite of European Latin readers. This only changed when the "...revolutionary vernacularization thrust of capitalism" (Anderson 1991:39) took place during and after the sixteenth century. This development was, according to Anderson, largely influenced by the Reformation as well as the development of administrative vernaculars in the wake of absolutist centralisation. In contrast to many perennialists, Anderson (1991: 41) believes that there is no evidence that any proto-national impulses underlay this development. Instead, he argues that the print vernaculars created a new medium of communication, allowing speakers of the various dialects to communicate. Another consequence of this was that spoken vernaculars, which were closest or identical to the print vernaculars, grew ultimately stronger while remote dialects declined, assisted by the forced oppression of dialects by many states such as France as part of a centralisation and nation-formation campaign. The growing community of fellow-readers of the same print-vernacular is according to Anderson (1991:44) "...the embryo of the nationally-imagined community". It is often claimed that only nations (meaning nation states) can sustain and enforce both a uniform vernacular and an adequate educational system to produce literate citizens which form the base of modern society and the modern state as indicated in Chapter One. In such a society, the education of a person limits the culture in which they can live and work. The stress on culture and education implies that, as a consequence, people can only be politically unified with those, who share their education and culture. Assuming that certain comparisons between
national and European integration, and between national and European identity formation, are valid, this implies that education could also have an important, if not crucial, impact on European integration and European identity formation, as will be explored in subsequent chapters.

In any case, proto-national bonds are a contentious issue. Many prominent perennialists such as Hastings (1997) consider them to be the basis of nations, while many modernists claim that important differences separate proto-national from national bonds. For example, it has been argued that proto-national bonds have "...no necessary relation with the unit of territorial political organization which is a crucial criterion of what we understand as a 'nation' today" (Hobsbawm 1990:47).

Hobsbawm (1990) also believes that proto-nationalism is different from modern nationalism and that proto-nationalism alone is not enough to form nationalities, nations or nation states. Gellner (1994:64) agrees and claims that "...nationalism engenders nations and not the other way round" although some pre-existent differentiation features, such as folklore, may be required as building blocks and can be artificially included in the self-image of the nation. This does not necessarily mean, however, that nationalism makes use of actual proto-national features. Similar to Anderson, Gellner (1983:56) argues that many of these pre-modern bonds have either been invented or modified beyond recognition. Thus Gellner (1983:48-49) rejects both the perennialist and the primordialist perspectives by saying that "...nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and generally an inescapable one."

In an attempt to fuse both perennialist and modernist approaches, Dann (1996) argues that, at least in the older European states, one can distinguish between two sub-phases in the nation formation process and therefore between two basic forms of nations in Western Europe namely the estate
nation (ständische Nation) and the modern civic-bourgeois nation (Staatsbürgernation) (Dann 1996:14). In early European states, the estate nation was a predecessor of the modern nation. Although both are labelled 'nations', the estate nation is different in both character and outlook. The estate nation was restricted to privileged social strata such as the nobility and clergy, who acted as an interest-community versus the territorial ruler and who had exclusive access to limited political rights. In comparison, the modern civic nation is described as inclusive, incorporating all members of the population of a given political and cultural community within a specific territory (Dann 1996:12). Through this distinction, Dann (1996) was able to propose a definition, in which both modernist and perennialist arguments to a certain extent are valid.

2.4 The nature of nations: primordialist or instrumentalist?

When it comes to the nature of nations, most frequently encountered are distinctions between voluntary and organic nations, whereby voluntary nations are often equated with or referred to as civic (political) nations and organic as cultural nations. According to Kohn (1945) both organic and voluntary nations co-exist in Europe as a result of the different developments in Western and Central/Eastern Europe after the Renaissance and Reformation. In the West, these two events led to a new modern societal order, in which medieval concepts were theoretically and practically abandoned. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, according to Kohn (1994:162-5), the Renaissance and Reformation were mere theoretical and scholarly events which did not change the social and political order or the political idea of a world empire.

Smith (2000:6) agrees and argues that “voluntarist or associational forms” of nationalism are associated largely with Western Europe, most notably Britain and France. According to Kohn (1994:164), in Western Europe, the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political phenomenon, preceded by the formation of the sovereign states. In this process, the territorial and administrative consolidation through absolutist states, as discussed in the previous chapter, was an important prerogative not only for
the emergence of nations but also for the subsequent development of citizenship, popular sovereignty and liberal rights (Guibernau 1996:55).

The idea that nations are voluntary or contractual and thus artificial constructs is referred to as the instrumentalist (or constructivist) theory. This approach suggests that "...national identity is constructed on the basis of institutional or ideological frameworks which offer simple and indeed simplistic formulas of identity" (Brown 2000:20). Some instrumentalists, such as Hobsbawm (1990), argue that nations were invented by political elites to legitimise their power while others, such as Anderson (1991), describe nations as communities imagined by their members (Hutchinson and Smith 1994:48), although again, a certain degree of elite involvement cannot be denied.

Voluntary nations are usually closely related to eighteenth century enlightenment concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism instead of sentimental attachments to the often mystified past. Voluntaristic or contractual nations are therefore essentially modern nations. According to the instrumentalist model, national group membership in a Western European (nation-)state was linked to the person's citizenship. Stress is on active citizenship and active participation in this "community of choice" (Kumar 2003:23). The nation is in this case a contractual political association, which includes the right for every individual to choose to which nation s/he wishes to belong. A nation is thus understood as a rational territorial association of citizens within a nation state and depends on "...voluntary inclusion in the political community" (Kumar 2003:23). This has influenced to a great extent the 'Western' (French or British) concept of citizenship which is usually expressed in the principle of *jus soli*, the achievement of citizenship through inhabitation of a certain territory. Chronologically, according to Kohn and other instrumentalists, it follows that there was first the state, then nationalism and then nation states. Nationalism served to build a nation in order to reinforce the cohesion of the state whereby some states such as France forcibly induced the process of nation formation. Kumar (2003:22) therefore describes these nations as "state-nations".
In contrast, Smith (2000:6) describes nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe as “organic” or what Greenfeld (1994:168) labels “ethnic nationalism”. Guibernau (1996:55) refers to this type of nation as the “cultural nation” and cites Italy and Germany as the most prominent examples. In contrast to voluntary nations, organic or ethno-cultural nations developed before the emergence of a state and played an important part in the process of nation state formation. Historically the organic nation is usually fostered and promoted by an urban and academic intelligentsia in absence of a strong bourgeoisie. Kohn (Brown 2000:63) also related the distinction between ethno-cultural and civic nationalism to social development, that is, to whether social transformation had produced a strong bourgeoisie and civil society, able to promote nationalism, or whether in the absence of a strong middle class, nationalism was articulated by scholars and the intelligentsia whose opinion was unsupported by public opinion, which did not exist. As Brown (2000:63) points out, the presence of a strong middle class has also often been regarded as “...the key factor in the development of liberalism and democracy" again linking the emergence of nationalism to that of liberal-democratic values.

Furthermore, primordialists claim that nations are organic entities and that the world is inevitably divided into nations. As Canovan (1996:7) sums up “...the reason why a nation has the right to form a state and to call upon the allegiance of its members is that its existence and its historic destiny proceed from a natural order that is assumed to be the source of authoritative values". In general, primordialism is based on the idea that certain “...cultural attributes and formations possess a prior, overriding, and determining influence on people’s lives, one that is largely immune to rational interest and political calculation" (Smith 2000:5). In other words, as Brown (2000:6) summarises, “...primordialist approaches depict the nation as based upon a natural, organic community which defines the identity of its members, who feel an innate and emotionally powerful attachment to it”. Therefore the national attachment and identification is permanent, an individual is born into a nation and will always remain a member of this nation. It is a “community of fate”, not a “community of choice”, and its membership is expressed through the
principle of *jus sanguinis* whereby ethnic descent determined national membership (Kumar 2003:24). The nation is according to the primordialists more a spiritual entity, which binds its members together through myths of a common past and origin. Nationalism is seen as a state of mind, an idea and an attachment to the native territory and people. Kohn (1994:165) argues that the justification for nationalism in this case is found in traditional ties to *Volk* (kinship, the people) and status instead of the rational concepts of citizenship and contract. Dann (1996) points out that the term *Volk* in the German political literature is in relation to politics identical to the nation. In addition, *Volk* is also an ethnic term, which describes a population with a common language, culture, religion or history.

It is important to understand that in practice, both types of nation and nationalism are not as easily, some would say impossible, to separate. Smith (2000:18) shows that the difference between civic-territorial and ethnic-cultural nations is often reduced to a theoretical argument. Both forms represent ideal types that are usually considered not to exist in their pure form, but as mixtures where political and cultural factors support each other (Kumar 2003: 22).

Having highlighted some of the dominant issues commonly encountered in the theoretical debate, attention must now turn to the application of some of these theories to the development of nations and nationalism in England (and Britain as a whole) and Germany. For the purpose of the thesis, it will be assumed that, according to many historians, nationalism as an ideology and discourse became prevalent in Western Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century, although it did not emerge without antecedents (Hutchison and Smith 1994:5). The following country-specific discussion will therefore focus on the eighteenth to the twentieth century.
2.5 The development of nationalism and the nation state in Germany

The *Kulturnation*

In Germany, the national movement and the process of nation formation was faced with a number of difficulties (Dann 1996:45). Firstly, the Holy Roman Empire, which nominally held together a multiplicity of territorial states, did not have stable boundaries and included a large variety of other ethnic and linguistic groups. Thus the empire could not develop into the nation state of only one of these groups. Secondly, as explained in Chapter One, the territorial rulers were not interested in forming a national state as they had, by the seventeenth century, more or less successfully accumulated sovereignty in their own territories. Thirdly, from the sixteenth century onwards, the empire was religiously split, which further hindered both the formation of a unified nation and also the establishment of a national mass movement.

Despite these patterns of variety, by 1800, an educated minority existed which believed that "...for all the regional differences of dialect and culture, for all the variants of socioeconomic and political structure, there were common elements of a German culture which served to render the Germans a *Kulturnation*, a nation defined by its culture" (Fulbrook 1997:1). The reliance on an educated elite to promote a national consciousness is an example for the development of 'Eastern' ethno-cultural nationalism as explained above. In accordance with modernist theorists such as Anderson, this cultural nation was to a great extent made possible through the increase in German literature and its diffusion across the German speaking area creating a new linguistic-cultural community across the territorial boundaries. This cultural nation (*rechtsdeutsche Kulturgesellschaft*) has often been described as the embryo of the modern German nation. (Dann 1996:48). The German educated bourgeoisie, however, was despite their cultural-*national* orientation politically focused on the *territorial* state, which was partly due to the fact that any existing educational provision was provided at territorial or regional level. This led to a gap between political (fragmented) and cultural (national or Pan-German) identity, which is what James (1989:34) describes as "cultural unity and political diversity", which is diametrically opposite to the idea of many
modern pro-Europeans who favour "political unity and cultural diversity". Nevertheless, the idea of a cultural nation served German patriots in providing a sense of togetherness in times of political division (Berger 1997a:22).

Other preoccupations of the German intelligentsia included various strands of patriotism. The French and American Revolution stimulated an enlightened bourgeois patriotism, which found supporters such as Herder (1744-1803), who at first responded positively to the French Revolution, hailing it as the start of a new age of freedom (Whaley 1997:21). In 1784, he commented on nations that "...no greater injury can be inflicted on a nation than to be robbed of her national character, the peculiarity of her spirit and her language" (Modern History Sourcebook 1998a:1). At the same time, there was a strong conviction that a German revolution was unnecessary since conditions were better and many of the French ideals could be achieved by evolution rather than revolution (Whaley 1997:21). After 1792, with the advent of Robespierre’s reign of terror in France, the German patriots became increasingly disillusioned and resigned with regards to their own national destiny (Dann 1996:66). Therefore, by 1800, in addition to enlightened patriotism, a conservative imperial patriotism (Reichspatriotismus) developed, which was anti-modern, anti-revolutionary, anti-French and preoccupied with debates on imperial reform. It is important to note that patriotism in Germany was at that time a rather diffuse concept and not linked to a clear national geographical concept. It is equally important to remember that patriotism was limited to the elite. The majority of the population was organised into a hierarchy of social privilege, whereby mobility and literacy were limited to a small proportion of society. German Gymnasien at the time were characterised by their focus on Bildung, an emphasis on culture and humanist neo-classical ideals, which would directly inform the establishment of the Kulturation (Hahn 1998:15-17). Elementary education on the other hand was limited to producing loyal and obedient subjects and was unable to produce genuine socialisation (Hahn 1998:18). It is therefore deemed likely that the unprivileged masses thought predominantly along local or regional lines. To them, patriotism or the national idea remained remote and unimportant (Breuilly 1997:559-561).
The patriotic movement developed in close relation with the anti-Napoleonic resistance movement after the French invasion in 1792 and the French occupation until 1815. Traditionally, the birth of German nationalism has often been described as the most important feature of the Napoleonic occupation whereby the Wars of Liberation (1813-15) were regarded as the first collective action of the German nation (Whaley 1997:32). This, however, is a myth that was constructed, together with the myth of the French hereditary enemy (Erbfeind) and the glorification of the Volk, by later nationalists trying to give the German nation a romanticised common history. These Romanticists had a vision of a German identity rooted in folk, blood and soil, which was in stark contrast to classical-liberal models of nations and national states as political communities of equal citizens (Carter 1997:434-435). The Wars of Liberation, therefore, left an important legacy and provided the foundations for later nationalist ideology (Whaley 1997:35). As will become clear in this and subsequent chapters, war often provides an important stimulus for national development (or contributes to the development of national myths). In 1815, however, there was neither a coherent nationalist ideology nor a firm political orientation (Whaley 1997:32).

By 1815, some of the barriers to the emergence of fully sovereign states had been removed through secularisation, mediatisation and the dissolution of the empire in 1806 (Whaley 1997:35). As explained in Chapter One, after the War of Liberation a Deutscher Bund (German Confederation) was created on the 8 June 1813. At the time, a German nation state, usually thought of as a new empire, was only imagined by the educated elite (James 1989:38). The imperial idea was celebrated by these patriots in “...romantic depictions of mediaeval German greatness” (Breuilly 1997:559). The idea of a German cultural nation had survived the Napoleonic Wars. In the first half of the nineteenth century countless societies for the promotion of national art and culture were founded. The most important of these societies were the gymnast’s society (Tumverein) and student societies (Burschenschaften), most of which had a certain patriotic or national (Pan-German) orientation (Schauer 1996:23). These societies attempted to extend the elitist idea of a
Kulturation to interests with a broader appeal (Dijkink 1996:22). The cultural nation however was not necessarily linked to a political nation as attachments to the territorial states and dynasties remained strong (Clark 1997:44). In fact, in the nineteenth century, many territorial states such as Bavaria created their own regional myths and traditions thus “...inventing and sustaining a strong regional particularism, which would by no means be easily submerged in a united Germany” (Fulbrook 1992:103). Such territorial particularism has survived to some extent in many areas of modern Germany.

The Confederation itself was used by its member states to repress any liberal or national-political movements, whose significance it largely overrated (Breuilly 1997:559). As a result of the oppression, patriotic groups and the national movement decreased drastically. In fact, the reactionary politics of the Confederation were so efficient that most patriotic initiatives with a political agenda altogether ceased.

Nevertheless, the early 1830s were a time of acceleration of the national-patriotic movement in Germany (Dann 1996:111). From the 1830s an increasingly industrial society meant that the previous feudal society was gradually replaced by a class society (Fulbrook 1992:112-113). As explained by Kohn (1945), this process of social transformation had already taken place in other European countries such as Britain. The late development of the German middle class is due to a variety of reasons such as the backward nature of the German economy, the late industrialisation and the political particularism (Hahn 1995:143). In addition, Hahn (1995:143) claims that until the 1870s one must distinguish between the Bürger and the bourgeoisie. Bürger were associated with traditional lifestyle that is “...the life of small towns and cities, traditional crafts and trades and various posts at the many courts and universities” while the bourgeoisie emerged rapidly after 1850 and was allied with the big cities, industry and capitalism (Hahn 1995:143).

In the period from around 1830 to the 1848 Revolution, the reactionary conservatism of the Bürger dominated political opinion in Germany. Middle class protests were often centred on socio-economic issues, such as
hereditary and the impenetrable privileges of the nobility, rather than on political demands for a new national order. The emerging bourgeoisie for example mainly opposed the nobility because of their blocking influence on the economy, while the intelligentsia’s opposition was based on the aristocratic social privileges including exclusive access to high ranking official positions in the state and the military. The lack of co-operation between the different middle class factions considerably weakened the potential political power of liberalism (Schauer 1996:26).

Nevertheless, the gradual emergence of a class society meant that from the 1830s the opposition to the territorial states, to absolutism and to the political oppression spread from the societies to other parts of the population (Schauer 1996:24). Patriots started to elevate their hopes for citizenship and democracy to a national level, however elusive this idea might have been. Still, the patriotic opposition in the early 1830s rarely co-operated across territorial boundaries. In 1830 to 1833 protests broke out in nearly all Western European states. In Germany in 1832 some 30,000 people attended the Hambach Festival at which demands for a unified national Germany were made. One of the slogan of the festival was “Long live a free, united Germany.”5 The national movement, however, did not agree on a particular political programme, as another slogan from the Hambach festival illustrates: “Long live the united territorial states of Germany. Long live the confederate republican Europe!”.6 At the same time, in some territorial states such as Saxony and the Palatinate, protestors fought successfully for liberal if limited constitutions, although the Confederation quickly renewed the oppression of popular political meetings and associations (Fulbrook 1992:110).

By around 1840 elementary education had ceased to be a prerogative of the elite and even the lowest social classes were now able to read books and newspapers, which increasingly had a national orientation or contained references to German national culture. In addition, developments in

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5 “Es lebe das freie, das einige Deutschland” (Dann 1996:108)
6 “[...] dreimal hoch leben die vereinigten Freistaaten Deutschlands! Hoch, dreimal hoch das konföderierte republikanische Europal” (Dann 1996:109)
transportation (railways) and communications (telegraph) enabled a faster inter-regional exchange of ideas. The 1840s were also characterised by frequent social unrest, be it in the form of peasant insurrections and artisan riots, both rooted in economic problems or liberal pressures for political reform (Fulbrook 1992:117-118).

Following the revolutionary events in Paris in 1848, similar protests broke out in numerous German cities. The March movement in 1848 could be described as having the character of a national revolution as it achieved a pan-German dimension (Dann 1996:128), although any co-ordination of events was limited and often non-existent. In addition, the national movement and the political public sphere were characterised by factionalism, which was to influence greatly the future national development. For example, one of the main political groups were the conservatives who wished to maintain the old order. The bourgeois national-liberals on the other hand, favoured in general the creation of a constitutional national state combining a monarchy with liberal-democratic citizen rights. They hoped to reform the existing system in co-operation with the ruling classes. Thirdly, the democratic movement called for popular sovereignty in a parliamentary and republican national state. In addition, there was a Catholic movement favouring a federal national state along the lines of the former Holy Roman Empire, and a worker’s movement which hoped to gain social and political emancipation from a national state.

During the course of the 1848 revolution, liberal regimes and constitutions were established in many German states. At the national level, in May 1848 a National Assembly (Nationalversammlung), which had been elected by a rather restricted suffrage, opened in Frankfurt (Fulbrook 1992:119). The main task of the National Assembly was to work out a constitution for a new nation state and, until the national state was operative, to act as sovereign. As explained earlier, the latter was a lost cause, as the National Assembly had no real political power and did not have the support of the leading territorial rulers, who in the course of 1848-49 managed to regain control in their territories.
The deliberations of the National Assembly concerning a new constitution were prolonged until 1849. The questions regarding the choice of sovereign and the geographical borders of the new nation state were particularly difficult to resolve. When Austria boycotted the National Assembly, it eventually decided in favour of a small-German solution (*Kleindeutsche Lösung*) and offered the Imperial crown to the Prussian king, who, as noted in Chapter One, subsequently declined. The reasons for the failure of the national project were varied and included the unwillingness of territorial rulers to subsume their sovereignty to a national state, the lack of power of the liberal movement and a lack of popular support (Fulbrook 1992:122). For the majority of Germans, to whom practical issues such as social, economic or rural reforms were most important, the national issue had lost its allure during 1848 (Breuilly 1997:563). On the other hand, some progress had been achieved. Rural feudal relationships, effectively abolished everywhere by 1850, did not return and neither did the pre-revolution system of political oppression (Fulbrook 1992:122). In 1850, the German Confederation was re-established and the participants of the 1848 revolution were left in general political confusion (Dann 1996:141).

National unity and nation formation

The 1850s and 1860s were characterised by the continuing shift in focus, not only from the territorial to the national level, but also to economic integration between territorial states (Dijkink 1996:22). The national movement re-emerged in the 1850s when it came to rely on a wide network of cultural movements (Breuilly 1997:565). In 1859 the German National Association (*Deutscher Nationalverein*) was founded as German societies increasingly organised themselves under national umbrella organisations. Altogether the national movement of the 1860s was better organised and more self-conscious. It was also politically more realistic in its aims and targets. As James (1989:61) puts it, the national movement “...was no longer a strong national awakening, but rather a more sober tale of institutional arrangements designed to promote prosperity”. *Realpolitik* and economic determinism replaced to a great extent the idealism of earlier decades.
The national movement, however, was in 1871 neither the cause nor the facilitator of German unification and nation state formation. This must be attributed to Prussian expansionism and rivalry with Austria (Fulbrook 1992:126). The Prussian Prime Minster Otto von Bismarck is traditionally described as the architect of German unification, although there must be some doubt as to whether he followed a predetermined strategy or made, at least at times, good use of favourable circumstances. Bismarck’s conservative political position was distanced from the national movement, patriotism and democracy. His target can be described as securing unlimited political power for the Prussian monarchy and oppose any form of popular sovereignty (Schauer 1996:32). Prussian dominance was achieved through three successful wars, in 1864 with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein, in 1866 with Austria and in 1870-71 with France (Fulbrook 1992:127). As Chapter One pointed out, the Prussian success, especially in the war with Austria, has sometimes been attributed to the “...superiority of Prussian schoolmasters” (Hahn 1998:30). Therefore, it could be said that both war and education played a decisive role in German unification as well as, perhaps more indirectly, national development.

The Austro-Prussian War removed the dualism between Prussia and Austria, which had been one of the most important barriers to a German nation state, since Austria, as part of the peace settlement, had to withdraw from any further intervention in German affairs (Dann 1996:157). All states formerly allied with Austria, including Hanover and Saxony, were annexed by Prussia, considerably increasing her power and geographical area. The Franco-Prussian war caused a revival of national patriotism utilising the myth of the French Erbeind. The creation of the German Empire in 1871, however, was not an expression of national enthusiasm, but in effect a contract between the North German confederation and the south German states as a result of the Prussian Realpolitik (Dijkink 1996:22). Breuilly (1997:566) claims that there was indeed no question that in reality the new empire was simply a greater Prussia.
James (1989:88) points out that the German Reich was the result of a double compromise. First between a constitutional state and an autocracy, and secondly between nationalism and dynasticism. There was a somewhat uneasy mix of dynastic and national values embodied in the adoption of national symbols that were a compromise of Prussian and German attributes (Breuilly 1997:566). Politically, the Reich was not a national state but a federation of territorial rulers, where the principle of popular sovereignty was not realised. Not surprisingly, education in the empire continued to be essentially "...an instrument for the education of subjects, not citizens ... [whereby] secular Protestant virtues such as diligence, industriousness and discipline were judged of paramount importance" (Hahn 1998:30).

The conceptions of what national identity meant were diffuse and varied. As Dijkink (1996:24) asserts, the "...German state might have been created, but it appeared to possess no unity or soul [...]". Liberalism, which after 1848 had pursued primarily the aim of nation state formation, lost with the foundation of the Reich much of its left wing appeal and raison d'être. After 1871, there was a certain turning away from activist liberal nationalism in favour of monarchical and authoritarian nationalism (Breuilly 1997:567). Nationalism, which had once been a "...progressive force aimed at sweeping away the old regime and furthering the cause of constitutional liberties, [...] was now conservative and bent on maintaining the status quo [...]" (Kitchen 2006:128).

One of the issues dominating the contemporary nationalist debate was the question whether the nation should be a civic nation (Staatsnation) or an ethno-cultural nation (Volksnation). As James (1989:89) points out, 7% of the population within the Reich did not speak German while many German speakers now lived outside its political borders. Therefore the creation of an ethnically homogenous Volksnation was somewhat unrealistic, but nevertheless remained the aim of many nationalists. Dann (1996:205) asserts that the 1870s were the commencement of the era of ethnic-national thinking (volksnationales Denken). Dijkink (1996:22) agrees that the period after 1871 was to some extent characterised by an emphasis on German cultural and
intellectual superiority, fostered by the German preoccupation with Bildung, that was soon fed by actual economic superiority as the empire’s industrial output and production rose.

The Reich was turning into being the principal creator of the national idea, rather than being its product (Breuilly 1997:570). As already indicated, a common German culture was promoted through mass education, but also through the mass media, while the enforcement of German as a language of state became more rigorous. For example, in 1885 Germany expelled Polish-speaking Russian and Austrian citizens from West Prussia (James 1989:89-90). The increasing ethno-cultural orientation was expressed in the 1913 Citizenship Law that used the principle of *jus sanguinis*, which made German citizenship a matter of inheritance (Breuilly 1997:570).

In the final years of the nineteenth century, the awareness of the incompleteness of the nation state and the nation itself gave rise to a new wave of national initiatives and movements among some parts of the population. It came to a development of both democratic and anti-democratic nationalism. Dijkink (1996:25) points out that at the turn of the century cosmopolitan thinking was mixed with xenophobic nationalism, a sense of inferiority contrasted by megalomania. In case of the right wing anti-democratic nationalism, 'German' was not any longer used as a term for national integration, but of ethnic limitation. The 'Germaness' of nationality was aggressively promoted by some nationalist groups (James 1989:90). Part of this movement were the antisemitic parties and societies such as the German Anti-Semitic Society (*Deutsche Antisemitische Vereinigung*) which was founded in 1886. These societies expressed a greater German connection (*grossdeutsche Verbundenheit*), especially with Austria, which was increasingly understood as a blood community (*Blutgemeinschaft*) (Dann 1996:201). In 1893 the All-German Society (*Alldeutscher Verband*) was founded, a propagandistic society of the new nationalism. It not only had a national orientation, but promoted the creation of a German *Volkstum* (Dann 1996:203), which was understood as an ethno-cultural community. *Völkisch* came to denote some kind of naturalness and purity and was used to
measure the quality of nationalist ideas (Dijkink 1996:22). Organisations like these were by no means mass societies, but still had an influence on the population as a whole (James 1989:90-91).

Furthermore, the idea of the cultural nation proved useful for the propagation of an aggressive foreign policy as the cultural nation nearly always extended well beyond the political nation (Berger 1997a:22). By the time the First World War broke out in 1914, the "...national idea and its identification with the interests of the Reich had become an end in itself for many Germans" (Breuilly 1997:571). Nevertheless, Imperial Germany was by no means a united nation. It remained dominated by elites, lacked democratisation and the successful incorporation of the working classes in a rapidly industrialising society. Internally, no balance was struck between the interests of different parts of society (Fulbrook 1992: 154).

The rise and decline of the national idea in the twentieth century

The post-war successor of the Second Reich was the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). While the unification of 1871 had not managed to create a strong sense of German nationality, the experience of the First World War strengthened the sense of belonging to a national community among the population (Breuilly 1997:572). It was the unprecedented scale and destruction of the Great War that not only prompted political upheaval, but also national re-orientation. The adoption of a unitary constitution and of national symbols was made easier after the removal of the dynasties and the territorial rulers, not to mention the Imperial Crown (Breuilly 1997:572). In the Weimar Republic, the growth of a mass culture, enhanced through new media such as film and radio as well as mass consumption, added to the national experience of the war and helped to form what was in many ways "...Germany's first 'real' nation state and national society" (Breuilly 1997:572).

State and society, however, were much divided and there were some reactions, largely from middle class sections, against modernism and mass culture (Harvey 1997:291). As Breuilly (1997:572) states "...Weimar [...] demonstrates vividly that a common, even intense, sense of nationality does
not itself produce unity”. In addition, the national self-image had been damaged by the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, which was resented by many (especially on the right) who considered the treaty as an act of national humiliation (Stephenson 1997:315).

**The Third Reich**

In 1933 the National Socialists (NSDAP) came to power. National Socialism was as such nothing new but drew from an amalgam of nationalist ideas especially the *völkisch* ideology as well as ideas of racial, national and cultural superiority (Breuilly 1997:573). The proposed *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community) appealed to those wishing to overcome the divisions within German society and the paralysis of government as well as those longing for a stronger Germany freed from the “Versailles shackles” (Bessel 1997:256). To them, Hitler offered hopes for “national redemption” (Kershaw 1997:322). In order to achieve the *Volksgemeinschaft*, institutions embodying social divisions, such as trade unions, parties or the language of class, were forbidden (Breuilly 1997:575). The National Socialists made extensive use of indoctrination through propaganda, the mass media, education and the creation of hierarchical organisations such as the Hitler Youth. Society was thoroughly put through a process of Nazification (Kershaw 1997:324). The school curriculum promoted the idea of German superiority, which was linked with imperialism to satisfy ideological demands for *Lebensraum* and to secure Germany the dominant position that Hitler felt should be accorded to her. Ideas of racial purity combined with xenophobia and anti-Semitism eventually led to the exploitation of ‘inferiors’ and even to genocide. It should be noted though that the National Socialists only converted a minority to its extreme racial and imperialist version of ethnic nationalism (Breuilly 1997:576). To keep the masses in line, the government had to rely largely on the already mentioned methods of indoctrination as well as on coercion.

**Post-war partition and unification**

The Second World War had an unprecedented impact on German national identity, resulting in a radical political re-education and national re-invention. As previously pointed out, war is often the catalyst for political change and
stimulus for national development, which was never more true than in the case of post-1945 Germany. After the war, German unity ended with partition and the establishment of the West German Federal Republic and the East German Democratic Republic. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the nation was constituted of the German citizens, whereby German citizenship continued to be based on descent as prescribed by the 1913 Citizenship Law (Breuilly 1997:577). Although both post-war German states rejected the idea of völkisch national identity, it nevertheless continued to shape "...popular conceptions of national belonging and citizenship" (Carter 1997:434). Citizenship therefore continued to have an explicit ethnic component whereby a person usually can claim German citizenship if a parent is a German citizen, irrespective of place of birth (Rose 1996:79). The national idea, however, was to be thoroughly based on Western values while the sovereign nation state as the object of loyalty and identity was undermined internally by a stress on federalism and externally by integration into supranational institutions such as the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Breuilly 1997:578). Hope of reunification, however, was never completely abandoned by either of the two German states (Dijkink 1996:30), although in the West German foreign policy conception, unification had to be closely linked to continued European integration (Roseman 1997:382). As Chapter Six will show, the political and national commitment to European integration is also reflected in the school curriculum, which embraces the national re-invention as a European state.

German common national identity and common heritage had been fractured in the course of the post-war division by extensive differences in relation to social class, cultural attitudes and patterns of behaviour making ‘Ossies' and ‘Wessies’ quite different social beings (Fulbrook 1997:430). However, in the event, German unification had as much to do with liberal-democratic values as with national ideas (Breuilly 1997:581). Die Wende (Change) in 1989 reasserted the importance of concepts such as Volk and nation for German identity as the people participating in the mass demonstrations used the slogans ‘we are the people' (Wir sind das Volk) and increasingly ‘we are one people' (Wir sind ein Volk) (Carter 197:451).
Following unification, Germany was eager to demonstrate its commitment to Western liberal democratic values and European integration. In January 2000 Germany introduced a new citizenship and nationality law in harmonisation with European standards. The new law changes the principle of descent (jus sanguinis) to enable the acquisition of German citizenship as the result of being born in Germany (jus soli). The new citizenship and nationality law offers a shorter mandatory waiting period for naturalisation. According to the German government (http://www.german-embassy.org.uk, accessed 2 June 2004), “…children who are born in Germany to foreign nationals will receive German citizenship when one of the respective child’s parents has resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and holds entitlement to residence or has had an unlimited residence permit for at least three years”. Under the new law, such children will be given at birth both the German citizenship and in most cases also their parents’ citizenship. However, these children will then have to decide before their twenty-third birthday which citizenship and nationality they wish to retain. Although exceptions are made, in general once the person has declared to keep either the German or the foreign citizenship, the other will be lost (http://www.german-embassy.org.uk, accessed 2 June 2004). This reluctance to allow dual citizenship and the restrictive policies dealing with the naturalisation of immigrants illustrate a lingering conception of citizenship as a matter of culture and descent rather than legal rights (Breuilly 1997:579).

The experiences of the Third Reich and the Second World War had a profound impact on German nationalism by not only discrediting the “…racial versions of the national idea but the national idea per se” (Breuilly 1997:576). The German post-war assessment of the past relied heavily on the idea of a German Sonderweg (Dijkink 1996:33). In the nineteenth century, the German development of a Kultnation in the absence of a nation state had been regarded as a unique and superior phenomenon. After 1945, this Sonderweg was considered a pathological deviation from the ‘normal’ development, while the Western Alliance was perceived to be the only remedy to prevent a renewed Sonderweg and its excesses (Dijkink 1996:33).
Recently, theorists have started to dismiss the Sonderweg theory with the argument that ‘normal’ national or historic developments do not exist (Berger 1997b:488-489). It might also be the case that the nationalist perspective may become more "...widely accepted, on account of the logic of some of its arguments and the inevitable erosion of the legacy of the Second World War" (Dijkink 1996:34). Dijkink (1996:34) claims that the post-war German concept of constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus) in place of national patriotism may be insufficient to create a sense of meaning and belonging. At the moment, the future of the German national idea is undecided; there could either be a revival, as Dijkink (1996) suggests, or a continuation of the post war trend of national decline in favour of supranational as well as regional identities. There are a number of political theorists who argue that nationalism and the nation state are nineteenth century relics that will eventually be superseded by a post-national order where either regional or supranational affiliations (or a combination of both) will replace or substitute national ideas. The possibilities of a supranational identity in relation to national identity will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Five.

2.6 The development of nationalism and the nation state in England and Britain

According to Smith (2000:36) "...it is, nevertheless, the English case that has stirred the greatest controversy". The controversy he refers to relates to the origins of the English nation and nationalism on the one hand and the transition after 1707 from English to British nationalism on the other. The following brief outline of the development of the English and subsequently British nation will focus on these two issues. As the discussion is limited, some aspects, such as the development of Scottish, Irish or Welsh nationalism, had to be omitted.

7 1707 Act of Union joining Scotland with England and Wales
The early nation
There is an abundance of theories regarding the history of the English and, after 1707, British nation. Many authors agree that the development of the English nation was a key event in the history of nations, as England is often described as a prototype of the nation. For most historians, according to Smith (2000:36) "...an English national sentiment (as opposed to a later British sentiment) can be found no earlier than the very end of the sixteenth century". As Greenfeld (1994:167) puts it, "...the original modern idea of the nation emerged in sixteenth century England, which was the first nation in the world (and the only one with the possible exception of Holland), for about two hundred years".

Some perennialists, however, trace the origin of the English nation to even earlier periods. Hastings (1997) for example argues that English national development preceded every other and thus established the very nature of the nation. His controversial theory states that the English nation state survived the Norman invasion in 1066 and grew fairly steadily in strength in the twelfth and thirteenth century. It then emerged still more vociferously by the end of the fourteenth century following a vernacular literary renaissance and the pressures of the Hundred Year War with France, then part of the Anglo-Norman kingdom (Hastings 1997:4-5). England provided the lead with regard to the establishment of a strong central state, the growth of parliamentary government, the emergence of a powerful capital city, the formation of political parties, the emergence of an industrial society and an effective press (Hastings 1997:6). In his theory, the fourteenth century is the "...very latest point at which it is plausible to claim that the nation state had gelled so decisively that no imaginable circumstance could later have diverted English society into some quite other form" (Hastings 1997:51).

Hastings believes that in the fourteenth century the concept of 'nation' was widely used in a sense that was in all important aspects identical to its modern usage. The frequency with which the term 'nation' was used suggests a basis of experience; the English felt themselves to be a nation (Hastings 1997:15). Smith (2005:5) agrees and argues that, although it is debatable
when a distinct English national identity was established, by the fourteenth century the expansion of the already existing embryonic nation state was evident, as English was elevated to court language and London was established as the state capital.

Seton-Watson (1977) also agrees that a nation state emerged earlier in England than in continental Western Europe, but contrary to Hastings he locates the start of its development in the fifteenth century and stresses that this was the development of a modern nation, which was somewhat different to the mediaeval 'natio' (Seton-Watson 1977:17). As discussed earlier, in Tudor England a strong absolutist state developed. The impact of state membership for the development of early 'proto-nationalism' was so strong that in the case of Tudor England "...something close to modern patriotism" could emerge (Hobsbawm 1990:75). In addition, it would seem that there was a link or influence between developments in France and England. As Seton-Watson (1977:21) claims "...the formation of the national consciousness of each of these two is insolubly connected [...]". In his opinion one can hardly speak of the English or French nation before the thirteenth century, only of two French speaking monarchs, one in Paris and one in London.

According to Seton-Watson (1977:25) the formation of modern English took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth century and was of crucial importance to the development of the English national sentiment. Haseler (1996:13) agrees and claims that the English language made its breakthrough when it became the official language of the government in 1362. The emergence of a standardised and increasingly popular English, which was in fact a new language, was crucial for the development of an English consciousness (Haseler 1996:14). Therefore Seton-Watson (1977:26) concludes (contrary to Hastings), that an English nation could not have developed before the fourteenth century at the earliest. In any case, it is of equal importance that pride in the comparatively early development of the English nation has substantially contributed to English national identity.
Tudor Protestantism and national sentiment

In England the development of the vernacular was closely linked to the development of Protestantism. Henry VIII disseminated his popular brand of Protestantism through material printed in the vernacular (Schulze 1995:118). The mass production of such material was made possible and was fostered by the first translation of the Bible in the fourteenth and the introduction of the printing press in the fifteenth century (Schulze 1995:118). As a result, Schulze (1995:117) states that a relatively compact and homogenous English speaking community emerged, although dialects prevailed, especially in rural and remote areas.

It is often argued that religion was one of the most enduring elements in English national sentiment. According to Smith (2005:7) the massive Puritan reinforcement of a pre-existing national identity had its strongest effects in England, leading by the time of the English Revolution to the widespread assumption that the English were 'God's chosen people'. The Elizabethan English national pride was therefore characterised by ideas of an elect nation, which served as a strong Protestant ideology in defence against the continental European Catholic powers. Protestantism, combined with a distinct national church, thus gave power to English national identity and provided a “...potent rationale for subsequent British foreign policies [...] and for the later maritime expansion” (Smith 2005:8).

