REGULATING GEOPOLITICAL SPACE: EU INTERACTION WITH EAST AFRICA

by

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ABSTRACT

Veit Klemens Bachmann

Regulating geopolitical space: EU interaction with East Africa

Relations with developing countries have been a field of collective European policy for more than fifty years. Yet, European development policy remains fragmented; conducted on different levels through a variety of actors with multiple instruments applied in various policy fields. Articulations of Europe’s collective role in the world first emerged in the 1970s under the idea of Europe as a civilian power (Duchêne 1972, 1973b). These initial elaborations have served as a key point of departure in political and academic debates on the international identity and role of an integrated/integrating Europe (see for example Solana 2002; Ferrero-Waldner 2007; also Manners 2002; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Telò 2006; Lucarelli 2007). However, Europe’s relations with developing countries have neither received adequate conceptual nor empirical attention in these debates.

This thesis therefore aims to address these gaps by exploring the spaces of interaction between the EU and the Republic of Kenya, the East African Community and the African Union. I argue that regulating spaces of interaction has always been a key element of the European project, both internally and externally. These regulation attempts resulted in the construction of a particular version of European ‘space’, operating through multiple structures, processes and flows that have significantly shaped the EU’s external relations. In order to explore an aspect of these external relations – development policy – this thesis pursues a three-dimensional approach addressing constructions, projections and perceptions of such European ‘space’ in East Africa. I demonstrate how key assumptions about geopolitical space and the international system made in civilian power debates can be theoretically informed and interrogated by drawing on critical geopolitics and allied work. Furthermore, I argue that the failure to engage critically with the EU’s relations with developing countries and external perceptions thereof, both in the civilian power discourse and on the part of European policy makers, has created a civilian/power dilemma. In so doing this thesis contributes conceptually and empirically to a more comprehensive understanding of Europe’s collective role in the world and as a development actor.
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>Group of Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>Development Coordination Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DED</td>
<td>Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst</td>
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<tr>
<td>DelAU</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DelKEN</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>DelTAN</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Commission to the Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFG</td>
<td>Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBA</td>
<td>Everything But Arms Initiative</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESPON</td>
<td>European Spatial Planning Observation Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUEI PDF</td>
<td>European Union Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>General System of Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Harmonisation, Alignment, Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Missions Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KJAS</td>
<td>Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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02 October 2007 | Presentation: *Die Europäische Union als globale Zivilmacht und geopolitischer Akteur in Ostafrika*; Deutscher Geographentag, Bayreuth, Germany

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The European Union is often portrayed as a unique polity in the international system. Descriptions include terms and attributes such as, Empire, civilian, normative, or ethical power, trade superpower, or ‘economic giant but political pygmy’ (Freres 2000; Ginsberg 2001; Manners 2002; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Hyde-Price 2006; Sjursen 2006; Sidaway 2006; Zielonka 2006; Teló 2006; Bialasiewicz 2008). In either case, however, the system that the EU has developed internally to regulate interaction between different levels and actors of governance is considered as unique, complex and as a profound component of the EU’s identity and wider role in the world. Its external relations are equally complex, conducted multilaterally and bilaterally on multiple levels and in multiple policy fields. This also applies to the EU’s relations with the developing world. Those have been a field of collective European policy for more than fifty years, yet the engagement of individual EU member states with developing countries has traditionally been more intense, though sometimes also very troubled.

This thesis, however, deals with Europe’s collective role in the world and as a development actor with an empirical focus on the conduct of European development policy from the Kenyan capital of Nairobi as one of the major hubs of international development cooperation. A key point of departure in academic and political debates for addressing Europe’s role in the world is the notion of Europe as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne 1972, 1973b; Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 1993, 2005; Telò 2006). As a civilian power, it is argued, Europe seeks to influence the international system through “functional spheres of influence“, as opposed to territorial ones, and aims to “domesticate international relations“, i.e. to transfer domestic modes of interaction and policy conduct (rule of law, democratic decision-making, etc.) to the international system. The system for political-economic organisation that has materialised within the European Union is thus “also being projected in its external relations as
the preferred world order model” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005, 538). Underpinning this is an assumption that the international system is not exclusively determined by fixed territorial demarcations, but also shaped by evolving processes of social, political and historical constructions of a geopolitical space (Agnew and Corbridge 1989, 1995; Ó Tuathail and Luke 1994; Agnew 1994; Ó Tuathail 1996; Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998b). Such space consists of a complex system of structures, processes and flows through which different actors interact on several levels and in a variety of ways. There is, however, limited research on the conceptual link of the civilian power discourse with such understandings of geopolitical space and the EU’s relations with developing countries. In addition, there is remarkably little research on how Europe’s “preferred world order model” is externally projected and perceived.

This research therefore addresses these conceptual and empirical gaps by exploring the EU’s relations with the Republic of Kenya, the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union (AU). The overall objective is to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Europe’s collective identities and roles in the world in order to identify opportunities and challenges for definitions of possible roles and functions of the EU as a global and development actor. More specifically, this thesis seeks to highlight how conceptualisations of geopolitical space can theoretically inform analyses of Europe’s role in the world and how elaborations on Europe’s role in the world can enrich such conceptualisations empirically. In addition, it aims to contribute to the conceptual applicability of the civilian power discourse to the EU’s relations with developing countries. Empirically, the key objective is to explore external perceptions of Europe’s role in the world and as a development actor and to find out how those perceptions relate to official European constructions thereof.

It is in this context that this research project examines the external relations of the European Union in the field of development cooperation through a three-dimensional approach addressing the construction, projection and perception of a particular European version of geopolitical space. This thesis outlines how such ‘European space’, understood as
Europe’s identity, presence and power, has developed through the European integration process, how such space is being projected in the EU’s external relations with East Africa and how it is perceived by the EU’s cooperation partners. The empirical focus is thereby on the conduct of European development policy from the Kenyan capital of Nairobi.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUNDS

Conceptually this research project draws on the literatures on European integration and Europe’s collective role in the world. During the early 1970s the writings of François Duchêne formed an initial starting point for such articulations and provided an important intellectual foundation for the early debates and processes of European integration (Duchêne 1972, 1973b). His arguments were based around the notion of Europe\(^1\) as a civilian power would aim to ‘domesticate’ international relations (Duchêne 1973b, 19) by exercising power through “functional spheres of influence” (Duchêne 1972, 38). He argued that, within the European Community, peaceful and institutionalised modes of international interaction had developed that should be transferred to the international system. Duchêne’s visions have since served as a key reference point for elaborations on Europe’s collective international role and have been reworked mostly at times of major geopolitical flux and in attempts to distinguish a European identity, presence and power in the international system from the United States’. In the 1990s a research project by the German Science Foundation (DFG) aimed to provide a thorough conceptual basis for Duchêne’s elaborations (Maull 1990, 1993; Kirste and Maull 1996; Frenkler et al. 1997; Harnisch and Maull 2001). The contributing scholars argued that civilian

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\(^1\) Duchêne’s elaborations only extended to Western Europe. The term ‘Europe’ is thus used partially to refer to the then EEC and neglects significant parts of the continent (see in this context the discussion in Davies 1997, 44). Acknowledging these deficiencies, for reasons of simplicity and for maintaining consistency with articulations of informants in Chapters V-VII, I will retain this terminology throughout the thesis. Unless otherwise stated, ‘Europe’ thus refers to the EU, including the member states. The term ‘European Community’ (EC), on the other hand, does not include references to the member states or member states’ policies.
power has a threefold meaning and can refer to an actor in the international system, a theoretical concept in International Relations, or as a means of foreign policy conduct in a ‘civilianized’ way. The central objective in each case is to create a ‘civilianized’ international system characterised by multilateralism, international institutions, the rule of law, commitment to norms and values, supranational integration, democracy, market liberalisation, and the restriction of the use of force as a means for international politics. Key to the concept is the political will and capability to promote civilianized structures to the international system along the lines of the characteristics mentioned above (Maull 1993, 126). The concept is thus two-dimensional in that it has a civilian dimension, which refers to the commitment to civilianized structures, and a power dimension in the sense of the willingness and capability to diffuse those structures into the international system.

The European Union’s nature as a global actor has been comprehensively examined by Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006). They define an actor as “an entity that is capable of agency; of formulating and acting upon decisions. [...] the capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about internal character and capabilities and external opportunities” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 35). Bretherton and Vogler introduce the term ‘actorness’ to refer to such capability and capacity of an actor in the international system, and conclude that the EU possesses significant international actorness.

This research also builds on theorisations of geopolitical space rooted in the critical geopolitics literature (Agnew and Corbridge 1989, 1995; Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992; Luke 1993, 1994; Dodds and Sidaway 1994; Agnew 1994; Ó Tuathail and Luke 1994; Ó Tuathail 1994, 1996; Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998b). Geopolitics is understood not as a fixed or rigid construct but characterised by a variability of geopolitical space and possible political constructions of it (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998a, 2-3). Such geopolitical space is thus also not considered as an exclusive territorial configuration but as constructed in an evolving social,
political and historical process. Interaction between different actors occurs not only between territorially separated nation-states but is increasingly exercised through a system of transnational networks and flows comprising a variety of structurally different actors, such as nation-states, economic actors, international institutions and NGOs (Barry 1996; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004; Peterson 2004). Structures, processes and flows of the international system are therefore regarded as key elements that determine the shape of geopolitical space as well as the positions and roles of relevant actors in it. Through such networks, spheres of influence are created that become increasingly detached from territory and allow for the projection of power and geopolitical space anywhere where these networks are manifest (Barry 1996; Bach and Peters 2002; Taylor 2004c).

In this context, European space is understood as Europe’s identity, presence and power. Academic engagements with European space predominantly focus on constructions of physical space within the EU; for instance as a space that is geographically imagined as “connected/mobile/networked” (Sidaway 2001, 746) within a “single overarching rationality of making a ‘one space’ made possible by seamless networks enabling frictionless mobility” (Jensen and Richardson 2004, x). My research, however, addresses spaces of interaction beyond the boundaries of the EU characterised by the structures, processes and flows of interaction. *Structures* are thereby understood to set the broad framework for interaction; embedded in these structures are certain *processes* that define the parameters and topics of the actual *flows* of interaction. In this manner, my research explores how “a global political space [is] envisioned and scripted [by] dominant intellectuals, institutions and practitioners of statecraft” and how “certain constellations of geopolitical meaning [are] congealed around global visions” (Ó Tuathail 1996, 185) – such as in the civilian power discourse. Internal modes of interaction therefore form the basis for the “visions and scripts” of the “global political space” to be projected externally. Based on such conceptualisations, European space is understood as Europe’s *identity* as a civilian power, its *presence* as a significant actor in the
international system, and its power to influence the structures, processes and flows of geopolitical space.

The “geopolitical meanings congealed” in articulations of Europe’s collective role in the world are particularly multifaceted and complex with regard to the EU’s interactions with developing countries. The colonial history continues to loom large but, at the same time, the EU aims to position itself as a value-based global actor and a “helping hand” for developing countries (EC 2007c; see also Manners 2002; Fioramonti and Poletti 2008; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009a). Such histories and narratives have a profound impact on conceptions and imaginations of the EU in developing countries. In addition, as the largest integrated economy in the world and the most significant trade partner, the EU is a key cooperation partner for ACP2-countries and -regions whereby its development and trade policies have wide-reaching implications (Lister 1997; Holland 2002; Dialer 2007; Carbone 2007, 2008). In the context of the foundation of the European Union, Hill (1993, 311) suggested for the EU to become the “principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South [...] and the principal interlocuteur with the poor majority in the UN”. Others, however, see the EU’s relations with developing countries more critically (Hurt 2003; Gibb 2000, 2004, 2006; Nixson 2007; Holden 2009). Holland (2002, 139), for instance, judged that the performance of EU development policy “is at best mixed, at worst disorganized and incremental”. In the context of European pressure on ACP-countries to comply with WTO regulations, Hurt (2003, 161) even argues that the EU-ACP relationship is shifting from “one of co-operation to one of coercion”.

This relationship is increasingly exercised through transnational development networks (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Bebbington 2003; Henry, Mohan, and Yanacopulos 2004; Bebbington and Kothari 2006; McFarlane 2006). According to Bebbington (2003, 300) these are “networks through which people, ideas and resources circulate and in which material

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2 ACP refers to Africa, Caribbean, Pacific - a group of countries that was formed in 1973 in the process of the negotiations leading up to the Lomé Convention (see Section 3.2.2).
interventions in particular locations are conceptualised and executed”. Development cooperation can thus be carried out through global networks, which operate in various locations and levels as well as through different actors. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) discuss how such transnational development networks exercise substantial influence on subnational and local levels. They argue that “state spatialization”, understood as the manifestation of national state power and influence on the local, is challenged by transnational development networks. Those increasingly take over traditional functions of the state, a process they call “transnational governmentality” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 982) with the result that state functions are being outsourced and state capacity deteriorates (Ferguson 2006, 38). These complex mechanisms of exercising governance through development agencies (see also Ferguson 1990) has led Hobart (1993, 2) to consider “development [as] a big business. [It] is very profitable not just to the western industries involved, but to those parts of governments which receive aid, let alone to development agencies”. In the same context Hancock (1989, 41-42) speaks of the “development industry”, a “fantastically complex, diversified and devolved industry [...] financed largely by the official aid of rich countries, mandated to promote ‘development’ in the poor ones”. Whilst Hancock’s classifications are made in a wider critique on the contemporary development practices in the 1980s, the term ‘development industry’ became frequently used for referring to the international development community comprised mostly of the official development agencies of OECD-countries. It is also in this understanding that the term is used throughout this thesis.

OBJECTIVES AND AIMS

This research seeks to make original contributions to academic debates on a conceptual, an empirical and a methodological level. The overall aim is to improve understandings of Europe’s role in the world and in the East African development industry in order to contribute to a
constructive and critical engagement with possible roles and functions of the EU as a global and development actor.

On a conceptual level, this thesis aspires to contribute to the civilian power discourse in three ways. Firstly, it aims to analyse how narratives about Europe as a civilian power have evolved over time, what assumptions they embody, and which articulations and visions of Europe’s collective role in the world they entail. Secondly, I seek to establish a conceptual link between the civilian power discourse and the critical geopolitics literature by excavating the assumptions and understandings of the international system and geopolitical space underlying the civilian power discourse. The goal thereby is to explore how civilian power debates can be theoretically informed by conceptualisations of geopolitical space and how such conceptualisations can be empirically enriched by analyses on Europe’s collective role in the world. Thirdly, this thesis examines how, despite its continued relevance in academic and political debates on Europe’s role in the world, the civilian power discourse has failed to engage critically with Europe’s imperial past (and present) as well as with EU’s relations with developing countries and how this failure has created a civilian/power dilemma.

On an empirical level, this thesis seeks to show how the European Union is articulated and positioned (in official documents and by key figures) as a global and development actor and how it is perceived in East Africa in these contexts. The key objective thereby is to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the ways and mechanism how the EU constructs and articulates a key aspect of its role in the world, how it projects European space, understood as Europe’s identity, presence and power, how this is perceived externally and how it is reworked and articulated by the EU’s external cooperation partners. In so doing this thesis seeks to find out how these perceptions and articulations relate to Europe’s role in the world and as a development actor.

On a methodological level, this thesis aims to contribute to geographic debates on ethnographic-style fieldwork in situations of a rapidly changing research environment. I discuss
possible adaptations to such changes and aim to show how they can be utilised constructively, how they impact on the balance between multiple roles (as researcher and practitioner) in the field, what methodological and ethical implications this entails, and how it affects relations between the researcher and the researched as well as the geography in which those relations are inscribed. The goal is to highlight how the spatial setting of fieldwork has significant impacts on such challenges and opportunities arising from unexpected changes in the research environment and how those changes can be addressed.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Methodologically, this research project was predominantly based on semi-structured interviews and participant observation in order to capture how key individuals involved in European-East African interaction imagine and articulate the EU and its role as a global and development actor. In total I conducted 55 interviews with 60 informants during three main periods of fieldwork (October 2007 – April 2008 in East Africa, June 2008 in Brussels, and October – December 2008 in East Africa). Interviews were conducted with the key individuals involved in European interaction with Kenya, the EAC and the AU. These included the respective desk officers at the European Commission in Brussels, Heads of Mission and Heads of Operations at European Delegations, Ambassadors and Heads of Development Cooperation Programmes of European member states and other donors, Directors for Political and Economic Affairs at the AU, Directors for Trade and Planning and Infrastructure at the EAC, senior personnel in different Kenyan ministries, NGO directors and coordinators, programme coordinators of the World Bank and the UN-system (including the Under-Secretary General of the United Nations and Director General of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)).

3 Equivalent to a Commissioner in the EU system.
Participant observation was an additional methodology that resulted from my affiliation with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) as a research associate and later from my role as independent consultant with the European Union Energy Initiative (EUEI). Through these affiliations I participated in a development cooperation project with the EAC on regional integration in the energy sector and thus occupied multiple identities in the field as researcher and practitioner. The central methodological preparations for the fieldwork focused on the literatures on semi-structured interviews (Richards 1996; Valentine 1997; Baxter and Eyles 1997; Wengraf 2001; Longhurst 2003) as well as participant observation and researcher positionality (Rabinow 1977; Gans 1982; Jorgensen 1989; England 1994; Cook and Crang 1995; Mullings 1999; Mandel 2003; Laurier 2003; Kingsbury and Klak 2005; Moser 2008).

However, after the first two months of fieldwork my research environment changed significantly as a result of the outbreak of the post-election crisis in Kenya at the beginning of 2008. These changes, and the processes caused by it, had profound impacts on my roles as researcher and practitioner, my relations with the informants, the conduct of the fieldwork, and, as such, on the entire project.

I chose to conduct this research in sub-Saharan Africa as the focal region for EC development policy (Michel 2006, 4). It is a region in Europe’s extended vicinity that is not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy but that has an intense historical-geographic relation to Europe and where the EU continues to have strong geopolitical interests. Within sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa has been chosen as the location to conduct fieldwork mainly because of the development node of the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. Nairobi harbours regional or continental offices for almost all major development agencies, a great extent of development engagement in sub-Saharan Africa is coordinated from Nairobi, and it is the world’s most connected city with respect to NGO networks (Taylor 2004c). Because of its strategic function and location between the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa – as well as because of the sheer
number of international organisations and development agencies in Nairobi — it is among the foremost centres of the global development industry. Furthermore, Nairobi is also the political, economic, social and cultural centre for the wider East Africa region. It is thus the key departure point for European interaction with East Africa through which ideas of Europe and European space are articulated and projected across the region and sub-Saharan Africa. Nairobi thus is an ideal location to research Europe’s role as a global and development actor and explore dominant perceptions amongst Europe’s key cooperation partners in this context.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This thesis comprises eight chapters, and a vignette (Annex A) that describes my experiences as a participant observer in/of a regional integration project in the East African energy sector. Following this introductory chapter, two conceptual chapters provide the theoretical background for the research work presented in this thesis. The subsequent methodological chapter addresses the key methodologies used and outlines how I dealt with the changes in the research environment caused by the outbreak of the Kenyan crisis. Chapters V, VI and VII form the empirical centrepiece of this thesis and address constructions, projections and perceptions of European space respectively. Finally, the conclusion summarises the key arguments and intends to provoke further thought on the key problematic issues identified through this research.

Chapter II introduces concepts and discourses on Europe’s collective role in the world, mainly associated with the notion of Europe as a civilian power. It explores how these debates emerged and developed, what influenced them, how they have been shaped, and which geopolitical visions and assumptions they embody. The chapter

* Parts of this chapter have appeared in *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* as a joint paper entitled ‘Zivilmacht Europa: a critical geopolitics of the European Union as a global power’; see Bachmann and Sidaway (2009b).
thereby traces how elaborations of Duchêne’s vision of a civilian power Europe have intensified at times of major geopolitical flux, such as the end of the Cold War and the neo-conservative shift in American foreign policy during the presidency of George W. Bush. It highlights how discourses about Europe’s role in the world tend to position an integrated/integrating Europe as a geopolitical source of influence, alternative to and distinct from the United States, and how the promotion of a civilianized international system (epitomised by the one within the European Union) is articulated as a key objective of external relations.

Chapter III engages with conceptualisations of the international system and the EU as a development actor. It outlines how an understanding of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows constitutes the basis for a civilianized international system and conceptualisations of European space in the context of this research. In addition, this chapter introduces conceptualisations of the international development industry and briefly reviews how the EU has evolved as a development actor and what factors and interests shape collective European development policy.

Chapter IV covers the methodological background for the conduct of the fieldwork and discusses the impacts of the Kenyan post-election crisis in early 2008 on my research project. It introduces the key methodologies of semi-structured interviews and participant observation, addresses issues of research positionality and multiple roles in the field and describes the set-up of the research in Nairobi. In addition, the chapter outlines how the implications of the Kenyan crisis posed considerable challenges to my research project but also opened up new spaces of inquiry and data acquisition. It describes how my affiliation with GTZ and EUEI mediated the effects of the Kenyan crisis

5 The section of this chapter addressing the background of the Kenyan crisis formed the basis for a paper entitled ‘Kenya’s ‘Collapse’ and its post-election tragedy of the commons’ that has been accepted for publication by Affect; see Bachmann (2009b). Other parts of this chapter have been reworked as a manuscript entitled ‘Participating and observing: changing methodologies and identities in the ‘field’ of Kenya’s post-election crisis’ which is currently in the review process with Area.
on my fieldwork and enriched my research methodologically, thematically and spatially, but at the same time raised a number of ethical issues.

Chapter V deals with constructions of European space and understandings of European space in the context of this research. In so doing, it examines how Europe’s identity and role in the world and as a development actor are articulated in official EU documents and by key figures. It thereby draws on the conceptualisations of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows and contextualises those with the dominant imaginations and narratives presented in documents and interviews. It argues for a definition of European space understood as Europe’s identity, presence and power and shows how the external projection thereof is based on the EU’s internal system of political-economic organisation characterised by a preference for regional integration and regulated spaces of interaction.

Chapter VI analyses the structures, processes and flows associated with the EU’s presence in East Africa. It considers the implications of the Africa-EU summit in Lisbon in December 2007 for African-European relations and highlights the European preference for inter- and intraregional cooperation in the East African context. It then addresses the key parameters of European development cooperation as well as the complexities of conducting external relations through multiple actors, with multiple instruments as well

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6 The chapter predominantly builds on political geography and critical geopolitics literature. The related constructivism debate in international relations (Checkel 1998; Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 2001; Ulbert 2006) informs these literatures, it is, however, not introduced here separately because this thesis only draws on the constructivism debate indirectly. The term ‘constructions of European space’ thus needs to be understood not predominantly in this theoretical context but in a more practical sense, referring to the ways in which a particular system of political-economic organisation has been developed and established within the EU.

7 The term ‘European external relations’ refers to multilateral and bilateral external relations of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (i.e. the CSFP) as well as the EU member states. It includes foreign, development, and trade policy of the EU institutions and the member states. The term ‘EC external relations’ refers only to the collective external relations, including foreign, development and trade policy, of the European Community, but excluding bilateral external relations of EU member states. The terms ‘foreign’, ‘development’ and ‘trade’ policy thereby need to be understood as flexible categories with considerable overlaps. These terms are often not separable and repeatedly referred to
as on multiple policy fields. In this context, this chapter analyses how the role of European development actors is articulated in Kenya’s development industry and provides an overview of the structures, processes and flows and European interaction with Kenya, the EAC and the AU.

Chapter VII presents perceptions of European space in East Africa and the EU’s geopolitical role. It first outlines perceptions of the EU’s nature as a political entity in the international system and summarises the most positive as well as the most negative perceptions associated with the EU. This chapter then sketches perceptions of the EU as a development actor in East Africa and shows how traditional assumptions have been challenged by reconfigurations of European development policy and by the emergence of ‘new donors’, such as China. In addition, this chapter sketches dominant imaginations and suggestions about Europe’s collective role in the world more generally and analyses how the structures, processes and flows of European space are reflected in the perceptions of the informants.

In the literature simply as ‘foreign policy’. Yet, the distinction is maintained here in order to reflect the differences in competences and authorities between EU and member state institutions in the respective policy fields. As part of the EU’s three pillar structure, the second pillar aims to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), yet foreign policy largely remains a national domain. Trade policy, however, is predominantly a field of collective policy in the first pillar. Development policy takes both shapes. In addition to a collective development policy in the first pillar, EU member states maintain individual development policies. The term ‘EC development policy’ thus only refers to collective policies of the European Community (EC) implemented through the European Commission and its delegations; ‘European development policy’ refers to policies of the EC and those of the EU member states. Throughout the thesis I will mostly use the terms ‘EU external relations’ and ‘EU development policy’ for referring to policies of European actors (EC and some or all EU member states) that are part of a collective approach, i.e. that are at least to some extent harmonized and aligned or genuinely collective. Bilateral policies of EU member states will be indicated as such.
 CHAPTER II: THE CIVILIAN POWER CONCEPT AND EUROPE’S ROLE IN THE WORLD

The movement of European unity which began in Western Europe after 1945 was fired by an idealism that contained an important historical dimension. It aimed to remove the welter of ultra-nationalistic attitudes which had fuelled the conflicts of the past. (Davies 1997, 42)

This chapter addresses conceptualisations of Europe’s collective role in the world associated with the notion of Europe as a global civilian power. The term was originally coined by François Duchène in 1972 and has since served as a key point of reference for elaborations on Europe’s identity and roles in the world by academics, journalists and political elites. Sometimes the term ‘civilian power’ is also rendered as ‘civil power’, as in a speech by Javier Solana (2002) referring to Europe’s “unrivalled claim as a global ‘civil power’”. Similarly, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2007; my translation) asserted that

the successful European model of regional integration and ecosocial market economy can play an important role. It is up to us, as civilian power Europe, to build up a strong self-conception as a global actor and to make best possible and constructive use of the attractiveness of our ideas. To stand up for openness and global equity - while at the same time demanding good governance in the respective countries - this is what I see as the task and the responsibility of the European Foreign Policy in the 21st century. The original Marshall plan, financed by the US, has built the financial basis for Europe’s economic uprise and peaceful European integration. With a Global Marshall Plan we can bring in our experiences on an international level.

These quotes illustrate the prominence of the civilian power notion in articulations of Europe’s global role. In particular Ferrero-Waldner’s statement also demonstrates how these articulations have, from the very beginning, emphasised that Europe has developed a particular model for political-economic organisation and that it should promote this model

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8 Duchêne (1927-2005) was an Anglo-Swiss scholar, journalist and close advisor to Jean Monnet. He had worked as the press attaché at the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies and founded the European Studies Programme at the University of Sussex.
9 The EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
10 The European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy.
internationally. It is in this context that this chapter traces the evolution of the idea of Europe as a global civilian power, the geopolitical conditions that influenced it and the changing modes and forms through which it has been, and continues to be, expressed. In the literature of foreign policy Europeanization Wong (2008, 324) described Duchêne as the “first major spokesman” of a school of ‘European-idealist’ that envisages “the EU as a ‘civilian power’, a kind of ‘soft power’ which wields civilian instruments on behalf of a collectivity which has renounced the use of force among its members and encourages others to do likewise”. Based on Duchêne’s premise that Europe “should and can become [...] a model for reconciliation and peace for other regions in the world [...] EU foreign policy should focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and security cooperation”. Duchêne’s writings were thus amongst the first to formulate a collective geopolitical vision for an integrated/integrating Europe. They appeared at a time of major geopolitical flux associated with a sense of faltering American hegemony and just prior to the first enlargement of the European Economic Community to include Britain, Denmark and Ireland. Conceptions of civilian power have subsequently been reworked and revitalised, again mostly at times of geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts, such as the end of the Cold War, the succession of European enlargements, the coming of the Euro and challenges from American neo-conservatism.

The first section in this chapter introduces Duchêne’s civilian power vision and charts how and in what circumstances it was formulated. It also discusses subsequent engagement with Duchêne’s ideas and outlines how they were systematically theorised in the mid 1990s. The next section engages with more recent elaborations associated with the civilian power concept and the EU’s role and identity in the world. It first sketches Bretherton and Vogler’s concept of actorness and then engages with the civilian power concept’s two dimensions

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2.1 European integration and civilian power conceptualisations

In 1972 and based on the perceived need to re-address Europe’s collective role in the world, François Duchêne introduced the idea of Europe as a global civilian power. This section will review those early discussions on Europe’s role(s) in the world and show how the idea of a civilian power Europe progressed in the two decades following the enlargement of the European Community in 1973. The objective thereby is to trace the historical foundations for the processes of constructing European space.

2.1.1 Changing geopolitical conditions in the 1970s and Duchêne’s civilian power

Europe is once again on the move. The European Community of the Six is being enlarged. But what Europe should Europeans be building? (Mayne 1972, 7)

In the course of the preparation for the enlargement of the European Economic Community in 1973 to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom the question “what Europe Europeans should be building” was intensely discussed. In his 1972 volume, *Europe Tomorrow - 16 European look ahead*, Richard Mayne, personal assistant to Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein, invited the contributors to outline their vision on the future of Europe and develop a framework for “The Europe we want”. Duchêne’s contribution dealt with *Europe’s Role in World Peace* and introduced the notion of Europe as a global civilian power. His ideas quickly gained popularity and were further developed in the following year as the opening chapter in another volume on Europe’s identity and role in the world edited by Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager, president and director of the European Community Institute for University Studies. Next to the original English version the book appeared simultaneously in French and
German, however, interestingly with quite differing titles. The English title *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community* became *L’Europe avec un grand e* in French. The German title even carries the term ‘civilian power’: *Zivilmacht Europa – Supermacht oder Partner?* It was thus less than a year since Duchêne had first coined the term that another publication of a major European think-tank carried it in the title – illustrating the appeal of the idea of Europe as a civilian power and the perceived need to further explore the identity and role of the enlarged Community at the time. The resulting discussions were fuelled by the enlargement of the Community and the contemporary changing geopolitical conditions and changes. Duchêne argued that

The enlargement of the European Community from six countries to nine, including Britain, comes at a time when the whole world system appears to be in flux. In Europe, a series of agreements culminating in the codification of the status of West Berlin is virtually closing that phase of history associated with the phrase ‘the cold war’, though they do not settle the ambiguities of the long-term balance between the Eurasian super-power, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the European peninsula, especially if, as it now seems, the position of the United States is uncertain. [...] America, disillusioned with the notion of policing the world, seems potentially to be consummating the retreat of the West begun with the collapse of the great European empires after the war. The Soviet Union is coming out for the first time from its North Eurasian glacis and claiming all the perquisites of global power. At the same time, in the West (if that term is taken to include the easternmost state of Asia, Japan), the smooth surface of post-war economic co-operation, so long suggestive of a new, contractual, and more civilised form of relations between states, has been broken by uncouth sounds of rising competition between a hitherto invulnerable United States and hitherto outclassed Western Europe and Japan. (Duchêne 1973b, 1-2)

The historical circumstances in which these writings appeared included a changing global system and uncertainties about the future American role in it and as the leader of the Western world. The United States was facing defeat in Vietnam and the financial architecture of the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates fixed around the Dollar had collapsed. In addition, growing differences in transatlantic relations increased European suspicion about American leadership and even speculations about a possible American retreat from Europe

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12 Europe with a capital E.
13 Civilian power Europe – superpower or partner?
American hegemony was losing ground and European integration had produced an economic power, through the common market, that was increasingly rivalling American economic dominance. In light of these changes Europe’s collective role in the world was unclear and there was a widely perceived need to critically engage with these new constellations in world politics. Duchène suggested that Europe move beyond the stage of a common market towards a political and economic union to form a new force in the world. The development of such a more independent force became necessary because “increasing competition with the United States will cast doubt on the permanence of Europe’s ‘free ride’ of the past generation” (ibid, 7).

In Duchène’s vision, Europe should exert a stabilising influence on the international system and some of its trouble spots. This influence would be rooted in Europe’s collective development from a war-torn continent to a political-economic system in which interaction is regulated through a commonly agreed upon framework instead of the use of force. Within Europe such a framework became possible mainly for three reasons. First, the historical experiences of warfare and suffering which have transformed the European population in one of the most “resolutely amilitary populations in the world” (Duchène 1973b, 19). Second, the American presence in Western Europe to provide effective security whereby Europe could focus on political and economic recovery. Third, the commonly perceived Soviet threat to the East. Especially the latter two are obvious results of the Cold War and superpower rivalry which materialised on the European continent. In fact, Duchène argues, it was precisely this “compulsion of the nuclear super-powers to avoid direct military confrontations” that facilitated civilian structures for the conduct of international relations. Through this “balance of terror” (Duchène 1972, 34) which expressed itself in the destructive potential of military force, the use of which would have effectively meant complete mutual destruction. Instead alternative ways for the settlement of conflict needed to be developed.
In a similar way, almost ten years before Duchêne, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker argued in his speech as the winner of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in 1963 that “the elimination of conflict does not inevitably yield peace [... peace results from] the elimination of a certain kind of conflict resolution” (Weizsäcker 1981, 127; my translation). According to Weizsäcker the danger of a great war has been reduced by the realisation of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. As a result he called for a Welt-Innenpolitik – global domestic policy – understood as the development of supranational institutions and the assessment and resolution of geopolitical problems in categories of domestic policy. International differences should thus – like domestic problems – be dealt with in the framework of a legal system and be resolved in a constitutionally regulated way. Weizsäcker’s Welt-Innenpolitik has since been articulated frequently in the context of civilian power ideas. Duchêne (1973b, 19) described it as the domestication of international relations and Mau as “the transfer of the interior level of civilianized structures to the international system” (Kirste and Maull 1996, 301; my translation). Similarly, in the 1970s and 1980s the accompanying literature on European Political Cooperation (EPC) pointed to processes of “simultaneous ‘internationalization’ of some special problems (Spain-Gibraltar-UK; Greece-Cyprus-Turkey)” that arise from an extension of the EC’s structures for interaction to newly acceding members. This would then allow those problems to be dealt with in a ‘civilianized’ way and thus increase political stability in the then “‘new’ democracies of Southern Europe” (Rummel 1982, 152). More recently the literature on the Europeanization of EU member states foreign policies identifies processes of ‘uploading’ referring to the “bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level” (Wong 2008, 325) that increasingly align the levels of domestic and international policy. 

14 Weizsäcker (1912-2007) was a physicist and philosopher. Prior and during World War Two he was involved in German nuclear research projects alongside Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. After the war he pursued an academic career, first in physics and later in philosophy as a pacifist and anti-nuclear weapons campaigner.
All of these articulations are based on an assumed preference for civilianized structures as the basis of conduct for foreign policy. However, Duchêne was the first to focus on those in the European Community. For Duchêne, Europe would serve as a role model illustrating the appeal and the benefits of civilianized structures and would thus become

the first example in history of a major centre of the balance of power becoming in the era of its decline not a colonised victim but the exemplar of a new stage of political civilisation. The European Community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operation formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power. This may be almost too good to be true. The fact remains that the unpleasant effects of Europe’s decline in traditional terms have been singularly softened by a sea-change in the sources of power. History rarely offers such second chances. They should be taken. (Duchêne 1973b, 19)

Duchêne hence proposed Europe as a “force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” because if it does not become this it will “itself be more or less a victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself” (ibid, 20-21). Such a move towards more civilian ways of exercising international relations is not only essential for the role of the EC in the international system, but also for the preservation of peace:

The problem of peace in the next twenty years seems less likely to be that of containing major war than of building up the means, international, national, and even subnational, of absorbing changes which will certainly be great and some of which may create appalling injustice, suffering, conflict, and fears of shifts in the balance of power. This is certainly the kind of world most relevant to the role tomorrow’s Europe can aspire to play. The one thing Europe cannot be is a major military power. (Duchêne 1972, 37)

Duchêne firmly believed that the destructive potential of the nuclear stalemate led to the downgrade of military power in international relations and the simultaneous upgrade of civilianized ways for foreign political conduct. He saw Europe’s advantage in comparison to other players in the international system in the ability to master the geopolitical changes of the time because of its experience since the end of World War Two. Europe had since set an example of overcoming war and creating relative peace and prosperity. Even though the
geopolitical circumstances of the time (such as the Marshall-plan and the Cold War) were major factors in this development, within Europe a system of regulated interactions and interdependencies between its members was materialising.

Regarding relations with the developing world, Europe’s appeal, according to Duchêne, derived from the fact that Europe is “both rich and not a super-power, a makeweight of imposing proportions rather than a potential master, like America, Russia, or in some areas China or Japan”. Europe’s influence on the international system would then be exercised through functional spheres of influence, as in trade, instead of primarily territorial ones (ibid, 38-39). The focus therein lies on economic, diplomatic, and cultural exchanges rather than in military ones. Through the achievement in post-war Europe to settle conflicts and establish a civilian cooperation framework between Western European states, Europe has become the first major area in the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of power. [... However,] stability has come to Europe in very peculiar circumstances, including two disastrous wars followed by the protectorate of the two super-powers. It is clearly no precedent for anyone else. Nevertheless, a primarily civilian power on the scale of Western Europe [...] could play a very important and potentially constructive role. More and more, security policies today, even for the super-powers, consist in shaping the international milieu often in areas which at first sight have little to do with security. From this point of view Western Europe would be endowed with resources and free of a load of military power which could give it great influence in a world where both the positive and negative charges of interdependence seem to be growing at a rapid rate. (ibid, 43)

The ability to adapt to such interdependencies and the resulting changes in the international system is one of Duchêne’s central concerns. These interdependencies developed with changes in the global economic system after World War Two that established an American-led system of liberal capitalism, technically open to everyone willing to subscribe to its rules, and that intertwined the economies of the major players in this system. At the time Duchêne formulated the civilian power ideas this was essentially the triad of the United States,
Western Europe and Japan\textsuperscript{15}. The collective approach and the interdependencies of the three major economic powers of the time strengthened the Western economic system as a whole and entrenched civilian modes for the settlement of disagreements and conflicts between them. The collective agreements upon which their economic development and welfare rested were not to be put at risk; hence there were strong incentives to develop regulated and institutionalised ways for negotiation and conflict resolution. International relations thus became partially domesticated and civilianized structures developed within the Triad (Duchêne 1973a, 16).

\textbf{2.1.2 New elaborations and the end of the Cold War}

Duchêne’s ideas were further elaborated in a volume edited by Kenneth Twitchett (1976) entitled \textit{Europe and the world: the external relations of the Common Market}. Twitchett accepted Duchêne’s civilian power notion for the European Community and argued that “the EEC’s impact on the international system so far has been and will probably continue to be that of a civilian power, exercising influence by commerce and diplomacy, not traditional military strength” (Twitchett 1976, 2). Based on the European integration process of the post-war period, Twitchett (1976, xiii-xiv) asserts that

\begin{quote}
The Community has become an important international actor in its own right [...] In fact its unique nature as an international organization added to the collective economic and political influence of the Nine gives the Community the characteristics of a civilian power: an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able to exercise influence on states, global and regional organizations, international corporations, and other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and legal factors.
\end{quote}

Civilian power ideas subsequently ceased to be a major part of the academic discourse for well over a decade, with the one exception of a 1982 article by the Australian international

\textsuperscript{15} Duchêne and Maull (see below) worked for the European branch of the Trilateral Commission in Paris.
relations scholar Hedley Bull. Bull took a very sceptical position towards civilian power ideas and any form of power that is not backed by effectively deployable military force. He argued that all power and influence of “the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control”. Consequently Bull disagreed with Duchêne and Twitchett on the point that the EC is a significant actor in international affairs or might develop into one (Bull 1982, 151). He emphasised that “there is no supranational community in Western Europe but only a group of nation states” and viewed the EC as an instrument of cooperation among governments with a history of “endemic mutual conflict”. Any recent collaboration has been “under the shadow of American presence and the threat from the East”. Bull also regarded the idea of an area of peace between Western European countries as merely wishful thinking “if it means that war between them could not happen again, and not simply that is has not happened in recent decades” (ibid, 163).

Bull was also sceptical about the devaluation of military power in favour of an increasing reliance on cooperation and negotiation. In fact he saw military power as an underlying necessity without which negotiations could not even take place. According to Bull (1982, 156) there is no contradiction between reliance on détente, on the pursuit of political settlements, the promotion of trade and understanding, and the reliance on a balance of power: it is the security afforded to each side by effective defences that provides the confidence required to work for change.

In Bull’s view the future American provision of security and the balance of power in Western Europe is uncertain because the policies pursued by the Reagan administration led to diverging interests between the US and Europe – a point where he agreed with Duchêne. As a result, Bull argues, the countries of Western Europe cannot rely on the American provision of security any longer and need to “take steps towards providing themselves with nuclear deterrent forces that will in due course take over from the United States the function of
neutralising any Soviet nuclear threat” (ibid, 157). Bull thus advocated the creation of a nuclear-equipped European military alliance as the most important step of integration, with other forms of European integration, such as the European Economic Community, serving this military alliance.

After his elaborations in the early 1970s Duchêne himself wrote little else with respect to the civilian power debate, in the mid-1990s, however, his ideas started to be theorised more systematically through the work of a group of scholars around Hanns Maull (Kirste and Maull 1996; Frenkler et al. 1997). Maull’s early work on civilian power focuses, much like Duchêne, Twitchett and Bull before him, on security issues and the relevance of the concept for global security (Maull 1990, 1992, 1993). Furthermore, like Duchêne’s, Maull’s contributions to the civilian power idea appear at a time of major geopolitical changes: the end of the Cold War, German reunification, and the foundation of the European Union. Europe’s role in this new post-Cold War world was unclear. At the beginning of the wars in a collapsing Yugoslavia in 1991 Jacques Poos, Luxembourg foreign minister at the time, firmly believed Europe could end the fighting on its own. His widely cited assertion that ”This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans” (quoted in IISS 2006) turned out to be wrong. However, fundamental geopolitical changes were underway again, especially in Europe. In very much the same way as Mayne and Duchêne more than two decades earlier, academic work on civilian power ideas in the 1990s started with the observation of a changing international system. Mayne (1972, 7) observed that “Europe is once again on the move”, Duchêne (1973b, 1) found that “the whole world system appears to be in flux” and in 1994 Butterwegge and Grundmann set the stage for their edited volume Zivilmacht Europa: Friedenspolitik und Rüstungskonversion in Ost und West16 by pointing out that

16 Civilian Power Europe: Peace Policy and Conversation of Armament in East and West.
Europe is in the most dramatic transformation process of the post-war period. It not only comprises the formerly communist states of Eastern Europe, but also the capitalist states of Western Europe are forced to reorient themselves. (Butterwegge and Grundmann 1994, 7; my translation)

In that volume, Galtung suggested a reorientation that would lead to a European house; which would eventually also include Russia and Turkey. Cooperation between the countries within this European house would focus on security, cultural, and economic policies and be conducted in a non-military, civilianized way (Galtung 1994). Generally, the authors shared Duchêne’s view on the modified role of military force for the provision of security. Vogt (1994, 33) called for a change of political paradigms which would transform traditional military security policy into civilianized reform-, development- and peace policy, whereby he emphasised the global interdependencies of security, peace and development in the Third World. This had become necessary because, according to Vogt, military force is incapable of addressing most of the future challenges, such as climate change, environmental destruction or an increasing North-South divide. Instead he suggested, very much in line with Weizsäcker’s Welt-Innenpolitik, an institutionalised system of multi- and supranational regulating instances to deal with such problems as they are beyond the control of individual nation-states. Europe should thus not be

transformed into a new (military) great power, or even a “fortress Europe”, but into a largely demilitarised “civilian power”, whose political concept is constructive world policy of civilianized non-military peace development. (Vogt 1994, 42-45; my translation)

In the same volume, Mader argued – very much like Duchêne two decades earlier – that economic integration of nation-states create interdependencies which make war unlikely between them. European development in the post-war period rested upon such interdependencies:

the economic integration of the hereditary enemies Germany and France in the EC has impressively illustrated this internal peace function. The strategic achievement of the EC is without any doubt that it has banished the danger of
intra-European wars: within the Community war has been abolished. (Mader 1994, 71; my translation)

The historical background of the Cold War, the setting of the international system, and the American strategy to rebuild Western Europe according to the Marshall plan laid the foundations for civilianized structures in Europe. The American commitment towards European reconstruction was paired with heavy military presence in Europe. Together these guaranteed the success of American economic hegemony and the possibility for Western Europe, Germany in particular, to focus on economic and political reconstruction. The American military umbrella provided security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Marshall plan allowed for integration into the world economy; thus freeing resources and creating political preferences to develop civilianized structures within Europe.\(^{17}\)

**2.1.3 Civilian power as actor, concept and medium**

Despite the appeal of Duchêne’s civilian power vision, a common point of criticism was the “unsystematic manner in which it was advanced” (Whitman 1998, 11). As a result, in 1994 the German Research Foundation (DFG) initiated a three-year project to advance the civilian power concept and examine its applicability to the foreign policy of German, Japan and the United States.\(^{18}\) The goal was to substantiate the theoretical foundations of the concept and to evaluate the extent to which these countries fit the criteria of a civilian power. According to Kirste and Maull (1996, 297) the meaning of civilian power is threefold: First, it refers to an actor with the determination to shape international relations, however, with consciously different goals and strategies than a classical great power (civilian power as a power). Second,

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\(^{17}\) For a more detailed account of these processes in relation to the changes in German geopolitical outlook see Bachmann (2009a)

\(^{18}\) The final report of the project (Frenkler et al. 1997) and detailed publications on the development of the theoretical concept (Kirste and Maull 1996) are only available in German, the best summary of the project available in English is the introductory chapter of Harnisch and Maull (2001).
civilian power refers to a specific role concept whose foreign political values and style is specifically targeting the civilianization of international politics (civilian power as a concept). Third, it is a way of policy implementation for reaching specific international goals; a foreign policy strategy based on specific civilian instruments (civilian power as medium). All three are interrelated and derive from the central characteristics developed in the DFG-project. The project was centred on the analysis of six categories, which represent ideal typical civilian power behaviour to be compared to the actual foreign political behaviour of the three countries in order to determine the congruence between actual policy and the ideal type of the role concept. The six categories of analysis are (based on Kirste and Maull 1996, 301-303):

- Influence in the international system: civilian powers are powers. They aim to participate in the shaping of the international system and take responsibility, not by way of exclusive leadership, but rather by seeking influence through collective action and by setting examples of how to act;

- National goals: security, welfare, social balance, democratic stability. Foreign policy aims to transfer the interior level of civilianized structures to the international system;

- International goals (organization): civilianizing international politics, partial transfer of sovereignty and acceptance of binding international norms, institutionalisation of international relations and rule of law, also in the context of conflict settlement;

- International goals (contents): human rights, good governance, participatory democracy, rule of law, pluralism, market economy, and sustainable development for social, ecological and economic balance. Inclusion of countries into the international system is also tied to conditions with the possibility of multilateral intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state if it does not comply with the rules;

- Foreign political practices: no do-it-alone practices, instead focus on multilateral action, international cooperation institutionalised through the transfer of sovereignty, especially in the security sector, problem solving through negotiation and compromises, rejection of the use of force except for cases of self-defence or collectively legitimised measures;

- Foreign political instruments: ‘political’ instruments, negotiations, sanctions, conditions, etc. Acceptance of the use of force in collectively legitimised cases, counteracting aggressors through a system of collective security.

None of the foreign policies of the countries examined was fully congruent with the theoretical role concept. For Germany and Japan 21 foreign policy cases were examined, for
the United States. With 81 percent, Germany’s foreign policy showed the largest congruence with the ideal typical role concept; Japan followed with 66 percent. With only 46 percent, the United States’ foreign policy differed more substantially from the ideal typical civilian power concept (Frenkler et al. 1997, 102-106). The United States thus, predictably, acted more as the classical great power it is than as a civilian power, yet also retained considerable civilian power aspects in its foreign policy.

The elaborations outlined above share the understanding that the promotion of civilianized structures and a civilianized international system constitutes the key foreign political objective. In this context Maull (1993, 118) argues that:

We must either successfully export and extrapolate the mechanisms of taming social violence which we have developed at home, thus ‘domesticating’ international relations, or suffer the intrusion of traditional patterns of international relations (anarchy, self-help and the resort to force) into our societies and polities.

The major problem of a return to an international system based on the balance of power and containment is, according to Maull (1993), the inability to address security threats intensified by an increasingly interlinked and interdependent world, such as the substantial intensification of international terrorism. Therefore the structures in the international system should be civilianized. The core principles of the civilian power role concept thereby provide the basis for the central characteristics of such a system and can be summarised as (based on Maull 1993, 119; Kirste and Maull 1996, 300-301):

- Restrictions and regulations for the use of force
- Rule of law and regulations in international relations
- Intensification of multilateral cooperation and creation of participatory decision making processes for legitimising an international system based on freedom, democracy and social market economy
- Promotion of social balance and fairness on a global level
- Institution building to control and implement general norms and values
- The willingness to partial transfer of sovereignty in favour of supranational integration
These characteristics (comprising elements of civilian power as *concept* and *medium*) also lay the thematic foundations for defining civilian power as an actor (civilian power as *power*). Directly influenced by Duchêne’s idea of a civilian power as “a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” (1973b, 20), Maull defined that “civilian powers are, in other words, states which are willing and able to advance the civilianization of the international system” (1993, 126). Both thus emphasised the concept’s two dimensions: *civilian* (committed to the civilianized structures and principles) and *power* (willingness and ability to transfer those structures onto the international system).

2.2 Europe as normative power, civilian power, or civilian force

2.2.1 Global actoriness of the European Union

The previous section has shown that discussions and elaborations on the EC/EU’s collective role in the world have always intensified at times of major geopolitical flux. In the same context and as part of a wider analysis of the international identity of the European Union entitled *From civilian power to superpower? The international identity of the European Union*, Richard Whitman (1998, 233) asserted that:

The European Union has become a significant international actor *without* transforming itself into a nation state. The reason for this state of affairs is that the international context within which the Union now operates, and the instruments available at its disposal, have undergone a convergence to create circumstances in which the relative significance of the Union has been enhanced. Furthermore, in asserting its international identity the Union has not supplanted the foreign policy or the instruments of diplomacy of the Member States. The instruments that are available to the European Union [...] are common instruments, not single instruments. The EU instruments are supranational in that they are the outcome of a supranational decision-making and implementation process. The Member States contribute to this process rather than being supplanted by the process.

Only a few years after the foundation of the European Union Whitman thus claimed that the EU is a powerful global actor with considerable influence on the global system. Similarly,
their landmark contribution *The European Union as a Global Actor* Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (1999; 2nd ed. 2006) ascribed significant actor capability to the EU as an actor in the international system. Their term ‘actorness’ expresses the capability to exercise effective influence in a given system and comprises three elements (based on Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 24):

- **Opportunity** denotes factors in the external environment of ideas and events which constrain or enable actorness. Opportunity signifies the structural context of action.

- **Presence** conceptualizes the ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders. An indication of the EU’s structural power, presence combines understandings about the fundamental nature, or identity of the EU and the (often unintended) consequences of the Union’s internal priorities and policies.

- **Capability** refers to the internal context of EU external action – the availability of policy instruments and understandings about the Union’s ability to utilize these instruments, in response to opportunity and/or capitalize on presence.

Bretherton and Vogler developed this approach to actorness in order to address the unique nature of the EU as an actor in the global system. They argue that it has proved difficult to accommodate a hybrid entity which is neither an intergovernmental organization nor a state, but which operates globally across a range of policy areas. [...] comparisons between the EU and other actors in the global system are likely to produce only limited insights. The EU is an actor *sui generis*. We conceive of it as a multiperspectival polity whose construction reflects both the experimentation of policy entrepreneurs and the opportunities afforded by the changing structures of the international system. Essentially, therefore the EU remains in the course of construction. This approach accommodates its evolution over time and its shifting character at any one time; it also leaves open the question of its future destination. (ibid, 35-36)

According to the three-dimensional structure of actorness an actor is defined as “an entity that is capable of agency; of formulating and acting upon decisions. [...] the capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about internal character and capabilities and external opportunities” (ibid, 35). Applying that to the European Union’s global actorness in the field of development cooperation, the Union proved that it can *formulate and act upon*
decisions for a long time not only in the agreements of Lomé and Cotonou. Its internal character takes the form of a civilianized international system, which it seeks to transfer onto the international system. The capabilities to act internationally remain contested and depended on the policy field (see Figure 15 in Section 6.2.1). In some policy fields, such as trade and aid policy, the Union has shown its capability to promote its own interests, whereas in other, such as security and defence policy, the external capability to act remains low and largely vested in the hands of the individual member states. The external opportunity to present itself as a ‘partner’ to developing countries is dependent on the roles of others in this context. Clearly the arrival of China as a ‘donor’ and the Obama-administration in the US has changed the rules of the development game in that China constitutes a cooperation alternative to the ‘West’ and Obama recaptured some of the “collaborative foreign political charme that Europe had largely claimed during the Bush-presidency” (Bachmann and Sidaway 2009a). Yet, such times of changes and fluctuations always offer opportunities for (re-)positioning. Given that collectively the EU is the biggest donor, such (re-)positioning will depend on the level of coherence in European development policies (see Chapter VI).

