PERFORMING THE SELF: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY AND PERFORMANCE

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PERFORMING THE SELF: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY AND PERFORMANCE.

by

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

PERFORMING THE SELF: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY AND PERFORMANCE

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MATTHEW THOMAS WELLINGS

This thesis sets out to examine the idea that self-identity can be coherently viewed as a performance event. If such a proposition is supportable, it would seem to argue for attention to be paid to the nature of the activity of performing as a means to better understanding the processes of human identity. Beginning with an analysis of an early example of such a theoretical position, this thesis examines some of the central issues involved in viewing the self as performative. The agenda dictating the direction of this analysis can be summarised as an effort to provide a model of the performative self that is affirmatory rather than negative; that establishes it as a positive, rather than debilitating, fact of existence. The construction of this model is achieved in large part by the adoption of the ontological outlook contained in the philosophy of Frederich Nietzsche which, it is argued, offers a reading of the nature of human identity that avoids the sometimes reductive elements of more contemporary theories such as post-structuralism. Allied to this elaboration of a theoretical model of the self is the recognition that the theory produced within and around radical theatre practice in the West over the last century can be seen as a field of activity that has consistently argued for, and experimented with, new conceptualisations of the constituent factors of human social identities. Because of this, such theatre writings are proposed as being genuinely potent political activities; ones which continuously seeks to extend, rather than reduce, the sphere of influence of individuals in society. The contribution this thesis makes to research in the field of theatre studies, then, is in the provision of a theoretical framework within which it becomes possible to see radical theatre as a paradigmatic site of liberatory activity.
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I should also like to acknowledge the help, advice and support given to me by my team of supervisors, namely Dr. Phil Terry, Dr. Sue Purdie and Dr. Osy Okagbue. It is likely that without their separate influences this work would not have been completed.

It seems to me that my reasons for undertaking this work were varied, and somewhat different from my reasons for completing it; but consistent over the whole period of research seems to be a continuing urge to understand in a fuller way the activity of performing.
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University award.

This study was partially funded with the aid of an award from the British Academy.

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INTRODUCTION.
INTRODUCTION.

This thesis sets out to provide a theoretical notion of the human self that is consistent with the radical approach to the matter underlying the work of avant-garde theatre in the West this century. It therefore offers, in effect, a fully theorized version of the type of conceptualisation that has been explored, developed, questioned, attempted and performed in such theatre. Its central assertion is double-edged: that such a notion of the self is important for an understanding of this type of performance, and that performance itself is important for an understanding of this notion of the self.

The intention is to present a schematic of this self that operates on two levels, asserting that the structuration of consciousness that is this 'self' is a secondary aspect of the human organism, which is founded primarily upon two basic 'building blocks' of identity - a 'capacity to learn' and a 'will to power'. This notion of the self presents it basically as a dynamic process that occurs within a more 'fixed' containing device. This containing device is characterised as 'innate', since it involves the presence of certain 'pre-conditions' of human existence, such as embodiment in a certain form, a basic psychic topography (a capacity to learn), and a particular dynamic trajectory (a will to power). All of these things are described as 'prior' by this thesis, and their determining function for human life is asserted, together with an insistence on their dialectical relationship to a given exterior world. The lived experience of human life as that of a 'cohesive, unitary self' is problematized, and revealed to be a 'secondary' phenomenon which has attached to, and grounded itself in, the basic structure of the prior factors of the human form. As Richard Foreman, the American theatre practitioner points out, "society
teaches us to represent our lives to ourselves within the framework of a coherent narrative, but beneath that conditioning we feel our lives as a series of multidirectional impulses and collisions." (in Drain [ed], 1995, p68). Psychic activity - self-consciousness - is described as basically performative in nature, meaning that it is viewed as having, metaphorically speaking, the same structure as might be found in any performance event. The energising factor of this 'performance event' of self-consciousness is described as 'agency', or 'creative agency'; and it is stated that without this 'force' the production of meaning would not occur. At its most basic level, the schematic of self presented here describes an energising force known as the will to power, which operates the 'instinct' of the capacity to learn and is contained within the psychic structuration known as the 'self'.

This basic schematic of the self is advanced and defended throughout the thesis, in order to test its coherence as a concept. This is done, as will become clear, since this version of what the 'self' is is viewed as allowing for more ambiguity and freedom of movement for the individual than those versions which emphasise notions such as innate 'character' or 'human nature'. In this way the thesis attempts to help the drive to avoid what Paul Kornfeld held to be the crime of Naturalism - its dependence on characterization and its subsequent 'imprisoning' of humanity "in the simplicity of an aphorism," (in Drain [ed], 1995, p258).

It is the contention of this thesis that the activity of making non-naturalistic theatre in the West over the last century generally exhibits a similar outlook to this. To return to Foreman once again, we might describe this outlook as a suspicion that "it might be desirable to reconstitute our very way of being," (in Drain [ed], 1995, p70). As Elizabeth Burns notes, it may well be the case that the theatre is particularly well suited as a medium to support this attempt at reconstitution:
The theatre is an innovative laboratory for the exercise of the capacity to transcend the personage - the reified typifications into which we may be trapped. It serves as a constant renewal of the claim to escape from a ritualized personage into other moods, different representations of oneself, (in George, 1986, p360).