Haseler (1996:14) agrees and states that the Reformation in the sixteenth century was a seminal event in English nation state building and not just in relation to language. He argues that the Reformation led to an incremental growth of English national sensibility, at least among the educated and politically active classes, that was caused by the perception of separateness of England from the continental religious system. Hastings (1997:55) claims that the break with Rome, the secularisation and the shift to Protestantism brought a change in intensity of national development. Events such as the Spanish War and the Gunpowder Plot “...combined to heat up English nationalism from the middle of Elizabeth’s reign while reshaping it as a thoroughly militant and Protestant force [...]” (Hastings 1997:55). This
change to Protestant nationalism, which dominated the English national sentiment from the Reformation until the eighteenth century, must be viewed, according to Hastings (1997:59), as a re-direction of a long pre-existing sentiment and also as a reorientation which took time to be assimilated by the nation at large. Therefore it could be argued that late Elizabethan society was already becoming a genuinely national society (Hastings 1997:35). Many historians claim that by the end of Elizabeth's reign the nation formation process in England was virtually complete (Seton-Watson 1977:20).

National integration proceeded hand in hand with political integration and centralisation of the state as discussed in Chapter One. In the fifteenth century the Tudor dynasty established a stable political order in England after the War of the Roses (Schulze 1995:123). Smith (2005:7) claims that the Tudor drive for a strong centralised state, reliant on its naval power and warfare, set England apart and ahead of other countries on the continent. The king was becoming the ruler of the entire English nation and not only of the aristocracy. The crown had therefore acquired a symbolic national potency (Schulze 1995:124). Together, crown and parliament formed the English nation state and through these institutions the idea of the nation became a palpable reality (Schulze 1995:124).

Besides possession of a common language, religion and a centralised monarchy, it was a belief in a common decent and deeds that characterised the English nation (Schulze 1995:120). Social mobility was greater than elsewhere in Europe, which allowed the educated classes to share a common culture. By the end of the Tudor era, the nation had replaced the feudal medieval structure as Seton-Watson (1977:30) explains: "...for hundreds of thousands, if not perhaps yet for all, subjects of the crown loyalty was now given not only to feudal superior, or church, or distant sovereign, but to the nation: the links which bound the population together were not only vertical but also horizontal". Schauer (1996:105) agrees and believes that all social groups in England were conscious of certain basic ideologies. They felt united through their consciousness of common rights and freedoms and the idea of being a member of a Protestant nation. It is important to note at this point that
large parts of the population, mainly women, the working class and men without property, Catholics and those living in areas and towns without parliamentary representation were excluded from the (politically active) nation. As explained in Chapter One, Parliament itself was rather a virtual then a direct representation and had limited political power until the seventeenth century.

Nevertheless, in contrast to early nineteenth century German patriots, English patriotic sentiments in the sixteenth century had no immediate need to rely on myths or a vision of national unity. Instead, patriotic sentiments could be "...bodied forth in a self-confident account of the country's political institutions" (Schulze 1995:125) not unlike modern English national identity. National membership in Elizabethan England was based on a cultural 'us-awareness' that depended on common language, historical prototypes, religion and a notion of what England was and what it was meant to be (Schulze 1995:122).

**Englishness and Britishness**

As Colley (1992) points out, the emergence of a British national sentiment in the eighteenth century was closely bound to Protestantism, war with France and the acquisition of the empire. The emergence of a British identity was a consequence of the foundation of the United Kingdom in 1707. A common British identity, however, was not the result of integration and homogenisation, but instead was superimposed over existing loyalties as a response to the conflict with France and a desire to unify Scotland, England and Wales in a United Kingdom state. Again, this stresses the importance of war as an important incentive for national development, in this case a government-sponsored response to the need for patriotic British soldiers. However, as Colls (2002:34) points out, the new British Union did not try to eradicate its constituent nationalities. The result was that the English, Welsh and Scottish nationalities were "strangely non-political" as they did not have a nation state to focus their separate ambitions (Colls 2002:34). Nevertheless, these "...national feelings, not British ones, [...] provided the heart and soul of identity "(Colls 2002:43).
According to Colley (1992:5), Britain was essentially an "invented nation". Britain in 1707 resembled a patchwork of uncertain areas of Englishness, Scottishness and Welshness, cut across by strong regional and local attachments (Colley 1992:17). Only by the end of the eighteenth century better transport and greater supply of mass-produced goods as well as English-language books and newspapers began to reduce the peculiarities across the United Kingdom (Colley 1992:14). The easy access to print (freeing of the printing presses in 1695) played a vital part in the conviction that Protestant Britons were especially privileged, although large parts of the population remained illiterate and British newspapers did not become national organs until the late nineteenth century (Colls 2002:58). Other factors that helped promote national sentiment and feelings of being privileged included an absence of famine, freedom of trade, the high rate of urban expansion and a geographical mobility of the population (Colley 1992:37). A sense of Britishness, however, also developed because the British, at least the educated elite, believed themselves to be different in political terms, particularly in comparison to the French. Parliament was seen in the eighteenth and nineteenth century as the prerogative of a free and Protestant British people (Colley 1992:50). 'Being British' was not as such an ethnic sentiment, but could be described as "...the nearest the United Kingdom got to a concept of citizenship" (Colls 2002:43).

It has often been claimed that since 1707 the new addition of Britishness has been harnessed to the English core (Smith 1999:71). As Hastings points out (1997:64), 'British' was for the English just an additional label, whereby English and British identity remained largely synonymous. England dominated Great Britain, both politically and demographically since, by 1900, three quarters of people in Britain were English (Feldman 1994:127). On the other hand, for the Welsh and Scottish, British identity was an additional and often opposing identity while their own national identities provoked powerful emotional attachments (Colls 2002:43). Seton-Watson (1977:34) argues that English national consciousness merged into a British national consciousness, which the English tended to appropriate to themselves. Although many Scots and Welsh also acquired a British
consciousness, the majority continued to have a predominant Scottish or Welsh identity. In addition to the Welsh and Scottish national consciousness, there was also Scottish and Welsh nationalism, which emerged in defence of regional identity or even to seek independence. An expression of this can be found in twentieth century devolution, which will be discussed further on.

Haseler (1996:30) takes the argument a step further and points out that ‘Greater England’, instead of Great Britain, would have been a better term for the new state. According to his theory, the English aristocracy built the new state based on the constitution of 1688, as the 1707 Act of Union was not accompanied by a new constitution. London remained the capital while Englishness was the only contender to be the leading culture. English landowners dominated the aristocracy, while the Celtic aristocracy was simply absorbed into the ruling class as they adopted the lifestyle of Englishness. The empire also helped to reconcile a majority of the Celtic aristocracy to England and Britain (Haseler 1996:32). Yet, as Colls (2002:42) points out, although the English dominated the Union, they were not interested enough “...in turning Celts into little Englanders”.

The Jacobite revolt in the 1740s was a reminder of the constant threats to Protestant Britishness and prompted fears about Britain’s security (Colley 1992:p.86). Charles Edward Stuart had landed in the Hebrides in 1745 and penetrated into England as far south as Derby by the end of 1745 (Colley 1992:80). The Stuart threat effectively ended with the defeat of the rebel army at the Battle of Culloden in April 1746 and with the retreat of Charles Stuart to France. Although short-lived, the Jacobite revolt had some long-lasting consequences. Many patriots such as John Brown (1757) argued that the real danger was not posed by the Jacobites or France, but by Britain’s own moral internal corruption and lack of cohesion and public spirit (Colley 1992:87). The idea of the necessity of British regeneration led to the foundation of mostly urban patriotic societies such as the Laudable Association of Anti-Gallicans in 1745 (Colley 1992:88). A recurrent point of attack was the aristocratic passion for French manufactured goods and language (Colley 1992:90). As Haseler (1996:15) points out, in the eighteenth century, the English nobility was still
seriously imbued with French cultural and intellectual influences, which were now branded as un-patriotic. Efforts were undertaken to promote British produce and to replace the French influence. For example, the Society of Arts was showing the first large public exhibition of British art in London in 1761 (Colley 1992:91). Colley (1992:94) explains that the societies suggested by the way they were organised that willingness to participate, and not rank or property, made out the true Briton. Participation in patriotic societies was, however, limited and a prerogative of the middle and upper classes. Nevertheless, many societies had female subscribers and the Society of Art's prizes were open to both women and the poor.

After 1789, the nobility largely put French habits aside, as they feared that they might meet with the same destiny as the French aristocracy (Haseler 1996:23). Instead, in fear of patriotic protests, the nobility turned towards British patriotism and nationalism. Therefore, it has been argued that at the end of the eighteenth and the start of the nineteenth century a genuinely British ruling group emerged. As with the German Kulturnation, British aristocratic culture and lifestyle became a British national lifestyle, for example aristocratic objects of art in privately owned houses became part of the national heritage (Colley 1992:179). In turn, the aristocracy's lifestyle, their cult of heroism and morality, became ideals of Britishness (Colley 1992:192). Similarly, Haseler (1996:18) argues that Englishness (used in the sense of Britishness) was built on the pre-industrial trinity of race, class and land. In the eighteenth century, the landed elite fused land and class in a manner that created the peculiar character of the English class system and became a pronounced part of the cult of Britishness at the heart of which was the idea of the British gentlemen based on the lifestyle of the landed gentry (Haseler 1996:19). Land, class and race meant in this sense familiarity and tradition (Haseler 1996:20).

Redefining the nation
In the 1820s and 1830s, after the Napoleonic Wars, economic regression, high levels of unemployment and the demobilisation of hundreds of thousand of men led to social unrest. Not only the economic situation accounted for the
discontent, but also a general loss in direction (Colley 1992:322). Since 1689 there had been a succession of wars with France, which made it possible for the British as a whole to share fear or aggression against the common enemy and against Catholicism. The wars had united the British against a common enemy, thus providing an important focus of the national identity. After the Napoleonic Wars, the British had to look for different ways of re-defining themselves whereby a number of campaigns and movements played an important role (Colley 1992:322-324).

First, there was a movement for change in the electoral franchise. During the Napoleonic Wars, the government utilised patriotism and nationalism for propaganda to mobilise popular support (Dunkerley et al 2002:27). The male population had been treated equally as patriots when they were enlisted to defend the country. After the war, there was some resentment that the previous egalitarian treatment was not continued and expressed in equal representation in Parliament. This resentment led to mounting nationwide pressures to change the franchise to include all working men. To put it simply, consequences of war contributed significantly to political and national change. The reform campaigns, initiated by a range of political groups, used mass open-air meetings and petitions for their cause, extensively relying on patriotic language (Colley 1992:342).

At the same time there were problems arising from Ireland’s incorporation into the United Kingdom in 1800, mainly in relation to the extension of full citizenship to the Irish Catholics without making similar concessions for the Catholics in England, Wales and Scotland. Many believed that the Catholic emancipation should ideally take place without making concessions to the traditional Protestant identity, which was one of the central foundations of Britishness. The issue was finally settled in the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act. The argument put forward was that the intolerance of the sixteenth century towards Catholics was now inappropriate for an empire of this size and power (Colley 1992:328). By 1815, the British Empire included a fifth of the world’s population. The inclusion of the non-British masses in the
British nation is another frequently debated issue, especially after the decolonisation in the twentieth century as discussed later on.

In the early and mid nineteenth century, romanticised interpretations of English and British history, based on myths of ancestry and descent similar to German Romanticism, gained a wide following. The essence of English Romanticism was the cult of imagination (Colls 2002:61). There was a presence of a strong English or British ethnic identity, based on the study of origins in archaeology and so forth (Smith 1999:72). Racism had a considerable following in late nineteenth century in Britain, but the liberal idea of self-government, an integral part of English and British national consciousness, tended to preclude the ethno-racist nationalism found in Germany at the time (Smith 1999:72). Instead, nostalgic references to the peaceful Glorious Revolution 1688, the gradual growth of representative government and the origins of parliament were made (Smith 1999:72).

At the same time, developments in education, as discussed in Chapter One, and the mass press brought the idea of national identity to more and more people. From the 1870s, the school boards ensured that most of the population had basic levels of literacy while the railway brought most cities in Britain within a day's journey to London after 1850s (Colls 2002:38). By the end of the nineteenth century, after the extension of the state through the Reform Acts, the middle classes “...had come to see themselves as the political nation” (Colls 2002:307). The political nation was further extended in the twentieth century as both the franchise and the education system became more inclusive.

The twentieth century
As in Germany at the turn of the century, groups and societies with a patriotic outlook, such as the National Service League, the Tariff Reform League or the Navy League, were popular in Britain (Feldman 1994:132). One of the effects of such societies was the association of patriotism with imperialism (Feldman 1994:133). This imperial patriotism presented the British monarchy as the core, not only of the United Kingdom, but also of the empire (Feldman
The link between empire, monarchy and imperial patriotism was promoted and brought to the masses through theatre plays, music, the cinema as well as popular postcards and imagines of the colonies (Feldman 1994:136). Apart from this conservative imperial patriotism, other variants of patriotism found supporters, such as "...the patriotism of free trade and liberty" (Feldman 1994:138).

By the 1930s the mass media had gained immense potential to represent the nation and was used extensively during the Second World War for propaganda, which incorporated national language, myths and imagery (Colls 2002:39). By the end of the Second World War, the British state and nation was more united than ever before (Colls 2002:64). The war had a decisive impact on national identity, creating widespread feelings of belonging and togetherness, united against the common enemy, united in the common effort and united in common experiences such as the bomb raids, conscription and general hardship. The war in general, however, had, unlike in Germany, a positive impact on national identity and has subsequently been successfully incorporated into the national myth. The experience of the war and victory in 1945 are frequently used for invocations of sentimental-nostalgic national pride, especially in relation to continental Europe and the EU. Chapters Five will further investigate the continued importance of the war especially with regards to national and European identity.

Another form of identification in Britain relates to class. Schöpflin (2000:318) argues that most modern states are defined, more or less explicitly in ethnic terms. England (or Britain), however, could be described as a rare exception where ethnicity is subordinated to class, which has helped to make British identity comparatively open to foreigners such as migrants. Although immigration took place before and throughout the twentieth century, its potential impact on national culture became a dominant feature of political debate after the Second World War as part of the dissolution of the empire.

In fact, it has been claimed that one of the most important post-war developments in relation to the nation was decolonisation, which also
introduced the idea of a multiethnic Britain in its wake (Colls 2002:143). The 1948 Nationality Act "...tried to render those who had formerly lived in the Empire, on settlement, full citizens of Britain" (Colls 2002:160). In 1962 the Commonwealth Immigrants Act established entry categories and the use of work vouchers, while the 1971 Immigration Act effectively ended primary non-white immigration through a patriarchy clause (Kushner 1994:417). In contrast to German citizenship laws, the British Nationality Act in 1981 abandoned the *jus soli* concept in favour of moves towards *jus sanguinis*, however, without defining what constitutes a British national (Colls 2002:160-161). Immigration was now effectively restricted to those whose parents were either British or settled in Britain while 'British' citizens with no family in Britain and who were not born in Britain were not allowed to settle (Budge et al 2001:654). These measures have been criticised by some as signs of "insular English nationalism" (Kushner 1994:423).

Finally we need to note that in addition, throughout the twentieth century, there were growing demands in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales for more political and national independence from the centre, which eventually led to the devolution process as discussed in the previous chapter. As Feldman (1994:127) points out, the United Kingdom, despite the English dominance, remained a multinational state.

2.7 Conclusion

National identity and nationalism are much debated concepts, not only in relation to their nature and categorisation, but also with regards to their origin. The development of English (or British) and German national identity has been quite different and was intrinsically linked to the political development, as this and the previous chapter have demonstrated. This chapter has shown how, in England, the comparatively early development of the political parliamentary system combined with economic factors (such as commerce, the overseas empire and the early industrialisation) have resulted in the development of a national identity largely based on civic values combined with a strong Protestant belief in England as the 'chosen nation'. After 1707,
English national identity proceeded to dominate British national identity. Although gradual changes and adjustments have occurred, modern English (and British) national identity continues to be associated with civic values (such as parliamentary sovereignty and liberal rights). In fact, the longevity of these institutions and values per se has now become an integral part of the national myth and national identity.

In comparison, national identity in Germany was at least until the nineteenth century an elite concept, which focused almost entirely on cultural aspects until the creation of a German state in 1871. Even then, national identity continued to be associated with ethno-cultural concepts, pseudo-historical national myths and notions of the German Volk as expressed in the respective citizenship laws. Unlike in Britain, where citizenship was based on the principle of *jus soli*, in Germany citizenship and therefore nationality was based on *jus sanguinis*. Only recently, following an EU recommendation, Germany has amended the law to incorporate aspects of *jus soli*, while Britain has started to move towards *jus sanguinis*.

Finally, this chapter has shown that war in general and especially the events in the twentieth century have had a crucial impact on national identity, especially in Germany. Modern German national identity has been extensively reformed by the experiences of Third Reich nationalism and the Second World War. In the post-war period, the negative connotations now associated with nationalism prompted a general search for an alternative 'fatherland'. Subsequently, post-war German governments linked German political and national rehabilitation to a firm commitment to European integration. This also resulted in generally more positive attitudes to a European identity, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. Before we turn to European integration and identity, however, it is important to examine, in the next chapter, the philosophical development of the European idea in the last few centuries. This is necessary in order to understand the historical and theoretical roots of twentieth century European integration. By assessing the catalysts that prompted, in the past, alternative proposals for political systems
and co-operation in Europe, we will be able to better understand what triggered post-1945 European integration
3. The development of the European idea until the Second World War

3.1 Introduction

Having outlined the development of the national idea in Chapter Two, this chapter will examine the history of the European idea, which developed roughly at the same time as the national idea and was sometimes regarded as an alternative solution to governance. The continuous objective of European integration plans and schemes was to "...put an end to intracontinental warfare and enhance the welfare of all the peoples of the region" (Pagden 2002:54). Generally, the idea of re-organising and uniting Europe can be traced back several centuries although, "...in spite of a genuine need and an occasional able spokesman [...] [it] made little headway" until the twentieth century (Pegg 1983:3). Nevertheless it is important to outline the most important developments, especially in the last two hundred years, although some earlier European plans need to be explained to provide continuity. From the eighteenth century the European idea gained new momentum in intellectual circles as a political and increasingly as an economic concept. After the Great War, especially in the 1920s, attempts were made by leading politicians to turn European integration schemes into political reality. In the 1930s, however, following the establishment of National Socialism in Germany and the subsequent Second World War, such attempts ended. They were revived after 1945 with new vigour leading eventually to the foundation of the EU. It seems therefore suitable for this chapter to examine the, largely theoretical, development of the European idea until the Second World War, while the next chapter will discuss European integration from 1945 onwards.

The European idea and European integration schemes were usually focused on Western Europe. The division into Western and Eastern Europe resulted from the earlier separation of the Roman Empire into a Western half, which formed the basis of the Christian Commonwealth, and the Eastern
Byzantine half. The East Roman Emperor Justinian I (527-565 AD) was able to establish caesaropapism, an absolute reign of the emperor over the Church (Columbia Encyclopedia 2001:1). In Western Europe, Pope Gregory the Great (590-604 AD) established the foundations for the Western Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican, which became the secular papal power base. This part real and part imagined separation between East and West has been sustained, more or less artificially (and more or less conscious in popular thought), until the present day and had a certain influence on twentieth century European integration as well as on earlier integration schemes.

Until the sixteenth century politics and society in Western Europe in the Middle Ages were dominated by the idea of Christendom and the Christian community. From the time of Charlemagne (742-814), the notion of Europe as a geographical concept was increasingly applied to the Christian parts of Western Europe, creating the idea that Europe and the Christian Commonwealth were identical (Delanty 1995:26). As Rieu (1993:26) explains the world was dominated by religious modes of thought whereby politics and science were “...wholly subordinate to a theological conception of the world [...]”. In medieval Western Europe, any existing unity and continuity, albeit very limited, was derived mainly from the language of the scholarly elite and was based on Christianity and the Catholic Church on the one hand and the “...global inheritance of the universal might of the Roman Empire” on the other (Mikkeli 1998:30). This is highlighted by the usage of the term ‘Europe’ throughout this period. As Den Boer (1995:27) puts it, the term was deemed suitable for ceremonial occasions, but was “...nevertheless an example of literary artifice” and as yet without its modern emotional connotation. Only from the fifteenth century onwards did the concepts of Europe, Christianity and humanism develop into three key ideas of the intellectual elite of Europe, which started to form the respublica litteraria (Den Boer 1995:35).

However, the unity of Europe in the Middle Ages must not be overrated. In fact, as Delanty (1995:41) puts it, this unity is largely a myth, created mostly by nineteenth century romantics, who constructed this ideal as a basis not only for early nineteenth century romanticism and nationalism but
also to serve as a historical dimension and justification of their European schemes as examined further on.

3.2 Sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe: the reinforcement of the European idea

It was not until the sixteenth century that the development of the modern concept of Europe became possible. This is largely due to the Reformation and secularisation, which dissolved the unity of Christendom and Europe thus making way for a more socio-cultural and political concept of Europe. The Reformation created religious diversity in Europe thereby ending the religious monopoly of the Catholic Church as well as its all-encompassing influence on politics and everyday life. The religious fragmentation made the mediaeval equation of Europe and (Catholic) Christendom increasingly impossible to maintain.

European supremacy and European values
From the sixteenth century, the term Europe, as used in intellectual discourse, gradually changed its context. As Delanty (1995:30) explains, the contemporary image of Europe was a theoretical construction, which existed predominantly in comparison with ‘non-European’ factors. This comparison was enabled due to the more and more frequent exploration of the non-European world. In contrast to the extremely limited worldview of the Middle Ages, the horizon of the European elites was gradually broadened and obtained an increasingly global perspective. In this changing world, the concept of Europe came to symbolise cultural superiority and unity. This idea of European superiority, as cultivated by European intellectuals and increasingly the wider European population, proved to be influential and would remain largely unchallenged until after the First World War (Delanty 1995:30). Thus, in addition to constituting a specific territory, Europe was now associated with certain values, although this was not properly articulated until the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Delanty 1995:30).
At the same time, a theory of the balance of power between states was developed, following a general political stabilisation and centralisation, which was the result of the emergence of early modern states in Europe. This new political environment started to replace the old mediaeval idea of a universal Christian Empire, while theories of the balance of power would come to play a dominant role in the creation of a non-Christian political concept of Europe (Den Boer 1995:39). The balance of power refers to a system of state interaction whereby states usually enter into balanced alliances to ensure peace and stability (Heywood 2002:128). This idea, usually categorised as part of the school of realism, was also reflected in early European integration schemes in the sixteenth and especially in the seventeenth century.

Early European integration schemes

From the seventeenth century onwards, having faced large scale and long-term European wars (such as the Thirty Years War), and inspired by the utopian novels of the Renaissance, philosophers turned their attention to European peace and how it might be achieved (Mikkeli 1998:45). Although some ideas of European integration had previously been formulated, schemes for European co-operation became now ever more popular with the literary elite. The predominant aim of all these schemes was to establish perpetual peace in Europe, although many continued to be based on traditional concepts such as religious unity and monarchical rule.

In 1623, Emeric Crucé (c.1590-1648) published an essay on universal peace and freedom of trade (Le Nouveau Cynée) (Pagden 2002:14). According to Mikkeli (1998:47), Crucé considered war to be a major barrier to progress and formulated a peace plan according to which envoys of the different states had to meet regularly to solve any problems and would be obliged to accept majority decisions. The plan, however, assumed a general peace desire among the rulers, which was not matched by the political reality of the seventeenth century (Mikkeli 1998:47).

A similar scheme entitled The Great Design of Henry IV (Le grand dessein de Henri IV) was published in 1620 by the Duc de Sully (1560-1641).
Sully considered both the Ottoman Empire as well as the increasingly powerful House of Habsburg as major threats to political stability in Europe (Malettke 1992:84). Sully proposed to create a balance of power by downsizing the Habsburg’s European territory and dividing Europe into a number of monarchies and republics. A new European senate would deal with disputes, levy taxes and maintain a European army. A first joint action would then be a crusade against the Ottoman Empire to reduce the threat to Europe's eastern border (Hay 1957:115). Sully defined the eastern border largely in religious terms as he regarded only Roman Catholicism, Calvinism and Lutheranism as valid Christian religions while all others (including the Eastern Orthodox Church) were considered heretical and as such would not be permitted to join the proposed scheme (Malettke 1992:90).

Later in the seventeenth century, the establishment of a highly centralised absolutist France under Louis XIV replaced the Habsburgs as the main threat to the European balance of power and therefore as the main reason for the development of integration schemes. As Mikkeli (1998:50) put it, “...the word Europe became widely incorporated in political discourse in the latter half of the seventeenth century, as the states of Europe fought to oppose the hegemonic strivings of France led by Louis XIV”. The most prominent example in this context is William Penn (1644-1718) who in 1693 published his Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe proposing a European Peace Alliance whereby the preservation of the status quo would be entrusted to a European Parliament (Hay 1957:119). Economic revenue rather than the political power of a member state would determine its number of parliamentary representatives (Mikkeli 1998:51). The parliament alone would be entitled to use force in case of any disputes. Penn was also one of the first to acknowledge the economic advantages of European integration. He argued that European integration would save the money spend on warfare and would make trading between European states easier (Mikkeli 1998:52).
3.3 The eighteenth century: Enlightenment and secularisation of the European idea

The process of secularisation continued into the eighteenth century. The mediaeval symbiotic unit of church and state had by now ceased to exist as states and secular rulers increased in importance (Delanty 1995:70). Although religion continued to play an important role in the self-image of Europeans, it had by now lost its central position. The term Europe was, especially in Protestant political thinking, in regular use and a sense of belonging to Europe, to a shared continent, can be said to have germinated at least among the educated urban population of Western Europe (Mikkeli 1998:60).

European culture and civilisation

In fact, among the European urban educated population, an artistic and scientific community, a république littéraire, clearly inspired by the humanistic sixteenth century respublica litteraria, had emerged (Den Boer 1995:60). By the eighteenth century the "...feeling of belonging together, prevailing among the European intellectuals, in the republic of letters, had been growing stronger and stronger" (Mikkeli 1998:60). As part of the Enlightenment, many philosophers started to acknowledge European culture and European values in their own right.

Rousseau for example claimed that Europe was united through religion, law, customs, literature and trade, while Montesquieu associated joint trading, political tolerance as well as the idea of freedom with Europe (Mikkeli 1998:60). Voltaire described Europe in his Le siècle de Louis XIV (1751) as a commonwealth of interconnected states with the same religious background as well as distinguished European manners and customs such as the principles of civil law and politics that were unknown to the non-European world (Den Boer 1995:60). Many of these suggested European values, as well as the Enlightenment tradition itself, would be put forward again in the twentieth century as potential features of a shared cultural European identity as will be discussed in Chapter Five.
Under the influence of the Enlightenment, these ideals and values were essentially non-Christian and "...excessive reliance on the Christian tradition was even regarded as being injurious to the fostering of pan-Europeanism" (Mikkeli 1998:61). Furthermore, the Enlightenment ideals became associated with 'civilisation' as the eighteenth century progressed. The expression *La civilisation européenne* was first used in 1766 and was increasingly employed after the French Revolution (Den Boer 1995:64). The equation of Western Europe with civilisation replaced the previous symbiosis of Western Europe and Christendom, although the effect, a feeling of European supremacy, remained the same (Den Boer 1995:63). In addition, the concept of civilisation encompassed a belief in progress and science that further separated the 'modern' world from traditional religious superstition. The emphasis on Europeanism, however, continued to be an intellectual prerogative whereby 'Europe', despite its linguistic and ethnic differences, was an expression of spiritual and intellectual unity (Pegg 1981:4).

European integration schemes continued to flourish in the eighteenth century. For example, in ca. 1712 L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) wrote *Project for Eternal Peace in Europe (Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe)*, in which he agreed with Penn and Crucé that the present political situation, characterised by an imbalance of political power, was the reason for constant warfare (Mikkeli 1998:55). Saint-Pierre proposed a European Republic, a federation of states based on the model of the Holy Roman Empire (Shennan 1991:6). The member states would remain sovereign, but each would send a senator to a European Council (Mikkeli 1998:55). The prime objective was to secure the peace, to maintain the status quo in Europe and to defend the interests of the princes and monarchs, who would, as Saint-Pierre idealistically believed, willingly engage in such a scheme (Mikkeli 1998:55). Saint-Pierre's model, albeit a little utopian, nevertheless maintained an influence on European integration theory well into the twentieth century, when it was regarded as a prophecy for the creation of the United Nations and the League of Nations (Den Boer 1995:43).
Thus, in the eighteenth century, the idea of European modernity started to be firmly linked with the emergence of the Western European polity of nation states as discussed in Chapter One. In this political climate the national idea referred to the particularism and relativism of culture, while the European idea gradually acquired the character of a normative idea associated with civilisation in connection to the notion of European supremacy over non-Europeans in terms of culture, commerce and economy (Chebel d'Appollonia 2002:175). At the same time, an integrated 'Europe' increasingly lost its appeal as a political alternative to the nation state (Delanty 1995:66). Only a few philosophers such as Voltaire thought that 'Europe' was replacing the nation-state. For his part, Rousseau envisaged an age in which everyone would be Europeans (Delanty 1995:71).

The Influence of the French Revolution
At the end of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution influenced both supporters and opponents of the new political order. As Den Boer (1995:66) points out, the realisation of belonging to a European community was more conscious among conservative thinkers and politicians who expressed a desire to restore the old pre-revolutionary order. Edmund Burke (1729-1797) for example published in 1790 his highly contested essay Reflection on the Revolution in France (Black 1993:111). Burke considered Europe to be a cultural unit shaped by a common historical heritage based on common institutions such as the Christian faith, monarchical rule, Roman law, similar customs and education (Mikkeli 1998:60). Some of these would later be (re)discovered as foundations for a European identity as shown in Chapter Five. Burke thought that key European values were religion and the "gentlemanly spirit" (Mikkeli 1998:60), which was a reflection of contemporary perceptions of English or British identity as outlined in the previous chapter. Burke concluded that the European states were so similar to each other that they could practically be regarded as constituting one big nation (Mikkeli 1998:60).

At the end of the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth century, intellectuals started to assign a historical perspective to the European idea,
which served both as an existential explanation and justification. 'Europe' was now subjected to often idealised historical interpretations and romanticised visions of medieval religion and politics, which were popular especially among Romanticists as well as opponents of the French Revolution (Den Boer 1995:69). Such nostalgic reflections on the Middle Ages can for example be found in Novalis' work *Die Christenheit oder Europa* (Christendom or Europe, 1799). Novalis (1772-1801) considered the Middle Ages to be a source of inspiration that should serve to revive Christian faith in Europe after "...the religious vacuum left by the French Revolution" (Friedrich 1997:82). Mediaeval Christendom was thought of as a utopian alternative to European modernity and its secular ideologies (Delanty 1995:80). Novalis argued that in a new Europe the Christian faith should again play an important and unifying role (Mikkeli 1998:64).

3.4 The nineteenth century: Romanticism and early European federallists

Thus, while the concept of European culture was developed retrospectively in the eighteenth century, the history of European culture as an idea only originated in the nineteenth century when the Romantic Movement reached its peak (Den Boer 1995:69). The nineteenth century Romantics frequently investigated the roots of European civilisation and often presumed that there had been a conscious idea of Europe throughout the Middle Ages.

**Romantic Movement and political reality**

The Duc de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a nineteenth century romanticist and utopian socialist (Friedrich 1997:97), sentimentally looked back to the days of a "united Christian Europe" and forward to the days when free trade would make Europe an economic community (Hoggart and Johnson 1987:108). At the height of the Napoleonic Wars in 1813, he described his vision of Europe that should serve the common good and be united through communal institutions and a single parliamentary government (Pegg 1983:4). Resembling the ideas of twentieth century federalists, Saint-Simon argued that Europe would have to be a gradually developed federal community
composed of member states, which also should have a parliamentary political system (Mikkeli 1998:72). The European Parliament should be composed of elected representatives who should be inspired by European patriotism and make decisions in the interest of Europe and the people and not serve the rulers or national governments (Mikkeli 1998:73). The aims of Saint-Simon's European Union were similar to that of the modern EU and focused on maintaining peace and promoting wider political, social and economic advantages for the population. Saint-Simon, however, also designed an 'Upper House' made up by the wealthiest Europeans, who were to be elected by the 'King of Europe' (Mikkeli 1998:73).

The Romantic Movement was revived from the 1830s onwards. The new Romantics included theorists such as the Italian nationalist Mazzini (1805-72) who founded the ‘Young Europe' movement in 1834 in Bern. Especially during the revolutionary years of 1847 and 1848, the idea of a United States of Europe appeared in many political pamphlets and publications (Mikkeli 1998:79). As Mikkeli put it (1998:80) "...the Romantics entertained great projects and beautiful visions in the nineteenth century" although their visions had little in common with political reality in the nineteenth century, which clearly belonged to the nation state.

Indeed, the political reality in the second half of the nineteenth century was characterised by nationalisation at every level, where even rural communities and young children were re-educated into national citizens as discussed in Chapter Two (Den Boer 1995:75). The attitude of many politicians at the time, and their focus on the nation state, is expressed in a statement by Bismarck, who claimed that 'Europe' was nothing more than a geographical expression (Den Boer 1995:76). Even more than before, a concept of Europe that went beyond the geographical dimension was largely restricted to the intelligentsia. In Germany, for example, opponents of Bismarck's Realpolitik remained influenced by Kant's Zum Ewigen Frieden (Perpetual Peace, 1795), which stresses the importance of a League of Nations or federal Europe. Kant felt that the creation of such a community of
people would be the only way to regularise the relations between the states (Chebel d’Appollonia 2002:175).

**Popular Culture and democratic-federal European schemes**

Another important development at the time, as previously discussed, was the gradual propagation of education and literacy, which combined with the proliferation of the national mass media, led subsequently to the spread of public opinion and popular culture to wider parts of society. Until now, civilisation as a universal European definition had largely been identified with elite culture. With the development of national political publics, however, the concept of civilisation became ‘nationalised’ and European civilisation was subdivided into various national cultures (Den Boer 1995: 73). Hence, by the late nineteenth century, nationalism replaced to a large extent the enlightened cosmopolitanism of the previous century, although the European tradition continued to exist in several political schools of thinking.

The emergence of popular culture and the process of democratisation altered not only the perception of the concept of civilisation, but also the historical interpretation of Europe. While previous European integration plans had focused, in accordance with the principles of balance of powers, on the co-operation of states and their rulers, some democrats now started to abandon the traditional ‘European peace plan’ in favour of a federation of nations, similar to the one proposed by Saint-Simon (Den Boer 1995:73).

Although the federalist movement was largely restricted to a small literary circle, it also had some more prominent supporters such as Victor Hugo, who argued at the international peace conference in Paris in 1849 in favour of a European federation (Pegg 1983:4-5). He, together with a group of similar minded personalities, developed this idea further at the 1867 Geneva peace conference where they established the International League for Peace and Freedom, which soon published a journal entitled *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe* (The United States of Europe) (Pegg 1983:5). However, as Delanty (1995:79) put it, Victor Hugo's ideal of a United States of Europe was an anomaly in an age of nationalism. It is probably not surprising that in this
political environment, "...at the eve of the war, the idea of European integration had made little if any progress in the corridors of power" (Stirk 1996:10).

One of the main reasons why the deep-rooted awareness of "...sharing a vague but common European destiny" survived at all, was the continuing assumption of European supremacy over non-European nations (Den Boer 1995:77). More than ever before, as Den Boer (1995:77) explains, the mid and late nineteenth century, dominated by imperialism and colonialism, was an era of boundless belief in European superiority and of unlimited European self-confidence. It was not until the First World War that the idea of European supremacy ceased to exist as a dominant political idea (Den Boer 1995:78), a development that was accompanied by a revival of European federalism in the 1920s (Mikkeli 1998:73).

3.5 The European idea between the wars

In 1918, after the First World War, European self-belief was in ruins, along with large parts of a continent that was now dominated by widespread pessimism and depression. The intervention of the US in the war had demonstrated how the old European era was gradually giving way to a new Western or Atlantic era (Bugge 1993:86). After the war, the US would become an increasingly influential power in Europe, although the US influence on European affairs was largely passive with no official participation in the European reconstruction process (Stirk 1996:23). For example, although Wilson had suggested the creation of a League of Nations in his Fourteen Points, the US did not join the League when it was founded in 1919. Nevertheless, post-1918 European politics and economies were progressively more part of an international system not any longer dominated by Europe and the European states.

Some of the immediate challenges in the post war years included the political turmoil in Germany; the need to restructure large parts of Europe after the collapse of both the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Soviet challenge in relation to a more general fear of communism (Bugge
1993:86). The Treaty of Versailles set up the aforementioned League of Nations, which was not confined to Europe and was strongly influenced by eighteenth century Enlightenment globalism. It was the first international entity "...that was intended to establish universal jurisdiction" (Heywood 2002:151). The League was supposed to promote international co-operation, but membership was not compulsory. Moreover, it did not have real political power, which made it a rather inefficient organ for maintaining international peace (Wistrich 1994:21). The League did not infringe on the national sovereignty of its members and lacked the power to apply effective sanctions to ensure compliance with its decisions. Nevertheless, the League symbolised a general desire, triggered by the First World War, for co-operation and peace.

In addition, and surpassing the remit of the League of Nations, whose relative impotence had quickly disappointed its advocates, twentieth century philosophers wanted to establish a stable political structure in Europe that had been missing for centuries. Spurned on by the disaster of the First World War, "...it was possibly partly this feeling of the vulnerability of European civilisation that prepared the soil for a recognition of the advantages of unity over free competition" (Mikkeli 1998:92).

However, in the first years after 1918, there were only a few campaigners for full-scale European integration as more pressing needs engaged people, politicians and theorists alike. For example, most French theorists at the time were preoccupied with achieving French security, not through co-operation and reconciliation, but through control over Germany. Nevertheless, by 1922, the continued failure to establish a stable order in Europe prompted some people to turn back to the idea of European Union, although their perceptions and visions of Europe varied greatly depending on their political background (Stirk 1996:18). In 1923, at the height of the Ruhr crisis, the German writer Heinrich Mann reminded his readers in an article that Victor Hugo had said in 1871 "...down with frontiers. The Rhine for

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8 the Ruhr occupation in 1923 by French troops when the French reparations committee found that Germany had defaulted their reparation coal deliveries (Heater 1992:121)
everyone! Let us create a Republic, let us form the United States of Europe” (Pegg 1983:26). In this spirit, numerous European movements sprang up in the 1920s, the most prominent of which probably was the Pan-European movement of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, who “...perhaps did more at this time than anyone else to popularize the European idea” (Pegg 1983:28).