Accepting the actor quality of the EU on the global stage, Bretherton and Vogler identify three complementary roles for the EU in international affairs. First, the EU as a model for regional integration and the development of peace and prosperity - as Duchêne had argued three decades earlier (Duchêne 1973b, 19). After centuries of warfare on the European continent, the creation of civilianized structures within the EU has a substantial appeal to other regions as a model. Regarding the two dimension of the civilian power concept, this role illustrates the realisation of the civilian dimension within the EU. Second, the EU is a promoter of this internal values and civilianized structures into the world. This role applies to the power dimension of the civilian power concept in the sense of Duchêne’s “force for the international

\footnote{For the leadership role of the Commission in setting standards in the international development industry see Carbone (2007).}
diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” (ibid, 20). Third, the EU can be understood as a counterweight to the USA. This role as an alternative source of influence combines the two other roles as model and promoter of norms, values and civilianized structures (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 56-57).

In addition to the complementarities of civilian power discourse with Bretherton and Vogler’s suggested roles for the EU, McCormick (2007, 83) also points out that Duchêne was remarkably prescient in his assessment of Europe’s future role. As he suggested, there is more scope today for civilian forms of action and influence. Europe’s inability (or unwillingness) to use the kind of military force that the Americans have at their disposal has worked in its favour. Europe has not ignored military power, but neither does it aspire to achieve military parity with the Americans. Europe is acting as a model of a new kind of interstate relationship that holds strong prospects for overcoming war, intimidation, and violence. It is remaining true to its core characteristics of civilian means and ends, developing its credentials as a force for the diffusion of civilian and democratic standards. In the process, it has developed a model of a superpower that is distinctive from its American and Soviet predecessors.

McCormick’s assessment of European superpower is certainly questionable. However, the quote illustrates the complementarities of the actorness and the civilian power concepts. In fact, actorness is a central component of the civilian power concept: the power dimension. Without substantial actorness as outlined by Bretherton and Vogler, civilian power is stripped of its power dimension as it would not possess the capability to diffuse civilianized structures into the international system.

2.2.2 The EU’s civilian dimension

In light of the reorientation of American foreign policy under George W. Bush, a broader range of scholars engaged with the civilian power discourse, in particular its civilian dimension, as an alternative approach to Bush’s neo-conservative doctrine (Freres 2000; Grimm 2002; Manners 2002; Farrel 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Sjursen 2006). A special edition of the Journal
of European Public Policy (Vol. 13, 2) entitled What kind of power? discussed identity and role of the EU in the global system (see Sjursen 2006). The authors take a rather sceptical approach towards the continued relevance of the civilian power concept to the EU’s external relations, because of recent development of European military structures (Sjursen 2006, 171). It is argued that the acquisition of military means or even the EU’s intent to do so, is increasingly diminishing the civilian power identity of the EU, moving it more towards a traditional great power.

Ian Manners (2002) introduced the notion of the EU as a normative power. In reference to Bull’s 1982 article he entitled his 2002 article in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? His basic argument is that despite the “status of the EU as a global civilian power [...] which is still central to a discussion of its role in international relations”, the EU is best conceived of as a “normative power Europe”. The understanding of civilian power thereby forms the basis for his definition of normative power. On this topic Manners (2002, 236-237) points out that

Twitchett and Maull have both defined civilian power as involving three key features which I interpret as being the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress.

Manners thus does not reject the civilian power identity of the EU. Rather he argues for a more specific consideration of the EU as a normative power. Manners argues that the basis of this has developed over the past fifty years and is centred on the five core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. In addition to those core norms, Manners introduces four minor norms: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance. However, such a normative basis does not inevitably transform the EU into a normative power, just as the civilian dimension is not equivalent to civilian power

20 Other contributors include Ian Manners, Wolfgang Wagner, Adrian Hyde-Prince, Michael Smith, and Erik Oddvar Eriksen.
In that respect the power dimension also applies to normative power. As such, according to Manners, “normative power” is not a contradiction in terms. In his case study he showed how the EU, based on its normative basis, successfully exerted power by outlawing the death penalty as a ‘normal’ practice. Manners thus concludes that “rather than being a contradiction in terms, the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all” (2002, 253).

In later work, Manners (2006) warns of the development of a Brussels-based ”military-industrial simplex”22. He understands this as a way in which the defence industries of individual member states have used European integration for armaments co-operation and successfully engaged in lobbying their interests on the European level. The danger therein lies not in the “acquisition of conflict prevention, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction capacities”, but in the “prioritization of military intervention over non-military conciliation” (Manners 2006, 193-194). Even though sceptical about the militarisation, Manners does not necessarily see the EU losing its normative character by developing military capacities. He regards a critical reflection upon the militarisation process as opposed to the pursuit of great power status as a prerequisite for maintaining the EU’s normative character. The central norm guiding external relations of the EU should thus be a normative path of sustainable peace. Within such an approach, he argues,

it is entirely plausible that the EU can engage in most of the Article III-309 tasks (‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks’) under a UN mandate as part of a wider peace-building solution. (Manners 2006, 195)

21 Manner’s theoretical basis also differs from Bull’s in that he points to the possibility of exercising power indirectly and unintentionally. The shaping of norms and values in interaction structures or of an external cooperation partner, for instance, can occur through a reflection of the own identity during the interaction process, as opposed to through the deliberate projection of power, in both military and civilian forms.

22 Manners thereby makes reference to the American military-industrial complex, however, invoking a less complex entity through the word ‘simplex’.
In the same context and in an attempt to gain a “better grasp of the nature and quality of EU normative power” Hettne and Söderbaum (2005, 538) compare the specific civilian power character of the EU’s foreign policy with the idea of soft imperialism. They argue that the way the EU deals with the external world has been different from that of a great power driven by geopolitical interests. This is because the civilian power employed in the EU’s own region-building is also being projected in its external relations as the preferred world order model.

Like Manners they aim to specify the civilian power nature more precisely. However, Hettne and Söderbaum draw distinctions between two ways of foreign policy conduct: civilian power and soft imperialism.

The former implies a foreign policy built on the norms promoted internally within the Union (such as social pluralism, the rule of law, democracy and market economy) and on voluntary dialogue and consensus-building with the counterpart. The latter refers to an asymmetric relationship, and the imposition of norms in order to promote the EU’s self-interest rather than a genuine (interregional) dialogue as a foundation for sustainable global governance. (ibid, 249)

Hettne and Söderbaum’s understanding of civilian power thus differs in certain aspects from the conceptualisation outlined above. The norm-driven foreign policy they attribute to the term civilian power is described as “power without the hard option”. It is the civilian dimension of the civilian power concept. The foreign policy they describe as soft imperialism is “soft power applied in a hard way” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005, 539). It is the power dimension of the concept. The understanding of civilian power based on Duchêne’s ideas and Maull’s theoretical concept, however, comprises both. On the one hand, internally the EU has largely domesticated international relations and created a largely civilianized international system. A significant amount of those civilianized structures are rooted in the EU’s normative basis, as are certain aspects of its external relations, such as the abolitionist policy for the death penalty examined by Manners (2002). As such Hettne and Söderbaum’s account of civilian power foreign policy is an integral part, the civilian dimension, of the civilian power concept. On the other hand, their account of soft imperialism is an equally constituting part:
the *power* dimension. It deals with the EU’s actorness; its ability to exert power on the international system for promoting civilianized structures. EU trade policy is a good example how the EU projects power in order to promote its self-interest in the international system - often in very asymmetrical power relations.

### 2.2.3 The EU’s *power* dimension

Unlike Hettne and Söderbaum’s uni-dimensional civilian power notion, Mario Teló (2006) advocates a more inclusive understanding of the term in his book *Europe: a Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order*. In order to address the geopolitical changes of the early 21st century Teló (2006, 2) proposes

a new concept of ‘civilian power’ which differs, on the one hand, from the concept of ‘soft power’ developed by Joseph Nye as complementary to ‘hard power’, both of which were related to the international role of the US. Indeed, to an extent, the increasing civilian power of the EU reduces the soft power of the US. On the other hand, our basically realist understanding of ‘civilian power’ differs from the normative and idealists notions of ‘civil power’ and ‘civilizing power’, even if its ideational factors and history of political thought are not neglected at all.

In line with Duchêne’s and Maull earlier civilian power conceptions Teló suggests a new multilateralism as a “theoretical framework for a new world order based on interdependence, conflict prevention and management, and institutionalized global and regional cooperation” (ibid, 9). Like most other authors writing on the civilian power role of the EU in the global system, Teló writes to address major geopolitical changes and the changing role of the EU in the system. He points to “epoch-making events, such as the end of the cold war and September 11th [that] have transformed the global system and Europe’s role in it at a pace and to a degree which can be compared with the historical turning point of 1945” (ibid, 2). He further argues that the changes that came along with the post-bipolar world order will “condition the role and the status of the EU as an actor on the international stage”. In this
context he emphasises that, at least for another generation, no other actor will be in “the position of the EU either in terms of resources or willingness, if not to counterbalance, at least to ‘civilize’ (as an ally of course) the US superpower” (ibid, 7). Taking into account both dimensions of the EU’s civilian power character, Teló neither questions the civilian nor the power dimension. Based on the successful development of both, he asserts that the EU has powerful global actorness and, accordingly, significant capabilities to influence world affairs:

The existence of EU civilian and multilateral power in the world is thus an incontrovertible fact and well exceeds a mere ‘vague influence’. [...] Contrary to trivial understanding of transatlantic differences the EU in facts acts like a power, looks like a power and is an international power, albeit a very particular one; it combines hard economic power with soft power. We have illustrated how in many ways and to what extent the EU civilian power is emerging, while limiting the US soft power. Furthermore, to a lesser extent it also contains the other’s hard power. (ibid, 57-58)

Stavridis (2001) also highlights the importance of engaging with both dimensions of the concept. Stavridis points to the two main characteristics of a civilian power Europe according to Duchêne. First, as “a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces” and second, as “a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” (Stavridis 2001, 44; Duchêne 1973b, 19-20). Similarly, Lodge argues for the EU as a civilian power to use all its power resources to advance the civilianization of the international system, including the use of limited military power. She argues against the notion that the EU’s civilian power image must be forfeited as it [the EU] assumes, through WEU and links with NATO, a very limited military role. Rather, the civilian power image behoves it to try and influence the agenda of international politics in such a way as to focus on measures that will decrease the prospects for the resort to arms and force to resolve conflict. (Lodge 1993, 249)

According to Stavridis, recent research on the civilian power EU has almost entirely neglected Duchêne’s second element of a civilian power, the power dimension. He criticises that “only half of the initial definition has been used over the past three decades” (Stavridis 2001, 50). The focus has almost exclusively been on the civilian dimension thereby omitting
the question how the EU, as such a *civilian* actor, would diffuse the internally developed civilianized structures to the international system. Stavridis also rejects the argument that the development of certain European military structures marks the end of the civilian power in Europe and thus renders the concept inappropriate for explaining the EU’s international relations. The problem, according to Stavridis (2001, 44), rather is that the “question how to use military power as part of a civilian power concept has not been studied sufficiently”.

Similarly, Mauell (2005, 781) claims that

> The widely held view that ‘civilian powers’ want nothing to do with military force, and that an EU which is in the process of developing its own European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can no longer be a civilian power, is in that context quite misleading. In fact, Duchêne recognized explicitly that the European Community did have military power […] civilian power therefore does not describe any inability or unwillingness to use military force; rather, it suggests the specific way in which military force will be applied — never alone and autonomously, but only collectively, only with international legitimacy, and only in the pursuit of ‘civilizing’ international relations. Thus civilian powers accept, indeed impose, significant constraints on themselves in their ability to project military power, and they will generally be rather sceptical about the utility of military power in the context of building a sustainable ‘civilized’ global order.

In the same context, Biscop and Coolsaet (2003, 30) argue that “without the willingness to apply pressure, sanction and, if need be, force, EU external action will not acquire the credibility it needs to be effective”. Based on the lack thereof in certain situations, Mauell (2005) conceives of the EU not as a civilian power, but rather as a civilian force in the international system. This force is based on the EU’s political, economic, social and cultural clout and should be used, according to Mauell, for the promotion of civilianized structures in the international system. The EU’s structural power thereby aims to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate. [....] Structural power, in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises. (Strange 1994, 24-25)
The EU has exercised significant structural power on its own territory and upon the accession countries, however, Whitman (2002, 4) points out that the “exercise of the structural power of civilian power Europe does not begin and end in Europe” (2002, 4). Holden (2009), for instance, analyses how the EU uses structural power as a “global political instrument” in its development policies. The projection of structural power thus depends on and aims to promote mechanism and ways of interaction characteristic of a civilianized international system.

2.3 Summary: The civilian power discourse of Europe’s global identity and role

The literature surveyed in this chapter covers a wide range of elaborations on Europe’s collective role in the world, mostly associated with the idea of Europe as a global civilian power. Some of the approaches differ considerably between a focus on the civilian dimension, a concentration on the power dimension or a complete dismissal of the civilian power notion. However, the point here is not to precisely evaluate the validity of these individual approaches. The accounts presented in this chapter have their explanatory strengths and weaknesses and are part of a discourse that engages with the international role and identity of the EU, whereby recurrence and intensity of this discourse has significantly contributed to a more nuanced understanding of Europe’s role in the world23.

Debates on civilian power have intensified at moments of major geopolitical flux, with a strong perceived need to re-address both the European role in the world and its relation to the United States. Duchêne first introduced his ideas in the 1970s when American power was visibly on the decline and simultaneously the EC’s influence on the international system on the rise, boosted by resurging European economies and the accession of Britain, Ireland and

23 Of course this also includes authors not cited here (Freres 2000; Grimm 2002; Schlotter 2003; Blauberger 2005; Farrel 2005; Hyde-Price 2006; Bretherton and Vogler 2006) and others.
Denmark. The next intense engagement with civilian power ideas came with the end of the Cold War, German reunification and the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s. It led to the theoretical conceptualisation of the civilian power idea in the framework of a DFG-study by scholars around Hanns Maull (Kirste and Maull 1996; Frenkler et al. 1997). As such Duchêne’s geopolitical vision of Europe as a global civilian power was further developed into an analytical tool for the conceptualisation of foreign policy. This, however, did not deal with the European Union and its civilian power identity and role in the world, instead it focussed on the theoretical development of the concept and its applicability to the foreign policy of Germany, Japan and the United States. After the Balkan Wars, especially Kosovo, and the rise of the American neo-conservatism under George W. Bush, the civilian power discourse resurfaced. On the one hand, the European incapability to deal with crisis situations, even in its own backyard, was painfully demonstrated and triggered debates on European power to address those crises. On the other hand, through Bush’s neo-conservative influenced foreign policy, ideas of civilian power increasingly regained popularity as an alternative to the American geopolitical project.

Nowadays, much of the civilian power discourse deals with the question of to what extent the EU can still be conceived of as a civilian power either in light of the development of EU military structures or because of doubts on European actorness, thereby focusing either on the civilian or the power dimension of the concept. In her opening contribution to the 2006 special edition of the *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 13, 2) Helen Sjursen (2006, 170) points to a contemporary debate dominated by the view that the EU “is not only a civilian power (in the sense that it does not have military instruments at its disposal) but (also) a normative, civilizing or ethical power within the international system”. Such a viewpoint is problematic because it categorically excludes the possibility of a civilian power to have military instruments at its disposal, thus reducing the power dimension of the concept, yet at the same time argues that the EU could (also) be a normative, civilizing or ethical power. Whilst civilian is
thus replaced, the term power remains. The omission of the power dimension in these debates it therefore surprising. Conceiving of the EU as a civilian, normative or ethical power implies the power to promote these standards internationally. Clearly such power is not predominantly military, however, if so it does not necessarily undermine civilian, normative or ethical standards if deployed under certain conditions and in order to defend such standards (Lodge 1993; Stavridis 2001; Biscop and Coolsaet 2003). As Manners (2006) and Maull (2005) point out, this depends on the level of (self-imposed) restrictions and the framework for the use of force along the lines of Europe’s civilian (power) identity.

Internally, the EU member states have committed to a commonly agreed upon system of political-economic interaction and have thus created a largely civilianized system within the EU. This was initially based on the desire to overcome war, rested on American hegemony, and was shaped by the visions and beliefs of the architects of European integration, such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman (who were influenced by people like François Duchêne and Richard Mayne and who influenced the key political leaders at the time). Central to the construction of this civilianized system was the decision by European member states to bundle certain interests and integrate supranationally in the form of the EC/EU. Through these processes of Europeanization (Graziano and Vink 2008) interaction for a wide range of policy fields has become regulated and institutionalised: decision making and policy conduct is highly multilateral, institutionalised and based on a commonly agreed-upon framework of the rule of law. Members agreed on a set of shared values and are (partially) willing to cede national authority and transfer sovereignty in favour of supranational integration. There are no formal trade barriers between the members and the use of force has ceased to exist as a foreign policy tool within the European Union.

This largely civilianized international system that has become manifest within the EU “is also being projected in its external relations as the preferred world order model” (Hettne
and Söderbaum 2005, 538). EU external relations are thus heavily influenced by internal preferences for Europe’s model of political-economic organisation. This articulates with what Weizsäcker (1981) described as Welt-Innenpolitik, Duchêne (1973b, 19) as the domestication of international relations and Kirste and Maull (1996, 301; my translation) as “the transfer of the interior level of civilianized structures to the international system”. Similar processes are referred to as “internalization of some special problems” (Rummel 1982, 152) in the literature on European Political Cooperation of the 1970s and 1980s or as ‘uploading’ of national preferences and models to the supranational level in more recent texts on foreign policy Europeanization (Wong 2008; Lehmkuhl 2008). Yet, despite this largely civilianized international system within the EU and the inherent influence it has on the conception of the EU’s role in the world, external relations remain fragmented. The second pillar of the European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is determined by a complex array of competences, decision-making procedures and policies between Brussels, the member states and other geopolitical actors and factors. Conceptualisations thereof are as complex as the array itself.

Discourses about the EU’s civilian power identity and role in the international system are usefully conceived of as a continuum\textsuperscript{24} on which various EU external relations range. Some of these are more congruent with the ideal typical civilian power concept, some less. Consequently, ‘civilian power’ does not imply that an actor’s foreign policy is always and completely in line with the concept, but rather that it predominantly operates within the policy parameters outlined by the concept. Whilst the key goal remains the promotion of civilianized structures in the international system, EU external relations waver regarding the congruence with the ideal typical civilian power concept. In certain situations it falls within the concept, in

\textsuperscript{24} As a response to Kirste and Maull (1996), Tewes (1997) introduced the notion of looking at the civilian power concept in terms of a continuum according to which certain political entities act more or less as a civilian power and certain policies fall more or less within the ideal typical policy patterns of the concept.
others it does not. Understood in such flexible terms and inclusive of other debates on Europe’s role in the world, the civilian power discourse offers a key conceptual contribution to the understanding of Europe’s identity and role in the world. In this context ‘civilian power’ has always been both a geopolitical vision for Europe’s collective role in the world (preferably in a civilianized international system) and an analytical tool for conceptualising the relation between Europe’s internal system of political-economic organisation and its external relations.
CHAPTER III: CONCEPTS OF SPACE, INTERACTION AND THE EU AS A DEVELOPMENT ACTOR

Whilst the previous chapter has sketched conceptualisations of Europe’s role in the world and as a civilian power, this chapter addresses the nature of the international system and the EU’s role as a development actor. It thereby introduces an understanding of geopolitical space as a socially, politically and historically constructed system of structures, processes and flows and outlines how this constitutes the basis for a ‘civilianized’ international system (see Chapter II). In addition, such an understanding of geopolitical space also lays the foundation for a conceptualisation of European space (Chapter V) and the construction, projection and perception thereof in East Africa. Space is thus not primarily understood as physical space, but rather as spaces of interaction (characterised by structures, process and flows) within which different actors stand in particular relations to each other. I argue that Europe’s collective international actorness is strongest and most effective when these spaces of interaction are regulated and institutionalised, as opposed to disordered and anarchic. The projection of European space is therefore dependent on such a system of regulated spaces of interaction and consequently aims to promote it. This also has a substantial impact on European development policy and the EU’s relations with developing countries.

Both collectively and bilaterally, Europe has a long (and troubled) history with developing countries. In fact development policy is one of the oldest fields of collective European policy, dating back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Since then collective European development policy has been framed by long-term agreements (Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou) with the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) group of states. These agreements traditionally focus on economic aspects and are often subject to influences outside the immediate relations between the EC/EU and the ACP-countries, like the European integration processes, broader geopolitical changes, and WTO regulations.
The first section of this chapter reviews conceptual approaches for the definition of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows. It subsequently sets those in a context of elaborations on Europe’s preferences for operating within a civilianized international system and distinguishes between different categories of European power. The second section addresses the nature of the international development industry and Europe’s role in it. This research project, however, is not primarily development-focussed in a sense that it deals with how to generate ‘development’; the focus is on constructions, projections and perceptions of Europe’s collective role in the world. I will therefore not review the development literature\(^{25}\) comprehensively here. However, considering that my project took place in a development context I will introduce some conceptual approaches that touch on wider issues relevant to the interaction between ‘developed’ Europe and ‘developing’ East Africa. As part thereof, this section will also briefly review the history of collective European development policy as well as identify differences in the underlying factors and interests.

3.1 Constructions of geopolitical space and European power

3.1.1 Structures, processes and flows of geopolitical space

In problematizing the re-envisioning of global space at the end of the twentieth century and in developing an agenda for critical geopolitics in the twenty-first century, let us remember that geopolitics is a complex phenomenon embedded in multiple, overlapping networks of power within contemporary states. (Ó Tuathail 1996, 256)

Duchêne’s notion of “functional spheres of influence” serves as a starting point here for conceptualising a modified understanding of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows. This is more concerned with historical, political, and social processes leading to the constitution of such space, as well as with structural relations between the

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\(^{25}\) For useful reviews see (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; Simon 2006b; Chari and Corbridge 2008)
players in it, than it is with territorial demarcation. Geopolitics, in Ó Tuathail (1996, 72) words, “is best studied in its messy historical con-textuality”, it is thus “a point of intervention into a multiplicity of different con-textualities” (ibid, 183). Just as the civilian power debate has always intensified at times of geopolitical change and uncertainty (see Chapter II), the fundamental changes in international politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s led a number of political geographers to engage with the evolving constitution of post-Cold War geopolitical space. In light of those changes Agnew and Corbridge (1989, 267) point out that the "1980s [were] a time of crisis in geopolitics precisely because as an old world order [was] dying and a new one [had] not yet been born”. Geopolitics, in their words, is thus “an active process of constituting the world order rather than an accounting of permanent geographical constraints”.

The changing nature of the geopolitical system has created what Agnew (Agnew 1994; Agnew and Corbridge 1995) calls a ‘territorial trap’. Agnew and Corbridge suggest that “a changing global economic geography is exploding the fixity of the territorial states and is thereby creating a trap for those who want to build timeless models upon rapidly shifting foundations” (8). Even though the nation-state remains a central component of the

Agnew (1994, 55) outlines two different ways of understanding space in social sciences: a territorial and a structural. The former views space as a “series of blocks defined by state territorial boundaries”. In the latter, the spatial effects of geographic entities “result from their interaction or relationship within one another. For example, an industrial core area is paired with a resource periphery in a structural relationship of superiority/subordination”. In the following it will be outlined how a structural understanding of space is essential for the conceptualisation of European space in the context of this research project. However, this is not to imply that the territorial dimension is irrelevant to configurations and manifestations of geopolitical space. In fact Elden (2005) argues that globalisation must not be understood as a de-territorialisation process rather as a reconfiguration of territory and space. In the European context, in particular the evolving nature of European borders, both internal and external, have significant territorial dimensions. In this context see Houtum, Kramsch, and Ziehhofer (2005) and Houtum (2009). Also EU external relations maintain significant territorial and state-focussed components. EC development policy, for instance, is predominantly focused on cooperation with nation-states and the promotion of regional integration is dependent on degrees of territorial proximity and cohesion. Taking these territorial dimensions into account, I argue that territorial configurations or the nation-state as an actor retain their relevance, yet I seek to emphasise the importance of other factors, such as structures, processes and flows of interaction, for the shaping of the international system and the relations of different actors in it. Useful overviews of the related debates are provided by Agnew (2003) and Dodds (2005, 2007a)
geopolitical system, they argue, the territorial fixation looses relevance in favour of a historical-structural conception of space more concerned with processes, interactions and flows. Such “new representations of the division and patterning of global space” have come along with the “changing ways in which the international political economy operates (new patterns of flows, transfers and interactions)” (7). In addition, the territorial trap extends to understandings and theorisations of the international system. Mainstream international relations theory, Agnew argues (1994, 76), is trapped by conceptions of “fixed territorial spaces” and hence incapable of adequately capturing “the world that is in the process of emergence”. Geographical assumptions frequently produce state centred accounts of the international political economy in which space, occupied by states, is timeless; theorising is thus put beyond historical processes (ibid, 72). Agnew (1994, 77) concludes that

In idealizing the territorial state we cannot see a world in which its role and meaning change. In international relations theory territorial space has most definitely conquered time. Only historical-geographical consciousness can release us from its dead hand.

With a focus on the international political economy, Ó Tuathail (1996, 229-230) points to a “gradual dissolution of national economic space” and places that “are denationalized and globalized by transnational flows”. Territorial economies are thus beginning to “come apart and bifurcate into zones connected to global webs and flows [...] and zones outside and disconnected from legal global webs and flows”. Accordingly the territoriality of global affairs, in Ó Tuathail (1996, 238) words, is “no longer one of competing, segmented, and discretely sovereign nation-states but a territoriality shaped by global flows”. In the literature on policy network analysis similar processes are described as a “system of deterritorialized regulation” (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004, 109); referring to the detachment of power and spheres of influence from territory.

The discussion of ‘geopolitics’ therefore needs to move “away from the fixed effects of a limiting or determining global physical geography to an understanding of geographies as
socially constructed in different historical epochs” (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, xi). Geopolitics, Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992, 192) suggest, should “be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics”. Inspired by the work of Joseph Nye (1990a; 1990b) and others, Agnew and Corbridge (1995, 4-5) thus understand geopolitics as the

division of global space by institutions (states, firms, social movements, international organizations, armed forces, terrorist groups, etc.) into discrete territories and spheres of political-economic influence through which the international political economy is regulated materially and represented intellectually as a natural order of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’, ‘friendly’ and ‘threatening’ areas. It is that set of socially constructed, rather than naturally given, practices and ideas through which the international political economy is realized geographically.

Accordingly geopolitical space, in the words of Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998a, 2-3), is not demarcated by national boundaries, but “implicated in the ongoing social reproduction of power and the political economy”. It is evolving over time in a process of social, cultural and political practices. Geopolitics in the sense of critical geopolitics therefore is not a fixed or rigid construct but “bears witness to the irredeemable plurality of space and the multiplicity of possible political constructions of space”.

Any actor seeking to exercise power in such a system of geopolitical space needs to focus on the ability to influence transnational flows and through them the processes and structures through which such geopolitical space is constructed and projected. The structure of the international system thereby sets the framework for certain processes constituted by a variety of flows within them. Within such a system it becomes “a crucial attribute of power, perhaps as vital as juridico-legal sovereignty” to have “open and unconstrained access to flows, not closed domination of places” (Luke 1993, 239). According to Luke (1993) such flows are
decentering, despatializing, and dematerializing forces, and they work alongside and against the geopolitical codes of spatial sovereignty. (240)
[They] form new sites or project new spaces, beyond political jurisdiction, where now ideas, techniques, symbols, images of money speak in their own structuralizing codes. (238)

With respect to the networked nature of the European polity, Barry (1996) points to the possibility of Europe developing into an “empire without centre” (30), characterised by “a surface of mobile and unstable linkages operating across a space within which national forms of regulation have become increasingly disrupted” (36). For the EU’s actorness and global presence in the field of development cooperation, such a politically and socially constructed, largely deterritorialised and networked space could signify that “the European sphere of influence is to be extended by networking, externally as well as internally” (Barry 1996, 35). “New spaces of flows [... thereby] dominate old spaces of places [...] because they provide a flexibility in activity that can simply by-pass fixed assets in territories”. Geographically, social interaction then takes place in hubs and nodes which is where “transnational social organization is constructed” (Taylor 2004b, 267). ‘Space’ in the sense of ‘sphere of influence’ is thus modified; it becomes increasingly detached from fixed territory and can be projected wherever those networks operate.

In these contexts, my research explores the projection of a particular version of geopolitical space, i.e. European space, in the development hub of the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. Critical geopolitics provides a discourse-centred approach that interrogates narratives and meanings of a variety of geopolitical articulations of formal, practical and popular accounts. Martin Müller (2008) has recently called for a critical geopolitics that engages more thoroughly with “language and practice”. In this manner, this thesis goes beyond textual analysis to examine the EU’s geopolitical role and function in the context of the international development industry through participant observation and interviews with key figures.
3.1.2 Geopolitical space and Europe’s civilianized international system

The European project, according to Sidaway (2001, 746), “embodies a particular geographical imagination of European space as connected/mobile/networked”. In a similar context, however, with a focus on a New Spirit of German Geopolitics Bach and Peters point to “a widening tension between the spatial, territorial nation-state based geopolitics of ‘spheres’ and the temporal, globalised geopolitics of ‘flows’”. German geopolitical outlook in the first half of the twentieth century, they argue, was bound to the idea of spheres of influence, mainly in Eastern Europe. The ‘new geopolitics’, however, embedded in the networked European polity, intimates the arrival of flows of influences, where Germany is more concerned with seeking international influence through the shaping of norms and supporting its commercial activities than controlling adjacent territory. Within this new Mittellage it is Europe, not Germany, that gains the contours of a ‘civilian world power’ (zivile Weltmacht) lead [sic] by Germany (from the second row, but lead [sic] nonetheless), preferably with its own permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Germany’s recent push to have its candidate lead the IMF coincides with a concern about shaping norms more than merely asserting power. (Bach and Peters 2002, 10)

Leaving aside their argument on German geopolitics, underpinning Bach and Peters’ understanding of geopolitical space in terms of ‘flows of influence’ is its complementarity with civilian power ideas. Such complementarity is particularly well demonstrated in the European context and the process of constructing European space. ‘Civilian power’ as an analytical tool and a geopolitical vision for an integrated/integrating Europe has been a significant contribution to the construction of a specific European version of geopolitical space. However, the construction of such space could also not have occurred outside geopolitical conditions evolving around structures, processes and flows. An exclusively territorial, nation-state fixed configuration of geopolitical space based on the assumption of an anarchic international system characterised by Realpolitik would render civilian power ideas largely irrelevant,
unsuitable as analytical tool and to be only a vision. ‘Civilian power’ cannot operate in such an environment; it needs regulated spaces of interaction, a ‘domesticated’ or ‘civilianized’ international system. Within the EU such a system has largely materialised because Europe(ans) produced it in an attempt to overcome the disaster of two World Wars. It embodies those historical experiences, was influenced by the geopolitical constellation of the Cold War and has been shaped by internal political and social preferences for the future of the EC/EU. Key to its construction was the bundling of certain interests of its member states27, which have gradually transferred certain ‘civilian’ interests to the supranational entity of the EC/EU, whereas ‘non-civilian’ aspirations largely remained in national policy domains. The EU therefore exemplifies core aspects of the civilian power concept, in particular the willingness of nation-states to cede sovereignty in favour of supranational integration. Policy conduct and spaces of interaction within the Union are highly multilateral and institutionalised as well as based on the rule of law and values which have commonly been agreed upon. Formal trade barriers within the Union have long been abolished and the use of military force is virtually irrelevant as a means for international politics within the European Union.

After the experience of developing, shaping and materialising a networked “polity and space of connection, movement and interdependence” (Bachmann and Sidaway 2009b, 94), the projection of such space onto the wider international system is intrinsic to the EU’s geopolitical agenda as this constitutes the preferred environment for the EU to operate in (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005, 538). There the EU also has a considerable head-start compared to other players in the international system. In this context, Holden (2009) argues that through its external relations the EU aims to “develop structures ultimately favourable to Europe” (14), a mode of “global governance conducive to its model of operation and its values” (17). In fact, the EU depends on this because its ways of power projection lie within the structures of such a

27 See in this context the literature on European Political Cooperation (Allen, Rummel, and Wessels 1982)
system. The production of a geopolitical space in line with Europe’s internally developed space, a civilianized international system, therefore becomes key to European geopolitical practices. This is asserted not only in the relevant literatures but also in all official EU documents (see above and Chapters II and V). In the case of Kenya, for instance, the EC-Kenya strategy paper for the period 2008-2013 affirms that the EU “will achieve genuine coherence between its domestic and its external agendas, contributing thereby to global security and prosperity” (EC 2007e, 1). In this context Ó Tuathail (1996, 185) describes the problematic of ‘geo-politics’ as

the politics of the production of global political space by dominant intellectuals, institutions, and practitioners of statecraft in practices that constitute "global politics." How is global political space envisioned and scripted by these actors? How are certain constellations of geopolitical meaning congealed around global visions like lebensraum, the Cold War, the New World Order, or global anarchy?

For this research, Ó Tuathail’s questions might be extended to the civilian power debate as a European geopolitical project: How does an integrating Europe envision its version of global political space? How is it producing/projecting such space? Which geopolitical meanings are congealed around the civilian power discourse and a civilianized international system?

Furthermore, for Ó Tuathail (1996, 185), the ‘problematic of geo-politics’ continues:

How, in sum, is geographical discourse governmentalized in the practices of statecraft by centers of authority and power? How is the spinning globe disciplined by a fixed "imperial" perspective, by mapping projects that reduce the indeterminancy of place to a homogenized surface of space?

The key point made here by Ó Tuathail is that geopolitical space is produced; its constitution is subject to historical processes and ongoing social, cultural and political constructions and re-productions. The processes of producing geopolitical space along with the structures in which they are embedded as well as the flows that constitute them are intrinsic to the civilian power debate initiated by Duchêne’s vision of ‘functional spheres of influence’. This informs the understanding of geopolitical space as it is used here to conceptualise European ‘space’ and the EU’s role as a geopolitical actor (see Chapter V).
3.1.3 Categories of European power

Categorisations of the EU’s role in the international system are manifold and diverse (see Chapter II). A wide variety of terms is thereby used to described the nature of the EU as a global actor, such as civilian, normative, or ethical power, Empire, trade superpower, or ‘economic giant but political pygmy’ (Freres 2000; Ginsberg 2001; Grimm 2002; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Farrel 2005; Hyde-Price 2006; Manners 2002; Sjursen 2006; Zielonka 2006; Teló 2006; Bialasiewicz 2008). The civilian power approach presented in Chapter II allows the flexibility of including other approaches such as Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006) concept of ‘actorness’ or Boulding’s (1989) approach of ‘integrative power’.

Over the past decade relations with developing countries have not only increasingly moved in the focus of the ‘West’ but also of countries such as China, India and the richer parts of the Arab world. On the one hand this has been influenced by the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in September 2000, events such as the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (2002) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002), as well as the development focus of the British EU and G8 presidency in 2005 (Nixson 2007; Carbone 2007). On the other hand concerns over the implications of failing and failed states have also contributed to the (renewed) interest of the ‘West’ in developing countries (Duffield 2001, 2007). In addition, the emerging markets in other parts of the world, in particular the BRIC-group (Brazil, Russia, India, China), have challenged the hitherto largely unrivalled Western access to resources in the developing world and are increasingly posing a competition to the ‘West’ with respect to resource exploitation and political influence in other developing countries (Taylor and Williams 2004; Mohan and Power 2009). For European development policy, the key focus is thereby on sub-Saharan Africa (Michel 2006, 4).
Relations with developing countries have long been a playing field for major powers to manifest their capability of global actorness and influence. Such actorness and influence, however, is less exercised through traditional means of military power, rather through ways of structural, integrative and soft power\(^{28}\) (Boulding 1989; Keohane and Nye 1989; Nye 1990a; Strange 1994; Holden 2009). In this context Flint (2004, 366) emphasises that

Instead of a realist fixation upon military strength, the ability to exert power across the globe requires the political vision to construct a geopolitical project that will gain international support as well as the political will to carry it out. [...] It will also require belief in the need and the value of a global civilizing mission.

This articulates with Europe’s geopolitical understanding, as described in the civilian power discourse (see Chapter II), and differs considerably from neo-conservative ‘great power’ articulations that possessed significant influence on the American Bush-administration (2000-2008). One of its proponents, Robert Kagan (2003, 3), for instance contrasts the differences in the European and American perceptions of power in the international system.

Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”. The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.

Kagan basically ascribes soft power as the political medium for Europe and hard power as the one for the United States. The distinction between civilian power and great power, however, is different. Drawing on Dahl’s (1957) earlier work on power Keohane and Nye (1989, 11) principally think of power as “the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Power can also be conceived in terms of control over outcomes”. Nye outlines three ways of exercising power with respect to affecting the behaviour of others. First, coercing with threats (sticks). Second, inducing with

\(^{28}\) See also Section 2.1.3 and discussion of civilian power as medium.
payments (carrots). Third, attracting or co-opting so that a power’s own goals are appealing to others and considered legitimate (Nye 1990a). Soft power refers to the third option and tries to make others act in a certain way by convincing them of the attraction of one’s own goals.

Hard power and soft power are thus mechanisms and ways to exercise power in the international system. Great powers and civilian powers on the other hand are actors, although civilian power can also refer to a concept that describes their behaviour or a medium through which power is exercised (civilian power as power, concept and medium; see Section 2.1.3). It can be argued that great powers tend to employ more hard power whereas civilian powers generally prefer to operate through soft power. Nonetheless, both great powers and civilian powers employ both hard power and soft power. Classifying a great power as hard power and a civilian power as soft power is thus inadequate. Even though norms and values are important components, civilian powers do not exclusively conduct foreign policy norm-driven or through the use of soft policy. Hard power – in the form of economic or political coercion, under certain circumstances also military power – is not absent to civilian powers.

Nonetheless, civilian powers tend to favour multilateral and cooperative policy conduct (civilian power as medium). Given Europe’s imperial history, Boulding’s (1989) concept of ‘integrative power’ is particularly relevant in the development context. It is similar to Nye’s concept of soft power and refers to power deriving from legitimacy, respect and consensual integration into a system portrayed as beneficial for all. Boulding (1989, 10) outlines three faces of power:

- threat power, economic power, and integrative power – the stick, the carrot, and the hug. These are closely related to another tripartite division: the power to destroy, the power to produce and exchange, and the power to integrate, that is, the power to create such relationships as love, respect, friendship, legitimacy, and so on.

Integrative power essentially produces legitimacy for the exercise and projection of all three kinds of power. Without integrative power, the other two faces of power will thus become ineffective, which causes a decline in overall power:
Integrative power is an elusive and multidimensional concept that is very hard to quantify, yet it has a strong claim to be in the last analysis, the most significant of the three major categories or power. Without some sort of legitimacy, which is an aspect of integrative power, neither threat nor economic power can be realized in any large degree. (ibid, 109)

Foreign policy conduct based on multilateralism and international cooperation is therefore the logical means to enhance integrative power. In this context Nye (2003, xiv-xv) points to the failure of military power to “produce the outcomes we want on many of the issues that matter to Americans”. As such America is not only “bound to lead, but bound to cooperate”. In particular during the presidency of George W. Bush a variety of texts appeared that outlined (and often overstated) the United States’ failure and Europe’s success in this respect (Kupchan 2003; Rifkin 2004; Reid 2005; Leonhard 2005; McCormick 2007). Moravcsik (2002), for instance argues, that Europeans already wield effective power over peace and war as great as that of the United States, but they do so quietly, through “civilian power.” That does not lie in the deployment of battalions or bombers, but rather in the quiet promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping.

However, the EC/EU’s role and its power in the world, in particular towards developing countries, have also been subject to substantial criticism, almost ever since collective foreign policy started to emerge. As early as 1973 and in light of the first enlargement of the European Community the Norwegian intellectual Johan Galtung (1973) criticised the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions (see next section) between the EC and its former colonies as neo-imperialism through structural domination (Holden 2009, 127). Generally, Galtung was sceptical towards the early European integration efforts. Even though far from an outright rejection of European integration, Galtung called for a critical engagement with the development of the European Community in order to prevent it from becoming an imperial superpower. The opening lines of his 1973 book clearly expressed his reservations about the rising power of an integrating Europe:
These years and months, every week and every day, a new superpower is gradually taking shape in Western Europe: the European Community (EC). This is a long and problematic process. (Galtung 1973, 11)

His basic concern was that European countries would not be able to overcome their imperial past and that they would be tempted to transfer their inherent imperial ambitions to the newly created polity. Galtung recalled how within the two decades since the end of World War Two, six Western European powers lost their colonies: Germany (in Eastern Europe), France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Britain. Furthermore, during the same time the centres of imperialism had shifted away from Europe to Washington and Moscow. Europe itself became more or less colonised by the superpowers. European integration, according to Galtung (1973, 16), is therefore an attempt of Western European countries to “take five broken empires, add a sixth one later [Britain], and make one big neo-colonial empire out of it all”. With respect to the common market, “it is considerably more than a ‘market’: it is a struggle for power, for world power for Western Europe” (ibid, 17). The European Community is thus “an effort to turn history backwards and give rebirth to the old world structure” (ibid, 29) by recreating:

1) A Eurocentric world, a world with its center in Europe,
2) A unicentric Europe, a Europe with center in the West. (ibid, 12)

Those efforts are part of Europe's imperial history, which the EC will be incapable of shedding of, but will use in a new, even more intense, way instead: “The traditional arrogance of European states will grow to the level of super-arrogance to be expected from a European super-state” (ibid, 122)

However, on the one hand Galtung takes a positive stance towards some effects of European integration. With regard to the effects in Western Europe, he asserts that internally the community has very successfully promoted equality and peace amongst its members. He is also supportive of a strong European stance against imperial practices of the United States in
both Europe and other parts of the world. In this context Europe could provide ideas to other countries “as to how a group of countries can defend itself effectively against economic aggression from a giant”. On the other hand, he also warns that “what the EC has done relative to the US may well turn out to be what other countries will have to do relative to the EC – but are prevented from doing by EC divisive tactics” (ibid, 59). Just as he regards the power and imperial practices of the superpowers as dangerous, he also affirms that

the power of the European Community is not less dangerous, it is only a different kind. It is the power of an economic system that moves people, commodities, and money around, creating centers and peripheries, enriching the former and impoverishing the latter (ibid, 154)

Such a development, however, will eventually lead to counterforces undermining the power of the dominant, exploiting political entity. At the time of Galtung’s writing he saw the EC as such a counterforce contributing to the relative decline in the power status of the US. However, at the same time it was developing comparable imperial structures that would eventually trigger the development of counterforces against itself. Galtung concludes with the speculation that it might be the most positive outcome of the European Community to stimulate counterforces against Western, white dominance “that might one day lead to a more equitable, more diversified world” (ibid, 158).
3.2 The EU as an actor in the field of development cooperation

3.2.1 Critical approaches to development

Development projects, limited in time and space, occupy certain landscapes to turn them into exemplars, the local territories of ‘development space’, localized manifestations of a worldwide complex system [...] Development practitioners see the need to make examples out of certain landscapes, to fashion them into facsimile-in-miniature of what the global development machine can achieve. A development organization’s territory thus takes on certain strong qualitative differences from ‘normal’ (‘disorganized’) landscapes, and effects in a certain way an iconographic space. (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 180)

A key approach for conceptualising relations between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ parts of the world is based on the work of the American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989) and came to be known as world-systems theory (later world-systems analysis). Heavily influenced by the dependency theory of development and the work of Andre Gunder Frank (1967, 1969, 1979) Wallerstein further elaborated on the relations between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ in a world system\(^\text{29}\) of production and accumulation. Wallerstein argued that the historical-geographical structure of core-periphery relations need to be examined as parts of one integrated world system over long time periods and in light of the evolution of capitalism in the world economy. In this world system, economic strength and flexibility are the key parameters for political power and the division between core and periphery. Politics and economic are thus considered inseparable\(^\text{30}\).


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\(^{29}\) In his early writings, a world system comprises the area that can be economically controlled by less than 60 days travel and bulk good transportation: ‘the 60-day European world-economy’ (Wallerstein 1974, 38). Wallerstein essentially defines three zones of the world-economy: the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery (Wallerstein 1974, 63). In addition, there is an ‘external arena’: parts of the world outside the world-economy under consideration.

\(^{30}\) In this context also see Foucault's work on governmentality (Foucault 1991).
Chhachhi and Herrera 2007). Criticising the ways that the “logic of the market has been extended to the operation of state functions” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 989), post-developmentalist calls “development” in general into question. Development, according to Rahnema (1997, 379), is

an ideology that was born and refined in the North, mainly to meet the needs of the dominant powers in search of a more ‘appropriate’ tool for their economic and geopolitical expansion. [...] In fact, the ideology helped a dying and obsolete colonialism to transform itself into an aggressive – even sometimes an attractive – instrument able to recapture lost ground.

Similarly, Kothari (1988, 143) argues that “where colonialism left off, development took over” and Stirrat (2000, 32-33) considers development workers as the heirs of colonial administrators and missionaries.

A key figure of these discourses, Arturo Escobar, criticises development for depriving the Third World of the sovereignty of free thought by imposing a reality, external to the Third World, through “regimes of power” determined by Western science, thought and knowledge. According to Escobar, by so doing “development colonized reality, it became reality” (Escobar 1992, 414-415). He continues to describe development as an invention of modernity to modernise the Third World (Escobar 2004, 15) and as prescriptions for the Third World to join the First World in the form of a “powerful and encompassing discourse which has ruled most social design and actions” (Escobar 1992, 411). In his view, development has functioned as a mechanism for the production and management of the Third World in the post-war period. It has done so through the systematic elaboration of fields of knowledge and institutions which made possible the establishment in the Third World of forms of power through which individuals, government officials, and, sometimes, whole communities recognized themselves as underdeveloped, as unfinished manifestations of a European ideal. [...] They constituted a system for organizing the production of truth about the Third World. The knowledge so produced made possible the exercise of power in novel ways. Conversely, once Third World countries became the target of new mechanisms of power, their economies, societies, and cultures were offered up as new objects of knowledge. The result of the functioning of this dynamic apparatus has been not less than the mapping of the Third World, the production of the specific social and economic configurations which we recognize today as underdevelopment. (ibid, 413-414)
As a result of this general rejection of development, many post-development authors are “not interested in Development alternatives, but rather in alternatives to Development” (ibid, 417). Simon (2006a, 12) argues that “the whole thrust of anti- and post-development is precisely the rejection of the existing institutions and procedures; that they cannot be reformed and need replacement and reorientation, and that mainstream multilateral poverty eradication strategies become diluted and ineffective”.

This complete rejection of development without any differentiations between approaches, however, is also a frequent criticism directed at the post-development school. In this context Simon (2006a, 12-13) points out that

‘Development’ has always been far more heterogeneous in discourse, policy and practice than implied by the universalizing claims of many anti- and post-development writers. Such assertions also take little account of the many millions of people who have benefited and others whose legitimate aspirations for a better quality of life and more sustainable livelihoods are bound up with progressive and appropriate visions and programmes of development. Popular protests, said to represent a rejection of development per se, are usually reactions to the specific, non-participatory interventions that threaten or undermine lives, livelihoods and environments in the name of ‘development’ through displacement by large dam schemes, corporate greed and the like.

Similarly, Pieterse (2000, 181) argues that the “record of development is mixed but does include achievements (as noted in human development), so what is the point of rejecting it in toto? In many ways the line between alternative and post-development is quite thin, again except for the rejection of development”. Alternative development, Pieterse suggests, has successfully contributed to new practices and a redefinition of development goals, which have been adopted by mainstream development. As an example of the inclusion of such alternative development approaches he mentions the commonly accepted view that development efforts are more successful when there is participation on the grassroots level, and the breakdown of regulation (Pieterse 1998, 344). As a result, the distinction between alternative and mainstream development are reduced and many of the early post-development critiques of development are being qualified. Simon (2006a, 13), for example, asserts that it is less a total
rejection of development that can be experienced in the South, but rather a more “nuanced rejection of unwanted state imposition as ‘oppression’”.

With respect to the role of the state in ‘development’ the work of the American anthropologist James Ferguson is particularly instructive. In his earlier work on development practices in Lesotho, Ferguson (1990, 255) argued that

the ‘development’ apparatus in Lesotho is not a machine for eliminating poverty that is incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy; it is a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which incidentally takes ‘poverty’ as its point of entry – launching an intervention that may have no effect on the poverty but does in fact have other concrete effects.

The development apparatus and the state, thus, ‘depoliticise’ problems to purely technical issues, obscuring political effects and implications of development intervention. By so doing politics are suspended from highly political operations, which leads Ferguson (1990, 251-277) to label the development apparatus as The Anti-Politics Machine. Ferguson thus initially critiqued the development apparatus as a mechanism for increasing bureaucratic state power (as opposed to reducing poverty). In his later work, however, Ferguson shifted focus to consider a complex system of networked transnational actors that is progressively taking over state functions (Ferguson and Gupta 2002)\(^{31}\). Ferguson and Gupta therefore suggest the need to extend the discussion of governmentality to modes of government that are being set up on a global scale. These include not only strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by the WTO and the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF, but also transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots organizations supported by complex networks of international and transnational funding and personnel. The outsourcing of the function of the state to NGOs and other ostensible nonstate agencies, we argue, is a key feature, not only of the operation of national states, but of an emerging system of transnational governmentality (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 990)

As a result of such transnational governmentality, according to Ferguson and Gupta (2002, 992), most African states are

\(^{31}\) In this context see also Frederick Cooper’s notion of the ‘gatekeeper’ state (Cooper 2002).
ruled, in significant part, by transnational organizations that are not themselves governments, but work together with powerful First World states within a global system of nation-states that Frederick Cooper has characterized as ‘international imperialism’. [...] Perhaps most familiar, international agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, together with allied banks and First World governments today often directly impose policies in African states. [...] Rather significantly and specific aspects of state policy, in other words, are for many African countries, being directly formulated in places like New York, London, Brussels, and Washington.

The projection of such externally formulated policies frequently occurs through transnational development networks. According to Bebington (2003, 300) those are “networks through which people, ideas and resources circulate and in which material interventions in particular locations are conceptualised and executed”. In further work Bebington and Kothari (2006) argue that those networks are often determined by personal relations and social interaction, but nonetheless are structured by the broader institutional and social processes of the people involved (see also McFarlane 2006).

Within such networks, ideas and normative arguments about development are debated and translated into intentional forms of intervention; resources are negotiated and distributed; and orthodoxies about ‘best practice’ are formed and challenged. At the same time [...] the forms taken by such development networks, the ideas that circulate within them, and their geographical manifestations can only be understood in the light of the prior social and institutional networks out of which they emerged and/or onto which they grafted their activities [...] reflecting on development networks might [thus] be useful for exploring social relations and interactions over time and across space. (Bebbington and Kothari 2006, 851-852)

Development cooperation is thus increasingly exercised through global networks operating in various locations (North or South) and through different actors (governmental and multilateral institutions, and NGOs). Clearly, the European development industry is part of these networks.

