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NEW BELGRADE AFTER 1999:

SPATIAL VIOLENCE AS DE-SOCIALISATION, DE-ROMANISATION AND DE-HISTORISATION

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ABSTRACT:

New Belgrade after 1999 is associated with the transition from a socialist and single-party state to a consumer capitalist and multi-party system, with the latter perceived as an indicator of democracy. This paper asks if and how this transitional period points to NATO's 1999 bombing campaign still being *in-operation* through spatial violence by other means, with these means related to the negation of difference and the transformation of everyday life and social values. Might this spatial violence be even more coercive than that of the war as it manifests through the convergence of military, legal, governmental and economic entities of international "redevelopment" agencies working in the name of "security" along with the Serbian government? This paper explores this proposition by focusing on the post-1999 transformation and re-modernisation of New Belgrade as an elimination of difference through processes of de-socialisation, de-Romanisation and de-historisation connected with neo-liberal privatisation.

INTRODUCTION

This paper will explore urban transformations in Belgrade occurring in the aftermath of the 1999 Operation Allied Force (March 24 – June 10). These transformations will be framed as obliterations of alternative approaches to ways of living and to communal social values through processes of de-socialisation, de-Romanisation and de-historisation. The vehicle for the exploration will be New Belgrade in general, and Block 67 and the 'Old Fairground' (Blocks 17 and 18) in particular (refer to Figure 01).

The paper will firstly trace various shifts in the urban planning of New Belgrade. Examining various urban plans in relation to the political period when they emerged will allow re-evaluation of both distant and more immediate histories in order to expose recent spatial violence associated with neo-liberal privatisation. This investigation will be driven by three key ideas. The first is that the change from social(ist) to consumer values is associated with a violent elimination of social solidarity and diverse approaches to living. The second is that supposedly civilised ways of living were advanced by the violent expunging of Romani settlements in New Belgrade. The third is that the elimination of historical traces from the urban landscape negates the imbrication of space and violence.

This text will therefore explore the proposition that de-socialisation, de-Romanisation and de-historisation are intrinsically and cyclically linked through spatial violence. Here, de-historisation might be understood to extend beyond negation of the violent history of particular urban sites to the erasure of socialist symbols through the renaming of streets and buildings and the changes in their appearance. De-socialisation might be understood to be associated not only with the commodification of residential and public space and economic resources, but also with the elimination of all alternative social and urban values such as those associated with Romani settlements. Together, these linked processes suggest a continuation of spatial violence by means other than the direct military campaign.

NEW BELGRADE

New Belgrade is one of Belgrade's municipalities. This municipality is important not only because it was largely constructed in the wake of WWII (unlike Belgrade's Old City), but also because its construction might be understood as a manifestation of spatial violence, especially the more recent and coercive examples of this violence associated with the transition and transformation of Belgrade in the wake of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign.¹

Up until the nineteenth century, the site of New Belgrade was a swamp and a no-man's land. In military terms it was also used as a strategic place from which to launch attacks on Belgrade's Old City. The swamp separated Belgrade's Old City, which was under the Ottoman rule, from the adjacent town of Zemun, which was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The vital characteristic of New Belgrade is its physical flatness, posing a sharp contrast to the Old City, which is built on 32 hills. According to the architect and academic Ljiljana Blagojevic, since New Belgrade was

[d]evoid of any urban structure, it fulfilled the function of a *cordon sanitaire*, observed and controlled as a no-connection-zone between the Orient, where Belgrade, as it were, marked its end point, and the Occident, of which Zemun was the, first, even if modest and marginal, port of call.²

Despite the apparent physical flatness prior to the construction of current day New Belgrade, the fact that the area has a history of identification as a border zone – between the Occidental Austro-Hungarian Empire / Christendom and the Oriental Ottoman Empire / Islam, Western and Eastern Empires, and Roman Catholicism and Orthodox Christendom – exposes the underlying politics of violence that occurs when borders are assigned for the purpose of territorial control between an Occident associated with civilisation and an Orient associated with barbarism. Against this no-man's land position and status of territories with fixed and antagonistic identities arose the 20th Century imagining of New Belgrade.

NEW BELGRADE: 'The Fairground' – Block 17 and Block 18

The erection of New Belgrade began in the mid 1930s in the area that is today colloquially known as 'The Fairground', and officially as Block 17 and Block 18 (refer to Figure 01). The construction of this zone began even though no urban plan was approved despite many being proposed since the 1920s.³

The zone along the left bank of the river Sava (present day Block 18) was the first area to be built-up. It was probably chosen for construction of residential houses due to its slight elevation above the level of the wetland. Prior to the purchase of 200 hectares by the Yugoslav King Aleksandar in mid 1930s, the land was owned by farmers and used to graze sheep. After it was purchased, this area was divided into seven linear streets (only six streets exist now), as well as subdivided into two hundred, long, narrow parcels, sold to individuals and used for the construction of houses. The parcelisation was a rural influenced-system on what was in the process of becoming an urban context. Initial construction on each parcel included erection of a small, one-storey house on the edge of a strip and closer to the street, with a long garden behind utilised for orchards and vegetable gardens. At the edge of Block 18, in 1983, two Romani families settled despite the immediate area in Block 18A used for waste disposal. The Romani move from southern Serbia was incited by the economic crisis, spurred by Tito's death in 1980 and increasing interest rates from World Bank loans. Over time, and since 1983, the Romani population grew to 173 dwellings and 820 people in 2005.⁴ The increase in settlement size and population was also due to

the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the 1990s, which signified the disintegration of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and the 1998-1999 war in Kosovo and Metohija, when 140 new families settled between 1998 – 2000.⁵ The Romani zone expanded from the initial edge of Block 18 towards the New Railway Bridge (*Stari Zeleznicki Most*) to the south.

The area once occupied by the middle class has, since the 1980s arrival of the Romani, 1990s influx of refugees spurred by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the mid 1990s hyperinflation in Serbia that affected the livelihood of some Belgrade-born population, largely accommodated lower classes and the disadvantaged. The change in occupation has also affected the status of land and home ownership, meaning that developments in the past 20-30 years have largely remained unregistered and illegal. To this day, despite the zone having a central location – it joins New Belgrade with the Old City; it is located along the fringe of the river Sava; and, it is in a tight proximity to major traffic routes and public transport zones – it has a peripheral and quiet atmosphere. This is largely a result of a green belt of trees that sits on a slightly higher terrain between the Sava and the residential zone.