**Kalergi and Paneuropa**

Kalergi believed that only a politically united Europe could overcome the crisis faced by wide parts of Europe after the First World War. He envisaged a united federal Europe under exclusion of the British Empire, whose interests he considered to be too different. However, both Europe and Britain were to share the task of global Europeanisation, whereby Britain was to act as mediator between Paneuropa and Panamerica (Bugge 1993:97). Paneuropa’s main function would be to secure peace in Europe and give Europe a constructive world role as an equal member of a Triple Alliance with the USA and Russia (Calleo 2001:24). Kalergi argued that, in return for small concessions on national sovereignty, all European countries could prosper economically and obtain lasting peace (Pegg 1983:28). Internally, Paneuropa would have a supranational structure based on obligatory arbitration and multilateral co-operation, while externally a Paneuropean defence alliance would be established to protect smaller states from external threats (Bugge 1993:98). Kalergi’s ultimate aim, a United States of Europe, would be a gradual creation, following a step-wise plan, which would firstly institute a governmental conference, then a system of arbitration treaties and thirdly a common market and customs union, which Kalergi believed to be the best method to revive the economy (Stirk 1996:26). Kalergi regarded nationalism in Europe as a dying ideal and stressed, similarly to many modern definitions of European identity, the importance of Pan-European ideals such as Christian faith, European arts/science and culture, the Christian-Hellenistic tradition etc (Stirk 1996:26).

**Pan-European movement and Franco-German relations**

Based on these ideas, Kalergi founded in 1923 the Pan-European Movement and managed, for the first time in the history of European integration
schemes, to win the sympathies of leading politicians such as Edouard Herriot, Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, who became the honorary president of the movement in 1927. The combined Franco-German support was crucial as Franco-German co-operation lay at the heart of Kalergi's scheme. Until 1924, when Herriot replaced the anti-German Poincaré as French Prime Minister, Briand was made French foreign minister and Gustav Stresemann German foreign minister, the Franco-German relations had been somewhat unfriendly. The combined efforts of these politicians, however, led to Franco-German rapprochement, which was at its height in 1925, when the Treaty of Locarno paved the way for the admission of Germany to the League of Nations in 1926 and guaranteed the borders in Western Europe thus alleviating to some extent French security concerns (Calleo 2001:24). In 1925, the German SPD even incorporated support for the United States of Europe into their Heidelberg programme (Stirk 1996:28). Despite the support of some leading politicians, however, Pan-Europa was never a popular mass movement and any progress in the inter-war years towards European integration was largely elite driven (Stirk 1996:28). As will be explained in the following chapter, the same could be said about European integration in the second half of the twentieth century.

The Briand Memorandum
Briand believed it possible for Europe to achieve a federal union in the near future and began to plan a federal initiative in 1929 (Pegg 1983:106+111). The whole venture was based on French security interests (Bugge 1993:105). As Hoggart and Johnson (1987:109) explain "...it is interesting that while Briand's plan involved the merging of all European nationalities into a United States of Europe, his major concern was Franco-German relations [...]". As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the same approach would also be taken by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman after the Second World War, when he proposed a Franco-German coal and steel community in 1950, not so much because he was an ideological advocate of European integration, but "...because France had not succeeded in preventing or delaying the economic recovery of Germany and it looked as if Germany was
about to resume her role Europe’s industrial giant” (Hoggart and Johnson 1987:109).

Inspired by a desire to involve Germany more permanently in some kind of European network that would guarantee France a certain degree of control over German development, Briand proposed in 1929 at the League of Nations conference at Geneva that the time had come for closer European economic co-operation (Bugge 1993:104). Earlier he had declared that “...it is necessary to organize Europe, not against any country or any group of countries, but to strengthen the conditions of peace, to put an end to the state of anarchy that will give rise to conflicts as long as actions are not sufficiently coordinated to organize the vital interests of the peoples of the continent” (Pegg 1983:112). Although Briand realised that the chances of establishing a European bond were slim, he was determined to put forward a plan for European integration (Pegg 1983:140). On 17 May 1930, he submitted a Memorandum on European Federal Union arguing that due to the common ethnic background, shared civilisation and geographical proximity, the European nations should co-operate instead of contend with each other (Pegg 1983:141). The first step of such a co-operation was to be the ratification of a treaty establishing the principle of a European moral union and confirming the solidarity between the states involved (Bugge 1993:104). Structurally, the main organ for co-operation would be a European Conference that was to function in close co-operation with the League of Nations (Pegg 1983:141). Between its sessions, a smaller political committee with its own secretariat was to function as executive. There was no provision for any means of popular or democratic legitimisation (Stirk 1996:36). Contrary to his original suggestion at Geneva, the memorandum gave preference to political co-operation and demanded the subordination of economic to political issues (Bugge 1993:104). Briand believed that political rapprochement was critical to the establishment of a common market.

This explains partly why the reception to the memorandum was overall polite, but not particularly encouraging with Britain, Germany and Italy being the most resistant to the plan (Pegg 1983:142). Subsequently, Briand tried to
persuade the League of Nations to establish a European Council, but strong resistance allowed solely for the creation of a ‘Study Commission for the European Union’ over which Briand would preside (Pegg 1983:154). This Commission ceased to exist after only a couple of meetings.

Bugge (1993:105) lists a number of reasons why the Briand memorandum failed to achieve its targets. Firstly, its main advocates died around that time, Stresemann in 1929 and Briand himself in 1932. Secondly, it has been argued that the plan was characterised by a lack of political courage and realism. It tried to create a supranational European Union but promised not to touch the political sovereignty of the member states. Thirdly, the strong opposition, especially from Britain, successfully limited the outcomes of the plan thereby rendering it largely ineffective. Fourthly, the worldwide Great Depression following the Wall Street Crash in 1929 resulted in a turn towards economic protectionism. Another reason was the rise of the NSDAP to power in Germany. The new regime, entrenched after the 1934 Enabling Act, effectively stopped all European integration plans, as they were not sustainable without German co-operation. Finally, the League of Nations itself resisted the Briand memorandum as it was perceived as a potential bureaucratic rival in Europe. All in all, as Heater (1992:142) argued, the Briand plan was altogether too vague and left too much to future negotiations. Nevertheless, Briand’s scheme for European integration was the first to be devised by a leading European politician and the first to be officially considered by European governments. Therefore, Briand managed, at least to some extent, to move the theoretical idea of European integration towards actual implementation (Heater 1992:145).

**Mitteleuropa**

Although the above discussed early twentieth century schemes for European integration were dominated by proposals for federal unity, there were some alternatives. One of the more prominent of these alternatives was the idea of *Mitteleuropa* (Central Europe), which originated in nineteenth century Germany from the dissatisfaction with the geographical borders of the German Empire. Many Germans, including the Austrians, had been excluded
when the empire was created and considered the artificial division between imperial and other Germans as illogical and unsatisfactory (Delanty 1995:107). Mitteleuropa was revived following the German victories in the first years of the First World War, which inspired Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) to write his influential *Mitteleuropa* in 1915 (Stirk 1996:20).

According to Bugge (1993:90), Naumann envisaged a union between Austria and Germany and proposed that post-war Europe would be divided by two permanent trenches, one between Germany and France and one between Germany and the Soviet Union. Mitteleuropa itself should take the form of a loose confederation with a common Central European market and was considered to be the natural successor of the mediaeval Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Naumann’s plan was criticised by contemporaries mainly for its ambiguity. The German SPD rejected the idea as imperialistic, while some economists worried that Mitteleuropa would be isolated from international trade (Bugge 1993:90). Other states suspected that Naumann’s condescending characterisation of other cultures was in fact promoting German hegemony (Stirk 1996:21). Although in the 1920s and 1930s some theorists and politicians contemplated Mitteleuropa as a potential German foreign policy, it was never a serious alternative due to its internal weaknesses (such as different German and Austrian ambitions) and the overwhelming superior power of its opponents, notably the USA (Stirk 1996:18). When in 1931 the Austrian Chancellor and the German Foreign Minister proposed a German-Austrian customs union, the scheme received widespread suspicion from other European governments and eventually had to be abandoned (Stirk 1996:39).

### 3.6 Conclusion

Over the centuries, the main rationale and raison d’être of European integration plans was a desire to put an end to warfare and to create lasting peace in Europe. Some European schemes, especially the earlier ones, also had religious aims and strived to unify Christendom against real or perceived non-Christian threats, most notably the Ottoman Empire. Later, from the
sixteenth century onwards, the aim was to prevent war by achieving a balance of power in Europe. According to this theory, war was the result of hegemonic desires of states and rulers, which could only be kept at bay if some form of intervention prevented any one state from becoming too powerful and thus upsetting the balance of power. Thus, European peace plans were usually prompted by major wars (such as the Thirty Years War) when philosophers thought that either a supranational entity or some forum for European cooperation and arbitration needed to be created in order to mediate and thus create peace. This European forum or institution was at the heart of most peace plans. Some plans accorded this forum more power than others, but in general, the states involved would ultimately remain in control.

Nevertheless, in an age when first absolutist rulers and then the nation state and nationalism reigned supreme, such plans failed to create the required governmental or popular support. It was not until after the First World War, and the scale of destruction it created, that European integration schemes generated the support of active politicians. Neither the Pan-European Movement, the Briand Memorandum or initiatives inspired by Mitteleuropa, however, led to tangible results. In the last years before the Second World War, support for European movements declined drastically for a variety of reasons including the introduction of national economic protection policies (a result of the Great Depression), the establishment of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy as well as the lack of British support for European integrative schemes. At the end of the 1930s, "...Europe was [now] less integrated than it had been in the 1920s and even in the years before 1914" (Stirk 1996:45). Although the First World War had sparked so far unprecedented interest in European integration, the catalyst that would eventually bring the European idea to fruition was the Second World War as will now be explained in the following chapter.
4. European Integration after 1945

4.1. Introduction

As the previous chapter illustrated, schemes for European integration have been a recurrent topic among philosophers for some centuries and have been discussed, more or less, by the emerging educated political public in the nineteenth century. Politics and political debates, however, were dominated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by nationalism and imperialism. European integration until 1914, therefore, never outgrew its status as a mere theoretical idea. This started to change when the First World War gave new substance to the potential merits of European integration for the peace process. The devastation caused by the war initiated a so far unheard of popularity of European integration schemes in the early 1920s such as Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European Movement. This movement managed to gain, for the first time in the history of European integration schemes, some support of acting politicians. Other initiatives, such as the Briand memorandum, also won limited support, but in the 1930s the world economic crisis, subsequent economic protectionism and the rise of fascist regimes effectively slowed any attempts for European integration to a virtual standstill. It was not until after the Second World War, as this chapter will explain, that the unprecedented destruction of the war, which had shaken the very foundations of Europe, prompted the European governments to seek a lasting solution that would create permanent peace and prosperity in Europe. As Nugent (2003:11) points out, the Second World War marked a turning point in Western Europe that would eventually lead to political co-operation and even integration that would have been inconceivable before the war. The aim of this chapter is to outline the gradual process of European integration after 1945 as well as the broad theoretical concepts used to explain the integration process.
4.2 General assumptions and limitations

Before going into any further detail, it is important to state a few necessary assumptions and limitations. Firstly, for the purpose of this thesis, it will be sufficient to concentrate on the development of Western European integration in the form of the European Economic Community (EEC), founded in 1957, and its successors namely the European Union (EU), created in 1992. There were other integrative initiatives, both in Eastern and Western Europe, notably the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the (failed) European Defence Community (EDC) and others such as NATO, the UN, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Eastern European Council for Mutual Assistance (COMECON). Despite their importance, it is impossible to deal with them all in full.

Secondly, although it will be noted that external powers (such as the US and the USSR) and events (for example the Cold War and German unification) had a crucial influence on European integration, there is not sufficient space to discuss these developments in greater detail.

Thirdly, post-war European integration gave rise to a discipline of its own, namely integration theory, which has in the past fifty years harboured a great variety of schools of thought (Den Boer 1995:17). As O'Neill (1996:49) stresses "...no single theory of regional integration can expect to offer a definitive account of the immensely complex international process that is European integration". As the focus of this chapter is not on a detailed analysis of European integration theory, emphasis will be on some broad theoretical concepts such as federalism, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism in order to better illuminate post-war European integration. Although some of these theories have emerged in comparative politics, it has to be acknowledged, according to Rosamond (2000:15-16), that some theorists argue that European integration is not suitable for theoretical generalisation, but should be treated as a historically rooted phenomenon,
arising in specific conditions and thus without meaningful precedent or contemporary parallel.

Finally, the history of post-war European integration is often described as a gradual evolution interspersed with sudden bursts of action and can as such be grouped into a series of stages (Mikkeli 1998: 112-114), although some might argue that this categorisation is too simplistic. According to Mikkeli (1998:112-114) the first stage from 1945-50 was characterised by debates on the underlying principles of co-operation and a search for suitable forms of European organisation. In the second stage, from 1950 to 1957, the functional organisations took shape followed by a third stage (1960s to the mid 1980s) when European integration was dominated by intergovernmental agreements and a revival of national economic protectionism due to the 1970s economic depression. From the mid 1980s a revival and acceleration of European integration took place. In contrast to the previously prevailing intergovernmentalism, the federal-functional approach achieved now new popularity. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union followed by an unprecedented deepening and widening of union with the introduction of the single currency, the Euro, in 2002 and the fifth enlargement with the accession of ten new members (mostly in Eastern Europe) in 2004 with further enlargement scheduled for 2007. For the purpose of this thesis, this chapter will be structured based on this chronological categorisation.

4.3 Functional Federalism or federal Functionalism: European Integration from 1945 to 1960

The federalist idea and post-war Europe
As the previous chapter has shown, the idea of European integration had been largely abandoned in the 1930s and especially during the Second World War. However, the war did not totally eradicate the ethos of 'Europe'. A noteworthy example is the 1941 Ventotene Manifesto composed by Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986), whose plan for a federal Europe was adopted by the Italian Resistance and resulted in 1943 in the formation of the European Federalist Movement “to overcome "international anarchy”” (Dedman
1996:17). After 1945, the supranationalists believed that the nation state was obsolescent, even though there was no agreement as to the most appropriate replacement. As O’Neill (1996:21) puts it “...the postwar mood for change was fuelled in large measure by the assumption that the nation state had outlived its historic usefulness in a century of immensely destructive total war“. Organisations were founded in Europe that advocated a certain degree of economic and political unity such as the United Europe Movement in Britain or the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe in France. They found joint expression in the 1946 European Union of Federalists (Mikkeli 1998:113).

Federalism, as a very broad theoretical concept, includes a wide spectrum of views, which made it a controversial concept in European integration. As mentioned in Chapter One, federal systems are characterised by a division of authority between central and regional governments. They usually originated as historical compromises involving a permanent contract between territorial units, which yield a measure of authority to a common and centralised institution whilst retaining at least some degree of autonomy, although there is no core prescriptive about the division of powers (Rosamond 2000:24-25). Such an institution will have some degree of independence from the governments of the member states or territories (Pinder 1998:46). Federalist supporters of European integration emphasised that priority should be given to making formal changes in political institutions and procedures as the key to securing social harmony and democracy (O’Neill 1996:22). In general, they thought that a European federation might be achieved either revolutionary or gradually (Rosamond 2000:27). Many gradualists argued that European federalism would have to be cultivated as a popular movement to create the impetus for a federal pact among political elites (Rosamond 2000:28).

After the end of the war in 1945, however, there was a rapid return to traditional political and parliamentary life, at least in Western Europe. In the East, many new governments were dominated by Communist parties thus creating a division in Europe between two spheres of influence dominated by
the two superpowers (Ladrech 2000:29). In this political climate, the wartime ideas for a federal united Europe were quickly abandoned as the European governments were pre-occupied by more urgent matters. The scale of the devastation after the war was so enormous that the rebuilding of Western Europe in the late 1940s had to rely to a great extent on the US and the Marshall Plan. The latter was official termed the European Recovery Program (ERP) and was a US initiative, which involved large scale financial aid and loans to Western European countries, although the Plan had originally been offered to East European countries as well (Ladrech 2000:29). The distribution of this aid was handled by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). It promoted international co-operation through its own intergovermentaL character as well as through the US encouragement for European integration (Mikkeli 1998:115).

Another primary political goal after 1945 was to maintain peace in Europe and avoid another major war (Mikkeli 1998:111). The European governments and allied forces needed to address the German question as well as that of increasing hostility between the two superpowers. In addition, the spread of communism was considered to be a threat, which could only be warded off by the creation of a strong united Western Europe (Mikkeli 1998:109). These issues were powerful imperatives for the allies to ensure Germany’s future within a strong Western Alliance (Rosamond 2000:22).

Under the circumstances, some form of European integration was perceived to be beneficial by most European governments, although the details of integration were contentious. The creation of a federal European Union, however, was not as such on the agenda of the European governments. In addition, and much to the disappointment of the federalists, there was no popular revolt against the established political order as people had to deal with the more pressing problem of rebuilding their lives (Stirk 1996:85). In addition, federalism suffered from endemic weaknesses and factional divisions with regards to strategy and objectives, which reduced its potential to have an impact on events (O’Neill 1996:25). In general, the proposed federal Europe was far too experimental and too radical to be given
serious consideration by politicians. In the end, as O'Neill (1996:25) concludes, "...the federalist prospectus barely dented the European political establishment"; and the nation-state system, criticised and discredited by many, was never seriously in danger of being replaced by an alternative system. Therefore, although many architects of European integration such as Henri Spaak or Robert Schuman were prepared to articulate avowedly federalist goals, they acknowledged that neither a revolutionary nor a gradual federalist approach would be feasible within the current political climate (Rosamond 2000: 29). Many realised that, given the political reality, European integration could only be achieved by a more functional approach, which would stress economic co-operation and a minimum level of political institutionalisation.

**Functionalism and neo-functionalism**

Originally, functionalism essentially was the theory that governments are primarily responsive to human needs (Heywood 2002:147). Functionalists like Mitrany (1888-1975), although not himself a theorist of European integration, analysed the functions of international societies under disregard of their ideal form (Wiener and Diez 2004:7). Functionalism provided an alternative model for post war Western Europe by proposing sectoral instead of regional integration, the latter being discarded by Mitrany who argued that regionalism would only reproduce the faults of the nation state (Rosamond 2000:37).

Neo-functionalism was a revision of functionalism and has come to be the most influential theory of European and regional integration (Heywood 2002:148). To some extent, as will be discussed shortly, the neo-functional approach reflected and represented the reality of the 1950s and early 1960s. One of its main contributors was Ernst Haas (1924-2003), who provided an analysis of the process and progress of European integration in terms of supranationality, sub-national actors and spill-over (Rosamond 2002:499). Spill-over was the main characteristic of neo-functional theory and assumed that gradual economic integration of particular economic sectors across nations would create functional pressures for integration in related economic sectors. It was believed that the full advantage of integration of one sector
could not be achieved unless related or dependent economic sectors were also involved (George 1991:21). The integration of coal and steel would for example yield substantial benefits for key economic actors, but its full advantage could only be achieved when related economic sectors such as transport or finance/taxation would also be involved (Rosamond 2000:60).

Neo-functionalists argued that the economic spill-over would eventually result in political spill-over (political or even federal integration) since increasing integration would require greater regulatory complexity to guide the integration process (George 1991:23). Furthermore, in order to secure the success of continued integration, it was considered important that the supranational institutions should secure enough autonomy to escape tendencies of states to dissolve the international organisations once the preferences of those states have been met (Rosamond 2000:62).

Although the integrative processes were regarded as largely automatic, many neo-functionalists agreed that some political activism was needed to direct, co-ordinate and sponsor the processes of functional spill-over (Rosamond 2000:61). This role was assigned to non-state actors pursuing national or other self-interests (Schmitter 2004:46). Haas (2003:147) explained that European integration basically came about when political parties and interest groups accepted that action should be taken at the supranational level. These interest groups and political parties would then start to organise, function and redefine their interests on the supranational level as political spill-over would require the successful process of loyalty transfer from the old national to the new supranational authorities (Waaver 2004:172).

In contrast to federalist integration schemes, there is little talk of mobilising the general population. In general it could be argued that “...federalism opted for a radical ‘bottom up’ model of political change. ‘Europe’ was a grand project that would be build by a cooperative compact between enlightened elites and their people. Functionalism, on the other hand, adopted a ‘top down’ model of international change” (O’Neill 1996:23).
Neo-functionalism argued that popular support would follow a successful elite sponsored integration. Given that the new supranational institutions would address popular needs systematically and efficiently, this would lead to "...a movement of mass allegiances away from established modes of authority" (Rosamond 2000:66). Neo-functionalsists, however, tended to over-estimate the visibility of the benefits of the new institutions and also their ability to command loyalty (Rosamond 2000:66). It has been also been claimed that mass allegiances would not be forthcoming without an additional sense of belonging (Rosamond 2002:102) as will be discussed in Chapter Five.

The Council of Europe

In the 1950s, the change from a federalist to a functionalist approach was strongly influenced by the lessons learned from the Council of Europe. The establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949 was, together with the North Atlantic Treaty, a first significant step taken in a bid to create political stability in Western Europe (Stirk 1996:103). The Council of Europe was Western Europe's first post war political association although it lacked substantial political power and was designed to be a purely advisory assembly (Urwin 1995:35). The draft treaty of the Council of Europe had originally proposed a more powerful institution, that had been viewed by federalists as the first step towards European Union, but it had to be substantially diluted in order to accommodate Britain.

Britain had refused to be part of any supranational organisation. Although many British politicians accepted that European unity was a valuable ideal, they also felt that British participation was not compatible with their commitment to the Commonwealth and the Anglo-American relationship (Urwin 1995:31). In addition, Britain was not prepared to accept any loss of sovereignty implied by integration. As Nugent (2003:25) points out, there were a variety of reasons for this, including pride in the long established parliamentary tradition; the belief that dilution of sovereignty was neither desirable nor necessary since Britain was still a world power, as well as a certain dislike of the idea of being dependent on continental countries and governments. As Dedman (1996:22) points out, after the war, Britain saw
herself still as one of the 'Big Three' (USSR, USA and UK) rather than "one of the big three in Europe". Churchill (2003:11) for example said in a speech in Zurich in 1946 in relation to the Council of Europe: "...Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia [...] must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe [...]", thus implying that Britain must support European integration but not necessarily be part of it. The continental governments, however, regarded British participation as a guarantee for security against any possible resurgence of German militarism or the Soviet threat (Urwin 1995:28). Thus, in order to secure British involvement, the Council was reduced to being “…in many ways [...] little more than a continuation of the traditional format of co-operation, transcribed to a bigger stage, and could not itself move forward to a supranational or federalist future” (Urwin 1995:36). Due to its intergovernmental nature, its vague aims and the fact that many of its members, notably Britain, were unwilling to go beyond voluntary co-operation, the Council was severely limited when it came to furthering European integration, which was one of its main aims. On the other hand, as Heywood (2002:147) points out, it managed to serve (and still does) as a useful forum for discussing common interests. In addition, the Council issues reports and consultative documents as well as conventions (Sakwa and Stevens 2000:253).

One of the lessons learned from this episode was that Britain would not be interested in anything more than loose intergovernmental co-operation. More comprehensive integration attempts would therefore have to go ahead without British participation. It was also concluded that the general political-federal approach had not worked and that subsequently the economical-functional approach was to be followed (Heywood 2002:147). In the end, the chosen method of integration was a hybrid creation that was characterised by “…technical co-operation in some fields leading to further co-operation and integration in others through the guidance of determined elite politics (neo-functionalism). [...] the option of appealing directly to the people, asking them to transfer power to European supranational institutions has been exercised (federalism), but overall neo-functionalism has dominated federalism" (Waever 2004:174).
The functionalist approach at work: the foundation of the ECSC

In 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman (1886-1963) proposed a Coal and Steel Community through which the Western European coal and steel resources should be pooled and jointly administered by the member-states and a new supranational institution (Urwin 1995:44). The rationale of the plan was that this co-operation would resolve historical antagonism between France and Germany thus helping to avoid future European wars (Rosamond 2002:505). The Schuman Plan has often been hailed as the most significant document presenting the post-war goal for integration (Mikkeli 1998:116). Although the method, co-operation within an economic sector, was decidedly neo-functional, Schuman was a federalist and considered the plan to be "...the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace" (Schuman 2003:14). The plan had been devised by Jean Monnet (1888-1979), who, although not as such a formal advocate of federalism, had favoured a supranational government over intergovernmentalism (Heywood 2002:147).

Monnet had realised, however, that any political-federal method would not work because the European countries remained strongly attached to their political sovereignty (Trausch 1999:2). Subsequently, he adjusted his practical recommendations for supranational change in order to reflect these political realities. As O'Neill (1996:27) points out "...this pragmatism clearly distinguishes his functionalist method from the visionary approach of the federalists". Monnet considered it most important that the integration process was launched on a realistic basis, thereby making it capable of sustaining supranational co-operation against the opposition from the political elements who felt threatened by the process (O'Neill 1996:27). As pointed out above, it is often argued that the theory of neo-functionalism was in fact inspired by the reality of European integration and was formulated especially to explain this phenomenon. There is an obvious resemblance between the so-called 'Monnet method' of integration and the propositions developed by the neo-functionalists (Rosamond 2000:50).
The Schuman Plan was presented to the French government as an instrument to keep check on Germany's potential (Urwin 1995:45). After the war, German Ruhr coal and steel production had been placed under the International Ruhr Authority, while the Saar area was under French occupation. The other allied forces now proposed to abandon controls on German industry despite strong French opposition (Stirk 1996:121). The situation insured both French and German support for the Schuman Plan for different and quite contradictory reasons. To the French, it meant continued control over German industry while the German government believed that a more integrated Europe would enable a reconstructed Germany to regain acceptance and rehabilitation (Urwin 1995:28).

Quite crucial to its eventual success, the Schuman Plan enjoyed the support of leading politicians: Robert Schuman himself (French Prime Minister 1947-48 and Foreign Minister 1948-1952), Alcide de Gasperi (Italian Prime Minister 1945-1953) and Konrad Adenauer (German Chancellor 1949-1963). These mutual acquaintances were all generally pro-European with a similar Christian Democrat political background, which earned them the nickname 'Black Front' (Mikkeli 1998:115).

Under such favourable circumstances, Schuman and Monnet were anxious that their scheme should not suffer from the kind of obstructionism that Britain had displayed with regards to the European Council. Therefore, membership of the proposed European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was based on prior acceptance of the necessity of supranationalism. This prerequisite effectively resulted in Britain declining the invitation to join the ECSC, which was founded in April 1951 by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Nugent 2003:518).

With the supranational structure in place, the ECSC was the first organisation of its kind to go beyond consultative or intergovernmental cooperation (Urwin 1995:47). The High Authority, however, was far from being a sovereign body. Monnet had originally designed the High Authority to be a supranational body with responsibility for planning, which would have
effectively taken economic co-ordination out of national hands (George 1991:3). This structure, however, met with considerable national resistance reducing the High Authority to a somewhat ineffective and cautious body that was virtually controlled by the Council of Ministers, which represented national interests. Nevertheless, this supranational structure was to be the blueprint for all future European projects. Apart from the supranational High Authority, the ECSC contained various institutional innovations of lasting importance such as a Common Assembly and a Court of Justice (Waever 2004: 168). In addition, the ECSC helped to create a European atmosphere among the member-state leaders and paved the way for the creation of the EEC in 1957 (Urwin 1995:56).

From the ECSC to the EEC
Although neo-functionalist theory advocated a more or less automated spill-over of integration into other economic sectors, it became apparent as the 1950s progressed, that the six founding members of the ECSC were in no rush to progress the sectoral integration by including new economic sectors into the network (Urwin 1995:59). Instead, the next integration initiative was partly set in motion by a US proposal, made against the backdrop of the Cold and the Korean Wars, to integrate West Germany into the Western Alliance. This caused distress among many European countries, most notably France, who was not ready for German rearmament (Nugent 2003:38). Therefore, in 1950, the French Prime Minister René Pleven (1901-1993) proposed the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) as a possible solution to the problem (Dedman 1996:74).

As before with the ECSC, Britain stated that she was not interested in joining the proposed EDC due to its supranational character, especially after Germany suggested that a successful EDC should be subordinated to a European Political Community (EPC) that would co-ordinate foreign and defence policies (Urwin 1995:64). In the end, the attempts to create a common defence policy proved abortive and the plan finally failed in 1954 when the French parliament declined to sign the agreement (George 1991:62). As a result, German rearmament was subsequently organised
within the framework of NATO. Shortly after, in 1957, the Saar region was returned to Germany after a referendum in the Saar rejected the ‘Europeanisation’ of the area (Kitchen 2006:333). In the ensuing climate of French-German rapprochement, European integration could resume and gain new heights in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in addition to the ECSC.

Both the EEC and EURATOM treaties had a functional design and were modelled on the ECSC in the hope that the economic integration might spill over into the political sphere. One of the main goals of the EEC was the establishment of a common market as well as the creation of an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Heywood 2002:148). To achieve its goals, the EEC was furnished with a supranational structure based on the ECSC model with the general split between executive, legislative and judicature. The EEC executive, the Commission, was comprised of nine commissioners who had to swear an oath of loyalty to the European Community instead of serving national interests (Urwin 1995:81). The Commission’s role was to be the principle policy initiator, but with fewer powers than the ECSC High Authority to impose decisions on the EEC member states (Nugent 2003:43). Any Commission proposals had to be accepted by the Council of Ministers, the main decision making institution, before they could become EEC law (George 1991:5). In addition there was a European Parliamentary Assembly, later the European Parliament, which was initially indirectly elected and had a largely consultative role (Dedman 1996:96). Finally a European Court of Justice was set up to interpret the Treaty and make sure that the other organs were fulfilling their obligations (Urwin 1995:83).

The first years of EEC operation were rather promising especially since both the economic and the political climate in the late 1950s and early 1960s were favourable to European integration. The overall economic boom with the Wirtschaftwunder in Germany and the trente glorieuses in France as well as the successes of the EEC and continued rapprochement between France and
Germany promoted economic growth in a variety of sectors (Ladrech 2000:30). Politically, the situation was much improved by the continued rapprochement between France and Germany within an overall more relaxed global climate (Urwin 1995:86-7). “In short, progress in the first years after 1957 was sufficiently gratifying to all who had backed the formation of the EEC, and sufficient to oblige other states to take more account of it” (Urwin 1995:87).

In 1967 the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM were formally merged (by the so called Merger Treaty) into the European Community (EC) with a single Council of Ministers and a single Commission for all three Communities (Nugent 2003:57). However, by the mid 1960s, the optimism surrounding European integration was stifled as the global and European political and economic climate worsened caused by for example the new USA-USSR hostility following the Cuba crisis and the slowing of economic growth (Urwin 1995:103). Within the EEC, several governments, including Germany and Italy, were opening up to more leftwing parties while the conservative Christian-Democrats (who traditionally supported European integration) declined.

4.4  The era of Intergovernmentalism: European integration from the 1960s to the mid 1980s

Enlargement, Gaullism and the turn to Intergovernmentalism

In 1961, Britain’s Prime Minister Macmillan announced that Britain would apply for EEC membership (Rubinstein 2003:267). Since the late 1940s and early 1950s, Britain’s pet project for Western Europe had been a restricted inter-governmental co-operation in form of an industrial free trade area with no surrounding external tariff and no supranational/political structure except possibly an executive administrative body (Waever 2004:166). This so-called ‘Grand Design’ collapsed in 1958 due to a lack of support from the Europe of the Six who decided to go with the EEC instead (Urwin 1995:94). Subsequently, Britain and six other European countries formed in 1959 the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), effectively dividing Western
Europe economically into the EEC and EFTA. However, EFTA seemed to be short-lived when only a year after its formation, three of its members states including Britain applied for membership of the EEC.⁹

Macmillan was a fairly dedicated European, although he and many other conservative ministers were opposed to the implied limitations on British sovereignty (Rubinstein 2003:267). Nevertheless, the EEC and European cooperation offered an alternative of success in the face of apparent political and economic decline. As Rubinstein (2003:268) explains, Europe offered a replacement for the Commonwealth, now an outmoded vehicle for asserting British power, while for others the EEC represented the economic equivalent of NATO (without the USA) and as such “...the economic facet of European democracy’s defence against Soviet Communism”. In addition, the nature and status of the ‘special relationship’ with the USA had weakened (Nugent 2003:26). Nevertheless, the decision to co-operate with ‘Europe’ remained controversial ever since, especially whenever further threats to British sovereignty occurred (or were perceived) (Rubinstein 2003:268).

Despite a general positive attitude towards EEC enlargement, France under Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application for membership in 1963 (and also the second application in 1967). Officially, de Gaulle objected to British membership due to the strong Anglo-American relationship. De Gaulle feared that the US influence in Europe would increase should Britain enter the EEC. However, de Gaulle also feared that the British would threaten French supremacy on the continent and decrease her influence within the EEC. As he put it in a French statement on 16 May 1967:

“[..] Compared with the motives that led the Six to organize their unit, we understand for what reasons, why Britain—who is not continental, who remains, because of the Commonwealth and because she is an island, committed far beyond the seas, who is tied to the United States by all kinds of special agreements—did not merge into a Community with

⁹ In 2005, the remaining members of EFTA were Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, although Norway has applied in the past to join the EU while the other three countries are considering application.
set dimensions and strict rules. While this Community was taking shape, Britain therefore first refused to participate in it and even took toward it a hostile attitude as if she saw in it an economic and political threat. [...]” (Modern History Sourcebook 1998b:1)

De Gaulle (2003:34) opposed the idea of Britain “…dragging the West into an Atlantic system which would be totally incompatible with a European Europe [...].” In fact, de Gaulle had ambitious plans for the EEC himself including a restructure in order to increase intergovernmental co-operation and to weaken the supranational elements. De Gaulle, although superficially favouring greater political co-operation, wished to base this co-operation purely on a perceived national interest and not on a commitment to a united Western Europe (George 1991:11). Thus, de Gaulle’s ideal was an intergovernmental ‘Europe of the States’ under French leadership, instead of a more or less federal ‘European State’ (Urwin 1995:105). It has even been argued that de Gaulle regarded the EEC simply as an intergovernmental instrument to safeguard French interests in Europe (Mikkeli 1998:121).

In 1965 the mounting tensions between France and the EEC culminated in the so-called “empty chair crisis” when France withdrew from EEC business mostly due to disagreements over the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) (George 1991:11). By blocking all Community business, de Gaulle hoped to enforce his intergovernmental vision of the European future. Internal pressures on de Gaulle, however, to resolve the situation were also mounting and the French elections clearly indicated that parts of the French population (especially the farming community) were not too happy with de Gaulle’s anti-European policy (Urwin 1995:113).

The crisis came to an end in 1966 with the Luxembourg compromise, which effectively enshrined the sovereignty of the member states (Heywood 2002:148). One of the most important outcomes was the institutionalisation of the national right to veto whereby in future a member-state had the right to veto any matters that would have a negative impact on vital national interests.
This was a clear reminder of the relative fragility of the EEC and the continued importance of national self-interests and state structure in Western Europe. It demonstrated that member-states would question the nature of economic and political integration in Europe in a bid to secure their sovereignty and national interests although most had acknowledged by now that unilateralism was not beneficial in the climate of increased global economic competition and the Cold War. The Treaty of Rome had already expressed an uncertainty about the structure of the EEC that resulted in a mixture of federal and intergovernmental elements. The compromise in 1966 “...effectively swung the balance towards intergovernmentalism” (Urwin 1995:130).

The events of the 1960s and the resurgence of nationalism ended the dominance of supranational neo-functionalist philosophy. Neo-functionalism was subjected to a gradual demise and revision. It was criticised for example for its underestimation of the residual power of nation statehood and the national preferences that remain at the very heart of the regional process (George 1991:29). The 1960s crisis showed the limitations of this cooperation, although the member states continued to be engaged in a unique form of transnational co-operation (O’Neill 1996:50). Another criticism of neo-functionalism was that it failed to take into account the wider international dimension (George 1991:32-33). After 1965 when “…the member states reasserted their hold on the Community process, and caution if not rising pessimism about the project began to prevail over the earlier mood of expectancy, the theoretical initiative moved elsewhere…A new model centred on intergovernmentalism began to dominate […]” (O’Neill 1996:45).

Intergovernmentalism is closely related to realism and neo-realism. Intergovernmentalists believe in state interaction on the basis of sovereign independence, whereby sovereignty is preserved through a process of unanimous decision-making that allows states to veto at least over matters of

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10 This national right to veto would remain in place until 2001, when the Treaty of Nice extended qualified majority voting and abolished the national right to veto in some areas.
11 Both of which argue that states are the basic units in global politics, a fact that was considered unlikely to change by integration projects (Rosamond 2000:76).
national importance (Heywood 2002:148) as has been institutionalised by the Luxembourg compromise. The Intergovernmentalists argued that the tensions in the 1960s arose because European integration was taken into areas of controversy were further integration would challenge the autonomy of the governments. In other words, "...areas of key importance, where national interests were deemed to be at stake" (Rosamond 2000:77). Neo-functionalism, it was concluded, had under-estimated these forces by supposing that nationalism would cease to exist eventually as the supranational institutions would take over the loyalty of the affected population (Rosamond 2000:78).

From the 1960s, intergovernmentalism came to characterise European integration and had powerful supporters such as Margaret Thatcher (in the 1980s), who used the national veto somewhat excessively (Budge et al 2001:91). Intergovernmentalism was then even further embedded in European integration through the creation of the European Council in 1969, which was effectively a regulated summit meeting of the heads of national governments, coming together thrice annually with a rotating presidency (Urwin 1995:174). The Council was in the position to lay down new guidelines for future EC progress and resolve disputes between member-states. The decisions of the Council were characterised by interest trade-offs and compromises without aspiring to be a supranational institution (Urwin 1995:175).

The Council of Europe and global interdependence

The intergovernmental turn in European integration can also be illustrated by the summit meetings of the early 1970s. The summit meetings served to reaffirm the belief in European economic and political integration although they were basically intergovernmental meetings. As Urwin (1995:164) puts it "...the first summit meeting of the Nine in Paris in 1972 simply confirmed that the institutional matrix of the EC had undergone a fundamental shift in structure, with the Commission being more obviously treated at best as a partner of national governments rather than a supranational entity." The new approach to European integration was in many ways the opposite of federalist
hopes and was to dominate EC policies until at least the mid-1980s (Urwin 1995:164).

The summit meeting came about after one of the main obstacles to EEC progress, Charles de Gaulle, had been replaced in 1969 by Georges Pompidou as French President. Pompidou immediately called for a summit of the six heads of states in The Hague. One of the decisive catalysts for the summit was the new Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) of the German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Ostpolitik was primarily an effort to open up the East European countries to Western economic and cultural influences while maintaining and accepting the bipolar status quo (Calleo 2001:104). The German attempt of reconciliation with the Soviet bloc had renewed fears of German power within the French government. Germany on the other hand was eager to accept the proposals for closer European co-operation as a means to illustrate Germany’s commitment to peace and to gain support for the Ostpolitik.