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3.2.2 Fifty years of collective European development policy

The giving of aid and the relationship between donor and recipient countries raise a number of complex issues and pose problems which have no simple solutions. EU aid is no exception in this respect. (Nixson 2007, 349)

European development policy is one of the oldest fields of collective European policy conduct, with origins dating back to the Treaty of Rome which first articulated collective European approaches in relations with African countries. Mainly due to French and Belgium pressure, the treaty included clauses demanding contributions of other EEC members to financial provisions towards the (former) colonies (Dialer 2007, 45). In this context, Holden points (2009, 126) out that

as the French Union faded France promoted a structural relationship between its ex-colonies and the EU as a part (and only one part) of its continued influence. The overlap between the origins of EU development policy and European colonial projects gives ready ammunition to critics of the EU’s role in Africa, but this historical conjuncture is not in itself proof of neo-imperialism.

In 1949, the French Minister for Reconstruction claimed that “Europa mag seine frühere Prosperität nur wiederzugewinnen, wenn es all seine materiellen und kulturellen Kräfte Afrikawidmet. Gemeinsam muss Europa diesen Kontinent erschließen und ausrüsten...”33. With respect to the European, in particular German, focus on the ‘Heartland’ during the war, the French Resident-General to Morocco argued similarly “Pour nous, pour l’Union Française, pour l’Union Européenne, l’Atlas doit être l’Oural et l’Afrique la Sibérie”34 (quoted from Zischka 1951, 60). Both quotes are taken from a book by the Austrian geopolitical writer Anton Zischka

33 The quote is taken from Zischka (1951, 60) where it appears in German. It can be translated as: Europe can only regain its prosperity if it dedicates all its material and cultural efforts to Africa. Jointly Europe has to develop and supply this continent...
34 The quote is also taken from Zischka (1951, 60) but appears there in French. It can be translated as: For us, for the French Union, for the European Union, the Atlas mountains have to be the Urals and Africa Siberia.
that appeared in 1951 under the title: *Afrika - Europas Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Nr. 1*. Zischka, clearly frustrated by Europe’s, in particular Germany’s, diminished global role behind the superpowers, is captivated by those arguments of a bright joint European future; independent and freed from anglo-american ‘Westernisation’ just as from Sovietisation. In the light of the superpower rivalry, the only possibility for a neutral, prosperous and peaceful Europe is its orientation to Africa and to create what he calls *Eurafrika*, “the most centrally located third of the earth”; essentially what Haushofer (1938) had roughly described as a Eurafrikan pan-region (see also O'Loughlin and Van der Wusten 1990).

Figure 1 shows how Zischka cartographically emphasised *Eurafrika* as a ‘naturally’ given unity; conveniently also including the resource rich parts of Western Asia. Whilst Zischka did not occupy any political position and there is no evidence that his work had any significant political impact, his journalistic books enjoyed great popularity and illustrated popular imaginations about Europe’s collective role towards Africa at the time collective development policy started to emerge.

**Figure 1: Zischka's *Eurafrika*: The most centrally located third of the Earth**

Source: Zischka (1951, 2)

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35 *Africa – Europe’s common duty No. 1.*
The early agreements in the Treaty of Rome resulted in the signing of the first European Development Fund (EDF) in 1958 as the “first attempt to communitise aid” (Carbone 2007, 51). The following ‘association agreement’ eventually led to the signing of the Yaoundé Convention between the six countries of the European Economic Community and the 18 countries of the group of Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) in 1963. The Yaoundé Convention was reworked and renewed in 1969 (Yaoundé II), however, with the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community in 1973, a modification of collective European development policy became necessary to include former British colonies. During the accompanying discussions on the future shape of European relations with developing countries two opposing views emerged. On the one hand, the ‘regionalists’ (mainly France) favoured a continuation of the contractual association of former colonies to Europe and to extend this to former British colonies. On the other hand, the ‘globalists’ (mainly Germany and the Netherlands) preferred to replace the existing association agreements with an approach to global development policy (Dialer 2007, 45-50). After a long debate, the Council eventually adopted recommendations to the Member States to engage in more comprehensive information exchange without any binding commitments. For Grilli (1993, 82), the debate “must have been so negative that no further action in the field of aid harmonisation and co-ordination was proposed in any of the subsequent documents on development policies” (see also Carbone 2007, 52).

In 1973, however, negotiations commenced in Brussels for a new agreement between the EC and the 43 countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP), that had just been consolidated under Nigerian leadership. These negotiations led to the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1975 that was praised at a turning point in global North-South relations in a sense that it moved EC-ACP relations away from dependent ‘association agreements’ to

‘partnership’ and ‘cooperation’ (Dialer 2007, 50-51). Over the next 25 years, the Lomé Convention was renegotiated and renewed every five years (Lomé I-IV); by the time it was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, it had developed into a comprehensive and long-term interaction framework including the 15 countries of the European Union and 71 ACP-states. The Lomé Conventions were characterised by aid and trade preferences for former colonies of European countries and as such limited in both geographical and policy scope. When the foundation of the European Union in 1993 established the basis for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the EU “wanted to evolve into a global actor and EC external assistance became an ideal tool. The EC become actively involved in all regions of the developing world, but this generated an overstretched and fragmented policy”. The Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union – TEU) thereby laid the “foundations for a change of directions, establishing the principles of co-ordination and complementarity and granting the European Commission the role of promoter of aid co-ordination” (Carbone 2007, 58-59).

These changes had a profound impact on European relations with developing countries. The section on development cooperation in the TEU 37 reaffirmed the principles of complementarity of European development policies and the global economic integration of developing countries. Article 130u reads:

1. Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster:
   - the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;
   - the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
   - the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.

2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

3. The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations.

Part of these processes of ‘europeanising’ and ‘complementarising’ European external relations was to successively align trade relations with developing countries in the general agreements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This was in line with the general preference of the EU to push for global trade liberalisation. Relations with Africa were envisioned to be more aligned with globalization and strategic concerns, such as dealing with those demarcated as failed states, migration and access to resources. Europe’s major role in ‘development’ in Africa would thus be to “support partners to engage in liberal economic reforms, through aid conditionality and free trade” (Holden 2009, 127). In many cases, however, these new arrangements meant an end to the Lomé era of preferential and non-reciprocal trade arrangements for ACP-countries towards the EU. The European side frequently presented this as necessary in order to comply with WTO rules, although the EU was a major force in shaping these rules in the first place (Gibb 2000). Hurt (2003, 161) argues that

the new approach taken by the EU can be understood within the context of the hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism within political elites. This is most explicitly demonstrated by the EU’s major justification for the proposed changes: the need to comply with the core principles and rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) […] a strategic attempt by the EU to externalise responsibility for its own policy (174)

The trade concessions of the Lomé Conventions were extended for a period of eight years, after which trade would be based on the ‘Everything but Arms Initiative’ (EBA), the ‘General System of Preferences’ (GSP) or the ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’ (EPAs) (Holden 2009, 127-128).

These agreements have been signed, or are still being negotiated, in addition to the revised Cotonou Agreement of 2005 (EC 2006b) that currently constitutes the framework for EU-ACP relations. This indicates the extent of the evolution that these broad framework agreements have undergone since the Treaty of Rome. The first EDF and the Yaoundé convention were predominantly ‘association agreements’ for aid and trade. The subsequent
Lomé Conventions then increasingly included aspects of political partnership and cooperation, next to the remaining focus on economic aspects. When the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 it was praised as a “ACP-EC Partnership Agreement” that would – once again – mark “the beginning of a new era in the relationship between the ACP States and the European Union” (EC 2006b, 3) with a focus on poverty eradication and the MDGs (EPCC 2006a; Nixson 2007).

Although external relations of the EC towards the ACP-countries have always maintained a substantial economic component, the broad framework agreements (Lomé and Cotonou) have gradually included more ‘political’ aspects over time. Additional agreements became necessary, such as EBA, GSP or EPAs, to regulate economic and trade relations between the EU and different ACP countries and regions. In addition, European development policy now includes more specific agreements, such as the Joint Africa-EU strategy, that focus on political relations and development cooperation (see Chapter V).

Since the Treaty of Rome, Carbone (2007, 31) argues, “EC development policy has gradually progressed from a relationship with a few African countries to a global policy”. Through the entire time there has been a variety of different factors and interests influencing European development policy. These often prevent(ed) more coherence in the policies of different European development actors and are also often external to immediate relations between Europe and Africa.
Complementarity as an underlying principle of EU development policy not only requires the development policies of the EU to be complementary to those of the individual member states, but also to the broader CFSP of the EU as well as to the foreign policies of its member states. For European relations with Africa this means that EU development policies are constricted and determined by factors external to direct European-African interaction (SAIIA 2002, 114). As such the principle of complementarity causes several challenges to the formulation of European external relations as there are different interests and factors influencing foreign and development policy. In this context an important distinction is to be made between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ interests (see also Figure 15 in Section 6.2.1). Whilst ‘economic’ interests seek to influence EU external relations in favour of a maximisation of benefit for the European economy, ‘political’ interests seek to promote a civilianized international system and as such include components that aim to assist developing countries in economic, social and political ‘development’.

Generally, as Chapter II has illustrated, the belief in EU’s internal system of political-economic organisation also forms the basis for the ‘preferred world order to be projected externally’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005, 538). The development of interdependent structures and regulated spaces of interaction in Europe, have traditionally occurred first in the economic realm. In fact Duchêne (1994, 408) argued that “had the European Union not been forced to work through the economic medium, it might never have been the catchment area it has proved”. As a result Europe is ‘economically’ more integrated and speaks more with one voice than ‘politically’; also because external ‘economic’ relations are a collective policy field of the first pillar of the EU, the European Communtiy, whilst external ‘political’ relations remain largely a national policy domain. Through successive steps of economic integration, the EU has become the largest economy in the world with considerable power to influence the global
economic system. Collective European power on the global stage is thus predominantly economic. As such the ‘economic medium’ also constitutes a decisive influence on the conception of collective European external relations and, hence on, development policy. The economic medium, however, operates first and foremost for the promotion of European economic interests which often differ significantly from interests seeking to promote ‘development’ in African countries, given the different positions and roles of European and African economies.

In addition, unlike external economic policy, development policy is predominantly conducted bilaterally between EU member states and ‘partner’ countries. This is also expressed in quantitative terms of the financial volume allocated for development cooperation. The tenth European Development Fund (EDF) totals an ODA of € 22.682 bn for the years 2008 to 2013\(^3\), whereas the combined total ODA of the three largest contributors, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, was valued at € 25.148 bn for 2008\(^3\) alone. Hence, considering that economic policy is largely integrated as part of the EU’s first pillar whereas development policy is relatively fragmented and partly remains in the policy domains of the member states and that collective European power on a global scale is predominantly ‘economic’, it is no surprise that for the conception of EC development policy, administered by the Commission, economic interests feature more prominently.

This is not to say that economic interests exclusively determine collective European development policy. Clearly there are ‘political’ and developmentally-oriented interests that aim to improve economic, political and social conditions in Africa. The European integration process has long moved beyond a purely economic union to include aspects of political

\(^3\) [http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/source-funding/10edf_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/source-funding/10edf_en.cfm) [06/08/2009]
integration and Europeanization in almost every policy field (Clark and Jones 2008; Graziano and Vink 2008). As such the EU has also developed interests beyond the economic. Official documents frequently communicate a sense of responsibility towards developing countries as part of the aspiration to manifest the EU as a key ‘partner’ of the Global South and a more significant global actor (EC 2007c). It can be argued that, based on its long (though often problematic) history with developing countries and as the largest donor of official development assistance (ODA), Europe would be well placed at the interface of global North-South relations. In 1993 Hill (1993, 311) emphasised the importance for the EC to be the “principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South [...] and the principal interlocuteur with the poor majority in the UN”.

In that context Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 136) point out that the EU has developed “models of partnership and cooperation” as well as institutions such as the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) that have “undoubtedly enhanced the reputation of the Union as a global actor”. Similarly, Holland (2002, 15) emphasises the potential for the EU to enhance is international status by arguing that “the EU has long held a desire to emerge as a global actor – both economic as well as political. The development agenda allows it to play such a political role through its economic power as the world’s largest trader”. In fact he regards development policy as central to the European integration process because

without external policies such as relations to the Third World, the ‘idea’ of Europe is diminished. The challenge for the EU is to harness its various external policy sectors to this end – to enhance the integration process. [...] However, the greatest challenge remains defining development policy as an exclusive EU competence and in making that policy a future success (Holland 2002, 244).

With the inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact countries of Central and Eastern Europe the EU has demonstrated its ability to include ‘weaker’ or ‘less developed’ countries into the world economy and its civilianized system, albeit clearly not exclusively for selfless reasons...
(see Baldwin et al. 1997; Agnew 2001; Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003; Kuus 2004; Schadler 2007). Yet, these processes produce a substantial appeal of the EU as a ‘helping hand’ towards other countries (See Chapter VII). Development policy, however, falls into a different category of external relations. The long-term frameworks for relations with the ACP-countries have traditionally been strongly determined by ‘economic’ interests (Gibb 2000, 2006; SAIIA 2002; Holland 2002); although more recently ‘political’ and developmentally-oriented interests appear to be gaining a stronger influence on European development policy (Carbone 2007; Holland 2008). However, given the asymmetries of global influence of the European Union in ‘economic’ and ‘political’ terms and the powerful role of the Commission in the ‘economic’ realm relative to the ‘political’, it is no surprise that the ‘economic medium’ looms large over collective external relations. In this context, Dodds (2000, 70) points out that “For many commentators in the South, the current penchant for securing ‘market access’ to the world economy will ensure that Northern states continue to exploit the vulnerable and poorer zones of the world economy”. In its fifty years of existence EU development policy has thus often served as a mode of foreign policy towards developing countries, aligned with the broader objectives of European geoeconomic power.
3.3 Summary: Geopolitical space and Europe’s role in ‘development’

A civilianized international system forms the basis for European actorness on a global scale and as such constitutes objective and medium of European international actorness in a sense that external relations are exercised through it and at the same time aim to promote it. Conceptualisations of this can be rooted in an understanding of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows that create a framework for such a system to develop, operate and expand. Key to this understanding is the notion that geopolitical space is not a straightforward territorial fixation of nation-states, but constructed socially, culturally, economically and politically in historical processes. Even though territorial structures are far from insignificant, they are accompanied by interdependent and transnational networks. The structure of those networks as well as the processes and flows within them, have become increasingly important for the international projection of power. A variety of factors influence the constitution of such space, including historical experiences, external circumstances and internal preferences, as well as the specific geopolitical narratives that articulate Europe’s role in the world. The ‘domestication’ of international relations within Europe thereby set the tone for the preferred world order model to be projected outside Europe. Just as within the EU, also with respect to its external relations, economic integration is more advanced than political integration; competence for external trade policy is with the European Community whereas foreign policy (in a sense of diplomatic and political relations) is fragmented and largely in the domains of the member states. Europe’s collective role in the world is thus more pronounced in the economic than in the political arena and its international actorness is predominantly rooted in the EU’s economic power as the largest integrated economy and provider of development aid.

This configuration of an integrated European economy and fragmented foreign policy has a significant influence on Europe’s relations with developing countries in a sense that
those are often determined by European economic interests. Such interests thus tend to
overshadow European external relations and often are not in tune with interests seeking to
promote international development objectives, such as the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). From a development perspective, a major challenge in future will be to detach
European economic interests from development policy. The European Consensus on
Development states that “all EU non-development policies which are likely to affect developing
countries, such as trade, security and migration, [shall] contribute to developing countries’
efforts to meeting the MDGs” (EPCC 2006b). Realising this commitment would mark a
significant change in priorities for agenda setting in European external relations. It would
signify a prioritisation of interests favouring economic, political and social development in the
Global South over European economic interests, which would include contentious measures
such as cutting agricultural subsidies within the EU (Gibb 2006, 2004). Even though key
agreements between the EU and ACP-countries have more recently moved towards a focus on
poverty reduction and the MDGs, European economic (and agricultural) interests continue to
exercise a substantial influence on collective external relations with developing countries. As
such those are often determined by factors and circumstances outside the immediate EU-ACP
relationship. Collective European development policy is therefore more often than not a
‘Global Political Instrument’ (Holden 2009) aligned with the broader geopolitical and
goeconomic interests of the European Union.

This thesis will investigate how these are enacted in the specific context of the EU’s
relations with East Africa. The next chapter sets out the methodologies used to examine these
relations during a total of eight months of fieldwork in Brussels and East Africa.
CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGIES AND THE SETUP OF THE FIELDWORK

How are people getting their boots dirty these days, and what lessons might these accounts hold for other fieldworkers? (Corbridge and Mawdsley 2003, 145)

This chapter addresses the methodologies used during this research and the set-up of fieldwork in East Africa. As such it discusses how, in Corbridge and Mawdsley’s terms, I “got my boots dirty”. However, it also directs attention to methodological issues with wider relevance to debates on ethnographic-style research and to fieldwork adaptations caused by unexpected changes. Conducting fieldwork in developing countries is often subject to unforeseen events and changes in the research environment that necessitate substantial adaptations on the part of the researcher (Rabinow 1977; Cook and Crang 1995; Mandel 2003; Carr 2005). This often requires considerable reconfigurations of the fieldwork and includes alterations in the researcher’s positionality and his/her relations with the researched (England 1994; Mullings 1999; Kingsbury and Klak 2005; Moser 2008). The events inducing such changes can vary significantly: natural catastrophes, personal tragedies, institutional rearrangements, political shifts, etc.. In this case it was the outbreak of an unexpected political crisis after the Kenyan general election in December 2007 that caused a significantly altered research environment. The crisis itself was not part of the research, but it was within the circumstances of the crisis that fieldwork was conducted.

Whilst there is a wide literature on the conduct of fieldwork in sensitive and conflict situations as well as on multiple roles in the field (Burgess 1982; Evans 1988; Sidaway 1992; Katz 1994; Cook and Crang 1995; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Laurier 2003; Donge 2006), literature on fieldwork adaptations in a suddenly arising crisis is limited. This particularly applies to questions of how adaptations might be utilised constructively for the research, how they impact on the balance between multiple roles (as researcher and practitioner) in the field,
what methodological and ethical implications this entails and how it affects relations between
the researcher and the researched as well as the geography in which those relations are
inscribed.

This chapter deals with such issues. However, it first outlines some methodological
preparations for the fieldwork with respect to semi-structured interviews, reflexivity and
handling primary and secondary data. Based on Wengraf’s (2001) pyramid model for semi-
structured interviews, I explain how the formulation of interview questions was derived from
the wider objectives of the research project and the three dimensions of the construction,
projection and perception of European space. In the next section I address the set-up of the
fieldwork in Nairobi, engage with issues of positionality in the context of the research method
of participant observation and discuss how multiple roles in the field affected relations with
the researched and the research environment. The subsequent section outlines how changes
in the research environment were negotiated and mediated during the course of my fieldwork
and in light of the Kenyan crisis. It first briefly explains some background to the Kenyan crisis
and illustrates how the research environment suddenly changed after the general elections in
December 2007. It then shows how the adaptations to the unexpected changes in my research
environment opened up a variety of new spaces and modes of inquiry for data acquisition,
thus enriching my research methodologically, sharpening it thematically and broadening it
geographically. Methodologically, these adaptations caused a shift in priorities from semi-
structured interviews to participant observation to a combination of both towards the end of
my fieldwork. Thematically, I sharpened the focus of my research to issues of regional
integration as a central tenet of EC external relations. Geographically, the adaptations resulted
in an extension of the fieldwork site from the development hub Nairobi to the wider East
Africa region. I then discuss how these adaptations and the multiple roles I occupied
influenced the relations with my informants. In this context, I also direct attention to ethical
considerations, such as taking advantage of such tragic events for research purposes or

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occupying a double identity in the field as a critical researcher and a practitioner in the development industry. Finally, I briefly summarise the main experiences and outline how they are relevant to the wider discussion of conducting ethnographic-style fieldwork in human geography.

4.1 Methodological preparations, reflexivity and interview data

4.1.1 The pyramid model for research based on semi-structured interviews

A substantial part of the empirical data has been obtained through semi-structured interviews with key individuals involved in European interactions with states and regional institutions in East Africa. Wengraf’s structural model (Figure 2) illustrates how questions for semi-structured interviews can be generated in relation to the general research question and the wider purpose of a specific project.

Figure 2: Wengraf’s pyramid model

![Diagram of Wengraf’s pyramid model]

As a deductive model, it starts with the Research Purpose (RP) and the Central Research Question (CRQ). Both are directly linked with each other and can thus be formulated together, the CRQ, however, needs to be broken down into several major subquestions. Wengraf (2001, 61-64) refers to those as Theory (research) questions (TQs) as they are usually “formulated in the theory language of the research community”. Those TQs ‘govern’ the production of
Interview questions (IQs)\textsuperscript{41} which are then supposed to help produce the interview material relevant to the particular TQ. TQs and IQs need to be clearly distinguished from each other because of the theory language used in TQs and the interview language used in IQs/IIs.

Adapting Wengraf’s pyramid model to my research (Figure 3), the main research purpose (RP) was to deepen the understanding of Europe’s role in the world and in the East African development industry (see Chapter I). In this manner, the CRQ seeks to investigate how characteristic aspects of European space manifest in European interaction with states and regional institutions in East Africa. In my case TQs are not exclusively theoretical; they largely derive from the three-dimensional approach, dealing with the construction, the projection, and perceptions of European space as mediated through development cooperation in East Africa. As such only the first of these dimensions is predominantly theoretical. I will, however, maintain Wengraf’s terminology of ‘TQs’ for the remainder of the chapter. After the TQ level, Wengraf’s model needs some modifications in order to deal with the specificities of my research. I am thus introducing an additional level of more specific research questions (SRQs). This is not outlined by Wengraf, however, it is helpful to facilitate the schematic understanding of the research setup and the connection between complex TQs and practically formulated IQs.

\textbf{Figure 3: Adaptation of Wengraf’s pyramid model to my research}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{wengraf_model.png}
\end{center}

Source: author

\textsuperscript{41} Wengraf refers to IQs more often as interview interventions (II), because interview questions are only one of the types of intervention that interviews make.
First, in the case of the construction of European space, I introduce conceptualisations of European space and external relations as they are portrayed in official documents and interviews with EU personnel. I then investigate how this relates to key theoretical underpinnings, mainly concepts of geopolitical space and the EU’s role in the world, and their connection with each other. The question here is how a modified understanding of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows is linked to an understanding of the EU’s global actoriness as a civilian power and the construction of European space as identity, presence and power. Finally, I outline how such European space, rooted in the concepts, documents and statements presented in this thesis, is manifest in the EU’s external relations with East Africa. The task of this first dimension (TQ₁) is to define what to understand as European space and how it is constructed.

Second, the dimension addressing the projection of European space to East Africa (TQ₂) is primarily dealt with in an empirical way and based on fieldwork in East Africa and Brussels. It aims to contribute to the understanding of EU policy implementation beyond its own territory, particularly in East Africa and with the objective to identify main structures, processes and flows of interaction. Interviews focused on the nature and interactions of the international development community and the European role in it.

Third, the section dealing with perceptions of European space in East Africa (TQ₃) forms the second major empirical-based part of this study. Interviews were conducted with key individuals (representative of European-, other donor-, and African institutions) involved in European development cooperation and political relations with countries and regional institutions in East Africa. The objective is to inquire into perceptions of the EU’s role as a global and a development actor as well as to highlight differentiations therein depending on the policy field of interaction and the affiliation of the informant.
Based on this structure, semi-structured elite interviews formed the methodological centerpiece of primary data acquisition for this research (a full list of informants, their institutional affiliation, location and date of the interview is included as Appendix C). The flexibility of semi-structured interviews was essential given the variety of circumstances in which fieldwork was conducted, the diverse relations with informants and the differences in positionalities of both me and the informants. Valentine (1997, 111) outlines that semi-structured interviews take a conversational, fluid form [and can vary] according to the interests, experiences and views of the interviewees. In the course of the interview, researchers have the chance to go back over the same ground, asking the same questions in different ways in order to explore issues thoroughly; and interviewees can explain the complexities and contradictions of their experiences.

The conversational nature of semi-structured interviews allows the researcher “to probe deeply, to uncover new clues, to open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive accounts from informants based on personal experiences” (Burgess 1982, 101). Semi-structured interviews require the skill to improvise on part of the interviewer in order to react to possibly unexpected answers by the interviewee. As such Wengraf (2001, 3) argues that “the interview as a whole is a joint production, a co-production, by you and your interviewee”. The existing literature on elite interviews was helpful in this respect as the “joint production” mostly came from interviews with senior officials in the development industry. Richards (1996, 200) observes that “elites are less accessible and are more conscious of their own power”. However, I largely managed to circumvent this problem by what Smith (2006, 648-649) outlines as another problem of elite interviews: collaborative approaches to research. According to Bradshaw (2001) the danger of collaborating in the field with elites by interviewing them is that the researcher might give away too much control over the research to the interviewee. Pile (1991, 467) is concerned about extensive collaboration with the interviewees because he sees the risk that “allowing many voices into the text undermines the
authority of the author”. Taking these concerns into account and in light of my engagement with GTZ and EUEI (see Section 4.2), in my case the benefits of information obtained through a cooperative character in the interview process clearly outweighed such possible drawbacks. Such a cooperative character is more likely to provide the information sought because “informants have an interest in the information they provide” (Herzog 1995, 176). It was precisely this interest in the research that led to my engagement with EUEI (see Section 4.2) and thus to access to more data through additional informants and participant observation.

With respect to power relations, interviewing elites for the most part situated me in an inferior position – albeit in very different ways depending on where the interview took place and who the informant was and how contact was first established. There are differences in interviewing someone in their office compared to a meeting at a more neutral location, such as a Café or restaurant. Talking to the Under-Secretary General of the United Nations or to the Director for Political Affairs of the African Union is certainly different from talking to a press-officer of a European Commission Delegation. In either case, however, it was essential to prepare and adapt to the respective situation and “to tailor the wording of the questions to each particular individual” (Eyles 1988, 7), because as Longhurst (2003, 127) points out “there is a web of ethical issues and power relations that need to be teased out when conducting semi-structured interviews”. Reflecting on those different power relations and my positionality was of fundamental significance in the preparation process for each interview.

After having sought permission from the informants, I either taped and transcribed the interviews or took notes during the interview. With regard to taping interviews, Cook and Crang point out that some interviewees might be more reluctant to express their true opinions when interviews are being taped. Cook and Crang (1995, 29) reported that some of their interviewees tended to be more circumspect when a voice recorder was turned on, whereas on occasions of just socialising the same person would get involved in much looser
conversation revealing more of their personal opinions. I usually made the decision to use a voice recorder dependent on the setting in which the interview took place and how I met the informant in the first place. Sometimes interviews were more structured and formal, at other occasions I chose a more informal style of conducting the interview tending towards looser conversations.

4.1.2 Critical analysis of documents, literature and primary data

Analysis of the relevant academic literature on European geopolitical interests, European-African relations and European development policy constituted an important part of all stages of this research. In addition, analysing the content of official European documents on the EU’s role in the world and with East Africa represented a valuable data source. This secondary data played an important role for the preparation of the subsequent interviews and for situating the primary data deriving from the interviews in a broader context (Clark 1997, 59). Methodologically the use of secondary data requires critical reading because such “information has been collected by someone else, for another purpose” and “may already have been manipulated for particular, possibly political, purposes” (White 2003, 68-69). Similarly, Clark (1997, 58, 69) argues that the utilisation of secondary data needs to take into account that it “is a cultural artefact, produced for administrators with priorities and ways of seeing the world” and that it “reflects the aims and attitudes of the people and organisations that collected the data”. Such documents are to be read and analysed critically because sometimes more information on the relevant issues can be obtained by identifying what the text is missing or silent about by reading between the lines (Aitken 1997, 242).

Regarding primary data obtained through interviews, whenever possible I started the process of analysing such data shortly after having conducted interviews. I reread and reflected upon the primary material in the contexts in which it was constructed during the
research and what the thoughts on the particular information were at the time. As Cook and Crang (1995, 76-77) point out, in this context I also realised that some of the primary material was more or less irrelevant. The challenge there was to sift through the material and pick out the pieces of information that are important to the research. This process is greatly facilitated if the time span between the processes of data collection and data analysis remains relatively short. I was able to use those experiences to continuously modify the approaches of how to gather more relevant information. Additionally I could go back to some informants and work with them more closely so that an evolving reflexive process developed as part of which the experiences of the process were used to modify the subsequent research. By drawing upon the experiences of interviews already conducted, I could discard less useful techniques and focus on more efficient ones.

Upon return from fieldwork I reread the annotated material and began to code it, using the qualitative analysis software NVivo 8. The complexities of the process of coding itself have been discussed by Anselm Strauss (1987, 55). According to him, coding

(1) both follows upon and leads to generative questions; (2) fractures the data, thus freeing the researcher from description and forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction; (3) is the pivotal operation for moving toward the discovery of a core category or categories, and so (4) moves toward ultimate integration of the entire analysis; as well as (5) yields the desired conceptual density.

However, in the case of my research I had to rework and code the material in order to organise it and the sections of the interviews in categories, which are roughly related to the more specific research questions (SRQs) as outlined the modified version of Wengraf’s pyramid model (Figure 3). At a later stage, I then organised those categories in dimensions according to the three-dimensional approach (the three TQs in the pyramid model) of this research which eventually formed the basis for the key analytical chapters V-VII. The organisation of those categories of primary material in dimensions also involved categorisation of secondary material. All the relevant information for each specific dimension had to be compiled and the
primary data linked to the background literature and the official documents. In so doing, I addressed the link between my empirical research, official articulations of Europe’s role in the world and the theoretical underpinnings. The empirical data was thus situated in a theoretical background thereby enhancing its explanatory value and applying the conceptual underpinnings.

4.1.3 Positionality and reflexivity in the field

When directly interacting with informants during the conduct of fieldwork, through interviews or cooperative and participant observation, it is essential to reflect upon the both the positionality of oneself as the research as well as upon that of the informants. For conducting ethnographic-style fieldwork in geography, the literature on feminist geography has contributed significantly to excavating such issues of positionality and power relations between the researcher and the researched. England (2006, 286) describes the key focus of feminist geographies as “analyses of the complexities of power, privilege, oppression and representation, with gender foregrounded as the primary social relation [...] Feminist geographers expose the [...] power relations in the past and contemporary constructions of gender”. Since the early 1970s, feminist geographers have challenged the hitherto presumed objectivity in the production of empirical data and knowledge, and thus the underlying positivist approaches to the research process. England (2006, 287) continues

Early on, feminists raised suspicion that ‘good research’ could be produced only by unbiased ‘experts’ seeking universal truths by using value-free data where ‘the facts speak for themselves’. Research informed by the ‘western industrial scientific approach’ is anchored by a positivist epistemology of objectivity [...] No research inquiry, whether positivist, or indeed humanist or feminist, exists outside the realms of ideology and politics; research is never value-free [...] Instead, feminists understand research to be produced in a world already interpreted by people, including ourselves, who live their lives in it.
As such, a fundamental aspect for conducting research has to be seen in engaging with the nature of the interactions and relations between the researcher and the researched. Such reflecting upon one’s own position as the researcher has been described, particularly evident though not exclusively, in feminist literature as the concepts of positionality and reflexivity (England 1994; Rose 1997; Twyman, Morrison, and Sporton 1999; Moss 2002; Worth 2008).

Considering the substantial variations in the backgrounds and affiliations of my informants, it was crucial to engage with my own positionality and the multiple roles and identities I occupied as researcher and practitioner of/in the development industry (see Section 4.2 and Appendix A). Smith (1988, 18) stresses the importance of understanding “the active role of the analyst’s self which is exercised throughout the research process”. In later work Valentine (1997, 113) points out that when conducting interview-based research it is “important to reflect on who you are and how your identity will shape the interactions that you have with others”. England (1994, 82) also argues in a similar tone and describes reflexivity as a “self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as the researcher. Indeed reflexivity is critical to the conduct of fieldwork, it induces self-discovery and can lead to insights and new hypotheses about the research questions”.

Such positionality and the roles and identities occupied in a certain social setting, including gendered roles, have been described by Judith Butler as an expression not of what one is, but of what one does. These roles and identities are thus a result of performances. In this context, Butler developed the concept of gender performativity whereby she argues that gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts. (Butler 1990, 191)

The emphasis on repetition is important in this context as only through repetitive performances the identity becomes constructed and established. “The repetition is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing already socially established; and it is the mundane and
ritualized form of their legitimation” (ibid, 191). In a review of Butler’s argument, Moya Lloyd (1999, 196-197) argues that these identities and roles are produced and manifest in a “social space [...] in which the performative enactment of gender occurs”.

In the case of my research, it was the social space of the international development industry in Nairobi in which my performances as researcher and practitioner were enacted (see Section 4.2 and Appendix A). Conducting research on European-African interaction, as a white, male European of German origin based at a British university, I had to expect different perceptions of my identity depending on a variety of factors, including location of the interview, first contact with the informant and my positionality as well as that of the interviewee. Thereby my performative acts during the conduct of the research were situated in a social space that needed to take account of positionality issues such as whiteness, status, masculinity, Europeaness and Germaness.

In an insightful study on The meaning of Whitemen Ira Bashkow (2006, 2) illustrates how “the whiteman’, as a perceived cultural presence, is a global phenomenon” that represents “similar archetypes of western modernity, wealth, and race privilege, personifying the legacy of imperialism, the ideal of development, and the force of globalization”. Such archetypes also exist in East Africa and thus influenced the reflections on my own positionality and the empirical data obtained in the research process. Similarly, my gendered identity as a male researcher allowed me to conduct the research project in a certain manner and to access networks through ways that would have been difficult to do otherwise. For example, it was easy for me to join the amateur football teams of both the British and the German embassies/development agencies (see Section 4.2). Through such performative acts, I developed a wide array of contacts amongst both European development agencies as well as their African cooperation partners (for a wider debate on masculinity and the spatial politics of geographic knowledge production see Berg and Longhurst 2003)
My position, as a male European researcher of German origin, affiliated to a British university, thus opened up ways of inquiry and data acquisition that would have been difficult to access with a different background. Similarly, my role as a PhD-candidate from a European University certainly facilitated access to higher ranked officials in both European and African institutions. Whilst I can only speculate that it would be more difficult for a woman from a Senegalese university to gain such access, I made the personal experience that the status as PhD-candidate enables easier access than when I conducted research for my Masters project three years before. As such, I was in the fortunate situation that “the power relations that constitute researcher and ‘objects of research,’ as well as the geopolitical relations that create the very conditions that enable fieldwork” (Sundberg 2003, 180) worked in my favour to facilitate the conduct of the fieldwork.

In light of those conditions and an overwhelmingly white (Anglo-American) dominance in the academic discipline of geography (see Pulido 2002; Hyndman 2007; Dias and Blecha 2007), it appeared particularly important to reflect on positionality issues of both me as the researcher and the researched. This applies to both the preparation for the interview as well as post-interview analysis and interpreting of the primary data. Having grown up in (Western) Germany, including its education and university system, clearly influenced my views on the European integration process and Europe’s role in the world. The civilian power concept, along with its outlooks, viewpoints and visions, is firmly rooted in German political consciousness. As such my largely pro-European and civilian power account of the EU and its role in the world were certainly shaped by these thoughts and debates, and hence most likely influenced my approach to conducting and interpreting this research and the obtained results. Yet, Cook and Crang emphasise the necessity to apply caution when dealing with our own [the researcher’s] accounts of the world and those encountered during fieldwork. Researchers, so they argue, never have an omniscient view and must resist the temptation to set up their analysis as such by constantly cross-referring between their abstractions and the wider context in which they
developed. At the same time the views of the interviewees are also to be handled with the same caution as there are no pure subjects or perfectly knowledgeable informants. Moreover, there are unlikely to be singular accounts of singular cultures but multiple competing versions, and it is by shuffling between these different versions that ethnographers can begin to perceive the way in which people produce and reproduce the world through their/our lives. The process of analysis is not a matter of developing a definitive account, but of trying to find a means to understand the interrelations of multiple versions of reality – including not least that of the academy – so that it serves to stress the interconnectivities. (Cook and Crang 1995, 91-92)

Cook and Crang continue to emphasise the difficult and creative nature of conducting ethnographic research because of the complexities of the social world and the problems researchers encounter when trying to analyse it. The focus should then be to address those problems instead of avoiding them. Ethnographies might not produce concrete results, such as proven or discarded hypotheses, but, as Cook and Crang (1995, 92) to argue, “an honest and serious engagement with the world is not a failure because it admits that things are messier than that and tries to think through the various complexities and entanglements involved rather than deny them”. Similarly, Gillian Rose cautions that total reflexivity is not possible, even though when engaging intensely with one’s own positionality, because there are always factors situating the researcher in a specific way that s/he is unaware of. As a result, Rose (1997, 319) advocates, we should “inscribe into our research practices some absences and fallibilities while recognizing that the significance of this does not rest entirely in our own hands”.

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4.2 Multiple identities in the field as researcher and practitioner

4.2.1 Researcher and practitioner, participant and observer: aspects of positionality

The main fieldwork periods were between October 2007 - April 2008 in East Africa, June 2008 in Brussels and October – December 2008 in East Africa. In total I conducted 55 interviews with 60 informants\textsuperscript{42} from a wide variety of organisations; most of the interviews were conducted in Nairobi, others in Arusha, Addis Ababa as well as in Brussels and Frankfurt. As shown in Figure 4, 23 informants where affiliated with EU institutions or those of EU member states (group E), 16 with other donor institutions (group D), and 21 with African institutions or NGOs (group L).

Figure 4: Informants and affiliations

For reasons of confidentiality I will keep the names of the informants anonymous, however, I indicate the institutional affiliation of each informant in the text. In order to

\textsuperscript{42} Some interviews included two or three informants.
distinguish the informants throughout the text, each informant will be referred to by the group and an individual number as well as the location and the date of the interview. This will thus read, for instance, as ‘Informant E12, Nairobi, 14/11/2007’ (for more detail see Appendix C).

During the main period of fieldwork in East Africa between October 2007 and April 2008, I was loosely affiliated as research associate with GTZ REAP\(^{43}\) (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit – Regional Energy Advisory Platform East Africa). I worked from the regional GTZ REAP office in Nairobi and participated in a project on cooperation with EUEI PDF (European Union Energy Initiative - Partnership Dialogue Facility) to support the East African Community (EAC) in the implementation of its regional energy access strategy. The citation below is taken from my contract with GTZ REAP and defines my engagement with them as an

‘informal and unpaid’ affiliation as a Research Associate for the period between October 2007 and April 2008. In return, Mr. Bachmann will contribute to certain tasks and projects where his knowledge can be beneficial to REAP. He will assist in a set of assignments related to his PHD-project as outlined below. This will be mainly in the line of interactions of the EU and EAC as regional organisations, and the role of policy networks in the support of implementing the regional energy strategy.

At all times, Mr. Bachmann will be identified as a “Research Associate” with the University of Plymouth, UK attached to the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Regional Energy Advisory Platform (REAP) East Africa. He will ensure that both institutions (and persons involved) are aware that his research is conducted as part of his research project at the University of Plymouth, independent of the GTZ, and that GTZ takes no responsibility of the findings. Mr. Bachmann is entitled to use the experiences obtained in course of his engagement with REAP for his research, however he will, at all times, ensure discretion and confidentiality on confidential matters of GTZ Office in Nairobi, and its affiliate offices. [...] cooperation will occur in a way that both REAP and Mr. Bachmann’s research can benefit out of it as this is intended as an added value to both parties.

My day to day life in Nairobi thus offered an array of opportunities to study the development industry, its structures, processes and flows as well as the space it operates in.

\(^{43}\) During the second set of fieldwork in East Africa from October to December 2008, I was not formally affiliated as research associate with GTZ REAP anymore, but through ongoing consultancy contract with EUEI PDF I could resume working from the local GTZ REAP office in Nairobi.
This exposure to the practicalities of development cooperation allowed me to gain valuable insights through participant observation. On this topic Gans (1982, 53) recalls that:

> When I was a graduate student at the University of Chicago just after the Second World War, no one talked much about participant observation; we just did it.

Whilst the methodological literature has grown a lot since Gans’ graduate studies, participant observation certainly remains a way of data acquisition more based on common sense and ad hoc practices than specific training. However, it requires the researcher to engage critically with his/her positionality and the roles s/he is taking towards the informants and the research environment. According to Gans (1982, 54) there are three different types of roles for the participant observer; the total participant who is completely involved in the situation s/he is studying, the researcher participant who is only partially involved, and the total researcher who observed a situation without significant personal involvement. The categories, however, may not always be completely distinct because, as Gans (1982, 54) argues,

> the participant observer is a researcher twenty-four hours a day. Even when he momentarily forgets his research role and becomes really involved in a social situation, he soon remembers who he is and what he is doing and quickly returns to his research. Being a total participant is probably the most fruitful kind of participant observation, for only by being completely immersed in an event as an involved person can one really confront and grasp the social and emotional incentives and pressures that act on people in groups.

In terms of Gans’ three categories I played the role of a total participant, mainly based on my affiliation with GTZ REAP and EUEI. I coordinated my research from their local office in Nairobi and participated in a support project on regional integration in the East African Community (EAC). GTZ REAP supplied me with a professional working environment for the conduct of my research and, most importantly, access to the development networks I was seeking to research.

In turn I acted as one of their contact persons for the EAC project and matters of EU/EC development cooperation. I participated in conferences and meetings in relation to the project.
and communicated on behalf of GTZ with consultants and other stakeholders involved. Through this affiliation I was playing two different roles: researcher (see Figure 5) and practitioner (see Figure 6), which I thought of as being highly complementary.

Figure 5: The author as researcher

Figure 6: The author as practitioner

44 The picture was taken in Arusha in March 2008 and shows the author on the way to conduct interviews at the EAC headquarters.
45 The picture shows the author in a group picture taken at a workshop for the EAC energy strategy project in Kigali in February 2008. It reappears in the Vignette (Appendix A) on the cover page of the report derived from the workshop.
However, in particular during my first weeks in the field, I found myself performing multiple identities but was doing so in a rather separated manner and, as a result, was initially unable to link the two sufficiently in order to reap the benefits possibly arising from such complementarity. As researcher I was conducting semi-structured interviews; as practitioner I was participating in the EAC project for GTZ REAP. As such, my positionality and roles towards the informants varied depending on the context in which I interacted with them. Even though I clearly identified myself as researcher from the University of Plymouth to everybody I met, verbally and through handing-out University of Plymouth business cards, in particular people I interacted with in the context of the EAC project soon seemed to forget that I was a researcher and instead perceived of me as GTZ staff.

In this context, Gans (1982, 59) points out that “once the fieldworker has gained entry, people tend to forget that he is there and let down their guard, but he does not; however much he seems to participate, he is really there to observe and even to watch what happens when people let down their guards”. After initially identifying myself as researcher, I refrained from reminding people continuously that I was first and foremost a researcher and not a development practitioner. “Participant observation”, Gans (1982, 57) argues, “puts one about as close to real data and the sources of real data as is humanly possible”. Similarly, Laurier (2003, 135) reiterates “that the best participant observation is generally done by those who have been involved in and tried to do and/or be a part of the things they are observing”. In this context I noted into my research diary upon the return from a workshop in Kigali:

Even though I see myself more as an outsider to the process, when encountering other partners or the consultants I am clearly perceived as someone working for GTZ. As such I am playing a double role in the sense that on the one hand I am representing one of the organizations involved in the process and am also perceived as such by the others, on the other hand I am a researcher doing participant observation. To all of the partners I stated at some point that I am doing research on EU presence in East Africa and that I am only loosely affiliated with GTZ in this context. However, I am fairly sure that they look at me almost exclusively as a representative of GTZ and not as a researcher on fieldwork. As a result I am also fairly sure that they have no idea that my participation in the process involves that they are being studied and researched by me in terms of their role in the process, their behavior and personality during the meeting, the
role of their institutions in the process and the underlying motifs they, and their institutions, might have. I am not sure to what extent this is a methodological issue in terms of research ethics. They know I am doing research, but they never gave their consent to being researched. Still I am observing them and gaining information on the process and am setting this information in a broader context of their institutional affiliation.

In this manner I was playing a double - actually a triple - role. My prime purpose for being there was to conduct research, however, I was also a research associate with GTZ REAP, and resulting from that affiliation I was hired as an independent consultant for EUEI PDF to review the process and roles of the stakeholders involved. Whilst my roles as researcher and associate with GTZ both followed clear - and clearly separated - purposes, my role as consultant with EUEI was based on the other two roles. EUEI had a strong interest in a critical analysis of the process and the lessons to be learnt for regional integration projects. As such my inclusion in the process as GTZ affiliate and the insider’s knowledge obtained thereby was essential in order to be well informed about the EAC process. However, EUEI’s main motive to hire me was my role as an academic researcher outside the development industry, which enabled me to comment upon the process more critically from an external viewpoint and include aspects of the academic debate on regional integration and cooperation.

As a result of the combination of my roles as researcher and GTZ/EUEI affiliate I was in the fortunate situation of being both “inside and outside the group” and thus able to provide “an insider’s account with an outsider’s detachment” (Eyles 1988, 9). Informants did not perceive of me as an outsider; I was part of the situation, the process and the group I was researching. Van Donge (2006, 180) emphasises that “one must gain the confidence of the people to be studied so that one can be near to them and therefore able to carry out the research”. Having gained this confidence, being exposed to those situations and employing participant observation as a research method offered the possibility for me as researcher to “study social life as it unfolds in the practices of day-to-day life. These methods avoid as much
as possible artificial research situations” (Donge 2006, 180). For obtaining data for my research this performance of multiple roles offers the distinct advantage of providing access to different standpoints and perspectives. The researcher gains a more comprehensive and accurate picture of what is happening simply by observing, but also by developing relationships with different people. These relationships, typically based on mutual interests, open up the setting for further participant observation (Jorgensen 1989, 61)

The relationship I developed when playing the multiple roles in the field and participating on the EAC energy strategy project did not only open up the setting for further participant observations in my case, but also for identifying and reaching out to more informants for the conduct of formal interviews. Adopting multiple identities and playing double/triple roles in the field, however, induced the tremendously difficult endeavour of finding a balance between complementing the roles enough to obtain a maximum of useful information and data and merging the roles too much, thereby risking to compromise the researcher’s detachment.

4.2.2 Socialising in the field, accessing informants and methodological challenges

The affiliation with GTZ had significant impacts on the course of my fieldwork and the practicalities of my time in the field. Although such affiliations can compromise the researcher’s position as an independent outsider investigating a certain topic and/or might distract too much from the actual research work, the loose affiliation with GTZ REAP turned out to be an immense asset for conducting fieldwork. It was particularly convenient for me to be able to coordinate and manage my research from within a professional working environment. I operated from the regional GTZ REAP office in Nairobi, where I had an office desk and constant telephone and internet access. For a Western researcher this might appear as a given, however, especially decent internet cannot be taken for granted when doing
fieldwork in Africa. Compared to conducting research in Kenya in 2005 when I had to arrange interviews through an expensive cell phone line and operate from a very basic ‘home’ as well as expensive and slow internet cafes, the set-up in the GTZ office proved an invaluable asset for making the research much more efficient and rewarding.

The single most important advantage of my affiliation with GTZ REAP, however, was the way it facilitated inclusion and socialisation in the new (research) environment. It offered constant opportunity for participant observation as well as frequent coincidental encounter and exposure to informants. When coming to Nairobi first, I only had a few contacts, mostly through pre-existing relationships with friends and colleagues. My introduction into professional and social networks was simply a matter of finding my way around and familiarising myself with a new situation in a new environment. Through participation in the daily business of a European development agency (GTZ) I became very quickly exposed to the wider development community in general, in particular Europeans working in East Africa, however also their local cooperation partners. As part of this process I was thus being included into the development industry but also into the social networks of my colleagues and friends both local and expats. Not long after my arrival in Nairobi I had become part of “that crowd” (Evans 1988, 206) through both the everyday life at work, but also through socialising in private and leisure time activities. On a regular basis, I would be invited to social events or parties comprised mostly of people in the development business and staff of international organisations. During those events or by coincidentally meeting people who came by the GTZ office, I frequently had the opportunity to introduce myself and ask informally about the possibility of a more formal interview at some other time. It thus substantially facilitated surmounting “the problem of gaining entry to the field setting chosen” (Evans 1988, 206).

In particular in the case of elite interviews identifying and accessing informants often is a major challenge. Evans suggests to identify certain significant individuals, gatekeepers, attach oneself to them and build other field-relationships based on the relationship with the
gatekeeper. In her own research, Evans’ “field relationships were built upon pre-existing roles and relationships” (Evans 1988, 206-208). This is also how I gained entry to my field setting through the affiliation with GTZ REAP and how I eventually managed to build a wide array of field relationships. My gatekeeper was a former fellow student at the University of Trier, who had started to work for GTZ REAP in Nairobi roughly half a year before. During the preparation phase of my fieldwork I approached him seeking an informal affiliation to a development agency through which I could gain entry to the (European) development community in Nairobi and beyond. It was the pre-existing connection with my gatekeeper which facilitated my affiliation with GTZ REAP and inclusion into the EUEI-funded project on regional integration in the East African energy sector. Through this, I quickly became exposed to the social networks of friends and colleagues, which opened up a wide array of field relationships in the wider development community in Nairobi. Figure 7 shows an ‘Informants Map’ that sketches the professional and private/social connections that led to informants. Of the total of 55 conducted interviews 23 were a result of pre-existing relationships I had built or of my affiliation with GTZ REAP.

This affiliation also facilitated accommodation in Nairobi. For the eight months of fieldwork in Nairobi I stayed in the guesthouse of GTZ’s sister organisation DED (German Development Service). This not only provided me with secure and affordable accommodation – particularly valuable during the time of the Kenyan crisis – it also extended the hours of my time in the field beyond the regular working day. My housemates were part of the development industry I intended to study during my time in Nairobi. I was often able to steer the conversation to issues that interested me and that were relevant to my research. Clearly these conversations were not representative of the entire development industry, as most of the conversation partners were German and working for the same German organisation (DED). However, it gave me numerous opportunities to study them informally and understand their perceptions of the development industry and their roles in it. I was, in fact, living in field.
Figure 7: Informants map of connections to and amongst informants

The house was located in a relatively wealthy part of Nairobi and coincidentally next to a British consultant, in whose backyard the British High Commission (BHC) and the British Department for International Development (DFID) held their weekly football games. Unaware of my neighbour’s institutional affiliation I politely asked if I was allowed to join the football game and after a while I developed friendships with BHC and DFID staff that eventually led to useful interviews. In a very similar way I became part of the German football team in Nairobi. Through my affiliation with GTZ I was asked to become part of the team and participate in a football tournament of German organisations in Nairobi. At the day-long tournament I established informal contacts to relevant people in the German embassy and other organisations which led to formal interviews and an inclusion into the professional and social networks of expats and development workers in Nairobi.
Those networks turned out to be a valuable foundation for obtaining data through semi-structured interviews and participant observation. In this context Jorgensen (1989, 80) points out that “developing and sustaining relationships with insiders in the field is crucial to gathering accurate and dependable information. This process is not unlike being socialized into a way of life”. Such socialization into the way of life was precisely what I went through during my first weeks in Nairobi. It was in both my professional and my personal interest; I was seeking information for my research but was also new to the city and in the process of developing a social life there. Jorgensen (1989, 80) goes on to note that arranging oneself with such situations and doing fieldwork involves hanging around, listening, watching, and otherwise learning the ropes. Establishing and maintaining relationships based on trust and cooperation depend on the deliberate use of commonsense abilities and strategies for gaining rapport and making friends with people within particular situations. These strategies include being open and willing to listen to other people, seeking out common interests, self-disclosures, and establishing common experiences through joint participation.

Clearly I was being socialised into those networks and became part of ‘that crowd’ not because people were curious about my research or fascinated by the idea of being studied by me, but because there were common interests, such as football or simply developing friendships. Due to the highly networked nature of Nairobi (Taylor 2004c), the city has a large flow of foreigners, many of whom have worked for years in the transnational development industry, but were just as new to the city and as interested in socialising as I was. It was thus easy to approach people this way and gain entry to the wider networks they were part of. For Jorgensen (1989, 80-81) such “field relationships involve exchanges of material and non-material items among people. The participant observer may offer money, services, or friendship in exchange for the cooperation of insiders”. Whilst I did not offer money, I did offer services and friendship. I offered services to GTZ REAP in exchange for a working place, accession to their networks and contacts as well as the inclusion into the EAC regional energy
project. I offered friendship in exchange for becoming socialised into life in Nairobi, which also contributed to my inclusion into social and professional networks.