Block 17 (refer to Figure 01), which encompasses the Belgrade Fairground built in 1937 and expanded in 1938,⁶ was turned into a concentration camp soon after it was built. It was used by the Nazis during WWII to exterminate Romani, Jews and all those Serbs who were openly opposed to the Fascist regime. During 1947 – 1950, the Fairground was used as the Headquarters of a construction firm that was in charge of building New Belgrade.⁷ Some of the pavilions also housed volunteer members of the Youth Labour Brigades⁸ – referred to subsequently as the ORA (*Omladinska Radna Akcija*) – who helped lay eight million cubic meters of sand and gravel to set the terrain for New Belgrade's post WWII construction (their role is explored later in this paper). In 1987, the Fairground was placed under a historical preservation order. In 1995, a memorial sculpted by Miodrag Popovic was built near the vicinity of the 1937 Belgrade Fairground to mark the violent extermination of peoples during WWII; while commemorating the manifestation of genocide in Belgrade on the Fairground site, the memorial plaque also mentions the Serb and Romani victims of the concentration camp in Jasenovac (Croatia), and marks the heroism and resistance of all Yugoslav peoples and victims of the Nazi terror (refer to Image 02). It has been proposed that the construction of a memorial complex specific to all those exterminated within the Fairground, and located within the same grounds, will begin in 2015.

NEW BELGRADE: Urban Development of New Belgrade: 1945 – 1990s

When the urbanisation of the rest of New Belgrade began to accelerate after WWII, development of Blocks 17 and 18 started to stagnate. The urbanisation was provisioned by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Head of State Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav Communist Party Politburo of Serbia and the City Party Committee.⁹ New Belgrade was designed 'with a strategic political intent: to serve as the capital of [what has since the 1963 Constitution become known as] the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.'¹⁰ Under Tito, the SFRY was established as a series of multiethnic republics, with populations 'striving to create a balance between Western capitalism and Soviet communism.'¹¹ With the SFRY split from Soviet Russia in 1948, Yugoslavia spearheaded the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The NAM was conceived as a network of nations that had a 'third way' political geography and offered an alternative to the Cold War politics of the USSR / Warsaw Pact and the United States / NATO.¹² The SFRY under Titoism had an alternative approach to economics, law and the military, and was one of two European countries – the other being Cyprus – that openly

opposed Europe's Eastern and Western Block divisions. Springing from this, urban construction in Belgrade was part of a larger political project whose motives were uniquely ideological and experimental: the interlacing of Soviet communist social welfare with a planned market economy. The economy was decentralised, meaning that autonomy was given to districts, regions and Republics. Land, property and institutions were initially state owned, however, with the introduction of self-management in the 1950s the vast majority of enterprises became socially owned. In other words, self-management and workers' rights prevailed, and, in theory at least, profit sharing occurred in socially-run enterprises.¹³ Travel outside the Yugoslav borders was also permitted, unlike in other Communist countries.

Before any construction could take place after WWII, New Belgrade's swampy terrain firstly had to be drained.¹⁴ The area was then evenly covered with landfill and raised above the reach of flooding and the underground water table. Sand and gravel were transported from a small island called Little War Island (*Malo Ratno Ostrvo*), almost destroying the island.¹⁵ This work was predominantly done the ORA. Up until 1990, a year that marked ORA's last activity, 'more than two million young Yugoslavs participated in these events.'¹⁶ After WWII, the ORA became a means of strengthening friendship and solidarity among people, as well as spreading Tito's ideology, helping to re-build the SFRY and providing a base from which to 'combat illiteracy by organizing educational and other courses in the brigades.'¹⁷ Between 1947 and 1950 alone, 100,000 ORA volunteers participated in various labour-intensive activities in New Belgrade.¹⁸ The ORA was also involved in other projects, such as the construction of the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity, the transport route linking Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Nis and Skopje¹⁹ (the road is now known as the Boulevard of Arsenija Carnojevic, and since 1999 has become particularly significant as it connects to E75 and Pan-European Corridor X which is a significant West-East thoroughfare leading to Germany on one end and Turkey on the other end). However, due to the immense scale of New Belgrade's urbanisation, with time, construction work including that carried out by the ORA became dependent on World Bank loans from the West.²⁰ The loans helped support the SFRY's split from the USSR in 1948.²¹ The West hoped that other socialist / communist satellite states would follow Yugoslavia's example. It is said that developments facilitated by grants and loans from the West 'were not confined to "industrialization" in its narrower sense, but were extended to include such developments as the creation of tourism industry.'²² In brief, the building of New Belgrade (initially conceived as an administration centre) and other Yugoslav industrial and infrastructure zones

rested on a threefold support: (1) ideological: the socialist government was in a position to manage the entire country like a vast industrial enterprise; (2) economic: starting from the early 1950s Yugoslavia was granted hefty credits from the West; and (3) popular: a considerable part of the work was performed by unpaid labor in the form of Voluntary Youth brigades [ORA]. This was a uniquely Yugoslavian invention that marked the reconstruction effort after the war and was maintained well into the 1980s as one of the crowning examples of the country's "permanent revolution".²³

With Western loans offered to support the SFRY's split with the USSR, and as the SFRY experienced great housing demand post WWII, the intent (led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Tito, the Yugoslav Communist Party Politburo of Serbia and the City Party Committee) that New Belgrade be known for its government and cultural buildings was redefined. New Belgrade instead developed a residential character. Construction of residential accommodation was accelerated as a result of SFRY's socially owned property system, in which state institutions provided housing for their employees. From a legal and social standpoint, a free apartment and social services were considered fundamental rights necessary to the wellbeing of society. According to Blagojevic, in

New Belgrade, the specificity of the housing function followed the ideological premise that a place of residence/apartment in socialism is not only a commodity, but that it is its use value which defines it. It reflected another socio-political construct of the right to a residence as a universal right to the common public good, and related to the ideal of the just distribution, i.e. the ideal of free apartment, and free social services for all.²⁴

The urban plan that allowed such an accelerated construction was devised in the 1950s. This plan primarily dealt with the central zone of New Belgrade, and was constituted by nine symmetrical blocks (Blocks 21 – 29) whose central axis was composed of three blocks (Block 24, 25, 26) intended for public use, and the grand assembly area (refer to Figure 01). The symmetrical blocks fronted the building of the Federal Executive Council (1947 – 1961) and were backed by a proposed, yet never built, railway station. The Plan closely followed principles of Le Corbusier's Radiant City and Brasilia from the Athens Charter.²⁵ However, with residential buildings taking precedence construction of the central axis was halted. New Belgrade was filled with block-type buildings, which were seen as a highly efficient solution to the great housing demand.²⁶ The orthogonal blocks were planned with hierarchical vehicular / pedestrian circulation. The hierarchy was achieved in three ways. Firstly, by having major streets connecting the area; secondly, by having an internal street system between the blocks consisting of primary streets; and thirdly, by having bridges connecting the blocks to a pedestrian zone within each block.