The Hague summit’s main progress was that it accepted the enlargement of the EEC, which had been so effectively blocked by de Gaulle (Dedman 1996:119). The agreement on enlargement was in best intergovernmental tradition a trade-off that did not come to pass because France was eager to have Britain as a member, but because France could bargain for a re-financed CAP in return. Subsequently, Britain along with Ireland and Denmark became full members of the EEC, while Norway decided against membership (Urwin 1995:144). The British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, was committed to Britain’s entry into the EEC, which he considered to be a collective economic entity, a replacement to the empire and a potential power block to rival America and Russia (Rubinstein 2003:295). Although mainstream opinion was in favour of joining the EEC, opposition came from anti-European Conservative and Labour factions who feared a loss of British sovereignty, the end of the advantages enjoyed by the Commonwealth and potential disadvantages for British agriculture. On a more emotive basis, there was also some residual anti-Catholicism to joining the largely Catholic EEC (Rubinstein 2003:299).
Another important point raised at the Hague Summit was the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a project that had been developed for some time and was considered to be a necessary prerequisite for a true economic community (Urwin 1995:154). EMU was thought to follow the rules of spill-over as it was argued that the full potential of a customs union could not be achieved without fiscal and tax harmonisation or even a single currency (Urwin 1995:154). The main contributors to the European Monetary System (EMS) in the late 1970s were Helmut Schmidt (German Chancellor 1974-1982) and Giscard d’Estaing (French President 1974-1981) (Calleo 2001:168). The EMS was eventually established in 1979 and had as its main purpose the protection and stabilisation of exchange rates.

However, enthusiasm for such ambitious economic projects was somewhat dampened by the economic crisis following the 1973 oil shock and subsequent national protection policies, which are to some degree comparable to the protectionism that had followed the 1930s depression. As a result, European integration stagnated during the later 1970s and the early 1980s when much time was spent on struggles over the budget and the highly controversial agricultural policy (Rosamond 2000:98). This stagnation was one of the main reasons for the growth of Euro-scepticism in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as British reservations towards the EC. It also caused the postponement of the administrative reforms that would emphasise the role of the European Parliament and the democratic decision-making process (Mikkeli 1998:126). The popular mood of the late 1970s and early 1980s was therefore characterised by perceptions of the EC being dominated by the controversial CAP and concerns about the growing bureaucracy in Brussels (Wæver 2004:176).

As already mentioned, at the same time neo-functionalism was criticised for failing to put European integration into the wider global context. In the 1970s, it became apparent that many of the difficulties faced by the EC were related to factors that originated outside the EC, such as the oil crisis and the Cold War. Therefore, traditional European integration theories were substituted and partly replaced by the theory of interdependence, which
placed the EC within the global network instead of regarding it as an isolate state-centred phenomenon (Rosamond 2000:94).

In the meantime, the European Parliament (EP) in particular was not satisfied with the intergovernmental attitude to policy making. The EP hoped that it could boost its influence and status by pressing for direct elections, which had been provided for in the Treaty of Rome in Article 138. Until then, MEPs had been nominated by their national parliaments (Nugent 2003:212). Although especially the British and French governments were strongly opposed to the idea, the French Constitutional Court ruled in 1976 that direct elections would not present a challenge to national sovereignty as long as the power of the European Parliament would not be increased (Urwin 1995:167). Subsequently, the first direct elections were held in 1979. The elections, however, did little to increase the EPs status as European elections tended to be dominated by national issues and were often treated as an evaluation of the popularity of national governments and parties (Urwin 1995:170).

4.5 European integration revival in the 1980s and 1990s: European Union and the Single Currency

The Single European Act and the Single Market Programme
Although the final years of the 1970s had witnessed some integrationist developments such as the direct EP elections and the EMS, the EC continued to be suffering from considerable pessimism in the early 1980s (Stirk and Weigall 1999:243). This pessimism was largely due to the stagnation in the EC reform process as well as the generic economic recession that had resulted in growing unemployment in many EC member states. Despite this stagnation several attempts were made to revive the EC early in the 1980s, most notably the Genscher-Colombo Draft European Act in 1981 and Spinelli’s Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984. The most important initiative however was a series of meetings of the European Council in 1984 and 1985 when plans for institutional reform of the EC and for a single internal market by 31 December 1992 were agreed (Wæver 2004:176).
Several circumstances contributed to the revival of European integration and secured support for the single market project. The end of the Cold War and German unification considerably changed the environment in which the EC operated: "...within the originally limited geographic scope of the EC, the institutional arrangements, supported by the protective umbrella of the Atlantic Alliance and the self-restraint of a divided Germany, had helped to manage those disparities...[but] the unanticipated reunification of Germany and the opening up of [Eastern] Europe were forcing those disparities back on the agenda" (Stirk and Weigall 1999:284). Kohl's way of reassuring the other EC members was by stressing that a united Germany would still be a loyal member of the EC and NATO. Nevertheless, these external factors prompted the EC to seek consolidation and self-strengthening in order to be able to deal with the challenges of a restructured Europe (Nugent 2003:61). Some federalists even argued that "...the ending of the bipolar world within which the EC had grown up, and EFTA's drift towards it, made it possible, for the first time since 1945, to believe that the dreams of pre-war federalists such as Coudenhove-Kalergi of a united Europe [...] might be on the threshold of realization" (Urwin 1995:244).

Internal factors included the support from the Franco-German axis, which had for a long time formed the cornerstone of the EC, enshrining the reconciliation of the two states as well as being the locomotive that pulled the EC forward (Stirk and Weigall 1999:274-275). The two main protagonists were the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French Prime Minister Francois Mitterrand, who advocated institutional reform in form of Treaty amendment and called in 1990 for an intergovernmental conference on political union which would run alongside a conference on economic and monetary union (Stirk and Weigall 1999:245+275). At the same time, in 1984, the decidedly pro-European Jacques Delors was appointed President of the Commission. He pursued a revitalisation of European integration and envisaged a People's Europe in which Europeans could come to regard the EU as a second homeland (Delors 2003:62). Thus the Single Market was not only chosen for economic reasons. As Stirk and Weigall (1999:246) point out: "...the fact that efforts to counter the malaise of Eurosclerosis, and to inject
new optimism into both the European Community and the idea of regional integration, crystallized around the idea of completing the market through 'Europe 1992' and institutional reform was no accident". Indeed, the common market appealed not only to the governments, but also to manufacturers. With the increasing global competition from the early 1980s onward, the fragmentation of Western European economy was regarded as a real problem (Stirk and Weigall 1999:246).

Although there was some resistance to the project, most notably from the UK, the Commission's final proposal on the Single Market was published in the 1985 White Paper entitled 'Completing the Internal Market', which recommended around three hundred measures that needed to be addressed to enable the Single Market (Stirk and Weigall 1999:247). At around the same time the Dooge report recommended a series of institutional reforms, which found opposition among several member states including Britain (Stirk and Weigall 1999:247). In 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) came into effect. It laid down the timetable for the completion of the internal market that would provide for the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital by 1992 (Rosamond 2000:99). The SEA also incorporated a number of policy areas such as environment and research into the EEC Treaty and gave legal recognition to European Political Cooperation and to the summit meetings (Nugent 2003:59).

Furthermore, as Nugent (2003:60-61) points out, the SEA also addressed some persistent and unresolved issues including the 'democratic deficit', which was "...increasingly seen as needing attention as the Community exercised ever more power over a broad range of policy areas but in a political context where its decision-makers were not democratically accountable". This problem, especially in relation to popular support and European identity, will be addressed in further detail in the next chapter. The institutional reform of the SEA, however, was not as far-reaching as many reports had demanded, but it was a "...reasonable comprehensive attempt [...] to streamline some of its activities" (Urwin 1995:234). The institutional reforms were limited to the introduction of majority voting and the creation of co-
decision procedure with the EP and left many, who had lobbied for more substantial changes, disappointed (Stirk and Weigall 1999:248).

Nevertheless, the importance of the SEA, especially with regard to the internal market, must not be underestimated. As Stirk and Weigall (1999:249) put it: "...the adoption of the single market programme was ... a catalyst for a new phase of European integration which was, together with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, to transform the agenda of the Community and wider Europe". Nugent (2003:59) described the SEA as a "...major boost to the European integration process".

For example, the SEA sparked a renewal of interest in monetary union. For those, who supported further European integration, a monetary union was a logical consequence of the Single Market. Neo-functionalists thought that the internal market carried high spill-over expectations for a single currency and single monetary authority with all the necessary political implications (Rosamond 2000:99). Many federalists were equally enthusiastic and hailed the monetary union as a first step towards a European federation (Stirk and Weigall 1999:251). As Rosamond (2000:103) describes it: "...the single market programme also prompted a partial resuscitation of federalist theory and of normative arguments about the desirability of a constitutional settlement to accompany the deepening of the integration process".

This apparent deepening of European integration implied by the proposed monetary union caused considerable controversy among the member states. Especially the more Euro-sceptical members such as Britain were anxious to avoid the transfer of currency authority to the EC. Although differences remained between the states with regards to EMU content and implementation, all EC members (apart from the UK) agreed to the framework outlined by the Delors Committee in their 1989 Report on Economic and Monetary Union (Nugent 2003:306). The plan set up a three stage progression, which would eventually lead to a single currency, and was endorsed against strong British reservations (Stirk and Weigall 1999:252). Nevertheless it was acknowledged that the EMU would probably not involve
all member states, some of which might not be able to join, while others would not be willing to (Stevens 2000:154).

The Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the European Union

Alongside the scheme for EMU, a three pillared structure was suggested for the proposed European Union (EU) consisting of the existing EC (plus the EMU), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Co-operation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Stirk and Weigall 1999:276). The resulting Treaty on European Union (TEU, also commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty) was as such a revision of the existing treaties. Several issues had to be dealt with separately while special allowances were made for Britain over the single currency and the Social Charter, which effectively meant that the Treaty met on the lowest common denominator although the EC competence was extended in a variety of areas (Urwin 1995:254-256). Therefore the Maastricht Treaty opened up the possibilities for opt-outs and a 'Europe à la carte'. It has been warned that this 'multi-velocity' integration could easily lead to new divisions in Europe, to the creation a second class member states and to disruptions to European integrity (Stirk and Weigall 1999:281). At the same time, many Eastern European states announced their desire to apply for accession to the EU, which counted fifteen members at the time the TEU was ratified.

The new European Union (EU) committed its members to both political and monetary union explicitly aiming to create an 'ever closer union' (Heywood 2002:148). The phrase 'ever closer union' replaced the proposed 'federal union' after repeated British complaints (Nugent 2003:63). Some of the main innovations of the TEU included (apart from the EMU) an increase of the power of the European Parliament and the acknowledgment of the general principle of subsidiary (Stirk and Weigall 1999:277). Subsidiarity refers to "...the transfer of decision-making from central to peripheral bodies" and is "...the principle that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level" (Heywood 2002:432). Interestingly, both intergovernmentalists and federalist evoked the principle of subsidiary; the former to restrict the actions of the EU (to areas that cannot sufficiently be
dealt with by the member states) and the latter to increase the power of the regions and ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen (Stirk and Weigall 1999:277). European citizenship was also introduced by the Maastricht Treaty whereby every citizen of a member state automatically became a citizen of the EU. The significance of EU citizenship, especially in relation to the democratic deficit and European identity will be examined in the following chapter.

The EU and the nation state
As Heywood (2002:148) illustrates, the new EU is rather difficult to categorise as it has both intergovernmental and supranational features whereby EU law is binding on the member states and the power of some EU institutions has been expanded at the expense of the member state governments. The mixed intergovernmental and supranational elements of the EU led theorists to realise that the traditional prognoses regarding the future final structure of ‘Europe’ (either a federal supranational state or an intergovernmental organisation) were perhaps no longer valid. With the foundation of the European Union, it has become evident that integration now permeated into areas of politics, which had so far been considered by many as prerogatives of the state. The level of sovereignty transfer required by the TEU was considered by many as ambiguous or even problematic, as sovereignty, by definition, is considered to be absolute and indivisible. These issues are best illustrated with the example of the EMU. As mentioned above, the proposal for monetary union had sparked considerable controversy, reflecting “...the fact that [...] the EC remained a grouping of nation states with conventional national interests (Stirk and Weigall 1999:251). Although many hailed EMU as a ‘stepping-stone’ to the creation of some kind of European state, others, especially British politicians, refused to acknowledge any potential political implications of EMU and consistently stated that the EMU was an economic matter (Shore 2000:93). Nevertheless, it could be argued that the EU with “...its single currency, its Central Bank and treaty control over money supply and borrowing, [...] takes on the powers of a sovereign state, albeit a transnational state without a democratic government [...]” (Shore 2000:94).
In light of this controversy, debate became soon dominated by the exploration of "...the fundamental question of the role of the nation-state and national governments, both as agents of integration and as plausible ways of organizing and ordering social and political life" (Rosamond 2000:105). In comparison to earlier decades, European integration theory was now in general more focused on the governance approach that analyses the multi-level policy making structures of the EU (Wiener and Diez 2004:9). The sensitive issue of sovereignty transfer was now often carefully described as 'multi-level governance' or in terms of autonomy rather than sovereignty (Rosamond 2000:155). Not surprisingly, these issues also led to fresh debates concerning the future development of the EU and the desirability of a constitutional settlement to accompany the integration process (Rosamond 2000:103).

4.6 The future of the EU

Overall, there was a loss of confidence in the first few years post-Maastricht. The EU struggled with a series of commitments and challenges including the potential wave of Eastern European membership applications, which urged the Copenhagen Council in 1993 to issue an official statement. It declared that Eastward enlargement was possible in theory if the potential member states could fulfil a series of requirements (European Council 1993).¹² The potential impact on the EU was so enormous that in 1994 the Essen Council agreed that any Eastern enlargement would not take place until the EU itself had undergone considerable institutional reforms (European Council 1994).

The extent and form of these reforms were vague and controversial. In general, Germany favoured a more federal Europe, while in 1996 France proposed the creation of a strong Europe without strong institutions (Stirk and Weigall 1999:282). The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999. The negotiations had

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¹² The requirements included: to be a stable democracy, respect human rights and the rule of law, protect minorities, have a functioning market economy, adopt common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law.
been speeded up by the 1997 government change in Britain and the more positive attitude of the new Labour government towards European integration (Nugent 2003:72). The Amsterdam Treaty amended, consolidated and renumbered the EU and EC treaties. Although it was an important treaty, it did not contain major reforms, which many found disappointing (Nugent 2003:80). Most importantly, it failed to resolve the crucial issue of institutional reform and contained no agreement on weighting of the votes in the Council or on the composition of the Commission (Stirk and Weigall 1999:283).

The Treaty of Amsterdam also failed to prepare the EU institutions for enlargement, which had to be addressed by the consecutive Treaty of Nice, which was signed on 26 February 2001 (Nelsen and Stubb 2003:67). It addressed institutional issues in preparation for enlargement and also provided the EP with further powers (Nugent 2003:92). Subsequently, the first group of new members (ten in total) joined the EU in 2004 with further enlargements scheduled for 2007 and beyond.

In addition to the enlargement, the final stage of the EMU has been completed and on 1 January 2002 the Euro coins enter circulation in the twelve participating member states. The single currency and the enlargement highlighted the fact that although the EU can now be described as an “economic heavyweight”, it still has a limited framework for political cooperation (Stirk and Weigall 1999:250). In a speech at Brussels on 9 October 2002 the President of the European Council, Romano Prodi, announced that:

" [...] enlargement is [...] important primarily for political and ethical reasons. Enlargement is the fulfilment of the European project. This project has given us half a century of peace and prosperity, and it should be extended to the whole continent. [...] We must understand that, without a radical and intelligent reform of the institutions, enlargement could turn out to be an unsustainable success. The new European Union needs a clear, stable geographical shape and institutional framework that is understood by all our citizens. In other words, the time has come for a European constitution [...] A constitution that guarantees the rights of all citizens and the role of the Member
States. A constitution that preserves cultural and linguistic diversity, while also reinforcing solidarity. A constitution that enshrines the creation of a democratic EU, a true union of peoples and states" (http://europa.eu.int/, accessed 23 May 2006).

Subsequently, in 2004, the member states, as well as the three applicant countries, signed and adopted the Treaty establishing the European Constitution. The aim of the constitution is to bring "...together for the first time the many treaties and agreements on which the EU is based. It defines the powers of the EU, stating where it can act and where the member states retain their right of veto. It also defines the role of the EU institutions"(http://news.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 23 May 2006). Prior to the ratification process, a special flash Eurobarometer survey on the Future European Constitution in 2004 showed that the majority of the population (77% in total, but only 51% in the UK - the lowest figure of all member states) in the member states supports a constitution, which is perceived to be important for the functioning of the EU institutions (European Commission 2004: 21). The same survey also showed that in total 71% of EU citizens felt badly informed about the constitution. The required ratification could not be completed as a referendum in France and the Netherlands in 2005 rejected the Treaty. Eurobarometer 64 showed that support for the concept of a European constitution remained high at overall 63% and has even risen in many member states (European Commission 2005: 23). As yet, it is too early to assess if the constitution will be ratified in the future or to analyse the potential impact of a EU constitution on European identity perceptions.

4.7 Conclusions

Post-1945 European integration was set in motion by the experience of both world wars, which occurred in relatively short succession; and the destruction caused by the Second World War, which had been on an unprecedented scale. It would seem that such cataclysmic events were necessary to launch the European idea, although, as this chapter has shown, the European states
in question would remain sceptical, to varying degrees, of relinquishing sovereignty and power to a supranational entity. In fact, the nation state as such, although discredited by many, was never in any real danger of being replaced by a radically different form of governance (such as a European Federation for example).

The architects of European integration soon realised that the federal approach of political integration was unrealistic and should be replaced by a more pragmatic, functional method. While previous schemes for European integration focussed almost solely on the political arena, now economic integration was chosen in the hope that co-operation in one sector might spill-over into related sectors and subsequently into the political sphere. Often referred to as the Monnet method of integration, it successfully completed a number of treaties, establishing both economic co-operation and supranational institutions. Hypothetically, one might even speculate that a similar approach of economic integration might have also been successful after the First World War, considering that several circumstances (such as the general French security policy in relation to Germany; the dismal state of the economy and the contentious issue of the Saar and Ruhr area) were similar both in 1918 and in 1945.

Although European integration, as predicted by neo-functionalist theory, has developed some self-propelling spill-over mechanisms, its speed and direction remains both vulnerable to external factors and, in end effect, determined by the member states. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s external factors such as the oil crisis and global economic depression triggered a new wave of national protectionism, which subsequently resulted in European policy being dominated by intergovernmentalism. European integration only picked up again in the 1980s and 1990s. Again, the reasons for this (including a favourable economic climate and the support of leading politicians) were not as such under the control of the EC (EU after 1992). In Britain, the Thatcher government was replaced by a more pro-European leadership and in Germany, Chancellor Kohl was anxious to progress European integration in the wake of German unification. Therefore, any
widening and deepening of European integration seems to rely to some degree on events and persons over which it does not, as such, have any control. This does explain partly why post-war European integration has progressed in leaps and bounds with interspersed intervals of stagnation.

Today, at the time of writing (2006), the EU encompasses a vast geographical area, spanning the European continent from the Atlantic far into the East. This is not just a geographical area, but also contains a multitude of cultures, languages and nations with great disparities. Some of these countries now share a single currency. Although it would be fair to say that the EU has never been more integrated, it has been pointed out that a set of central institutions does not necessarily add up to a political community. It has become apparent that European integration has so far been driven by elites, but it has been argued that the success of a potential federal Europe will depend on the “…EU’s ability to acquire democratic legitimacy and authority which, in turn, hinges on its capacity to forge a popular sense of belonging and loyalty to EU institutions and ideals” (Shore 2000:21). In other words it could be argued that further political integration, which is by no means desired by everyone concerned, can only be successful if it is based to a certain degree on popular support and a sense of popular identity with the EU, which will be the topic of the next chapter.
5. European identity

5.1 Introduction

So far it has been shown that European integration in the past usually followed the so-called Monnet method of functional and elite driven integration leading to the gradual establishment of a complex network of multi-level interactions. This top-down approach, it has frequently been argued, has resulted in strong EU institutions that now require "...an even stronger legitimacy" (Lipponen 2003:86). It would seem, however, that the neo-functionalist prediction of loyalty transfer and wider popular support, which would render the EU popular legitimacy, has not as yet materialised. As Lipponen (2003:86) pointed out in a speech given in 2000, the "...Monnet method does not reflect the reality of day-to-day politics. [...] The EU cannot be run as a functionalist elite-driven project, which is bureaucratically managed on the basis of a top-down philosophy". Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the lack of popular support and thus popular legitimacy can be related to the lack of direct lines of accountability between the decision-makers and the citizenry within the EU. Lipponen (2003:85) claimed that the "...alienation from the people which is due to lack of democratic legitimacy, lack of transparency and too much bureaucracy [...]" is one of the fundamental problems of the EU. As the Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2005:table annex) shows, in 2005 a total of 59% of European citizens thought that their voice did not count in Europe and 72% did not feel involved in European affairs.

Shore (2000:226) explains that it is generally accepted by many theorists that decision-making in the EU is somewhat undemocratic and rather the result of "...covert deals, bargaining and compromises struck between Ministers and their permanent representatives in the Council of Ministers, conducted behind closed doors". The European Parliament is, according to Shore (2000:226), not a legislature as such and does not elect a government. It could even be said that it would be misleading to speak of a democratic
deficit, since, according to some, the EU was explicitly constructed as a non-democratic structure (Hobsbawrn 1997:268). The existing system of indirect representation would probably be sufficient if there were reasons to believe that the majority of citizens are supportive of the integration process and content to leave the decision-making processes to the appropriate elites. Public opinion polls, however, have suggested that the EU currently lacks the tangibility and intelligibility that would enable it to capture the imagination and therefore gain the voluntary support of its citizens (Graham 1998a:12). In fact, the lack of popular enthusiasm is often described as one of the most striking features of the history of integration (Stirk 1996:287). For example, indicative results of the latest Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2005:9), have shown that only half (50%) of European citizens think that their country's membership of the EU is a good thing.

As Shore (2000:19) argued, Europeans essentially have not embraced the 'European idea' as anticipated or hoped for. It is important to note in this context, that the EU task, that is how to transform a 'Europe of the elites' into a 'Europe of the people', does not simply entail increasing popular support, but also creating a European public per se (Shore 2000:19). The European institutions' legitimacy rests on their claim to represent not only the member states, but also the European public or demos, which, however, barely exists as a self-recognising entity (Shore 2000:19). According to Eurobarometer 64, although on average 48% of EU citizens consider themselves to be both a national of their own country and a European, 41% identify only with their own nationality (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005:3). Not surprisingly, the national leaders decided at a meeting in 1992 that "...the EC had to become more open and receptive to public opinion" (Urwin 1995:258). This decision was taken after the rejection of the TEU by the 1992 Danish referendum, which was a wake-up call for the EC, which had so far been "...unaccustomed to popular revolts" (Urwin 1995:257). Another referendum in France only just approved the TEU with a narrow majority of 51% (Urwin 1995:258).
Shore (2000:20) states that "...the essential ingredient that is missing from the European Union is the political identification of the peoples of Europe". Graham (1998b:42) agrees and argues that the successful integration of Europe and the formation of a European public might demand an iconography of identity that would complement national, regional and local identities. The EU takes the same view and argues, for example in the 1993 Green Paper on the European dimension of education (COM (93) 457 final), that Europe is not a dimension that replaces others, but one that enhances them. As Feneyrou (1993:37) points out "...introducing the European dimension into our lives does not entail conflict with other levels of belonging". Van Oudenaren (2000:16) believes that the extent to which a European identity emerges will determine in part how successful the EU will be in managing the conflicting demands of deepening and widening European integration. Nugent (2003:502) even argues that the absence of a firm common identity would make it very difficult to construct and maintain a strong and fully effective political system. It is possible that the growing impact of the EU on the daily life of its citizens, for example through the introduction of a common currency, may lead to greater solidarity between its citizens (Anderson 1991:47). However, as pointed out above, there has been so far no significant shift in political loyalty or popular sentiment (Shore 2000:18). National identity in the EU member states is yet to be rivalled by a sense of European solidarity (Anderson 1991:46).

5.2 European identity

Definitions of political identity

The concept of identity is usually highly ambiguous, multi-layered and artificial; generally incorporating values, beliefs and aspirations, which are used to construct structures of sameness, identifying individuals with like-minded people while excluding others. In general, recognisability takes precedence over reality, the response happens because something is familiar and not because it is known to be true (Spiering 1996:119). Identity itself, as an image of association and self-projection, is usually made up of several separate identifications, some of which may be contradictory, some may be
stronger and most will change over time (Wintle 1996b:22). Similarly, with regards to political identity, Graham (1998a:2) argues that identities, and their defining criteria, overlap in complex ways and on different geographical scales and are perhaps best visualised as a multiplicity of superimposed layers. Thus, individuals can identify in the political-cultural sense with imagined (and potentially conflicting) communities at a variety of scales: supranational, national and sub-national. At the same time, identity does not always remain territorially fixed or exclusive through time (Graham 1998b:42).

As discussed in previous chapters, the predominant form of political-cultural identity in modern Western Europe to date is national identity, although people retain a multiplicity of allegiances or identities, which may reinforce or weaken this national identity (Smith 1999:229). Since the end of the Second World War, nation states and national identity in Western Europe have been increasingly challenged to some extent by supranational or global developments on the one hand and regionalism on the other. For the purpose of this study, this chapter will concentrate on the impact of new political structures in Western Europe, namely the EU, on established networks of governance and political-cultural identities. Of crucial importance are hereby the interdependencies of democracy, legitimacy in political governance, popular support and political identity, which may yield the argument for a European identity.

European identity, legitimacy and the democratic deficit
Traditionally, the nation state's claim to legitimacy is often based on aspirations to unity of a largely heterogeneous population in terms of public culture, political community as well as popular sovereignty (Smith 1999:232). In turn, the links between state and community are re-forged and disseminated for example through rituals and ceremonies, political myths and symbols, the arts and history textbooks (Smith 1999:233). If one would apply such concepts to the EU, it could be argued that a legitimate and democratic EU would require a similarly integrated public sphere with a common political culture; a civil society with interest associations; non-governmental organisations and an appropriate party system (Habermas 1997:263). It could
also be argued that this is not the case at present and that European integration continues to be driven ahead by engaged political actors and other elites on behalf of the population. For example, since the Council of Ministers continues to make the most important EU decisions, it could be said that EU policy is decided mostly by agents, who have their reference point, as far as legitimisation and responsibility goes, in the member states and not in the EU (Grimm 1997:249). It follows, according to Stirk (1996:288) that the popular legitimacy of the EU remains dependent on the domestic legitimacy of those elites. The EU, however, is not just an inter-governmental institution of the traditional type, but has sovereign rights conveyed to it by the member states that it exercises with direct effect without being a state itself (Habermas 1997:259). Following the Maastricht Treaty, which increased the EU institutional competence, the need to establish direct democratic legitimisation for European policies, and not one derived from member-state governments, has become vital to the survival of the EU (Grant 1998:160).

As already pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, many theorists argue that the EU was not originally devised as a democratic institution. Indeed, according to Stirk (1996:288), the few feeble existing democratic provisions, such as the direct elections to the European Parliament, were added as an afterthought. It has also been claimed that the democratic deficit had arisen because

"(1)...of transfers of sovereignty to the community level where decisions are taken in secret and often by the unaccountable Council; (2) due to the still rather minor role of the European Parliament, the only Community institution directly and democratically elected, but one with comparatively marginal involvement in the EU legislative process; (3) because the executive power of the Community lies exclusively with the Commissions and the Council" (Dunkerley et al 2002:15).

Since the 1970s, the creation of a European identity has often been seized upon as a possible mean to address the democratic deficit. It was

13 in the modern sense of a constitutional state characterised by a monopoly on violence and a domestically and internationally recognised sovereignty as discussed in Chapter One
thought that the construction of a European identity, of whichever description, could raise levels of popular support which in turn would remedy the situation where increasing political integration without adequate democratic provision has led to a lack of political legitimacy. Several key texts from the 1970s and 1980s directly address the issue: the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration concerning European identity, the 1975 Tindemann Report on European Union, the 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union and the 1984 Adonnino Report (Wintle 1996b:10). The 1975 Tindemann Report is broadly recognised as one of the first significant EU statements on the importance of promoting a European identity. The Adonnino Report recommended, as part of a ‘People’s Europe’ campaign, the adoption of European symbols. Subsequently, in 1985 a standardised European passport was introduced as well as a flag and an anthem, all of which are traditional icons of the nation state. The issue was taken up by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, declaring in article 128(1): “...the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore” (http://europa.eu.int/, accessed 12/01/2006). This was followed by the 1993 De Clerq Report which focussed on the necessity of more effective communication of ‘Europe’ to its citizens (Dunkerley et al 2002:117). In 2002, the common currency, another traditional symbol of national unity, was introduced in most of the EU member-states.

The introduction of these European symbols has been accompanied by public campaigns designed to raise public awareness, promote the symbols as ‘European’ icons and generate a sense of ‘us’ Europeans hoping that awareness and familiarity would produce support (Dunkerley et al 2002:118). However, as Grant (1998:161) puts it “...attempts at creating a community by providing more information, telephone hot-lines and web sites [...] are scarcely sufficient, nor do they impact on the vast majority of the EU’s population”. Shore (2000:226) agrees and somewhat dismisses these manufactured efforts as being unable to capture popular loyalty. He believes that, to be effective, these symbols must be meaningful and should only come after political legitimacy has been established.
Symbols of national identity on the other hand are meaningful to its members as they derive from and express a deep-rooted sense of belonging based on a variety of factors, as discussed in Chapter Two, such as ethnic, cultural, linguistic or civic ties. Although the creation of European symbols might have been to some extent successful, they seem to lack this foundation for identity formation. Grant (1998:161) states that "...the EU entirely lacks [...] an overarching origin-myth to underpin its legitimacy, and it may prove impossible to create and rationalize one ex post facto [...]". European identity appears to be ineffective and superficial, a "...utopian dream of intellectuals and idealists with little chance of mobilising mass consciousness" (Shore 2000:17). It is therefore not only the lack of democratic provision or popular support that creates a democratic deficit, but also the lack of a European people, demos or community which would be represented by the European democracy. Therefore what obstructs democracy in the EU is not only the lack of cohesion of EU citizens as a people, but also their weakly developed collective identity and low capacity for trans-national discourse (Grimm 1997:255). This also means that the democratic deficit could not simply be removed by institutional reform, such as the creation of democratic structures (Grimm 1997:255).

Generally speaking, it is often proposed that European legitimacy and identity should be bound into a complex political system whereby the EU, the member states and to some extent the regions share sovereignty and thus legitimacy. As explained in Chapter One, it is still uncertain if sovereignty and political legitimacy can be shared in this way and if such a European identity can be created (Grant 1998:161). Again, the term 'creation' implies that the formation of a European identity would have to rely heavily on stimulus from above, a reflection of the artificial nature of the EU itself. However, before debating possible means of creating a European identity, the possible characteristics of such a European identity need to be discussed.
5.3 Approaches to European identity

Some European politicians have argued that a clearly distinct European identity is needed in order to give the EU a solid socio-intellectual and cultural base (Boxhoorn 1996:133). The problem, however, of how to define Europe and a European identity has occupied politicians, historians and geographers for centuries (Phillips 2003:81). In general, as Soysal (2002:2) points out, 'Europe' in itself, never mind a European identity, is a "really diffuse idea", that can be understood in a variety of meanings such as geographical, cultural or political, neither of which always overlap with the territory of the EU. Some say that a European identity should consist of the diversity of cultures in Europe ('unity in diversity' being the official EU statement), while others claim that this diversity will in fact be a stumbling block to the unification process (Boxhoorn 1996:133). Although there are many quite different theories regarding the creation, definition and characteristics of European identity, many theorists tend to agree that there is something, no matter how elusive, that brings Europeans at least partially together (Wintle 1996b:12).

As with national identity, one can distinguish two general approaches to European identity. The cultural approach is mainly concerned with attempts to establish a shared cultural platform upon which a uniquely European identity could be build. The civic approach on the other hand proposes that, especially in light of the controversies surrounding the cultural approach, European identity should be more closely linked to citizenship. In practice, most theorists advocate a mixed approach that combines cultural and civic elements.

Cultural European identity

As opposed to the mere geographical or even the geo-political concept of Europe, the idea of Europe can be understood as an essentially cultural construct that cannot as such claim universal validity (Delanty 1995:12). Or, in other words, "...Europe is not so much a place as an idea. [...] Europe is not only a neutral geographical term but a word expressing a sense of group
identity, a form of collective consciousness not unlike national consciousness [...] or the sense of belonging to a particular age group or generation.” (Burke 1980:21). This often idealised and contentious view of Europe as an identifiable entity with specific European values and culture rooted in a shared history can be found among many advocates of European integration, who believe that “...transcending the differences, divergences and conflicts between peoples and states there has long been a certain commonality and identity of interest in Europe based on interrelationships between geography and historical, political, economic, social and cultural developments” (Nugent 2003:9).

However, a potential European cultural identity, which would be more than the sum total of its constituent cultures, is not easy to pinpoint despite the numerous shared experiences that would have had a formative influence (Wintle 1996a:1-2). As Graham (1998b:43) explains, European identity would have to embrace and accentuate notions of 'multiculturalism', striving to be inclusive of all the continent's peoples in the sense that multiculturalism “...provides the only viable basis for a meaningful axis of European identity”. An ideal European identity would not subsume other (national and regional) identities but instead be “...reflective of the complex dismantling of the synonymy of territoriality, sovereignty, nationalism and the state in the new Europe” (Graham 1998b:45).

Smith (1999:240) lists a variety of shared characteristics and experiences that may be useful to the development of a European identity and may count as uniquely European. Firstly, the vast majority of European languages are Indo-European and belong as such to a common linguistic group. Secondly, there are few geographical barriers that interrupt the protected geopolitical space between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, although any territorial classification is contentious, especially in relation to the Eastern borders of Europe. Thirdly, Christianity is often attributed to be a European characteristic, despite the prior division into Western and Eastern Churches, the internal split following the Reformation and the existence of large non-Christian groups in many modern European countries. Other shared
traditions and heritages, which are often cited as European values, include Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, the Renaissance, humanism, rationalism, empiricism, romanticism and classicism. Smith (1999:242) argues that together these form not a "unity in diversity" but a "family of cultures" made up of partially shared historical traditions and cultural heritages. The distribution of these factors across Europe, however, is highly variable and some member-states or cultures share particular traditions only marginally. Furthermore many belong to the sphere of high culture, reflecting the aspirations and perspectives of the intelligentsia and not of the mass population (Schlesinger 1994:321). In fact, according to a study entitled How European see themselves (European Commission 2000:12), only a minority of 38% of EU citizens agreed that a shared European cultural identity exists (49% disagreed).

In addition, all these traditions and values cannot mask the fact that Europeans arguably differ from each other as much as from non-Europeans in respect of language, territorial characteristics, religion, economic and political system as well as in terms of ethnicity and culture. Furthermore, although these values may have originated in Europe, and can thus be regarded as historical European achievements, today they no longer represent strictly European values. Therefore, the universality of these values makes it near impossible, according to Soysal (2002:2), to define a territorially and culturally bounded European identity, especially as Europe fails to create a cultural and symbolic 'other'. The existence of such an 'other' might be necessary, as Barrett's (1992:351) findings reveal, since identity or self-categorisation is usually activated vis-à-vis the 'other' or within a comparative context. However, the creation of such an 'other' is ambiguous and may involve membership restrictions as well as potential notions of superiority in comparison to those excluded. Moreover, the idea of constructing a European cultural identity often produces fears that this might be an attempt to replace existing regional and national cultural identities.
Civic European identity
Considering the controversial nature of a cultural European identity, many authors suggest a different approach. Weiler (1997:287) for example argues, that the concept of a European demos should not be based on imagined or real trans-European cultural affinities, shared histories or the construction of a European 'national myth'. Instead, a civic approach might be more suitable whereby European identity is based on European citizenship. In this case, European identity can be understood as a "...loose confection of civic ideas", such as democracy or human rights, which would differ from traditional national identity, which is normally at least to some degree bound to national histories, cultures or territories (Soysal 2002:2).

According to Isin and Wood (1999:4), citizenship can be described as both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual's membership in a polity. According to this definition, citizenship literally provides an identity that is shared with others carrying similar papers (Spiering 1996:114). In this respect, citizenship serves as an identity marker that "...simultaneously 'brands' the population that is to be governed whilst reminding individuals of their nationality and the state to which they belong" (Shore 2000:71). Could this also work for the European Union?

European Union citizenship was officially introduced on 1 November 1993, but created neither enthusiasm nor anxiety among the new citizens, most of whom "...were either unmoved by or unaware of it" (Shore 2000:67). EU citizenship was designed firstly to improve the status of nationals residing in a member state other than their own. Secondly, it was intended to help reduce the democratic deficit and to form the basis for European identity construction. It was thought that EU citizenship would encourage individual member state nationals to feel part of the integration process, thereby enhancing the political legitimacy of the EU and ensuring that there is sufficient consensus among the peoples of Europe to allow the integration process to proceed (O'Leary 1998: 86).
EU citizenship, however, proved to be not unproblematic. Shore (2000:72) points out that unless individuals internalise the values and norms associated with European citizenship, it will not constitute a meaningful badge of social identity and the identity building processes might not work. In addition, citizenship of the EU is not an autonomous and distinct notion with regard to the nationalities of the individual member states (Nascimbene 1998:64). If a person lives in the EU, but is not a citizen of a member state, then s/he cannot be a citizen of the EU. European citizenship is thus determined by national citizenship and therefore, indirectly, by national identity (Dunkerley et al 2002:18). This is complicated by the different national approaches to citizenship in the EU. Not surprisingly, the EU has proposed to establish “...certain uniform rules on the acquisition and loss of member state nationality” and “...has called for a replacement of the principle of ius sanguinis by ius soli” (O’Leary 1998:104). Subsequently, in 2000, Germany introduced new citizenship laws in harmonisation with European standards as discussed in Chapter Two.