On the negative side of my engagement with GTZ REAP, the arguments which have been made against participant observation as a research methodology evolve around issues of objectivity and rigour of the data obtained. In this context Evans (1988, 197) points to a tendency that

has contributed to the dismissal of participant observation by some researchers as being idiosyncratic, not sufficiently objective and ‘unscientific’. But by its very application participant observation (in common with other qualitative methods) has led to the very questioning of the objectivity of the researcher, the status of the observation of social phenomena, and indeed the scientificity of social research.

In this context it was essential to reflect critically on my inclusion in the process and my role as participant observer in order to make the best possibly use of data obtained in this way. My affiliation with GTZ REAP necessitated a clear distinction to my research work. The possible concern was for me to become too absorbed in the role I was playing for GTZ, both time- and content-wise, thereby neglecting my research. Especially in the first two to three weeks in Nairobi, I spent more time on project-related activities for GTZ REAP than I did for my research. It was easy to get involved in those activities and I did yet not have the contacts and networks I needed to pursue my research. Through this inclusion, however, I could familiarise myself with parts of the Nairobi-based development industry in East Africa and start building up contacts as well as identifying possible informants. After this initial phase, I focussed on research activities since I could then access informants and schedule formal interviews.

Throughout the entire time of fieldwork activity, however, I identified myself and perceived of myself as a researcher based at the University of Plymouth. As part of my fieldwork I played a double role as researcher and practitioner. Also at times I was completely immersed into the activities and development networks GTZ and EUEI are part of, I maintained
my role as researcher and used those experiences to gather data through participant observation. I had arranged this affiliation before the start of the fieldwork and considered the danger of becoming too absorbed by it at the expense of time and thought for the actual fieldwork. Critically reflecting about those concerns in advance helped losing sight of the goals of my research. Instead I used the affiliation as an opportunity to gain access to structures, processes and flows of European development cooperation I set out to study.

4.3 Negotiating and mediating unexpected changes in the research environment

4.3.1 The Kenyan post-election crisis at the beginning of 2008

Elections are manipulated to produce crowing winners because that is the way things are done; opponents are rubbed off to remove obstacles to desired immediate goals because it is instant and it produces immediate openings. (Kenya’s Sunday Standard, 03/02/2008, p.26)

Kenya is certainly not the only place where ‘things’ are done like this, but the quote above from a Kenyan newspaper described the situation in Kenya after the general elections in December 2007. A widely unexpected manipulation of the presidential elections confirmed Mwai Kibaki for a second term in office as Kenyan president, beating opposition leader Raila Odinga by a small margin of 200,000 votes. After an unduly prolonged tallying process, Kibaki had been sworn in in the backyard of the presidential residence within twenty minutes of the announcement of the result; with only a handful of loyalists present. The contrast to the swearing-in ceremony in 2002 was striking. Then, opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki won the presidential elections against Uhuru Kenyatta, the candidate backed by long-term incumbent Daniel Arap Moi and son of the nation’s independence hero Jomo Kenyatta. At that point Kenya was widely praised for the free and fair election and as an example of functioning
democracy in Africa. Kibaki headed a coalition of parties crosscutting Kenya’s ethnic diversity and was sworn in at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park in a public ceremony with almost a million Kenyans peacefully cheering him as a symbol for national unity and progress. In the aftermath of the presidential elections in 2007, there was no sign of national unity and Kenya’s ethnic diversity erupted in violent clashes, especially in the Rift Valley. The magnitude and violence came as a surprise, causing the temporary breakdown of Kenya’s political-economic system and costing the lives of more than 1000 Kenyans and Kenya its appeal as a political role model in Africa.

The problems Kenya was facing at this point were not exclusively created by the election fraud. Long-term issues, such as poverty, social segregation, violence and crime, inequalities in land ownership as well as in political and economic participation, had been pending for many years, sometimes latent, sometimes more overt. However, tensions were brought to the fore through decisions and failures on part of Kenya’s political elite, above all the rigging of the presidential elections. The election fraud was the straw that broke the camel’s back after long-held perceptions of political-economic discrimination in Kenyan society. This caused Kenya’s worst political crisis since independence. Crucial in this context was Kibaki’s disregard for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that had been agreed upon between Kibaki and Odinga before the 2002 general elections to change the constitution. This would have entailed curbing the powers of the president through the creation of the position of an executive prime minister. In addition, it envisioned devolution of executive powers to the provinces to allow a broader political participation of Kenya’s various communities on sub-national levels. Instead Kibaki retained Kenya’s centralised presidential system and a firm grip on power thereby ensuring political and economic supremacy for himself and his supporters, causing a fall-out with Odinga and his resignation from the Kibaki government in 2005. Many of Odinga’s followers perceived this as an ongoing betrayal which had deprived them of the possibility of significant political-economic participation since independence. In 2002 they had voted for
Kibaki on the basis of a Kibaki/Odinga coalition and under the premise of the MoU between the two. In this context Kenyan Nobel laureate Wangari Maathai points out that the failure to honour the 2002 pre-election MoU between President Kibaki and the other members led by ODM leader Raila Odinga had entrenched the mistrust among the Kenyan leadership thereby hindering the spirit of negotiation.

Similarly, the authors of a political comment in Kenya’s largest daily newspaper, the *Daily Nation*, argued that

The country experienced a peaceful transition of power in 2002 on an overwhelming mandate for the multi-ethnic National Rainbow Coalition, Narc. This support was driven by two main promises – that of revival of the economy and conclusion of constitutional reform. The collapse of the Coalition’s Memorandum of Understanding (among the coalition partners) on the sharing of political power, and therefore economic goods, weakened the multiethnic and inclusive character of the Government. Now, it has had far-reaching implications on the winners and losers in the economic recovery in the past five years as well as the constitutional debate and conference. The issues that have surfaced during the ragging post-election crisis bring to the fore latent tensions present in Kenyan society. Such tensions revolve around equal chances to earn a living and the ability to have in place inclusive governance systems that capture the aspiration of many in the nation.

In 2007/2008 election fraud, the immediate swearing-in procedure and the rapid formation of a government comprised of Kibaki’s own and affiliated communities further intensified the perception of ongoing political-economic exclusion amongst Odinga’s supporters. Appendix B shows some pictures taken in Nairobi and reproduces two cover pages from Kenya’s leading newspaper during the most violent phases of the crisis. In addition, the previous and following citations from major media outlets across the region illustrate how this view has been commonly expressed during the post-election turmoil. A Kigali-based weekly pointed out that

The incumbent government in Kenya is perceived by the opposition as being Kikuyu-dominated, so the current political dispute is fuel for the smouldering embers of a land dispute which has existed for decades.

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46 quoted in Daily Nation 23/01/2008, p.8
47 quoted in Daily Nation 01/02/2008, p.19
48 The Sunday Times 03/02/2008a, p.5
Similarly, the Nairobi-based *Daily Nation* proclaimed:

Our people, from Mount Elgon in the west, to the Kenya Coast, have always asked for change, from the structures and policies that we inherited from colonialism. But our leaders, starting with Jomo Kenyatta down to Mwai Kibaki, have always refused to listen [...] In Africa, power is used to develop the regions of the leaders [...] Our leaders campaign to go to Parliament not to cater for the interests or concerns of their electors, but to find ways of enriching themselves. 49

As a result of this perceived self-enrichment of Kenya’s elites and motivated by Raila Odinga’s party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), no longer accepted the executive power of the government they perceived as illegal. In some occasions the demonstrations lost their political character and turned into violent crimes against the supporters of the other side. The government tried to halt those protests through the excessive use of force against all demonstrations. This strategy clearly failed as the police proved just as incapable as the government to deal with the situation adequately, thus triggering more violence in parts of the country. Just one of countless commentaries in Kenyan national newspapers was lamenting that “it is distressing to accept that the State is unable to defend the right of Kenyans to live safely and own property wherever they choose”. 50

Both government and opposition were predominantly concerned with their own power position and appeasing their own supporters, thereby forgetting their aspiration to be legitimate representatives of all Kenyans. The government failed to quell civil disorder and criminal violence. Similarly, the opposition also failed to stop the escalating violence, possibly in an attempt to further delegitimize the government through the deliberate fostering of civil disorder and disruption of economic activity. During the immediate post-election crisis, in which more than 1000 Kenyans were killed, almost the entire Kenyan political elite failed to act

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49 *Daily Nation* 18/02/2008a
50 quoted in *Daily Nation* 18/02/2008b
in the interest of Kenya and the ‘Kenyan’ people. John Githongo\textsuperscript{51} described this in a Kigali-based weekly as an “environment where political institutions do not offer solutions, but are actually expressions of the fundamental contradictions in society”\textsuperscript{52}.

From all sides there was a sequence of failures in constraining violence and de-escalating the crisis that erupted after the 2007 general elections. Despite several failures on part of Kenya’s political elite in the past, in particular with respect to allowing broad political-economic participation, the key failure which triggered Kenya’s post-election crisis was Kibaki’s decision to disrespect the people’s verdict of voting him out of power. As a result, parts of the Kenyan population disrespected the state authorities, causing the outbreak of the post-election crisis in the beginning of 2008 (see Bachmann 2009b).

4.3.2 Implications of the crisis on the fieldwork: methodological broadening, thematic sharpening, spatial extrapolation

The world is simply not the tidy, logically organized place it is conceived to be. (Stirrat 2000, 41)

The Kenyan post-election crisis transformed Kenya from an African role model for democracy, peace and stability into one of the many crisis spots on the continent, at least temporarily. In cases of such rapidly changing research environments, the researcher is forced to adapt to the new situation and often has to redefine its relations with informants as well as the nature of doing fieldwork. The violence that erupted in parts of the country in early 2008 and the political crisis overshadowed day-to-day life in Nairobi, making it very difficult for me to schedule further interviews. Even before the elections it was difficult to access Kenyan government officials as the country was preparing for the upcoming elections; after the

\textsuperscript{51} John Githongo was formerly in charge of rooting out corruption Kenya, however, upon discovery of a corruption scandal involving government ministers he was threatened and went into exile in the UK.

\textsuperscript{52} quoted in The Sunday Times, 03/02/2008b, p.5
elections it was almost impossible as the state apparatus was in a state of chaos. Possible informants within the Kenyan government either did not appear at work or were not even sure if there were still employed. It was similar for people working for donors or international organizations as most organizations closed down their offices and instructed people to remain in their houses. The overarching context of those two months was clearly the political situation and people did not find time or interest in giving interviews to a researcher.

In addition, during the worst parts of the crisis, mobility in Nairobi was seriously affected. On occasions of severe demonstrations or street clashes, bus and matatu\textsuperscript{53} routes would be closed down and even taxis only offered limited services as they had to fear road blocks or ethnic hostility. However, those extreme situations were restricted to a few hours on very few days and particular parts of the city. Private homes in wealthy parts of the city were not attacked at any time, so if the situation in a certain part of the city reached alarming dimensions, I remained in the house. Considering that the government prohibited live radio and television coverage, the best way to receive up-to-date information were taxi-drivers or security guards who worked for large taxi- or security companies. These companies have their personnel spread across the entire city and use internal radio communication to continuously update each other about the situation. However, at no point did I perceive any immediate security threat. Generally, foreigners were not affected and I was part of an expat group consisting of development workers as well as members of both the German embassy and the British High Commission. Nonetheless, I had to deal with the disruptions for my fieldwork.

In so doing I relocated parts of my fieldwork away from Nairobi to other locations across East Africa and sharpened the focus on wider aspects of EU cooperation with regional institutions, such as the EAC and the African Union (AU). The EU’s role as model for regional integration is not only articulated in formulations on Europe’s role in the world (see earlier

\textsuperscript{53} Matatus are minibuses that hold up to 14 passengers, they constitute a main mode of transport in Nairobi
Chapters) but also in official documents. The EC country strategy paper for Kenya, for instance, outlines as the first of three focal areas for EC cooperation with Kenya the support of “Regional economic integration by means of transport infrastructure” (EC 2007e, vii). Similarly, the two focal areas in the EC regional strategy paper for Eastern and Southern Africa are “Regional Economic Integration” and “Regional Political Integration” (EC 2008b, 9). Also the Joint Africa-EU Strategy following the December 2007 Africa-EU Lisbon summit articulates “trade and regional integration” as one of the “four main objectives of this long-term strategic partnership” (EC 2007a, 4). In this context, the resulting first action plan specifies that “Africa has adopted socio-economic and political integration as a key development strategy. The EU has undergone a successful process of integration and can usefully share its experience with Africa” (EC 2007d, 16). Also beyond the rhetoric displayed in official documents, during the fieldwork such a role for the EU as a model for regional integration has been frequently articulated by interviews with senior AU and EAC officials (see Chapter VII).

Consequently, issues of regional integration and the EU’s role as a model for such were a central aspect of the kind of European space I set out to explore. The predominantly European-funded EAC support project I was participating in for GTZ and EUEI offered the opportunity to become more exposed to some of the practicalities of such European space in form of European development cooperation. Through a more intensive involvement in the project and the lack of otherwise accessible informants in Nairobi, I increasingly realised the relevant aspects of the project to my research, which in turn amplified my interest in and engagement with the project. As Rabinow expressed his experiences during fieldwork, I also realised that “After all, now I was in the field, everything was fieldwork” (Rabinow 1977, 11). The reorientation I was forced to undertake because of the crisis thus contributed to sharpening my project thematically to issues of regional integration and the EU’s role in this context. I became much more of a participant observer than before as I participated more in the project and also observed it much more intensely with regard to these aspects. The focus of my
research methodologies had shifted from semi-structured interviews to participant observation during that time and the geographical location had expanded from Nairobi to other locations across Eastern Africa.

I travelled to Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania, partly in my role as a participant in the EAC project and partly in my role as researcher, but in most instances the trips yielded benefits for both roles. My interest in the regional integration mechanism in East Africa and the EU’s role in it made it increasingly obvious that my research would greatly benefit from a visit to the headquarters of the East African Community in Arusha (See Figure 8) and of the African Union in Addis Ababa (see Figure 9). I thus used the time during the hold up of research activity in Nairobi, resulting from the crisis, to travel to Ethiopia to conduct several interviews on AU-EU relations with senior staff at the AU and EU. Just before my trip to Ethiopia, the Delegation of the European Union to the African Union (DelAU) had become operational (see Figure 10).

DelAU was intended to be the first deliverable of the Africa-EU Lisbon summit in December 2007 with the goal to intensify political relations and partnership between the AU and the EU. In the following action plan the EU committed itself to “further enhance the coherence of EU action, in particular through: the opening of EU Delegation exclusively dedicated to the African Union, representing the EU in all areas of competency and activity of the AU [...]” (EC 2007d, 3). At this point it was only the second EU delegation worldwide. Whilst permanent missions of the European Commission have been established in most countries, the permanent mission of the European Union to the African Union is a unique tool in European external relations because its mandate is to represent both Commission and Council. The trips that were partly time-fillers for the delay and disruptions in Nairobi turned out to produce highly valuable data and to re-establish semi-structured interviews as a key methodology.

54 next to one in Skopje, Macedonia.
55 The EU delegation in Skopje also represents commission and council, but through different sections; the one in Addis Ababa is a truly shared representation of Commission and Council.
Figure 8: EAC headquarters in Arusha (picture taken by author)

Figure 9: AU headquarters in Addis Ababa (picture taken by author)

Figure 10: The European Union Delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa (picture taken by author)
In addition, the inclusion in the EAC project positioned me inside the international development industry, constantly offering opportunities for data acquisition. The trips in the context of the project and my participation in it revealed interesting insights into the internal dynamics of a heavily European funded process in East Africa and the coordination mechanisms entangled in it. As the situation in Kenya improved in March 2008 many of the activities were coordinated from Nairobi again. However, the project remained a regional one, which meant that political stakeholders from all countries in the region as well as the EAC were participating. In the course of the project I could use these connections to conduct interviews with representatives from across the region. By April 2008, the situation in Kenya had calmed down and I had established good contacts with Kenyan officials from the Ministries of East African Community, Finance, and Planning and National Development. Through this ‘detour’ of making contacts in the context of the EAC project, I eventually managed to interview Kenyan government officials and include their perceptions on the EU and cooperation with the EU. In hindsight I judge that it would have been unlikely that I would have succeeded in establishing these contacts without the inclusion in the EAC project; initially a means for me to stay busy during the hold-up caused by the crisis.

4.3.3 Changing relations with informants and considerations of research ethics

On my travels across the region during the time of the Kenyan crisis it also seemed to me that the way interviewees interacted with me changed. As I had contacted them before the actual meeting to schedule the interview, all informants were aware that I was Nairobi-based. When encountering them in person the Kenyan situation immediately became a central part of the conversation. I was no longer exclusively perceived as a white foreigner seeking information from them, but as somebody who could deliver first-hand information from Africa’s prime crisis spot at the time. It was a good point to start the conversation in a more informal way and
also created an atmosphere of information exchange. I could thus “gain the confidence of the people to be studied” (Donge 2006, 180).

Other occasions where I noticed that informants perceived me differently were more closely related to my role as a GTZ affiliate. In the context of the EAC project I attend two workshops; amongst other things the aim of the first one was to determine the structure of the second one. It was discussed how to include competent and senior people from the ministries who would be able to deliver the necessary technical input, but also be in a position to ensure the implementation of the workshop outcomes by the responsible ministries in their individual countries. One of the regional consultants, who possessed extensive experience in the respective field in East Africa, suggested that for the regional workshop to succeed it would require significant financial incentives for senior and/or competent civil servants of the individual countries to attend. Otherwise incompetent or junior personnel would be sent and the workshop might be rendered ineffective. I did not doubt the consultant’s judgment of the situation, and he was probably correct that this might create favourable conditions for the completion of the process, however, it was pointed out by a representative of a donor organization that this would be defying the purpose of their engagement in the process. Donor organizations, he argued, were acting on behalf of the EAC and should not consider to pay such inflated financial incentives that were tantamount to bribes. Even though this argument was acknowledged by the consultant, his focus was to get the job done quickly and satisfactorily. If this could be accomplished better and/or faster through paying ‘financial incentives’, it might not be the ideal case, but so be it. It reflected a sense of “this is just the way Africa works”.

At the follow-up workshop, the attendees from the national ministries were paid a significant DSA (daily service allowance). Whilst it is not unusual to be paying travelling staff a certain amount of money for covering the costs of accommodation and food while on business travel, the amount paid exceeded the amount needed for covering those costs and the standard amount that would be paid by their governments. As I was the only GTZ
representative there, I was in the interesting situation of having to hand over the DSA to the attendees on behalf of GTZ. On the one hand this intensified the attendees’ perception of me as GTZ staff. On the other hand, from the research perspective it also put me in the very favourable position to have a guaranteed open ear for my questions and for inquiries about setting a date for a formal interview. I did not even have to approach the attendees – all senior officials from the countries’ ministries - as I could be sure they would approach me in order to receive the DSA. In many cases this led to more, and very important, contacts with the respective ministries. I thus used my role as a GTZ affiliate at the meetings in order to gain access to informants in the field, although in all instances I took care to re-emphasize my role as researcher when conducting interviews at a later point.

In the context of ethical considerations on participant observation as research methodology Gans raises the point that the participant observer might be conceived of as deceiving his informants by spying on them. However, Gans (1967, 440) regards this as inevitable because “if the researcher is completely honest with people about his activities, they will try to hide actions and attitudes they consider undesirable, and so will be dishonest. Consequently the researcher must be dishonest to get honest data”. In one specific case - a shared taxi ride from Nairobi airport to downtown after a workshop in Kigali - I ‘interviewed’ a UNDP official who I had been in email contact with for several months regarding the EAC energy project, but had only met a few days before. He knew that I was doing research as part of my PhD, but since we had just spend a few days on the workshop together where I acted on behalf of GTZ and EUEI, I am doubtful that he remembered I was actually doing research and in the process of interviewing him at the point. It was not a formal interview, I neither taped it nor did I take notes, it was much more of an informal conversation that I used to ask the questions related to my research. As soon as I returned home I noted down the contents of the conversation, only then realising the actual value of the information obtained during the
‘interview’. He had just acted as a valuable informant, without being aware that he was doing so.

Taking into account Gans’ arguments about dishonesty, I did not perceive my interactions with informants as especially dishonest as I had clearly identified myself as researcher at first encounters, however, the fact that the informants tended to forget that research was my main purpose for being there in the first place certainly helped to attain richer data.

Furthermore, in the case of this research it became necessary to reflect on the ethical implications arising from the conduct of fieldwork during the Kenyan crisis. In relation to the tragedy that unfolded in Kenya and severely affected the day-to-day lives of millions of Kenyans, it might appear questionable, possibly even inappropriate, to engage with such relatively immaterial issues like implications for fieldwork. Clearly it raises all kinds of ethical questions. Is it ethical to take advantage of such humanitarian disaster only to contribute to an academic understanding of methodological issues? Is it ethical to benefit from such tragedies in form of an enrichment of my research work? In this context Kingsburg and Klak (2005, 268) raise the question: “does the researcher exploit the host country and its people for careerist gains? At some level” they argue”s/he does”. Yet, despite the disastrous implications of the crisis for Kenya, and albeit many restrictions, people had to deal with the situation - including myself being in Nairobi at the time. Life went on. Clearly my research had been influenced by unforeseen events, which raised a variety of issues, including ethical ones, I did not expect to encounter but had to deal with. Bringing life and work to a complete halt did not seem a viable option, not for ethical reasons, nor for the situation in Kenya, nor for me and my research. In a different context on ethnographic research methods, yet no less important for approaching the situation of the post-election crisis in Kenya, Cook and Crang (1995, 92) point out that

Ethnographies may lack the apparently 'concrete' results of other methods (with hypotheses proven or not), but an honest and serious engagement with the world
is not a failure because it admits that things are messier than that and tries to think through the various complexities and entanglements involved rather than to deny them.

I tried to adapt to the new circumstances, engage with the complexities and entanglements, continue with my research and do what researchers do: write about their research.

However, besides the concern on conducting relatively crisis-unrelated fieldwork in an environment of human tragedy, my role in the EAC project also raised other ethical questions, in particular with respect to paying out DSA to workshop attendees. I generally disagree with the practice of paying such financial incentives, yet I ended up being the one doing so on behalf of the donor organizations. I had become a part of the development industry that I set out to critically research for the sake of maintaining the very beneficial working relationship with GTZ and EUEI and in order to put myself in a favourable position for accessing possible informants. In no way was I pressured to do so; it was simply a part of my being there on behalf of the agency and trying to gain as much out of it for my research as possible. At the time, these ethical concerns did not appear evident to me, it was only after I had noticed how paying out the DSA facilitated my access to informants that I realized that this possibly came at ethical costs. Did this price compromise my research project as such? Probably not; in fact quite the opposite as it gave me access to informants I was hitherto unable to access. Did it compromise my integrity as an ethical researcher? Possibly, because I did something I am generally opposed to as a result of becoming immersed into a system that I set out to critically question and research in the first place.
4.4 Summary: Methodological challenges and unexpected benefits

This chapter has given an overview of the methodologies used for this research and the dilemmas and opportunities encountered due to occupying multiple roles in the field and the adaptations to the effects of the Kenyan crisis. It has first introduced a structural (pyramid) model for qualitative research that illustrates how interview questions relate to and are derived from the more general research purpose and the central research question. It thereby also addressed issues of researcher reflexivity and the relevance of this to the analysis of both primary and secondary data. This chapter then went on to discuss the research methodology of participant observation and showed how I occupied multiple roles in the field as researcher and practitioner in the development industry. It described my affiliation with GTZ and EUEI and illustrated how this affiliation facilitated access to informants but also raised methodological challenges with regard to researcher independence. In this context I discussed how the outbreak of the Kenyan post-election severely affected my life in Nairobi, my time in the field and engagement with GTZ/EUEI, as well as the course of my research, the conduct of fieldwork and my relation with the informants. In particular in the beginning, it posed serious difficulties to access informants and to continue the research. However, the affiliation with GTZ/EUEI emerged as a valuable asset for overcoming this impasse. The reorientation I was forced to undertake thus eventually opened up new, but related and highly relevant, spaces of inquiry. Methodologically, it significantly improved my access to a variety of informants I would not have had otherwise. It also meant a temporary shift from a focus on semi-structured interviews to participant observation, which was easily possible through my inclusion in the EAC project. Thematically, it sharpened the focus on aspects of regional integration in East Africa and the EU’s role in it. Geographically, it extended the research across the East Africa region. The presumably negative effects of the Kenyan crisis on the conduct of my fieldwork were thus largely mediated through my affiliation with GTZ/EUEI and the resulting inclusion
into the EAC project. However, this affiliation also induced a variety of ethical implications that I directed attention to here, but to which definite answers appear difficult – possibly impossible.

In this chapter, I have tried to illustrate how “getting the boots dirty” in a suddenly changed research environment can cause substantial methodological, thematic and geographical adaptations to a research project. In my case this had a significant impact of my positionality, the multiple roles in the field I occupied as researcher and practitioner as well as on the relations between me as a researcher and the researched. Those relations are inscribed in the geography of the place where they manifest and thus take significantly different forms depending on a variety of factors: Where did interaction with the researched take place (Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Arusha, etc.)? Did the interaction occur before, during or after the crisis? Was it located in an office or in a more neutral location, such as a café or a restaurant? Where was contact with the informant first established (at an official reception, on the football pitch, through work relations, etc.)? Those factors – and others not mentioned here – influence how relations between the researcher and the researched are defined and redefined by the spaces and the environment in which they occur. In this context, Doreen Massey (1994, 120) points out that “some of these relations will be, as it were, contained within the place; others will stretch beyond it, tying any particular locality into wider relations and processes”. Some of the relations with my informants were “contained within” Nairobi, during the crisis, however, many “stretched beyond it”, thereby “tying the locality of my research into wider relations and processes” of the development business in East Africa. Locality and spatial malleability of the research therefore mattered. They substantially affect the positionality of the researcher and his/her relations with the researched and as such not only the nature and the conduct of the fieldwork but also the thematic focus and the very geography of a research project.
CHAPTER V: THE IDENTITY OF THE EU AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN ‘SPACE’

European space itself is the subject of a fledgling policy field which seeks to create a vision for its future, and to impose orders on actions within it. (Jensen and Richardson 2004, 5)

This “fledgling policy field” that Jensen and Richardson signal is predominantly concerned with “a new discourse of European spatial development” (ibid, 6) in the sense of physical space within Europe, yet therein it focuses on questions of how connection, interaction and flows are regulated. It explores “the relations between core and peripheral regions” and how such space is “decisively shaped by transnational politics and power struggles” (ibid, i). These questions are also addressed here, however, not in the context of constructions and shapes of physical spaces within Europe, but rather in a sense of spaces of interaction. In a related, non-physical imagination of space, Bialasiewicz (2008, 77) speaks of a “European space of rights”. She refers to the intention of the families of Polish soldiers executed by Stalin’s secret policy in what is now Belarus to take Russia to the European Court of Human Rights to enforce a full disclosure of information. Bialasiewicz (2008, 77) describes this as an attempt to extend Europe’s “juridical reach into time and space to bring justice to events that took place more than 60 years ago”. ‘European space’ is thereby not understood in a simple physical way, but as a set of imaginations, meanings and regulations for interaction.

It is in such a context that this chapter explores the spaces of interaction of the EU’s relations with Kenya, the EAC and the AU. In so doing this chapter deals with construction of European space in East Africa and aims to define an understanding of European space in the context of this research. It thereby draws on official EU documents and on data obtained from interviews with key foreign political personnel of the European Commission and EU member states in order to elaborate how the EU positions itself as a global and development actor. This chapter also draws on the conceptualisations of geopolitical space in terms of structures,
processes and flows and sets those in context with constructions of European external relations in official documents and the interviews. The chapter then develops a definition of European space, understood as Europe’s identity, presence and power and explores how those facets manifest in the structures, processes and flows of European external relations. Key parameters of European space thereby are regional integration and regulated spaces of interaction for different actors in a civilianized international system.

The chapter begins with a review of official EU documents relevant to European development policy in sub-Saharan Africa and contextualises those with the civilian power concept. It then draws on the conceptualisations of geopolitical space outlined in Section 3.1 and adapts them to constructions of European space and the external projection thereof. Finally this chapter highlights how certain aspects of European space appear with regard to the EU’s interactions with the Republic of Kenya, the EAC and the AU.

5.1 The EU’s portrayal of its identity and role

At nearly 500 million, the population of the European Union is the third largest in the world after China and India. Its sheer size and its impact in commercial, economic and financial terms make the EU a globally important power. It accounts for the greatest share of world trade and generates one quarter of global wealth. With size and economic power come responsibilities. The Union is the biggest provider of financial assistance and advice to poorer countries. (EC 2007c, 3)

This quote is taken from a document in which the EU aims to explain its role in the world. In this section I will discuss such European self-representations and critically examine how the European Union portrays its identity, its global role, and its development engagement in the documents provided by EU institutions. Whilst there is a plethora of documentation available, there are also considerable overlaps in documents dealing with similar issues. The long history of interaction frameworks for collective European relations with the ACP-countries, the Yaoundé, Lomé, Cotonou agreements, will therefore not feature here as those are elaborated
in great detail elsewhere (see Section 3.2.2 and Lister 1997; Engel and Olsen 2005; Carbone 2007; Dialer 2007; Holland 2008). Nonetheless, the broad parameters of the most current of these agreements, the reworked Cotonou agreement of 2005 (EC 2006b), are also reflected in the three key sets of documents on the EU’s role in the world and as a development actor addressed here.

First, the documents A world player – The European Union’s external relations (EC 2004) and The EU in the world – The foreign policy of the European Union (EC 2007c) discuss the EU’s international policy in general and its role in the world. They introduce the identity of the EU as a global actor, the main policy fields in which it is active on the global stage, and the geography of its interaction. Second, The European Consensus on Development (EPCC 2006a) is more specific to the Union’s role as a global actor in the international development business. It is a joint declaration of the European Parliament, Council and Commission and sets the framework for the future conduct of European development policy. Third, The EU Strategy for Africa (EC 2006a) and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (EC 2007a) deal with the EU’s policies towards Africa. Both emphasise the special role Africa is supposed to play in the EU’s global agenda and adapt the general framework outlined in the The European Consensus on Development to specific circumstances in Africa. After only two years the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (EC 2007a) replaced The EU Strategy for Africa as a jointly developed strategy at the Lisbon Africa-EU summit in December 2007.

5.1.1 A world player and The EU in the world

The document A world player (2004) and its reworked version The EU in the world (2007) outline how changes in the global system required the EU to take on more responsibilities after the Cold War. It is noted that, for the EU, amongst all its newly gained international obligations, it will always defend “its legitimate economic and commercial interest in the
international arena” (2004, 3). The EU, it is argued, “does not try to impose its system on others, but is not shy about its values. [...] The EU acts out of enlightened self-interest just as much as global solidarity” (EC 2007c, 4). Taking into account the historical background of the development of the European Union as an economic community, also with regard to its external relations, trade policy is prioritised in the context of the Union’s interactions with the rest of the world (EC 2007c, 8-9). However, in tandem with trade policy, development assistance has been a part of common European policy from the very beginning. The EU understands itself as a strongly value-based community emphasising that partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote common values of respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice (EPCC 2006a, 3). Similarly, A world player highlights the significance that the EU puts on promoting peace and security as well as human rights through strengthening democracy, good government and the rule of law (EC 2004, 7). Those values are, at least as the documents try to communicate, fundamental objectives in every aspect of the Union’s development engagement.

Though not aspiring to become a major military power, the development of certain military structures in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is signalled as an important part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (EC 2007c, 11-12). Although for a civilian power, the use of military forces is problematic, the stated goal is to develop adequate capabilities to “play an international diplomatic and security role more in line with its economic power” (ibid, 11) and “respond rapidly to emerging crisis by military means” (ibid, 12). Here too, the power dimension and the strong commitment to multilateralism become evident. It is, however, emphasised that the focus of the CFSP is on prevention of crises rather than their cure. Military capabilities are thereby described as only a means to “reinforce the EU’s traditional tools of external relations, including technical and financial assistance, support for institution-building and good governance in developing
countries, humanitarian aid and diplomatic instruments like political dialogue and mediation” (ibid, 11).

Both *A world player* and *The EU in the world* emphasise the importance of trade for the EU’s external relations and position the EU as “the world’s biggest trader, accounting for 20% of global imports and exports” (EC 2004, 11). Clearly, institutionalised structures of free trade and liberal capitalism are presented as central aspects in both European space and a civilianized international system (see Chapters II and III). “The Union therefore takes a lead in pushing for further trade liberalisation at world level for the benefit of rich and poor countries alike” and praises its trade policies to be “free and fair” (EC 2007c, 8). For a civilian power most international actoriness (see Chapter II and Bretherton and Vogler 2006) is rooted in economic strength. For the European Union, trade is one of the fundamentals on which its integration has been built from the very beginning. It has always been strongly committed to internal free trade, externally, on the other hand, (especially in agricultural policy) the commitment to free trade is still impaired by powerful internal pressure groups seeking to protect European producers (Gibb 2006, 15). Official documents, however, only emphasise the EU’s commitment to free trade and how globalisation can benefit the developing world via integration into the world economy. As the world’s largest trader the EU occupies a pivotal position in this respect. As an example of how such integration can benefit the developing world, the relation with ACP countries is mentioned in the same section. The EU considers those as “a model for how rich countries can help poorer ones” (EC 2004, 12).

More critically, the EU-ACP relationship can also be considered as a template for how to project space and exert power, because access to the European market forces developing counties to accept the European rules of the game as the underlying trading framework. The result of the preferential access for ACP countries to the EU market can be an exclusive focus on those markets, putting the EU in the position of a monopolistic buyer, thereby creating dependencies for ACP-countries as the seller. These configurations are not discussed in the
main EU documents. Instead it is stated that “the EU’s development cooperation aims to give disadvantaged people in the third world control over their own development” (EC 2007c, 14).

Similarly, it is claimed that

The EU’s trade policy is closely linked to its development policy. The two come together as the Union assumes its share of responsibility to help developing countries fight poverty and integrate into the global economy (EC 2004, 12).

Such coherence between development and trade policy is in fact less evident in practice. The EU’s trade policy promotes European economic interests, whereas development policy is supposed to improve social, economic and political conditions in developing countries. In the past, the large-scale frameworks of European development policy have been very much concerned with regulating trade policy towards ACP-countries and as such sometimes “undermine developmentally oriented social policies” (Gibb 2000, 459); mainly through forcing market liberalisation.

The European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) is more autonomous from the dominance of trade-related interests. However, its role is to channel relief funding for severe crisis and emergencies, not primarily to create permanent structures or conduct development cooperation. A world player positions the EU

at the centre of a network whose role is to alleviate the human suffering caused by these disasters. EU humanitarian aid is unconditional; the aim is to get help to victims as quickly as possible irrespective of race, religion or the political convictions of their government (EC 2004, 15)

Within this, ECHO contributes to the international reputation and credibility of the EU as a development actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 136) in general, nonetheless, its effect on wider and long-term European development policy remains limited.
5.1.2 The European Consensus on Development

After a lengthy and comprehensive restructuring process of (European) development cooperation policy, the EU member states adopted the *European Consensus on Development* in December 2005. After the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005), adopted in March 2005, the development consensus was an additional EU document to increase aid effectiveness and coherence of European donors. It reaffirmed their commitment to

promoting policy coherence for development, based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives. (EPCC 2006a, 2)

Whilst the European development policy has always had the objective of seeking coherence between the Commission and various member states (see Holland 2002), the commitment to subordinate other policy fields to development objectives marks a decisive change in priorities. The practical effects of this shift, however, are likely to be much less pronounced than the commitments made. Nonetheless, the development consensus marked a significant upgrade of development-related issues in the external agenda of the European Union. Signed by the presidents of the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission in December 2005, the declaration emphasises the necessity to increase coherence of all European development engagement. It is divided into two parts; a common vision on development and policy guiding for the implementation of this vision. The first part, named *The EU Vision of Development*,

sets out common objectives and principles for development cooperation. It reaffirms EU commitment to poverty eradication [in line with the MDGs], ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid and promoting policy coherence for development. It will guide Community and Member State

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56 For a detailed overview of these processes see Carbone (2007)
57 The full title is: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability
development cooperation activities in all developing countries, in a spirit of complementarity (EPCC 2006a, 2).

In this context the EU affirms its commitment to effective multilateralism and the promotion of “common values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice” (EPCC 2006a, 3). To achieve those objectives the EU has pledged to increase its aid budget to 0.7% of its GNI by 2015, with an intermediate collective target of 0.56% by 2010 with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa (Michel 2006, 4). The EU aims to enhance both quality and quantity of its development cooperation through monitoring and evaluating (M&E) the effectiveness of the programmes as well as the achievement of concrete targets along the lines of the Paris Declaration (EPCC 2006a, 5). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was adopted by governments of developing and developed countries in early 2005 and sets specific outlines for increasing the efficiency of ODA. These are the commitment to greater harmonisation and coherence of donor engagement, the acknowledgement of national and regional differences in the recipient countries and a resulting adaptation of development engagement to local circumstances, the setting of specific indicators, timetables and targets for the progress in the implementation of development practices, and a continuous monitoring and evaluation process responsible to the signatories of the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005, 1-3). The second part of The European Consensus on Development entitled The European Community Development Policy, defines how the Community will implement the European vision on development set out in the first part, for the resources entrusted to the Community. The Community’s policy is complementary to the bilateral policies of Member States. The European Commission, within the competences conferred to it by the Treaty, provides added value thanks to its global presence and expertise as a delivery agent, its role in promoting policy coherence and best practices, in facilitating coordination and harmonisation, in supporting democracy, human rights, good governance and respect for international law, in promoting the participation of civil society and North-South solidarity. [...] Development cooperation is one major element of a wider set of external actions, all of which are important and should be coherent, mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other. The programming documents – country, regional and thematic strategy
papers – reflect this range of policies and ensure coherence between them (EPCC 2006b).

Here too, the EU clearly reaffirms that development cooperation should be coherent and not subordinate to trade policies. Despite this rhetoric, practical implementation of this objective is lagging (see Chapter VI). The nine areas in which EU sets out to focus on are: trade and regional integration; the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; water and energy; rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; conflict prevention and fragile states; human development; social cohesion and employment. Based on the underlying values outlined above, the cross-cutting issues are supposed to be mainstreamed in all areas of EU development cooperation: democracy, good governance, human rights, the rights of children and indigenous peoples; gender equality; environmental sustainability; and the fight against HIV/AIDS (EPCC 2006a, 11-16). The modalities of the provision of such assistance are set out to be individually tailored in close cooperation with the partner countries in order to adapt to their specific contexts. A key tool thereby will be general and sector budget support in coordination with other donors and the International Financial Institutions (see Section 6.2.3).

5.1.3 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy

The central elements of The European Consensus on Development are also reflected in the EU strategy for Africa, named The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership. Both declarations were adopted during the British presidency in late 2005 and aim at improving efficiency and coherence of EU development policy. Based on the general development policy framework of The European Consensus on Development, the Africa-strategy sets the guidelines

58 The term ‘partner country’ is commonly used for a recipient country of development aid.
for development engagement in Africa. In the introduction Louis Michel\textsuperscript{59} defines Europe as “Africa’s natural ally and friend in the quest for stability and prosperity”, but also points out that

for too long, the EU’s relations with Africa were too fragmented, both in terms of policy formulation and implementation of development aid programmes. There have been too many parallel policies and actions of EU Member States and the European Commission. There has not been enough coordination between traditional development efforts and political strategies. Neither Europe nor Africa could afford to sustain this situation much longer. (EC 2006a, 6)

As a result of these incoherencies, the Africa-strategy was developed, and has been praised by the EU a “comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent” (ibid, 7). The strategy emphasises the importance of peace and security as well as an “adherence to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law; and effective well-governed states, and strong and efficient institutions” for “successful development” (ibid, 12).

However, just over one year later, during the preparations for the Africa-EU Lisbon summit in December 2007, it became obvious that the 2005 strategy, \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, was inappropriate to serve as the document for restructuring the future of African-European relations. On this an informant from DG Development in Brussels pointed out that

The previous EU Africa strategy was not impressive, it has been developed fairly quickly under British presidency and basically just expressed the consensus at the time. It came in 2005, a time of ‘Africa-hype’. The problem was that it was a unilateral strategy with very little consultations with Africans and little dialogue with the civil society. But it provided a context for the development of the joint strategy. (Informant E11, Brussels, 04/07/2008)

The title \textit{Strategic Partnership} did thus not reflect the development and formulation of the strategy as there was almost no input from the African side, therefore the strategy was seen very suspiciously by the African delegations. However, the British presidency in 2005 and

\textsuperscript{59} European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 2004-2009
the ‘Africa-hype’ laid the foundations for the Lisbon summit and a more thorough European engagement with Africa. When the preparations for the Lisbon summit started there was a consensus that a new strategy for European-African relations would have to be jointly formulated. Another European official involved in the process recalled that the previous (EU developed-) EU-Africa strategy was thrown out in order to make it possible to develop a joint strategy on a truly equal basis. Both sides were very serious and engaged very thoroughly with the process and the other side’s position. (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

The spirit of cooperation and partnership was also expressed in the name, The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership – A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Whilst the term Strategic Partnership was adopted from the 2005 EU-Africa strategy, the new strategy’s Joint character is specifically emphasised along with the wording order in the title changing EU and Africa to Africa-EU. European informants emphasised that the formulation process was consultative and that both sides started with “a blank sheet of paper” in order to produce a truly joint document (Informants E11, Brussels, 04/07/2008; E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). For the most part the European assertions about the cooperative character of the Lisbon summit and the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy were echoed by their African counterparts. An EAC official identified the Lisbon summit, and the strategy, as a “new step towards cooperation and a true partnership which is being put on an increasingly equal basis” (Informant L1, Arusha, 18/03/2008). Similarly, informants on the AU level praised the newly developed “equal fora for discussion and negotiation” (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008) as well as the “theoretical commitment of the Europeans to move to a more equal relationship and work in the interest of the African countries” (Informant L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008).

Whilst the 2005 EU-Africa strategy centred around an increase in quantity and quality of EU ODA to Africa, the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy focuses on elements of cooperation and partnership. Rhetorically the emphasis on joint/common/cooperative approaches is obvious;
along with the wording order: Africa first, then Europe. The opening phrases are almost identical: The 2005 document started with reminding the reader that

Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all their peoples. (EC 2006a, 10)

With similar contents, yet rhetorically slightly different, the 2007 strategy commences with the words:

Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the constitutive texts of our respective Unions. (EC 2007a, 1)

As further regards contents, the 2007 document has considerable overlaps with the 2005 strategy. The joint strategy outlines four main objectives of a long-term African-European strategic partnership (ibid, 2-3) :

1) To reinforce and elevate the African-EU political partnership that treats Africa as one with the goal to enable a continent-to-continent partnership with the AU and the EU at the centre

2) To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa, and to ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 2015.

3) To jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative and legitimate institutions, and the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns

4) To facilitate a people-centred partnership and empower civil society and non-state actors

Within these objectives, the specific areas for cooperation strategies that have been identified are a) peace and security, b) governance and human rights, c) trade and regional integration and d) key development issues (EC 2007a, 4). The tone of the entire document
purposely omits references to unequal donor-recipient relations or specific ODA flows, instead it highlights areas of possible collaboration and constructive partnership. Yet, a certain imbalance remains. As an EAC official expressed it, it is well understood that such a “partnership is between a strong and a weak partner, but they realised that they need each other and therefore the partnership is being put increasingly on a more equal basis” (Informant L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008). Clearly the Joint Africa-EU Strategy has sparked hopes for a more equal relation, but both African and European informants pointed out that this is only the beginning in developing the relations between the two continents into a more balanced partnership than previously.

5.1.4 Reflections of the EU’s civilian power identity in its major strategy papers

The documents examined here show significant similarities in some respects, but also major differences in others. On the one hand, as Table 1 sets out they articulate with the civilian power concept and an interest in promoting a civilianized international system and universal values. Those are first and foremost the commitment to human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice.

The key principles of A world player and The EU in the world are the promotion of peace and security, human rights, democracy, good governance, rule of law; the shaping of globalisation with putative trade benefits for all; a multilateral, institutionalised common foreign and security policy including the development of military structures for the regulated use of force to defend civilianized structures.

The European Consensus on Development puts central importance on improving coherence of European development policy through internationally shared responsibility; as well as on “supporting democracy, human rights, good governance and respect for international law, in promoting the participation of civil society and North-South solidarity”
(EPCC 2006b); along with support of trade and regional integration, economic and institutional reforms, conflict prevention and fragile states, human development, social cohesion and employment.

The EU Strategy for Africa and the Joint Africa-EU strategy specifically point to peace and security, human rights and good governance, sustainable economic growth, regional integration and trade, and investing in people; as well as the need for “democratic principles and the rule of law; and effective well-governed states, and strong and efficient institutions” (EC 2006a, 12)

The crosscutting aspects of the documents and the civilian power discourse are shown in Table 1.

**Table 1: Civilian power aspect in major EU documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Power</th>
<th>A world player/The EU in the world</th>
<th>European Consensus on Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>restrictions and regulations for the use of force</td>
<td>peace and security, regulated military structures</td>
<td>support of conflict prevention and fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td>respect for international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multilateralism and participatory decision making</td>
<td>multilateral CFSP and democracy</td>
<td>coherent development policy and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free trade and social balance on a global level</td>
<td>trade benefits for all</td>
<td>trade and North-South solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generally binding norms and values</td>
<td>human rights and good governance</td>
<td>human rights and good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supranationalism and institution-building</td>
<td>institutionalised CFSP</td>
<td>internationally shared responsibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author
They represent central tenets of the EU’s self-understanding and of Europe’s collective external relations, articulated in discourses on Europe’s role in the world (see Chapter II), official strategies (see Section 5.1) and by European foreign political personnel (see Chapters VI and VII). As such they form the basis for representations of European space in terms of Europe’s identity, presence and power as it will be outlined in the following sections.

On the other hand, there are also pronounced differences between the various EU documents. A world player and The EU in the world, for instance, prioritise the EU’s trade-related interests and the EU position as an influential actor with a global reach. It is specifically stated that the EU will always defend “its legitimate economic and commercial interest in the international arena” (EC 2004, 3). In this respect both The European Consensus on Development and the EU Strategy for Africa differ rather significantly. The former clearly emphasises that all external actions “are important and should be coherent, mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other” (EPCC 2006b). It even goes a step further by calling for policy coherence in the sense that all policies affecting developing countries (including trade policies) should contribute to the achievement of development objectives. However, both documents are from a strongly developmentally-oriented background. Even though adopted by all major EU institutions, DG Development and Louis Michel significantly shaped the contents. It is thus not surprising that development interests take a much more elevated position than they do in documents dealing with the EU’s general external relations.

The most recent document, the Joint Africa-EU strategy, is in itself a rather different document as it has not exclusively been developed by European Union agencies. Unlike the other documents its formulation was a cooperative effort of African and European stakeholders. It is much less Eurocentric and does not aim to position the EU in its relations with either the rest of the world, or the developing world, or Africa – as it is the case in the other documents; instead it seeks to outline possibilities for African-European partnerships and cooperation. Its joint formulation has been portrayed as one of the key factors for the
(perceived) success of the Africa-EU Lisbon summit in Lisbon and for “putting the relationship”
on a more equal basis in future. Also European informants acknowledged that the unilaterally
formulated EU-Africa strategy (2005) would not set a foundation for such processes. Yet, many
of the issues addressed do not differ significantly from the previous documents, the main
differences lie in the cooperative rhetoric and its emphasis on joint approaches as well as on
moving beyond the traditional donor-recipient relationship. Overlaps with the civilian power
ideas are identifiable in a variety of aspects, ranging from a peaceful security architecture and
good governance to participatory and cooperative modes of policy conduct on all levels
through democracy, multilateralism, institution-building. The most obvious similarities,
however, are clearly with respect to issues of regional integration and trade promotion.

The function of the EC/EU as a role model for regional integration has been identified in
key articulations of civilian power ideas and Europe’s role in the world (Duchêne 1972, 1973b;
Maull 2005; Telò 2006; Bretherton and Vogler 2006) since the early 1970s. This also features
prominently in official EU documents. The strategy paper The EU in the world, for instance,
asserts that the EU “serves as a model for cooperation and integration between countries in
other regions” (EC 2007c, 4) and encourages ACP-countries “to foster economic integration
with regional neighbours as a step towards their global integration” (ibid, 10). In the African
context the Joint Africa-EU Strategy following the December 2007 Africa-EU Lisbon summit
articulates “trade and regional integration” as one of the four areas for which specific
strategies are being put in place within the long-term strategic African-European partnership
(EC 2007a, 4). The resulting first action plan for 2008-2010 specifies that “Africa has adopted
socio-economic and political integration as a key development strategy. The EU has undergone
a successful process of integration and can usefully share its experience with Africa” (EC
2007d, 16). More specifically to the context of East Africa, the two focal areas in the EC
regional strategy paper for East Africa are “Regional Economic Integration” and “Regional
Political Integration” (EC 2008b, 9). In the Kenyan case, the EC country strategy paper outlines
as the first of three focal areas for EC cooperation with Kenya the support of “Regional economic integration by means of transport infrastructure” (EC 2007e, vii).

Ideas initially conveyed through the civilian power discourse thus became fundamental conceptions for defining the EU’s role in the world and with developing countries. Bearing in mind that, from the very beginning, the civilian power debate was focussing on Europe’s collective role in the world, it certainly did not exclusively create the ideas suggested in EU strategy papers. EU policy documents were not being formulated to the civilian power blueprint. Nonetheless, the civilian power debate first articulated some of the ideas that are now being frequently employed in the design of EC external relations. The civilian power debate has always been both a vision for a collective European role in the world and an analytical tool for conceptualising its foreign policy behaviour. As such, complex interlinkages and reciprocal impetuses between the debate and aligned practical European policies have developed. In some countries debate and policy are linked closer with each other than in others, however, in particular in EC external relations documents there are considerable overlaps with ideas articulated in the civilian power debate. Key for the EU to exercise international actorness along the lines suggested in its policy documents is a civilianized international system characterised by regulated spaces of interaction in which power is exercised through functional spheres of influence as opposed to territorial ones (Duchêne 1972, 39).
5.2 Constructing European space in the international system

5.2.1 European ‘space’ as a political construct

Historically, geographical representations of Europe have changed and it would be fallacious in the extreme to contend that there are secure understandings of this continental space. (Dodds 2007a, 99)

As outlined in Chapter III, Europe’s particular version of geopolitical space has not exclusively been shaped through internal determination by Europe. It was heavily influenced by the geopolitical constellations of the Cold War and colonialism as well as historical experiences and other political, cultural, and social factors. It ‘grew’ in an ad hoc manner instead of being deliberately shaped. Nonetheless, the particular version of space which materialised within the EC/EU is generally agreed upon by its constituents to be the preferred structure for interaction with each other. Within the EU, international politics became domesticated, civilianized. Yet, the process of evolving space continues. Just as European space evolved and materialised within Europe, historical experiences, external circumstances and internal preferences continue to shape European visions for the constitution of the international system and Europe’s collective role in it. The positive experience of interaction within such civilianized space in Europe, of such regulated spaces of interaction, Europe’s relatively limited abilities to project military power as well as social, political and cultural preference for civilianized foreign policy influenced the debate on and the visions of European geopolitics. One example of such regulated spaces of interaction in European geopolitical visions is shown in Figure 11.
The figure is taken from a publication by the European Spatial Planning and Observation Network (ESPON)\textsuperscript{60} entitled *Europe in the World - Territorial evidence and visions*. It portrays a suggested vision for Europe’s role in the world, “The Regional Vision: a strategic vision of Europe”, that combines elements of three previously outlined visions. The “continent” vision suggests limited interaction between the EU 27 territory, aggregated with Switzerland, Norway, Turkey and the Western Balkans, and the rest of the world and a focus on creating

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\textsuperscript{60} ESPON is a Commission agency, physically headquartered in Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxemburg and networked with universities and/or spatial planning agencies in all EU member countries (except Cyprus and Lithuania, but including Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). ESPON aims to increase “knowledge about territorial structures, trends and policy impacts in the enlarged European Union” (ESPON 2004, 7) and as such forms part of “a new discourse of European space [whereby] new modes of thought, forms of knowledge and practices emerged, which significantly shaped the EU policy agenda” (Jensen and Richardson 2004, ix)
cohesion within this territory. The “centre-periphery” vision advocates intense integration of Europe’s “immediate developing periphery” to the East and the South. This would serve to build a powerful – Eurocentric - region as one of three dominant economic centres in the world, but would also be characterised by highly asymmetric relationships within the region. The “archipelago” vision proposes a strong integration of (Western European) metropolitan areas in the world economy and as central nodes in a globally networked system. Disparities within Europe, however, would substantially increase (ESPON 2007, 61-76).