With Tito's death in 1980, and the ensuing economic crisis resulting from increasing state indebtedness to the World Bank, the planning, use and decision making process concerning land developments of many unbuilt zones within designated Blocks also started changing despite the Modernist urban plan and imagining of New Belgrade literally not completed. This was seen in the private adaptation of public space, introduction of predominantly one-storey private commercial shops, and a somewhat gradual approach to selling state-owned apartments to their occupants. In the 1990s, with the violent disintegration of the SFRY, the United Nations Security Council imposed trade and travel embargoes on those Republics largely seen as responsible for the conflict, which in practice meant Serbia and Montenegro.²⁷ In an attempt to deal with growing hyperinflation flowing from these measures, the state started to more rapidly sell apartments in New Belgrade.²⁸ With this shift, an apartment was no longer a social right but a possession which also posed a shift in relation to time since time was now oriented towards earning in order to rent or own a property. The notion of common good was now headed towards individual survival. The war and the influx of refugees in the 1990s from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina also affected commercial trade, including the scale and typology of buildings in New Belgrade. In terms of architecture, roof-terraces and balconies were often converted to provide rentable space for the newly arrived refugees. The building typology of New Belgrade started diversifying, at a time when social values were becoming more corrupt as a result of the political crises, nationalism and war.²⁹ In relation to commerce, the crisis of war and international travel and economic embargos facilitated the introduction of wild markets such as New Belgrade's Flea market (*Buvljak*). The Flea market sold goods (illegally) transported from countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania or even China. It is still in operation today, albeit significantly reduced, *despite of or because of* New Belgrade's "vacant" blocks since 1999 being filled with shopping centres and private mixed-use buildings. This market is a signifier of New Belgrade's polarised living, where shopping centres demonstrate a privileged consumer culture of *want*, and the Flea market demonstrating a disadvantaged socio-economic layer *in need to survive* (refer to Figure 03).

NATO AND NEW BELGRADE: DE-SOCIALISATION THROUGH DE-HISTORISATION

A string of events leading up to and during NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force might raise the question of the relation of this operation to the subsequent post-war redevelopment of New Belgrade. In 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY – constituted of Serbia and Montenegro) was one of the last remaining countries in Europe resisting the shift toward consumer neo-liberalism; a shift first manifest with the fall of the Berlin Wall, followed by the disintegration of the USSR and the East Bloc, and then the breakup of the SFRY in the 1990s. On March 23, 1999, one day before NATO's strikes began, then US President Clinton stated the importance of economic restructuring to the NATO intervention, claiming that if the US is

going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key. And if we want people to share our burdens of leadership with all the problems that will inevitably crop up, Europe needs to be our partner. Now, that's what this Kosovo thing is all about.²⁸

The military analyst William M. Arkin (indirectly) re-affirms the noted restructuring in NATO's targeting strategy:

[w]hen Allied Force began, a variety of possible targets – including electricity, media facilities, and certain dual-use industries – were put off limits because they were largely 'civilian' targets. Yet it took all of a day or two before NATO governments began 'escalating' and considering them to be additional target categories.²⁹

This targeting strategy was explicitly addressed in a 2002/03 thesis – *Crony Attack. Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?* – written by Julian H. Tolbert, a pilot who participated in NATO's bombing campaign. According to Tolbert, 'crony attack targets key elite supporters of an enemy leader to effect policy change in the attacker's favor. It is also one of a set of tools used in coercive diplomacy. Other tools include economic sanctions and information operations.'³⁰ If this is the case, then the 1993 travel and economic sanctions imposed on the FRY by the West may be seen in part a preparation for NATO's 1999 Operation. The significance of economic restructuring can also be found in the proposed 1999 Rambouillet Agreement,³¹ whereby one of the conditions NATO required FRY to accept was 'the use of airports, roads, rail and ports without payment of fees, duties, tolls or charge ... (and the functioning of the) economy ... in accordance with free market principles.'³² Here, the stipulation of 'free market principles' might be read in association with the NATO campaign's targeting of an economy outside the neo-liberal order.

The economic aspect in post-Cold wars is, according to Stephen Graham, a part of a 'larger *geo-economic* scheme for engineering the urban machinations of control that are necessary to secure the triumph of neoliberal capitalism across the globe.'³³ Often, the means of achieving this agenda is through a military strategy that Graham terms 'de-modernisation' and Eyal Weizman 'design by destruction'.³⁴ Weizman writes that from the 'political/military point of view, the city is a social/physical obstacle that must be reorganised before it can be controlled.'³⁵ If one accepts Graham and Weizman's thinking, then NATO's intervention might be understood as an attempt to physically destroy and de-modernise cities by systematically paralysing all lines of communication in Serbia – military, economic, infrastructural, media and civilian. The re-building of destroyed buildings/infrastructure in cities such as Belgrade would then be dependent upon opening up Serbia to neo-liberalism and transforming the city and country according to *free market principles*. With the conditional nature of international bank loans,

international control also results. The advancement of neo-liberalism might then be thought of as a covert or implicit aspect of NATO's campaign of violence, whereby the attack on Belgrade not only immobilised the economic flows of the FRY, but also mobilised a relationship of dependence upon the West. The infrastructural and economic interests behind targeting Serbia and Belgrade may suggest that NATO's campaign is connected to a whole theatre of violence (short-term being NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force, and long-term and indefinite being the current period of transition), where alternative systems that sustain the life of a city are destroyed in an attempt 'to coerce resistant populations and political leaderships into surrender'.⁷ In order to overcome the effects of de-modernisation / design by destruction, the process of re-modernisation necessitates a form construction that benefits neo-liberalism and foreign bank loans.

The importance of controlling and eliminating alternative social values and histories in relation to the SFRY/FRY context is suggested in an article written, during the NATO campaign, by the right-wing columnist of the *New York Times*, Thomas L. Friedman.⁸ In response to the public gatherings in Belgrade in 1999, which were used to voice protest against NATO's campaign, Friedman wrote that '[i]t should be lights out in Belgrade: every power grid, water pipe, bridge, road and war-related factory has to be targeted. [...] You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389 too.'⁹ Friedman's comments, according to Stephen Graham, not only urge that 'all the movements and mobilities sustaining urban life in Serbia should be brought to a grinding halt', but also open the possibility that 'the precise reversal of time that the adversary society is to be bombed 'back' through is presumably a matter merely of the correct weapon and target selection.'¹⁰ Of the dates selected, 1950 is associated with the period of socialism in Belgrade (and Serbia). 1389 is significant as it marked the defeat of Serbia by the Ottomans (as well as the loss of Kosovo's territory).