On the other hand, there are those who argue that the real problem is related to the understanding of and the expectations associated with European citizenship, which were somewhat erroneously based on comparisons with the nation state and nation building processes. Both Soysal (1997) and Delanty (1995) argue that European citizenship rights should be decoupled from traditional ideas of state and nation and should instead be based on more universal human rights. This could prove, however, rather difficult. As Dunkerley et al (2002:19), explain, the “...adoption of nationality as a base for Union citizenship means that the key factor for defining its content was the preservation of national sovereignty rather than the fostering of individual rights”. Dunkerley et al (2002:22) also doubt that the introduction of a European citizenship has helped to reduce the democratic deficit. They argue for example that the electoral rights in the country of residence do not increase the citizen’s influence on the EU as the important decisions concerning the EU are still taken at national level and in the Council of Ministers.
It must also be remembered that all of the above considerations regarding European identity are focused on the area of the EU, excluding other non-EU states, nations and people who would still describe themselves as Europeans (Wintle 1996b:10). In addition, it will also be very difficult to establish a European identity in the face of the continuing dominance of existing political-cultural identities. As Smith (1999:233) points out, the advantages of national identity over the idea of a unified European identity are that national identities are vivid, accessible, well established, long popularised and still widely believed. The EU on the other hand, as Wintle (1996b:19) explains, is characterised by a weak ideology, the persistent particularism of its members as well as frequent internal adjustments in terms of political content and membership. As stated in Chapter One, the aim of European integration is as yet undetermined. As the EU is still under construction, it will be difficult for the public to associate with it until its final form has been established. This fact reinforces the conundrum whereby it can be argued that popular support and public affiliation are needed to enable and legitimise further European integration, but neither will be easy to obtain until the EU has settled into its final shape. This is especially significant with regards to education, which we will focus on later. Phillips (2003:82) for example points out that it becomes difficult to instil an awareness of Europe in young people or, with regards to the subject of this study, to create a European dimension for the curriculum if “…perspectives on what constitutes ‘Europe’ change as the descriptions change” (Phillips 2003:82).

Phillips (2003:83) also believes that teaching about Europe will always be “…seen through the prism of individual nations”. EU identity constructions are assumed to interact with the existing national identities of the member states. It would appear that the incorporation of a European identity into national identities tends to be easier the more this resonates with national political cultures and institutions. Thus, as Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002:293) argue, some nation states might incorporate ‘Europe’ more easily than others. National identity and self-image can also be expected to influence and inform the prevalent definition of and associations with the EU
and a European identity. This can be illustrated with an analysis of attitudes to European identity in Germany and England.\footnote{As perceptions and attitudes towards the EU may vary in the different parts of the UK, it was decided to concentrate on England in accordance with the case study although 'England' and 'Britain' can sometimes be difficult to differentiate. Due to the terminology used by the consulted sources, it is sometimes unavoidable to use the terms Britain or UK instead of England.}

5.4 European and national identity in Germany

As discussed in Chapter Two, after the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945, German nation state identity was thoroughly reconstructed. Nationalism had been discredited by the experiences of the Third Reich and the Second World War and was now redefined as 'constitutional patriotism'. National identity was to focus not on the nation, but on democratic values embodied in the Basic Law that were upheld as the proper object of patriotic devotion (Stirk 1996:290). In addition, the political elites began to look to 'Europe' as a less problematic 'fatherland'. European integration became a substitute for the own defeated, divided and occupied country, whereby Europeaness replaced at least in part traditional notions of nation state identity (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002:301). Subsequently, as Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002:287-298) explain, since the 1950s, the political elites and governments of the Federal Republic of Germany have thoroughly tried to Europeanise German national identity. Konrad Adenauer considered German integration into the West as the best means of overcoming Germany's past and of regaining national sovereignty. In the process, European institutions became central to the way German political elites conceive of the country's national interest and to the way in which Germans conceive of themselves (Berghahn et al 1997:180). European integration was so closely linked to national identity and national rehabilitation that political debates hardly ever questioned the need for European integration (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002:301).

After the fall of the GDR in 1989 and unification in 1990, Germany has continued her policy towards European integration. It has been argued that this is largely due to a profound commitment among the majority of Germans...
to prevent Germany from ever becoming a source of instability in Europe again (Berghahn et al 1997:181). In addition, it seems that Germany in general has less trouble than other member states with the idea of shared sovereignty. This has as much to do with the post-war experience of limited sovereignty and a divided nation as with the German federal system, which created a confidence with multiple layers of authority (Berghahn et al 1997:182). Thus, it could be argued in general that the positive German attitude to and understanding of European integration and the political structure of the EU are strongly correlated with their own domestic order (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002:315).

The German attitude to the introduction of the Euro can also be related to the post-war German national identity. The political elites, particularly Helmut Kohl, considered the Euro as part of the following equation: support for the Euro equals support for European integration, which in turn equals “good Europeaness” and therefore “good Germaness” (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002:307). This line of argumentation made opposition to the Euro difficult to uphold as opposition could have been regarded as nationalistic “bad Germaness”. Nevertheless, opposition to the Euro existed among wide parts of the population, usually in the form of the so-called ‘Deutsche Mark patriotism’. After its introduction in 1949, the Deutsche Mark acquired a strong identity-inducing value as a powerful national symbol of German post-war prosperity (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002:312). At government level, the enthusiasm for European integration has also trembled slightly, for example when Chancellor Kohl was unexpectedly cautious about the extension of supranational decision-making in the negotiations leading to the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Nugent 2003:24). The reasons for this are usually given as internal problems and priorities, for example the costs of unification.

In general though, the German public has supported European integration in terms of a passive consensus for a long time. The latest Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, full report Germany 2005:16-20) indicates that 40% of Germans have a positive image of the EU, while 53%
believe that membership is a good thing (in comparison to only 34% in the UK). On the other hand, the majority of Germans (56%) do not think that their voice counts in Europe, underlining the popular belief in the democratic deficit, especially since 71% feel that Europe is something happening without their participation. Nevertheless 53% are proud to be Europeans. Only 30% saw themselves as German only.

5.5 European and national identity in England

The English or British approach to national and European identity is somewhat different. The Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005:3) found that in the UK 61% are proud of their nationality (in comparison to only 19% in Germany) and 63% saw themselves as British only. 85% of UK respondent thought that Europe was happening without their participation. A 2002 BBC talking point (http://news.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 23 May 2005) entitled Can there be a common European identity illustrates some of the opinions prevalent among the British public. Although the answers are probably far from representative, some common themes seem to emerge. It appears that many people believe that a common European identity would replace existing national or regional identities as a European identity would create a “homogenised mass of European clones”. Many respondents also feared a loss of national sovereignty to a European “super state”. Similarly, the latest Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005:6) found that 53% of UK respondents (the second highest figure in the EU) were against the development of a European political union, although it is likely that this was influenced by the highly visible and often negative debate on the European constitution in the British media at the time.

It would seem that many respondents assume European and national identity, as well as the EU and national sovereignty, to be virtually non-compatible and mutually exclusive. Or, as Hugh Gaitskell, then leader of the Labour Party, remarked in a speech at the party conference in Brighton in 1962, membership of the EEC would mean “...the end of Britain as an
independent European state [...] it means the end of a thousand years of history” (Rubinstein 2003:276). In addition, some respondents said that they did not wish to lose their sovereignty to a non-democratic EU that is run by un-elected bureaucrats. Finally, some respondents could not imagine a shared European identity since, in their opinion, English or British people have not much in common with their European neighbours. Overall, the current predominant attitude to European integration, although by far not shared by all, is expressed in a statement by Gordon Brown (Daily Telegraph 31 July 2003): “...the only way forward [for Europe] is inter-governamental, not federal [...] not a superstate [...] in line with long-held British values – internationalism, enterprise, fairness, political accountability. [...] a new vision for Europe: that, as a trade bloc. [...] the national state is and will remain the focus of our British identity and loyalty.”

Unlike Germany, it would seem that especially England has been suffering from fears of sovereignty and identity loss to the EU, since England has no previous experience of sovereignty loss or with federal systems as such. It has also been argued that England has no previous experience of identity loss. As discussed earlier, English national identity became largely synonymous with British identity after 1707, while other identities in the UK, such as Scottish national identity, had to struggle to resist being subsumed into the emerging British national identity. This has provided Scotland with the experience that union does not necessarily mean identity loss (Kumar 2003:271).

Although, as shown in Chapter Four, in the lead up to Britain joining the EEC, mainstream opinion was at first in favour of ‘Europe’, which was seen as a solution to Britain’s economic problems, especially in light of the post-war economic success of the EEC members. Since then, however, Britain has been a somewhat awkward partner, especially during the Conservative Party’s term of office from 1979 to 1997 (Nugent 2003:26) when more significant opposition to deeper involvement in the EEC (EU) arose within the Conservative Party and among large parts of the media (Rubinstein 2003:310). The Conservative government almost invariably “...sought to resist
supranational developments" while the majority of the continental member states tended to be, in varying degrees, more integrationist (Nugent 2003:26-27). Hostility towards ‘Europe’ was increased by events in the early 1990s, especially after ‘Black Wednesday’ in 1992 when interest rates were raised dramatically after a currency crisis related to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). By 1993, large parts of the press and other opinion-leaders became almost obsessed with hostility to Europe and especially further increases in the central power of the European bureaucracy (Rubinstein 1993:339). Since the Labour Party came to power in 1997, the British government has been more co-operative, although it remained in the slow integration stream insisting for example on opt-out options from certain treaty provisions that would have interfered substantially with British national sovereignty (Nugent 2003:27). The reasons for these often, but by no means always, sceptical attitudes towards European integration and the EU are manifold and, in order to understand them, it is necessary to investigate the underlying English images of ‘Europe’ and their historical roots (Smith 2005:1).

**Nation and sovereignty in England**

First of all, as a paper by Baker (2005:1) stresses, there is a strength and durability of belief in national sovereignty and independence which can be described as extraordinary by modern European standards. In England, the terms of sovereignty and independence are often used interchangeably and remain emotive concepts that are often associated with power, authority, individualism and a sense of national self-determination. They also have a strong historical connotation evoking feelings of patriotism, tradition and national pride based on the long history of the English law and the unique character of the English institutions as indicated in Chapter One and Two. As Smith (2005:2) points out, the regulative approach of the EU, which is extending into the political and cultural sphere, has caused English Eurosceptics to fear the EU as a threat to the established English political system.

As illustrated in Chapter Two, it can be argued that national identity has developed in England over centuries. This part real, part perceived antiquity
not only characterises English national identity, but also plays an important role in English attitudes towards ‘Europe’. The island location and the resulting English preoccupation with naval power and the overseas Empire is widely considered to be a crucial defining factor of English identity and attitudes towards ‘Europe’. The physical separation from mainland Europe often coupled with an old fashioned patriotism and an inherent conservatism, resulted in what is commonly referred to as ‘island mentality’ (Ichijo 2005:12). An expression of this can be found in the common use of the term ‘Europe’ meaning continental Europe (Kumar 2003:241). A study by Dr Atsuko Ichijo for the LSE’s European institute (2005:3) summarised this common attitude in the following equation: “Europe as ‘elsewhere’ and Britain as ‘different’”. Similarly, Margaret Thatcher (2003:51) said in a speech in 1988 in relation to the Second World War “...it was from our island fortress that the liberation of Europe itself was mounted”. This also denotes an uncertainty as to whether England or Britain is part of ‘Europe’ and often creates a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ situation, in the past particularly with regard to the French and Spanish Catholics. Ichijo (2005:12) claims that Britain is hardly ever mentioned in British media coverage of EU related topics, thus strengthening the persistent ‘them and us’ mentality by distancing Britain from Europe and the EU. The study also noted the often cited special relationship of Britain with the USA (Dijkink 1996:46). Generally, it was felt that Britain had more in common with the USA than with her European neighbours. In addition, many British respondents in this study exhibited a general alienation from politics in general and admitted to a lack of knowledge about Europe. According to Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005:6) 62% of British respondents (in comparison to a 52% EU average) claimed that they did not know how the EU works.

Finally, it must be noted that the Second World War seems to inform perceptions of national identity, as well as European attitudes, to a similar degree in both Germany and England. While in Germany the experience of nationalism and the war led to the above described re-assessment of national identity, the same time period had the almost opposite effect on English and British attitudes. In England, and in Britain as a whole, the war strengthened
feelings of patriotism and even feelings of moral 'superiority' in comparison with continental Europe. Thus, while German national identity was discredited by the war, British national identity was affirmed and strengthened by the belief that Britain and the allied forces were the morally superior saviours of 'Europe'. The memory of the war, reinforced and transmitted through the mass media since the war, has become a firm part of national identity and the national myth: "...the memory of the war is now at the heart of British national identity" (BBC "War Stories" 2006). Therefore, while Germany in the post-war period turned towards Europe in search of a substitute political identity, England and Britain had no need to do so and even detached herself further from 'Europe' (Smith 2005:10).

Nevertheless, Britain's entry into the European Union has not only been welcomed by many, but has been hailed by some as an opportunity for the British to renegotiate their identities. The idea was put forward that for example a 'Europe of the Regions' might help to dissolve 'outdated' national identities and help to create an overarching European or even cosmopolitan identity (Kumar 2003:241). Indeed, as the BBC talking point in 2002 (http:news.bbc.co.uk, accessed 23 May 2005) illustrated, there are quite a few English or British citizens who embrace a European identity, usually perceived to exist in addition to their own national identity. Judging by the responses, albeit anecdotal, it would seem that this attitude is most common among people who have lived in other European countries or are of foreign nationality now living in Britain. Thus it would seem that knowledge of and in depth direct experience of other European countries have a strong impact on people's attitudes towards the EU and their European neighbours, a hypothesis that shall be further explored in Chapter Seven.

5.6 Conclusions

In sum, this chapter has discussed some of the ambiguities surrounding European identity especially in relation to national identity. Although the EU has made some attempts to stimulate a European identity through the creation of a European iconography, relatively little is yet known, as Checkel
(2003:352) points out, about the socialisation and identity-shaping effects of the EU on national agents.

This chapter has shown that support for the EU varies considerably by member state, for example between Germany and England (or Britain). Research findings consistently show that in general Germans tend to feel more European and have a more positive attitude to European integration than English people. Some of the factors that influence attitudes towards the EU stem from different understandings of national identity. In the case of Germany and England, the different experience of the Second World War and the post war period, which has left Germans with a negative impression of nationalism and a search for alternative identities, seems to have shaped attitudes to national and European identity considerably.

This chapter has also discussed possible definitions of European identity. Generally speaking, advocates of European identity agree that a European identity should exist alongside existing identities rather than replacing them. Although the concept remains vague and ill-defined, in general two broad approaches to European identity can be discerned. Those who argue in favour of a cultural European identity base their approach mostly on European values and shared historical European roots in an attempt to find commonalities among the cultural diversity of Europe. Alternatively, those who favour a civic European identity, base this identity on European citizenship rights. Both approaches are problematic for a number of reasons as this chapter has explained. Nevertheless, despite its contentious nature, the idea of European identity has frequently been put forward by those who hope that a more widespread European attachment might increase popular support, give the EU stronger political legitimacy and address the democratic deficit. As the terminology implies, the process of creating a European identity is also largely elite driven and tends to rely on top-down approaches, which will be explored in further detail in the next chapter.
6. The European dimension in the school curriculum

6.1 Introduction: European citizenship, identity and education

So far, the previous chapters have shown the links between political and national developments and their influence on shaping attitudes towards European integration and European identity. The development of the European idea, which was often considered as an alternative form of governance and a solution to the problems caused by national rivalry, has also been illustrated as has the subsequent actual post-war integration processes in Europe. Chapters Four and Five have explained that elite driven integration processes as well as the different popular attitudes to European integration are some of the reasons for the apparent lack of popular support for the EU with implications for the political legitimacy of the EU. In addition, a democratic deficit has been mentioned by many as another consequence of the elite driven integration, the intergovernmental approach as well as the institutional set-up of the EU. The previous chapter concluded that theoretically a European identity is needed in order to boast popular support and address the democratic deficit and political legitimacy of the EU. As the European Youth Forum Jeunesse (2002:6) points outs, following the creation of EU citizenship and a European trans-national community life, the ‘European project’ now needs to “…capture people’s imagination to ensure citizens’ allegiance and secure the future legitimacy of the European Union”. The economic-political structure of the EU must now be “…anchored in the minds and hearts of its citizens by instilling in them the sentiment of belonging to a common European entity with shared values and ideals” (European Youth Forum Jeunesse 2002:6). While the previous chapter investigated possible forms and characteristics of such a European identity, the possible means to create this identity have not as yet been discussed.

As already pointed out, it seems unlikely that a European identity will be created through grass root movements or automated loyalty transfer, as the EU does not generate the sorts of passions and allegiances that people
feel towards their nations (Dunkerley et al 2002:121). In the past, the EU has modelled its attempts to create a European identity on traditional nation state methods and has focused largely on the establishment of European icons such as a flag, anthem, passport and, in some countries, a single currency. As Novoa and DeJong-Lambert (2003:50) observe, “...in a certain way, [...] nineteenth-century processes of identity building are being replicated nowadays in Europe”. However, as the previous chapter pointed out, while neo-functionalists were probably right in presuming that European integration has led to the emergence of a European orientated elite, such sentiments and beliefs cannot as yet be attributed to the majority of the wider population. Therefore, in the last decades, the EU has increasingly started to look for other methods of identity stimulation and has again turned for inspiration to traditional state sponsored methods of national identity formation or fortification. Some traditional methods such as standardisation of language and culture would not be suitable since the EU seeks to maintain ‘unity in diversity’. Others, however, such as the use of the mass education system and its potential to impart knowledge about and create support for Europe, have generated considerable interest.

As previously explored, in the nineteenth century, the rise of mass education helped to disseminate elite concepts of national identity to the wider population and the previously illiterate masses. A central purpose of the educational expansion was to instil from an early age what it meant to be a citizen of the respective nation state. Thus, mass education was an important facilitator in the process of national establishment and fortification as well as political unification in countries such as Germany or Italy (Novoa and DeJong-Lambert 2003:49). As explained in Chapter Two, many consider national identification not a natural attachment whereby people have to learn to think of themselves as part of a nation (Dunkerley 2002: 53). Education in this context, as Novoa and DeJong-Lambert (2003:49) point out, has the important role of being “…a transmitter of national identity, [...] linking the private citizen with the public polity”. Similarly, it could be argued that if a European identity in whichever form is to persist, the public would have to learn an attachment to the EU, which again could be transmitted through the
education system. Furthermore, a European dimension in education would provide the EU with informed citizens who are able to participate fully in the institutions of a modern society, fulfil their duties as European citizens, understand how the EU works and understand what is at stake in elections (Dunkerley et al. 2002:131). Education therefore enables citizens to contribute to society as well as to enjoy its benefits (Dunkerley et al. 2002:131). This has been expressed in the 1985 EU Commission’s Report Teaching about Europe, which states that one of the core educational objectives should be to make European citizens aware of the rights and obligations which Community institutions imply for them and the influence of the EU on their lives. As Shennan (1991:19) argues “...Europe has already the institutional framework [...] to go on shaping the lives of millions of citizens for the indefinite future. For this reason [...] European children are entitled to be prepared for life within European society. So [...] teaching and learning about Europe must be treated as an educational priority [...]”.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that education and training have been regarded in recent years as increasingly important tools not only for the promotion of European citizenship (Dekker 1993:45), but also, as the European Youth Forum Jeunesse pointed out in their 2002 Vision of Education in the Future, as one of the main tools by which societies can help young people to come to terms with their European identity. This chapter will therefore explore the role of education in creating a European identity as well as EU and governmental guidelines regarding a European dimension in teaching. Finally, this chapter will analyse the extent to which a European dimension has been integrated in selected curricula.

6.2 Education and young people’s attitudes to Europe

There is some evidence supporting the theory that better educated citizens, with a more extensive knowledge about Europe and the EU, tend to be more supportive of the EU and be more likely to feel European. For example Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005:4) has shown that, in the UK, 48% of the best educated group, but only 19% of
the least educated group saw membership to the EU as a good thing. Similarly, 50% of the most educated respondents, but only 22% of the least educated group thought that the UK had benefited from EU membership. 49% of the best educated group wished to know more about the EU in comparison to only 27% to those who left school aged 15 or younger. 43% of the most educated, but only 27% of the least educated claimed to understand how the EU works. The survey also claims that those with better education tend to be more in favour of European political union, the constitution and the euro.\textsuperscript{15} It must, however, be stressed that opinion polls such as the Eurobarometer are unable to establish causal relationships (Harrison 2001:49). It can therefore not be assumed that the Eurobarometer findings indicate that better education increases support for European integration.

Despite this apparent importance of education, little research has been carried out that explores the role of education in forming children's perceptions. Some studies have shown that schools and teachers are one of the key information sources on Europe (Convery et al 1997:19). For example, Barett's (1992) investigation into the acquisition and development of a European identity among English children found that all three sampled age groups (six, ten and fourteen year olds) agreed that the three most important information sources were parents, television and teachers. The fourteen year olds even thought the teachers to be the second most important information source after the media (Barrett 1992:363). In a similar study,\textsuperscript{16} Convery et al (1997:20) showed that the main information sources on Europe and the EU were the media (54.8%) and schools (46.5%). This result varied considerably by country. While 48.5% of English pupils claimed to have gained all or most of their information on Europe from school, for German pupils this figure was significantly lower (41.2%) (Convery et al 1997:108-109). Nevertheless, the result stresses the important role that teachers and school education play in informing young people about Europe. Given that one of the most important information sources, the media, has a tendency (at least in some countries) to

\textsuperscript{15} At the time of writing (May 2006) this information was only available for the UK but not Germany

\textsuperscript{16} which surveyed 1337 pupils in twenty-five secondary schools (year ten) across the ability range in England, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy.
give a negative view of the EU or to over-represent EU crises, makes the teachers' role in providing balanced and factual information about Europe and the EU even more crucial.

Relatively little research has been carried out to explore the attitudes of young people in relation to Europe and the EU (Convery et al 1997:11-12). Nevertheless, as Convery et al (1997:15) show, the available findings in this area indicate that the majority of teenagers respond to the topic with interest and a desire to know more. Convery et al (1997:20) found that the majority of their respondents (54.7%) considered themselves quite well informed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1</th>
<th>How well informed are pupils about Europe (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very well informed</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite well informed</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not well informed</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all informed</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Overall, 67% of the pupils said they would like to know and understand more about Europe (Convery et al 1997:26). When asked how often they learned about Europe, 36.6% said a few lessons a week while almost 10% said 'never or almost never' (Convery et al 1997:20).\(^{17}\)

Chapter Five has already considered general levels of identification with Europe. In addition, some studies have assessed in how far school children identify with Europe. Convery et al (1997) found that, among secondary school pupils, German pupils were least likely to think of

\(^{17}\) no country specific data available
themselves as only German, although it is difficult to ascertain in how far the difference can be attributed to a stronger European orientation, weaker national identity or relatively strong regional affiliations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.2 Feeling of belonging to [own nationality] (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table shows that the majority of secondary school pupils in England (70.3%) consider themselves as solely English (or British) in comparison to less than half of the German pupils (Convery et al 1997:62). Barrett (1992:358) discovered that although many English children stated that they felt European (68% of the fourteen year olds), the most frequent explanation for this was geographical (a child was European because England was in Europe). On the other hand, 28% of the fourteen year olds stated that even though England was part of Europe, they themselves were not European.

Convery et al (1997) also investigated the extent to which pupils considered themselves to be European and came to similar conclusions:
Table 6.3 Breakdown by country of how European pupils feel (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, totally</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only partly</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The percentage of English children, who felt not European at all, was the highest in comparison to other countries. English pupils have been found to have a much weaker association with the concept of European identity than their mainland equivalents (Convery et al 1997:61). Convery et al (1997:63) offered as possible reasons for this result the comparatively large number of non-white respondents in England as well as the influence of the English media, which has a tendency to present Europe as an arena of economic-political conflict, although both might also apply to other European countries. In addition, Morell (1996:19) has pointed out that young people in the UK watch an average of eighteen hours of TV per week with an almost entirely Anglo-American schedule, which helps to strengthen traditional Anglo-American rather than Anglo-European ties as discussed earlier.

In any case, the EU acknowledges the link between education, knowledge and feeling/being Europeans in several publications, for example in the 1993 Green Paper on the European dimension of education (COM (93) 457 final) which was published following the Maastricht Treaty and its provision for new EU competencies in the field of education. The paper stresses that "...the mutual understanding of the practices and cultures of other Member States, and even the ability to work with those of other nationalities or in another setting, are among the most important factors which help young people to become integrated into society and to accept more readily their responsibilities as European citizens" (COM (93) 457 final 1993:3). The Commission understands European citizenship to be based on shared values such as interdependence, democracy, equality, opportunity and mutual
The EU commission (COM (93) 457 final 1993:6) recommended that an education for European citizenship ought to include European languages, knowledge of other countries, trans-national exchanges and a better understanding of Europe today and its future construction.

6.3 EU policy and the European dimension in education

Despite the Commissions recommendation in relation to the possible contents of a European dimension in education, there is considerable debate as to what exactly constitutes a ‘European education’. According to Bell (1991:6), the four main contributing factors to a European dimension in education are often considered to be a) the school curriculum, b) teacher training, c) teaching materials and d) strategies (such as exchange programmes etc). Others argue that European education could be characterised by two approaches “…referred to […] as the pragmatic and identitarian approaches. The first consists of [for example] mobility, recognition of diplomas and credentials, employability and the enhancement of quality. In the case of the latter […] the focus is placed on what has been called the ‘European dimension of education’, encompassing more sensitive issues such as curriculum content and teacher training” (Novoa and DeJong-Lambert 2003:50). To narrow the focus of this paper, this study will concentrate on the European dimension in education and more specifically on the European dimension in the school curriculum. The focus will be on secondary education as according to Barrett (1992:354), the acquisition of a European identity, if this occurs at all, is very unlikely to happen before the age of ten. Shennan (1991:18-19) agrees and states that the secondary school stage is important because “…that is when childhood impressions are reinforced and extended, while adult attitudes and patterns of behaviour towards the external world are certainly determined by adolescent experience”.

The actual implementation of a European dimension in education would necessarily have to rely on the existing education systems of the EU member states. The difficulty, however, with this is that education is organised
on a national basis and, as long as this remains to be the case, it will be difficult for Europeans to genuinely imagine themselves as living outside of national territorial units (Dunkerley et al 2002:61). Similarly, Smith (1999:243) argues that the national prerogative to determine the curriculum is one of the main barriers to the implementation of a European dimension. He claims that without a centralised European state, one cannot expect too much from the national education systems in terms of European education. As "...schools have [traditionally] served as powerful ‘agents of socialisation’ by transmitting ‘national’ history, ‘national’ languages, ‘national’ geography among others" (European Youth Forum Jeunesse 2002:6), it would be difficult to shift the focus from the national to the European stage, as will be further analysed in the next chapter.

The EU Commission believes that reforms in key areas such as curricular renovation or quality assurance cannot achieve their full potential "...if they are designed for a purely national context and disregard the broader, new European context" (COM (2002) 779 final:4). The aim for such reforms should be to achieve "...as much convergence as necessary (whilst keeping as much diversity as possible)” (COM (2002) 779 final: 22). The EU itself, however, is rather reluctant to interfere in issues relating to education. As Ryba (1992:11) observes "...neither the Treaty of Rome itself, nor any subsequent Community legislation, gives the Community any supranational powers in the field of education, and, for the most part, Member States have zealously guarded their educational systems from any supranational intervention that might conceivably infringe on their national rights”.

The following brief chronology of EU educational policies is adapted from Economou (2003:118-120), who splits the development of EU education policies into four time periods. This overview is by no means complete or meant to be comprehensive. As this study is mainly concerned with the European dimension in the curriculum, other policy areas, for example those concerning European exchange programmes, have been omitted.
• **1957-1976: The early years**
   In the early EEC and EC period, any educational recommendations or policy initiatives were limited to vocational education and training in conjunction with social policy, although there was an interest to promote member state cooperation in this area. The Treaty of Rome itself makes no mention of education.

• **1976-1986: Education for the labour market**
   During this period, the European Communities set up a number of initiatives such as the information network EURYDICE in 1976 and the NARIC scheme in 1984. In 1974-76 the Education Committee was created, which was composed of the member states' ministers of education and of the European Commission (Ertl 2003: 17). The stronger emphasis on education and training was largely due to the economic depression and the realisation that many young people entered the labour market without the necessary qualifications (Ertl 2003:18). In 1976 the EC published a Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Education concerning an action programme for education, which, for the first time, developed the idea of a European dimension in primary and secondary education (Bell 1991:3). This was followed in 1983 by the Stuttgart Declaration that recommended the improvement of information on European history and culture in order to promote a European awareness.

• **1986-1992: intensification of educational initiatives to meet the needs of the Single European market**
   In 1988, the EC released the *Resolution on the European Dimension in Education*, which is one of its most important documents regarding the European dimension in education to date. The Resolution invited the Member States to integrate the European dimension into the school curriculum, teaching material and teacher training. The defined objective was to “…strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilisation and of the foundation on which the

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18 improvement of recognition of diplomas and periods of study
European peoples intend to base their development [...] in particular [...] the principles of democracy, social justice and respect for human rights" (COM (93) 457 final:17-18). The Resolution claimed that young people ought to be made aware of the advantages and the challenges of the European Communities. Education ought to improve their knowledge of the Community and its Member States in their historical, cultural, economic and social aspects and "...bring home to them the significance of the co-operation of the member states of the European Community with other countries of Europe and the world" (Resolution 88/C 177/02). All Member States were required to respond to the Resolution and, generally speaking, were in agreement that the European dimension should not be limited to a separate European course, but should be delivered cross-curricular in the appropriate areas (Convery et al 1997:7). The German and UK response are discussed further on in greater detail.

- 1992-today: Focus on educational programmes
The Maastricht Treaty made provision for a generally more supplementary role for the EU in the area of education and specified in Article 126 that “...the Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging co-operation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action" (http://europa.eu.int, accessed 12 April 2005). The responsibility for the European dimension in education, as well as educational content and organisation, however, was left to the member states. The role of the EU was to be promotional, encouraging the member states to co-operate in the field of education and academic recognition. The development of the European dimension was to be encouraged particularly though the teaching of European languages. In addition, Article 127 of the Maastricht Treaty deals with vocational training and exchanges. Again the member states are to be responsible for vocational training, but the EU was to stimulate and support vocational integration and mobility which would be beneficial for future employment and the common market.
The Maastricht Treaty makes no mention of a joint European curriculum or programmes with identical content (Vaniscotte 1993:19). Instead, the EU Commission argues that curricular renovation should involve the integration of a European dimension into all subjects, including the possibility for students and trainees to undertake part of their learning in another country (COM (2002) 779 final:22-23). Similarly, the Council of Europe recommended in 1983 that schools should make special linkages across the disciplines as the European dimension spreads over many subjects (Shennan 1991:29). In addition, Convery et al (1997:54) contend that although the Maastricht Treaty gave legitimacy to the European dimension, it equally undermined the 1988 Resolution by extending the principle of subsidiarity to education. As a result, "...apart from a few pockets of activity, evidence of learning about Europe at any level of sophistication is scarce" (Convery et al 1997:54). Since the Maastricht Treaty, EU initiatives in the field of education and training seem to focus on two main objectives: firstly, the promotion of new technologies in learning processes and secondly the increase of mobility within the EU (Ertl 2003:30).

Although this paper concentrates on the educational recommendations of EU institutions, it is worth pointing out that the Council of Europe has also published a series of papers dealing with education. The Council of Europe and especially the standing European Cultural Convention19 carried out a range of work in the field of cultural co-operation under inclusion of educational initiatives. Of interest here is a five year project entitled Secondary education for Europe. This project, launched by the Council for Cultural Co-operation in 1991, was seeking to promote educational conditions and practices that:

- provide young people with the knowledge, skills and attitudes they need to cope with the major challenges facing European society
- prepare young people for higher education, mobility, work and everyday life in a democratic, multilingual and multicultural Europe

19 established in 1954
• make young people aware of their common cultural heritage and their common responsibilities as Europeans (http://www.coe.int/t/e/cultural_co-operation, accessed 2 January 2005).

It was envisaged to bring the European dimension into schools through materials, teaching guides and case studies covering individual subjects (including history, geography, literature), lateral projects (environment, international problems) and extracurricular activities (links and exchanges between schools etc.). This project was based on an earlier 1983 Recommendation by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe that member states should promote European awareness in secondary schools (Shennan 1991:19).

In the end, despite the efforts of European institutions, the education systems ultimately remain the responsibility of the EU member states. It is thus important to assess government attitudes to a European dimension in education by examining relevant government guidelines and policies in Germany and England.

6.4 The European dimension in education in Germany and England

Government guidelines in relation to the European dimension in education in Germany
In Germany, the European dimension has been part of the curriculum for over twenty-five years. As previously explained, Germany’s constitution, the Basic Law, contains a commitment to European integration with schools being under the obligation to teach about the importance of European co-operation and instil a sense of belonging to Europe (Shennan 1991:21).

Educational and cultural legislation is primarily the responsibility of the Länder, although the Länder governments co-operate with each other at federal level through the Standing Conference of the Education Ministers (Kultusminister Konferenz KMK). As part of the KMK, a Committee for European and International Affairs deals with EU co-operation in relation to
education, culture and research. The committee develops common positions which may be taken into account in federal consultations (Eurydice 2002/2003).

In 1978 the KMK adopted the Resolution on Europe in the Classroom, which was updated in 1990 in a booklet entitled Europe in the classroom (Europa im Unterricht) published in five community languages. The official response to the 1988 EEC Resolution was published later in 1992, but directly refers to and partly incorporates the earlier 1990 publication. The Europe in the classroom document claims that Europe is based on a common historical heritage and cultural tradition (KMK 1990:13). The goal of the European Community, according to this document, is the creation of a European Union with federal structures (Europe of the Regions), which would guarantee to preserve cultural diversity, a balanced economic development and grass root decision making in the member states (KMK 1990:14). As a consequence of this political development, European citizens would have to understand Europe as a shared ‘house’ in which “...vital developments concerning their lives are taking place in the fields of politics and society, business and culture—a house which they have to build and maintain together” (KMK 1990:14). As shown below, such a political declaration is markedly absent from all UK official documents relating to the European dimension in education, including the UK response to the 1988 EC Resolution.

The KMK (1990:15) defines “...raising awareness of the European integration process” as one of the tasks of education as well as contributing “...towards developing awareness of European identity and fostering understanding of the fact that in many spheres of our lives European terms of reference apply and that European decisions are necessary”. The required knowledge, which schools would have to teach, includes:

- The geographical diversity of Europe
- Political and social structures of Europe
- Formative historical forces in Europe and the development of European political values such as freedom
• Features of a common European culture
• The multi-lingual nature and cultural wealth of Europe
• History of the European idea and post-1945 integration
• Joint action in Europe
• Roles and working methods of the European institutions
(KMK 1990:15-16)

The document acknowledges the link between knowledge, identity and citizenship and declares several times that the aim of education must be "...to arouse young people's awareness of a European identity" which also involves preparing them to fulfil their tasks as citizens in the European community (KMK 1990:17). According to this document (KMK 1990:17) the European dimension in Germany is statutory part of geography, history, social studies/politics as well as economics and law. Special emphasis is placed on languages, especially in the form of bilingual teaching at secondary schools. In addition, maths, sciences, technology, religion and philosophy, art, music and sports are understood to be part of a common European heritage and as such cannot be taught solely along national lines (KMK 1990:18). As Convery et al (1997:7) note, Germany lists the most impressive number of subjects for implementing a European dimension, whereas other countries such as the UK limit their responses to the 1988 EC Resolution to a few subjects, mostly geography, history and modern languages.

In addition to the curriculum, the KMK (1990) stipulates that special projects such as school partnerships, exchanges, the annual European Schools Day competition or visits to European institutions are equally important. The document makes numerous recommendations for future development including:
• Improvement of pupil and teacher motivation through first hand experiences (bilateral exchanges, foreign language practise etc)
• Improvement of basic information on Europe/ European integration in both teacher and pupil material
• Taking the KMK resolutions into account when revising curricula
- Encouragement of foreign language learning and bilingual teaching
- Pilot projects to promote Europe in the classroom
- Encouragement of school partnerships
- Consideration of the European dimension in teacher training

(KMK 1990:19-20)

This 1990 paper was consolidated in the 1992 government response to the 1988 EC Resolution entitled The European Dimension in Education (Zur Europäischen Dimension im Bildungswesen). According to the KMK (1992:9) the priority of their 1991/1992 action programme would be the general improvement of the European orientation in the education system. A stronger European dimension was envisaged especially for modern language teaching, political and cultural education, pupil exchanges, school partnerships and teacher exchanges especially in non-modern language subjects.

The document emphasises that the main aim of the relevant subjects\(^{20}\) should be to teach a sound basic knowledge of Europe and the European Union. Written prior to Eastern enlargement, the document states that a European dimension should include Central and Eastern Europe as well as the (then) area of the EU (KMK 1992:13). Some initiatives and pilot projects are also listed such as bilingual teaching, special status European schools\(^{21}\) and the European Schools Day competition, which has been held annually since 1953 (KMK 1992:28-29 +42).

The KMK recommended that textbook publishers should stress the European dimension in textbooks and teaching materials and praised the exemplary series of materials published by Lower Saxony entitled Europa – Materialien für den Unterricht (Europe- materials for teaching, KMK 1992:30). Furthermore, it was pointed out that the European dimension was increasingly incorporated in teacher training (KMK 1992:33).

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\(^{20}\) Geography, history, social studies/politics, subjects dealing with economy or law, languages including German, maths, sciences, technology, religion and philosophy, art, music and sport

\(^{21}\) Schools with a special European orientation. European schools tend to offer for example bilingual teaching, multiple foreign languages, special European projects and exchanges etc.
The 1992 German response was followed in 1996 by the KMK recommendation *Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule* (Intercultural education in schools, Beschluss der Kultusministerkonferenz vom 25.10.1996). The recommendation focused on inter-cultural education, which relates both to the increasing number of non-German pupils at German schools as well as to the European/global dimension in teaching. The document states that in recent years a vast variety of suggestions and programmes have been put forward, which aimed at preparing the young generation for increasing levels of professional mobility, European integration and globalisation (KMK 1996:3). According to the KMK (1996:6) it cannot be assumed that pupils possess a differentiated knowledge and acceptance of other cultural identities, which results in additional tasks for schools and the education system. These tasks include:

- Making pupils aware of their cultural environment
- Providing pupils with knowledge about other cultures
- Promoting curiosity, tolerance and respect for other cultures
- Making pupils aware of prejudice (KMK 1996:6)

'Intercultural competence' is regarded as a key qualification for all young people and should be an overall task of schools (and not solely the responsibility of certain subjects or projects) (KMK 1996:6). Accordingly, the KMK proposed to promote and develop curricula and textbooks, which do not marginalise nor demote societies and cultures (KMK 1996:11). In practice, as Soysal (2002:3) claims, the increasing importance of European issues is reflected in some school books to such an extent that the nation has started to disappear in favour of Europe and the regions.

In sum, the German federal government and the KMK take a positive attitude to the European dimension in education, which is seen as a necessary and desirable aspect of modern school teaching. In contrast to the UK, the inclusion of a European dimension in teaching is in Germany part of the constitution and thus embedded in the political structure of Germany. Programmes and recommendations for the incorporation of a European
dimension in teaching date back to the 1970s. Since Germany was able to draw upon an existing European programme, the German response to the 1988 EC Resolution incorporated both existing and planned activities and policies. The UK response, on the other hand, focused primarily on suggestions for initiatives as the next section will show.