ESPON has no formal authority over European external relations, and does not claim for these visions to be – or become – policy. With the “Regional” vision, on the other hand, it suggests an alternative that comprises and rejects certain elements of the previous three visions. It combines the importance of international flows and networks and at the same time recognises the relevance of the European neighbourhood and of territorial configurations in certain EU policies, in particular the border regimes and the regional cohesion policies. Yet, here too questionable imaginations of Europe’s global role are compressed into a – even more questionable – conception thereof. As such all four visions are no more than possible illustrations for multiple ways on how to think about “Europe in the world”. Most importantly, however, the ESPON publication presents an example of how such geopolitical visions of Europe and its role in the world are constructed and amalgamated from a variety of factors and how regulating the spaces of interaction, within Europe and with other parts of the world, is intrinsic to each of the visions presented.

The ability to influence or shape space and the resulting power positions are topics of traditional and central concern for the study of geopolitics. In fact for Dalby (1990, 33) the “interrelationship of space and power” is the general concern that all meanings of geopolitics have in common. Both are mutually reinforcing. It requires power and a means of power projection for shaping space, and at the same time the formation of space according to a
specific actor’s preferences increases the power of the actor within this space. In the case of European integration, it became easier to shape internal space in Europe the further this process had advanced and the more of such space had materialised. This is probably best exemplified by the increasing competencies of the European Commission over time. Very much like the double function of the civilian power concept as an analytical tool and a geopolitical vision for an integrating Europe, civilianized structures of internal European space also have a double function. Those structures are both the means through which the EU projects space and a goal to be achieved by the projection of European space. Jensen and Richardson recognise this double function and point out that “European space itself is the subject of a fledging policy field which seeks to create a vision for its future, and to impose order on actions within it” (2004, 5).

As outlined in Section 3.1, the regulated spaces of civilianized structures constitute the basis for the EU’s operations and means of power projection, therefore their promotion has become central to the EU’s external relations. Civilianized structures and European space are thus tightly interwoven. European space depends on civilianized structures for its functioning and civilianized structures are much of what constitutes European space. In a non-civilianized international system power and actorness of the EU would be significantly reduced, because its power projection tools outside such a system are very limited. Whilst, in the words of a Nairobi-based European official, “the EU has internally transformed foreign policy into domestic policy through its specific European approach to international relations” (Informant E8, Nairobi, 05/12/2007), it remains central for the EU’s external relations to “domesticate relations between states, including [...] those with states outside its frontiers” (Duchêne 1973b, 19) and thus to “transfer the interior level of civilianized structures to the international system” (Kirste and Maull 1996, 301; my translation). The underlying idea of exporting its internally developed space to the international system is a common position in EU statements. A European official in Nairobi, for instance, pointed out that
The appeal and the global role of the EU lies in the example it has set on how to build a strong union in a peaceful and stable way. Globally it should serve as a role model for others in regional integration to act likewise on how to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity by promote European values and supranationalism. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007)

In similar terms, major EU publications, such as *The EU in the world* (EC 2007c, 4) assert that:

Having brought stability and prosperity to its own citizens today, the EU seeks to work with others in an interdependent world to spread the advantages of open markets, economic growth and a political system based on social responsibility and democracy. [...] In 50 years, the Union has brought together 27 countries which have successfully pooled economic and political resources in the common interest. As such, it serves as a model for cooperation and regional integration between countries in other regions.

In particular, the EU’s own efforts for regional integration are often considered as the central aspect of Europe’s identity and European space, internally as well as in the EU’s external relations. As a DG Development official expressed it: “The inherently ‘European thing’ is regional integration” (Informant E12, Brussels, 04/07/2008). Likewise, a German official working on regional integration in East Africa sees the EU ideally positioned to be a model for “all aspects of regional integration and the promotion of civilian forms of conduct” (Informant E21, Arusha, 18/03/2008). Similar views have frequently been communicated by other informants (see Chapters VI and VII), in the respective literature (see Chapter II) as well as in official documents provided by the EU (EC 2007a, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2008b). As a model for regional integration the EU provides a substantial appeal to other regions in the world (see Chapter VII and Fioramonti and Poletti 2008; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009a). It is on issues of regional integration where Europe’s competences are most concentrated and where the EU is the most legitimate and the most credible actor in the world. Currently the EU is the only significant actor of its kind in the international system. The EU, with its considerable head-start, would most likely occupy a lead role amongst others, thereby significantly enhancing its influence on the structures, processes and flows of the international system. Consequently,
regional integration as an inherent aspect of European space becomes a key element of EU external relations and the external projection of European space.

5.2.2 The external projection of European space

For the EU it became possible to promote its preferred structures internationally because, according to Telò (2006, 57), the “existence of EU civilian and multilateral power in the world is thus an incontrovertible fact and well exceeds a mere ‘vague influence’”. The EU is thereby understood as a strongly value-based community conducting its external relations based on the values declared and practised at both internal and external levels. These include human right, democracy, peace and the settlement of conflicts, justice and tolerance, combined with the non-military instruments used by the EU to conduct external relations and international actions and, above all, the possible dissemination of elements of the regional integration experience to other continents, as a way of achieving democracy and lasting peace (Telò 2006, 255-256).

As part of the processes that lead to the creation of that kind of European space these values became internalised by an integrated/integrating Europe, and now the presence of and commitment to these values is constitutive of European space. Such notions were also frequently articulated by European diplomats in Nairobi. A Finnish diplomat, for instance, envisions a leading European role “parallel to the US” which presents the EU as a “value-based union and a counterforce to US foreign policy” (Informant E19, Nairobi, 26/11/2007). Also a German diplomat suggested that for the EU to act internationally as a “clearly value-based actor, with values different to those of other major actors. Those include human rights, soft power, civilian power, but also militarily, however, very institutionalised and regulated” (Informant E20, Nairobi, 17/12/2007). The informants’ statements articulate well with Maull’s contribution to the European civilian power debate (see Chapter III); he argues that, as a civilian power, the EU has been advancing
universal observance of human rights and the rule of law and institutions; [...] the development of constraints on the use and instruments of force [...] and the promotion of universal social justice through support for development and of broad political participation in addressing ‘global issues’ (Maull 2005, 786).

[Yet], the role concept of a civilian power [also] suggests the specific way in which military force will be applied—never alone and autonomously, but only collectively, only with international legitimacy, and only in the pursuit of ‘civilizing’ international relations. (ibid, 781)

With respect to ‘civilizing’ the EU’s international relations with the developing world, the EU specifically emphasises that “partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote common values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice” (EPCC 2006a, 3). Another EU publication, A world player highlights, the significance the EU puts on promoting peace and security as well as human rights through “strengthening democracy, good government and the rule of law” (EC 2004, 7).

Those aspects have always been constitutive elements of European integration and the civilian power debate and are, at least as the documents communicate, also fundamental objectives of the Union’s external relations. An Ethiopian-based European official sees Europe as a role model for peace, stability, regional integration and the creation of common values and common sense in a particular area. Europe overcame the structures of forceful conflict settlement and developed civilianized structures. It should export those to the world. (Informant E15, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

As pointed out above, on its own territory the EU has successfully created civilianized structures and produced European space. The projection of European space within the EU always reflects elements of what it is projected upon. It is inherent to Europe, but not to the external cooperation partners. Internal and external projection thus differ. Internal projection creates, modifies and adapts itself in and through the geographical area, the structures, processes and flows it is projected upon. The respective identities are the same as the ones which constitute the space in the first place. Even though the projected space is an
amalgamated European space and will thus somehow differ amongst the individual national space of member states, there are always overlaps. European space is therefore not exclusively perceived as imposed, because it always contains familiar elements which contributed to constructing such European space in the first place. As a result, within Europe it tends to be perceived less as external projection, but rather as an internal process of cultural, social, economic, and political evolution. In a related debate on “spatialities of Europeanisation” Clark and Jones (2008, 300) argue that “Europeanisation’s myriad socialisation and learning processes have been configured over centuries by territorial propinquity and sites of government and power, with construction and projection of these continent-wide processes by political elites integral to nation building and latterly European integration, that is the building of ‘EUrope’”. When externally projected, on the other hand, European space is not inherent to the territories, structures and actors. It does not redefine itself through internal processes. It is a completely external construction and its projection might require substantial adaptation to something completely unfamiliar, because it is not an amalgamation of internal identities with neighbouring ones.

Europe, however, has a long history of attempts of forceful projection of what was considered superior and civilizational spaces (O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten 1990; Sidaway and Power 2005). Geopolitical writings have always been part of this history and despite their differences they had “one common theme: the production of knowledge to aid the practice of statecraft and further the power of the state” (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 192). The ideas underlying the promotion of European space in form of a civilianized international system certainly take a different character to prior European imperial and colonial missions to ‘civilize’ the world. Yet, those histories cannot easily be dismissed – as Galtung pointed out as early as 1973 (see Section 3.1.3).

Whilst the promotion of European space as conceptualised here differs consciously from earlier imperial aspirations, it too articulates an attempt by Europe(ans) to export a
political, economic and social model to the rest of the world. Even though the EU claims “not to impose its system on others” (EC 2007c, 4), the legitimacy of exporting its political-economic model is constantly expressed in EU documents (see Section 5.1) and widely shared by European elites (see Chapter VII). In this context Ó Tuathail reminds us that “the imposition and smooth unfolding of such imperial orders of space has never been without contestation and resistance” (1996, 256). Any external projection of European space needs to be aware of Europe’s troubled history in this respect.

5.3 The EU’s presence and development engagement in East Africa

The understanding of European space as identity, presence and power within a geopolitical system in terms of structures processes and flows (see Sections 3.1 and 5.2.1 and 5.2.2) forms the basis for constructions and perceptions of European space in the context of my research. European relations with sub-Saharan Africa occupy a rather unique position in EU external relations with most official EU documents communicating a sense of responsibility on Europe’s part for African development. This is frequently articulated in official documents (Michel 2006; EC 2007a, 2007c, 2007d), by European informants interviewed during this research (Informants E11 and E12, both Brussels, 04/07/2008; E15 and E16, both Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008) and is often cartographically depicted by EU agencies, such as ESPON (see below and Footnote 60). With respect to the geopolitical meaning of cartographic representations Dodds (2007a, 143) argues that: “Maps are conceived as instruments of power and states have long recognized the importance of mapping”. The European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) is an EU agency that develops and utilises such ‘instruments of power’ for territorial expressions of EU power and influence, both within the EU and beyond. Figure 12 outlines a typology of four different sets of European influence in the world. Type A (integration) is a group of states in the immediate neighbourhood and with strong connections
to EU territory. Type B (responsibility [falsely labelled ‘Responsability’ in the figure]), are mainly African states (plus Afghanistan) where the EU plays a key development (and sometimes security) role. Type C (opportunity) are places such as Australia, Brazil or South Asia, distant from EU, but which share widespread use of a European language and colonial history, and which are envisaged as partners in a context where services represent a major part of added value and where scientific and cultural innovations are major factors for long-term development. Finally, Type D presents a challenge, as these are the parts of the world where historical links from European countries remain relatively weak (such as China) and/or whose rapid development poses special challenges (ESPON 2004, 64-65).

Figure 12: Typology of European Influence in the World

Type A: Integration
- A.1: Ukraine
- A.2: Tunisia

Type B: Responsability
- B: Cameroon

Type C: Opportunity
- C.1: India
- C.2: Brazil

Type D: Challenge
- D.1: Vietnam
- D.2: China

Source: ESPON 2004, 64
Whilst the ESPON typologies have no formal influence on EU external relations, they depict certain geopolitical imaginations of regulated spaces of interaction between Europe and the rest of the world. Based on the conceptualisations of the previous sections, this section addresses the manifestation of European space in the context of development policy and the areas of my research.

5.3.1 European space in Kenya, at the EAC and the AU

The power projection element of EU aid involves efforts to reform the state, laws and institutions, change the socio-economic power structure more generally and develop regional integration. This reforming of states and regions along lines favourable to the EU’s power may or may not involve democratization, although it certainly involves political liberalization. (Holden 2009, 183)

As one of the most vibrant hubs of the international development industry and the key node in East Africa, Nairobi offered the possibility to conduct research on the European interaction with the Republic of Kenya, the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union (AU). In all three cases, however, European interaction and the projection of European space varied considerably (see Chapter VI).

The immediately visible manifestation of European space in Kenya is the Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Kenya (DelKEN), a relatively large and significant European representation responsible also for EC affairs with Somalia, the Horn of Africa as well as the Great Lakes region (see Figure 13). According to a European official in Nairobi, the three main areas of interaction between the EC and Kenya are trade, political dialogue and development cooperation (informant E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007). Kenyan-European trade relations are set within the long-term framework of ACP-EU agreements and are currently being renegotiated with the goal to reach a new Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Economically, the EU is Kenya’s most important partner by a wide margin, accounting for 20 percent of its imports and 28 percent of its exports. As such Kenya’s trade volume with the EU
is roughly triple the size of the trade volume with its second and third most important trade partner, the UAE and China respectively (EC 2008a). Politically, on the other hand, the EU – as an integrated union – plays a limited role in Kenya as most EU member states have embassies in Nairobi conducting political relations separately (see discussions on economic integration and political fragmentation in Section 3.2.2, 3.3 and 6.2).

**Figure 13: The European Commission Delegation in Kenya (DelKEN)** (picture taken by author)

Both political relations and development cooperation between DelKEN, as an expression of integrated Europe, and Kenya are outlined in the *Republic of Kenya – European Community Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013* (EC 2007e). The specific ‘political’ dimension of EC-Kenyan cooperation is defined through four cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in any field of cooperation. The first aims to strengthen “good governance, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and support for NSAs [non-state
In addition, it includes a cooperation agreement on ‘political dialogue’ between DelKEN and the Kenyan government. This has first been initiated in February 2002 and encompasses the areas of democratic principles, human rights, constitutional review, economic and structural reform, governance and environment, security and regional affairs (EC 2007e, 27). In this manner, key aspects of European space (see Section 5.2 and 5.3) are reflected in the cross-cutting issues and aspects for dialogue in this ‘political’ dimension of EC-Kenyan interaction.

This also applies to European-Kenyan development cooperation. It focuses on macroeconomic support in form of general and sector budget support (for more detail see section 6.2.3) for the focal areas of “regional economic integration by means of transport infrastructure” and “agricultural and rural development“. Non-focal sectors include capacity-building for “improving governance and strengthening non-State actors“ as well as “economic growth through trade and private sector development“ (EC 2007e, vii and 34-39). The strategy paper generally regulates the disbursement of the EDF allocated to Kenya and is thus embedded in the long-term European development framework of the Cotonou agreement. DelKEN thereby serves as the central institutions in Kenya, and partly also in the wider region, for the implementation.

Unlike the important role of the European delegation in Kenya, there is no direct EC/EU representation at the EAC. Cooperation and political relations are communicated through the Delegation of the European Commission to Tanzania (DelTAN) and financial procurement is handled by the secretariat of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

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61 The others focusing on rights of children, indigenous peoples and gender equality, environmental sustainability and the fight against HIV/AIDS.
62 The problems of a constitutional review as well as economic and structural reforms have been particularly relevant to Kenyan politics since the campaign leading up to the general elections in December 2002. The lack of a constitutional reform during the first Kibaki presidency (2002-2007) was one of the reasons that contributed to the escalating violence after the general elections in December 2007 (see Section 4.2).
(Informants E12, Brussels, 04/07/2008; L9 and L10, both Arusha, 18/03/2008). Informal and technical cooperation between EC directorates-general and the respective subdivisions at the EAC is facilitated through both a DFID and a GTZ Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP) (informant E21, Arusha, 18/03/2008).

Relations between the European Commission and the EAC are part of the EC’s administrative structure dealing with the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean and are outlined in the Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013 (EC 2008b). This putative region comprises the regional organisations of the Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and thus stretches across a range of countries as diverse as Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Swaziland, and the Seychelles. Within the ACP framework, in itself an artificially created conglomeration of states that were grouped together in the context of the launch of the European Development Funds (EDF), six administrative subdivisions had been created. Even more so than the ACP-bloc itself, the formation of the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean bears no natural coherence and is a result of European administrative structures and the European preference of regulating spaces of interaction with other regions. Europe has thereby deliberately promoted the construction of an extrinsic spatial structure in Africa that is convenient for Europe’s structures and processes of regulating interaction. The impression remains that modes of European organisation of

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63 Between July 2008 and January 2009 the EAC was undergoing an audit for a Contribution Agreement (CA) which would enable it to receive and administer funds from the EC, independent of COMESA. An internal communication from the European Commission’s Delegation in Tanzania to DG DEV and AIDCO at the Commission, however, states: ‘We cannot provide reasonable assurance that, should a contribution agreement be signed between the EC and the EAC there are mechanisms and controls in place to ensure that the funds will be used for their intended purpose. [...] It is clear that on the basis of these findings it is not an option to the current stage to process with a Contribution Agreement for EAC, even though this should be the target for both them and us’ (confidential communication, received from an informant).

64 The Caribbean; West Africa; East and Southern Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa and the Pacific.
African space, which had their most symbolic expression in the Berlin Conference in 1884/85 when European countries drew borders in Africa, persist.

AU-EU interaction, however, appears to have entered a new phase with the Africa-EU Lisbon summit and the establishment of the European Union Delegation to the African Union (DelAU) (see Section 6.1). As such it is different to EU-EAC relations where such regulated spaces of interaction are less pronounced. It is also unlike EU-Kenya relations that are overshadowed by economic issues and specific infrastructure programmes as well as representations of EU member states in Kenya. Even though also for AU-EU relations, the EU’s weight as a globally important ‘economic’ actor plays a significant role, interaction largely manifests in ‘political’ relations and partnerships between the two regional organisations (see Sections 6.2 and 6.4). The main frameworks for African-European ‘economic’ interaction are not negotiated on the AU-EU level. The commission negotiates those with individual countries or smaller groupings of countries, thus shifting the focus in AU-EU relations from economic issues to spaces of interaction for political debate and partnership.

At the Lisbon summit in December 2007 the heads of state as well as AU and EU institutions took steps towards jointly establishing institutionalised and regulated spaces of such interactions, leading to the agreement on tangible cooperative partnerships in eight commonly identified sectors (EC 2007d). Those partnerships are intended to be carried out jointly through cooperation between the respective sections at the AU and the EU whereby the institutional proximity between the two is supposed to facilitate implementation.

However, even though modelled on the EU, the AU took a different evolutionary path than the EU where integration increased gradually mostly through the economic medium over more than five decades. As Griggs (2003, 73) points out, Europe’s “starting point was a cluster of [six] stable states, not every European country”. The AU on the other hand is a nascent

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65 Peace and Security; Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure; Millennium Development Goals; Energy; Climate Change; Migration, Mobility and Employment; and Science, Information Society and Space.
political, intergovernmental grouping of all African states\textsuperscript{66}, subdivided by several other regional organisations. Yet the AU occupies an exceptional position in EU external relations. Unlike with European representations in individual countries where the commission and EU member states are present, at the AU DelAU is the only permanent European representation; mandated by the Commission as well as the member countries. A DelAU official described it as a “completely new structure of European foreign relations” (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). DelAU, as the only external institutional representation of the EU as a whole, thus features a unique manifestation of European space beyond European territory.

In each case – Kenya, EAC and AU – European space thus manifests differently and operates through different structures, processes and flows (see Table 4 in Section 6.4). In Kenya, DelKEN projects a strong ‘economic’ actor in particular on trade-related issues with a development cooperation programme centred around regional integration, budget support and transport infrastructure. Also the ‘political’ dimension reflects key aspects of European space, such as good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (EC 2007e), however, the EC’s role in this respect is limited due to the representations of EU member states. Similarly at the EAC level, the two focal areas of cooperation, Regional Economic Integration and Regional Political Integration (EC 2008b), are very much in line with the general objectives of EC external relations. Yet, here too the EC’s role is limited as there is no specific representation of the EU or the EC to the EAC or vice versa. With respect to the African Union, on the other hand, European space features strongly and significantly different to the other two cases; strongly as a ‘political’ partner with a limited ‘economic’ role (see Section 6.2). The four main objectives of the partnerships aiming - amongst other things - for structural reform of the international system towards “effective multilateralism, with strong, representative and legitimate institutions” (EC 2007a, 2-3) articulate central parameters of

\textsuperscript{66} Except Morocco

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European space. In addition, the institutional proximity and their roles in the international system almost make AU and EU partners by default. Through establishing eight specific partnerships this cooperation has been given a practical dimension in Lisbon, including regulated spaces of how to conduct this interaction.

In all three cases, however, development ‘aid’ functions as an “indirect instrument of structural power” (Holden 2009, 182) for the external projection of European space. As such it serves the EU’s goal to “achieve genuine coherence between its domestic and its external agendas” (EC 2007e, 1).

5.4 Summary: Geopolitical space and European space

The critical literatures on geopolitical space (e.g. Agnew and Corbridge 1989, 1995; Dalby 1990, 1991; Luke 1993; Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992; Ó Tuathail 1996; Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998b), civilian power and Europe (Duchêne 1972, 1973b; Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 2005; Telò 2006; Beck and Grande 2007) or official EU documents (EC 2004, 2007c; EPCC 2006a) overlap considerably in the articulation of their particular vision of the structure of the international system. Conceptualising geopolitical space in terms of structures, process and flows thereby forms the basis for the construction and projection of European space understood as identity, presence and power in the context of this thesis.

These three facets of European space are closely linked with each other and with the understanding of geopolitical space outlined above: The EU’s identity is based on the civilianized structures it has created on its own territory as well as the institutionalised processes and regulated spaces of interaction between its member states. The EU shows presence through the development, implementation and regulation of those structures, processes and flows. This is closely aligned with its civilian dimension in a sense of a commitment to the fundamental civilian principles of the discourse and a way of exerting
influence in the international system through what Robert Kagan has described – albeit from a very different viewpoint – as Europe’s preference for “peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion” and its appeal to “international law, international conventions, and international opinion to adjudicate dispute” (Kagan 2003, 4-5). The EU’s *power* expresses in the capability to promote its model of political-economic organisation on a broader international scale. In this context the *power* dimension differs to the *civilian* dimension’s way of exerting influence in a sense that it projects power and European interests more assertively, in certain cases this includes claiming the right to shape “the domestic political and economic structures of other countries” (Holden 2009, 21). However, both dimensions and ways of exerting influence are inextricably linked and constitutive parts of the EU’s identity as well as its interactions with other players in the international system (see Figures 14, 15 and Section 6.2.1).

**Figure 14: European space as identity, presence and power**

![European space as identity, presence and power](image)

Source: author

European space, on the most general level, thus refers to regulated spaces of interaction between different actors in a largely civilianized international system. As outlined above this derives from the evolution of Europe’s *identity* as a civilian power, the *presence* of the EU as such a system and the *power* to influences its structures, processes and flows. It implies the preference to act within (and to some extent also the dependence on) such a civilianized system and therefore the objective to promote it internationally. Structurally, this refers to a way of interaction that has domesticated international relations, i.e. that is (at least partially)
institutionalised, bound by a set of rules, and that has developed civilian ways of conflict resolution. Thematically, its central attributes of multilateralism, supranational integration, rule of law, institution-building, democracy, good governance and human rights mark the cornerstones of European space. Europe’s empirical proof for the functioning of such a system is the European Union. Through consolidation and expanding the necessary structures, regional integration was the process that made this model work in Europe and therefore becomes a central aspect of European space, the external projection thereof and hence of European development policy.

As discussed in Sections 3.1 and 5.2 the construction of European space (in East Africa) is understood as an ongoing social and political process, this process, however, has only been marginally influenced by the experiences of development cooperation and projecting such space in East Africa. Other factors, mostly external to European-Africa relations, such as the role of the US, the Cold War, European integration, American neo-conservatism, appear to have been prioritised in the conception of development policies. European-African relations thus rarely ever acted as such constructing elements of European space. This indicates a relatively low priority of those relations in the broader external relations portfolio of European external relations. Even though M&E (monitoring and evaluation) reports are a frequent exercise for development cooperation projects and have an impact on specific aspects of development policy conduct, the broader policies and objectives are predetermined in Brussels; often as a result of negotiations with OECD countries and mediations of different interests within the European Commission and between the member states. The relation between construction and projection of European space is thus unidirectional, not reciprocal. Conceptions and articulations of European space and Europe’s collective role in the world have a decisive influence on the projection of European space and development policies in East Africa, whereas the experiences of these interactions appear to have very limited impact on those conceptions and articulations.
CHAPTER VI: INTERACTION AND PROJECTION OF EUROPEAN SPACE IN EAST AFRICA

The European Union (EU) is a unique case in international development. It is both a bilateral donor - granting assistance through the European Community (EC) - and a multilateral donor - embodying the efforts of its twenty-seven Member States. (Carbone 2007, 1)

Chapter V has dealt with constructions of European space and how Europe’s identity is understood in the course of this research. Chapter VI will discuss how European space is manifest in the structures, processes and flows of EU relations with the AU, the EAC and Kenya as well as in the donor community in Nairobi.

The review of European development policy in Section 3.2 has demonstrated that European external relations are economically relatively integrated and politically relatively fragmented; despite attempts to harmonise foreign policy that started in the 1970s in the form of European Political Cooperation (EPC) (see Section 6.3). However, these attempts lead to what Wessels (1982, 4-6) described as a ‘coordination reflex’ that has been injected into the diplomatic behaviour of EC member states so that national policy positions were increasingly developed only after having consulted with European partners. Such adaptations of national policy making to processes of European integration are widely elaborated in the literature on Europeanization (Shore 2000; Knill 2001; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Tonra 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Clark and Jones 2008; Graziano and Vink 2008). With regard to external relations these processes can be described as

a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making. (Tonra 2000, 229)

In the context of such external dimensions of Europeanization, Wong refers to the notion of ‘coordination reflex’ and points out that “a reflexe communautaire becomes the
norm rather than the exception” (Wong 2008, 323). These observations also hold value for European development policy. Despite the multitude of European actors in the development industry, it is a policy field where national policies have been significantly influenced by processes of European integration as well as debates in the wider development community. The broad parameters of European interaction with the ACP-countries are set within the framework of the Cotonou agreement (EC 2000, 2006b). In addition to its focus on economic cooperation and trade issues the Cotonou agreement includes a variety of aspects for shaping political relations and development cooperation between the EU and the ACP-countries. As such, the Cotonou agreement sets the broad framework for the main tool of collective European development policy; the European Development Fund (EDF). In general terms, Holden (2009, 133) describes its previous round, the 9th EDF, as “standard development aid tweaked toward European interests and influence. [...] Its purpose is to promote poverty reduction and economic growth, which should enable regional integration and the EPAs”. These general objectives also remained in the focus of the 10th EDF which amounts to a total of € 22.7 billion for the period from 2008 to 201368. The subsequent analysis of European-African interaction will, however, not deal with the Cotonou agreement or the specificities of EDF allocations in great detail69. Instead it will focus on the trajectories of European external relations towards the African Union, the East African Community and the Republic of Kenya in the ‘political’ arena with a particular focus on development cooperation.

This chapter first discusses the implications of the Africa-EU summit in Lisbon in December 2007 for African-European interaction as well as aspects of inter- and intraregional cooperation in the design and implementation of European development cooperation. It then deals with the complexities of European external relations exercised by multiple actors, with multiple instruments as well as on multiple policy fields. It thereby outlines the particularities

69 For comprehensive overviews in this respect see (Dialer 2007; Nixson 2007; Carbone 2007, 2008; Holland 2008)
of this research approach and the issues considered here as well as the EC’s focus on budget support. The following section provides a comprehensive assessment of the European role in Kenya’s donor landscape as well as its institutionalised cooperation with the Kenyan government in form of the Kenya Joint Assistant Strategy (KJAS). Finally, Section 6.4 summarises the main arguments made in light of the understanding of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows as outlined in Chapter V.

6.1 Regulated spaces of interaction and the Lisbon Summit

6.1.1 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy and interactions with the AU and the EAC

On a continental level interaction between the EU and the AU became more intense and institutionalised after the Lisbon summit in December 2007 and the establishment of the European Union Delegation to the African Union (DelAU). In particular DelAU is expected, in the words of an AU official, “to improve and facilitate communication with both commission and council of the EU” (Informant L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008). As such the summit and the resulting Joint Africa-EU strategy had a significant impact on African-European relations and the formation of regulated spaces of interaction. This also applies to relations between the EU, the EAC and Kenya. Whilst, as outlined in section 5.3, European interaction with the EAC remains weak and with Kenya focussed on specific issues, the Lisbon summit and the resulting Joint Africa-EU Strategy can be situated in the wider debate on the structures, processes and flows of African-European interaction, of which relations with East Africa are just a part. The Lisbon summit and its implications for regulating the spaces of African-European interaction will therefore be discussed in more detail.

The attempt to generate such regulated spaces of interaction has, for instance, been exemplified prior and during the Lisbon summit through the controversy around the attendance of Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe. German chancellor Angela Merkel
renounced calls for a boycott underlining that Mugabe would have to face criticism on his
disastrous governance record by asserting that “we will make all our assessments heard. We
will also raise all our criticisms. We would do so in the presence of each and everyone” (quoted
in McVeigh 2007). After seven years of controversy over Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, the Africa-EU
summit was the first direct encounter of African and European leaders in an attempt to
establish regulated spaces for highest-level interaction. Despite the controversies about
Mugabe and the difficult negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), it
provided a forum for exchange and for addressing such controversies. The summit and the
previously formulated Joint Africa-EU strategy thus set a framework for future interaction
based on the principle of partnership.

In particular the set-up of DelAU and the process of formulating the strategy have been
described by African and European participants as steps towards overcoming traditional
donor-recipient relations and a genuine partnership (Informants E11, Brussels, 04/07/2008;
E16 and L1, both Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008; L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008). On the European side, it
was emphasised that the formulation process for the joint strategy started with “a blank sheet
of paper” (Informants E 11, Brussels, 04/07/2008; E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). For the
most part this cooperative spirit has been echoed by the African informants (Informants L1,
Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008; L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008; L9 and L10, both Arusha,
18/03/2008). Whilst the perception of an unequal partnership prevailed, these differences did
not necessarily translate into a domination of one over the other in the process of the strategy
formulation or the summit. Yet, despite the general satisfaction with the strategy and the
hopes that arose from it, a certain level of suspicion on part of the African informants
remained, as Europe has made commitments and promises before and frequently failed to live
up to it (Informants L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008; L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008). With respect
to the Joint Africa-EU strategy, an AU official pointed out that:

This strategy has the theoretical commitment of the Europeans to move to a more
equal relationship and work in the interest of the African countries. The question
is if Europe can change its mind in practice to treat Africa as equal? There is concern of the African countries if [sic] Europe would live up to its theoretical commitments and show the same commitment in practice. (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

Very similar assessments have been voiced in interviews with other informants involved in the process, including Europeans. A DelAU official by and large echoed his AU counterpart:

There is a strong need to get out of the donor-recipient relationship and move to a more equal partnership. Lisbon marked the beginning of truly restructuring this relationship. Now action needs to follow to proof the commitment through implementation. The EU is definitely taking Africa more serious now than it did before. DelAU is the first concrete step of the EU to implement the Lisbon strategy. (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

This first “concrete step” of establishing DelAU marked a clear sign on part of the EU (in particular in light of its joint mandate by the Commission and Council) for institutionalising and regulating the spaces of interaction between the EU and the AU. DelAU launched its operations in January 2008, merely a month after the Lisbon summit, with the initial staff of only seven: the head of the delegation, two staff in the political section, three staff in the technical section and an EU-AU military officer. In particular the fact that even such a limited number of staff comprises a military officer reveals European security interests in its cooperation with the African Union, expressed in programmes such as the EU financing of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). However, the wider importance of DelAU is the ambition to further regulate the spaces of interaction with the AU and the symbolic character of setting up a delegation to the African Union, as the EU’s only comparable sister organisation world-wide (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). As such it is a rather unique institution, only comparable to the Mission of the European Union in Skopje, Macedonia. Joint institutional representation of European Commission and Council marks a relatively new approach in EU external relations; setting up DelAU as the first of such representations outside Europe underlined the EU’s interest in its sister organisation in Africa and caused a perceived upgrade of the status as cooperation partner on part of African officials (Informant E15, Addis
Ababa, 22/02/2008). This cooperation manifests mainly in two ways. First, official communication and formal interaction conducted through the respective permanent representations, i.e. the EU Delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa and the African Union’s Permanent Mission in Brussels. Second, technical and day-to-day interaction between the respective DGs at both the EC and the AU (Informants E11, Brussels, 04/07/2008; L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008).

Also the European cooperation with the EAC falls within the spaces of interaction discussed in Lisbon. Just as the relations with the AU, the status of the EAC as a partner organisation for the EU is undergoing an upgrading process with the attempt to move away from the traditional top-down relationship. The EAC’s recent revival and reaffirmed commitment to further integration as well as the feasibility of the integration process in East Africa compared to other regions make the EAC appear as an increasingly favourable partner to the EU with a strong interest in gaining from the European integration experience. The current East African Community came into effect in July 2000 through reviving the integration process between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda that had collapsed when the first East African Community was dissolved in 1977, after only ten years of existence. As outlined in Section 5.4, interaction between the EAC and the EC are handled through DelTAN in Dar Es Salaam and the COMESA secretariat in Lusaka. In addition there is limited institutionalised interaction between some European agencies and the EAC. Since the re-launch or the East African integration process in the mid-1990s there has been a GTZ programme supporting regional integration in East Africa, now institutionally anchored within the EAC secretariat in Arusha. Additionally, there is a similar DfID programme, the Regional East Africa Integration Programme (REAP), that does not, however, have permanent representation to the EAC. Yet, both programmes are more integrated in the cooperation framework of their respective countries with the EAC than
they are with each other. With regard to the wider European involvement with EAC, a GTZ-official based in Arusha pointed out that

the EU was mostly focussing on bigger regional organisations, such as AU, COMESA, SADC because the EAC does not have the capacity to engage large scale with EU. More recently the EU has became more interested in developing relations with the EAC, but now the EAC has also more bilateral relations. (Informant E4, Arusha, 17/03/2008)

Similarly, an EC official in Brussels expressed the perception that “the EAC is still too small and weak to have more formalised relations, things are dealt with through DelTAN. But this will change; the contribution agreement\(^70\) is a very important step” (Informant E12, Brussels, 04/07/2008). On a less institutionalised and more thematic level, however, EAC sector coordinators interact and cooperate with their counterparts of the respective DGs in Brussels. Even though there are no permanent representations (EAC in Brussels, EU in Arusha) there are annual exchanges of EAC delegations to Brussels and vice versa addressing specific cooperation opportunities on all aspects of regional integration (Informant E21, Arusha, 18/03/2008). Despite the limited interaction, EAC officials repeatedly highlighted the EU’s role as their most important partner on all issues of regional integration. In particular the cooperation with DG Development and DG Trade has been mentioned as fruitful in the process of putting into place the customs union in East Africa and is expected to be similarly supportive in the aspiration of realising a common market – which is envisioned as “an almost exact replication of the EU’s” (Informants L9 and L10, both Arusha, 18/03/2008).

\(^70\) The informant is thereby referring to a Diagnostic Financing Agreement, which will allow the EAC to receive EC funds directly and avoid the ‘detour’ via the COMESA secretariat. The agreement was supposed to come into effect at the beginning of 2009, but has been postponed due to doubts about the institutional capacity of the EAC.
6.1.2 Inter- and intraregional cooperation

On a more general level the EU attempts to develop forms of global governance conducive to its model of operation and its values. One noteworthy aspect of this is the EU's efforts to develop region-region level cooperation. (Holden 2009, 17)

The attention attributed to the African Union on the part of the EU is hardly surprising because, as a European official in Addis Ababa expressed, there is not only an institutional closeness but also a historical and geographical proximity (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). Just as in Europe, ideas of regional integration in Africa and pan-Africanism look back to a long history (Griggs 2003, 73-74). Prominent proponents prior and during the decolonisation period in the 1950s and 1960s included Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere. Fifty years later the EU is seen by some as a “realised version of Nkrumah’s ideas and illustrates a functioning community” (Informant D16, Nairobi, 07/11/2007). When the African Union replaced the Organisation of African Unity in 2002 its institutional structure was modelled on the EU.

Through this institutional proximity and the common commitment to regional integration as their raison d’être, the EU and the AU share an interest in promoting such actors in the international system and their status in global politics. According to a DelAU official there is a strong European interest in

promoting regional integration in Africa, because in the age of globalisation Africa can only compete if it is integrated and speaks with one voice. But Europe also needs to interact with Africa in an integrated way, speaking with one voice (of the commission and the council), otherwise it will not work. Thereby European has to be an example on the global basis on how regional integration makes the bloc much more powerful and ‘prepare’ the world for such kind of actors within the system; it has to pave the way for Africa as regional bloc to enter the global scene. (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

Regarding the contents of African-European cooperation, a Brussels-based EC official pointed out that those are currently largely pre-occupied with issues in Africa. It should, however, be extended to a thorough political partnership including common assessments and
statements on global issues. Such partnerships should utilise the immense inherent potential and attempt to voice a common position in international conventions, constituting a very powerful voting bloc of roughly 80 countries (Informant E11, Brussels, 04/07/2008).

Leaving aside the institutional proximity of EU and AU, European relations with Africa have a long and troubled history (see Chapter III). Even though the character of European interaction with Africa is now a different from the colonial period, the colonial and (neo)imperial past (and present) cannot be dismissed when restructuring African-European relations and discussing European space in Africa. Even the ESPON map of Europe’s influence in the world (Figure 12 in Section 5.3) and the categorisation of Africa as an area of European responsibility bears remarkable similarities to Zischka’s map of Eurafrika (Figure 1 in Section 3.2.2), thereby implying - consciously or not - a certain residual neo-imperial vision and Europe’s history of exercising influence over African affairs. In this context a CIDA official in Nairobi pointed out that Europe is sometimes “blinded by its own success” on how the EU developed. Despite this success, he continued, Europe “has to recognise the limitations of the model, it does not necessarily work everywhere” (Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008).

The African-EU summit in Lisbon and the establishment of DelAU were attempts to break with such histories, but regulating the spaces of interaction remains the central endeavour. The goal appeared no longer to regulate domination but to set-up fora for negotiation, interaction, cooperation and the articulation of different opinions, similar to the way it is with other actors in the world and within the EU itself. Internally the EU also consists of weaker and stronger players with diverging viewpoints, yet the civilianized conduct of relations within the EU mediates such differences through regulated spaces of interaction.

71 Also the Lomé and Cotonou conventions had been announced as frameworks for entering into a new era of partnership. In hindsight, however, both have been regularly criticised for failing in this respect. Hurt (2003, 174) even argues that the “entire history of the official discourse of EU-ACP development cooperation can be dismissed as, to a large degree, false rhetoric that is subsumed by the realities and power relations of the international political economy”. It will have to be seen to what extent the Joint Africa-EU strategy will break with this tradition.
European space now has the objective of such regulation without domination or exploitation of the weaker by the stronger. As an EAC official pointed out, the inclusion of Eastern European countries into the EU is thereby often seen as a model for including developing countries into the world economy:

The EU has gone through a process of incorporating the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. It therefore knows and understands the difficulties weaker countries encounter and it is a good position to assist them to be included in the world economy.

The EU’s goal in its assistance to the CEE countries has been their inclusion into Europe and into the world economy, the partnership was not one of dominance because it has been realised that a fair partnership is in the mutual interest. The idea was to create economic opportunities for the weaker partner and include them, thereby using their strength. (Informant L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008)

Adapting this to European relations with the ACP-countries, another EAC official argued that “the EU has been very supportive of the ACP-group in WTO negotiations. It is seen as a partner by ACP countries in that respect. The ACP can exercise some influence globally through the EU” (Informant L9, Arusha, 18/03/2008). These accounts are clearly debatable. With respect to the EU-ACP relation, Hurt (2003, 161) contests that the EU has been “very supportive” of the ACP countries. The Cotonou agreement, he argues, “has significantly shifted the relationship further from one of co-operation to one of coercion”. Trade with ACP-countries is thus not determined by developmentally-oriented interests but “by the obligations of membership of the WTO” (Nixson 2007, 323).

Yet, the possibility of using the EU-vehicle to gain greater international influences is appealing as the quotes above illustrate. Also for European countries, in particular smaller ones, the EU offers a means to increase their influence in the international system. Acting through the EU, a Finnish official in Nairobi asserted, is preferable to unilateral policies:

For Finland, a strong role of the EU and of multilateral systems is very important. As a small country, Finland needs strong reference groups [such as its European

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72 For a background and discussions on the EU/ACP relations see Chapter III. For alternative views on the EU’s East Enlargement see Baldwin et al. (1997), Henderson (1999), Agnew (2001), Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003), Grzymala-Busse and Innes (2003), Kuus (2004) and Schadler (2007).
partners] and if Finland is active in those, it serves its interest better than acting alone. (Informant E19, Nairobi, 26/11/2007)

Such foreign policy strategy has been described by Wong (2008, 325) as the second dimension of foreign policy Europeanization73: “the bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level (uploading or “national projection”)”. Wong further points out that the EU thereby gives small states the necessary institutional resources to profile themselves in “new” regions, or to project their own interests as European interests. [...] the EU provides even the larger states (especially those with colonial histories), a means to re-engage in areas of former colonial influences in Africa and Asia. [...] By acting as an agent of European foreign policy, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands could claim more credit for their dual national/European roles in troubled areas. (ibid, 325-326)

Interviews with European diplomats in Nairobi and Addis Ababa (Informants E1, Nairobi, 27/11/2007; E2, Nairobi, 27/11/2008; E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008) largely confirmed Wong’s argument about the second dimension of foreign policy Europeanization, such as the statement by a DelKEN official that:

Smaller countries rather use the EU roof as they wouldn’t have enough separate capacities – there is a tendency towards a Brusselization of foreign policy. Also France is becoming stronger in EU approaches (La France parle L’Europe) as this is the way it can still exercise more influence on global politics in the sense of a world power than on its own. (Informant E8, Nairobi, 05/12/2007)

Whilst aspects of such foreign policy Europeanization might be utilised in certain instances for the advancement of national interests, the processes leading to it were part of the wider ambition to establish mechanisms of interaction between stronger and weaker actors within the EU and to regulate the spaces of EU external relations interaction.

It is also in this context that the Lisbon summit as a forum for exchange and addressing controversies might have paved the way for intra-African fora with the same purpose. Whilst

73 The first being ’a top-down process of national adaptation and policy convergence (downloading or “EU-ization”)’ and the third being “the socialization of interests and identities, or “identity reconstruction” (“crossloading”)’ (Wong 2008, 325).
African leaders hitherto held the principle of non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs high, the African Union summit in late January 2008 was dominated by the situation in Kenya and by strong calls for resolving the crisis through the Kofi Annan-led mediation talks (BBC 2008). The subsequent summit in June 2008 was overshadowed by the situation in Zimbabwe with African leaders urging ‘Comrade Bob’ to stop the escalating violence and concede a power-sharing agreement with the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. By that point the relative resolution of the Kenyan problem through a ‘panel of eminent African personalities’ led by Kofi Annan and backed by all African as well as outside leaders emitted a significant appeal of how Africa can resolve its crisis on its own (see Bachmann 2009b). A similar strategy was thus suggested for the Zimbabwean case. The crucial point therein was that it was part of a regulated space of interaction which addressed those issues and dealt with them openly along the lines practiced in Lisbon, namely the meeting of the African Heads of States. Clearly, just as within Europe, between Europe and Africa, as well as within Africa there are strong and weak players and diverging interests and opinions. The Africa-EU summit had created a regulated space of interaction to deal with those; this fundamental aspect of European space appeared to have at least partially transferred to spaces of interaction within the African Union.
6.2 Parameters of European development cooperation

6.2.1 Complex interactions: multiple actors, modes and policy fields

In order to simplify an overview of the very diverse African-European relations, Figure 15 shows an abstraction that roughly differentiates between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ interactions. The starting point of Figure 15 is an understanding of European space in terms of identity, presence and power (see Chapter 5). As discussed in Chapter 3, Europe’s identity as a collective global actor can usefully be theorised through the civilian power discourse with its dimensions of civilian and power. The civilian dimension thereby expresses a commitment to the fundamental principles of the concept (rule of law, human rights, democracy, multilateralism, institution-building, etc.), and the power dimension refers to the ability and willingness to shape the international system along those lines (see Chapter 3). This differentiation in a civilian and a power dimension will also serve as a rough guideline for abstracting different, yet heavily intertwined, facets of European external relations in Figure 15. These facets, expressed as ‘political’ and ‘economic’ in Figure 15, however, are not rigid separations, rather they are fluid categories, closely entangled and both inseparable parts of Europe’s collective external relations.

As part of this civilian/power differentiation the projection of European space – in terms of identity, presence and power – manifests itself through various characteristics of interaction. The abstraction in Figure 15 categorises the civilian dimension’s main characteristic of interaction as ‘showing presence’ as an important actor in the international system with interaction based on interdependencies and the central tenets of the civilian

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74 These differentiations are adopted and adapted from Fioramonti and Poletti (2008) who similarly differentiated between those aspects during an extensive research project on ‘The external image of the EU’ (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009b).
power concept. The power dimension, on the other hand, is more assertive of aspects where the EU has considerable strength to exercise international influence and actorness. This is thereby utilised to project power more directly and coercively, mostly through economic and financial instruments. These characteristics of interaction play different roles for different policy fields, in Figure 15 indicated as ‘political’ and ‘economic’ interaction.

Figure 15: Differentiations in the external projection of European space

Source: author

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75 See Chapter 3 (p. 12): civilian power as a medium.
76 See Chapter 3 (p.XX): concept of actorness by Bretherton and Vogler (2006).
‘Political’ interaction mostly refers to the aspects of African-European relations aiming to promote a system of political-economic organisation and regional integration similar to the European Union’s (see Chapters 3 and 5). In this respect, the EU often positions itself as a geopolitical actor that claims to function as a ‘partner’ for developing countries (EC 2007c), as a model for international political-economic organisation, or as a counterweight to the United States (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 56-57). ‘Economic’ interaction predominantly refers to African-European relations with respect to global economic policy as well as trade and commerce, whereby Europe is often described as a geoeconomic power utilising its considerable economic weight for projecting power and advancing its own economic interests (Gibb 2006; Fioramonti and Poletti 2008). With respect to those differentiations a German official in Nairobi pointed out that the EU should be a lawyer and supporter for developing countries on a global stage, but it fails due to own interests. It should be a trade partner for developing countries. The EPAs don’t seem to be that good, the question is if that is the way in the right direction? For sure the European agricultural interests are a big obstacle. The EU also has its own economic interests. There are frictions and dilemmas between those and development interests. (Informant E22, Nairobi, 18/11/2008)

Similarly an UNEP official articulated that those “frictions and dilemmas” of differing interests also influence the conduct and the perceptions of the EU’s external policies:

There is a dichotomy in the EU between the approaches calling for a true partnership (more or less on equal terms) with developing countries and the EU’s inherent economic interest. Developing countries are therefore suspicious that the EU is pursuing its own economic interests at their expense. The EU is not benevolent, it has its own distinct interests. There is a dichotomy between moral obligation and economic interests. (Informant D9, Nairobi, 02/12/2008)

“In general”, Fioramonti and Poletti (2008, 173) argue, “the ‘EU as opportunity’ is contrasted with the ‘EU as fortress’, a huge economic power characterised by a protectionist attitude“.
Nonetheless, none of those differentiations in characteristics of interaction, policy fields and types of actor can be regarded or analysed separately, they are always intertwined and part of the complex array of European external relations. For instance, the EU shows significant presence as a geopolitical model for regional integration, but as part thereof it also shows presence (and projects power) in the context of designing global economic policy. Similarly, as a ‘partner’ for developing countries the EU claims to advocate the inclusion of developing countries in the world economy. It might thus operate as geopolitical partner in an ‘economic’ policy field – or vice versa. In so doing, the EU also projects power\(^7\) in ‘political’ policy fields, for instance through conditionalities attached to development policies or the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) regarding the political-economic organisation of different countries. Emphasising that the EU’s interactions with developing countries cannot be clearly separated by the dashed vertical line in the middle of Figure 15, the figure abstracts these interdependencies and linkages by grouping varying aspects together. The EU always acts on multiple policy fields and behaves as a multifaceted geopolitical/geoeconomic actor with an identity comprised by the civilian and the power dimension as well as by showing interdependent presence and through projecting power. The smaller, solid arrows indicate tendencies in the relation between characteristics of interaction, policy fields and types of actor, however, the dashed arrows also indicate that those differentiations are fluid, intertwined and overlap to a considerable extent.

In addition, the lower part of Figure 15 suggests an inverse relation between the EU’s appeal as a global actor and its capability to exert power for influencing the international system. On the one hand, the EU’s role in the world as a model for political-economic organisation and regional integration not only features prominently in both academic discourses\(^7\) and official strategies (EC 2007a, 2007d, 2007c, 2008b), but also in external

\(^7\) Such as structural power, see Holden (2009).
\(^7\) For a comprehensive review see Chapter II and Bachmann and Sidaway (2009b)
perceptions (see Chapter VII). However, at the same time its power to act in this respect is limited due to different underlying interests and policies of the individual member states. On the other hand, the EU’s biggest weight in international politics is in the field of economic policy, where the EU acts more cohesively, but is also frequently criticised for (neo-)imperial practices (see Chapter VII and Hooper and Kramsch 2007). In this context Fioramonti and Poletti (2008, 178) point out that

a number of issues (particularly free trade, non-tariff barriers and agricultural subsidies) produce an image of the EU as an actor that perpetuates Western domination. [...] As regards the more ‘political’ dimension, political elites’ discourse points to a qualitative difference between the EU and the USA with respect to issues such as the strengthening of global democratic governance mechanisms, support for multilateralism and a more balanced distribution of power at the global level. [...] the EU is recognised as promoting a principled and rules-based foreign policy. Nevertheless, one should observe that those policy areas in which the EU’s self-representation is closest to its external image (eg diplomacy, promotion of democracy, etc) are also those in which the EU’s power is perceived to be less developed and effective vis-a-vis areas such as international trade, where the EU could make a real difference.

African-European development cooperation and interaction thereby ranges across the entire spectrum of differentiations indicated here. These complexities can certainly not be completely captured in illustrations and abstractions such as Figure 15. However, the figure and the differentiations developed in it can serve as useful heuristic devices to expose such complexities and to simplify - at least to some extent – a more structured understanding and analysis of the complex reality of African-European relations.

6.2.2 Actors and levels of interaction in the East African context

Further to the differentiations indicated in Figure 15, Figure 16 sketches the various interactions between different European and African actors considered in this research on a most general level. In this context the term ‘European multilaterals’ refers mostly to the
European Community, externally represented through the delegations of the Commission\textsuperscript{79}, however, also to other European multilateral representations abroad such as EUEI PDF\textsuperscript{80}, Swedish/Danish (SIDA/DANIDA) or Dutch/German (DGIS/GTZ) cooperation and other temporarily and thematically confined groupings of European countries and institutions. The term ‘African multilaterals’ refers to African regional institutions included in this research, i.e. the African Union (AU) and the East African Community (EAC).