The re-modernisation benefits the EU, the West and the market economy more than it does Belgrade and Serbia. In respect to Belgrade, the initial 78-day air offensive has been converted into an unnoticed, ongoing ground offensive, despite the Operation officially terminating on 10 June 1999. The (re)formation is seen in the privatisation of various telecommunications, construction firms, banks, power plants, refineries, and shipping concerns. This exposes the interconnection of military intervention and economic globalisation, with NATO's Operation facilitating this reconnection, reorganisation and reterritorialisation. The attempt to map and code Belgrade's space to suit military objectives finds a parallel in NATO's 1973 plan by the *Committee on the Challenge of Modern Society*, 'whose aim was to *universally map out the circulation of persons and commodities*'.¹¹ Perhaps the most important claim made about the plan is that 'the NATO plan aims at making *entirely logistical* that which, in the spatial continuum, was still divided between the civilian and the military.'¹² This plan is now being put into operation, with the First Security Forum taking place in Belgrade in 2011 as part of building a broader understanding of the present and future security architecture of the EU. The idea is that civil and military relations become part of a larger reform involving 'full cooperation with NATO and EU, as one of the main preconditions for SCG [sic. Serbia and Montenegro] joining the Euro-Atlantic community.'¹³ The rebuilding and re-modernisation of Belgrade becomes the means by which to implement a "Western style" legal and economic system aimed at constraining and controlling the movement of people and resources. With the introduction of various (re)formation programs in the name of "security", urban infrastructure becomes the means to seamlessly observe, circulate and extend violence and control.

After NATO's 1999 de-modernisation of Belgrade, and in the ongoing transition period for New Belgrade, the city may be understood as being rapidly being re-modernised by being de-socialised. The socialist right to a residence and even the subsequent understanding of a residence as a possession are now being replaced with a new understanding: the residence as a commodity. Changes are also prominent in terms of public spaces where, through de-socialisation, these places are being turned into matter to be looked at rather than matter to be used. The tight relationship between de-socialisation through de-historisation is further apparent with the renaming of buildings (discussed later) and street names. For example, the ORA constructed Highway of Brotherhood and Unity, now known as the Boulevard of Arsenija Carnojevic and a key route to the Corridor X, has through renaming facilitated a symbolic erasure of a historically and socially unique aspect of its construction.

New Belgrade's transition aligns with the introduction of the first purported democratic government in 2000, and the ensuing introduction of consumer neo-liberalism and the denationalisation laws whose governing notion is that public companies and buildings should be privatised. This change has affected land tenure laws such that

[i]n 2003, after the new planning law adoption, the City remained the owner/user of the land only in New Belgrade, while locations in the old Belgrade are mainly in private use. [...] Of the total of Belgrade's building land allocated for long-term lease (250,000m²), only 31% was in New Belgrade in 2003. After the law changed, 84.57% of total 207.000m² was leased in New Belgrade in 2004, 79.73% of 139.305m² in 2005 [...].⁴

After 1999, with the advent of foreign loans, New Belgrade became one of the biggest construction sites in the Balkans. This resulted in the "gentrification of luxury high-rise buildings (primarily by new construction), while other blocks of lower quality [were] exposed to further downgrading in both physical and social terms."⁴ The socialist building typology was diversified through polarisation and demarcation between neighbourhoods, where there was a discrepancy in aesthetic language and socio-economic levels. The fragmented mix of new building types and old block-type buildings suggests that New Belgrade was coercively modulated by international, local and EU policies, with laws appropriated to suit a particular hegemonic agenda. In respect to Belgrade, this demarcation was perhaps demonstrated by conditions on both sides of the economic divide; that 'most new buildings, including the dozens of Western-style malls and business complexes erected since 2000, serve primarily the upper-middle and upper class of Belgrade's society' and 'as of 2005 25,000 Belgrade residents lived in 29 slums and 64 other slum-like settlements that do not meet elementary health and sanitary standards.'⁴ This demarcated and economically-polarised patchwork presents New Belgrade as

a city at war with itself, and its central zone is its main battlefield. Where the battle rages most vehemently is between a number of particular interests, now competing for supremacy and for the status of new, legitimate public interests. [...] First and foremost, a clear demarcation line is in force between the era of social idealism, planning, and modernization, however imposed and hegemonic its narrative was, and the new era driven by the forces of the market economy, privatization, and denigration of planning. [More so, it] is no more a no-man's-land, nor a common ground, but a land split by new boundaries.⁴

The rapid reconfiguration of New Belgrade's central axis and other blocks was mainly driven by international investment, foreign loans, contractual stipulations by the European Union, corrupt local Serbian politicians and their just as corrupt international clients. This is evident in Block 67 (refer to Figure 01), when in preparation for the 2007 Universiade Belgrade (25th World University Summer

Games), one of New Belgrade's "vacant" blocks – Block 67 – was turned into an Olympic Village called Belville, with the intention that the numerous apartments in the Village would be sold after the event.⁵ Whilst this practice has, unfortunately, become a common one in contemporary Olympic real-estate development (evident in both Beijing and London), what is specific to the context of Belville in Belgrade is that the evictions were directed towards a specific ethnic group of people – the Romani. The planning and construction of Belville exposes a shift from the SFRY model of owning property collectively, to treating property as a private commodity. Moreover, development of New Belgrade's "vacant" block also resulted in relocating a considerable number of the Romani population to marginal areas of the city. This suggests that New Belgrade's transition not only advanced de-socialisation, but also de-Romanisation, whereby the two modes of spatial violence were intrinsically linked. Considering that 'planning is always political, serving political goals, and planners are agents of political programs,'⁶ the privatisation inherent in the reconstruction of New Belgrade was facilitated by rapid changes in land and company ownership and the law, whereby numerous companies that used to have their headquarters in New Belgrade were artificially bankrupted in order to be more easily privatised.⁷ The shift was geared towards a fairly smooth transfer from the norms of a once alternative socialist country to those of a global and foreign controlled neo-liberalist zone. The convergence of legal, governmental and military entities proceeded to the point where they became indistinguishable, perhaps indicating that NATO's 1999 campaign had an impact beyond the three-month bombing of Belgrade.