**Government guidelines regarding the European dimension in education in England**

The British government generally tends to oppose any development of the Community’s powers in matters of education (Phillips 2003:76). In terms of a European dimension in education, the British approach was, as Economou (2003:122) puts it, “lukewarm”, especially as there was no common National Curriculum until 1989. The British contribution in the 1970s and 1980s to a European dimension in education was largely limited to the foundation of a national UK Centre for European Education (UKCEE) in 1978. The UKCEE’s activities were limited to information dissemination, dealing with requests from schools and the European Schools Day competition as well as organising national conferences and seminars (Economou 2003:121). In 1989 the UKCEE merged with the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges (CBEVE) which is now part of the British Council.

In 1991 the Department for Education and Science (DES, now the Department for Education and Skills DfES) published the British response to the 1988 EC Resolution entitled *The European dimension in Education: A statement of the UK Government’s Policy and Report of Activities Undertaken to Implement the EC Resolution of 24 May 1988 on the European Dimension in Education*. Although the document, as well as the other papers discussed further on, covers education in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, for the purpose of this thesis, only those parts concerning England will be discussed.

The document states that the British government has been and is continuing to be active in supporting the 1988 EC Resolution as young people, in order “...to benefit fully from closer European co-operation” need to
be equipped "...with knowledge, understanding, skills and attitudes which will enable them to take up the new opportunities" (DES 1991). However, as Convery et al (1997:9) note, in comparison to the original 1988 EC Resolution, some dilution of language has occurred, which probably was a result of the comparatively strong Eurosceptic lobby at the time.

According to the 1991 document, the aims of the government in relation to a European dimension in education include:

- Help pupils acquire a view of Europe as a multi-cultural, multi-lingual community which includes the UK
- Encourage awareness of the variety of European histories, geographies and cultures
- Prepare pupils to participate in the economic and social development of Europe
- Encourage interest in European languages
- Provide knowledge about the origins, workings and role of the EC
- Promote a sense of European identity, through first hand experiences where appropriate
- Promote an awareness of the EC’s interdependence with the rest of Europe and the world

According to the 1991 document, the government also supports the development of the European dimension through policies in the following areas:

- Support for language teaching and learning
- Support for bilateral links and exchanges through the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges and the Youth Exchange Centre  
  22 ceased to exist, now part of the British Council
- Support for the work of non-governmental organisations, which includes the Centre for European Education (UKCEE) and the Education Policy Information Centre (EPIC Europe)  
  23 seems to have ceased to exist
- Support of relevant conferences and seminars
Support for and implementation of EC education programmes

Encouraging Local Education Authorities (LEAs) to develop policies for the implementation of the European dimension

The document declared that a European dimension needs to permeate and be integrated into all relevant parts of the curriculum. In addition, the document recommended that the European dimension should be a cross-curricular theme and that learning a modern foreign language should be compulsory for the ages 11-16.\textsuperscript{24} The document remains vague in relation to the school curriculum, as this was still under development at the time. Furthermore, the paper argues that the European dimension should be part of teacher training and should be reflected in the relevant textbooks and materials. Finally the document lists additional initiatives including reminding the education authorities of the European Schools Day competition or providing support for language festivals.

In comparison to the German response, which is overall more prescriptive, the British response tends to suggest rather than stipulate and frequently uses terms such as ‘promote’ and ‘encourage’. The different approach might be partly due to the different educational organisation. While in Germany educational policy and curriculum content is decided at federal level, in England the responsibility for educational policy and thus the implementation of a European dimension rests primarily with the Local Education Authorities (LEA). Although they have to operate within the framework of the National Curriculum, the LEAs and the individual schools have greater freedom in deciding teaching content than in Germany. The British government might therefore be less inclined to prescribe and thus infringe on the education freedom of the LEAs and schools.

In addition, as Eurydice (2002) points out, there is no specific legislation in the UK covering the European dimension in school education. Instead, successive governments have published a range of policy documents

\textsuperscript{24} from 2004, Modern Foreign Languages is non-statutory for key stage four
intended to promote the incorporation of a European or global dimension in education. Furthermore, although the global dimension is considered to be important, there is no central strategy to co-ordinate support which would meet teachers' needs. The Department for International Development (DFID) has subsequently set up the Enabling Effective Support (EES) initiative\textsuperscript{25} which was specifically designed to provide teachers with more effective and sustained support to incorporate a global dimension into teaching.

Economou (2003) conducted a study from 1995 to 1998 among officials and LEAs in England, Scotland and Wales and found that "...the European dimension in education has not been a priority for the British government; their main interest has been the implementation of the national curriculum and raising standards in numeracy and literacy" (Economou 2003:15). Based on the findings, Economou (2003:127) concluded that the government has basically failed to perform a number of the functions mentioned in the 1991 DES response to the 1988 EC Resolution including the provision of a legislative framework, the inclusion of the European dimension in the curriculum and the organisation of conferences. On the other hand, the government has encourages exchanges, supported EU programmes, published policy models for LEAs and encouraged modern foreign language teaching in the curriculum (Economou 2003:128-129).

Since 1991, the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) (from 1995-2001 the Department for Education and Employment [DfEE]) continued to promote the European dimension, which was usually considered to be a non-specific aspect of an inclusive international dimension. For example, the 1997 White Paper Excellence in Schools stated that international work was "...able to make a pivotal contribution to the aim of raising standards" (DfEE 1997). The White Paper encouraged schools to become involved in international partnerships, while teachers were asked to be aware of comparative data on international education. Another example is the 1999 DfEE Development Agenda for Education (DfEE 1999b), which states that all young people

\textsuperscript{25} based on the Government's White Paper on International Development 1997
should complete key stage four with a good foundation for lifelong learning, work and citizenship within a rapidly changing world. This objective includes a specific focus on support for the European Union's SOCRATES26 programme and the development of a European dimension in education. The DfES strategy for 2000 to 2006 reinforced the government's commitment to an international dimension in education in terms of "...learning from the best of international experience and sharing good practice" (Eurybase 2004/2005).

The 2001 Green Paper Schools: Building on Success (DfES 2001) states that links to schools and teachers in other countries have offered enhanced opportunities for both pupils and teachers and have enabled a deeper understanding of world class standards. In 2004 the DfES published Putting the World into World-Class Education - An International Strategy for Education, Skills and Children's Services (DfES 2004). The paper recommended that international considerations should be integrated into mainstream policies and existing programmes of work. One of the main goals according to this document is to equip young people and adults for life in a global society and work in a global economy (DfES 2004:7). Although the EU is frequently referred to, the main focus of the document is to develop a global dimension in education. The terms 'European dimension' or 'European identity' are not mentioned, although the paper is committed to fulfilling the Lisbon goal to make the EU "...the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" (DfES 2004:7). The same aim is also addressed in the White Paper 21st Century Skills: Realising our potential (DfES 2003). Similarly, the DfID initiative Enabling Effective Support (DfID 2003) endeavours to increase and improve the global dimension in education.

As this overview shows, British educational policy and recommendations27, following the initial response to the 1988 EC Resolution, have a tendency to submerge the European dimension into a wider global dimension. In addition,

26 The current SOCRATES II programme aims to strengthen the European dimension of Higher Education by "...encouraging trans-national co-operation between universities, boosting European mobility and improving the transparency and full academic recognition of studies and qualifications throughout the Union" (http://ec.europa.eu, accessed 10 July 2006)
27 at least those relating to England (and Wales)
while a large number of German documents directly and often in some detail address the European dimension in the curriculum, the majority of British government documents focus on other activities such as European exchanges.

Governmental recommendations, however, do not necessarily guarantee what is actually being taught at school. School teaching is informed and prescribed by the curriculum, although this is also to some degree open to interpretation by the school or other educational authority. Therefore it is essential to have a closer look at the German and English curriculum in order to assess in how far a European dimension has been incorporated. Firstly, however, in order to understand the curricular analysis, it is necessary to explain the structure and organisation of the school system in Germany and England.
6.5 The German school system

Graph 6.1 The German school system

GERMANY

FURTHER EDUCATION
(various forms of general and vocational further education)

Promotion
Degree or examination after a 3-year course of study
Eidgen. Magist. Staatsexamen Bachelor Master

BERUFSABSCHLUSS (14)
Diplom

FACHSCHULE (12)
ABENDGYMNASIUM/ KOLLEGE

Vocational Qualification Fachhochschule

Qualification of vocational further education Allgemeine Hochschulreife

Berufsfachmittelschule at 12th grade or in cooperative form

BERUFSFACHSCHULE (10)
FACHOBER- SCHULE

BERUFS- OBER- SCHULE

GYMNASIUM OBERSTUFE (12.7)

In the different school types: Gymnasium, Berufliches Gymnasium, Fachgymnasium, Gesamtschule

AMFÄHIGER SCHULABGANG (11)
(Raumschule leaving certificate) after 10 years,
First general education qualification (Hauptschule leaving certificate) after 9 years

HAUPTSCHULE (14;)
REALSCHULE (15)
GESAMTSCHULE (5)
GYMNASIUM (5)

Orientation phase irrespective of the school type or as a separate school type

GRUNDschule (11)

Source: http://www.eurydice.org, accessed 12 May 2004
As already pointed out, the German Länder are responsible for the education system, but co-operate at national level through the KMK. The KMK has no formal legal status and is a voluntary forum that works toward increased harmonisation of the school systems in the different Länder (Lewis 2001:150). A 1964 agreement, amended in 1971, guarantees a uniform fundamental structure of the school system in Germany (Eurydice 1999:9). The KMK decides which subjects are to be included and the Länder organise their respective curriculum within this framework. The decentralised nature of the system allows for the development of regional particularities within the national framework (Lewis 2001:150). The educational ministries of the Länder supervise educational institutions and have various responsibilities including the organisation of schools, the content of the courses and the approval of textbooks (Eurydice 1999:10).

The administration of schools is usually two-tiered whereby the ministries are the upper tier and local/communal school offices (Schulamt) form the lower tier (Eurydice 1999:10). The local authorities are normally responsible for administering and funding public sector schools. There are a number of consultative bodies such as the teachers’ and school conferences as well as bodies representing the parents (Elternvertretungen) and the pupils (Schülervertretungen) (Eurydice 1999:12). In principle, attending a public sector school is free of charge.

Secondary schooling in most Länder is split according to pupil ability into three main school forms, the Hauptschulen, Realschulen and Gymnasien. Some Länder have also introduced comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen) or a special ‘orientation phase’ at level five and six.28 The educational path of a pupil is ultimately chosen by the parents, although schools will usually issue a recommendation based on the child’s performance.

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28 The orientation phase, which can take the form of a separate school, is a stage of special support and observation after which it will be decided which secondary school a pupil should attend.
All pupils have to attend in total nine years of compulsory schooling after which the lowest leaving qualification (*Hauptschulabschluss*) is available. Pupils at *Realschulen* normally attend school until year ten and leave with the *Realschulabschluss* (or *mittlerer Schulabschluss*), while pupils at *Gymnasien* attend school until year twelve or thirteen and leave school with the *Abitur* (A-levels). The structure is flexible to a certain degree and allows pupils with good leaving qualifications to change to a higher level school to obtain a higher qualification. Equally, pupils can change school forms at any stage if his/her abilities prove unsuitable for the chosen school form.

Teaching provision in schools is normally based on classes organised by age group. As a rule, pupils have to attend thirty hours of compulsory schooling in year seven to ten irrespective of the school form (Eurydice 1999:20). At the *Gymnasium*, compulsory subjects until year ten include German, at least two foreign languages, maths, physics, chemistry, biology, geography, history, politics, music, art, sport and religion. In 1997, 28.9% of all pupils in year eight attended a *Gymnasium* (Eurydice 1999:21).
6.6 The English school system

Graph 6.2 The school system in England and Wales

As in Germany, all children in England between the ages of five and sixteen are entitled to free education. Additional education (for example A-levels) is usually also free of charge up to the age of nineteen. Educational legislation is contained in a series of Acts of Parliament. The most recent ones are the 1988 Education Reform Act, which introduced the National Curriculum, and the 2002 Education Act which increased the schools' flexibility with respect to curriculum, staffing and governance. Most of the essential education legislation is now contained in the 1996 Education Act, which consolidated earlier legislation (Eurydice 2002:11).
The Central Secretary of State for Education and Skills has the overall responsibility for the Department for Education and Skills. There are also a number of non-departmental public bodies such as the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) whose prime duty is to advise the Secretary of State on all matters affecting the curriculum, pupil assessment and publicly funded qualifications (Eurydice 2002:12). The provision and organisation of schools, however, is normally the responsibility of elected local councils in England and Wales which have designated responsibility as Local Education Authorities (LEAs) (Eurydice 2002:13). Each school has a school governing body, which decides the general direction of the school and its curriculum (subject to the requirements of the national curriculum) and oversee the management of the school. The individual teachers decide on teaching methods and which textbooks they use (Eurydice 2002:14).

Compulsory secondary education comprises key stages three and four. Key stage three includes year seven to nine and key stage four year ten and eleven. The majority of secondary schools are comprehensive schools. Pupils may be taught in classes according to their general abilities (streaming) or according to their abilities in particular subjects (setting). Every publicly funded secondary school must provide the national curriculum, religious education, collective worship, sex education and career guidance, but schools have the discretion to develop the whole curriculum to reflect their particular needs and circumstances (Eurydice 2002:26).

In England at key stage three, the national curriculum includes the following compulsory subjects: English, maths, science, design and technology, information and communication technology (ICT), history, geography, modern foreign languages, art and design, music, physical education and (since 2002) citizenship. In key stage four, the national curriculum is limited to the following compulsory subjects: English, maths, science, ICT, citizenship (since 2002), religious education, sex education, careers education, physical education and work related learning. In addition to the compulsory subjects, all pupils have to choose several non-statutory subjects from a range offered by the school.
6.7 The European dimension in the curriculum in Germany and England

The following section will provide a curricular assessment of the European dimension for selected subjects. In the case of England, the curriculum analysis will assess the most recent National Curriculum for England and Wales (1999). In Germany, variations exist between the curricula of the Länder. Therefore, two Länder, namely Lower Saxony and Bavaria, have been chosen for further analysis, as both provide a fair representation of the majority of West German Länder. Lower Saxony in North Germany can be described, in general, as Protestant with a tendency to elect SPD-led Länder governments, while Bavaria in South Germany is largely Catholic and characterised by Christian Democrat Länder governments. East German Länder were deliberately excluded as their different development in the twentieth century was expected to have a major impact on both the curriculum and teacher attitudes. Since the main three school forms in both Länder each have a different curriculum, it was decided to focus on the Gymnasium. These are all schools providing secondary education leading to the Abitur (A-levels) (Lewis 2001:155). There are usually two stages: the compulsory stage including year ten after which pupils receive the mittlerer Schulabschluss, which entitles them to proceed to the next stage, the sixth form leading to the Abitur (Lewis 2001:155). As such, the Gymnasium was considered to be the German school form that most resembles English comprehensive schools, which also often offer compulsory secondary education followed by a sixth form. In addition, it must be noted that due to differences between the two countries in relation to the length of compulsory education, the curricular analysis assesses for England year seven to eleven and, in the case of Germany, year seven to ten.

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29 It would be interesting to investigate these potential differences between West and East German Länder regarding the European Dimension in the curriculum in a separate study.

30 At the time of study, Lower Saxony had an orientation phase, which was abolished in 2004. Therefore, at the time of analysis, secondary education in Lower Saxony started in year seven. In Bavaria, secondary education officially starts in year six.
For the purpose of this study, it was decided to focus on the European dimension in the subjects of history and politics/citizenship. As Shennan (1991:41) points out, history should be a prime facilitator of the European dimension as modern Europe is a product of history; although the European dimension does not exclusively mean “...teaching about the past”. History also helps to explain the present European situation and the values of contemporary society. Therefore, history should be a key subject for the teaching of the European dimension (Shennan 1991:41). Other studies have shown that history is one of the subjects most frequently used by schools to integrate the European dimension (Bordas et al 1993:98). Similarly, the subjects, which were perceived by pupils to provide the most information about Europe were geography (78.7%), history (68.5%) and modern languages (60%) (Convery et al 1997:22).

The second subject, citizenship/politics, has been selected to assess in further detail the links between citizenship, knowledge and identity as discussed in Chapter Five. At the time of their study, Convery et al (1997:58) found that only Germany and the Netherlands had an explicit political element in their curriculum. In the UK, on the other hand, “...anything resembling political education is limited to self-exploration and tolerance of others in personal and social education courses which are additions to the mainstream curriculum and held in low esteem by pupils” (Convery et al 1997:58). This has only changed with the introduction of the statutory citizenship subject for key stage three and four in 2002.

A comparison between the most recent curricula of England (1999), Lower Saxony31 (1996/1997) and Bavaria32 (1990) with regards to the two subjects is limited for the following two reasons. Firstly, the chosen subjects are not taught uniformly across the three examined curricula. In England, history is only compulsory in key stage three (year seven to nine), while in

32 http://www.km.bayern.de/km/schule/lehrplaene/, accessed 21 April 2003
Lower Saxony and Bavaria history is statutory until the end of compulsory secondary education including year ten. Citizenship on the other hand is now compulsory in England in key stage three and four (year seven to eleven). In Lower Saxony, on the other hand, politics is only taught in year nine and ten, while in Bavaria politics is only taught in year ten.

Secondly, the two German curricula are far more detailed than the English National Curriculum. German curriculum guidelines for all subjects generally include the aims of the subject; a list of statutory contents and some non-statutory suggestions for each level; the skills to be developed; an indication of suitable teaching methods and often suggestions for cross curricular co-operation. In addition, many Länder such as Bavaria provide two curricula, one framework curriculum, which is comparable to an executive summary for all subjects, plus more detailed subject curricula. Lower Saxony on the other hand only publishes a framework curriculum. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the analysis of both Länder used the framework curriculum, which proved to be sufficiently comprehensive and detailed in both cases. In England, on the other hand, the curriculum is less structured and focuses on knowledge, skills and understanding. It prescribes only the main topics or case studies for each key stage, but not the statutory contents. Instead, the National Curriculum suggests for each main topic some non-statutory contents and suitable cross-referencing with other subjects. The curricular analysis for Germany is thus inevitably more detailed than the analysis of the English National Curriculum. It must also be noted that the selected curricula have different publication dates.

Finally, it must be pointed out that content analysis is invariably subjective to some degree, not only due to the selection of included materials as described above, but also as it involves the identification and categorisation of key phrases and concepts, which often has to go beyond the mere counting of words and involve the interpretation of text in relation to the

33 In Bavaria, politics is officially called ‘social studies’ (not to be confused with social studies in Lower Saxony which has a different remit). To avoid confusion, the actual terminology will be disregarded and the subject will be uniformly referred to as ‘politics’ or ‘citizenship’.
The European dimension in the German curriculum

To examine the selected German curricula for their European content, it will be helpful to recall the aims set out by the German response to the 1988 EC Resolution. The KMK stated that it was the task of the schools to impart knowledge and understanding of the following key points:

1) the geographical diversity of Europe with its physical, social and economic structures
2) the political and social structures of Europe
3) influential historical forces in Europe, especially the development of an understanding of justice, the role of the state and freedom in Europe
4) lines of development, features and evidence of a common European culture notwithstanding its diversity
5) the linguistic diversity of Europe and the cultural richness which this represents
6) the history of the European ideal and integration efforts since 1945
7) the balance of interests and joint action in Europe to resolve economic, environmental, social and political problems
8) the functions and procedures of European institutions


Although the above tasks were directed at all schools, levels and subjects, the following analysis will examine in how far these points have been included in the history and politics curriculum. For the purpose of this analysis, the selected curricula for history and politics have been searched for key words and contents of the points listed above. Key point nine in the table below has been adopted in addition to the above list and represents references to European identity.
In both Bavaria and in Lower Saxony, the history curriculum most often addresses the political and social structures of Europe, as well as the influential historical forces in Europe. In addition, the development of a common European culture is also frequently referred to as are, to a lesser extent, the European idea and integration effort in the twentieth century.

The history curriculum of Lower Saxony also mentions a number of times the development of a European identity and discusses the importance of the EU in the future. For example, the aims of the Lower Saxony history curriculum include discussions on cultural European identity whereby shared values and histories are hoped to create a European attachment. The curriculum states that history teaching should provide pupils with a stimulus
for positive identification with the values of European humanism, human and
citizenship rights as well as the democratic tradition (NKM 1996: 5). Another
aim of the history curriculum is to investigate and acknowledge sub-national
and trans-national identities, thus helping pupils to create their own identity
while accepting 'others' (NKM 1996:7-8).

The history curriculum in Lower Saxony is divided into topic areas with
statutory themes, which span in chronological order the years seven to ten.
The topic areas are usually phrased in a European rather than purely national
context. For example, some of the year seven topics read as follows:
- The origins of European culture in ancient Greece
- Medieval ways of life including the European city and the European nature
  of the medieval landscape
- Religion and politics in the European Middle Ages

The history curriculum states that many pupils often have prejudices about
European and non-European cultures. One of the aims of teaching should be
to address and correct such prejudices and create an understanding for the
Europe of the future (NKM 1996:35). Furthermore the curriculum claims that
the acceptance of the unified Germany in Europe and her position in the
global community will continue to depend on the way Germans deal with the
National Socialist past. Previous chapters have already highlighted the
continued importance of this period in relation to national and European
attitudes, both in Germany and in England. Both the Bavarian and the Lower
Saxony history curriculum stress the significance of this topic, which is
considered to inform the political-historical identity search of young
generations. In relation to this, another statutory part of the Lower Saxony
curriculum is a discussion of the traditional nation state, which should guide
pupils to the realisation that the future requires a new concept of nationality
and that German unification and European integration need to go hand in
hand (NMK 1996:54).
Similarly, the Bavarian history curriculum presents the EU as a preferential alternative to nation states and nationalism. This is a reflection and dissemination of the government’s commitment to European integration as previously discussed. The Bavarian history curriculum is also frequently phrased in European terms. For example, the topics for year seven include the ‘Carolingian Empire as a European power’ and ‘shared religious movements and ways of life as unifying European elements in the Middle Ages’. Pupils should understand the development of the Carolingian Empire as a form of European unification (BMK 1990). In year ten, pupils learn about the European idea, European movement and European integration as concrete opportunities for a peaceful co-existence of the European nations, although the Bavarian history curriculum lacks the frequent references to European identity that can be found in the Lower Saxony curriculum.

The assessment of the politics curriculum inevitably has to be short as the subject is only taught for two years in Lower Saxony and one year in Bavaria. In Lower Saxony, the aim of the subject is to equip young people with the knowledge and skills needed to engage in society and actively participate in political decision making processes (NKM 1997:4). The curriculum acknowledges that years seven to ten are a crucial phase in pupils’ development, during which their social sensibility and differentiated value judgements are strongly developed.

Table 6.5 Frequency of key points in the German curricula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(politics)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politics (Bavaria)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In Lower Saxony, one of the statutory politics topics deals with the past and future roles of the European states. According to the curriculum, the idea of a unified Europe should be presented to the pupils as a historical chance and as a model, in which social differences are eroded while preserving cultural identities (NKM 1997:24). The statutory themes include the European integration process, regional/national/international unification as well as peace keeping with the help of EU, NATO and the UN. Furthermore, suggested contents include the Euro, the European institutions, EU Enlargement, the role of the unified Germany in Europe as well as the replacement of national sovereignty by European legislation.

In Bavaria, European integration is part of a statutory topic that deals with international organisations. Only at specialised social science Gymnasien, the politics curriculum is more detailed and includes issues such as the decision making processes and institutions of the European Community in year ten (BKM 1990).

The European dimension in the English curriculum
Traditionally, the English curriculum has always been referred to as “Anglo-centric” and “anti-European” (Savvides 2002:1). Following the UK’s response to the 1988 EC Resolution, which emphasised the UK’s commitment to a
European dimension in education, it could have been expected that the National Curriculum, introduced in 1994, displayed a stronger European focus. According to the 1991 UK response, the aims of the government regarding a European dimension in education include:

- Help pupils acquire a view of Europe as a multi-cultural, multi-lingual community which includes the UK
- Encourage awareness of the variety of European histories, geographies and cultures
- Prepare pupils to participate in the economic and social development of Europe
- Encourage interest in and improve competence in European languages
- Provide knowledge about the origins, workings and role of the EC
- Promote a sense of European identity, through first hand experiences where appropriate
- Promote an awareness of the EC's interdependence with the rest of Europe and the world (DES 1991)

Despite this commitment, it would appear, however, that “...the European Dimension has been virtually excluded from the [1994] National Curriculum” (Morrell 1996:1). Savvides (2002:3) agrees and argues that the government's attempt to incorporate a European dimension into the 1994 school curriculum remained of low priority with limited effect even in areas such as history, geography and modern foreign languages. Similarly, Convery et al (1997: 44-45) point out that the European dimension in the 1994 curriculum did not feature as a theme in its own right, but was part of 'education for citizenship' and an aspect of international awareness. This theme, which was one of five cross-curricular themes, was to be related to all subject areas of the curriculum. The themes, however, were non-statutory and remained so even after the Dearing review in 1993 (see below) (Convery et al 1997:47). Furthermore, although cross-curricular guidance papers on citizenships were produced, they were “...ignored and had very little influence at all” (Crick 2003:18). Before the introduction of citizenship as a compulsory subject in 2002, most schools included citizenship and politics teaching in their PSE
(Personal and Social Education) courses (Convery et al 1997:45), although Kenneth Baker (former Secretary of State for Education and architect of the National Curriculum) had favoured making citizenship a compulsory subject (a suggestion that was dismissed by Thatcher) (Crick 2003:18).³⁴ An investigation into some PSE course contents, however, has indicated that only a minimum amount of attention was being paid to Europe (Convery et al 1997:46). According to Morell (1996:15) the 1994 curriculum in history had no reference to the European Union at all. Although the history curriculum for key stage three made reference to the European and world context, the key stage four section on the twentieth century made no mention of the EU (Morrell 1996:16).

In 1993, Sir Ron Dearing was appointed to 'slim down' the National Curriculum, which resulted in the ditching of history and geography, two of the most important subjects in relation to the European dimension, as compulsory subjects at key stage four (Savvides 2003:143). Thus, the key stage four topic 'European integration between 1945-1970' is now non-compulsory (Convery et al 1997:66).

In recent years, as the British government has become less apprehensive toward the EU, the curriculum has obtained a greater European emphasis although educational policy retained an emphasis on British national history (Soysal 2002:3). This is also reflected in the latest revisions of the National Curriculum which were published in 1999 for implementation in 2000 (Convery et al 1997:143). The revised curriculum includes an increased European and international dimension with more statutory requirements for teaching about Europe in certain subjects such as history, geography, modern foreign languages and (from 2002) citizenship. It also includes more cross-curricular themes such as global interdependence and the environment. The term 'European dimension' is mentioned for the first time in the handbook for primary and secondary teachers, which now also acknowledges the

³⁴ Lord Baker later was a member of the Advisory Group producing the 1998 Crick Report (see below). His involvement was described as "...crucial to the group's decision to advise that citizenship must be compulsory" (Crick 2003:18).
importance of creating a European identity. It is stated that the school curriculum should:

- contribute to the development of pupils' identities through knowledge and understanding of the spiritual, moral, social and cultural heritages of British society and the local, national, European, Commonwealth and global dimensions of their lives
- develop pupils' awareness, understanding of and respect for their environments and secure their commitment to sustainable development at a personal, local, national and global level (DfEE 1999d:11).

It is apparent that the reference to a European dimension is less pronounced and more subordinated to a global dimension than in the discussed German curricula. As Economou (2003:124) points out, the British view of the European dimension refers "...primarily to the acquisition of general knowledge about the different European countries and largely ignore the present and future of the EEC/EU and Europe", which is explicitly mentioned in the German curricula.

In relation to history teaching, Savvides (2002:147) explains that the 1999 history syllabus has been developed quite considerably and includes now new study units which offer pupils a greater world perspective in comparison to the 1994 curriculum. The DfEE (1999c) History Key Stages 1-3 teacher booklet lists the following examples which "...indicate specific ways in which teaching of history can contribute to learning across the curriculum" (DfEE 1999c:8). History teaching should include

- teaching "...the role of national and international organisations [...]"
- "...providing opportunities for pupils to discuss the nature and diversity of societies in Britain and the wider world" (DfEE 1999c:8)

The history curriculum for key stage three states that pupils are not only to learn about British history, but also about "...key aspects of European and world history" (DfEE 1999c:20). The curriculum list of key knowledge, skills and understanding include:
• “...social, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of the societies studied, both in Britain and the wider world”

• “...to identify trends, both within and across different periods, and links between local, British, European and world history” (DfEE 1999c:20)

These aspects should be taught, during key stage three, through a range of statutory studies, one of which is a European and two are world studies. Pupils should be taught “...the history of Britain in its European and wider world context” (DfEE 1999c:20). The European and one of the world studies, however, has to be pre-1914, while the other world study must be after 1900. The aim of the twentieth century world study is to teach “…some of the significant individuals, events and developments from across the twentieth century, including the two World Wars, the Holocaust, the Cold War, and their impact on Britain, Europe and the wider world” (DfEE 1999c:22).

The curriculum also provides non-statutory suggestions for each study. As part of the British studies, pupils may learn about the Crusades, the Hundred Years War and relations with other European countries in the sixteenth century. Examples for the European study include the Roman Empire, the Thirty Years War, the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, German and Italian Unification or European imperialism in the nineteenth century. The twentieth century world study includes examples such as the Western Front in the First World War; National Socialism in Germany; the study of individuals such as Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Roosevelt, Gandhi, Mao Zedong or Martin Luther King; the fall of the Berlin Wall as well as the development of the European Union.

These suggestions are optional and it is left to the school and the individual teachers to decide which examples are being studied (see Chapter Seven for a further discussion on implementation). As Savvides (2003:149) points out, there is a possibility that some teachers will choose to ignore some or all of them. Therefore teachers may or may not decide to teach about the European Union. Furthermore, although the understanding of different cultures is a firm part of the curriculum, the emphasis, however, is often
international rather than European. In addition, most of the European individuals suggested for study are associated with the Second World War which does not necessarily promote a positive image of fellow Europeans and European countries.

From 2002, citizenship has become statutory at key stage three and four. The decision to include citizenship was taken by the government in 1997, who commissioned an independent committee to work out the details. These were published in 1998 in the *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools* report (the so-called Crick Report) (Crick 2003:16). As Crick (2003:16-17) points out, Britain was the last country in Europe to add citizenship to the curriculum, although the debate dates back to the 1970s when a voluntary movement campaigned for “education for political literacy”. In the 1970s, Bernard Crick was a leading figure in this campaign, which was supported by the Hansard Society35 (Frazer 2003:66). Generally, in the 1970s, the drive for political education was prompted by the 1969 People Act which lowered the age of majority to 18 (Frazer 2003:68). The campaign asserted that “…it is the need and right of every pupil in school and young adult in further education to receive a balanced and realistic political education […] primarily in terms of developing the knowledge, skill and disposition that we have called ‘political literacy’ (Crick and Porter 1978:27).

As already pointed out, however, citizenship education was not included in the National Curriculum as a statutory subject and was limited to a cross-curricular theme until 2002. As Crick (2003:18) explains, by the late 1990s the “time was ripe” for the introduction of citizenship education as the “…common man was replacing the gentlemen as the preferred social image”. Crick (20003:18) further considers the enthusiasm of the then Secretary of State for Education (David Blunkett) as crucial for the acceptance of the recommendations made by the 1998 Crick Report. The report defines citizenship education as:

35 “…an independent, non-partisan educational charity, which exists to promote effective parliamentary democracy” (http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk, accessed 14 March 2007)
"...the knowledge, skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of participative democracy; the duties, responsibilities, rights and development of pupils into citizens; and the value [...] of involvement in the local and wider community...both national and local [...] and the relationship of formal political activity to civil society in the context of the United Kingdom and Europe; and an awareness of world affairs and global issues" (Crick Report 1998:22).

These recommendations are reflected in the new citizenship curriculum and in the 1999 DfEE Teachers Handbook on Citizenship, which states that the "...knowledge, skills and understanding in the programme of study identify the aspects of citizenship in which pupils make progress [as]

- becoming informed citizens
- developing skills of enquiry and communication
- developing skills of participation and responsible action" (DfEE 1999a:6)

In key stage three, one of the aspects of becoming informed citizens is the study of "...the world as a global community, and the political, economic, environmental and social implication of this, and the role of the European Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations" (DfEE 1999a:14). In key stage four, teaching should include "...the opportunities for individuals and voluntary groups to bring about social change locally, nationally, in Europe and internationally" as well as "...the United Kingdom's relations in Europe, including the European Union, and relations with the Commonwealth and the United Nations" (DfEE 1999a:15).

In sum, as Savvides (2003:154) concludes, in England the European dimension was firstly introduced in the 1999 revised curriculum in subjects such as history, geography and modern foreign languages, although it is still missing from many other subjects. Although the new curriculum makes suggestions for more European topics, Savvides points out (2003:148) that, as most teachers are not specialised in European history and the topics are
kept rather vague, it will be difficult for teachers to know what to teach in relation to this topic.

6.8 Defining the European Dimension

Understanding the concept ‘European dimension’ in teaching appears to be a general problem that persists despite the efforts of European and national bodies to provide a workable definition. As Savvides (2002:4) points out, the lack of a definition for educational purposes poses a real problem for theorists and practitioners alike. Most schools and teachers would “...want a realistic definition, which they can interpret to suit their particular school situation” (Shennan 1991:27). Convery et al (1997:87) found in their 1994 study among trainee teachers that although almost half of the respondents were confident that they understood the European dimension in the 1994 National Curriculum, a similar number felt uncertain or not sure at all. The findings of the present study, which will be discussed in the following chapter, are even more discouraging. Half the German and nearly 60% of the English subject teachers complained that the lack of a clear definition made the implementation of a European dimension difficult. The surveyed head teachers even considered the lack of definition to be the most often encountered problem when trying to implement a European dimension despite the extensive suggestions provided in the curricula as highlighted above.

Both researchers and governmental institutions have long recognised this dilemma and have made attempts to define the European dimension for educational purposes although some or even most of the suggestions tend to be vague and therefore not particularly helpful. The Council of Europe’s Guidelines on European Awareness (1983) for example recommended that knowledge should reflect what is intrinsically distinctive or even unique of Europe. Another suggestion is that a European dimension could include learning about aspects of Europe’s past (relationships and links between member states), the present as well as its future (shared common interests) (Feneyrou 1993:32). The curriculum should highlight the distinctive character
of Europe’s past, whereby common experiences should take precedence over divisive factors such as European wars.

It could be summarised that a curriculum with “...an effective European dimension” would incorporate the compulsory teaching of at least one modern European language, the cultural differences and similarities of the European nations, the history of Europe (with emphasis on postwar European integration), European geography, the roles of European citizens (fostering a sense of European identity), common European values as well as the EU institutions and policies (Savvides 2002:4). Thus, pupils should learn about Europe and its member states as well as the meaning of living and working in Europe and being a European (Savvides 2002:5).

The concept that Shennan (1991:27) adopts, attempts to take into account some of the complexities of Europe. Shennan (1991:27) pictures Europe as a concept of time (history), area (geography) and culture. These concepts would be applied to education through skills (learning for life within Europe), knowledge (learning about Europe) and attitudes/values (learning through Europe). ‘Europe’ in this sense does not simply refer to the (changing) boundaries of the EU.

This overview, albeit brief, shows that definitions of a European dimension tend to be prone to numerous interpretations. This is a reflection of the EU approach to education which places the responsibility for education and the European dimension firmly with the national governments, who in turn often delegate the implementation of educational policies further to regional or local levels. Both the EU and many of the national governments are careful to avoid too prescriptive formulae, which often results in general confusion among education administrators as well as practitioners such as head and subject teachers. Not surprisingly, Convery et al (1996:55) ask if the lack of a clear definition of the European dimension and the lack of central directives about its value may be causing the conditions for procrastination. The purpose of the following chapter is to explore this question and some of the other issues surrounding the practical implementation of a European
dimension, using findings from a case study, which has been conducted among German and English subject and head teachers, on whom the realisation of European or governmental intentions regarding a 'European education' often depends.

6.9 Conclusions

This chapter has explored some issues relating to the European dimension in education as a possible means to stimulate and foster a European identity among young people and future generations of Europeans. The concept is not new. Mass education systems have been used at least since the nineteenth century by nation states as key political socialisation agents and promoters of national identity. Other important facilitators in the process of national establishment and fortification included a standardised language and culture as well as the mass media. After the EU acknowledged that some form of European identity could boost popular support for and popular legitimacy of the EU, it has modelled its attempts to create a European identity largely on traditional nation state methodology. This, however, is not unproblematic for a number of reasons.

For example, the EU has so far failed to put forward a distinct and generally accepted definition of European identity as discussed in Chapter Five. Some attempts to generate a European identity, such as the use of European symbols and iconography as well as references to shared European values appeal to those who support a cultural European identity. The attempt to find shared values, historical roots and symbols seems to try to establish a 'European myth', or imagined European community to use Anderson's (1991) terminology, which mimics the creation of national myths. On the other side, it is often argued that a European dimension should be incorporated because the EU needs informed citizens who know about their rights and obligations as European citizens. Such argumentation appeals to those who favour a civic definition of European identity. Thus, the vague nature of European identity invariably means that any recommendation
relating to its creation as well as their implementation, for example through a European dimension in education, will be equally ill-defined.

Secondly, the above mentioned facilitators of national identity cannot simply be transferred to the European sphere. Since the EU motto is ‘unity in diversity’, a standardised culture and language would be undesirable and unpopular. Furthermore, and quite essentially, the EU has no formal responsibility in the field of education, culture or the mass media, all of which are controlled and organised nationally. Any attempt to incorporate European elements, for example in education, is the decision and responsibility of the member states. The EU role in education is restricted to issuing recommendations and proposals. The member state responses to these recommendations depend to a considerable degree on the popular and governmental attitude to European integration and European identity in relation to national identity.

To analyse this further, this chapter has analysed some of the relevant German and English (British) government publications as well as selected German curricula and the English National Curriculum for references to the European dimension in education. The bulk of the publication analysis focussed on the governmental response to the 1988 EC Resolution on the European Dimension in Education. The curricular analysis concentrated on the subjects of history and citizenship in compulsory secondary education in the selected sample. In general, the German response to the 1988 EC Resolution was considerably more pro-European and was based on existing policies regarding a European dimension in education. This commitment to a European dimension in education, which existed in Germany since the 1970s, emphasises the overall pro-European attitude in Germany, which has been discussed in Chapter Five.