**Figure 16: Actors and dimensions of interaction**

![Diagram showing the interactions between European multilaterals, EU member states, African multilaterals, and African states. The diagram illustrates 'economic' and 'political' interactions.]

Source: author

As illustrated with arrow 1 in Figure 16, the main mode of ‘economic’ interaction is multilateral on the European and bilateral on the African side. Even though ‘economic’ interaction on the bilateral level between individual European and African countries (not shown in Figure 16) has not vanished, the broad parameters are set within trade agreements negotiated between individual ACP-countries and the Commission on behalf of the EU’s member states. On the ‘political’ level, however, European interaction with East Africa is much

\textsuperscript{79} Such as the Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic to Kenya (DelKEN).

\textsuperscript{80} The European Union Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF) is a voluntary grouping of 5 EU member states and the European Commission within the EU Energy Initiative with the goal to provide fast and unbureaucratic support to projects promoting energy access in developing countries. See [http://www.euei-pdf.org/](http://www.euei-pdf.org/) (10/09/2009).
more multifaceted, manifold and ambiguous. Interaction is both multilateral and bilateral on both sides. The most significant of these interactions are traditional bilateral political and diplomatic relations between European and African countries; shown as arrow 2 in Figure 16. Those bilateral relations occupy a wide spectrum in Europe’s external relations and vary depending on the underlying interests of individual countries influenced by historical, economic, security, political, social, and cultural factors. Bilateral relations are mostly conducted in form of interaction between the embassies or the official development apparatus of the respective countries with the local authorities. In the case of Kenya those are the National Authorising Officer (NAO) within the Ministry of Finance, The Office of the President, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Planning (MoP). Additionally, as illustrated with arrow 3 in Figure 16 ‘political’ relations also comprise interactions between European multilaterals and African countries, for instance between the Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Kenya (DelKEN) and the Government of Kenya (GoK) as outlined in the Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013 (EC 2007b). European ‘political’ interaction with Kenya is therefore complex. On the one hand a multilateral aspect captures relations between the Kenyan government and DelKEN, representing the European Commission. On the other hand bilateral relations are maintained between Kenya and EU member states through their embassies. Those can vary considerably to DelKEN positions and amongst each other. Whilst ‘economic’ interaction follows a defined framework and is largely handled by the European Commission (in form of DelKEN) for all EU member states, European ‘political’ interaction is much more complicated and ambiguous.

Arrow 4 in Figure 16 illustrates another level of political interaction considered in this research, i.e. between European and African multilaterals, such as the AU and the EAC. With respect to the AU this interaction has intensified significantly after the Lisbon summit and with the establishment of DelAU. Direct interaction between the EAC and the European Commission remains limited and is handled through the Tanzanian delegation (DelTAN) and
the COMESA secretariat. In Brussels the EAC is part of the Region for Eastern and Southern Africa and administratively grouped with other regional organisations\textsuperscript{81}. There are, however, other thematically confined European multilateral cooperation programmes with the EAC such as EUEI PDF’s support to regional integration in the East African energy sector that has informed this research. In addition to the interactions shown in Figure 16, there is limited interaction between African multilaterals and EU member states, such as DfID’s and GTZ’s cooperation programmes with the EAC\textsuperscript{82}. Table 2 summarises the interaction described above and illustrated in Figure 16.

**Table 2: Summary of interactions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>‘Economic’ Interaction</th>
<th>‘Political’ Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU - AU</strong></td>
<td>limited European multilateral to African multilateral</td>
<td>extensive European multilateral to African multilateral (arrow 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>EU - AU and EC-ACP</em></td>
<td><em>mostly EU - AU, limited EU – ACP</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>very limited European bilateral to African multilateral</td>
<td>limited European bilateral to African multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>EU member states to AU</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU - EAC</strong></td>
<td>limited European multilateral to African multilateral</td>
<td>limited European multilateral to African multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>EC - EAC (EPAs)</em></td>
<td><em>EC - EAC (regional integration), EUEI PDF - EAC (energy)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>very limited European bilateral to African multilateral</td>
<td>limited European bilateral to African multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>GTZ - EAC, DfID - EAC</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU - Kenya</strong></td>
<td>extensive European multilateral to African bilateral (arrow 1)</td>
<td>extensive European multilateral to African bilateral (arrow 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>EC – Kenya, all economic and trade policy, including EPAs</em></td>
<td><em>Development cooperation and political dialogue</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>limited European bilateral to African bilateral</td>
<td>extensive European bilateral to African bilateral (arrow 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>specified trade arrangements</em></td>
<td><em>diplomatic and political relations, development cooperation</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author

\textsuperscript{81} COMESA, IGAD, and IOC

\textsuperscript{82} DfID - Regional East Africa Integration Programme (REAP) and GTZ – Cooperation with the East African Community Programme
The analytical part of this research focused on the political dimension of development interactions and perceptions of the multilateral aspects of European external relations with East Africa, shown as arrows 3 and 4 in Figure 16. Empirically this refers to a common European approach towards the African Union, the East African Community and Kenya. This includes, to a limited extent, aspects arising from bilateral interaction if those were ‘labelled’ or described as ‘European’ by the informants. The goal thereby was not to assess and analyse the programmes of the European Commission or any specific European country towards East Africa, but to find out what is understood as ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ in the context of interactions with East Africa. Perceptions of ‘Europe’ can therefore refer to the European Commission, any of the EU’s member states, or any groupings thereof; whatever is perceived as ‘European’.

As set out in Chapter IV the research was based in Nairobi because it is one of the world’s largest and most vibrant hubs of the international development industry (Taylor 2004c) and as such a prime spot to research Europe’s interactions with developing countries and perceptions of Europe as a development and global actor. The relevant counterparts for interaction were therefore naturally the Kenyan government as well as the regional institutions of which Kenya is part. Including the regional component in Africa thereby came naturally as it is a) a key element of all European communications with respect to its external relations (EC 2007a, 2007c, 2007d, 2008b) and b) a key expectation of African cooperation partners that Europe supports regional integration efforts in Africa (see Chapter VII). This research therefore focuses on the trajectories of Europe’s interactions with Kenya, the EAC, and the AU as well as on the perception of Europe as a development and geopolitical actor on the part of key individuals involved in this interaction.
6.2.3 Budget support

In Kenya the most notable distinction between EC aid policy and that of its member states is DelKEN’s focus on budget support. The general approach of EC development policy is to promote a trend away from technical cooperation on certain projects, to sector wide approaches, to sector budget support, and finally to general budget support (Informants E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007; E20, Nairobi, 17/12/2007). Budget support, on the most general level, refers to the support of the partner government’s annual budget through the direct injection of funds by the donor. Depending on the donor there are different conditions and regulations attached. Holden (2009, 135) points out that “it is easier to disburse and it gives the Commission and other donors an entrée into the budgetary decision-making process in the partner country”. A DelKEN official identified a
trend in development cooperation to move away from technical cooperation towards budget support. The arguments are that technical cooperation has largely failed over the past 40 years and not managed to create enduring capacity building and structures. (Informant E8, Nairobi, 05/12/2007)

The main argument for budget support is to transfer responsibility and ownership to national governments and reduce the influence of external actors on the development situation in the host country. In the words of a DelKEN official in Nairobi “it is not by taking away the money and do stuff yourself that you responsibilise the GoK” (Informant E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007). Similarly, a EC official in Brussels stated that:

General budget support is brilliant. You make a huge payment once a year and then don’t worry about it anymore. You don’t have to worry about absorption capacities and you can be sure that you can disburse all your funds allocated for the year. The Africans think so, too! You can go and check the local Mercedes

83 Sometimes this distinction is referred to by the terms project support, programme support, and budget support.
84 This refers to a problem in the development community, probably best expressed with the German expression ‘der Mittelabfluss muss gesichert sein’ – the regular disbursement of development funds needs to be ensured – otherwise what to do with all the money.
dealership if you want to see corruption in a country. (Informant E12, Brussels, 04/07/2008)

Even though voiced in an ironic way the statement reflects a general opinion in EC development policy circles that budget support is “the way to go”, with the key argument in support of it being local ownership and responsibility. The informant, however, also raises the main problem associated with budget support, i.e. misappropriation. Disbursing funds directly into the host country’s annual budget reduces the control that can be exercised over the usage of the funds thereby risking fuelling corruption. In order to minimize this risk, the EC’s required financial audit procedures for fund disbursement are very stringent and any partner receiving EC funds has to undergo a very lengthy and complex appropriation process. These processes are highly institutionalised and usually commitments are made for up to five years. Such institutionalisation of the cooperation processes with the development partner is exemplary for the EC’s general preference to regulate the spaces of interaction with its partners. The central goal of budget support, however, is to enable the partner country’s government to take charge of development activities in the country. Emphasising the Kenyan government’s autonomy on the utilization of budget support a DelKEN informant claimed that the Kenyan government can set itself the goals it will be held responsible against without having to exactly indicate what the money is used for. EC funds will then be uploaded to the Kenyan budget (MoF) if these goals are being achieved. This is monitored annually, and if certain parts are not achieved, the next year’s budget will have some or all funds withheld. However, the GoK is fully in charge on what it does with the funds, the EC only insists on certain structures on the transparency of money use (mainly IMF rules for country budgetary). (Informant E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007)

DelKEN is the only donor in Kenya providing general budget support, other donors see the GoK’s role much more critical and have serious doubts with regards to corruption and effectiveness. A European informant working for the African Union as part of an integrated expert programme regards “budget support as the donors’ way to buy their way out. Through budget support donors don’t have to bother with the mess and at the same time being able to
say we are doing our share” (Informant L3, Nairobi, 28/11/2007). Yet, the most common
criticism targets corruption issues. An analyst for the HAC-group85 revealed that “not many
donors do general budget support in Kenya because Kenya does not meet the standards for
financial procurement” (Informant D15, Nairobi, 16/12/2008). In the same context, a Canadian
official identified a “general tendency amongst donors towards budget support, but in Kenya
the EC is the only one to push it. They are the only ones convinced of the Kenyan government”
(Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008). Similarly, a German official expressed a rejection of
budget support as a means for development cooperation as long as “circumstances are
doubtful in the partner country”. Kenya, he continued to argue, “is simply not ready for budget
support” (Informant E22, Nairobi, 18/11/2008). “Circumstances” became even more doubtful
after the political crisis caused by the flawed elections in December 2007. A Danish official, for
example, explained how the

Kenyan crisis has changed perceptions towards budget support significantly. Sweden, UK, and others were considering it, but now it is not an option anymore. There is also no IMF programme in Kenya. Most donors don’t do budget support if there is no IMF programme. (Informant E2, Nairobi, 27/11/2008)

A representative of the Japanese development agency (JICA) also affirmed that “JICA
was considering budget support in Kenya before the crisis, but is not doing so anymore”
(Informant D7, Nairobi, 19/11/2008). However, an official of the Kenyan Ministry of Finance
(MoF) sees the reasons for the reluctance of bilateral donors to operate through budget
support rather in their domestic policies:

Bilaterals don’t do budget support because they have a domestic political agenda. They have to account to their domestic tax payer; just injecting funds into another country’s budget doesn’t qualify very much. They rather do programmes or projects that produce visible results. Bilaterals just don’t have an interest in general budget support. This did not have anything to do with the crisis, they didn’t want to do it anyway. (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008)

85 The HAC (Harmonisation, Alignments and Coordination) is the main donor coordination group in Kenya through which the GoK negotiates donor involvement with the major donors.
Nevertheless, the Kenyan crisis has changed the attitude even within DelKEN causing a significant loss of confidence in the Kenyan government and a distancing from the previous push towards general budget support. The responsible person at DelKEN confirmed that:

DelKEN’s focus on budget support has been seriously affected by the crisis. It is still in the CSP but not actively pursued anymore. There has been a shift in the focus on issues that get the economy going, mainly infrastructure projects. Funds for infrastructure projects might increase; budget support will not change for now but will also not be actively pursued any more so strongly. There might be a re-evaluation during the mid-term review in 2011. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008)

Even though budget support is not so actively promoted by DelKEN in Kenya anymore due to doubts about the financial credibility of the Kenyan government, the general tendency to use budget support as a central component of development cooperation remains unaffected in the wider context of EC development policy (Carbone 2007, 55 and Informants D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008; E8, Nairobi, 05/12/2007). This, however, necessitates lengthy and institutionalised negotiation and cooperation processes between the donor and the partner country in order to minimise the risk of misappropriation and to ensure mutual accountability. The EC’s promotion of budget support thereby reflects its preference to institutionalise the cooperation with its development partners and to regulate the spaces of interaction through long-term commitments on parts of all actors involved.

6.3 European development cooperation and the donor landscape in Kenya

Mechanisms and procedures to harmonise European external relations first started to emerge in the 1970s and have since constituted an integral part of development policy conduct of the Commission and the member states. In addition to long-established cooperation of European countries in development policy in the form of the European Development Funds (EDF), European Political Cooperation (EPC) aimed to institutionalise cooperation on wider foreign
policy issues. Initial agreements were signed by the then six member states of the European Community in October 1970 and subsequently built upon and intensified over the following years, including the newly acceded members in 1973. As early as 1976, in consideration of the Tindemans report, the then nine foreign ministers of the EC noted that “European Political Cooperation must ultimately lead to a common foreign policy” (ENA 2009a). The EPC was a precursor to the second pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Contemporary academics and observers described it as “a pillar of the present European system of equal importance to the Community itself” within which “the foreign ministers work together ‘intergovernmentally’ on the basis of non-binding agreements that do not provide for formal or permanent institutions” but with the general aim to “put the Nine into a position whereby they can speak with one voice on international questions”. EPC thus was a “structure which favours and facilitates such approximation of points of view but does not necessarily produce them” (Wessels 1982, 1-3). These processes have evolved considerably since the 1970s, however, they laid the foundation for the institutionalised processes of current harmonisation of European external relations. This section will analyse such processes in the context of European development engagement in Nairobi.

6.3.1 The Paris Declaration and the ‘Europeans’ in Kenya’s donor community

The Paris Declaration (OECD 2005) was adopted in March 2005 by most donor and developing countries as well as other major organisations involved in the global development industry with the goal to increase volume and effectiveness of development aid through improved coordination efforts between donor and partner countries as well as within the donor community. Based on a commitment to aid harmonisation through a reduction of “the number

86 For more information on the Tindemans Report on ‘how the term “European Union” can be interpreted’ see (ENA 2009b).
of separate, duplicative, missions to the field and diagnostic reviews” (OECD 2005, 6), donors committed to concentrate their activity in any given partner country on three focal sectors identified in negotiations with the partner country’s government (and in most cases also with the other donors). In this context European donor countries have also adopted the concentration on three focal sectors into their Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour in Development Policy (EC 2007b). Carbone (2007, 57) describes the Code of Conduct as the “most far-reaching outcome of the EU agenda on aid effectiveness” and points out that “it is embedded in the principle of ownership – that is, developing countries are responsible for coordinating donors [...] and that it is open to all donors and must take existing processes into account” (see also EC 2007b, 10-11). Along those guidelines, European development cooperation in Kenya is largely tied into the main donor coordination mechanism, the Kenya Joint Assistant Strategy (KJAS). A document provided by DelKEN to EU member states active in Kenya entitled Aspects of EU Code of Conduct encountered within the KJAS clearly states that EU countries active in Kenya should “focus active involvement [...] on a maximum of three sectors according to their comparative advantage as recognized by government and by other development partners”. The document encourages European donors to “assess their own comparative advantage and name areas where they could be lead donor” and emphasises that “situations where all EU donors are absent from a strategic sector for poverty reduction should be avoided” (DelKen 2007a). The idea is that in each sector “a ‘lead donor’ is in charge of coordination in the sector, but has the obligation to consult with other donors” (Carbone 2007, 57). A German official confirmed that the “EU Code of Conduct tries to have a European donor in each sector, if possible also in the lead or co-lead role. This European donor is then supposed to show the European presence for this sector” (Informant E20, Nairobi, 17/12/2007).

In Kenya, European donors largely comply with these guidelines and the concentration on three focal areas for development cooperation, possibly because the guidelines request the
presence of at least one European donor in each sector. This marks a significant aspect of Europeanization in the donor coordination mechanisms in Kenya as European donors adapted their bilateral policies in the form of withdrawing from a specific sector as a result of a harmonized European development policy portfolio ensuring some European presence in the respective sector. Wong describes such policy adaptation as foreign policy Europeanization through processes of “socialization” as opposed to “forced, formal adaptation” (Wong 2008, 333).

The US and Japan are less committed to such socialization processes and the restriction to three sectors as outlined in the Paris Declaration. A USAID representative indicated that USAID has signed the Paris declaration, but does not feel obliged to it as long as the host countries do not live up to their obligation as outlined in the agreements [with respect to financial procurement]. The three-sector approach is not that much applicable to USAID as the scope of US engagement is too big; we have 150 people employed, of which 130 are Kenyans. The US does not want to be tied down to certain fields of activity. Our money comes through Congress and is therefore for more activities, not only three. USAID also wants to be able to react flexibly to the demands of the Kenyan government. USAID is active in 7-8 sectors in Kenya. (Informant D10, Nairobi, 12/03/2008)

The Japanese approach is comparable. A JICA official pointed out that JICA is active in six sectors in Kenya thereby acknowledging that “this causes a lot of trouble because JICA and USAID don’t pay too much attention to the Paris Declaration”. The informant also noted that “JICA and USAID are project based and do not have a programmatic (holistic) approach like the Europeans” (Informant D7, 19/11/2008). This viewpoint is supported by another USAID official who confirmed that “USAID is focussing on project support as opposed to budget or programme support. Project support is within a programme and done through contractors, NGOs, civil society organisations, etc. but the support is always tied to the specific project” (Informant D11, Nairobi, 09/12/2008).

These classifications fit into the scheme outlined by an economist for external resource of the Kenyan MoF who classified donor support into three broad categories: budget support,
programme support, project support. The informant went on to explain that the EC is the only donor to do general budget support, which is a “free injection into the budget that is not tied to anything. But most donors do programme support, most of the European bilaterals. Project support is largely done by the US, Japan, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank (ADB) “ (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008).

Figure 17: Aid at a glance (Kenya)

With regard to the financial volume of donor engagement in Kenya there are several different data sets. Figure 17 is taken from OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) and illustrates the total volume of external resources into Kenya as well as the top 10 donors, the percentage of external resources on Kenya’s GNI and bilateral ODA by sector. As can be seen in the figure, both Kenya’s GNI (absolute and per capita) and the Net ODA

87 ‘Budget support’ can be general budget support or sector budget support. ‘Programme support’ usually to donors’ support for (a) comprehensive programme(s) in specific sectors, for instance infrastructure. ‘Project support’ describes donors’ support to a specific project, for instance a certain stretch of road.
inflow have grown significantly in recent years. Figure 17 also illustrates that Net ODA only constitutes 4.3% of Kenya’s GNI; a very small fraction compared to the other countries of the EAC. As such Kenya is much less donor dependent than most other ACP-countries and in particular the countries in the region, yet there are more donors active in Kenya than in most other ACP-countries. In the course of this research I have examined data from three different sources: Firstly, data on aid disbursed in Kenya in 2007 provided by the HAC-group based on an OECD survey. Secondly, data of the OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) on ODA into Kenya in 2007 presented above in Figure 17. Thirdly, a summary of external funding for the 2008/09 budget provided by the Kenyan Ministry of Finance. Table 3 shows the information provided in each of the data sets.

The numbers vary considerably and are certainly debateable depending on what to include and how to assess the funding. Yet, the most relevant aspects for this research are not the absolute numbers of funds but rather their relation to each other, i.e. the ranking of donors and thus the relative importance of any specific donor to Kenya. Whilst the two data sets based on OECD data vary considerably in absolute numbers, their rankings of donors are largely similar. The data provided by the Kenyan MoF, on the other hand, has a significantly different ranking of donors, most obvious in the very different position of USAID as 19th compared to 1st in both other tables. This difference occurs because the MoF table lists funds that are committed by a specific donor to be disbursed through the Kenyan government for the upcoming financial year 2008/09. In contrast, the OECD tables show funds that have been disbursed by a specific donor in Kenya in 2007, including cooperation with non-governmental actors. It shows that donors like the US, the UK and Japan disburse most of their funds through alternative ways of development cooperation outside the influence of the Kenyan

88 Ranging from 15.7% for Uganda to 49.5% for Burundi.
91 This data set was handed to me in hardcopy in the Kenyan Ministry of Finance.
government, whilst the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the EC – and China – conduct their development cooperation mostly through the Kenyan government. On the one hand this reflects the capacity and/or preference of certain donors to conduct projects and programmes independent of the Kenyan government through their own development apparatus (such as USAID, DfID, JICA, GTZ); a capacity that the World Bank, the AfDB, and the EC do not possess. Such independent project implementation is sometimes seen as part of a wider neo-imperial agenda by the Kenyan government. On the other hand it expresses the level of confidence in the Kenyan government as a trustworthy cooperation partner (cf. section 6.2.2 on budget support).

Table 3: External resources (Kenya)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAC (OECD)</th>
<th>OECD (DCD-DAC)</th>
<th>Kenyan Ministry of Finance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top 10 Donors</td>
<td>Top 10 Donors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>million USD</td>
<td>million USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldbank (IDA)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Worldbank (IDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Fund</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of top 10 donors</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>1,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU share of top 10</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of all donors</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>1275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of top 10 donors on total of all donors</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HAC Kenya, see footnote 89
Source: OECD, see footnote 90
Source: Kenyan MoF, see footnote 91
During the course of the research I have mostly relied on the OECD (DCD-DAC) data set as it is largely in line with the empirical data obtained through interviews and participant observation and offers the chance for comparison because it is part of a large international data-base. With respect to the European role, all three tables list the EC (DelKEN) amongst the top 5 donors and at least 5 European donors amongst the top 10. Both tables based on OECD data show that the joint European funds are the largest contribution by a wide margin accounting for 42% and 44% of total external resources provided to Kenya by the top 10 donors. This is, however, significantly under the European (Commission and EU member states) share of 59% of global ODA. This difference between EU ODA to Kenya and globally is mainly caused by Kenya's largely donor-independent budget (cf. Figure 17) and the large number of donors active in Kenya due to the development hub Nairobi and the pivotal position of the country for the wider East Africa region, including the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. According to the data provided by the Kenyan Ministry of Finance, the European share constitutes only 31% percent of external resources provided by the top 10 donors. This difference occurs because some European donors channel only a small share of funds through the Kenyan government and, unlike the OECD data sets, the MoF table includes external resources of non-traditional donors like China and the Arab countries.

6.3.2 Donor Coordination mechanisms in Kenya

There are several mechanisms for donor coordination in Kenya: the Heads of Missions meetings (HOM), the Development Coordination Group (DCG), the Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination Group (HAC-group), and for EU member states the Development Council. The HOM-meetings are monthly meetings attended by the ambassadors of most donor

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92 These numbers are very consistent. Another publication by DelKEN puts the share of EU ODA to Kenya to 45% for the time between 2000-2004. (DelKen 2007b)

countries and engage more widely with the diplomatic, political, economic relations with the Kenyan government and the region. Development cooperation is thereby only discussed on a very general level and situated within the wider structure of interaction and relations with the Kenyan government. The DCG on the other hand is mostly concerned with issues of development coordination and, to a lesser extent also, with political and economic interaction. The meetings also take place on a monthly basis and are attended by senior figures of the embassies of donor countries, such as the heads of the divisions for development cooperation, vice-ambassadors, or sometimes even ambassadors (in the case of smaller countries). A subgroup of the DCG is the HAC-group. It also meets monthly and is attended by the development cooperation coordinators of the donors involved as well as representatives of the GoK. The HAC-group is subdivided into 17 sectoral groups and constitutes the forum for the Kenyan Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS). As such it deals with the practical implementation of donor assistance to Kenya and is the main mechanism for donor coordination amongst the ‘traditional donors’ (Informants E2, Nairobi, 27/11/2008; E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007). In addition meetings of the EU development council comprise the EU member states present in Kenya plus DelKEN. It is supposed to meet before the DCG and HAC meetings in order to find a common position of the EU countries to be promoted jointly when interacting with other donors or the GoK.

In light of this large number of meetings and donor coordination mechanisms it is no surprise that there are considerable overlaps and that not all groups enjoy equal priority within the donor community. A Danish official, for instance, pointed out that “most European donors prioritise DCG over the [EU] development council and quite often it is the same people in HAC

[^94]: Its members are Canada, Denmark, the European Commission (EC), Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, the African Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank Group. ‘Emerging’ donors like China, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, etc. are not part of the group.
and the [EU] development council” (Informant E2, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). Whilst the DCG sets the framework, the practical implementation of development assistance occurs within the HAC-group. A German official confirmed that:

Clearly the overarching means for donor coordination in Kenya is the HAC-group, which includes a variety of donors, not only European ones. European donors operate within that and are not aiming at establishing another separate donor coordination group of European countries, as this might be rather counter-productive. Specific European coordination is largely within the HAC-group, in the sense of participating in certain processes with the goal to drive those more along the lines of the European ideas on how things ought to be done. (Informant E20, Nairobi, 17/12/2007)

Within the HAC-group, coordination between European and other donors has been described as very effective. On Europe appearing as a bloc in donor coordination mechanism, a USAID official pointed out that:

Having the European countries speak with one voice is a good thing as long as USAID agrees with them. If they don’t agree it will be talked about. In about 80% of the cases there is agreement, in 10% Europeans get their way, in 10% Americans get their way. Reasons for disagreement were for example the structure of HAC. The US is more flexible concerning different structures in different sectors. Europeans are more rigid trying to push the same structure and way to do things on all sectors. There are also differences on issues of supranational power for the HAC-group. Nordic Plus countries try to give most of the decision making authority to the HAC-group (because they have smaller missions). The US and Japan try to maintain as much sovereignty as possible. The Europeans are in the middle. (Informant D10, Nairobi, 12/03/2008)

With respect to the European coordination efforts in the negotiations with other donors a DelKEN official explained that EU partners quite often ‘invisibly’ reach a coherent outcome as they are tending towards similar directions anyway. He argued that

The EU club may come with different ideas to the consultations, in the process they become somewhat modified; different member states still have different opinions yet by and large they tend towards following a similar direction, like a shotgun. Regarding constraints to harmonisation efforts, it has to be taken into account that underlying political interests and directives can cause such constraints. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008)

However, this appraisal of European alignment in Kenya has not been confirmed by
other European informants interviewed. Whilst donor coordination in Kenya appears to be frequent and intense, many European informants claimed that the coordination mechanism amongst the European partners is not specifically more intense than with others. Another DelKEN official pointed out that the “member states have different political agendas, it is very difficult to go beyond that and develop a joint European approach” (Informant E10, Nairobi, 03/03/2008). In particular DelKEN’s role in the process and its inability to rally European partners together was frequently criticised. A Finnish official, for instance, lamented that “Delken has a low profile and could be much more active” (Informant E19, Nairobi, 26/11/2007). Similarly, a French colleague involved in the process asserted that:

The EU is not really seen as a coherent and consistent entity. Donor coordination is done within the HAC-group, there is no room for additional European mechanism of coordination. The capacity of Delken to lead closer European coordination is very weak. Also Delken is not very active in the HAC-group; UK, Sweden and Finland for example are more active. There is no real common European position or a common voice in the HAC. DfID (and to a lesser extent Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden) had no interest in putting European ‘Code of Conduct’ in practice, because there is HAC. Other European countries (smaller ones) were not part of the HAC and wanted the European code of conduct. France and Germany (Italy and Spain a bit) are in the middle. They are part of both and want to see a consistency of both approaches as they are complimentary. There are different groups of interest within those negotiations: the Nordic Plus (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) often also UK don’t want to share the voice with others such as France, Germany, etc. (Informant E1, Nairobi, 27/11/2007)

According to a USAID representative (Informant D10, Nairobi, 12/03/2008), the extent to which Europeans coordinate before the DCG and HAC-meetings depends on who currently holds the presidency and how important the respective country, or as a matter of fact the individual representing that country in Kenya, regard prior European coordination before the wider donor coordination.

With respect to DelKEN, empirical data from my interviews clearly shows that there is a prioritisation of European donor coordination at the expense of a more holistic donor coordination including also non-European donors. In Kenya, however, as a country with a large number of donors (also for regional purposes), many European bilaterals prefer to have more
comprehensive donor coordination mechanisms including also non-European donors. As such European countries operate much more along the lines of the EU Code of Conduct than DelKEN does. Whilst DelKEN prioritises European coordination, most member states are in favour of more holistic donor coordination within the well-functioning structures of the DCG and the KJAS, thereby implementing the Code of Conduct’s call for “taking into account the broader donor engagement” and opening up to “all donors willing to join this good practice” (EC 2007b, 10-11; Carbone 2007, 57). However, one DelKEN official also pointed out that “the development council donor group has existed for a long time. It is a very good way for donor coordination, not only amongst the European donors, but also of the others. Hence there is no need to coordinate separately amongst the European countries” (Informant E10, Nairobi, 03/03/2008). Yet generally DelKEN’s lack of commitment to the HAC-group and KJAS has been frequently criticised, such as by a World Bank official who labelled it as “lip-service to harmonisation” (Informant D14, Nairobi, 27/02/2008). Similarly, an economist from the Kenyan MoF pointed out that “DelKEN is not very interested in HAC, they just want to do internal coordination to be stronger” (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). Even though DelKEN officials would not generally agree with such rather negative assessments, they do admit that the “whole idea of Europeans coordinating themselves before is to act as a more powerful bloc” (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008).

**6.3.3 Processes and flows of development interaction with Kenya**

As outlined in the previous section, there are multiple donor coordination mechanisms in Kenya, the most important being the HAC-group which served as the basis for the development of the Kenya Joint Assistant Strategy (KJAS). This section will consider in more detail the formulation process of the KJAS and the specific interaction with the Kenyan government.
A number of informants have described DelKEN’s role in the formulation process for KJAS differently. Whilst EC officials in Nairobi and Brussels tended to portray DelKEN’s role as very constructive, cooperative and influential in the process, most other informants involved tended to criticise DelKEN’s limited commitment to it. One of the problems thereby was that at the same time as the formulation of the KJAS, a new Country Strategy Paper (CSP) between the EC and the Kenyan Government needed to be formulated, resulting in two parallel processes occurring at the same time. A Danish official described the timing as “unfortunate” because “the CSP was just slightly before the KJAS and needed to be finalised and decisions needed to be made. The EC is moving on its own pace due to pressure from Brussels” (Informant E2, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). DelKEN’s focus appears to have been on the development of the CSP 2008-2013. One informant involved in the process recalled “a lot of tension between the EC and other partners - also its member states - during the formulation process. Especially DfID was not at all happy with the less than constructive role the EC was playing” (Informant D14, Nairobi, 27/02/2008). Also other donors had initial difficulties with the HAC-group and a joint donors’ approach to interacting with the Kenyan government, but eventually recognised the need for a common approach in a country with so many active donors. The USAID representative, for instance, pointed out that:

There is such a large number of donors active in Kenya and Kenya has not benefitted from it that much, so there is simply much more need to coordinate better than in other countries. USAID in Kenya is much more engaged in donor coordination than in other countries, simply because of practicality reasons. The US is willing to work within KJAS but not willing to give up sovereignty. USAID does not want to be tied to institutions that might have the power to outvote them. There was a proposal on the table that only the leader of sector working group would be allowed to communicate with the respective permanent secretary, but this was not acceptable to USAID, as we want to be able to communicate directly whatever concerns our development cooperation. So the agreement was that each country retains their sovereignty and decision-making power but pledges to keep the other members of the sector working group informed. (Informant D10, Nairobi, 12/03/2008)
Nonetheless, eventually both DelKEN and USAID strongly aligned their activities in Kenya with the KJAS and the European CSP even adopted large parts of the KJAS for the EC’s engagement in Kenya (Informants E13, Brussels, 04/07/2008; D15, Nairobi, 16/12/2008).

In addition to the simultaneous processes of KJAS and CSP formulation, the Kenyan government developed its Vision 2030; a comprehensive development plan for the country until 2030. A CIDA official serving as the HAC chair at the point emphasised that:

KJAS is structurally different to the Vision 2030. The Vision 2030 is what Kenya wants to achieve by 2030; KJAS is the mechanics how donors can assist the Kenyan Government. KJAS is pretty much a donor-driven document, donors refer to it a lot, but the Kenyan government does not, they rather refer to the Vision 2030. (Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008)

According to a Kenyan government official about 70% of the KJAS has been “spear-headed by the donors, but with frequent consultations with the Kenyan government, NGOs, businesses, university, etc.” (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). A German official involved in the process by and large argued along the same lines:

The KJAS has clearly been more donor-driven than from the Kenyan side, but still the Kenyan government always supported it and was involved, so that it definitely is a common document. Even though the notion of ownership has always been emphasised, when it comes to the efforts of the donor coordination, the Kenyan role is rather limited. (Informant E20, Nairobi, 17/12/2007)

Despite the variations in the empirical data obtained through interviews with individuals involved in the process, there is a consensus that both sides (GoK and donors) made some effort to include the other side in the formulation of their respective documents. Nevertheless, KJAS appears to be a largely donor driven document with the Kenyan government taking only a limited interest in it and vice versa with respect to the Vision 2030. KJAS thereby largely remained the donors’ document of reference for development activities in Kenya and the Vision 2030 that of the Kenyan government. A World Bank official even expressed the view that there is no real interest on HAC on certain parts of the Kenyan government because “HAC means that ODA is organised through the Ministry of Finance and therefore the individual
ministries are held responsible and accountable for what they are doing” (Informant D14, Nairobi, 27/02/2008).

Regardless of these differing points of references for the actors involved, the KJAS is largely seen as a successful example of donor coordination, also on part of the Kenyan Government. An economist for external resource in the Kenyan Ministry of Finance expressed the “usefulness of the KJAS to the Kenyan Government to take better charge of donor involvement in the country”. The KJAS, he continued, largely falls within “the framework of Kenya’s own Vision 2030” (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). One of its major obstacles, however, is the non-inclusion of China and other newly emerging donors. According to a USAID official, the Chinese role in development cooperation in Kenya “is difficult because it is not transparent at all. Nobody really knows what China and the Kenyan government are up to” (Informant D11, Nairobi, 09/12/2008). In the same context, the Kenyan economist from the MoF pointed out that

China posed a big challenge to Kenyan development agenda. Emerging donors like China, Brazil, India are not part of HAC and don’t want to be. They also don’t want to sign the Paris Declaration, but all donors need to deal with China now. The KJAS and the HAC-group are means of Western countries to strengthen their position and counteract other players, mostly China. (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008)

It is difficult to determine if the HAC-group is indeed a means of traditional donors in order to counteract China and retain their influence on the development scene in Kenya. However, members of the HAC-group tend to identify the Kenyan government’s reluctance to organise donor coordination, including China, as the main reason for the lack of Chinese involvement in the donor community. A CIDA official lamented that the GoK is not taking the lead in harmonisation, alignment and coordination. The government is just not very interested and not very much engaged in the HAC-group. Maybe this is because Kenya does not depend on foreign aid very much. The Kenyan government prefers and relies much more on bilateral agreements. (Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008)
However, due to the large number of development organisations in Kenya, a reliance on bilateral agreements tends to cause many overlaps of donor activities and a concentration on certain sectors whilst others become neglected. Under such circumstances functioning donor coordination mechanisms are particularly important. Despite the general satisfaction with the outcome of the HAC-group, one informant (from a donor organisation) pointed out that “HAC is very good in the present situation, but in an ideal world it should not exist, because what HAC is doing should be the government’s job. Donors should not permanently institutionalise something that the Kenyan government is supposed to do”. In Kenya, the informant continued, “there is such a large number of donors that they are almost competing with each other on who gets to do what” (Informant D10, Nairobi, 12/03/2008). Other informants pointed out the same issue more directly. A Kenyan economist, Head of the Africa bureau of an international NGO for just taxation, also identified that “there is definitely a competition amongst the donors and our [the Kenyan] government just gladly takes it and does not put their foot down to take charge of their own affairs” (Informant L20, Nairobi, 27/11/2007). This view has even been echoed by Kenyan government officials arguing that “there are cases of donor competition and the Kenyan government is not doing anything against it” (Informants L15 and L17, both Nairobi, 08/04/2008). During my first weeks in the field when I became increasingly integrated into donor procedures similar trends quickly became evident. On 30 October 2007 I noted in my research diary:

Getting more understanding on how the development industry works. There seem to be so many donors out there, all trying to find their ‘indispensable’ niche in which they make themselves necessary. African countries of course gladly take all they get and play well along in that donor competition. There is no coordination or coherence and no independence from donor involvement – and it is also contradictory to the European Consensus on Development.

My experience was based on an inclusion in the energy policy/renewable energy sector in East Africa and the donor competition I witnessed in that respect during my involvement with GTZ REAP (see also Appendix A). This was only a few weeks before the United Nations
Climate Change Conference in Bali where renewable energy and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) were topics of much debate. It appeared to me that in a strategically important development hub, such as Nairobi, many donors were seeking to get involved in this sector, thereby desperately trying to identify a potential involvement for themselves in order to show presence and acquire a green label in the high-prestige and very prominent areas of clean energy and climate change. At the same time, donor agencies did not pay much attention to existing programmes in the area or to the absorption capacity of additional involvement on part of the Kenyan government or the local population. The Kenyan government did not seem to care about this ‘run’ on one specific sector, the sole interest appeared to be the maximisation of incoming resources with little consideration of the effects. I often felt that if I really wanted to know what was happening and which approaches, programmes, or projects are being implemented or tested, where and by whom, I needed to talk to a donor involved in the respective sector as opposed to the Kenyan government that seemed to have lost the overview (based on fieldnotes from 30 October 2007). The European Consensus on Development has identified such problems, referring to them as “absorption capacity“:

> Development policy must reflect a distribution of resources which takes account of the effect of such resources on poverty reduction. Consequently, particular attention must be paid to the situation of the LDCs and other LICs, as part of an approach which also encompasses the efforts by the government of the partner countries to reduce poverty as well as their performance and absorption capacity. (EPCC 2006a, 11)

Even though all EU donors signed the European Consensus on Development, the “efforts by the government of the partner countries“ and its absorption capacity did not seem to be playing a major role in their design of development engagement in Kenya’s energy sector.
6.4 Summary: Structures, processes and flows of European space projection in East Africa

The findings presented in this chapter indicate that on the ‘political’ level, and with respect to development cooperation, European external relations with the cooperating partners in East Africa, i.e. the African Union, the East African Community and the Republic of Kenya are diverse and complex. Interaction with the three partners varies considerably and is particularly ambiguous and multifaceted on the national level (Kenya). Structurally, interactions take a variety of forms comprising two Delegations of the European Commission (DelKEN and DelTAN), one Delegation of the European Union (DelAU), many embassies of EU member states across the region as well as a multitude of strategy papers, political and development cooperation agreements. Economically, the main mode of interaction is between African countries (Kenya) and the European Commission; structurally regulated within the framework of the Cotonou agreement and, more recently, the EPAs.

Table 4 summarises EU interaction with the three partners with respect to structures, processes and flows. Structures are thereby understood as the framework within which the interaction plays out. Processes occur within those structures and identify the parameters, areas and strategies of interaction. Flows are the implementation procedures and the practical day-to-day interaction.

The structural arrangement of EU relations with East Africa as economically coherent and politically diverse reflects levels of integration within the EU. Economically, the EU is a large integrated economy in the form of the common market. Similarly, its external economic relations are comparably integrated with the European Commission negotiating external trade jointly and on behalf of its member states. On an economic level, the spaces of interaction are highly regulated both within the EU and with regard to its external relations. Politically, on the other hand, the integration process is much less advanced both internally as well as externally. Just as there is a multitude of political actors on different levels within Europe, there is also a
multitude of external political relations of European actors. Yet, the spaces of interaction between these actors within Europe are highly regulated, not least through supranational agreements. Also for EU external relations, regulating the spaces of interaction remains central, both between European actors when cooperating outside the EU as well as when interacting ‘politically’ with non-European partners. In the realms of development policy, Carbone (2007, 130) suggests that the next step is “to go from speaking with one voice in the international arena to projecting the European model of international development”.

**Table 4: Structures, processes and flows of interaction with the AU, EAC and Kenya**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Flows</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU - AU</strong></td>
<td>Joint Experts Meetings</td>
<td>practical cooperation on projects and programmes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Delegation to the African Union (DelAU)</td>
<td>DG exchanges (AU and EC DGs)</td>
<td>- EU financing of AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union’s Permanent Mission in Brussels</td>
<td>strategy formulation</td>
<td>- EU Water Initiative (EUWI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU - Africa summits (Lisbon, December 2007)</td>
<td>identifying cooperation areas (8 partnerships)</td>
<td>- EU Energy Initiative (EUEI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission exchanges (AU-EU commissions)</td>
<td>institutional dialogue</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy Cotonou Agreement</td>
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<th>Structures</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Flows</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU - EAC</strong></td>
<td>sector coordinator exchanges</td>
<td>practical cooperation on projects and programmes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation of the EC to Tanzania (DelTAN)</td>
<td>strategy formulation</td>
<td>- GTZ small arms control, DfID Aid for Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ and DfID programmes to the EAC</td>
<td>identifying cooperation areas</td>
<td>advisory on regional integration (customs union, common market, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Strategy Paper</td>
<td>institutional dialogue</td>
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<td>Cotonou Agreement</td>
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<th>Structures</th>
<th>Processes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU - Kenya</strong></td>
<td>EC - GoK consultations</td>
<td>practical cooperation on projects and programmes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation of the EC to Kenya (DelKEN)</td>
<td>Diplomatic interaction between embassies and the GoK</td>
<td>- budget support, infrastructure building, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states embassies, Kenyan embassies in EU</td>
<td>political dialogue</td>
<td>trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral political and diplomatic relations</td>
<td>strategy formulation (KJAS)</td>
<td>bilateral development cooperation</td>
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<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotonou Agreement and EPAs</td>
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Source: author
With regard to the AU, the Lisbon summit in December 2007 has been a key point for projecting this model by regulating the spaces of interaction and institutionalising cooperation through DelAU as well as frequent exchanges between both commissions. With regard to Kenya, political relations have a longer institutionalised history, however, are also much more multifaceted than with the AU as there is not only one European multilateral actor (the delegation) but in addition the EU member states maintaining direct relations, and development cooperation programmes, with the Kenyan government. Even though more diverse, it is an objective of European development policy in Kenya to promote a further regulation of the spaces of interaction with the government. This is expressed largely in the heavily institutionalised processes of donor coordination in Kenya and with the Kenyan government, but also in the preference for budget support as well as the long-term CSPs and agreements between the European Commission and the Kenyan government. The nature of budget support is highly institutionalised mainly because of the risk of misappropriations. The procedures required on part of the EC for the disbursement of funds are complex and very stringent, thereby requiring heavily regulated interaction processes.

In many ways analogies can be drawn to the phase of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s. Wessels (1982, 10) argued that EPC had developed into a structure within which the “coordination reflex” and the “harmonization of positions” have created the preconditions for a coordinated diplomacy. In the international system the Nine [the EC] have established themselves as an accepted partner in daily diplomatic affairs with the help of this coordinated diplomacy – a partner whose common declarations and other means of diplomacy are generally well regarded.

The structures of donor coordination in Kenya are similar to the ones described by Wessels and the EU is clearly an accepted group of countries within these structures. Yet, the extent to which European donors appear as a group and distinguish themselves as such from other donors depends on the level of aligned interests and policy preferences as well as prior
coordination and harmonisation of policies amongst EU members. Wessels (1982, 11) also points to ‘discrepancies’ in the process of EPC. Such discrepancies clearly also exist between EU member states and also towards DelKEN. On a technical level of development cooperation, these differences mostly occur with respect to the extent of donor coordination and the inclusion of non-European donors. Whilst DelKEN is advocating intense European donor coordination before interacting with other donors or the Kenyan government, some EU member states (the UK in particular) prefer a more holistic donor coordination and cooperation with the Kenyan government from the start without attributing specific importance to prior European coordination. Amongst all European donors, however, there is a general agreement to promote further regulation of the spaces of interaction both with each other and with the Kenyan partners, along the lines outlined in the Consensus on Development. In addition to strongly articulating central tenets of civilian power identity, such as peace, democracy, good governance, rule of law, the Consensus has also “institutionalised a number of development norms” (Carbone 2007, 130). Practically this is expressed in the general tendency within the donor community to move away from random project support (as practiced in Kenya largely by USAID and JICA) towards more institutionalised programme or budget support. In Kenya, this tendency is most strongly advocated by the Delegation of the European Commission.
Chapter VI has explored some of the interaction mechanisms how European space is projected in East Africa. This chapter discusses dominant perceptions of the EU and its identity and role as a global and development actor. It is predominantly based on empirical data obtained through interviews with key individuals involved in European interaction with the AU, the EAC and the Republic of Kenya and outlines how perceptions of the EU vary depending on the informant’s affiliation as well as the policy field and the mode of interaction. The differentiation of the EU’s identities between geopolitical partner/model/counterweight and geoeconomic power (see Section 6.2.1) thereby plays a significant role. With respect to the former, perceptions tend to be largely coherent between different informants. Descriptions are mostly positive, however, also suggest a limited global influence of the EU in this context. Regarding the latter, on the other hand, perceptions vary significantly between informants. Whilst most informants viewed the EU as a powerful global actor in this respect, perceptions of non-European informants also included much more negative aspects, often associated with (neo-)imperial practices of the EU as an actor in global economic policy (see also Fioramonti and Poletti 2008, 171-173).

These perceptions are presented and contextualised in this chapter. It first deals with narratives about the nature of the EU as a political entity and thereby focuses on perceptions related to Europe’s imperial past (and present), the region as a geopolitical space for internal as well as external interaction, and the most negative as well as the most positive perceptions associated with an integrated/integrating Europe. In the next section, this chapter concentrates on perceptions more closely related to the EU’s interaction with East Africa. It situates the EU as an actor in the development industry and outlines how changes in European development policy as well as the emergence of new development constellations influence
perceptions of the EU in this context. The following section addresses perceptions of the EU beyond the development business and presents viewpoints about the imagined and suggested collective role(s) for Europe in the world more generally. Finally, Section 7.4 summarises the main points and contextualises the perceptions presented with the framework of geopolitical space in terms of structures, processes and flows.

7.1 Perceptions of the EU as an actor on its own right

7.1.1 Perceptions of (neo-)imperialism and the EU's nature in the international system

Popular and academic debates on imperial practices tend to focus either on past European colonialism or more recent American neo-imperialism, in recent years most evidently displayed during the presidency of George W Bush. Yet as Hooper and Kramsch (2007) point out, a critical engagement with aspects of contemporary European imperial practices is rare, albeit for varying reasons. Neoconservative writers such as Robert Kagan (2003) tend to argue that Europe lacks the power, above all mechanisms for the projection of military power, to be playing an imperial role. His famous quote about Americans being from Mars and Europeans from Venus, summarises the views of Europeans living within their constructed perpetual peace within Europe, reluctant to and incapable of playing a more significant global role. Others argue that Europe continues to play a significant role in the world, but renounces ‘traditional’ imperial practices (Manners 2002; Zielonka 2006; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). On the other hand, Hooper and Kramsch (2007, 526-527) emphasise that:

constituting European goodness against American badness (not a Herculean task), Europeans have internalised the model of a Europe which has renounced armed warfare and violence and established a social democracy and ethical governance in their place: blood for roses. While there is certainly a reality to this analysis, there is also another Europe, one no less real but existing outside Europe's geopolitical consciousness: namely, a Europe oddly unreflective about its own imperialism, past and present, as well as its contemporary less than enlightening attitude towards ‘strangers’.
Indeed, when interacting in the context of developing countries, notions of European neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism are omnipresent. Europeans, Liam Kennedy (2006, 135) points out, tend to “repress spectres of European empires”. Clearly, the prime ‘imperial suspect’ is the United States, but in developing countries the perception of external actors pursuing imperial practices of exerting influence on the political and economic system looms large. The coordinator for the African branch of an international NGO for tax justice argued that:

Development Aid is not an action of good will, it is a political tool to influence policies; it has been that and it will always be that. Countries that are giving aid also have political and economic interest. Those economic interests sometimes stand in conflict with each other between the donor countries. There is a competition amongst powerful countries (EU, US, China) to dominate African countries. They are competing to exploit countries that are not able to protect themselves. The EU is yet another power in this game. (Informant L20, Nairobi, 27/11/2007)

During the course of most of my fieldwork, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were in the centre of criticism. The programme coordinator of another NGO in Nairobi condemned the exploitation of power relations in EU-ACP relations in the context of the negotiations on the new EPAs:

The ACP –group has almost 80 countries, how would one solution fit all? There are huge varieties amongst those countries. The EU is threatening to cut aid or impose sanctions on countries that don’t want to comply. The EU is trying to break solidarity of ACP countries to make them weaker negotiations partners. It is economic imperialism. The historical background of LOME was to maintain access for European countries to raw-materials from their former colonies. Now it is to maintain market access for European companies. (Informant L11, Nairobi, 20/11/2007)

Even though the countries of the East African Community signed agreements with the Commission just prior to the Lisbon summit, there was widespread popular resentment. A DelKEN official observed that “The EU has a fairly negative picture in the Kenyan media, mainly because of the EPAs” (Informant E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007); one example of such media representations of the EPAs is illustrated in Figure 18. It shows an advertisement by the Kenya
Human Rights Commission that appeared in Kenya’s most widely circulating daily paper, the *Daily Nation*, on 05 December 2008. It is entitled “EPA = Recolonisation of Kenya” and describes the EPAs as “modern day slavery” showing a picture of Africans in chains. With such images resembling slave deportations, citizens are supposed to mobilise their MP to oppose Kenya’s agreement to the EPAs with the European Commission. However, the advertisement neither explains what the Economic Partnership Agreements are nor does it mention the European Commission, the European Union, the EAC, or the ACP-group of countries.

Figure 18: Representing the Economic Partnership Agreement

Source: Daily Nation, 05 December 2008

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95 The Kenya Human Rights Commission is a private NGO based in Nairobi.
During the EPA negotiations between the Commission and East African countries, an EAC official recounted that the Europeans “had been pushing their interests quite heavily (government procurement amongst other things) and were arm-twisting the ACP countries. There was also a strong push on part of the EU to comply with WTO regulations” (Informant L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008). In fact the entire language of the Cotonou Agreement, Hurt (2003, 163) argues, “cleverly blends the ideas of consent and coercion” whereby consent is achieved through “notions of ‘dialogue’, ‘partnership’ and of ACP-states “owning their own development strategies”. At the same time coercion “is present in the EU’s presentation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as the only viable alternative and also through the implementation of frequent reviews of aid provision that have conditionalities attached”.

In reference to Chang’s (2002) work on the relation of protectionism and industrialisation, a NGO coordinator in Nairobi noted that:

Western institutions and countries are kicking away the ladder; they used a certain ladder to develop and ‘get up’ and now that they are on top they are kicking away the ladder for African countries. They were shutting themselves of the global market during their own development, but are now forcing African countries to open up. Totally opening up nascent industries is not a solution; industries need to be home-grown and develop domestically first. (Informant L20, Nairobi, 27/11/2007)

In this manner, Europe’s colonial past looms large over its contemporary relations with Africa. Even though the colonial history is predominantly associated with individual European countries, such perceptions of Europe as an imperial actor have profound ramifications on Europe’s future role. Holland (2002, 139) argues that because of the lack of “a long history of international action to bolster its reputation [the EU] is judged, and can only be judged, on how it deals with the present”. From a different viewpoint, a DelAU official claimed for the EU a “credibility bonus because of the mutual history of European and African countries, but the EU as an institution does not have the colonial stigma. The African side also asks for more cooperation with the EU than with the member states” (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 204
Similarly, an AU official argued that the EU as an integrated community has more credibility than its member states (colonial history) and also more than US and China. This is undermined by European countries that sometimes still pursue their individual interest. The AU would prefer to act with the EU. Europe is a preferable partner because of geographical closeness and the long-term relations, the EU should build on this advantage as it does not have the colonial stigma of its member states. Still Europe has not played its role since independence to treat Africa as equal and contribute significantly to Africa’s development. It is an unequal partnership and has always been one. (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

As for the perceptions of the EU as an actor in the international system, it is therefore often decisive to what extent it can present a common position. Perceptions on what counts as European or what is seen as Europe naturally vary significantly. Even though the respective delegations are the most prevalent European actors, a variety of imaginations and perceptions on Europe and European space can be found. For a USAID official, for instance, the “EU really is France and Germany, a little bit of the UK, with Holland and the Nordic countries as smaller appendices” (Informant D10, Nairobi, 12/03/2008). For some member states, the EU’s weight as a global actor is thereby utilised to upgrade their own position in the world and influence on specific policies (see section 6.1.2).