De-socialisation was facilitated both directly through policy, and obliquely through culture. The policy driven de-socialisation has been made possible by the various loans provided by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The cultural de-socialisation has been evident in the creation of a new consumer culture, exemplified by newly created Serbian tycoons such as Miroslav Miskovic who among other capital ventures includes ownership of several shopping centres.⁸ One of these is Delta City Shopping Centre located next to Belville, and in Block 67. Hypo Adria Bank, the first private (neo-liberal) bank introduced to Serbia after the 1999 targeting, and Miskovic's Delta Holdings funded Belville's construction. Notably, during Slobodan Milosevic's rule, some of the current tycoons were close supporters of the government, and therefore likely to be NATO crony targets. Presently, the old associations appear to have been forgotten as their power was directed towards accelerating neo-liberalism through consumerism and privatisation. Seemingly, de-socialisation is contingent on producing a collective historical amnesia. After 1999, Belgrade and Serbia were highly receptive to a lifestyle dependent on international bank loans, accepting risks similar to that of the early 1980s when the SFRY experienced significant alteration to living standards as a result of the inflation driven by post WWII international bank loans. The noted risks have already materialised, with Serbia slowly losing its middle class, and two distinct classes emerging – the privileged and the underprivileged.

Apart from the increased number of commercial properties, there has also been a change in appearance, use and (re) naming of particular buildings. For example, a building that was used as the headquarters of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (also known as the CK Tower), and one of three significant government/cultural buildings in the post WWII formation of New Belgrade (the other two being the Federal Executive Council and the Museum of Contemporary Art), has been given a makeover. The 1962 – 1964 CK Tower (refer to Figure 01) was targeted during the 1999 strikes, and was one of the first renamed and reconstructed buildings, a process that lasted 3 years (2002 – 2005). Now occupied by private/commercial offices and known as the Usce Tower, the building is a signifier of the necessity to eliminate socialist history. The tower has had two more storeys added to its initial twenty-three and used for purposes of hospitality and fitness,⁹ whilst the green-scaped public area surrounding

the building has been used for the construction of the new Usce Shopping Centre and a carpark that opened in 2009 (refer to Figure 04).³³ It appears that green spaces that were once social have been turned into private and inactive pristine spaces to be viewed and consumed rather than used. Even the added storey within the tower, used for recreational purposes, plays a role in shaping and sculpting a once social(ist) body into a consumer one in order to fit a particular advertising “ideal” tied to urban spectacle and the consumption of leisure. An indication of a consumer culture of spectacle playing a prominent role is amplified with the re-clad glass façade of the USCE complex (tower and shopping centre) turned into a billboard of messages. At night the volume of the complex hauntingly disappears, apart from the array of spectacle manifested by neon light signs. The ultimate irony of the reconstruction is that a tower once associated with communism/socialism now boasts the sign of the first neo-liberal bank – Hypo Adria – introduced to Belgrade and Serbia after 1999.

The global and political restructuring, where buildings and goods are becoming commodities for consumption and where residents are re-educated to believe in the necessity of consuming, underscores the proliferation of spatial violence. This form of spatial incursion is not as direct as the targeting of Belgrade in 1999 or the violence that occurred prior and during 1998-99 between Serbs and Albanians from the Province of Kosovo and Metohija. In New Belgrade, violence after 1999 has been more obscure, facilitated not only by international agencies, but also by local tycoons and corrupt government. Here, Zygmunt Bauman’s words find resonance, as the ‘state washes its hands of the vulnerability and uncertainty arising from the logic (or illogicality) of the free market, now redefined as a private affair, a matter for the individuals to deal and cope with by the resources in their private possession.’³⁴ While fashion has driven a greater level of heterogeneity in New Belgrade’s current built landscape, it may still be understood as expressing an economic polarisation fiercer than in the preceding socialist context. Here, spatial violence may be understood as having transformed values, using consumerism as the conditioner of a “democratic” society despite this type of “democracy” being appropriated to suit narrow interests and depending upon short-term memory and a consumer culture of spectacle.

BLOCKS 17 AND 18: DE-ROMANISATION THROUGH DE-HISTORISATION AND DE-SOCIALISATION

De-Romanisation has been evident in the attempt to expunge the eclectic nature of zones in New Belgrade, and in particular the Romani settlements.³⁵ The spatialisation of this violence has been reinforced through de-historisation and de-socialisation associated with negation of history of settlement and occupation; the Romani zones in New Belgrade’s history were whitewashed just as the residences occupied by other lower classes/disadvantaged peoples in Blocks 17 and 18 (refer to Figure 01).

At their largest population and footprint in 2005, the Romani settlements in Block 18 were a bustling and rich patchwork of inhabitation with each Romani dwelling constructed of different materials; here, rubbish took on a new meaning and purpose as a valued and primary element of construction. Over the years, the settlements increased in size despite the lack of adequate infrastructure in terms of sanitation, sewage, electricity lines and pedestrian corridors. To address this problem would be the first step towards legalisation of these informal and illegal settlements,³⁶ which is not in the interest of the Serbian government considering the prime position of this zone overlooking the river Sava.

Besides this part of Block 18 exemplifying the type of Romani living not approved by the Serbian government (and more recently international agencies, to be explored below), the central importance of

these settlements is that they are located beneath the Gazela bridge (*Gazela most*), a major transport route that connects to both the West and the East via E75 (refer to Figure 05). Although visible to a passerby only from a distance via the bridge, the settlements occupied by the Romani provoke in that they expose normative expectations of how “civilised” and “respectable” people should live. They do not use the aesthetic approved by the West or the Serbian government. As they are located in the central zones of New Belgrade, rather than the fringes, the settlements are difficult to dismiss. They expose a normative limit, a signifier of a social and political cut of who can live in a city and how that city can be occupied. According to Bauman, the norm

is the projection of the model of order upon human conduct. The norm tells what it means to behave in an orderly fashion in a well-ordered society; it translates, so to speak, the concept of order into the language of human choices. If any order is a choice, so is the norm; but the choice of a certain kind of order limits the choice of tolerable behavioural patterns. It privileges certain kinds of conduct as normal, while casting all other kinds as abnormal.²⁷

Expunging abnormality associated with the Romani differs from other forms in a long history of spatial violence through urban redevelopment and gentrification. Considering that the Romani have not had a fixed association with land, territory or a nation state, their very presence counters the grain of thinking that treats land as a commodity and a potential for economic surplus and political power, reinforcing a reminder that alternatives perhaps exist on how to think *nation*, *national rights* and legitimisation of land and territory. From this perspective, the presence of the Romani proffers a radical difference. That very little academic writing has been dedicated to the status of the Romani living in this New Belgrade zone since 1983 reinforces the hegemonic position.²⁸ The relocation of the Romani – as the ultimate “outsiders” – to the fringes from this central location removes visibility and thinking to do with land, nation and national rights beyond what is currently accepted.