The British response to the 1988 EC Resolution appears to be similar, albeit not as detailed and less prescriptive. Retrospective analysis, however, shows that many of the proposals put forward by the British response have not materialised or have ceased to exist. The general, more reserved, attitude
to a European dimension in education is also reflected in the English National Curriculum, which hardly refers to European elements. The focus of the English National Curriculum is more on an international dimension. The assessed German curricula, by comparison, show a much more pro-active attitude to the European dimension in education by assigning education a vital role in creating a European identity. Furthermore, the terminology used throughout the analysed German curricula has a significantly stronger European orientation. While in Germany many European themes are statutory, this is not the case in England since the English curriculum is considerably less prescriptive and therefore less detailed. In England, teachers have more freedom to choose teaching content, which invariably has implications for the implementation of a European dimension. These implications, as well as other aspects of the practical implementation of the European dimension in education, will be analysed in the next chapter.
7. Implementing a European dimension in education

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the foundations of a European dimension in education as outlined in EU and governmental guidelines as well as sample curricula in England and Germany. EU educational guidelines usually consider the rationale for a more European education to be the provision of informed citizens; the preparation of young people for life and work in the EU; the fostering of support for European integration and laying the foundations for a European identity. Based on the 1988 EC Resolution on the European Dimension in Education, the member states were invited to integrate European elements in their curricula and educational policies, which, as the previous chapter has shown, was taken up to varying degrees. The extent to which a European dimension was integrated by Germany and England has been influenced at least partly by national attitudes towards European integration. In England, a latent desire to safeguard national sovereignty and identity, as discussed in Chapter Five, has resulted in a certain reluctance to Europeanise educational policy, while in Germany a different attitude to national identity has resulted in generally more integrationist policies, including in the sphere of education.

The previous chapter has shown that education appears to have an influence on young people’s attitudes towards Europe. Previous research has identified schools as one of the three most important information sources about Europe and the EU. In addition, Eurobarometer findings suggest that people with higher educational qualifications are more likely to support European integration, although, as pointed out before, a causal relationship cannot be assumed. Convery et al (1997) have found that the majority of young people tend to be interested in Europe and would like to learn more. Convery et al (1997) also indicated that the majority of German children already feel to some degree European, which, however, is not the case in England.
Since the member states remain in charge of the education systems while the role of the EU is restricted to making recommendations, Soysal (2002:12) claims that so far the attempts of the EU to "Europeanise" education have remained largely ineffective. The member states responses to the 1988 EC Resolution made it clear that "...in general terms, the main emphasis in almost all the countries was on the provision of European content within traditional subject areas: learning about Europe rather than learning to be Europeans" (Ryba 1992:15). However, what pupils learn at school about Europe does not only depend on the curriculum and on general educational policies, but to a considerable degree on the individual schools and teachers. This reliance on the local level to implement a European dimension in teaching seems to be a particular issue in England, although German teachers and schools also have some freedom within the curriculum to specialise and select teaching content.

Since both subject and head teachers are key stake holders in the practical implementation of a European dimension, a case study has been conducted in Germany and England to gain an insight into a range of topics that may affect whether or not European elements are being taught. The overall aim of the study was to establish if any significant differences exist between England and Germany in relation to, for example, which elements are considered by the teachers to be components of a European dimension and what is actually being taught or offered by the school. Special emphasis has been placed on an investigation of teacher training and knowledge as well as personal attitudes to a European dimension in education. Furthermore, teachers were asked about any problems they encountered in relation to European aspects in teaching. Earlier studies have identified a number of potential problems and one of the aims of this study is to establish if any of these previously identified problems persist.

7.2 Methodology

For the purpose of this study, a questionnaire based survey has been carried out among German and English subject and head teachers. Two similar
questionnaires were designed, one for subject teachers and one for head teachers whereby the head teachers were asked more open-ended questions concerning the European dimension at their school. The draft questionnaire was presented to a focus group of researchers, teachers and lecturers while the German translation was checked by native German speakers. The questionnaires were then piloted with a small sample of teachers, lecturers and researchers in order to eliminate potential sources of unreliability caused by errors in the research design, as well as to check the questionnaires for construct and content validity (Harrison 2001:27). This was particularly important as the topic of the research (European dimension) is in itself an ambiguous and ill-defined concept, which made a clear terminology even more crucial.

The questionnaires were then dispatched to a sample of two hundred Gymnasien in Germany and two hundred secondary comprehensive schools in England, which have been chosen at random from online school listings. As neither Bavaria nor Lower Saxony has a significant number of comprehensive schools,\(^\text{36}\) which would have enabled a more direct comparison with England, it was decided to focus on the Gymnasium, as explained in Chapter Six.

The survey was carried out with one hundred English and one hundred German head teachers\(^\text{37}\) as well as two hundred subject teachers in each country with the following distribution:

- one hundred English subject teachers (citizenship)
- one hundred English subject teachers (history)
- one hundred German subject teachers (history)\(^\text{38}\)
- one hundred German subject teachers (politics)\(^\text{39}\)

As the study’s focus is on compulsory secondary schooling, the teacher questionnaire was addressed to subject teachers in key stage three and four.

\(^{36}\) Comprehensive schools were only adopted as a mainstream school form in some German Länder

\(^{37}\) fifty each from Bavaria and Lower Saxony

\(^{38}\) fifty each from Bavaria and Lower Saxony

\(^{39}\) fifty each from Bavaria and Lower Saxony

215
(Germany year seven to ten). A copy of the English questionnaire for subject and for head teachers can be found in Appendix II.

Each questionnaire was accompanied by an introductory letter and a return envelope. The survey was conducted without reminders, which would have been too cost expensive. The questionnaires were sent out after the school Easter vacation at the end of April 2004, stipulating a two week return deadline (slightly longer for Germany to account for postal delivery times).

The overall response rate of the study exceeded 30%, which is acceptable and adequate since the purpose of this case study was to gain an insight and not to make valid generalisations to the rest of the population (DIIA 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1: Response rate</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
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<td>Head teachers</td>
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<td>Subject teachers</td>
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43.4% of the German head teachers were from Bavaria and 43.3% from Lower Saxony (13.2% unknown) while 50% of German subject teachers were from Bavaria and 44.9% from Lower Saxony (5.1% unknown). As discussed in Chapter Six, the two German Länder have been chosen to increase the representativeness of the German sample and it is therefore not intended to assess comparatively the results of both Länder. Please note that the tables for this chapter, if not printed in the text, can be found in Appendix I.

The majority of the English teachers responding to the questionnaire taught history, while the majority of German subject teachers taught both history and politics. Thus it would appear that in Germany the subjects of history and politics are usually taught by the same teacher at the school, which may result in greater content co-ordination between the two subjects. In

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40 see table 7.2
addition, a total of sixteen English and forty-seven German subject teachers stated that they were also teaching a variety of other subjects. The majority of head teachers (63.9% in England and 86.5% in Germany) were also teaching a range of subjects at their school.

The gender and age profile of the respondents differed considerably. The vast majority of German (70.1%), but only 43.9% of English subject teachers were male while less than one third of head teachers (32.3% in England and 20.6% in Germany) were female. Both German head and subject teachers are generally older than their English colleagues. 61% of the German and around 20% of English subject teachers were over fifty years old. By comparison, half of the English and nearly all German (91%) head teachers were aged fifty or over. Both the gender and the age profile seem to have an impact on the teachers' attitudes towards a European dimension. Younger teachers tended to be more likely to include a European dimension than their older colleagues, while overall female teachers were less likely to include European elements. The latest Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK Executive summary 2005: 4) provided similar results. In the UK, for example, men as well as younger people were found to be more enthusiastic about the EU than women and older generations.

7.3 Attitudes to a European dimension in teaching

Importance of a European dimension
The teachers have been asked which importance they assign to a European dimension in teaching, both in general and in their specific subject area. The findings show that generally the vast majority of both English and German subject teachers described European aspects in education as important, although German teachers valued them significantly more than their English colleagues. While only one in eight English teachers thought that European elements in education are very important, this figure rose to around one in

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41 nineteen German respondents preferred not to answer this question
42 see table 7.3
43 see table 7.4
44 see table 7.5
three German teachers. Equally, over 20% of the English but only 3% of the German teachers thought that European elements had no particular importance as the following graph illustrates:

**Graph 7.1 Importance of a European dimension in general**

(subject teachers) (%)

![Graph showing the importance of a European dimension in general for subject teachers in England and Germany.]

Similarly, while all German head teachers generally believed that European aspects in teaching are important, nearly one in seven of their English colleagues did not share this opinion.⁴⁵

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⁴⁵ see table 7.6
Graph 7.2 Importance of a European dimension in general (head teachers) (%)

It could have been expected that subject teachers may consider European elements in their subject area to be more important than in general teaching since both politics and history are considered to be key subjects for the 'Europeanisation' of education. This has been confirmed by the findings of this study. 46

Graph 7.3 Importance of a European dimension in the subject area (subject teachers) (%)

46 see table 7.7
As before, the German subject teachers deemed the European dimension in their subject area as decidedly more important than their English colleagues. Nearly every second German but only around every third English teacher believed that European aspects are very important in their subject area. On the other side, nearly 13% of English but only 1% of German teachers dismissed European elements in their subject area as not important.

**Graph 7.4 Importance of a European dimension at the school (head teachers) (%)**

The findings also show that head teachers thought that European aspects at their school were less important than in general teaching. German head teachers, however, valued the European dimension at their school more than English head teachers. Nearly one fifth of English but only around 4% of German head teachers attached no particular importance to European elements and thus may have given them a comparatively low priority at their school.

The reasons for the different ratings of European aspects varied considerably whereby, in general, German teachers provided more elaborate answers which tended to be more pro-European. Generally, the reasons

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47 see table 7.8
48 in total, forty-three reasons from English subject teachers and 120 from German subject teachers
given by subject teachers in support for a European dimension in teaching can be categorised as follows:

**Graph 7.5 Reasons for the importance of a European dimension (subject teachers)**

![Graph showing reasons for the importance of a European dimension](image)

a) **Economy/work opportunities.** Some teachers, especially in Germany, thought that a European dimension in education is important to prepare pupils for life and work in the EU and to increase their careers chances.

b) **Global orientation.** Many pro-European comments made by English teachers tend to mirror the English National Curriculum and other government guidelines by generally incorporating European elements into a global dimension. German teachers, on the other hand, seem to consider global and European aspects as distinct features. Some German teachers stressed that the EU should be strengthened as a counterweight to the USA.

c) **Knowledge of other countries/cultures, to teach tolerance.** This was the second most important reason given by German teachers to support a European dimension. Emphasis was placed on teaching tolerance and fostering international understanding (*Völkerverständigung*). Tolerance and understanding of other cultures was important to some English teachers, who also stressed
the role of education to counter prejudices and improve race relations.

d) Political understanding, influence of EU on political life. Understanding European politics and the role of the EU was for teachers in both countries the most important reason to include a European dimension. English teachers thought that political awareness is important and that pupils should understand "how things work". A few mentioned that "European politics" was part of the citizenship curriculum. The German responses were similar although in general more pro-European. Many expressed the feeling that teaching about European politics is not just a curricular requirement but a vital part of education to prepare pupils for their roles as European citizens. Pupils should be made aware of the current role of the EU and should understand how European integration offers new options and how pupils can actively create their European environment. Many German teachers pointed out that national politics can nowadays only be taught in the European context.

e) European history (history of other member states, historical links or history of the EU). Those English teachers, who thought that a European element in history is important, stressed that national history should be taught by examining links to other countries. Emphasis seems to remain on national history, but Britain's place in Europe is considered by some as important. However, the few examples provided are largely limited to the two world wars in the twentieth century. As discussed in Chapter Six, previous research has pointed out that English history teaching tends to emphasise periods or aspects of European history that often create negative images of other European countries. As one English teacher pointed out, history tends to concentrate on "...war and conflict in Europe, rather than integration". In comparison, German teachers focused on those European elements in history teaching, which make pupils aware of shared values and experiences. This does no simply mean that national history should be taught in context to
other countries, but that a ‘European history’ in its own right as well as historical European links and roots should be taught. As one teacher put it, pupils should understand “...Europe as a historic-cultural community”.

f) Proactive teaching: creation of European identity and support for a shared European future, overcoming nationalism. This was one of the main reasons for German teachers to support a European dimension in teaching. Many considered the creation of a European identity to be a principal aim of teaching. Under consideration of historical experiences, many teachers believed that European identity needed to be developed as an alternative to and replacement of nationalism and national identity; although some hoped that national and regional identities could continue to exist as part of a wider European orientation. Nevertheless, the dismantling of any form of nationalism was of crucial importance to many, reflecting the general popular and governmental post-war German attitude to national identity and the search for alternative identifications. In addition, one German teacher explained that without a European identity the further political development of the EU would be impossible. Quite a few German teachers believed that “a shared European future” is the only possible way forward and that the nation state should be overcome in order to enable European union. In total, two English teachers also mentioned European identity, but more broadly in relation to making pupils aware of their European identity, rather than actively promoting and encouraging such an identity. Regarding Ryba’s (1992:15) statement that the emphasis in most EU member states is on teaching about Europe and not teaching pupils to be Europeans, it would appear that English teachers tend to concentrate on raising awareness and teaching about Europe while the German approach is somewhat more pro-actively trying to create Europeans. This would appear to be successful in so far that German pupils tend to feel significantly more European than English pupils. Further
research into causal relationships is needed since education is not
the only agent that informs pupils attitudes to Europe and the EU.

**g) Teaching of a European dimension to secure peace.** Only
German teachers commented on the importance of European
elements and European integration to secure peace in Europe and
guarantee that “...wars are a thing of the past”.

**h) Preparation for an increased role of the EU in the future.** Again,
this was purely a German reason for supporting a European
dimension. Many teachers believed that the EU will inevitably have
an increased role in the future and that a “united Europe” is rather
likely. Education thus needs to prepare pupils for their European
future. The role of the EU in future will be discussed in more detail
further on.

Some subject teachers opposed a European dimension in teaching for
varied reasons. A few English teachers referred to time constraints and
curriculum pressures, while another pointed out that European issues are
irrelevant to pupils, who “find it difficult to relate” and consider politics to be
“boring”. Another English teacher believed that “...overall there are more
important issues in children’s education”. Only one German teacher argued
that a more comprehensive coverage of European elements was not possible
due to curriculum constraints while another thought that the desirability of a
‘blanket Europeanisation’ of all aspects of life might be questionable.

The head teacher’s reasons for supporting a European dimension were
slightly different:
The majority of English head teachers stressed the importance of a global dimension, which may incorporate European elements. As one head teacher put it: "...we are more concerned with a global (including European) dimension rather than being Euro-centred". Emphasis is usually placed on raising awareness of European and global issues, broadening horizons and understanding other cultures. Political understanding is also considered important, although again the emphasis is on making pupils aware of their country's position in Europe. A couple of English head teachers argued that pupils should have some understanding of European issues since Europe would play an important part in their country's future. As one head teacher claimed, school teaching needs to "...ensure students understand their European context and their rights and responsibilities as citizens of Europe".

In contrast, both the language and terminology used by both German head and subject teachers differed from that of their English counterparts in certain ways. The majority of German respondents seemed to embrace a European dimension as a necessity to prepare pupils for their role in a more integrated or even united Europe. Their attitude echoed the language used by the curricula (especially in Lower Saxony) as outlined in Chapter Six. Further European integration and political union were considered by many as
inevitable but welcome developments, which, as one German head teacher put it "...must urgently be accompanied and complemented by an integration of minds and hearts". Therefore both German head and subject teachers tend to regard European integration as a viable and welcome alternative to nationalism as discussed in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, a couple of German head teachers also pointed out that the pupil's 'own' identity (often understood as a regional rather than national identity) should be preserved as part of an overall European orientation. Still, the majority considered a European dimension at school to be imperative in order to enable future European integration in terms of cultural integration (understanding, tolerance and acceptance) and European identity formation. Quite a few German head teachers mentioned that their school has the status of Europaschule,\(^\)\(^4\) and thus, as one respondent expressed it, "...the European dimension is tradition at our school". By comparison, none of the English head teachers referred to the European dimension in teaching as an agent for furthering European integration or European identity.

In addition, several German head teachers believed that schools need to teach pupils about shared European historical roots, especially in relation to the past destructive force of nation states, and how Europe must now cooperate in order to avoid future conflicts. A few head teachers in both countries also stressed the importance of teaching about Europe for the future careers of the pupils on the European market.

Overall, only very few head teachers opposed a European dimension. Their reasons were mostly related to time constraints due to an already overloaded curriculum (in the case of the English head teachers), whereas a couple of German head teachers criticised that their school did not quite include as many European elements as could be desired. Despite the difference in attitudes, the vast majority of subject and head teachers were committed to teaching a European dimension with no significant differences

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\(^{4}\) see Chapter Six
between the English and the German responses\textsuperscript{50} or between age and gender groups. In general, English head teachers tended to be slightly less committed than their German colleagues.

7.4 Implementing a European dimension

Despite the overall commitment to European aspects in teaching, differences as to what is actually being taught by subject teachers are likely to occur especially considering the ambiguous and vaguely defined nature of ‘the European dimension’ as pointed out in the previous chapter. In general, the majority of both English (80\%) and German subject teachers (79\%) believe that their teaching has a European dimension.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, of those who are not yet including European elements, 69\% of English and 90.5\% of German teachers would like to do so.

To further assess what teachers actually teach within the broad label of a ‘European dimension’, the subject teachers were presented with a list of potential European aspects and asked to indicate which, if any, they teach. Teachers were also asked how important they consider the different elements to be.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} see table 7.19 and 7.20
\textsuperscript{51} see table 7.18
\textsuperscript{52} see table 7.21 and 7.22
As illustrated by the graphs, both German and English teachers considered European languages to be the most important contributor to a European dimension, followed by discussions on European identity (England) and European exchanges as well as the history of European integration (Germany). At the other end of the scale, special European projects were
generally considered to be least important. Overall, significantly more German teachers regarded all European elements (apart from European special projects) as important and were also more likely to include them in their teaching.

For example, over 80% of German but only 28% of English teachers included the history of European integration. Similarly, 77% of German in comparison to 37% of English teachers covered the EU institutions. Bearing in mind that the sample consisted of history and citizenship teachers, it is perhaps not surprising that not many included European languages in their teaching. Discussion on European identity, however, as well as European citizenship rights or EU institutions, which could have been expected in citizenship teaching, were included by only just over a third of English teachers. The element most commonly taught by English teachers was the history of other EU member states. The following graph illustrates the percentage of teachers in each country who offer a selection of proposed European aspects:

Graph 7.9 European elements included in teaching (%)
In addition to these proposed elements, a couple of English teachers also taught human rights issues, migration and European laws as elements of a European orientation. German teachers provided more varied examples of additional European elements. They included teaching about recent developments in European integration; conflicts between national and European politics; the common foreign and defence policy; the Euro; the subsidiarity principle; practical aspects of European integration (studying abroad etc); models for the future; European economy and ecology; an integrated approach to history (how the European states have influenced each other); EU policies in relation to individual member states; shared European culture and European elections. Some teachers also mentioned specific European projects such as the publication of an English school newspaper, European competitions, COMENIUS\textsuperscript{54} projects, arrangements for work placements abroad and school partnerships.

The head teachers' opinions were similar. Both German and English head teachers generally agreed that European languages, European exchanges and special European projects were the most important aspects of a European dimension.\textsuperscript{55} German head teachers, however, valued teaching about EU institutions as well as European exchanges significantly more than their English counterparts.

\begin{flushright}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{54} COMENIUS focuses on education (from pre-school and primary to secondary school) and supports "...school partnerships, projects for the training of school education staff, and school education networks. It thus aims to enhance the quality of teaching, strengthen its European dimension and promote language learning and mobility" (\url{http://ec.europa.eu}, accessed 10 July 2006).
\textsuperscript{55} see table 7.24 and 7.25
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushright}
Significantly more German (85%) than English head teachers (74%) believed that their school overall had a European dimension\(^{56}\) mostly in the form of exchanges, which were offered by 62% of the English and all of the

\(^{56}\) see table 7.26
English schools most often had exchanges with France and Germany and to a lesser extent with Italy and Spain. Similarly, the majority of the German exchanges took place with England and France, but Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland as well as other East European countries were also on offer. In general, the German exchange programme was more diverse with a stronger East European focus, which was virtually non-existent at the surveyed English schools. A likely explanation for the popularity of exchanges with East Europe is the close proximity of Germany to countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary. Apart from exchanges, seventeen English as well as eight German head teachers also mentioned other trips abroad, ranging from ski and shopping excursions to non-exchange language and study stays abroad. It may be possible to infer that while German schools focus on exchanges, English schools tend to offer more non-exchange trips abroad, but this would need to be investigated further.

Extra-curricular activities also included a variety of special projects with a European focus. Seven English head teachers mentioned collaborative special art or music projects, while twenty-one German head teachers listed for example European weeks and European collaboration projects as well as special talks and seminars on European topics. Ten of the German and three of the English schools offered COMENIUS projects/exchanges while four German schools also participated in European competitions. Eight of the German and two of the English head teachers mentioned their European school contacts or partner schools. It is of course possible that more schools offered exchanges or European projects, however, not all head teachers provided a comprehensive list of European elements at their school. It is also likely that head teachers' understanding of a 'European dimension' varied given the ambiguities of this concept.

Apart from exchanges, the second most often mentioned contributor to a European dimension at school was the curriculum. The majority of English head teachers, who thought that their school's curriculum contained European

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57 in total twenty-four English and forty-eight German head teachers provided details about the European dimension at their school.
elements, referred to specific parts of the curriculum such as "European geography", "history in year eight", "looking at links between English and European history", "using European statistics for maths exercises" and so forth. In comparison, the majority of German head teachers tended to consider the entire curriculum to contribute to the European dimension. As one German head teacher put it: "...[in order to include a European dimension in teaching] it really would be enough to teach the curriculum. Europe has an important role in most subjects".

The responses of many German head teachers, however, denote that the curriculum as such is not considered part of the school's European dimension. This is most likely due to the fact that most German head teachers restricted their responses to non-compulsory European elements at their school, which are offered in addition to the curriculum (such as exchanges, projects etc). The compulsory European aspects of the curriculum, as discussed in the previous chapter, almost seem to be taken for granted by many head teachers to the point that they are not considered worth mentioning as 'special' European elements. English respondents, by contrast, tend to list anything with a global or European orientation including specific lesson examples.

An example of this would be language teaching. Only a minority of fifteen German head teachers mentioned foreign language teaching as part of their schools European dimension. Their responses were mostly limited to extra-curricular language offers such as Spanish, Italian or East European languages as well as bilingual teaching (which was mentioned by seven German head teachers). Hardly anyone, however, referred to the core curriculum foreign languages, such as English, which is nevertheless compulsory at all schools in the sample. Therefore, it may be possible to deduce that statutory language teaching is taken for granted and as such not considered to be part of the school's European dimension. By contrast, the English head teachers, who thought that languages were part of their school's European aspect, referred almost entirely to core modern foreign language teaching. Only a few head teachers, mostly from specialist language schools,
gave examples of additional language offers such as Spanish or Italian. The language specialist schools also tended to offer more exchanges, language trips and other European related projects than other schools.

This following table shows which subjects are most likely considered by the head teachers to include European elements:

Table 7.27: Subjects most likely to include a European dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England</th>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern languages</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>Modern languages</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maths</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>Maths</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>Social Studies/Politics</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>Art</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>Religion/Ethics</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design and Technology</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT (Information and Communication Technology)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Head teachers in both countries agreed that the subjects most likely to include European elements were modern foreign languages, history and citizenship/politics. English head teachers, however, believed that many subjects (such as PE, Music, Religious Education, Science, Art and Maths) incorporated European aspects, while their German counterparts hardly selected these subjects at all. This may again originate in the different understanding of the European dimension in the curriculum and at the school as discussed above.
7.5 Barriers to the implementation of a European dimension

As already examined in the previous chapter, one of the main problems with the practical implementation of a European dimension is the lack of a clear definition of this concept. In addition, past research has identified a number of other problems frequently encountered by teachers trying to incorporate European aspects in their teaching. These include anti-European attitudes, curriculum and time pressures as well as a lack of information and an absence of a statutory basis for a European dimension (Economou 2003:136). These are important issues, as they affect, according to Ryba (1992:23), the factors, which really influence classroom teaching, such as teacher training, which will be discussed in further detail later on, and the development of classroom and other educational practices by the teachers themselves.

The English teachers' main reason for complaint was lack of training while the German subject teachers struggled especially with time constraints. Another major issue was a shortage of resources despite a general EU and governmental commitment to providing appropriate textbooks and materials. As Shore (2000:57) points out, many EU Commissioners dealing with education policy supported the idea that textbooks should be written from a European point of view to counter "...the nationalistic bias in most [...] education systems". In practice, member state governments are responsible for textbooks and materials although additional information is available from the EU and a range of informal education institutions. In the UK, however, as Convery et al (1997:34) claimed, no provision for special resources had been made. In Germany by contrast, according to Soysal (2002:3), the increasing importance of European issues is reflected in some school books to such an extent that the nation has started to disappear in favour of Europe and the regions. Nevertheless, some German subject teachers bemoaned the lack of European textbooks, exam plans and up to date materials.

In general English teachers were more likely to have encountered problems than German teachers. For example, while nearly every second
English teacher complaint about time constraints, less than one third of German subject teachers had the same problem. Some English subject teachers explained that although European elements are important, it was not possible to cover any of them in detail within the constraints of the National Curriculum and the key stage four exam courses. Similarly, some German teachers criticised that politics was often assigned a peripheral role, while history was usually only taught for two hours a week in many of the surveyed schools. Hardly any teachers, however, complained about lack of own commitment or lack of guidance from the head of school.

The head teachers' responses were very similar. Their main problems related to the lack of a clear definition and adequate training. In addition, the German head teachers complained especially about the absence of relevant resources and the English head teachers about time pressures. As one English respondent put it, due to the workload the European dimension is "...always competing with other priorities in the eyes of the subject teachers". It is worth noting that over half of the English but only around every fifth German head teacher considered time constraints to be a major problem. As before, this might be due to the common opinion of both English head and subject teachers that a European dimension is an additional feature that would need to be taught on top of the core curriculum. Their German colleagues, however, as pointed out earlier, tend to perceive the European dimension as a necessary and integral component of many curriculum subjects to such an extent that 'Europe' has almost become a 'natural' part of education and the pedagogical jargon, echoing the terminology used by German governmental policies and the curricula.

There are other areas of disagreement between the English and the German head teachers. For example, a quarter of English head teachers, but none of their German colleagues, criticised low levels of teacher commitment. In turn, nearly ten per cent of the German but none of the English head teachers admitted to lack of personal dedication to European elements. Some

58 see table 7.9
59 see table 7.10
English head teachers also complained about the deficiency of statutory European elements in the National Curriculum as well as a lack of LEA support for EU projects such as COMENIUS. A couple of German respondents thought that the subject teachers needed to be made more aware of the European dimension. Finally, a number of head teacher in both countries said that the decision to teach about Europe is usually left to the subject teachers. As one English head teacher pointed out “...the teaching of a European dimension is largely down to individual teachers as it is not school policy yet”.

Channels of Implementation
This reliance on individual teachers and schools instead of a national framework and curriculum to implement a European dimension in education has already been mentioned in the previous chapter and deserves further attention as this decentralised and informal pattern of implementation seems to characterise especially the English approach to the European dimension. Convery et al (1997:34) for example observed that “...what scant evidence there is of educating for European citizenship [in England] is found not at national, organized level but at best at the individual school level, if not at the individual teacher level”. While it appears that in Germany the European dimension is firmly anchored in the national framework and the Länder curricula, the English approach is better described as decentralised with a broader, less detailed and less prescriptive outline. The result is that the implementation of a European dimension, if left to the discretion of teachers (rather than being a visibly examined subject), can be somewhat haphazard, while the inclusion of European elements is likely to remain peripheral and incidental.

As explained previously, the UK response to the 1988 EC Resolution placed considerable responsibility for the initiation and support of a European dimension with the LEAs (Convery et al 1997:51). Thus, according to Economou (2003:127), although the DfES decides policy in relation to the European dimension, it does neither have a direct involvement in its delivery nor an active interest in its enforcement. Effectively, it has been left to the
LEAs to decide whether or not they wish to take the European dimension forward. Phillips (2003:83) agrees and comments that the UK seemed to have indicated reluctance at ministerial level to become too closely involved in adopting EU policies into national policies. He points out that "...transmission of the policy goes by default and [...] implementation becomes a matter of chance, left largely to institutions and individuals who become 'significant actors' in taking things forward: without the enthusiasm generated by such actors we are left with the impression that very little would happen" (Phillips 2003:83). This has been confirmed by the findings of this study which show that 51% of English but only 21% of German subject teachers complained about a lack of guidance from educational authorities. Convery et al (1997:51) observed that in England some informal support for teaching about Europe beyond the national curriculum is available, but that this is usually restricted to raising awareness about European initiatives such as SOCRATES. Convery et al (1997:34) argue that it is the lack of national impetus that is hindering an education for Europe in England.

In practice, as Soysal (2002:2) points out, the Europeanisation of education is a process largely happening through informal networks which remain unmonitored by intergovernmental structures or EU institutions. Such informal networks include teachers’ associations, academics, scientific experts, other supporting groups and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, which work towards promoting European education and ideals and help to define and assess diffuse concepts (Soysal 2002:2). Economou (2003:133-134) agrees and argues that whether or not a European dimension is encouraged depends on individuals’ interest, enthusiasm and effort. The actual implementation of the European dimension in schools can be considered as patchy and put into practise primarily through project participation and modern foreign language teaching, but fails to be taught as a cross-curricular theme which could permeate all subjects (Economou 2003:135). On an anecdotal basis, this study seems to confirm that considerable differences can exist between schools, especially in England. For example, while one English teacher said that the European dimension was rarely discussed with regard to citizenship, another teacher explained
that both EU institutions and European citizenship rights were part of his school's citizenship curriculum, which also offered annual trips to Brussels.

Another reason for the patchy implementation could be a lack of adequate teacher experience and training that would be needed to efficiently introduce European aspects into teaching. In fact, 60% of English and 24% of German subject teachers in this study reported that they did not have the necessary training or knowledge to include European elements in their teaching. This actual or perceived gap in training and knowledge is a central concern of both subject and head teachers and as such requires further analysis.

Training
According to Eurydice (2002) the broad content of the initial teacher training in England is specified by the government and can be found in the 2002 DfES and Teacher Training Agency (TTA) document entitled Qualifying to Teach. Within this framework, the individual institutions offering teacher training courses decide on their curriculum. As there is no compulsory need to cover global or European elements, it is up to the institutions if they wish to include any in their curriculum. This is the result of a governmental move in 1992 towards a school-based approach for teacher training under deletion of any reference to the European dimension (Convery et al 1997:91).

Once training is completed, the dissemination of any information regarding European awareness, which may be part of the continued personal development or in-service training of teachers, is the responsibility of the Education and Training Group of the British Council. This group has established, in cooperation with local LEAs, regional in-service training networks to provide practical support and opportunities for encouraging teachers to use a European and international dimension in schools. In addition, the European Association of Teachers (EAT), in collaboration with European and international organisations aims to widen teacher knowledge about European issues. In the UK, its members focus on providing pupils,
through their teachers, with the necessary language skills and training to enable them to live and compete for work within the European Market.

Nevertheless, research by Convery et al (1997:34) established that virtually none of the UK teachers in their study had been on an in-service training course dealing with the introduction of a European dimension in schools. Similarly, the present study shows that less than one in ten (9.5%) English subject teachers had received official training (organised by their school or the educational authorities) regarding the inclusions of a European dimension into teaching. When asked for the nature of their training, one teacher mentioned a LEA and European Bureau organised project on racism and xenophobia while another teacher had attended a British Council seminar on modern German and European history. A third teacher referred to school based material about opportunities for European exchanges. No-one mentioned specific EU or European dimension training. As a result, one English head teacher complained that his school had to invite external speakers for European issues as none of the subject teachers were able to cover the subject.

In Germany, it is considered vital that the European dimension forms part of the initial teacher training at University and also of the in-service training of teachers. According to Eurydice (2002/2003) "...in-service teacher training devotes a lot of attention to European issues, especially in the courses and seminars offered by the European Council or the SOCRATES programme of the European Union". Teacher training also offers the opportunity to participate in bilateral courses which allow teachers to exchange experiences with foreign colleagues, such as the German-French qualification programme for teachers at schools with bilingual teaching (Eurydice 2002/2003). Accordingly, significantly more German subject teachers (25%) said that they had been trained to implement a European dimension. Examples for such training included:

- Refresher courses, organised by the school, government and other funding bodies as well as by the EU in Brussels and Strasbourg or other member states
• Various seminars and conferences, especially on EU East enlargement, EU economical policies and the common defence and foreign policy
• Special University seminars on European integration
• German-Dutch youth congress on EU integration and enlargement
• German-Polish symposium on National Socialism and its role in European history

Only two German teachers complain that there was hardly any training on offer in their subject area while two other teachers stressed the importance of daily self-study (reading the newspapers etc).

Knowledge
Since significant numbers of teachers complained about a lack of training, it is perhaps not surprising that many teachers also believed that they do not know much about ‘Europe’. Previously, Convery et al (1997:91) discovered that many trainee teachers considered themselves to be not competent enough to teach the European dimension because of a perceived lack of basic knowledge. Similarly, the findings of the present study indicate that only 46% of English subject and 34% of English head teachers described their knowledge of the EU and its institutions as good, compared to 80% of German subject and 71% of German head teachers.\(^{60}\) When asked about knowledge of other EU member states, however, there was no significant difference between the German and English responses,\(^ {61}\) although many teachers remarked that they knew more about some member states (such as France) than others (such as the new member states).

The importance of knowledge (and thus ultimately training) can hardly be overestimated. Further analysis shows that both head and subject teachers with a better knowledge of the EU are significantly more likely to consider European elements to be important and are more committed to introducing European aspects into their teaching. Subject teachers with more knowledge of the EU are also more likely to ‘Europeanise’ their teaching,

\(^{60}\) see table 7.11 and 7.12
\(^{61}\) see table 7.13 and 7.14
although the head teachers’ level of European knowledge does not seem to have a significant influence on whether or not a European dimension is included at the school.

Another factor influencing both knowledge and commitment was personal attitudes to Europe. Although the majority of teachers in this study described themselves as pro-European, the English responses were significantly less pro-European than the German responses. Subject teachers who were less pro-European or even anti-European were not only rating European aspects as less important but were also less likely to include a European dimension in their teaching. Furthermore there seems to be a connection between knowledge about Europe and personal attitudes. As Convery et al (1997:34+91) found in their study, one of the reasons why many trainee teachers thought of themselves as not competent enough to teach European aspects was their ambivalent feelings about Europe. According to Bell (1991:11) this was a particular problem in the UK due the traditional British insularity, which has been discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, although teachers may generally consider European issues to be important, they as well as pupils may have insufficient interest in Europe. Some teachers said that pupils were not interested in the subject area or have a negative image of the EU, which made teaching about Europe difficult and often tedious.

In sum, knowledge of the EU has a significant impact on how subject and head teachers rate the importance of and their commitment to teaching a European dimension. In general, the study has found that the more teachers know about Europe the more likely they are to include European elements in their teaching. In addition, personal European attitudes also influence teaching whereby pro-European teachers are more likely to include a European dimension. The teachers are thus key role models for the pupils especially at this crucial stage of the pupil’s personal and identity development. As discussed, the Eurobarometer surveys have consistently

62 see table 7.17
found that increased levels of knowledge and awareness are often connected to increased levels of support for the EU and European integration. It could be deduced that pupils who have been taught about Europe at school in a pro-European manner may be more likely to be interested in the EU and maybe more likely to support European integration and even develop some form of European identity, although further research needs to be conducted to establish if there are any significant causal relationships between teaching content, teacher attitude and the development of a European identity among young people.

7.6 The future of European education

Another issue that has often been named as one of the main barriers to the implementation of a European dimension is that education remains the responsibility of the EU member states whereby the EU itself is basically limited to recommendations. It has been pointed out earlier that this has led to a patchwork approach across the EU whereby some countries such as Germany have, for a variety of reasons, embraced the European dimension more than other countries such as England. Some argue that maybe the EU should be given more responsibility in the field of education in order to assure a more uniform approach to teaching about Europe. Advocates of this approach argue that it would guarantee all pupils to be better prepared for life in Europe and their role as European citizens. To explore the teachers' opinions in relation to the role of the EU, they have been asked if they believe that the EU is going to have a bigger impact on everyday life in future and if the EU should have more responsibility for educational policy.

The findings show that German head and subject teachers are significantly more likely to believe that the EU will have a bigger impact on everyday life in the next ten years than their English colleagues, which reflects a general national opinion. For example, the results of Eurobarometer 58 (European Commission 2003:56) show that in the UK 21% of people

63 see table 7.15 and 7.16
wanted the EU to have a less important role in five years time, 35% hoped it would stay the same and only 31% hoped that the EU might play a more important role, which was the second lowest of all EU member states.\textsuperscript{64} This may be related to the fact that in the UK only 29% have a positive image of the EU, which is the third lowest of all member states (European Commission 2005:17). By comparison, in Germany only 12% wanted the EU to have a less important role, while equal numbers (37% and 38%) hoped that the EU would stay the same or have an increased role (European Commission 2003:56). In addition, 40% of Germans have a positive image of the EU (European Commission 2005:17). It is also worth noting that subject teachers with less knowledge of the EU tend to think that the future impact of the EU will be the same or less. The teachers' opinion about the future of the EU, however, had no significant impact on how important they rate European elements in education or how committed they are to teaching them.

When asked if the EU should have a more important future role in educational policies, opinions varied greatly. While only one in four English subject and one third of English head teachers thought that the EU should play a more important role, this wish was expressed by more than half of the German subject and head teachers.\textsuperscript{65} The reasons given for the responses also exhibit some significant differences.

Only very few English subject teachers (five in total) listed possible advantages of closer educational co-operation with the EU and other member states mostly in relation to sharing best practice. It was argued that an increased EU role in education would be beneficial if this would encourage tolerance and limit isolation. As one English teacher argued, closer links with other EU education systems could “only improve ours”. Some teachers, both in England and Germany, felt that they could not give an informed opinion due to lack of knowledge. The vast majority of English teachers, however, agreed that educational policy and the curriculum should remain national policy and that the EU should not impose an EU curriculum or have a greater role in

\textsuperscript{64} fifteen at the time of this Eurobarometer
\textsuperscript{65} see table 7.28 and 7.29
educational policy. The reasons for preferring a national curriculum varied, although three main arguments can be distinguished.

Firstly, it was believed that an increased role of the EU in educational policy would not be possible due to the diversity in Europe. As one English teacher explained "...different member states have different school systems" which are not necessarily compatible. Another teacher pointed out that "...the continent is too diverse and diversity is not a bad thing". Secondly, it was felt by many that further centralisation of education was not preferable. Some teachers stressed the educational rights and freedoms of LEAs and schools, which were considered to be most appropriate to make educational decisions since they can benefit from individual teaching expertise. There was also a general consensus among English head teachers that more central interference should be regarded as a negative impetus on the educational system. As one head teachers put it: "...[there is] too much central interference as is... leave education to the professionals". Although some co-operation between schools, both nationally and internationally, was considered to be useful, it was generally thought that schools should have more educational autonomy, not less. This is a reflection of the English educational system, where schools enjoy greater freedom concerning curricular interpretation than German schools which operate in a much more prescriptive and regulated curricular framework.