With respect to the European representation to the African Union a DelAU official described the commitment to a joint European approach as widely supported by the member states: “EU member states were very much in favour of having that one voice (DelAU); including the UK and France. Individual member states realised that they can be much more powerful under a European mandate” (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). Unlike bilateral relations, relations with the AU are not a traditional domain of national politics, therefore member states are likely to be more willing to conduct interaction with the AU through the common European vehicle, in particular with regard to the institutional proximity of EU and AU. As such the roles played by DelAU and DelKEN in the interaction with the official African institutions differ depending on their mandate. Whilst DelAU’s joint mandate of
Commission and Council enables it to officially conduct relations with the AU on behalf of EU member states, DelKEN’s responsibility is restricted to representing the Commission. Additionally, member states maintain bilateral relations with Kenya. Sectors and activities of development cooperation of the various European actors are thereby negotiated in longer-term frameworks through the coordination mechanisms outlined in Chapter VI.

7.1.2 Focus on the region as geopolitical space

The EU’s nature as a regional organisation with far-reaching supranational authorities marks it as a distinctive actor in the international system and thus partially defines its role as a model for regional integration in developing countries. Thematically, the role Europeans play in the development industry can overlap or resemble those of other actors. The Canadian approach to development cooperation, for instance, is in many ways very similar to the cross-cutting issues that European donors have agreed on. A CIDA-official in Nairobi pointed out that with respect to its approach to development cooperation “CIDA is much closer to the Europeans than to USAID; for example on issues of aid effectiveness Canada is also pushing towards budget support” (Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/12/2008). Hence, whilst there are thematic overlaps of Europe’s role in the donor community, the identity of ‘the Europeans’ as a regional grouping of countries that is integrated both internally as well as with regard to its external relations is unique. Clearly the level of external integration is less visible than that of internal integration, yet also in external relations the “reflexe communautaire” has become “the norm.

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96 ‘The Europeans’ is a term that was frequently used in the interviews to express a grouping of European countries that have aligned their positions on a specific programme or policy. As such it implies policy coherence, which is not always the case. However, despite their differences, it is remarkable how European donors are seen as a group, often in distinction to ‘the Americans’ (USAID) or ‘the Japanese’ (JICA). If a European country takes a different position on a specific issue, it is usually referred to separately; for instance: ‘the Europeans preferred option A but the Swedes favoured option B’. Acknowledging the differences in approaches and policies of European donors, in the context of this research I will continue to use the term ‘Europeans’ in the way it has been used by my informants, i.e. the largest group of European countries that jointly represent a coherent position.
rather than the exception” (Wong 2008, 323). Such foreign policy Europeanization, Wong (2008, 333) argues, “is much more a process of socialization than forced, formal adaptation”.

He thereby points to the three dimensions of ‘downloading’, ‘uploading’ and ‘cross-loading’ (see Section 6.1.2), through which the foreign policies of European actors become aligned (ibid, 324-326) and through which “member state representatives seek a reasoned consensus about which particular course of action is justified and appropriate to enact their collective identity” (Sedelmeier 2004, 129). However, this is not to imply that individual European countries do not sometimes pursue different policies, but usually this is subject to coordination or at least discussion with other European countries (Allen, Rummel, and Wessels 1982). It it thus also with respect to external relations that “the EU as an advanced instance of regional integration becomes a natural part of national politics” (Vink and Graziano 2008, 16). In this manner, the internal level of integration is projected in each country’s external relations and has an additional actor that represents the collective approach institutionally, the Delegation of the European Commission.

With respect to issues of regional integration, ‘the Europeans’ are widely regarded as the only reference point and the EU’s nature as an actor in the international system and the development community is clearly defined by its uniqueness as a supranational entity grouping together 27 countries. Not only internally, but also externally “the inherently ‘European thing’“, a DG Dev official in Brussels pointed out, “is regional integration” (Informant E12, Brussels, 04/07/2008). The promotion of regional integration and the “EU’s efforts to develop region-region level cooperation“ (Holden 2009, 17-18) are thus major components of European external relations, in this case with the regional organisations EAC and AU. As outlined in Chapter V, regional integration is a key aspect of European space and the promotion thereof a key aspect of the projection of European space beyond Europe (Duchêne 1972, 1973b; Maull 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Beck and Grande 2006; Telò 2006; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; EC 2007a, 2007d, 2007c, 2008b). The empirical data obtained
during the interviews very much supports these official and conceptual articulations of Europe’s preference for promoting regional integration. An economist from the Kenyan Ministry for the East African Community, for instance, observed that “the EU as a regional grouping prefers to deal with other regional groupings” (Informant L13, Nairobi, 09/04/2008) and a DelAU official suggested that the EU should be preparing the international system for other regional actors, in particular African regional communities, that are likely to become actors on their own right in the international system (Informant E16, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008).

Another informant, an American former NGO director, pointed to the “great admiration in Africa, in particular in the EAC, of the European project of regional integration” (Informant D16, Nairobi, 07/11/2007). Key informants of the EAC and the AU largely echoed this assessment and pointed to the understanding of ‘the Europeans’ with respect to the problems and difficulties of a regional integration process as opposed to others actors, notably the US. An EAC official, for instance, pointed out that “the EU succeeded very well in its own regional integration and had to go through its own troubles in that respect. It therefore appreciates much more the efforts of regional integration the EAC is encountering. The US does not have that level of understanding” (Informant L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008). Similarly, one of his colleagues at the EAC asserted that especially on issues of regional integration

the EU is very different to the US because the EU understands the intricacies of sovereignty when dealing with regional integration, it understands the process and the difficulties when trying to reach a common consensus amongst the member states, it is like the EAC and has gone through the processes the EAC aims to go through. The common market the EAC is negotiating at present is almost an exact replication of the EU’s. The EAC is following the steps of the EU, also when it comes to getting others ready to join. The EU’s neighbourhood policy is about getting neighbours to a point where the structures are already fairly similar to ones of the union once they get to the point of accession. (Informant L9, Arusha, 18/03/2008)

Whilst the East African Community with its five member states is a relatively small regional community, gradually taking steps towards the creation of a customs union and a
common market, the much larger African Union with its 53 member states takes a much more important position on European external relations, however, is also very restricted and much less advanced in taking concrete steps of integration. Yet for both the EAC and the AU, the EU is the key reference point and cooperation partner on issues of regional integration. An AU official in Addis Ababa emphasised that “the EU is the only actor which can serve as a model for regional integration. All of the AU aspirations are modelled on the EU” (Informant L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008). As outlined in Chapter VI, the establishment of DelAU was an important step and visible sign of an upgraded importance of the AU to the EU. According to DelAU officials there was a significant appreciation and a sense of privilege amongst senior AU officials that the first of such new kinds of European external relations, i.e. joint representations of Commission and Council, was established at the AU (Informants E15 and E16, both Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). Also the AU informants expressed their appreciation for the establishment of DelAU (Informants L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008; L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008); one AU official, for instance, expected that DelAU would lead to better communication and to an improved comprehension of African issues on part of the EU:

    Comprehension was difficult because Brussels did not really know the situation and what was going on in Africa. Now DelAU will be staffed with people who understand Africa and can explain it better to Brussels, therefore it will solve the problem of misunderstandings. (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

At the EAC, however, there are no permanent representations of the EU or the Commission; interaction is handled through the European Commission’s Delegation to Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. In light of the establishment of DelAU, EAC officials expressed the opinion that a permanent European representation to the EAC would very much be in their interest (Informants L9 and L10, both Arusha, 18/03/2008). Similarly, the GTZ official responsible for GTZ’s regional support programme to the EAC argued that the EU would be “ideal to play such a role [regional integration advisory] to the EAC”, thereby highlighting the institutional advantage of the EU as a regional organisation to conduct such a programme
compared to Germany and the UK, bilateral donors, who currently support regional integration at the EAC (Informant E21, Arusha, 18/03/2008). In this context, the fact that there is no permanent EU or Commission representation to the EAC illustrates that, even though “the EU is the major development partner for the EAC” (Informant L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008), this significance is far from being mutual and that the EAC is not high enough on the EU’s agenda to warrant the establishment of a separate delegation.

7.1.3 Europe’s fame and shame

At the end of the interviews I asked the informants what they regarded as the most positive and the most negative aspects of an integrated Europe. The questions were kept open and were not intended to exclusively refer to the EU’s role in Africa or as a development actor, rather they sought to inquire in very general terms about the most positive and most negative aspects that come to mind when thinking about the European Union. As most of the interviews took place in the context of the EU as a development actor, many responses reflected opinions about the EU in this respect. The results are shown in Figure 19 and 20.

On the positive side, the ‘freedom of movement’ within the EU was expressed most frequently, referring to the common market and the freedom of settlement and movement of people, capital and goods within Europe. Interestingly, this aspect and the ‘creation of peace and stability’ have been mentioned as important and positive aspects mostly by representatives of European or other donor organisations. African informants, on the other hand, tended to identify Europe’s collective role (mostly the Commission’s) in the development industry and the provision of development assistance as the most positive aspect.
On the negative side, African informants mostly criticised the EU’s neo-imperial practices and European interference in African affairs. As pointed out in Section 7.1.1, Europe’s
“flourishing neo-colonialist political economy” (Hooper and Kramsch 2007, 527) is not very evident in the perception of most Europeans, including those working in the development industry, but it is very much part of the perception of its African cooperation partners. A NGO coordinator in Nairobi, for instance, criticised that Europe is “pushing its agenda too forcefully, it has too much influence on our domestic affairs. There has been no change in the historical relationship” (Informant L11, Nairobi, 20/11/2007). Similarly, an EAC official argued that “the EU acts along geopolitical power structures which are not always to the benefit of African countries” (Informant L9, Arusha, 18/03/2008) and an AU official critiqued Europe’s “failure to understand African realities and positions. [The Europeans] are trying to impose their positions on us” (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008).

Other criticism focussed on the high level of bureaucracy and the Commission’s tendency to overregulation. This refers to the disregard of the subsidiarity principle on part of the Commission and its attempts to regulate detailed aspects and procedures of day-to-day life. Not only African officials in Kenya, at the EAC and at the AU (Informants L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008; L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008; L15 and L17, both Nairobi, 08/04/2008) identified the Commission’s highly bureaucratised processes as cumbersome but also DeIKEN officials:

Indeed there is a lot of bureaucracy in European development cooperation, in particular when it comes to the disbursement of funds. Well, the idea was that the Commission is willing to take more risk on what and how to use European tax money, but therefore it had to set guidelines and require commitments on part of the other side. The heavy bureaucracy is a result of the éclat of the Santer Commission, then the EU has been trying to plug all possible loopholes by ridiculous and exaggerated means. It really reaches an extent where I am sometimes surprised that we can even sign a contract. The rules are so strict that some of EU member states wouldn’t even qualify. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008)

My point here is not to assess the reality value of these statements, but rather to show how both positive and negative perceptions of a collective Europe diverge and converge in certain situations (see Section 7.4). On the positive side, it was almost exclusively Europeans and representatives of other donor organisations valuing factors such as ‘freedom of
movement’ and ‘peace and stability’ in Europe whilst Africans were positively remarking on the EC’s role as a development actor. On the negative side, donors cooperating with Commission agencies in Africa frequently lamented its high level of bureaucracy, Europeans complained about the democratic deficit of European institutions and Africans criticised imperial legacies in European policies and attitudes.

7.2 Perceptions of European interaction with East Africa

7.2.1 The EU in the development industry

Even though it is commonly understood that the European Union is a distinctive actor in the international system, it does not necessarily act differently with respect to its donor practices. Figure 21 shows the quantified responses to the question if the EC (the European Community – the first pillar of the EU - which is in charge of collective European development policy) is seen as a development actor that is structurally different to others (in a sense that it differs from both multilaterals and bilaterals) or if it is one more actor amongst a variety of others. From a total of 41 responses to that question, 23 informants viewed the EC as a development actor that is structurally different from its member states, other bilateral actors and also from multilateral institutions. The informants who viewed the EC as a structurally different actor were then asked in what respect they thought the EC differs from other development organisations. The responses are summarised in Figure 22 (multiple reasons allowed).

The informants were further asked about their opinion on what role the delegations as representations of the European Commission should be playing in the development community. As shown in Figure 23, a majority of informants viewed the delegation’s role as complementary and supportive to the member states. It should be emphasised here that the information presented in Figure 23 refers to the informants’ opinions about the role of delegations as part of the donor community, not the global role of the EU (see Figure 29).
Figure 21: Is the EC a structurally different actor in development?

![Figure 21](image)

Figure 22: Differences between EC delegations and other development actors

![Figure 22](image)

A statement by an informant from the Rwandan Ministry of Infrastructure largely summarised the wider sentiments:

The delegation [in Rwanda] is necessary in addition to the embassies of the European countries in order to cooperate with the EU directly. It is a little bit different in a way that it is not completely multilateral as the World Bank, but also not like a country. In Rwanda, the EU is a significant actor, much more so than the US. (Informant L12, Arusha, 26/03/2008)
As indicated in Figure 22, another striking difference between the role of EC delegations and member states is the delegation’s limited mandate to engage in diplomatic relations and that cooperation is therefore less ‘politicised’, i.e. less influenced by changes in political relations between the partners, as they might occur through a change of governments for example (Informants E2, Nairobi, 27/11/2008 and E20, Nairobi, 17/12/2007). As a result, however, in the words of two World Bank officials, cooperation with the EC “can be more stable and objective than that with its member states because it is not so much affected by political fluctuation. The EC’s approach is more long-term oriented and issue-based. For us it is easier to work with the EU as it is apolitical, just like the Bank” (Informants D12 and D13, both Nairobi, 13/02/2008). A UNEP official pointed out that as a development actor the Commission “can make more objective decisions. Similarly, a CIDA official observed that the EC is “not so susceptible to political issues and possible bilateral problems. It is more consistent, the EC can ride stormier seas” (Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008).

Figure 23: Functions of the delegation

Informants from the Commission, however, did not see their role as exclusively restricted to issues of technical and financial development cooperation and appeared to be
aspiring to a more significant ‘political’ role. With respect to DelKEN’s role in Kenya, a DG Dev official in Brussels asserted that:

its [DelKEN’s] political role is becoming more and more important, the political agenda is being upgraded. Also amongst the member states there is a desire to move closer to real CFSP, the EC is taking a coordinating position therein. This is important as all the member states have their individual interest, and the EC is needed to advocate the common interests and the European values. Kenya might see the EC as a less critical partner as it did not have a political role in the past, but the EC is set to move from a development agency to a political partner. (Informant E13, Brussels, 04/07/2008)

Next to budget support and infrastructure development, ‘political dialogue’ is one of the Commission’s cooperation aspects in Kenya. This is not a sense of establishing diplomatic relations between the Kenyan government and the European Commission, rather a dialogue between DelKEN and individual Kenyan ministries on governance issues and the conduct of policy implementation integrated with wider development cooperation aspects (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008). Regarding DelKEN’s mandate on political relations, a DelKEN official emphasized that:

DelKEN can make political statements on behalf of the Commission. It is one partner amongst others in the donor community and can therefore also make political statements separate from the member states and doesn’t have to consult with them. Statements on behalf of the EU, however, would have to be initiated by the presidency. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008)

In the context of Louis Michel’s visit to Kenya during the crisis, the same informant stressed that “it takes the courage of people like Louis Michel to sometimes ‘overstep’ their role and make statements on behalf of the EU, even though he is a Commissioner and has no mandate to speak for the EU” (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008). Michel had visited Kenya during the crisis in January 2008 and made a statement on behalf of the EU condemning the violence and urging the feuding parties to come to a peaceful solution. A Danish official explained that even though the Commission, in the form of DelKEN, “cannot make political statements on its own behalf, there was an informal consent amongst the member states for Louis Michel to make that statement” (Informant E2, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). This statement
caused an instant reaction by the Kenyan government. Figure 24 shows an ad that the Kenyan government ran in the *Daily Nation* on 17 January 2008 asking the critics of the election results to provide proof for their accusations. The EU (in its entirety and without differentiations) is listed as the first addressee of this ad, in addition also the British and the German ambassador. Michel’s statement was thus clearly perceived as an EU statement, however, even though the British and the German ambassadors largely echoed Michel’s statement, their outspoken criticism was rebuked separately. This illustrates the complex entanglements of bi- and multilateral agents, articulations and policies in the EU’s external relations as well as the equally complex perceptions thereof.

**Figure 24: The Kenyan government’s rebuke to election critics**

Source: *Daily Nation, 17 January 2008*
On a more general level and with respect to the Commission lead role in agenda-setting for development policy, Carbone (2007, 19) identifies three major factors upon which such leadership is contingent: First, an institutional entrepreneur (such as senior staff of a DG) must place the issue on the agenda. Second, the Commission must act as a unitary actor. Third, internal (from within the Commission) and external (from member states) resistance must be overcome. Carbone’s insightful study is mainly concerned with decision-making processes in Brussels and therefore has only limited applicability to procedures of collective European interaction in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, yet in particular his third factor on overcoming resistance from the member states is relevant to the issues of concern here. In ‘political’ issues of external relations, coordinating a concerted European position in the partner countries is part of the responsibility of the rotating presidency as it is within the domains of national foreign policy. The Commission’s role in it depends on the respective presidency. A UNEP official observed that:

In external representation and relations, the Commission is clearly subordinate to the presidency. Yet in particular for presidencies of smaller countries, Brussels generally leads the direction. The EC does not have particular national interests such as its member states and therefore can make more objective decisions. It is less politicised and instrumentalised for short-term domestic political purposes. (Informant D9, Nairobi, 02/12/2008)

This articulates with DelKEN’s preference for long-term agreements regulated spaces of interaction (see Chapter VI) as opposed to short, ad-hoc cooperation depending on a politically favourable climate. A DfID official referred to it as a “long-term commitment and cooperation frameworks determined for 5 year periods. But it is also less flexible than bilateral” (Informant E3, Nairobi, 13/02/2008). A EAC official also pointed out that the “EU takes more times to make a decision, but once the decision is made, the EU is more sound in terms of implementation” (Informant L9, Arusha, 18/03/2008) and a UNEP official argued that “it takes a long time to find common ground, but once it is found it is represented strongly” (Informant D9, Nairobi, 02/12/2008).
More specifically in the Kenyan context and DelKEN’s role in the development landscape in Nairobi most informants viewed it as a supplement to the member states’ embassies. An official working for ECHO described DelKEN’s functions as “an added value to the member states’ embassies; especially for smaller European states it is the way to have a presence here and to do cooperation with African countries. Another function, though to a lesser extent, is that it provides more money and acts as a collective voice of Europe” (Informant E9, Nairobi, 11/12/2007). Similarly, a NGO coordinator in Nairobi viewed DelKEN as an “additional presence of the EU in Kenya next to the ones of its member states, but it represents of a more legitimate and more important ‘voice of a united Europe’” (Informant L20, Nairobi, 27/11/2007) and an economist of the Kenyan Ministry of Finance observed that DelKEN’s presences allows “smaller countries to pool resources and use funds more effectively as part of a bigger project” (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). In the same context a DelKEN official explained that

smaller member states already position diplomats in EC delegations abroad. But so far many member states are reluctant to accept a lead role of the delegation. A lot of diplomats just try to safe their position, more unification would go counter their career planning as some jobs would be cancelled. The role of many expats in developing countries should be to make themselves obsolete, that goes counter their career plans. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008)

When asked about the delegation’s role in relation to that of its member states, a British official from DfID responded that the question should be posed the other way around by asking what the role of the member states could be in relation to the delegation, thereby implying that European external relations in the development field should first and foremost be conducted collectively (Informant E3, Nairobi, 13/02/2008).
7.2.2 A changing framework of EU development policy

In his comprehensive study of European development policies, Carbone argues that, during the 2000s, European development policy underwent fundamental changes. According to Carbone (2007, 54), the international framework for development cooperation changed significantly between the United National International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 and the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in 2005, mainly due to the leadership role played by the Commission seeking to shape international development cooperation according to its agenda. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005) and the European Consensus on Development (EPCC 2006a) were the results of this process and, according to Carbone’s informant, an attempt on part of the Commission to “produce a statement on EU development policy, a sort of Brussels consensus to counter the Washington consensus” (Carbone 2007, 54-55).

Such attempts to create a European approach, a “Brussels consensus”, to more harmonised development policies of European donors have of course existed before those processes and been widely discussed (Grilli 1993; Lister 1997; Reisen 1999; Holland 2002; Carbone 2007). The ultimate option of harmonizing and aligning European development policy, “the greatest challenge”, as Holland (2002, 244) put it, “remains defining development policy as an exclusive EU competence and in making that policy a future success”. Such an arrangement of development policy as an exclusive EU competence would mean a completed process of integration of a certain aspect of European external relations. The empirical data from my research, however, shows that such an arrangement would be highly contested. Figure 25 shows how the informants perceived the possibility of defining development cooperation as exclusive EU competence. During the interviews I specifically emphasised that I was not inquiring if this is a realistic option or not, but if it would be a desirable option.
There are no significant patterns in the distribution of preferences, neither with respect to informants favouring or opposing such an arrangement nor with respect to the informants’ affiliation. As Figure 26 shows the most common arguments for defining development cooperation as exclusive EU competence were that it would improve aid effectiveness and avoid overlaps as well as that it would be easier for cooperating partners to deal with one institution as opposed to several.

In this context, an official from the AU in Addis Ababa asserted that “development cooperation as an exclusive competence of the Commission would be very good. For the AU it is very good to be able to interact with the supranational institution of the Commission as it...
speaks for all of Europe. It would be great to have that also on issues of development cooperation” (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008). Most of the affirmative informants also emphasised that they viewed it as desirable, but not realistic. A German official in Nairobi, for instance, argued that “politically it would be desirable but practically there might be significant problems. The question is if the Commission is capable of doing so” (Informant E22, Nairobi, 18/11/2008). His Canadian colleague estimated that an exclusive EU competence in development policy “would be good for aid effectiveness, but it is not going to happen, because of domestic policy interests and preference for individual decision making” (Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008) and a DelKEN official articulated that “theoretically it would make a lot of sense; it is the ultimate goal. But it is not happening any time soon, as each country has its underlying agenda” (Informant E10, Nairobi, 03/03/2008).

Compared to the informants favouring development cooperation as an exclusive EU competence, the informants opposing it tended to substantiate their opinion much more thoroughly. Their most common arguments are listed in Figure 27.

Figure 27: Opposing views on development as exclusive EU competence

Would diminish flexibility and
diversity of approaches

Would diminish national sovereignty and interfere with interests of member states

Incompetence of the Commission

Better for African countries to deal with many donors bilaterally

Would diminish overall availability of funds

EU agency | Other donor | Local/NGO
Interestingly, most of the informants drawing attention to the Commission’s incompetence, lacking expertise, or inappropriate approach to development as the major reason for opposing it, are representatives of European organisations, whilst most African informants mentioned the loss of flexibility and diversity in approaches as the strongest argument against it. In this context and the relation to collective European trade policy, a UNEP official argued that in trade policy

the Commission’s exclusive competence is different because it is a clear external representation of internal interests. It is good for European countries if these interests are pooled and collectively represented by a powerful actor. But in development and environmental policy it is more important to be innovative for developing new and improved solutions to global problems. If European development cooperation was administered centrally by Brussels, it would be one huge bureaucracy which would eliminate diversity and the innovative potential deriving from diversity and pluralism. It is precisely such pluralism that is extremely important for innovations to solve developmental and environmental problems. It would be one mega-bureaucracy dealing with a minimal consensus of all member states; that is not a good approach for global problems and innovative solutions. It works well for external representation of joint internal interests, such as trade, but it kills innovation. (Informant D9, Nairobi, 02/12/2008)

In similar terms, however, also in light of the lacking mandate and the resulting lack of experience in diplomatic and political relations on part of the Commission, a EAC official pointed out that:

Many staff at the EC are bureaucrats, who are not flexible, very rigid and do not have political sensitivity. The role of the EC is not as political as the role of the member states, it is more technical. EU member countries have their own interests which they are trying to pursue with its development policy. As such they simply have to be more politically sensitive; the EU’s role on the other hand is more technical, the people are mostly technocrats. (Informant L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008)

The quote reveals a perception of bureaucratic Commission staff fulfilling their assigned duties in the implementation of pre-determined programmes. Simultaneously, the informant implied that many Commission officials lack political and diplomatic sensitivity because diplomacy is not in their competencies. This has repercussion on the conduct of development
cooperation in a sense that Commission programmes tend to be less flexible and more bureaucratic than those of bilateral donors operating in less rigid structures. This inflexibility and bureaucracy is partly due to the Commission’s preference to operate within long-term structures and agreements and is even unlikely to change in case of major reconfigurations of European external relations such as defining development cooperation exclusive competence of the Commission.

However, as most informants also clearly expressed, the possibility of such a major change in European development policy is very slim. Other agents of change, on the other hand, did and are likely to have a more real impact on the conduct of European development cooperation. As discussed above, the processes outlined by Carbone leading to the Paris Declaration and the European Consensus on Development modified the framework of the international development industry. Yet despite these changes, their impact on the perceptions of Europe’s role in the development industry was limited. Carbone’s research was conducted between 2001 and 2007, mainly in Europe, in order to investigate the decision making processes on development policy in Brussels. However, it did not include research outside Europe where development policy is being implemented on the ground (Carbone 2007, 8-9). My data indicates that even though the processes described by Carbone featured prominently amongst Europeans, other factors had a major impact on the perception of Europe’s role as a development actor by both other donors and African partners, in particular the Africa-EU summit in Lisbon in 2007 and the emergence of China as a major donor.
7.2.3 China and aid conditionalities

At the same time, while the Wolfowitz scandal unfolded, China was playing host to the Africa Development Bank (ADB), which held its board meeting in Shanghai. This is a vivid metaphor for today’s world: while the World Bank is caught up in corruption and controversy, China skilfully raises its geopolitical profile in the developing world. (Sachs 2007)

The emergence of China, and to a lesser extent also some of the Arab states97, as donors fundamentally changed the international donor landscape (Taylor 2004a; Alden 2005; Gill, Huang, and Morrison 2007; Lorenz and Thielke 2007; Martin 2008; Campbell 2008; Six 2009; Mohan and Power 2009)98. In the context of the 11th annual East African Power Industry Convention in Dar Es Salaam in August 2009, the Secretary General of the East African Community (EAC), Juma Mwapachu, highlighted that the EAC’s interest in cooperating with China, in particular in the energy sector: “Most of China's investment in the region focus on mineral resources, like copper, as well as infrastructure including roads. China has rich experience in developing energy sectors and East Africa has the potential for investment to develop energy” (quoted in Chunju 2009). Similarly, in a critique of the World Bank’s approach, Sachs (2007) points out that “unlike the Chinese, the Bank has too often forgotten the most basic lessons of development, preferring to lecture the poor and force them to privatise basic infrastructure, rather than to help the poor to invest in infrastructure and other crucial sectors”. The result of the free-market ideology of the “Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) were in many respects disastrous for Africa and cast increasing doubts on the West’s development industry. In this context, Campbell (2008, 91) argues that “the emergence of China as a force in Africa complicated the tussle between the EU and the USA over the ‘who controls Africa‘”. Also historically, Sino-African relations, in the words of Campbell (2008, 90-91), were

97 In the case of Kenya, this refers mostly to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
98 See also the September 2009 special issue of the European Journal of Development Research (Vol. 21, Issue 4) on ‘China in Africa: A relationship in transition’.

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qualitatively different from the experiences of European plunder, war and destruction that characterised the relations between Europe and Africa. [...] Africans everywhere are seeking to make the break with the iterations of war and plunder and have instinctively reached out to China. [...] Chinese diplomacy provided space for manoeuvre for Africans by laying the basis for an alternative international system in the 21st century.

China, an economist in the Kenyan Ministry of Finance pointed out, offers an alternative to the ‘West’ as a cooperation partner for African countries (Informant L14, Nairobi, 27/11/2008). “The Chinese policy of non-interference” as an economist in the Kenyan Ministry of East African Community observed, “is well liked. If Europe is not careful China might be playing a much more important role in Africa” (Informant L13, Nairobi, 09/04/2008). An AU official in Addis Ababa pointed out that

China is different, it has a new approach of how to deal with African countries. There are no conditionalities attached. The idea is to bring economic development first, then solve political problems and care about ‘luxury’ aspects of good governance, etc.. As a result many African countries prefer China as a partner, as there are no conditionalities and they don’t care what’s happening inside the country. The Chinese understand Africans better and now Europe becomes afraid that it might be losing its influence in Africa. As a result Europe had to change its position and relations in fact did change. The EU now disburses funds easier. The EU understood Chinese philosophy when it comes to Africa and has copied some of it, because if Europe does not adapt, China will rule Africa!

There are a lot of good commitments on the EU part, but a lack of implementation. The EU could make a big difference if it would live up to its commitments, if they don’t China will come in. (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

The quote and the cartoon shown in Figure 28 are illustrative of wider sentiments expressed during the interviews and in the perception of Western and Chinese involvement in Africa99. However, they also both imply that Africa will be ‘ruled’ by an external actor. In particular in the cartoon, taken from Kenya’s largest daily newspaper, it is implicit that for Africa nothing will change; Africans will continue to carry the throne of an external ‘ruler’. The statements indicate that the Chinese involvement is perceived as less neo-imperial than the

99 For a wider account on the articulations of geopolitical meanings in political cartoons see Dodds (2007b)
European (and American), but that there is also the awareness that the Chinese involvement does not necessarily promote ‘development’ in the interest of the African population. In this context, Mohan and Power (2009, 27)

see China as not much different from other countries over time and that its interests will not necessarily liberate Africa from dependent development. [...] If China’s development model simply serve as a smokescreen for business-as-usual exploitation by African elites, then whatever its normative and political appeal, it is not a model that impoverished and marginalized Africans need.

Figure 28: China replacing the ‘West’

Source: Daily Nation, 26 February 2008

Nevertheless, China offers an alternative cooperation model; free from the ‘West’ telling Africans what to do and what not to do and without (paternalising) practices such as conditionalities (Six 2009). An economist in the Kenyan Ministry of East African Community, for instance, critiqued that through conditionalities the entire spirit of long-term partnership with the EU is being undermined:

A problem with EU interaction is that donor support cannot always be factored in, because there are conditionalities attached. If the conditionalities are not met, then the support will not come. If there is a commitment to support a project, The EU should make sure the funds will be disbursed. The EU is extreme with its conditionalities; it can be counterproductive in the long term. The EU should
divorce politics from economic and projects and reduce the conditionalities. Conditionality of development aid is a little bit like blackmailing. The Chinese don’t care, they have a hands-off policy. The EU should not keep totally quiet but reduce conditionality so that it is not counterproductive. (Informant L13, Nairobi, 09/04/2008)

In the same context an official in the Kenyan Ministry of Finance observed that “the conditionalities are pretty much the same for all European countries. All donors are pushing their ideas and interests, they all have conditionalities, but that is ok. In many cases the conditionalities are good for Kenya” (Informants L15 and L17, both Nairobi, 08/04/2008). A DelKEN official expressed that the conditionalities were necessary in order to avoid misappropriations of funds:

A lot of resources are wasted and the Kenyan government often doesn’t take responsible charge of their own affairs, so we have to insist on certain guidelines. Africa needs to be held more responsible for its failures and not always blame it on colonialism and external circumstances so much anymore. The Kenyan National Authorising Officer has lost a lot of money by inaction and focus on topping-up their salaries and buying nice cars. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008)

The quotes above illustrate very common perceptions in the development industry: recipients criticising the attached conditions for the disbursement of funds and donors justifying them for reducing possible misappropriations. In comparison, Chinese aid “is premised on non-interference and mutual respect rather than conditionality” and in the “form of soft loans and a collateralizing of minerals rather than aid (Mohan and Power 2009, 26). As such, Mohan and Power continue, African governments can choose between two approaches to aid: a liberal model of western donors and the more commercially minded one of the Chinese. This creates the possibility of “‘triangulation’ in which governments can play donors and investors off against one another” (ibid, 26). How far this has caused “fundamental transformations in Africa’s geostrategic and world-economic relationships” as Martin (2008, 339) claims, remains debatable. However, the Chinese role in Africa has clearly altered the configurations of European-African relations and has thus become a frequent topic in European academic and policy debates.
7.3 Perceptions of the collective European role in the world

The EU as a united actor has developed a more coherent external appearance in the last 10-15 years. It has consolidated itself as a coherent bloc with political weight and now speaks more with one voice. Of course there are nuances and different opinions, but taking into account the wide range of countries included, it is remarkable how it reaches common ground on many issues. (Interview with Achim Steiner, under-secretary general of the United Nations and executive director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi, 02/12/2008)

Informants were asked what global role they envisioned for Europe in future, i.e. not how they perceived Europe’s current role in the world, but what role they thought Europe should collectively play in the world. An overview of the responses is shown in Figure 29 and largely supports the argument made by Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 56-57) of three complementary roles for the EU in international affairs: as a model for regional integration and the development of peace and prosperity; as a promoter of internal norms, values and civilianized structures; and as an alternative source of global influence and a counterweight to the US.

![Figure 29: Geopolitical roles for the EU](image-url)

There is no particular global role for the EU to play
The EU should be a global leader in environmental policy
Europe has a special relationship with Africa and should be a partner for Africa
The EU should focus on managing globalization and world trade
The EU should be a counterbalance to the US and one of the geopolitical power poles
The EU is a model for regional integration and should promote it internationally
The EU should promote its alternative geopolitical model based on values, cooperation, peace, etc.
The three most frequent answers correspond with the roles outlined by Bretherton and Vogler. It is, however, important to note that as the interviews were conducted in the general context of discussions about the Europe’s collective role as an actor in the development industry, hence some of the responses expressed the informants’ viewpoint on Europe’s role more specifically with regard to developing countries as opposed to Europe’s general global role. The most common responses, however, were a call for the EU to act as a normative, value-based actor and as a model for regional integration. These responses implied that the EU should promote this model of regulated spaces of interaction, i.e. its system of political-economic organisation, to the wider international level. During an interview at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa an AU official denoted the EU as
a role model for interdependencies and multilateralism, that should show others how to deal with global issues on a multilateral basis and through interdependencies. It should export its peaceful foreign policy and its strong commitment to peace. There the EU has a different philosophy to the US. It should share with the world the values and achievements it has developed internally, such as human rights, democracy, technological achievements. The EU should export those values to the world. (Informant L1, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

The notion of the EU as an “exporter” of internally developed values to the international system frequently appeared in the literature and interviews. A GTZ official at the EAC in Arusha, for instance, called on the EU to promote “civilian forms of policy conduct” (Informant E21, Arusha, 18/03/2008) and a NGO coordinator in Nairobi viewed Europe’s global roles as an advocate of “democratic structures, good governance, institutional capacity and institution building” (Informant L11, Nairobi, 20/11/2007). An (American) economist for World Bank in Nairobi even described the “EU as role model for the whole world, with free movement of labour and capital” and advocated for the EU to “transfer its interior structures to the world” (Informant D14, Nairobi, 27/02/2008). Similarly, an AU-official in Addis Ababa suggested that:

In a globalised world the EU should share the values it has developed and realised internally with the entire world. Share with the world the tools of regional integration and act as a model. Share with the world its infrastructure masterplan, and also its principles of democracy, anti-corruption, human rights, no torture, press freedom, and all the other freedoms. Share with the world the regulation
mechanisms that allow it to impose the level of civilian structures it has developed internally onto all 27 member states. Share the common values and the way how it managed to have those common values respected throughout the entire union. (Informant L2, Addis Ababa, 21/02/2008)

The quote touches on many aspects outlined in the literatures on civilian power and Europe’s role in the world. It outlines two of the three complementary roles suggested by Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 56-57) and articulates with both Duchêne (1973b, 19-21) calling for a “domestication of international relations” through the EC as a “force for the international diffusion of democratic and civilian standards” and Maull suggesting the “transfer of the interior level of civilianized structure to the international system” (Kirste and Maull 1996, 301). Precisely along those lines, a DelKEN official in Nairobi argued that the European approach to international relations has developed because within Europe, the EU has transformed foreign policy to domestic policy. This is a viable alternative to the Realpolitik and power politics of the US. The EU is pushing and illustrating the benefits of multilateralism and political pluralism which makes outrageous political mistakes less likely. Globally the EU has a lot of credibility but a power deficit, it is strongly recognised as a powerful economic power, but wider foreign policy without military remains toothless - there it is only in the beginning. (Informant E8, Nairobi, 05/12/2007)

Likewise a German diplomat in Nairobi asserted that the EU “should clearly be a value-based actor, with values different to those of other major actors. This includes human rights, soft power, civilian power, but also military power, however, very institutionalised and regulated” (Informant E20, Nairobi, 17/12/2007). Those articulations largely overlap with a vision for a collective European role in the world that has been outlined by a DeIAU official in Addis Ababa:

The EU’s role in the world should be in peace-making and in exporting its civilianized structures. The EU is clearly a role model for peace, stability, regional integration and the creation of common values and common sense in a particular area. It is doubtful if the AU can successfully emulate the EU. The EU overcame the structures of forceful conflict settlement and developed civilianized structures; it should export those to the world and export its democratic values. But is the EU strong enough to play that role? It needs credibility! The EU is very strong on the civilian dimension, but weak on the power dimension. The ESDP [European Security and Defence Policy] is desperately needed along with military
capacity. In recent years the EU has taken a very important lead role in Kosovo. It is a move in the right direction, but still too little. (Informant E15, Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008)

Both informants were trained as political scientists and thus familiar with the civilian power discourse, its history and elaborations and specifically referred to it. Clearly influenced by these debates, both informants referred to the two dimensions of the concepts, the civilian and the power dimension, and reiterated an argument frequently made in the literature with respect to the weak power of the EU to play a more active geopolitical role (Lodge 1993; Stavridis 2001; Biscop and Coolsaet 2003; Maull 2005). Such perceptions of Europe as a legitimate force in global politics but with limited power have occurred frequently in interviews, mainly with European officials. Another DelAU official stressed that the EU should be a model for regional integration, in particular for Africa. If African wants to survive in the globalised world in needs to speak with one voice. Europe should export the European model of peaceful coexistence, but for that it is absolutely necessary to increasingly develop the ESDP. Europe needs to play a global (also military) role different to the US. It needs to make good, more serious and well thought-through decisions when it comes to the use of military power. The EU already is well-positioned but cannot always implement its positions, unlike the US. The EU needs to make quick, clear and coherent foreign political decision and work more on how to implement them consequently, but it lacks implementing power. (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008)

Besides overlapping with the articulations regarding the promotion of the European model to the wider international system, the informant also raised the third of Bretherton and Vogler’s three complementary roles for the EU, i.e. as a counterweight to the US and an alternative source of influence in world politics. In this context, one of the aspect of distinct difference between the EU and the US Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 56-57) point to the Union’s relative holistic approach to international security [...]. Whether in its approach to regional conflict or to international terrorism, the Union has focused upon prevention – emphasizing the need to address fundamental causes rather than deal only with symptoms; and hence to employ a wide range of primarily civilian instruments.
Bretherton and Vogler’s argument appeared during the presidency of George W. Bush with its neo-conservative doctrine. It remains to be seen to what extent the arrival of the Obama administration will alter such perceptions, however, positioning a collective European role as a counterbalance in global politics to the American role has a long history (Bachmann and Sidaway 2009b). It has certainly also been a common theme throughout the interviews conducted with a variety of informants. A Finnish official, for instance, highlighted that the “EU’s global role should be a leading role parallel with the US. Foreign politically it should be a counterforce to US foreign policy, but it is not doing this adequately” (Informant E19, Nairobi, 26/11/2007). During an interview with an economist from the Kenyan Ministry of Planning and National Development and an official from the Ministry of Finance, the informants suggested that the EU now play a role like the Russians during the Cold War - as a counterbalance to the US. The EU should play a stabilising role in the world and balance out the power structures. Partly it is doing so. But if the EU and the US join together on certain issues this alliance is so strong that they will for sure get their way. (Informants L15 and L17, both Nairobi, 08/04/2008)

A factor that was identified by many informants as preventing the EU from playing a more active global role was the lack of commitment to act collectively and make joint statements. An official from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in Nairobi appealed to Europe’s responsibility towards developing countries:

As one of the powerhouses in the world it [the EU] also has responsibilities, those should be the promotion of human rights, democracies and the values it stands for. If Europe speaks with one voice, this voice is very powerful and has the potential to make a significant difference. The problem is that it speaks to little and too seldom with one voice, but it should play a more pronounced role. In doing so it should also counteract and balance US power; it is strong enough to do so if it speaks with one voice. (Informant E9, Nairobi, 11/12/2007)

Another political cartoon that appeared in Kenya’ largest daily, the Daily Nation, in February 2008 captures similar popular sentiments of the EU’s role during the Kenyan crisis (see Figure 30). It shows different international actors attempting to solve the crisis. It is
evident that neither the USA nor the former colonial power Britain, nor China are amongst those perceived as credible and legitimate to contribute towards a resolution of the crisis; only multilaterals such as the UN, the AU and the EU are shown. However, the EU, depicted as a major economic power by replacing the EU’s E with a € sign, is reluctant to take political action and engage with the mess caused by the crisis. Instead it stands in the back hesitant to act on the geopolitical credibility and legitimacy implied in positioning it there in the first place, waiting perhaps to contribute financially to a possible peace settlement at a later point whilst the AU representative is guiding others in first.

**Figure 30: The EU’s role during the Kenyan crisis**

![Image of a cartoon showing the EU and other organizations during the Kenyan crisis]

*Source: Daily Nation, 02 February 2008*

With respect to the EU’s relation with developing countries, a DelKEN official in Nairobi called on the EU to be
a critical but honest partner and to develop a true partnership, not a paternalistic one. This is also where the EU can distinguish itself from the US which heavily instrumentalises development cooperation. There is a demand in the developing world for an alternative to the US, and the EU has an advantage in credibility and confidence in that respect. It is more critical than other donors, but honest and open. Other donors (also EU member states) don’t dare to mention certain things or communicate unpleasant messages as they are afraid of damaging bilateral relations. Thus this is a very important role for the EU to play. There has to be a focus on governance and accountability issues with respect to the EU’s role in the developing world. (Informant E8, Nairobi, 05/12/2007)

The historical relation between Europe and Africa was another aspect that has been frequently outlined during the interviews. A Kenyan economist from the Ministry of East African Community (MEAC) pointed out that “Europe has a long common history and special relationship with Africa, not like the US of China” (Informant L13, Nairobi, 09/04/2008). In addition to, and in relation with, this ‘special relationship’, perceptions of the EU’s role as a model and reference point of regional integration in Africa are also widespread (see the previous sections). A Kenyan development worker regarded the “EU is a great role model for regional integration in East Africa. We should look at the European model, adopt it, change it and apply here” (Informant L5, Nairobi, 22/11/2007). An EAC official reflected that:

The EU is a model for regional integration and can build on the long relationship with the ACP countries. It is therefore much better positioned to understand the sensitivities of development countries and to appreciate efforts for regional integration as well as to understand the difficulties that come along with it. Contrarily, an exclusion policy does not help anyone, because the stronger partner will have to deal with the weaker partner trying to rob him or getting a share of his wealth or coming to his area. The EU policy on refugees and migrants is an example of EU exclusion policy, it is creating loads of problems for European and African countries.

The EU should take a more leading global role, as it is better placed than the US to understand the problems of developing countries and appreciate their levels of regional integration. (Informant L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008)

Within such a ‘special relationship’ issues of globalization and the future nature of global trade, in particular of African countries in it features prominently. In this context a NGO coordinator in Nairobi argued that:

The question is not if we like globalization are not; it is a fact. The question is, how we manage it and how do we make it more humane? The EU plays a very
important role in this process. Global problems require global decisions and global solutions (global warming, etc.). European countries grouped together under the roof of the EU can take on those global issues because then they constitute a powerful grouping of countries. (Informant L20, Nairobi, 27/11/2007)

Not all respondents, however, envisioned a specific role for the EU towards developing countries. During an interview in Nairobi a consultant in the development industry, for instance, made the point that:

The EU does not necessarily have to play a role in the developing enterprise. Its role should be restricted to coordinating and facilitating the activities of its member states, possibly with an advising function, but it should not play an implementing role. Also its global function should be to coordinate the member states so that they could act as a bloc in international institutions and negotiations. The EU is doing that and it is doing it very well. (Informant D4, Nairobi, 04/12/2007)

Perceptions about Europe’s collective role in the world vary considerably. However, my interviews indicate that the European model of regional integration, of cooperative and multilateral policy conduct, of overcoming internal warfare and restricting military force as a means for international politics has a substantial appeal. These aspects of European space and the creation of such regulated spaces of interaction (see Chapter V) feature prominently in perceptions of the EU and Europe’s role in the world as well as throughout the respective literature (Duchêne 1972, 1973b; Manners 2002; Maull 2005; Zielonka 2006; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Yet as argued in the previous sections, Europe’s collective geopolitical role, in particular towards developing countries, is far from being wholeheartedly appreciated. Residuals of European imperialism, Europe’s trade policy and often ambivalent external representations as well as problems associated with the term ‘Fortress Europe’ loom large in external perceptions of Europe and its role in the world. Probably the best short summary of the perceptions presented here arose during an interview with an (American) World Bank economist in Nairobi: “The EU is a great concept, even though it does stupid things sometimes” (Informant D14, Nairobi, 27/02/2008).
7.4 Summary: perceiving the EU's regulated spaces of interaction with East Africa

The EU’s international action in policy sectors such as trade and investment, as well as in democracy promotion, is quite controversial, multifaceted and, often, inconsistent. (Fioramonti and Poletti 2008, 167)

Chapter VII investigated the overlaps and significant differences in the perception of different stakeholders regarding the EU’s role in the world and its interactions with East Africa. The overlaps are largely with regard to ‘political’ interaction (see Figure 15 in section 6.2.1), i.e. the EU’s role as an alternative geopolitical model, as an example for regional integration, and as a geopolitical counterbalance to the United States. These aspects correlate with the roles for a collective Europe outlined in the respective literature (such as Bretherton and Vogler 2006; see Chapter II). In addition, perceptions of the EU’s role as an important actor in the international development industry are shared amongst informants from differing backgrounds. Even though viewpoints on the specificities of development policy conduct vary, mainly with regard to budget support and conditionalities, most of the informants perceived the EU as a significant development actor.

Different perceptions mainly occur with respect to ‘economic’ interaction. This has been particular evident in the context of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Whilst African informants frequently criticised the EU as dictating the terms of interaction and pursuing “economic imperialism” (Informant L11, Nairobi, 20/11/2007), European informants were much less critical in this respect. The EPAs are often seen as consolidating “regional integration initiatives within the ACP and to foster the gradual integration of the ACP into the global economy on the basis of an open, transparent and predictable framework for goods and services. EPAs are trade and cooperation agreements at the service of development” (EC 2009).
As a general tendency, perceptions of African informants were more differentiated between various roles and policy fields in which Europe is active than those of European informants. In reference to the differentiation in ‘political’ and ‘economic’ interaction (see Figure 15 in section 6.2.1), the data clearly revealed that both dimensions featured prominently in the perceptions of African informants about Europe’s role in the world and towards East Africa. Europe is recognised as both a civilian actor that shows presence as a geopolitical model/partner/counterbalance and also as a geoeconomic power that projects power in the international system. The European integration process is often understood as “a historically tested policy model of transforming a bellicose past into a cooperative future” (Dialer 2007, 242; my translation). According to Doris Dialer, Europe’s legitimacy and actorness as an actor in the international system are based on this development: “The export of globally applicable ideas, orientation and concepts is an essential factor for Europe to project power” (ibid). In this context, the appeal of the EU as a model for political-economic organisation and interaction of various actors in an international system, derives from the exclusivity and functionality of the European Union. In particular amongst non-European informants, however, these, predominantly positive, perceptions of the EU as a civilian geopolitical model/partner/counterbalance are coupled with more negative perceptions about roles and policy fields where the EU projects power more assertively. In this context Beck and Grande (2006, 264) caution that “Europe must avoid falling into the traps of arrogance”. In the (European) development industry these traps are often not avoided. European informants tend not to make differentiations about different aspects of European external relations to the same extent as the African informants, instead positive aspects of Europe’s engagement in the development industry are foregrounded. On this topic Hooper and Kramsch (2007, 527) criticise a Europe that is oddly unreflexive about its own imperialisms, past and present [...] The result is a geopolitical analysis which not only precludes recognition of the spatiotemporal complexities of empire, but masks Europe’s current complicity in the production
of exploitative and oppressive relations within as well as beyond its newly minted frontiers.

Such perceptions of (neo-)imperial practices in Europe’s external relations, however, loom large amongst many of the EU’s cooperation partners in the Global South. The EU’s role as geoeconomic power is often regarded in a negative way and in the context of prior forms of European imperialism during the colonial period. It is thereby perceived as an influential and strong actor but also often criticised for double standards, protectionism and the vigorous pursuit of European economic interests.

Applying the empirical findings to the understanding of European interaction with the AU, the EAC and Kenya in terms of structures, processes and flows (see Table 4 in Section 6.4), the ambiguity of coherent and diverging perceptions prevails depending on the aspects regarded as well as the affiliation of the informant.

Perceptions of the interaction structures have been largely coherent and predominantly positive for the AU, the EAC, and Kenya as well as amongst the informants. This refers mostly to the institutional set-up, such as the delegations and embassies, but also to the framework agreements, i.e. the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the Regional and Country Strategy Papers, as well as the Cotonou agreement. Exceptions to this largely coherent outlook on the structures of interaction were diverging perceptions between African and European informants regarding the Economic Partnership Agreements.

Furthermore, perceptions of the processes of interaction have also been largely coherent and positive, however, not to the same extent as perceptions of the interaction structures. In particular the process of recent AU-EU interaction in preparation for and since the Lisbon summit in December 2007 were described as cooperative and exemplary (Informants E6, Nairobi, 04/12/2007; E11, Brussels, 04/12/2008; L1 Addis Ababa, 22/02/2008; L10, Arusha, 18/03/2008). On the national level, however, perceptions of the processes of interaction diverged to some extent. Whilst most informants tended to view the processes of
donor coordination and of consultations between the Kenyan government and the donor community as generally positive, opinions diverged with respect to certain alliances and power-relations within these processes. Some donors claimed that other donors were trying to push their agenda too forcefully, sometimes through grouping with other donors, or that the Kenyan government did not show enough interests in the coordination process. Some Kenyan informants, on the other hand, complained about the agenda-setting in favour of donors’ concerns and the inclusion of conditionalities, mainly tied to a good governance agenda.

As regards the flows of interaction, the thematic contents of development cooperation and political-economic interaction, perceptions on specific topics differed significantly amongst informants, although certain coherences remained. Perceptions were most coherent, once again, with respect to AU-EU interaction, mainly because interaction is restricted to agreeing on specific partnerships and sectors of cooperation on a senior political level. This region-to-region cooperation is characterised by a consultative spirit and generally results in the EU providing assistance for specific programmes and initiatives, such as the EU Water and Energy Initiatives (EUWI, EUEI), which are then implemented on the country level. Problems in this context tend to occur mostly during the day-to-day interaction of the implementation process on the country level and are expressed in familiar mutual accusations: corruption and poor governance on the one side, paternalising and protective practices on the other. In addition, the practicalities of trade and ‘economic’ interaction - the most contentious issues of interaction - are also part of the interaction flows between the EU and African countries (see Section 6.2.2). It is therefore no surprise that perceptions between African and European informants tended to diverge more strongly in this context than with regard to region-to-region cooperation or the structures and processes of interaction.