In 2007, the European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provided funding for the reconstruction of the structurally unstable Gazela bridge located above Block 18 only on the condition that the people living underneath the bridge (the Romani) were moved and provided adequate housing.²⁹ The necessity to relocate was underpinned by invoking the condition of security. The Belgrade city authorities responded to this obligation by moving the Romani by force ‘to various provincial locations depending on their previous residential address.’³⁰ Options included relocation to housing in tin shanties, with no provision for water or electricity. Needless to say that the sweltering summer months turned these dwellings into furnaces and the sub-zero winter months turned them into ice blocks. Ironically, whilst the presence of the Romani inhabiting the spaces below the Gazela bridge in Block 18 was perhaps welcome by Belgrade authorities during the 78-day NATO campaign in 1999 as it saved the bridge from being targeted – just as it appears likely that the rock concert demonstrations staged on Branko’s Bridge during Operation Allied Force spared that bridge from destruction³¹ – their being there does not seem to be wanted by national or international bodies today. The EBRD’s pretext of security required during the reconstruction of the bridge was a cunning bid to “democratically” define how public space can be used and by whom. Given this invocation of the necessity for “security”, underpinned by international law, regulations and the neo-liberal agenda, the subsequent de-Romanisation can be compared to Weizman’s appraisal of the Palestinian settlements where

[v]iolence becomes a necessary condition for the constant application of seemingly ad hoc but actually strategic security measures, and is the very justification for the suspension of state budgetary constraints

and the allocation of massive funds for the purpose of security. The combination of security emergencies and economic recession during the early years of the second Intifada prepared the ground for the radical budget restructuring and the deep cuts in government spending (on all public projects but security) that typified the neo-liberal reforms promoted in 2002 by Minister of Finance Benjamin Netanyahu.⁶

Since 2007, density of the Romani settlements has been significantly reduced, now occupying only the edge of Block 18 as in 1983. The 2007 resettlement of the Romani is only one example of violent evictions; being perhaps a precursor for the instatement of the City of Belgrade's 2009 'Action Plan for the Resettlement of Shanty [Unhygienic] Settlements'.⁶ It seems that *despite of* or *because of* the historiographical absence of Romani voice, the violent nature of these evictions is becoming more frequent. In 2011, another 27 Romani families were force evicted from Block 61, a zone in close vicinity to the river Sava, in order to make space for a new commercial development.⁶ According to Amnesty International, this would be the first eviction of 'Roma in Belgrade to be carried out on behalf of the government rather than the city authorities.'⁶

Both Blocks 17 and 18 have a uniquely historical position in New Belgrade. Paradoxically, the urban proposals for New Belgrade have either treated Block 18 as an area that symbolically joins Old City with New Belgrade, or as a proposal that violently negates both the historical and current conditions. This is evident in the proposed 2021 Urban Plan of New Belgrade, prepared by the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade,⁶ which shows an extreme transition from the leftist post WWII socialist conception of 'space for all' to a right-wing neo-liberal and private property-oriented 'market for the few'.⁶ For Block 18, a new street network has been superimposed upon the Sava Amphitheatre, which has been imagined to connect Old and New Belgrade through the Gazela and the Old Railway Bridge. The proposed privatised mixed-use and high-rise complex is fragmented by a network of manicured pathways and landscaped grounds. The proposal treats Block 18 as a tabula rasa, despite this zone currently being comprised of private residences, small industries, artists' studios, car markets, and a Romani community. Elimination of this heterogeneity would not only negate the contemporary nature of living and building, but also a historical aspect in that this zone is a unique example of rural-influenced houses in an urban context built in the 1930s. The site may be seen as a living archive that shows the transformation of a single-storey residential type over time, with changes influenced by fluctuating social and economic factors. Whilst the rest of Belgrade's central zone was developed, this zone has evaded implementation of any rigorous planning visions, and *in spite of* or *because of* this, the area is a rich and a diverse source of ideas and approaches to building and aesthetics – including small workshops, auto mechanics and merchant spaces attached to and in extension from private family residences.

On an adjoining block – Block 17 – a different kind of historical erasure is taking place. The 1937 Fairground used so violently by the Nazis during WWII has been layered with more recent violence. Recent proposals include the conversion of the Fairground complex into a Holocaust memorial and museum.⁶ The adaptation of the complex into a Holocaust memorial and museum would 'displace the local communities [associated with small industries, artists' studios, car markets, small residences and a Romani community] that have made Staro Sajmiste [trans. the Old Fairground] their home and workplace, and in living there effectively protected the site from demolition and redevelopment.'⁶ The first evictees were forced out in 2013.⁶ The association of the Fairground only with a particular event reduces the meaning of other events, as well as other examples of violence that have occurred on this site and within these pavilions. This is not to disregard the immensity of scale and extreme nature of violence during the Holocaust, however, by associating the Fairground with only one violent event fixes history

to a frozen image; one that places measure and ordering on violence. It is the appearance that violence – both as an act and an outcome – is fixed and obvious matter that can be quantified and compared, whereby quantity becomes indicative of the immensity of violence. In this categorisation, violence begins to take on a hierarchy and symmetry, which further facilitates negation of *other* histories of violence. In other words, only violence that has been given the right to historical voice attains prominence, an ordering against which all other kinds of violence are measured against. Classification of violence prefigures a gauging on who can speak, and who needs to remain silent. Extensively, it eliminates the opportunity to question the strategy (*how*) and the intent (*why*) violence was spatialised beyond the voice that has been given the historical and hegemonic right to speak. Here, violence becomes pre-constituted thereby affixing the act and understanding of violence to a frozen image. If one is to accept this thinking, then it becomes plausible to reason that the 1999 incursion was only operative during the 78-day bombing campaign, rather than the incursion still being *in-operation*, though through a different enactment.