Thirdly, some English teachers feared that EU influence might result in identity loss, which relates to a general national issue with European integration as examined in Chapter Five. One teacher commented that "...there is a danger that poor EU policies would lead to loss of national identity" and another had "...concerns of loss of identity in traditional sense". This may be a reflection of general fears that national identity and sovereignty might be lost to a European super-state should further political integration take place. As shown in Chapter Five, sovereignty and identity are concepts that are often used interchangeably in England and which contain emotive associations including notions of self-determination. Thus relenting
educational policy to the EU is feared by some as this loss of sovereignty is linked to identity loss.

Thus the erosion of national identity was cited by some English teachers as a reason to oppose an increased role of the EU. Contrary to this, the creation of a European identity as a substitute for national identity was one of the main reasons for both German head and subject teachers to support European education and an increased role of the EU in educational policy. Again echoing the guidelines of the German curricula, some teachers believed that education should "...reduce the barriers in people's heads" and "...help to reduce prejudices against others". In the context of twentieth century history, education should "...show the common European roots to avoid wars" and create "...a European identity instead of national orientation". By teaching about the EU and other European member states, education can "...create the basis for a European identity". Basically, as one teacher put it, "...if the European youth shall think and feel European, then the education policies have to be European". As examined earlier on and in Chapter Five, this is a reflection of the general German attitude to nationalism and European integration, which has shown that in post-war Germany the government and political elites have tried consistently to Europeanise national identity and create support for European integration as a way to overcome Germany's nationalistic past. As previously shown, this process has resulted in considerably higher levels of pro-European attitudes and a partial replacement of national with European feelings of belonging in Germany, which cannot be observed to such an extent in England. It must also be noted that teaching regenerates and reinforces general national attitudes since education is one of the main agents of political socialisation. Accordingly, some teachers have assigned education a key role in forming young peoples attitudes towards Europe and in fostering European support and a European identity.

In any case, the majority of German subject teachers were in favour of an increased role of the EU in educational policy, although some qualified that while a degree of European co-operation, such as sharing of good practice,
would be welcomed, it should not be accompanied by an increase in administration and bureaucratisation. The main argument of both German head and subject teachers in favour of an increased role of the EU in educational policy stressed that leaving qualifications and degrees should be comparable and accepted throughout the EU "...to give young people in Europe the same chances" and enable them to work anywhere in Europe. To this effect, school systems and teaching targets should be similar to ensure that pupils leave school with comparable education levels. As one teacher pointed out "...with increasing economical integration, the job market is becoming increasingly European. Therefore, education and training should be European".

Another reason for a more European education relates to the role of the EU especially "...as the EU will have a larger impact in future". Some German head teachers pointed out that pupils should be prepared for the European reality. One subject teacher argued that "...we are citizens of Europe, two thirds of our laws come from Brussels, so we ought to know about it". Education should "...enable European citizens to orientate themselves in Europe", which, as shown in Chapter Six, is one of the main aims of EU educational recommendations. In order to achieve this aim, education should furthermore "...make Europe more realistic, practical and easier to understand".

The main German argument against further EU influence was that educational policies should continue to be the responsibility of the German Länder within the German federal system according to the EU principle of subsidiarity. It would seem that especially in countries where the education system is devolved to the regional level, prospects of European educational interference raises fears that the subsidiarity principle might be eroded. Accordingly, many German head teachers considered the German model, whereby the German Länder are responsible for educational policy while curricular contents and leaving qualifications are co-ordinated by the central umbrella organisation of the KMK, to be a useful solution that takes regional disparities and specialities into account. Therefore, some German head
teachers thought that instead of a general European centralisation, a European federal model would be a more suitable and workable model for the EU. A couple of head teachers thought that maintaining the divergences between the educational systems creates a healthy competitive environment.

7.7 Conclusions

Overall, the findings of the case study have conclusively demonstrated that significant differences exist between the attitudes of the sampled German and English teachers towards a European dimension in education. Noteworthy differences also exist in relation to what is included in teaching and the amount of European elements on offer. In general, the German teachers were substantially more pro-European than the English teachers and tended to include more European elements in their teaching. The European aspects available at German schools were overall more varied and included offers such as East European exchanges and bilingual teaching that were not available at the vast majority of English schools in the sample. The findings confirm the results from the curriculum assessment, as discussed in Chapter Six, and illustrate that the European dimension in the observed German schools is anchored more firmly in the curriculum and entrenched more deeply in teacher’s opinions as well as their actual teaching.

Both the German and English subject teachers in the study believed that the most important reason to teach about Europe is to provide pupils with an understanding of European politics and the role of the EU. Head teachers’ opinions varied to a certain degree as they tended to relate European elements not to a particular subject but to the overall syllabus of the school. English head teachers generally focused on a global dimension of which ‘Europe’ was a more or less defined part. This is a reflection of both the language used in the English National Curriculum and the traditional national extra-European orientation. In comparison, the German head teachers emphasised the importance of a European dimension specifically for the preparation of young people for life in the EU whereby it is generally
understood that the EU will play an increasingly important role in people's lives.

A substantial number of German subject and head teachers believed that laying the foundations for a European identity, in order to counteract forces of nationalism and to sustain European integration, was a vital part of education and an important mission for schools. This is also a commitment contained in the German curricula as shown in Chapter Six. Although 'European identity' as such was mentioned by a couple of English teachers, their focus was generally on 'raising awareness' and not on actively fostering a European identity. The study concluded that this is largely a result of the different national attitudes to European integration and identity, as outlined in Chapter Five, which in turn are based on the political and national development of the two countries (see Chapter One and Two). The study showed that the post-war modification to German national identity and the re-orientation towards 'Europe' as a new 'fatherland' has substantially informed teachers' attitudes to 'teaching about Europe' and European identity. It can be expected that pro-European values and opinions are disseminated to a much larger degree by German teachers than by English teachers, which reinforces the nationally promoted European orientation in Germany. Although other studies have shown that German pupils are indeed in general more pro-European and feel more European than their English counterparts, further research is needed to establish a causal relationship and to investigate if school education has a profound impact on the levels of support for European integration. Further research could also extend this study to include other subjects, school forms, year groups or nationalities.
8. Conclusion

This thesis set out to explore some of the issues concerning the concept, realisation and existence of European identity, which has been the subject of frequent debate in recent decades. In particular, the aim was to assess in how far school education is a suitable method to foster European identity and support for European integration. This assessment included a review of previous research and an analysis of documentary material and selected curricula. Also, as part of this assessment, the thesis sought to explore aspects of and problems with the implementation of a European dimension at a sample of secondary schools in Germany and England.

In this context, the wider aim of the thesis was to investigate whether variations in the historic and more recent political and national development in England and Germany have led to different attitudes to European integration, European identity and subsequently to a European dimension in education. The analysis compared the general attitude towards national and European identity in England and Germany and assessed which impact these attitudes had on the implementation of a European dimension in education. The thesis was able to confirm that especially the construction and emergence of national identities have had important implications for the study and progress of European integration (Diez Medrano 2003:257).

In order to reach these aims, the thesis started with an exploration of the political and national development in Germany and Britain. This assessment was necessary in order to be able to understand how the political and national development impacts on attitudes to European integration and European identity. Then, in Chapter Three, the thesis looked at the design of a variety of European schemes and peace plans that were proposed in the last few centuries. This discussion helped to understand why post-1945 European integration efforts came to fruition. European integration theories as well as key post-war events and developments of European integration were assessed in Chapter Four. Knowledge of the political concepts and processes
of European integration enabled an informed discussion on European identity, which was the focus of Chapter Five. Chapter Five established the premise for and discussed possible definitions of European identity, particularly in relation to national identity in Germany and England. The final two chapters were devoted to the case study. Chapter Six explored the usefulness of education as a potential facilitator for the creation and promotion of a European identity. It assessed the attitude of the EU and of the German and British government to a European dimension in education through documentary material and curricular analysis. For the purpose of this thesis, the case study was restricted to the subjects of history and citizenship in secondary compulsory education. Finally, Chapter Seven presented the findings of the case study, which had been carried out in the form of quantitative research with a sample of German and English secondary schools.

The thesis came to a number of conclusions. The most important can be summarised as follows:

- Historic and contemporary political and national developments influence attitudes to European integration, European identity and a European dimension in education.
- Attitudes to national identity strongly influence attitudes to European integration, European identity and to a European dimension in education.
- There is as yet no comprehensive, firm and well defined European identity, although many people have started to feel European to some degree. At the same time, many argue that a European identity is required in order to give the EU popular legitimacy and to address the so-called 'democratic deficit'.
- Education is a useful tool to create and foster European identity (within limitations).
- The documentary material and curricular analysis has shown that a European dimension is substantially more incorporated in German than in English compulsory secondary education.
The case study found that the sampled German teachers and schools are significantly more proactive with regards to a European dimension in education; they consider a European dimension as more important and include it more in their teaching.

A number of persistent problems exist in relation to the implementation of a European dimension in education. These include a lack of definition, lack of time, lack of training and knowledge as well as a lack of resources.

8.1 The EU and the nation state

The first point above included a reference to the political development. It would seem therefore most appropriate to start the conclusions by examining how the EU and European integration fit into the existing political nation-state system in Europe. Chapter One has examined the development of the modern liberal-democratic state in Western Europe, particularly in Germany and England. It has also assessed some key characteristics and features of the modern state such as sovereignty. Although the nation state eventually proved to be the dominant political system in Western Europe, Chapter Three has shown that many alternative proposals for European governance were made, often as a reaction to war and hegemonial tendencies of states and rulers. The main rationale and raison d'être of these European integration plans was a desire to put an end to warfare and to create lasting peace in Europe.

European integration schemes remained unsuccessful until after the Second World War, which was an important trigger in the realisation of previously theoretical models of European co-operation. It can thus be concluded that major upheavals were necessary in order to stimulate this consequential alteration to central aspects of the affected states and cultures (Diez Medrano 2003:259). Particular in Germany, the experiences of the Third Reich and the Second World War have prompted post-war Germany to actively engage in European integration. Nevertheless, Chapter Four has also
shown that the European states continued to remain somewhat sceptical of relinquishing sovereignty and power to a supranational entity.

It was therefore of crucial importance that the architects of European integration realised that political European integration, as advocated by most previous European peace plans, was unrealistic and should be replaced by a more pragmatic, functional method in order to appeal to the potential member states and gain their approval and co-operation. Economic integration thus became the vehicle of European integration, although many advocates of European integration, such as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, hoped that co-operation in one sector might spill-over into related sectors and subsequently into the political sphere. Shore (2000:207) compares these neo-functional optimistic beliefs in spill-over and the superiority of supranational governance with Enlightenment values and ideals that permeated some earlier models for European co-operation and their Eurocentric definitions of civilisation.

Over the past five decades, European integration was characterised by both economic and political spill-over; and progressed through stages of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Today (2006), the EU has managed to accumulate considerable amounts of power and a share of sovereignty, at least in some policy areas. Many theorists have described the EU as being an unparalleled and unique phenomenon. However, this 'uniqueness', coupled with the 'unfinished' nature of the EU as a work in progress, makes a political assessment or even a future prognosis difficult. Where will the EU go from here? Is the EU in the process, as Shore (2000:209) asks, of transforming itself into a state? As already pointed out, Chapter One analysed some of the key characteristics of the Western liberal-democratic state. Of particular interest in relation to the EU is the matter of state sovereignty, which has traditionally been defined as indivisible. In federal states, such as Germany, internal sovereignty is shared to some degree with the federal level, although the national government usually retains absolute external sovereignty as well as internal sovereignty in some policy areas of national importance (such as defence for example). In Britain, to a
lesser degree, autonomy in limited policy areas has been devolved to regional governments. The EU, however, has started to challenge the concept and definition of state sovereignty on the supranational level. Sovereignty within the EU is now shared between the member states and the EU institutions. The EU has acquired, as Shore (2000:209) points out, many characteristics of a state, including the power to negotiate and make international treaties, the monopoly on decision-making and jurisdiction in some policy areas, the establishment of its own currency and so forth. What the EU does not possess, and which remains an important prerogative of its member states, is the monopoly on “legitimate violence” (Heywood 2002:87).

It has also been pointed out that institutional shortcomings in the EU have resulted in the EU lacking certain key characteristics of the liberal-democratic state, such as a directly elected government and legislature. Although direct elections take place to the European Parliament (EP), the EP is not a legislature with the same law and policy making powers as national parliaments and legislatures. The EU Commission and the Council of Ministers remain the most important decision-making institutions of the EU. Both are made up of national representatives, who are at best indirectly elected via national elections. Shore (2000:207) proposes that the “supranational idealism” shared by many advocates of European integration, combined with the EU conception of itself as an evolutionary and “...unfinished project of social and political engineering” obstructs critical thinking about such institutional shortcomings.

The existence and extent of these institutional shortcomings are debatable, but it can hardly be disputed that the widening and deepening of European integration in the last decades was usually a response to favourable economic and political circumstances or the result of support from leading politicians and European idealists. European integration as such has not happened as a result of popular demand. It has often been argued that European integration has been and still is characterised by its top-down elitist approach based on popular ‘passive consensus’ (Leonard 1998:6). The question that arises is if this passive consensus is sufficient to sustain the
continued widening and deepening of European integration or even a political European Union, should this ever come to pass. Many would argue that the existing levels of popular support are insufficient and that European citizens should be more 'involved' in European governance. Certainly, Eurobarometer surveys have shown that the majority of European citizens feel that 'Europe' happens without their participation. To address this problem and to improve the popular legitimacy of the EU, it has been argued that a European identity is required.

8.2 National and European identity

This thesis has investigated a number of issues concerning European identity, including the theoretical rationale and possible definitions. It has also analysed education as a possible facilitator of European identity. Since European identity cannot be analysed out of context, this thesis has also investigated European identity in relation to national identity in Germany and England. In terms of national development, a number of differences between England (or Britain as a whole) and Germany have been noted, which are relevant to this thesis. In particular, it has been pointed out that in England national identity and the basic foundations of the modern parliamentary system developed comparatively early. The early centralised state, with its uniform law and national institutions, was one of the main forces that created English national identity (Bessel 1996: 27). Modern English national identity continues to have emotive attachments to civic concepts such as sovereignty and pride in the longevity of the political institutions. English (and British) national identity is thus politicised and intrinsically linked with political, and often sensitive, issues such as sovereignty and power (Shore 2000: 225). This has been a particular issue in Britain where opposition to European integration is often based on fears of sovereignty and identity loss, although this also stems from a lack of identification with 'Europe' in the first place since Britain has traditionally felt more closely related with the Empire and the Commonwealth than her European neighbours, which resulted in a persistent feeling of 'being different' from continental Europe (Diez Medrano 2003: 255).
In comparison, the first German Empire was created much later (in 1871), which for the first time enabled the development of a state-centred German national identity. Previously, Germany consisted of practically independent territorial states whereby national identity was an elite concept, which focused almost entirely on cultural aspects. Even after 1871, national identity continued to be associated with ethno-cultural concepts, pseudo-historical national myths and notions of the German Volk. In the twentieth century, Germany underwent a series of radical and often traumatic political changes, which had a crucial impact on national identity. Modern German national identity has been extensively reformed by the experiences of Third Reich nationalism and the Second World War. In the post-war period, the negative connotations now associated with nationalism prompted a general search for an alternative 'fatherland' and a generally more positive attitudes to a European identity. Subsequently, post-war German governments linked German political and national rehabilitation to a firm commitment to European integration. Therefore, this thesis has shown that in Germany, European integration was considered to be a viable alternative to the nation-state with, as Shore (2000:211) puts it, "...the promise of salvation through the creation of what, it is hoped, will eventually develop into the United States of Europe".

In general, however, as many opinion polls have shown, many Europeans continue to focus their loyalty and attachment on the nation state. Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2005:26-27) found that national pride is on the increase with 87% of EU citizens indicating that they are proud to be citizens of their country. Overall 41% identify with their own nationality only, although an additional 48% identify with their nationality and also with 'Europe' (European Commission 2005:47). These results have not changed much over the last decade. In 1993, 40% identified with their own nationality only and 45% with their nationality and also with 'Europe' (European Commission 1993:97). As Dunkerley et al (2002:8) point out "...for the near future it is difficult to imagine the EU emerging as a contender to nations and nation-states for the loyalties of EU citizens". Nevertheless, a majority of 63%

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66 Earlier Eurobarometer statistics for this particular question are not available.
of European citizens are proud to be Europeans (European Commission 2005:49).

But what is a ‘European’? As this thesis has shown, the definitions of ‘Europe’, ‘European’ and ‘European identity’ are subject to considerable debate. It is generally considered, in the context of European identity, that ‘Europe’ is not just a geographical location, but an emotive concept that can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Chapter Five has illustrated that those who advocate a cultural European identity, seek to define ‘Europe’ as an accumulation of European values, European culture and shared historic roots. Others base their definition of a European identity on the rights and obligations inherent in European citizenship. Alternatively, there are those who would argue that a European cultural identity is an elitist concept, which has, similarly to the concept of European citizenship, little meaning or relevance to most people’s lives (Leonard 1998:6-7). The unfinished and changing nature of the EU makes identification with it even more difficult, although it must be noted that ‘Europe’ and the EU are not necessarily one and the same thing. Some warn that a focus on EU identity would exclude those Europeans that remain outside the EU.

Overall, it must be concluded that there is at present no generic definition of ‘Europe’ or of a European identity. People who describe themselves as European do so for a variety of reasons based on different associations that they personally have with ‘Europe’ or the EU. Considering the rich socio-cultural diversity in Europe, which the EU is anxious to preserve, maybe European identity is destined to remain somewhat vague, illusive and loosely based on a pool of common factors which offers a ‘pick and mix’ approach to European identity.

Why a European identity?
This thesis has also explored the rationale of a European identity. This thesis has illustrated that one of the main reasons for advocating the creation and promotion of a European identity and ‘European public’ is the perceived need to bestow popular legitimacy to an otherwise elite-driven European project.
and to create popular support, rather than mere ‘passive consensus’, that would sustain the widening and deepening of European integration.

Public opinion polls, such as the European Commission’s Eurobarometer, consistently show that although the EU continues to accumulate more power, many EU citizens do not feel involved or well informed. Although 50% of all European citizens believe that EU membership is a good thing (European Commission 2005:53), 52% of European citizens claim not to understand how the EU works and 64% would like to know more about the EU (European Commission 2005:85-97). 59% believe that their voice does not count in the EU and 72% do not feel involved (European Commission 2005:34-36). Furthermore, only 45% of European citizens (25% in the UK and 39% in Germany) trust the EU (European Commission 2005:29). 44% have a positive image of the EU while 20% have a negative image (European Commission 2005:67).

Many of those, who believe that there should be a (stronger) European identity, argue that the credibility of the EU as well as its ability to mobilise people and win consent “…hinges on the development of a more tangible and coherent sense of shared identity among the peoples of Europe whose interests the Union claims to serve” (Shore 2000: 222). Others, for example Van Oudenaren (2000:16), argue that the success of the widening and deepening of the EU will be determined in part by the extent to which a European identity emerges. Although speculations about the political future of the EU are hypothetical, Nugent (2003:502) claims that the absence of a firm European identity would make the construction and maintenance of a strong and fully effective European political system very difficult. There are thus important and pertinent claims that establish, at least in theory, the need for a European identity; although it has to be pointed out that this line of argumentation is not universally supported. Some critics have argued that the creation of a European public or identity on its own would not resolve the

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67 However, trust in national governments was even lower at 31% (European Commission 2005:24)
problem of popular legitimacy, which can, in this view, only be addressed by institutional reform.

**European identity creation**

Most of the research in this area has concentrated on those agents of political socialisation which have been used in the past, especially in the nineteenth century, as part of the nation building process. As Chapter Two has shown, these agents, which include for example a standardised language, the creation of a mass education system and a mass media, were used to disseminate national identity, in the form of a uniform culture and society with standardised symbols and national myths, from the originating nucleus of the political and intellectual elites to the wider public. In short, they helped to establish a distinct socio-cultural entity, usually related to a particular territorial area, which enabled both group identification and separation from 'others'. In the past, as Chapter Five has illustrated, the EU has largely adapted such traditional top down approaches to identity and has focused on the establishment of a European iconography in the form of a flag, an anthem, a European passport and recently a European currency.

There are, however, several problems with the adaptation of the national methodology in terms of identity construction. First of all, national identity is extensively based on a shared and somewhat uniform culture. Although proposals have been made for the creation of a culturally based European identity, Chapter Five has shown that such a concept would be highly illusive and debatable. Many of the commonly cited 'European' values may have originated in Europe, but are now more or less global values, which makes an identification with Europe or the EU difficult. Secondly, the EU has no direct control over many of the above mentioned agents. For example, two of the most important, the mass media and mass education, remain firmly the responsibility of the member states. Thirdly, it has been pointed out that the formula is too simplistic. European identity and solidarity, it has been argued, cannot be generated solely by raising awareness of a shared cultural heritage, political values or a shared citizenship, but instead has to be earned gradually through political actions (Shore 2000:225-226).
8.3 European identity and education

In light of these arguments, this thesis has examined in how far education, as one of the agents used by nation states to create and promote national identity, could also be used to create a European identity or foster popular support for 'Europe'. Chapter Six has shown that there is empirical evidence that the level of education and knowledge about 'Europe' influences people's attitudes to 'Europe'. Research has indicated that European citizens with higher levels of education and knowledge about 'Europe' are more likely to feel European and more likely to be in favour of European integration. Similarly, Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2005:29) found that only 38% of those who left education prior to reaching the age of 16, but 60% of those still studying, tended to trust the EU. Those who studied longer also tended to be more in favour of EU membership (European Commission 2005:55). Again, it must be noted, that the findings do not establish a direct causal relationship. Therefore, the underlying assumption that knowledge about 'Europe' or even a European orientation automatically generates support for the EU is flawed and requires further validation.

Nevertheless, the EU has promoted for some time now a European dimension in education. One of its arguments for promoting the inclusion of European elements is that the EU needs educated citizens whose education and training has prepared them for life and work in the European community. Since education policy is the responsibility of the member states, the EU role in education is largely limited to recommendations and proposals. In relation to the thesis, the most notable of these recommendations was the 1988 EC Resolution on the European dimension in the curriculum. It invited the member states to respond with proposals and actions plans for the incorporation of a European dimension in education.

Despite the fact that the governmental responses to the 1988 Resolution were generally positive, Convery et al (1997:96) concluded that there was limited evidence of coherent implementation, particularly in the UK. This has been confirmed by the thesis. The findings of the case study as well
as the documentary material and curricular analysis indicate that in England the implementation of a European dimension in education is patchy and relies on individual teachers' commitment, interest and interpretation of the National Curriculum. The National Curriculum itself does not contain many references to a European dimension in education. Its suggestions for teaching content are non statutory, which means that teachers can decide whether or not to include European examples and study units. The documentary analysis has provided little evidence of governmental guidance in relation to European elements in teaching. This can at least partly be explained by the decentralised nature of the English education system, which allows the Local Education Authorities a considerable amount of freedom to develop educational policy within the national framework.

By comparison, the thesis has shown that in Germany the implementation of a European dimension in education is much more regulated by the respective curricula. The analysed German curricula are considerably more prescriptive and contain a significant amount of statutory European themes and teaching units. Overall, the language and terminology used by the assessed German curricula (and also by the German documentary material) is more European and stresses the importance of a European dimension in order to prepare young pupils for their role as European citizens and to actively promote a European identity. Such references are markedly absent from the English National Curriculum. Since the German curricula are more prescriptive, the freedom of schools and individual teachers in choosing teaching content is more restricted than in England. Individual teachers therefore have more guidance in relation to a European dimension and the channels of implementation are clearer. Nevertheless, actual implementation still depends to a great extent on the commitment, training and knowledge of the teachers. The findings of the case study show that German teacher training tends to have greater European focus than English teacher training. Subsequently, German teachers tend to feel better informed about the EU and its institutions. The importance of knowledge and training is vital as the analysis shows that teachers with a greater knowledge of the EU are significantly more likely to consider European elements to be important and
are more committed to introducing European aspects into their teaching. The thesis has confirmed that German teachers include significantly more European aspects in their teaching. An important reason for this is that many German teachers considered it a matter of fact that the EU will continue to affect young people in the future. Therefore the need to understand the fundamental changes instigated by the EU is believed to be a bona fide necessity and not as such a matter of opinion. Furthermore, my research shows that many German teachers believed that the promotion of a European identity is or should be an integral part of teaching. English teachers, by comparison, were significantly less pro-European and included less European elements in their teaching. Hardly any reported that they had relevant European (in-service) training. Although some English teachers acknowledged and considered it important that pupils should be made aware of the workings of the EU, their approach was not pro-active and was essentially limited to ‘raising awareness’.

As this thesis was able to show, one of the most important reasons for the difference in attitude between the two countries, and the subsequent difference in implementation, are different national attitudes to European integration and European identity. It has already been shown above that attitudes towards ‘Europe’ are not simply a reflection of values and identities of a “uniformly understood reality”, but are “...filtered by national and subnational cultures” (Diez Medrano 2003:249). It is only by taking into account these filters, which reflect national “...self-perceptions, collective memories, and current preoccupations” (Diez Medrano 2003:249), that attitudes towards European integration and identity can be fully understood. The same ‘national bias’ also applies to education professionals, education itself as well as teaching content as shown in Chapter Seven. This ‘national bias’ can pose an obstacle to the hope of utilising the mass education systems for the purpose of stimulating a generic European knowledge base and identity. As illustrated in Chapter Six and Seven, considerable national differences persist not only in relation to the European dimension in the curriculum, but also regarding the teachers’ evaluation of ‘Europe’ in teaching. It has been noted that especially the experience of the Second World War had
a profound impact on both German and British national identity and attitudes to European integration. Many German teachers in the sample regarded European integration and European identity as welcome solutions to nationalism and national hegemonies. They believed that education has an important role in dismantling nationalism, which has negative associations in modern Germany as Chapter Two has shown. In addition, many German teachers (but none of the English teachers) stated that a European dimension is important to continue the peace process in Europe and to prepare pupils for a more united Europe of the future. Although many English teachers believed a European dimension to be important to raise awareness of the EU, it is often considered as part of a global dimension. This is at least partly due to the overall Anglo-American orientation in England as pointed out in Chapter Five.

Apart from these differences, Chapter Seven has shown that the majority of teachers in both countries believe that their teaching has a European dimension. German teachers, however, were significantly more likely to include a range of European elements in their teaching. For example, over 80% of German but only 28% of English teachers taught the history of European integration. Similarly, 77% of German but only 37% of English teachers taught their pupils about the EU institutions. The case study indicated that German schools offered more European activities and events such as exchanges, foreign languages, bilingual teaching etc. Overall, the thesis can conclude that European elements and a European dimension permeate German teaching to a much greater extent and are more prominent in teacher attitudes than in England.

Nevertheless, problems with the implementation of a European dimension persist in both countries. Earlier studies have already indicted that some of the most prominent problems included a lack of time, lack of resources, lack of training, anti-European attitudes and the lack of a clear definition. This thesis can confirm that the main problem for English teachers is a lack of training, while the German teachers complained mostly about time constraints. Another main concern was the lack of relevant and appropriate
resources. In general, however, English teachers were significantly more likely to have encountered problems than German teachers. It has already been pointed out that one of the main reasons for this is the lack of adequate European training in England as well as the more informal and less prescriptive channels of implementation. Still, the majority of English teachers expressed the opinion that schools should not lose their autonomy and that the EU should therefore not have an increased role in education. Some English teachers also feared that an increased EU role in education might lead to further loss of national sovereignty and identity. By comparison, the majority of the German teachers thought that the EU role in education should be increased. Most German teachers believed that more European co-ordination in educational matters would be recommendable to ensure that leaving qualifications are compatible across Europe. Many also hoped that an increasingly 'Europeanised' education might stimulate the growth of a European identity. Again, this demonstrates how different attitudes to national identity can shape attitudes to a European dimension in education and EU policy.

8.4 Further research and concluding remarks

This thesis has established the link between political and national development and attitudes to national identity, European identity and education. It has shown that these attitudes have a significant impact on the implementation of a European dimension in education. As already pointed out, further research is needed to establish whether a causal relationship between European elements in teaching and their impact on young peoples' attitudes towards the EU and their acquisition of a European identity exists. In relation to Germany, further research could be undertaken in order to compare West and East German curricula and attitudes. Similar research by Diez Medrano (2003:250) has already indicated that significant differences exist between East and West German attitudes to European integration. While many West Germans consider European integration as an opportunity to regain international trust and to overcome any potential nationalistic tendencies, this conceptualisation appears to be missing in East Germany. It
would be interesting to investigate if this difference is reflected in East German curricula, teacher attitudes and actual teaching content. Further research could also extent this case study to include other countries, subjects, stages or school types.

To conclude, this thesis agrees with Shore’s (2000:232) assessment that the EU is not yet a “citizen’s Europe” and whether it ever will be is “...ultimately bound up with the future of the nation-state”. This thesis has indicatively shown that at least in Germany a socio-cultural as well as political re-orientation has taken place whereby ‘Europe’ has started to gain some prominence alongside the nation state and national identity. Considering that this change was triggered largely by the traumatic events of the 1930s and 1940s, it remains to be seen in how far this momentum can be sustained. Recent Eurobarometer opinion polls have already indicated that support for the EU in Germany has decreased somewhat, although the reasons for this development are unclear and cannot conclusively linked to a national revival. There are multiple other factors that would have an influence and are important to many European citizens and governments alike including the uncertain outcomes of European integration, debates over future enlargement and political union as well as issues relating to national politics and the economy.

Support for the ‘European project’ as well as European identity are therefore not straight forward concepts that can be easily explained. Their complex nature makes any attempt to promote or even define European identity a most difficult undertaking. Education most certainly will continue to be an important facilitator, but, as this thesis has shown, there is still a long way to go before a European identity comes to challenge national identity as the locus of collective self-identification. Moreover, not everyone involved is convinced that this is the right road to take.
Appendix I: Additional tables for Chapter Seven

Table 7.2: Subjects taught by subject teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>History</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Teaching both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Age distribution (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 years and under</th>
<th>31-49</th>
<th>50 years and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Age distribution (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 years and under</th>
<th>31-49</th>
<th>50 years and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>90.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5: Importance of a European dimension in teaching in general (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6: Importance of a European dimension in teaching in general (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.7: Importance of a European dimension in teaching in the specific subject area (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.8: Importance of a European dimension in teaching at the school (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.9: Problems with implementing a European dimension into teaching (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of resources</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No clear definition of “European dimension”</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of guidance from the educational authorities</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of guidance from head of school</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of own commitment</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not important</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not sure what a “European dimension” Is</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No time</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.10: Problems with implementing a European dimension into teaching (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of resources</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No clear definition of “European dimension”</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of guidance from the educational authorities</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of teacher commitment</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of own commitment</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not important</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not sure what a “European dimension” is</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No time</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.11: Knowledge of the EU and EU institutions (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>very good</th>
<th>good</th>
<th>neither</th>
<th>bad</th>
<th>very bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.12: Knowledge of the EU and EU institutions (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>good</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>bad</th>
<th>Very bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.13: Knowledge of other EU member states (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>very good</th>
<th>good</th>
<th>neither</th>
<th>bad</th>
<th>very bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.14: Knowledge of other EU member states (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>good</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>bad</th>
<th>Very bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.15: How will the EU impact on everyday life change in the next ten years (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>bigger impact</th>
<th>the same</th>
<th>less impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.16: How will the EU impact on everyday life change in the next ten years (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>bigger impact</th>
<th>the same</th>
<th>less impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.17: European attitudes (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very pro-European</th>
<th>Pro-European</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Anti-European</th>
<th>Very Anti-European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.18: Inclusion of a European dimension in teaching (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.19: Commitment to a European dimension in teaching (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very committed</th>
<th>committed</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very committed</th>
<th>Not at all committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>62.3%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.20: Commitment to a European dimension in teaching (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very committed</th>
<th>committed</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very committed</th>
<th>Not at all committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.21: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (English subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Included in teaching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European languages</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of other EU member states</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of European Integration</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European exchanges</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special European projects</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European citizenship rights</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions on European Identity</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.22: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (German subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Included in teaching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European languages</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of other EU member states</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of European Integration</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European exchanges</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special European projects</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European citizenship rights</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions on European Identity</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7.23: Aspects of a European dimension included in teaching

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Included in teaching</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European languages</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of other EU member states</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of European integration</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European exchanges</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special European projects</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European citizenship rights</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions on European identity</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.24: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (English head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European languages</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of other EU member states</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of European integration</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European exchanges</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special European projects</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European citizenship rights</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions on European identity</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.25: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (German head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European languages</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of other EU member states</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of European integration</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European exchanges</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special European projects</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European citizenship rights</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions on European identity</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.26: Schools with a European dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.28: The future role of the EU in education (subject teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>more important role</th>
<th>less important role</th>
<th>not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.29: The future role of the EU in education (head teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II: Questionnaires

a) Subject teacher questionnaire
b) Head Teacher questionnaire
Survey: The European dimension in secondary schooling

This questionnaire is for subject teachers (history or citizenship, key stage 3 or 4). I would greatly appreciate it if you could take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire and return it to me in the envelope provided. All answers are confidential. Please feel free to continue your answers on separate sheets of paper.

1) Do you □ teach history? □ teach citizenship? □ other, please specify: __________________________

2) Are you □ male □ female

3) Your age group □ 30 and under □ 31-49 □ 50 and over

4) The school you are teaching at:
   Name of school __________________________
   Town __________________________

5) What is your nationality: __________________________

6) Which is your mother tongue: __________________________

7) In relation to the EU, would you describe yourself as: □ very anti-European □ anti-European □ neither □ pro-European □ very pro-European

8) What would you consider to be a “European dimension” in teaching? Please rate the following factors by importance and also indicate (if applicable) if you are including any of these factors in your teaching:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>very important</th>
<th>not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European languages</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of other EU member states</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of European integration</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European exchanges</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special European projects</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European citizenship rights</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions on European identity</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other: __________________________

9) Overall, would you say that you include a European dimension in your teaching?
   □ yes  □ no  □ not sure

9b) If you selected “no” or “not sure”, would you like to introduce a European dimension in your teaching?
   □ yes  □ no please specify why not: __________________________

9c) Have you had any official training (organised by your school or the educational authorities) for the integration of a European dimension into your teaching?
   □ yes  □ no  □ not sure

If “yes”, what was the nature of the training? __________________________
10) How important would you rate a European dimension in teaching in general?
- very important
- important
- neither
- unimportant
- very unimportant

10b) and in your specific subject area?
- very important
- important
- neither
- unimportant
- very unimportant

10c) Please explain the way you rate the importance/unimportance of a European dimension in

11) How committed are you to a European dimension in teaching:
- very committed
- committed
- neither
- not very committed
- not at all committed

12) In your opinion what are the problems associated with integrating a European dimension into teaching, both in general and in your specific case? Please tick all that apply
- Lack of resources
- Lack of training
- No clear definition of “European dimension”
- Lack of guidance from the educational authorities
- Lack of guidance from head of school
- Lack of own commitment
- It is not important
- I am not sure what a “European dimension” is
- No time
- Other, please specify:

13) Have you travelled to other European countries in the last year?
- yes
- no

14) How would you rate your knowledge of the EU and its institutions?
- very good
- good
- average
- bad
- very bad

15) How would you rate your knowledge of other EU member states?
- very good
- good
- average
- bad
- very bad

16) In comparison to today, how will the impact of the EU on everyday life change over the next ten years in your opinion?
- EU will have a bigger impact
- impact will be about the same
- EU will have less impact

17) Should the EU have a more important role in educational policies in the future?
- yes
- no
- not sure

Please explain your opinion on the role of the EU in educational policies:

18) Which newspaper(s) do you regularly read?

19) Do you have any other comments about the European dimension in education?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
Survey: The European dimension in secondary schooling

I would greatly appreciate it if you could take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire and return it to me in the envelope provided. All answers are confidential. Please feel free to continue your answers on separate sheets of paper.

1) Do you also teach at your school?  □ no  □ yes, please specify the subject: ______________________

2) Are you  □ male  □ female

3) Your age group  □ 30 and under  □ 31-49  □ 50 and over

4) Your school:
   Name of school ______________________
   Town ______________________

5) What would you consider to be a "European dimension" in teaching? Please rate the following factors by importance very important not at all important
   - European languages
   - History of other EU member states
   - History of European integration
   - EU institutions
   - European exchanges
   - Special European projects
   - European citizenship rights
   - Discussions on European identity
   Other: ______________________________________

6) How important would you rate teaching a European dimension in general?  □ very important  □ important  □ neither  □ unimportant  □ very unimportant
   6b) and how important would you rate a European dimension in teaching at your school?  □ very important  □ important  □ neither  □ unimportant  □ very unimportant
   6c) Please explain the way you rate the importance/unimportance of a European dimension in teaching at your school: ______________________________________

7) How committed are you to a European dimension in teaching?  □ very committed  □ committed  □ neither  □ not very committed  □ not at all committed

8) In your opinion, what are the problems associated with integrating a European dimension into teaching, both in general and in your specific case? Please tick all that apply
   - Lack of resources
   - Lack of training
   - No clear definition of "European dimension"
   - Lack of guidance from the educational authorities
   - Lack of teacher commitment
   - Lack of own commitment
   - It is not important
   - I am not sure what a "European dimension" is
   - No time
   Other, please specify: ______________________________________
9) Overall, would you say that your school has included a European dimension in the teaching?
☐ yes  ☐ no  ☐ not sure

9b) If you selected “yes”, please explain in further detail how a European dimension is included into your curriculum. If your school also has any European extra-curricular activities (exchanges, study visits, project weeks etc), please give details:

9c) Which subjects would you consider most likely to include a European dimension? Please tick all that apply:
☐ English  ☐ Modern languages  ☐ Maths  ☐ Science  ☐ Citizenship
☐ History  ☐ Art  ☐ ICT  ☐ Geography  ☐ Music
☐ PE  ☐ Religious Education  ☐ Design and Technology

10) Have you travelled to other European countries in the last year?  ☐ yes  ☐ no

11) How would you rate your knowledge of the EU and its institutions?
☐ very good  ☐ good  ☐ average  ☐ bad  ☐ very bad

12) How would you rate your knowledge of other EU member states?
☐ very good  ☐ good  ☐ average  ☐ bad  ☐ very bad

13) In comparison to today, how will the impact of the EU on everyday life change over the next ten years in your opinion?
☐ EU will have a bigger impact  ☐ impact will be about the same  ☐ EU will have less impact

14) Should the EU have a more important role in educational policies in the future?
☐ yes  ☐ no  ☐ not sure

Please explain your opinion on the role of the EU in educational policies:

15) Which newspaper(s) do you regularly read?

16) Do you have any other comments about the European dimension in education?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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