Perceptions of Europe and its role in the world therefore diverge in at least two ways. Firstly, European perceptions diverge from non-European ones. Secondly, perceptions of the
EU as an influential, but controversial, geoeconomic power diverge from those of the EU as relatively weak, but legitimate, geopolitical model/partner/counterbalance (see ‘political’ / ‘economic’ differentiation in Section 6.2.1). Both are inextricably linked with each other. Whilst European perceptions are often dominated by the appeal of the European model of creating peace and prosperity (Telò 2006; McCormick 2007), external perceptions also reflect these aspects but are furthermore coupled with perceptions of Europe’s (neo-)imperial practices, mostly in the field of global economic policy (Fioramonti and Poletti 2008; Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2008). In this manner, the EU is both criticised for (geo-economic) power projection and admired as a political idea:

Interestingly the negative perception of the EU as a protectionist power is not coupled with a negative evaluation of its role in the international system. On the contrary the EU’s role in fostering multilateralism, its potential in shaping a new multipolar global order, as well as its perceived willingness to shape new ‘security paradigms’ for a new global governance, are all elements that contribute to consolidate a perception of the EU as ‘a fairer global actor’, which at times overshadows contingent divergences and negative perceptions concerning international trade issues. Finally, the importance of the EU as a model of regional integration must be emphasised. (Fioramonti and Poletti 2008, 174)

In most cases, non-European informants were more critical and tended make more differentiations between different aspects of European external relations than their European counterparts. In line with the argument made by Hooper and Kramsch (2007) European imperialism is often viewed as a practice of the past. The general attitude of the colonial period that Europe was the “most civilised and best governed of all the world regions” (Bassin 1991, 3) and therefore has the right to spread its model of political and economic organisation to the rest of the world is understood as a historical set of beliefs, but the impression that Europe “is blinded by its own success” [on how the EU shaped up] (Informant D1, Nairobi, 18/11/2008) prevails. For most contemporary Europeans, it is self-evident that Europe’s current role and ambitions in the world are different to those of the colonial period; for outsiders, in particular in the Global South, much less so.
CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION

The thesis has presented three key contributions to respective academic debates: a conceptual, an empirical and a methodological one. First, the thesis has shed new light on the civilian power discourse by tracing its evolution and critically scrutinising its assumptions, articulations and impacts. It has established a conceptual link between civilian power and critical geopolitics literatures by demonstrating how analyses of Europe’s role in the world, such as the one presented here, can benefit substantially from being informed by (geographic) conceptualisations of geopolitical space and at the same time enrich such conceptualisations empirically. In addition, it has indicated how, despite being a key point of reference for debates on Europe’s role in the world, the civilian power discourse has failed to engage critically with the EU’s relations towards developing countries and is thus caught in a civilian/power dilemma. In empirical terms, this thesis has explored how internal levels of integration are reflected in the EU’s role as a global and development actor. External relations are economically more integrated than politically. As such, a differentiation emerged between the EU as a geopolitical partner/model/counterbalance and the EU as a geoeconomic power. This differentiation is evident in the perceptions of Europe’s cooperation partners in East Africa whilst constructions of Europe’s role in the world, articulated in official documents and through key European personnel, tend to “repress spectres of European empires” (Kennedy 2006, 135). Methodologically, the thesis illustrates how a rapidly changing research environment not only causes disruptions to the conduct of fieldwork, but can also open up a variety of new spaces of inquiry and data acquisition. Moreover, this thesis joins that work exploring practice, language and understandings of geopolitical meaning embodied in formal, practical and popular narratives.

100 I will elaborate on this point below.
This conclusion will review the main arguments made through the thesis and contextualise them. This thesis has focussed on the EU’s identities and roles as a global and development actor. As such it first introduced key narratives of Europe’s collective role in the world. Chapter II traced how those concepts have evolved and influenced the European Union’s external relations. Chapter III reviewed conceptions of geopolitical space and discussed how the EU has emerged as a key actor in international development cooperation. Chapter IV dealt with the main methodologies utilized: semi-structured interviews and participant observation. It also addressed the challenges to the fieldwork arising from the Kenyan crisis in early 2008 and explained how the affiliation with a development agency enabled me to take advantage of the circumstances for the conduct of fieldwork but at the same time invariably raised a variety of problematic issues. The subsequent three chapters formed the empirical core of this thesis and addressed the construction of European space, its projection to East Africa and the local perceptions of the EU. Chapter V demonstrated how a specific version of European space, understood as Europe’s identity, presence and power, is constructed in the East African context. Chapter VI outlined how European interactions with the African Union, the East African Community and the Republic of Kenya are manifest in the structures, processes and flows that characterise those spaces of interaction. Chapter VII presented perceptions of key individuals involved in this interaction and outlined coherences and divergences related to the affiliations of the informant, the policy field or the mode of interaction.

This thesis has focused on Europe’s collective role in the world and as a development actor. However, this is not to imply that the EU operates as a unitary actor in its external relations, even though this is frequently portrayed in official documents. Despite numerous attempts to create what Reuber, Strüver and Wolkersdorfer (2005, 13) describe as...
Einheitsemantik\textsuperscript{101}, the EU’s external relations reflect the nature of the Union as a federation of sovereign and independent states, not a federal state. Even though this federation of states has developed certain mechanisms that allow it to act in a unitary manner, its member states have individual interests and aims and pursue different policies through different policy instruments. Whilst this (relative) political fragmentation has been discussed throughout the thesis and set in a context with the EU’s (relative) economic integration, the focus remained on the collective aspects of the EU’s external relations.

Respective academic, political and popular debates have been intense and controversial over the past four decades and comprise supporters of a strong international role for Europe (see Chapter II; in addition a variety of journalistic books has recently appeared in this context, see Kupchan 2003; Rifkin 2004; Leonhard 2005; Reid 2005; McCormick 2007) as well as critics and sceptics from sometimes very different backgrounds (Galtung 1973; Bull 1982; Kagan 2003). Duchêne’s notion of Europe as a civilian power has thereby been a key reference point for elaborations on Europe’s collective geopolitical role since the early 1970s. His vision was based on the idea that, within the European Economic Community international relations had become domesticated, i.e structures had developed that allowed for interaction between the different countries to be conducted in terms similar to those of domestic policy. At the same time “political elites were aware of the potency of Europeanisation’s shared transnational understandings, and devised the integration narrative to harness these processes to transcend the horrors of world war” (Clark and Jones 2008, 303). Power was exercised through functional spheres of influence as opposed to territorial ones. Key to that was a system of mutual interdependencies, first with regard to energy security, in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), then economically, in the form of the Common Market, and

\textsuperscript{101} With semantics of unity they understand European discourses that aim to construct Europe as a coherent, unitary entity with the goal to influence political structures of other countries.
eventually also politically\textsuperscript{102}. Differences were dealt with in regulated ways as opposed to by force. Implicit to Duchêne’s visions and subsequent theorisations (Maull 1990, 1993; Kirste and Maull 1996; Frenkler et al. 1997) were the two dimensions of civilian and power. Europe’s collective role in the world is, on the one hand, committed to the key civilian standards of multilateralism, democracy, rule of law, international institutions and a restriction of the use of force in international politics. On the other hand it also comprises a power dimension, i.e. the ability and willingness to promote such civilian standards also on the international level.

These two dimensions are not only inseparable components of an academic discourse but also epitomize key differentiations in European external relations and perceptions of the EU as a global and development actor. Section 6.2.1 and Figure 15 illustrate how the two dimensions of the civilian power discourse relate to European relations with and perceptions of these in East Africa. Aspects of both dimensions feature prominently in the literatures on Europe’s role in the world, in official documents, and in the data obtained in this research. In each case, the EU appears as both a civilian actor in the international system and as a power that has inherent interests which it tries to promote internationally. Its civilian part emits a substantial appeal as a model for regional integration and political-economic organisation, i.e. the EU’s regulated spaces of interaction. Much of that appeal is based on the history of European integration and the creation of peace and prosperity, as well as on offering an alternative geopolitical model, a counterweight, to the US\textsuperscript{103}. Its power dimension is based on this appeal. The export of this model of political-economic organisation is intrinsic to European external relations; and often also expected by others (see Chapter VII).

\textsuperscript{102} See Davies (1997, 1057-1136) for a comprehensive account of these processes.
\textsuperscript{103} In this context, Elden and Bialasiewicz (2006) describe a ‘new geopolitics of division’ in which not only position Europe’s civilian role in the world is positioned in distinction to a more militaristic American one, but where American neo-conservative articulations are rooted in positioning the US’ global role in distinction to a perceived European failure to grasp and address geopolitical realities such as the war on terror.
Nonetheless, despite a significantly refined military role, European power projection can remain assertive and sometimes even oppressive. Hard power is thus not absent to EU external relations, however, it must not be understood predominantly in military terms. European hard power refers to other means of external power projection, such as political and economic pressure or sanctions, exercised through regulated and (partially) institutionalised spaces of interaction like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thematically, the power dimension is mostly perceived with regard to economic and trade policy. As shown in Section 6.1.2 and Figure 15, the EU’s external relations with East Africa can usefully be differentiated between a (civilian) geopolitical partner/model/counterweight and a geoeconomic power. In light of Europe’s colonial history, the inseparability of both causes a dilemma between rejecting the colonial past (characterised by a claim about a superior civilisation) and the exertion of international actorness tied to the projection of power in order to promote Europe’s civilianized system; once again perceived by Europeans as a preferred world order model.

**CIVILIAN POWER AND EUROPE’S RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

Key elaborations of the civilian power discourse focus on Europe’s role as a global power, its uniqueness in the international system and, in particular, its distinctiveness from other major players. It was initiated during the Cold War in light of the superpower rivalry, received renewed impetus after the end of the Cold War and through the foundation of the European Union in 1992, and was again increasingly popularised as an alternative geopolitical model to the neo-conservative foreign policy doctrine of the administration of George W. Bush (see Chapter II).

What the civilian power discourse has failed to address for the most part, is Europe’s role vis-à-vis developing countries. Considering that development policy is one of the oldest
fields of collective European policy, dating back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, this appears surprising. To some extent, however, it also reflects priority settings in European external relations. Nonetheless, in light of Europe’s colonial histories the dilemma between the civilian and the power dimensions is particularly pronounced in the EU’s relations with developing countries. This is much less the case regarding European interaction with major global powers. There, Europe has something appealing to offer, a civilian dimension, a more peaceful and cooperative model of political-economic organisation. Towards global powers – often with a focus on military might as a foreign political tool – a more civilian alternative is easy to position and less contentious to promote. In such a case Europe operates from an inferior power position and its civilian mode of power projection attempts to modify other modes of power projection. Global powers, however, are in a position to resist European power projection. Developing countries often are not. There, Europe has a colonial past and operates from a relatively powerful position. In light of the colonial history, the promotion of Europe’s model of political-economic organisation is therefore much more contentious and means that relations appear in a fundamentally different light to those with global powers.

The civilian power discourse largely fails to address these differences. Where those relations are addressed in official documents, the focus tends to be on the potential of the EU as a partner to assist developing countries in integrating into the global economy. Hurt (2003, 174) even dismisses “the entire history of EU-ACP development cooperation [as] false rhetoric [that is] coupled with [...] a belief that only through global liberalisation will poverty be eradicated”. It is thereby rarely questioned if this reflects the interests or the political preferences of the respective partner countries. Global economic integration is seen as a given aim for developing countries and Europe’s role is to facilitate that (Hurt 2003; Nixson 2007). Jackson (2005) refers to development workers as “The Globalizers”; agents through which developed countries advance their project of globalization in developing countries, camouflaged as benevolent measures of aid with the goal to promote ‘development’. In a
wider review of development critiques in the 1990s, Hart (2001, 655) points to “the need to confront questions of capitalist development – not as unfolding teleology or immanent process, but in terms of the multiple, non-linear, interconnected trajectories that are constitutive of what has come, euphemistically, to be termed ‘globalization’”. In this context, a key question for the civilian power discourse is not whether the EU has enough power to project its vision, but whether it exerts power too assertively in certain instances.

This highlights two main aspects of the civilian power discourse as a concept for EU external relations. On the one hand it categorises Europe’s relations with major players in the world and articulates with official European strategy. As such the key ideas of the discourse have had a significant political impact and are reflected in the EU’s major strategy papers as well as the acts and words of key personnel. On the other hand it fails to capture the implications arising from Europe’s colonial histories as well as those arising from contemporary unequal power relations. It therefore – once again – reflects how Europe’s external relations are presented and narrated. In both official strategy (see Section 5.1) and statements of key figures (see Chapter VII), none of these disputed aspects feature prominently. Since the 1970s, the civilian power discourse has advocated the promotion of Europe’s model of political-economic organisation within the wider international system. However, it does not take into account that Europe can still be perceived as an imperial power. As set out in this thesis, there are two dimensions to the concept, a civilian one and a power one. Civilian does not preclude power; it leaves open the possibility to project power assertively (or even coercively). In developing countries, this is often perceived as neo-imperial practices and as such influences narratives about Europe. In this context, the civilian power discourse fails to address the dilemma of its twindimensions of civilian and power in that it cannot easily resolve how the European system of political-economic organisation can be promoted on a global basis without falling into the risk of neo-imperial practices (see Section 7.1.3).
The EU’s stated objective to “achieve genuine coherence between its domestic and its external agendas” (EC 2007e, 1) appears in many aspects of its relations with East Africa examined in the course of this research. Yet, not quite in the way the EU claims. Internal levels of integration are generally reflected in the EU’s external relations mainly with respect to the differentiation in economic and political policy fields. Whilst economic integration is well advanced within the EU, politically there are many levels of authority and governance\(^\text{104}\). This also applies to what Clark and Jones (2008, 301) call the “scales and spaces of Europeanisation”, including those of the EU’s external relations: European economic policy and external trade are largely set in Brussels, but foreign policy predominantly remains a national competence; and development policy takes both shapes. As such, the integration process, both internally as well as externally, is more evident in the economic realm than it is in the political arena. In this context Bachmann and Sidaway (2009a) argue that:

> Whilst Europe has long succeeded in acting with relative unity on economic issues, the interests of individual member states/governments often preclude a more active collective geopolitical role. This political fragmentation is a feature of the uniqueness of and limits to the European integration process, raising doubts about its real value as an alternative geopolitical influence.

Political fragmentation is thus both an integral part of the European project and a limitation to Europe’s collective political actorness. Whilst it precludes political unity and thus a more powerful global political role, it also characterises the EU’s uniqueness and its appeal of ‘united in diversity’. It is on this appeal, on the example on how different peoples and cultures co-exist and cooperate peacefully without completely amalgamating, that the EU’s legitimacy

\(^{104}\) See the literature on multilevel governance (Bache 1998; Bache and Flinders 2004; Jordan 2001; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996). This literature, however, largely addresses questions of scales and levels of governance within the EU. With regard to development policy, the supranational European and the national scale are clearly the most dominant. Other scales of European governance have limited influence. For a wider discussion on scales of governance see Brenner (2004), Mansfield (2005), Jessop, Brenner, and Jones (2008).
and respect as a global actor rests. Whilst often criticised for causing ambiguity in external relations and limiting global influence, political fragmentation is inherent and constitutive of Europe and its role in the world. Europe’s hard power is predominantly rooted in its economic integration, its soft power partially draws on its political fragmentation.

Nevertheless, the categories of economic integration and political fragmentation are relative. Europeanization processes occur in almost all policy fields (see Tonra 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Graziano and Vink 2008). With respect to external relations this started in the 1970s with the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC), leading to what Wessels (1982) termed a ‘coordination reflex’ amongst the members of the European Community. At the time it was predominantly a loose, intergovernmental cooperation mechanism to coordinate foreign political decisions in a wider international environment. Rummel (1982, 168) described the EPC as “less a means for the Europeans to transform the structure of international relations fundamentally and more a method for adaptation to given structural circumstances”. This, however, has changed significantly since the 1970s. EU external relations have developed into a means to transform the structure of international relations along the lines of Europe’s “preferred world order model”. The “EU’s external dynamic” is thereby, in the words of Bialasiewicz (2008, 78), “fundamentally reconfiguring political space at the Union’s borders and well beyond”.

Interaction with developing countries and the use of “EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument” (Holden 2009) has sometimes been criticised as a means for projecting an agenda determined by European (economic) interests (Hurt 2003; Gibb 2006; Fioramonti and Poletti 2008; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009a). Holden (2009, 190) thereby points out that the poverty and insecurity of hundreds of millions of human beings is seen as a blank canvass by the EU, upon which it can impose its models of society and governance. To put it mildly, this falls short of the ethical standards claimed to be at the heart of ‘European values’. Yet the EU is not alone in its proclivities, and its efforts to shape the international context could be viewed as an entirely legitimate, ‘natura’ mode of behaviour. Also, while there is a great deal of cant written by pro-Europeans, the EU does offer a model of cooperation between entities and a new form of ‘public power’.
Both aspects described by Holden, the EU imposing policies and offering a model of cooperation, reflect sentiments expressed by my informants with respect to European development cooperation programmes in East Africa (see Chapter VII). In addition, through my experience of being included in parts of the development industry in East Africa during the research, it became evident how different donors compete with each other in specific sectors (see Section 6.3 and Annex A (Vignette)). This was particularly pronounced in Nairobi as a major development hub. However, it was also visible in the context of the EAC energy strategy project as both the regional approach and the renewable energy sector feature prominently in the strategies of many donors and partner countries. Donors often engage in projects in order to maintain their existence. A European development worker employed by the AU through an integrated experts programme, for instance, argued that he and his ‘development’ colleagues often “fulfil alibi-functions” and have to “engage in intellectual acrobatics” to justify their existence (Informant L3, Nairobi, 28/11/2007). Similarly, a DelKEN official expressed the view that “the role of many expats, in particular in development cooperation, should be to make themselves obsolete, but that goes counter their career plans” (Informant E6, Nairobi, 31/10/2008).

Through heavy donor engagement, key functions of the government can, in James Ferguson’s terms, be ‘outsourced’ to the international development apparatus. The implementing agencies varied depending on the context, in some cases donor agencies, such as GTZ, were very active in the implementation of a certain project; in other cases NGOs or consultants\(^{105}\) were hired (by donors) to implement the project. In relation to this, however in a broader context of restructuring processes in the international development industry, Ferguson (2006, 38-39) argues that:

The reforms demanded by “structural adjustment” were – according to their neoliberal proponents – supposed to roll back oppressive and overbearing states and to liberate a newly vital “civil society.” The result was to be a new sort of

\(^{105}\) For a insightful discussion on the role of consultants in ‘development’ see Stirrat (2000).
“governance” that would be both more democratic and more economically efficient. [...] At the same time, swarms of new “nongovernmental organizations” (NGOs) have arisen, taking advantage of the shift in donor policies that moved funding for projects away from mistrusted state bureaucracies and into what were understood as more “direct” or “grassroots” channels of implementation. [...] As more and more of the functions of the state have been effectively “outsourced” to NGOs, state capacity has deteriorated rapidly – unsurprisingly, as Joseph Hanlon has pointed out, since the higher salaries and better terms of employment offered by NGOs quickly “decapacitated” governments by luring all the best civil servants out of the government ministries (Hanlon 2000). Those who remained were often paid less than subsistence salaries, with the inevitable consequences of corruption and an explosion of “parallel businesses”. Deprived both of capable staff and of economic resources, states quickly became “hollowed out,” in the words of Christopher Clapham (1996) [...] It is not states that have disappeared, or even simply that they are, as it is often put, “weak.” It is, rather, that they have increasingly gotten out of business of governing, even as they (or, rather, the politicians and bureaucrats who occupy their offices) retain a lively interest in other sorts of business. In this new era, it is not organizations of “civil society” that are “nongovernmental” – it is the state itself.

The developments described by Ferguson were also evident in the context of my research (see Section 6.3 and Annex A (Vignette)). It is evident that development agencies frequently fulfil key roles of the government and that governments often accept and enable such constellations. The existence of assistance programmes for specific development aspects is thereby less problematic. Instead, the permanent transfer of such government functions to external agencies is what Ferguson (2006, 39) termed as having “gotten states out of the business of governing”. With their fully fledged missions in developing countries, development networks (comprising state donors, philanthropic organisations, NGOs, etc.) often permanently occupy ‘development’ sectors and fulfil functions that lie in the general realm of government activity. In this manner, Sidaway argues (2007, 355), “development retains significant power to shape national imaginations and strategies. However, ever more superimposed on national narratives and schemes (reworking their roles) are sub- and transnational spaces, nodes and networks”.

Such disembedded spaces of development, it can be argued, delegitimize the government in two different ways. Firstly, John Gray suggests that the legitimacy of a government ultimately rests on the effective delivery of services to its population, as much as
on democratic election: “Governments are legitimate in so far as they meet the needs of their citizens. Those that fail in this will be judged by their citizens to be illegitimate whether or not they are democracies” (Gray 1998, 149-150). Similarly, Rose and Miller see the state as arising from the need to govern and to organise the co-existence of various social and economic actors. They argue that the state “has no essential necessity or functionality. Rather, the state can be seen as a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified [...] and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another” (Rose and Miller 1992, 176-177). The core question then becomes “how, and to what extent, the state is articulated in the activity of government” (ibid, 177). If some of these core functions of the state are outsourced to development agencies and the state ceases to be “articulated in the activity of government”, its legitimacy would be put into question when following Gray’s argument106.

Secondly, and to some extent counter to Gray’s argument, David Harvey argues that “the shift from government (state power on its own) to governance (a broader configuration of state and key elements of civil society)” undermines the democratic nature of the state and functions as the primary opposition movement and thus leads to the “exercise of governance under non-democratic circumstances through NGOs and civil society organisations” (Harvey 2005, 77-78). Even though Harvey’s argument has been developed mainly with reference to the ‘neoliberal state’ and stands in the line of Harvey’s positions towards neo-liberalism, it does also have certain relevance in the development context. Generally, processes of donor coordination and involvement lack a democratic component. In this context, however again from his critical viewpoint on neoliberal state structures, Harvey (ibid, 117) continues to argue that:

106 Whilst these processes are not unique to developing countries, it is often there where they become more visible because state power often tends to be weaker compared to OECD-countries.
It is only when the internal power structure has been reduced to a hollow shell and when internal institutional arrangements are in total chaos [...] that we see external powers freely orchestrating neoliberal restructurings. And in these instances the success rate tends to be poor precisely because neoliberalism cannot function without a strong state and strong market and legal institutions.

Leaving aside Harvey’s focus on neoliberalism, the observations made in this research suggest that in both lines of argument, the outsourcing of development functions by the state to development agencies undermines the key stated goals of these agencies: the promotion of democracy as well as strong and legitimate state institutions. This leads Moss, Pettersson and Van de Walle (2006, 1) to identify an “Aid-Institutions Paradox”. They argue that countries which rely heavily on revenue from the international community are less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure to maintain popular legitimacy. They are therefore less likely to have the incentives to cultivate and invest in effective public institutions. As a result, substantial increases in aid inflows over a sustained period could have a harmful effect on institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa.

The permanent institutionalisation of development aid missions in developing countries is a major contributing factor to such processes. European development policy reflects the complex, multiagency way and preference for institutionalisation characteristic of the internal (and external) European modus operandi and is thereby productive of such contradictions.

**EUROPE’S TRADITIONAL MARKET-BASED FOCUS**

EU development policy is often criticised for being heavily influenced by economic interests. Generally, the economic realm looms large in both internal as well as external components of collective European policy and also within articulations of Europe’s role in the world – and the
construction thereof – where a market-based agenda and trade liberalisation\textsuperscript{107} are key components. As outlined in Chapter II, civilian power ideas emerged during the 1970s, a time of superpower rivalry when the sheer (military) power of states – influenced by underlying (state-led) geopolitical interests – re-opened questions about (Western) Europe’s position and role in the world. State-power was expressed most visibly in the destructive potential of nuclear arsenals. The civilian power discourse developed as an alternative in this context; a more peaceful alternative, a \textit{civilian} alternative. The goal was to contain the risk of military confrontation and to restrict the use of force in international politics by creating interdependencies in the international system. Power was supposed to be exercised through functional spheres of influence rather than territorial ones. The EEC’s objective to create a common market was a possibility to establish such interdependencies between states in the commercial and economic arena. At this time trade liberalism with a focus on market-based approaches offered a way of tying countries together with the goal to contain and reshape state-power. In a similar context, Rose and Miller (1992, 173-174) argue that “criticising the excesses, inefficiencies and injustices of the extended State, alternatives have been posed in terms of the construction of a ‘free market’ and a ‘civil society’ in which a plurality of groups, organizations and individuals interact in liberty”. As such, market-based interdependencies were portrayed as preferable to state-led rivalries, which led to a broadly neo-liberal orientation in the civilian power discourse\textsuperscript{108}.

These considerations of (military) state rivalry have now been rendered obsolete within the European Union. Instead major problems of social inequality are more pressing. And in the light of the current financial crisis, the state is en vogue again for providing social protection

\textsuperscript{107} These articulations, however, often tend to overlook the EU’s protectionist measure for agricultural imports and the impact of subsidies to European farmers on the global market of agricultural commodities.

\textsuperscript{108} Yet, this generally contained social elements associated with the model of the European welfare state (Davies 1997, 1078). In Germany this was termed ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ – social market economy – in the post-World War Two years (see Ptak 2009)
from the effects of an economic recession, often attributed to speculative excesses of financial
capital, and doubts are cast on the prioritisation of the (capitalist) market over the (socially
protective) state\textsuperscript{109}. Yet, market-based approaches remain key to European foreign and
development policy. Generally, measures of trade liberalisation are encouraged within a
regional grouping, such as the EAC, SADC, COMESA; and eventually also an opening of the
markets to the world economy. In this manner, developing countries are supposed to first
develop competitive products and then to offer those on global markets.

The suspicion towards state power, the context in which the civilian power discourse
first embraced a market-based approach, also applies to the EU’s underlying development
policy agenda. Unlike in Europe in the 1970s, when those concerns were associated with the
destructive potential of (military) state power, in contemporary Africa governments are often
viewed as kleptocratic, inefficient, paternalistic and corrupt (See Frederick Cooper’s 2002
notion of the ‘gatekeeper state’; also Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999; Acemoglu, Robinson, and
Verdier 2004). The attempt to shift focus away from governments to achieve development
through (and towards) a market-based approach generating trade and thus income
possibilities for the population appeared self-evident. Yet, the negative effects of international
market-capitalism on the livelihoods of large parts of the population in developing countries
are thereby often underestimated.

\textit{PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPE’S STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND FLOWS OF INTERACTION}

The understanding of European space presented here is based on the assumption that
geopolitical narratives and roles are socially, politically, culturally and historically constructed

\textsuperscript{109} See for example the lead article of the \textit{Time Magazine} on 29 September 2008 by Andy Serwer and
Allan Sloan entitled ‘How Financial Madness Overtook Wall Street’. The respective cover pages read
‘How Wall Street Sold out America’ on the US edition and ‘The Price of Greed’ on the Europe, Asia and
South Pacific editions. \url{http://www.time.com/time/magazine/europe/0,9263,901080929,00.html}
[16/09/2009].

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European space has been manifest within the EU in the form of highly regulated and institutionalised processes of interaction and a commitment to regional and supranational integration as well as to civilian standards. This is reflected in the EU’s external relations through the objective of promoting this particular version of European space to the international system. Such European space operates within structures, processes and flows of the international system and is characterised by the EU’s identity as a civilian power, the presence as a civilian actor in the international system in the form of a geopolitical partner/model/counterweight, and the power to influence those structures, processes and flows, mainly as a geoeconomic power.

It is precisely for such reasons that understanding the perceptions of key individuals involved in the interaction between the EU and other parts of the world is so important. Those perceptions form the basis for, and express wider narratives about, Europe’s geopolitical role and, as such, contribute to constructing Europe’s external relations and role in the world - both within Europe and beyond. Based on these perceptions, geopolitical visions and roles for Europe are constructed. Reuber, Strüver and Wolkersdorfer (2005, 9; my translation) claim in this context that

Geopolitical constructions of Europe [...] portray regionalisations that are constructed from specific viewpoints and adapted to political purposes. [...] The diverging Europe-imaginations of political actors in the arena of global politics thereby constitute the basis for articulations that determine the political geographies of the continent.

This research has explored how perceptions of European space vary with respect to factors such as the positionality of the informant, the area of engagement, the EU’s power position and the policy field. The EU’s geopolitical role has been outlined by most informants as having only limited influence in international politics compared with major players in global politics, such as the US or China. It has, however, also often been described as positive, mainly with respect to the alternative model of political-economic organisation based on civilianized structures and regulated spaces of interaction as manifest within the EU. Geoeconomically, on
the other hand, the EU’s role is often viewed differently. The EU’s power position is much more pronounced in this respect as European policy is largely integrated and the EU acts more as a collective actor through the European Commission. As the largest integrated economy in the world the EU is in a position to project considerable power in global economic policy through the regulated spaces of interaction of the global economic system, such as the WTO. In this respect, however, perceptions diverge significantly between European and non-European informants. Europeans tend to see Europe’s role more positively than non-Europeans. Whilst Europeans highlighted the benefits of Europe’s trade agreements with African countries, non-European informants criticised Europe’s economic imperialism and European pressure on African countries to open up their markets whilst at the same time maintaining trade barriers and subsidies for its own producers, mainly in the agricultural sector.

With respect to the EU as a development actor, perceptions varied more with regard to specific policies than between informants with different backgrounds. The European focus on budget support and the inclusion of conditionalities as a means for development cooperation is both supported and opposed by informants from both donor and partner countries alike. Europe’s general commitment to development cooperation is perceived positively by most informants whereas the highly bureaucratised nature of many procedures in European development cooperation is generally viewed negatively. Whilst most informants agreed that specific development policies or projects should be developed and implemented jointly, African informants – unlike most Europeans - tended to criticise European donor organisations for trying to ‘arm-twist’ their African partners.

In this context, perceptions of the structures, processes and flows of European interaction with East Africa vary considerably. It is thereby useful to recall that structures refers to the framework for interaction; processes refers to the broader institutional and thematic set-up within those structures, i.e it outlines in which sectors interaction will occur;
flows are the actual content of the interaction and describe how the agreed sectors will be addressed and through which measures. Table 4 in Section 6.4 outlines those different aspects of interaction. Whilst there is generally a consensus on the structures and processes of interaction, the flows are in many ways more contested. For instance, whilst there is a widespread consensus for a European programme to support regional economic integration in East Africa, opinions on the specific way to do this and how European involvement might look like can vary significantly. In this manner, European insistence on conditionalities, such as human rights, good governance and certain environmental standards, often causes different perceptions of interaction flows, even though the institutional framework and set-up are generally agreed upon.

As such, structures and processes of European space in East Africa are perceived more coherently than the actual flows of interaction. Adapting this to Europe’s identity, presence and power, it is notable that non-European informants perceived the EU, its role in the world and towards developing countries in a more differentiated way than did Europeans. In many ways the inherent differentiation in Europe’s identity between civilian and power is more evident in the perceptions of non-Europeans. Those articulate with the civilian power concept in that they reflect both dimensions. The civilian power concept, however, fails to grasp that the power dimension might be unwelcome and the imposition of Europe’s model for political-economic organisation (or even parts thereof), as preferable it might appear to Europeans, might not be desired by the cooperation partners.

In this respect, the civilian power concept mirrors perceptions of European informants. Among this group Europe’s imperial past (and present) is only vaguely reflected upon and perceptions of non-Europeans, in particular in developing countries, are hardly taken into account in policy design. European informants often perceived the power dimension differently to non-European informants. The latter tended to be wary of too much European
power, whereas the former often suggested extending Europe’s power projection tools and for Europe to act more assertively in international politics.

Whilst the European identity is thus in many ways perceived as a two-dimensional construct, its presence and power are perceived in highly differentiated ways. Its presence in structures, processes and flows of international politics is recognised and perceived in a largely positive way in that it exerts a *civilian* influence. The ability to project *power* onto those structures, processes and flows, is viewed positively only in so far as it stands for a more civilianized conduct of international affairs. In the field of global economic policy, on the other hand, European *power* projection is often perceived negatively, but also as having a major impact.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PROSPECTS

The issues raised in this thesis relate to wider debates on constructions and meanings of Europe as well as on the EU’s role in the world and as a development actor (Grilli 1993; Lister 1997; Heffernan 1998; Shore 2000; Kelstrup and Williams 2000; Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 2001; Scott 2002; Holland 2002; Jessop 2005; Bialasiewicz and Minca 2005; Zielonka 2006; Sidaway 2006; Anderson 2006; Clark and Jones 2008; Holden 2009).

The focus of this thesis, however, has been on the nexus of international development policy and a collective European geopolitics therein. Based on respective articulations in the academic literature, official documents and statements by EU external relations personnel, I have argued that internal levels of integration are strongly reflected in the EU’s external relations and that, consequently, the aim is to promote the EU’s civilianized system of political-economic organisation. This entails, amongst other things, high levels of economic integration and hence relatively coherent external economic relations, but also political fragmentation manifest in the diverse foreign policies of different European actors.
Nicolaidis and Lacroix (2003) claim that the EU constitutes a “miniature world, an experiment in bringing together different peoples that have vowed to remain such” (127) and thus functions as a “laboratory not only for other regional endeavours but more importantly for global forms of cooperation” (152). The external projection of this miniature world, Nicolaidis and Lacroix (2003, 127) continue, is subject to “two different visions of the EU’s external role. Should Europe exist globally through power projection or attraction, as a ‘hegemon’ or as a ‘beacon’, as a ‘superpower’ or as a ‘model’?” In this thesis, I have argued that these are inseparable and integral parts of the EU’s external relations and perceptions thereof. This inseparability causes a dilemma between the EU’s civilian and its power dimension. In their arguments for a ‘Cosmopolitan Europe’, Beck and Grande (2006, 264) argue that

The capacity to act and the global influence exerted by the cosmopolitan Europe, therefore, are founded on the responsibility of shared dilemmas. On the one hand, Europe must avoid falling into the traps of arrogance and of self-betrayal while, on the other, deriving its pride and self-consciousness from the same source – as well as from the unique historical lesson which it teaches the world, namely, how enemies can become neighbours. Then there exists a global alternative to the American way, namely, a European way that accords priority to the rule of law, political equality, social justice, cosmopolitan integration and solidarity.

In this wider context Bialasiewicz (2008, 79) indicates the possibility of “new configurations of political, economic and cultural influence where Europe increasingly plays a perhaps ‘quiet’ but certainly leading role”. However, according to Anderson (2006, 24-25) this requires a recognition of the European project as imperial. European influence would then be exercised through a

politically more unified EU empire [that] could have a benign influence on the looming struggle for world hegemony involving the USA, China and others. Not because of any spurious assumptions about 'superior European values', and not because the EU would be a better hegemon, but, on the contrary, because traditional hegemony is not an effective way to run the world. [...] The empire metaphor points to the possibility of empowering Europe to compete globally with other major powers.
It is debatable if the ‘Empire’ metaphor indeed captures increased levels of Europe’s international actorness. Yet clearly, the power dimension in Europe’s discourses and external practices aim to increase such influence through – and with the objective to promote – a civilianized international system. With respect to developing countries civilian power articulations frequently invoke Europe’s aspiration to counteract “appalling injustice, suffering, conflict, and fears of shifts in the balance of power” (Duchêne 1972, 37), to promote “sustainable development for social, ecological and economic balance” (Kirste and Maull 1996, 301-302), and to “provide greater economic justice” for a “more legitimate world order” (Telò 2006, 242, 82). Yet, according to Makki (2004, 165), a “more equitable and sustainable system of growth requires complex international coordination and social arrangements that involve the collective transformation of centre–periphery relations”. To develop “forms of politics and analysis adequate to these tasks”, sustained reflection on the “historical legacy and contemporary agony” of the “circumstances in which the Third World was made and unmade” is necessary.

Such reflections include the necessity for a more thorough and detailed understanding of external perceptions of the EU and its role in the world, in particular towards developing countries. Recent research, such as Sonia Lucarelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti’s project on *The External Image of the European Union* (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009a, 2009b) or Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban’s project on *The European Union in the Eyes of Asia* (Holland and Chaban 2009) are pioneering a significant and neglected research agenda.

It is also in this context that this thesis attempted to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Europe’s collective identities and roles as a global and development actor as well as of the ways in which these are shaped and articulated. In 1992 Jürgen Habermas (1992, 12-13) suggested that, in contrast to previous empires, “Europe as a whole is being given a second chance” to influence world history; this time “under changed
premises, namely a non-imperial process of reaching understanding with, and learning from, other cultures”. This applies in particular to Europe’s relations with developing countries.

Only if we, as Europeans, understand the imaginations and perceptions of our external cooperation partners is it possible to engage seriously and critically with Europe’s role in the world. Despite all the ongoing problems, measured on the initial objective, namely to create peace and (relative) prosperity in Europe, the European integration process has been a success story. As such the European way, as Beck and Grande (2006, 264) refer to it, has something appealing to offer to the rest of the world. In addition, as the largest integrated economy in the world, a significant international role and extensive connections and interaction with all parts of the world are inevitable – if we desire those or not. For accomplishing those successfully we need to understand and be able to define our global role. It is thereby equally important to excavate our history, by trying to understand the processes of how we construct our identity and role in the world, and to grasp our external cooperation partners’ imaginations and expectations on Europe’s role in the world.

In this thesis, I have demonstrated that our understanding of the conceptions and expectations of our external cooperation partners is limited, in particular those of developing countries. These perceptions are characterised by diversity, not only between people with different backgrounds, but especially between different facets of European external relations (indicated here in a simplified differentiation of the EU as a geopolitical partner/model/counterweight and as a geoeconomic power). Such differentiations and critical interrogations of Europe’s role in the world barely appear in European accounts. In this context, I have identified the civilian/power dilemma in European external relations. This refers to the dilemma that arises in that neither respective discourses nor policy makers can easily resolve the question how to make use of the appeal of Europe’s civilianized model of political-economic organisation without falling into the trap of paternalising or neo-imperial practices. In order to resolve this dilemma, a key starting point is to engage critically and
seriously with external perceptions and expectations. It will thereby be essential to disentangle investigations of the EU’s external relations through a diversified approach looking at different facets and actors as well as different policy fields and instruments in different regions of European external relations. Attempts to understand Europe’s role in the world characterised by *Einheitssemantik* (see footnote 101) and by conceiving of one universal role for Europe in all parts of the world will only yield limited insight.

From April 2010, I will coordinate a research project that examines such different roles, discourses and policy fields, as well as the perceptions thereof, in different countries. Through a comparative approach we will look at four policy fields (political-economic organisation, migration, economy and trade, geopolitical rivalry) in Georgia and the Ukraine in the Black Sea Region and in Kenya and Senegal in sub-Saharan Africa. The goal thereby is to identify overlaps and differences between official European strategies and external perceptions thereof in the four policy fields and countries. This thesis has laid the foundation for my personal future research agenda. Moreover, it is offered as a contribution to a better understanding of external perceptions of the EU and a more critical engagement with the civilian/power dilemma in the EU’s external relations with developing countries and respective conceptualisations. Yet, it can only serve as a starting point for further research that would eventually identify ways and mechanisms in which these understandings become included in policy making.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - VIGNETTE: PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION IN/OF AN EAC REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROJECT ON ENERGY

In theory, it makes considerable conceptual sense to regard regionalism as a set of state-led-projects which intersect globalisation. (Dodds 1998, 740)

Regionalism in southern African has always been the product of a complex interplay of forces emanating from various scale-levels, including the national, continental and, increasingly important, the international. (Gibb 2007, 421)

As outlined in Chapter IV, through my affiliation with GTZ REAP and EUEI PDF I participated in – and observed – an EAC project on regional integration in the energy sector. This Vignette describes the experiences gained through this inclusion and aims to highlight how aspects of European space appear in the involvement of European agencies in the project.

The project aimed to “scale-up access to modern energy services” across East Africa, with a focus on the peri-urban and rural poor. In November 2006 the project was approved by the East African Council of Ministers and the EAC was put in charge to advance its implementation with the support of the ‘development partners’111. In tandem with a similar project through ECOWAS in West

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110 ‘Modern energy services’ refers to any means that improve the efficiency of traditional energy sources, such as gathered firewood or biomass, but also to alternative energy sources mainly used for decentralised electricity generation.

111 The main ‘partners’ involved in the project at this point were the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
Africa, UNDP and EUEI PDF initially commissioned the formulation of the project strategy as part of their efforts to promote regional approaches to energy policy (EUEI PDF) and to support the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP). As such, these engagements strongly reflected the underlying political agendas of these organisations and only took limited account of the practicalities of implementing such projects in cooperation with, or actually in support of, the EAC (for wider debates in this context see Ferguson 1990; Jackson 2005). My experiences confirmed an impression of the EAC as an institution with barely any capacity on the executive level (see Section 6.1.1) and a limited commitment on parts of its member states to advance regional integration. With regard to the EAC’s limited capacity I noted in a report prepared for EUEI PDF that the experiences of the process cast severe doubts on the ability of the Senior Energy Officer [of the EAC] to organise and coordinate the agreed procedures and to move the process forward. A potential donor expressed interest in funding a position to be located within the EAC, but lamented the EAC’s lack of initiative to attract such support. ‘At the EAC’, the potential donor criticised, ‘they can’t even write a proposal’. A main problem appears to be that the entire process should be in the hands of the EAC, with the partners in support of it. In practice, however, the development partners were in charge of advancing the process with limited contribution on the part of the EAC.

The EAC’s limited capacity was one problem in the process; another one was the limited commitment of the EAC member states even though they had previously approved it on a very senior political level. Through my participation in the process, it became clear how the major reason for the quick approval arose from the prospect of attracting significant donor funding; without really reviewing what for and what the full implications would be (see Section 6.3.3 on absorption capacity). These expectations seemed to have been caused by the very early donor engagement in the process. A consultant involved in the process from the beginning even

113 In a related debate Cooper (2002) uses the term ‘gatekeeper state’ to describe how African governments ‘keep the gates’ open for international actors and agencies to orchestrate their policies and practices in the respective state.
claimed that “the ministers had no idea what they adopted” (Informant D3, Nairobi, 04/12/2008). In this context I further noted in the report for EUEI PDF:

Real local ownership or understanding of the particularities of the implementation process have been lacking. It is doubtful whether the relevant stakeholders were fully aware of the magnitude of the project when they approved it. It appears that there were serious misconceptions about the kinds of commitments and efforts necessary for the attainment of the targets. Generally, the willingness to cede national authority to a supranational institution appears limited. The EAC strategy is seen in many ways as a competition to bilateral development cooperation with donors. Member states are reluctant to wholeheartedly commit to the process and move it forward as they fear a loss of influence.

In many cases, my impression was that the regional approach is seen as a way of personal enrichment for the individuals involved. As described in Section 4.4.2, it required substantial financial incentives to attract senior officials from the national ministries to attend the workshops. During a preparatory meeting one of the consultants involved in the process pointed out that the less daily service allowance (DSA) paid, the more junior the personnel sent from the ministries will be (Informant D2, Nairobi, 04/12/2008). In the same context a European informant working for an African Union branch in Nairobi observed: “people within the AU are first and foremost trying to enrich themselves and maximise their own personal benefits” (Informant L3, Nairobi,
In a related discussion on regional integration in southern Africa, Sidaway (1998, 569) describes the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as “an enterprise of state elites”. In previous work Niemann refers to these elites as the ‘state class’ and claims that SADCC\textsuperscript{114} is “a means to achieve external funding for shopping list of development projects which are basically national in scope [...] A weak regional organization which acts as a channel for foreign resources without any power to allocate these resources serves the interests of the state class rather well” (quoted in Sidaway 1998, 570).

Over the course of research on the EAC, I increasingly developed the impression that the EAC’s prospects to further extend and institutionalise cooperation, both internally and with external actors, is very limited. This is partly due to inherent institutional and organisational deficiencies, however, it is mainly due to a limited commitment on the part of the EAC’s member states towards furthering the integration process in East Africa; especially when it comes to the creation of supranational structures. Observers of the early processes of European Political Cooperation (EPC) noticed how a “coordination reflex” amongst European foreign policy makers had developed during the 1970s (Wessels 1982, 5). Even though the policies dealt with as part of the EAC energy strategy are concerned with domestic affairs within the EAC, the process itself is subject to (collective) interaction of EAC countries with external actors and as such shows parallels to the processes of early EPC. In my experiences, however, neither with respect to the EAC energy strategy nor in other contexts of East African integration, did coordination appear as a reflex. Although internal coordination as well as collective interaction towards external actors are on the agenda of East African countries, those processes are generally conducted exclusively on an intergovernmental basis with no steps to be taken to cede national authority to a supranational entity. In the context of the EAC energy strategy, member states coordinated with each other only if an immediate self-benefit

\textsuperscript{114} Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the precursor to the SADC.
was visible or expected. Coordination thus appeared more as a tool for ad-hoc benefit maximisation than a reflex or an inherent and institutionalised part of policy conduct. A “reflexe communautaire”, as Reuben Wong (2008, 323) describes it in the more recent literature on Europeanisation is not the norm, it rather is the exception.

It is therefore no surprise that direct collective EAC interaction with external actors remains limited (see sections 6.1.1 and 6.2.2). An EC official in Brussels described the EAC as (still) “too small and weak for having more formalised relations“ (Informant E12, Brussels, 04/07/2008). In the context of the EAC regional energy strategy the absorption capacity for cooperation with donors at the EAC headquarters was minimal, resulting in a lack of ownership. Yet, European development organisations, bilaterally in the form of GTZ REAP and multilaterally in form of EUEI PDF, played a significant role mainly due to their inherent interest in promoting aspects of regional integration and renewable energy utilisation. Both are currently particularly attractive sectors for donor involvement and as such frequently create instances of donor competition (see section 6.3.3) about competencies and allocation of ‘assisting’ roles. In particular after the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali in December 2007, the energy sector with a focus on renewable energy was boosted in the field of development cooperation. European and multilateral donors were trying to augment their engagement in this sector and decorate themselves with a green label. This, however, also marked a clear difference to the development policy of the United States, at this point still under the Bush-administration, and even more so to the engagement of emerging donors like China or the Arab countries whose energy policies in Africa is often focussed on fossil fuels. With respect to renewable energy projects there has been a particular interest not only by development organisations but also by commercial actors in the context of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). CDM gained great prominence in recent years as highly lucrative business

115 I suspect that the significant German interest in the process is also linked to the inclusion of UNDP and part of the German foreign political directive to maintain good working relations with the UN system as part of the ambition to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council
opportunities based on the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. The basic idea\textsuperscript{116} is that through saving carbon emissions by improving industrial processes or generating energy from renewables, certified emission reductions (CERs) are induced and subsequently sold in variable international trading scheme, such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).

As such the energy sector takes a central position in international development cooperation and for other external actors active in East Africa. In addition, a key aspect of collective European development policy is the promotion of regional integration in developing countries and of cooperation between those regions and the EU (see Chapter 5 and EC 2007a, 2007d, 2007c; EPCC 2006a). Hence the project I was involved in, a regional integration project on energy, was generating a great interest amongst (European) donors; issues of donor competition outlined in section 6.3.3 were particularly evident in this context. Nevertheless, despite the regional approach there seemed to be a preference amongst both donors and host countries to maintain their existing bilateral programmes and projects and only bundle them under a regional ‘roof’ – the EAC was in most cases not regarded as capable or reliable enough to be playing a significant role. Yet, labelling bilateral cooperation part of a regional project seemed to carry a major appeal amongst donors and host countries. With respect to the SADC, Sidaway (1998) argues that regional integration functions as a way for the “state class” to exercise and reassert sovereignty. States’ claims of sovereignty, he points out, “must be continuously reinforced by a set of actions”. SADC thereby reveals a “particularly stark form how institutions and discourse of integration tend to operate and how they related to the inscription of state powers” (ibid, 571). Regional integration must thus not be only be seen as entailing a concession of sovereignty and state power, but also as a way to demonstrate and preserve it through participating in practices only open to state actors; i.e. building regional

\textsuperscript{116} See the website of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change http://unfccc.int/2860.php [01/07/2009]
communities and all this entails with respect to (inter)national recognition and attraction of external funds. The experience of the SADC, Sidaway (1998, 571) continues, thus “indicates that a formal commitment to and participation in ‘integration’ should also be read as part of this set of processes by which sovereignty is confirmed – albeit with its own ‘resistances at the margins’”.

In the EAC context, however, the rhetorical commitments made by national ministers did not translate into actual commitment during the implementation process of the strategy. The interest in a truly integrated regional approach, or supranational structures, seemed very limited; instead there was a strong preference for external, bilateral cooperation and internal, ad-hoc, intergovernmental coordination of existing (and new) programmes and projects. “Many African states are reluctant to share sovereignty”, Gibb (2009, 718) claims, “because in reality they do not have sovereignty to share”. There is thus a fine line between a nominal commitment to regional integration, for reasons of “confirming sovereignty”, and a practical reluctance to cede authority in certain policy fields. In this context Gibb argues that

While the African states might want to convey an outward impression that they ‘buy into’ the Western model of regional integration and seek to emulate it, their approach is actually rather more nuanced and sophisticated, designed principally to support the neo-patrimonial African state system (ibid, 718).

As such, the regional integration project needs to be seen as state-led phenomenon that “can only be as strong as its constituent parts or, more precisely, as strong as its constituent parts what it to be” (ibid, 717).

However, despite all the problems in the process of the EAC energy strategy, the regional approach of this project is not only likely to guarantee the continued involvement of the two European organisations already involved, but very likely to attract more European involvement, such as SIDA, NORAD, AFD, etc. in an attempt to support the project itself and to upgrade institutional capacity at the EAC headquarters as part of the underlying motifs in their respective development policies.
In this context, the projection of European space (see Chapter V) has taken various shapes. On the one hand thematic aspects outlined in EU development policy, such as a focus on the MDGs (EPCC 2006a) as well as on climate change and environmental sustainability (EC 2008b), are also integral components of the approaches pursued as part of the EAC energy strategy. On the other hand it also reflects key structural aspects of European external relations such as the objective to promote regional integration and the regulation of interaction between both the members of a region and with external actors (see Chapter V and EC 2007a, 2007d, 2007c; EPCC 2006a). Regarding the thematic aspects of European space, the commitment to the MDGs enjoyed a widespread consensus on the part of all actors involved, however, the emphasis on climate change and environmental sustainability issues enjoyed consensus much less. In particular for UNDP, as the other major ‘development partner’, this was much less a priority than it was for the European donors. Similarly, the local cooperation partners from the EAC and its member states were much more interested in accessing ‘modern’ energy and electricity in the first place; their concern was not so much if it was generated in an environmentally-friendly way.

The structural aspects of European space, regional integration and regulated spaces of interaction, have also featured ambivalently in the EAC energy strategy process in a sense that they have been set-up and initiated, but have not been operationalised to a great extent. The
role of the EAC as a regional organisation and the integration effort pursued in the process as well as the structures that have been set up for regional coordination and organised collective interaction with external actors reflect key parameters of European external relations. The functionality of these structures, however, clearly falls a long way short of the regulated interaction displayed within the EU and envisioned in the external projection of European space. With respect to the understanding of European space in terms of structures, processes and flows, certain structures for regulated interaction have been put in place, yet processes and flows remain cumbersome due to limited institutional capacity at the regional level and limited commitment on part of the member states. However, as Wessels (1982, 17) pointed out in the context of the EPC: “the common enterprise has to begin with a loose, non-binding and modest formula, through which a process of developing trust can be initiated”.


APPENDIX B: IMAGES OF THE KENYAN CRISIS

Figure 34: Title pages of the *Daily Nation*, Kenya’s most widely circulated paper, on 18 and 26 January 2008

The following pictures were taken in Nairobi in January 2008 by a journalist housemate of mine. Used here with permission from Alexander Glodzinski.

Figure 35: Turmoil in the streets of Nairobi
Figure 36: Turmoil in Nairobi's Mathare slum

Figure 37: Protests in Nairobi’s Mathare slum: “Kenyans want peace!! No justice, no peace. Kenya is a democracy, not a dictatorship, nor a police state”
Figure 38: Kenyan police firing tear gas cartridges at the protesters

Figure 39: The para-military General Service Unit (GSU)
### List of Informants

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<th>Location</th>
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<td>D1 CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency)</td>
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**60 Informants**  
**55 Interviews**


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