CONCLUSION

While we may interpret the history of New Belgrade – from a zone of delineation between the Occident and Orient to planning and construction after WWII – as impregnated with spatial violence, post-1999 conditions are perhaps more dangerous in that they are less visible and more coercive. The violence may be understood as *in-continuation*, rather than *new*, with the Operation Allied Force being an example of military violence enacted in multiple modes: high-tech information operations (technology), neo-liberalism (economy), de-modernisation (temporality), de-socialisation (social welfare), de-Romanisation (alternative values), and de-historisation (alternative histories). As such, the operations of the 1999 campaign may be understood to have ranged between a high-intensity air campaign that lasted for 78 days (March 24 – June 10) during which time architecture was destroyed, and cities – particularly Belgrade – de-modernised, and a longer-term and perhaps indefinite operation that is still taking place. It is a low-intensity and high-tech ground conflict facilitated by rapid changes to infrastructure, law, privatisation of companies, and transformation of territorial relationships; perhaps expanding the discipline and control associated with the 1999 Operation. Through a concatenation of modes of spatial violence, another has been facilitated; re-modernisation of New Belgrade is used to remove all difference as extension of itself that pursues itself.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Paul Waley, "From Modernist to Market Urbanism: the Transformation of New Belgrade," *Planning Perspectives* 26:2 (2011): 210.
- ² Ljiljana Blagojevic, "New Belgrade: The Capital of No-City's Land," *Art-e-Fact, Strategies of Resistance* 4 (December 2005), accessed May 5, 2010, http://artefact.mi2.hr/_a04/lang_en/theory_blagojevic_en.htm. Note: original text is in italics.
- ³ Ljiljana Blagojevic, *Novi Beograd: Osporeni Modernizam / New Belgrade: Delayed Modernism* (Beograd: Zavod za udzbenike, Zavod za zastitu spomenika kulture grada and Arhitektonski fakultet, 2007).
- ⁴ Lorenc Agerman, Eduard Frojdam and Djan Gildji, *Beograd Gazela: Vodici kroz Sirotinjsko Naselje / Belgrade Gazela: A Guide through the Poverty Settlement* (Beograd: Rende, 2009), 20.
- ⁵ Agerman, Frojdam and Gildji, *Beograd Gazela: Vodici kroz Sirotinjsko Naselje*, 20.
- ⁶ Within the Pavilion complex, Italian, Hungarian, Romanian and Czechoslovak Pavilions were also built. A Turkish Pavilion was added in 1938 and a German one in 1939.
- ⁷ Forensic Architecture and Grupa Spomenik, "Living Death Camps," in *Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth*, a project by Forensic Architecture, Centre for Research Architecture, Department of Visual Cultures, Goldsmiths, University of London (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), 198.
- ⁸ Forensic Architecture and Grupa Spomenik, "Living Death Camps," 198.
- ⁹ Blagojevic, *Novi Beograd: Osporeni Modernizam*, 59.
- ¹⁰ Waley, "From Modernist to Market Urbanism: the Transformation of New Belgrade," 209.
- ¹¹ Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *The Balkans in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9.
- ¹² Those at the forefront of the NAM, who were also its conceptual initiators, were the presidents of three countries: India's Jawaharlal Nehru as a mediator and moral force for peace; Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser who was against colonialism; and Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, a defender of national independence between the two blocks, establishing an independent and experimental brand of socialism called Titoism (communism and capitalism combined). When the NAM was formalised, two more presidents became synonymous with this Movement: Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Indonesia's Ahmed Sukarno.
- ¹³ See: Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice of Yugoslav Socialism* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
- ¹⁴ Waley, "From Modernist to Market Urbanism: the Transformation of New Belgrade," 217.
- ¹⁵ Currently, the island is an inaccessible strip measuring less than 300m in length and 60m in width.
- ¹⁶ Dragan Popovic, "Youth Labor Action (Omladinska Radna Akcija, ORA) as Ideological Holiday-Making," In *Yugoslavia's Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism (1950s-1980s)*, eds. Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor (Budapest: Central European Press, 2010), 279.
- ¹⁷ It is said that over 500,000 youth received a basic education in the ORA. Refer to: Popovic, "Youth Labor Action (Omladinska Radna Akcija, ORA) as Ideological Holiday-Making," 281.
- ¹⁸ Blagojevic, *Novi Beograd: Osporeni Modernizam*, 125.
- ¹⁹ Popovic, "Youth Labor Action (Omladinska Radna Akcija, ORA) as Ideological Holiday-Making," 279 – 280 and 289.
- ²⁰ Waley, "From Modernist to Market Urbanism: the Transformation of New Belgrade," 218.
- ²¹ Taylor and Grandits, "Tourism and the Making of Socialist Yugoslavia," 5.
- ²² John B. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), 164.
- ²³ Branislav Jakovljevic, "Human Resources: June 1968, Hair, and the Beginning of Yugoslavia's End," *Grey Room* 30 (2008): 40.
- ²⁴ Blagojevic. "New Belgrade: The Capital of No-City's Land".
- ²⁵ Milos R. Perovic, *Iskustva Prosloti / Experiences from the Past* (Beograd: Zavod za planiranje razvoja grada Beograda, 1985), 126.
- ²⁶ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 290 – 291 and 386 – 387. David N. Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009), 133.
- ²⁷ Sonia Hirt and Mina Petrovic, "The Gates of Belgrade: Safety, Privacy, and New Housing Patterns in the Post-Communist City," *Problems of Post-Communism* 57:5 (2010): 6, accessed May 10, 2014, www.spia.vt.edu/SPIA/docs/shirt/The_Gates_of_Belgrade.pdf.
- ²⁸ Waley, "From Modernist to Market Urbanism: the Transformation of New Belgrade," 221.
- ²⁹ William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees", *The American Presidency Project*, March 23, 1999, accessed September 1, 2011, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=57294&st=&st1>.
- ³⁰ William M. Arkin, "Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 56:3 (2000): 50.
- ³¹ Julian H. Tolbert, "Crony Attack. Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?" (Masters Dissertation, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Alabama 2006), v, accessed September 12, 2009, http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/t_0032_tolbert_crony_attack.pdf.
- ³² The Rambouillet Agreement was drafted by NATO in what was represented as a peace agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Albanian majority population in Kosovo and Metohija. Yugoslavia's refusal to sign the agreement – on the basis that it contained provisions for the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija – became a justification for NATO's air strikes.

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- ¹⁶ John Pilger, "Revealed: the amazing Nato plan, tabled at Rambouillet, to occupy Yugoslavia," *New Statesman*, 17 May, 1999, accessed May 10, 2011, <http://www.newstatesman.com/node/134770>.
- ¹⁷ Bryan Finoki, "The City in the Crosshairs: A Conversation with Stephen Graham (Pt.1)," *Subtopia: A Field Guide to Military Urbanism*, August 6, 2007, accessed June 15, 2009, <http://subtopia.blogspot.com.au/2007/08/city-in-crosshairs-conversation-with.html>.
- ¹⁸ Stephen Graham, "War and the City," *New Left Review* 44 (2007): 131 – 132.
- ¹⁹ Eyal Weizman, "The Evil Architects Do – Crimes of Urbicide and the Built Environment," *monu* 5: July (2006): 25, accessed April 22 2009, <http://www.monu.org/monu5/architectsDo.pdf>.
- ²⁰ Stephen Graham, "War and the City," *New Left Review* 44 (2007): 131 – 132.
- ²¹ Thomas L. Friedman also served as chief economic correspondent in the Washington bureau. Prior to that, he was the chief White House correspondent. In 2005, Friedman was elected as a member of the Pulitzer Prize Board.
- ²² Thomas L. Friedman, "Foreign Affairs; Stop the Music," *New York Times*, April 23, 1999, accessed January 16, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/23/opinion/foreign-affairs-stop-the-music.html>.
- ²³ Stephen Graham, "Disruption by Design: Urban Infrastructure and Political Violence," in *Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails*, ed. Stephen Graham, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 116.
- ²⁴ Paul Virilio, *Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles*, trans. Mark Polizotti (New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series, 1990), 64. Note: original text is in italics.
- ²⁵ Virilio, *Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles*, 90. Note: original text is in italics.
- ²⁶ Belgrade Security Forum Homepage, *BSF 2011*, accessed November 1, 2011, <http://2011.belgradeforum.org/about-forum/aboutbfd2011.html>.
- ²⁷ Zaklina Gligorijevic, "Can new Developments and City Identity grow in Harmony? – The Quest for a successful Public Space design for New Belgrade," in *Proceedings of 42nd ISoCaRP Congress 2006, Cities Between Integration and Disintegration, September 14 – 17, 2006*. Turkey: Yıldız Technical University, Faculty of Architecture, Department of City and Regional Planning, Barbaros Bulvari, Besiktas, accessed June 1, 2010, http://www.isocarp.net/Data/case_studies/831.pdf.
- ²⁸ Mina Petrovic, "Diversification of Urban Neighbourhood: The Case Study in New Belgrade," in *Proceedings of the International Conference on Sustainable Urban Areas, Rotterdam, 2007*, accessed June 16, 2010, http://www.enhr2007rotterdam.nl/documents/W14_paper_Petrovic.pdf.
- ²⁹ This fact is according to a study conducted under the aegis of the United Nations. Hirt and Petrovic, "The Gates of Belgrade: Safety, Privacy, and New Housing Patterns in the Post-Communist City," 3.
- ³⁰ Blagojevic, "New Belgrade: The Capital of No-City's Land."
- ³¹ Ljubica Gajevic, "New Belgrade urban fortunes: Ideology and practice under the patronage of state and market," (Masters Dissertation, University of Catalonia, Barcelona, 2011), 97 – 98, accessed September 10, 2012, upcommons.upc.edu/pfc/bitstream/2099.1/.../1/GAJEVIC_TESIS.pdf.
- ³² Meron Benvenisti et al. (conversation), "Jerusalem, Between Urban Area and Apparition, From a Multiethnic City to Nationalism? Jerusalem in the early twentieth century," in *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism*, eds. Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rienits (Basel: Birkhauser, 2006), 43.
- ³³ Michel Chossudovsky, "Economic Terrorism," *International Action Center*, 10 May 2001, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.iacenter.org/bosnia/yugo_ecoter.htm.
- ³⁴ *Serbia Today* writes that other notable tycoons include Milan Beko, Miodrag Kostic, Toplica Spasojevic, Zoran Drakulic and Slobodan Petrovic, May 8, 2010, accessed June 21, 2010, <http://serbiatodayeconomy.blogspot.com/2010/05/serbian-tycoons-have-no-property-in.html>. In December 2012, charges were filed against Miroslav Miskovic due to various disputed privatisation deals. More recently, Miskovic has been restrained from being able to travel outside the borders of Serbia. Interestingly, Serbia's Fond for Development has from 2007 – 2013 assigned \$12,000,000 to Miskovic's Delta Holdings. Law and economics seems to have been deployed in a discursive way. See: Organised Crime and Corruption Project, "Charges filed against Miroslav Miskovic," May 13, 2013, accessed May 21, 2013, <https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/1951-serbia-charges-filed-against-miroslav-miskovic->.
- ³⁵ The design for the tower's reconstruction also put forward a construction of an adjoining tower. Whilst the proposal was approved, the second tower has not been constructed as yet.
- ³⁶ Gajevic, "New Belgrade urban fortunes: Ideology and practice under the patronage of state and market," 96 – 97.
- ³⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, "Living Together in an Urban World," in *Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, ed. Stephen Graham (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 118.
- ³⁸ Waley, "From Modernist to Market Urbanism: The Transformation of New Belgrade," 212 and 229.
- ³⁹ Agerman, Frojdam and Gildji, *Beograd Gazela: Vodici kroz Sirotinjsko Naselje*, 42.
- ⁴⁰ Zygmunt Bauman, *Work, consumerism and the new poor* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1998), 84.
- ⁴¹ Agerman, Frojdam and Gildji, *Beograd Gazela: Vodici kroz Sirotinjsko Naselje*, 20.
- ⁴² Bojana Barlovac, "Reconstruction of Main Belgrade Bridge Kicks Off," *BalkanInsight.com*, 1 July 1 2010, accessed July 3, 2010, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/29160/>. Note: this bridge was not targeted in 1999.
- ⁴³ Barlovac, "Reconstruction of Main Belgrade Bridge Kicks Off."
- ⁴⁴ During NATO's 1999 campaign, Branko's Bridge was utilised as a platform to expose and challenge the national and international political inconsistencies of NATO's targeting of Belgrade. The people became human shields to protect the bridge from being targeted. This is despite the attempt to paralyse all movement and protests taking place in Belgrade's urban spaces (as suggested in this text by quoting Thomas L. Friedman). Arguably, the Romani below the Gazela bridge also shielded the bridge from destruction. During the 1999 Operation Allied Force, NATO destroyed twenty-four road and railway bridges and overpasses, and damaged another thirty-six. The destruction of some of these transport routes is peculiar considering that a number were located in Central and Northern Serbia, areas which are not in direct proximity to Kosovo and Metohija and not of obvious military significance. For example, three bridges were destroyed/damaged in Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina, Serbia's northern province.
- ⁴⁵ Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007), 173.

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- « Amnesty International, "Roma families in Belgrade face forced eviction by government agency," 2 November 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/roma-families-belgrade-face-forced-eviction-government-agency-2011-11-02>, accessed January 30, 2015.
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 - « "Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade Homepage," Master Plan of Belgrade 2021, October 2005, accessed September 12, 2011. http://www.urbel.com/cms_images/gup1.jpg.
 - « Gajevic, "New Belgrade urban fortunes: Ideology and practice under the patronage of state and market," 90–1 and 102. Also see: Igor Maric et al., "Transformation of the New Belgrade Urban Tissue: Filling the Space instead of Interpolation," *SPATIUM International Review* 22 (2010): 51, accessed June 12, 2012, <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1450-569X/2010/1450-569X1022047M.pdf>.
 - « Forensic Architecture and Grupa Spomenik, "Living Death Camps," 191.
 - « Forensic Architecture and Grupa Spomenik, "Living Death Camps," 191.
 - « Forensic Architecture and Grupa Spomenik, "Living Death Camps," 191.