The basic methodology of the thesis is that of the construction of a theoretical position that can cope with the radical problematizations of the notion of the 'self' offered by examples of post-structuralist theory, which is seen as that body of writing most sceptical towards traditional notions of the self, whilst at the same time showing how such a position can avoid a simultaneous reduction of the notion of agency.

This particular approach is taken, basically, to ensure that agency as a concept is not reduced beyond usefulness; and this agenda is, in itself, the result of a view that the fundamental structure of any performance event is founded on the ramifications of effective agency.

The underlying ontological position of the thesis as a whole is drawn from the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, who held that the aesthetic practice of the 'self' was a genuine site of liberatory practice for individuals (1). Therefore, whilst seeking, like post-structuralism, to dismantle the myth of the autonomous 'subject', he did not, at the same time, seek to reject the effects of individual agency.

Post-structuralist theory is represented within these pages by the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan; and through an analysis of their positions that is grounded in a Nietzschean perspective, a coherent notion of the self is developed that can support a notion of agency and operate effectively with a radical scepticism towards the notion of the self per se.
The thesis closes with an examination of how such an expanded and critical notion of the self is, as has been mentioned, that which has been, and is, operative in much of the theory produced within and around much of what might be termed 'radical' performance practice in the West over the past century.

Chapter One (The Performance Event) introduces the general field of inquiry, and sets forth a theoretical model for looking at performance that can operate with a problematized notion of the 'self', but still depends on a positive notion of creative agency. This chapter should be seen as advancing a set of hypotheses which it is the task of the remainder of the thesis to substantiate through a critical scrutiny of the assumptions it is based on.

Chapter Two (The Problematized, Performing Self) introduces the original notion of the self as 'performative' as advanced by Goffman, and conducts an early review of its radical import when compared to the post-structuralist conceptualisation of the matter, indicating why a more critical inquiry into the concept of 'subjecthood' might be needed, and where it might be aimed. It also introduces the basic schematic of the 'self' being adopted by this thesis, and begins to suggest where, and how, this conception might find itself in conflict with post-structuralist theorisations.

Chapter Three (The Problematized, Post-structuralist Self) is by far the largest and densest section of the thesis, and gives an overview of the nature of the critique of the notion of the 'self' found in post-structuralism by focusing first on the work of Michel Foucault, and then on the theory of Jacques Lacan. The analysis is worked around a defence of the basic schema of the 'self' advanced in the previous chapter, and conducted from within a Nietzschean perspective that deliberately critiques the findings of both writers on the matter of their affirmatory intent.

Chapter Four (The Problematized Self as a Performance Event) examines the Nietzschean concept of a 'will to power', adding it to the basic schema of the 'self'
advanced so far, and sets forth the positive pathways of action that Nietzsche believed were available to individuals as so described within the sphere of aesthetic activity, which are then seen to have been mirrored by a variety of Western theatre practitioners over the last thirty years and beyond.

The conclusion makes clear the radical import of the concept of the self developed within the thesis and argues for its suitability as a contemporary theoretical example of the notion of self underlying avant-garde theatrical practice in the West this century.
CHAPTER ONE.
The Performance Event.

To create space for the imagination, free space for the imagination to counter the imperialistic occupation of the imagination, and the killing of imagination by prefabricated clichés and the standards of the media. I believe this is a primary political responsibility, even when the content has nothing at all to do with political realities.

(Müller, 1990, p188).

Acting is the specialized practice of that state of experience that is constitutive of human psychical existence. It is the creation of a crafted form out of what is "shifting raw material, unformed and undefined" (Brecht, 1965, p54); and as such, it is defined by the basic structure of this 'raw material', which is that of a reflexive attention to itself. For this is a basic definition of performance - it is that state of being wherein one exhibits a state of reflexivity towards one's actions, as opposed to normative 'consciousness', where one experiences this state of reflexivity, but does not necessarily exhibit it. As Richard Schechner notes, "the evidence is accumulating that the only difference between 'ordinary behaviour' and 'acting' is one of reflexivity: professional actors are aware that they are acting" (in Schechner & Appel [eds], 1990, p30).

So, can it be stated that where there is a 'performance' there must necessarily be a distance between the doer and the thing done? In other words, is a reflexive attention always a part of any act of performance; and if it is, then how important is it? Is it possible to suggest that this notion of 'distance' in what can be called a performance might be an important one? And if this is the case, then why is this so?
To enable satisfactory answers to these questions to be forwarded here, it will be constructive to establish a basic structural framework within which the notion of performance can be contained for the purposes of the discussion (1).

This thesis formulates the basic model of performance along the following assumptions - any performance is based on a stable triadic structure; within this structure, movement of the elements is essentially fluid, dynamic, and relatively and potentially unfixed; and the idea of this structure begins to make less sense if too great a challenge is raised against the effectivity of 'creative agency' as a conceptual tool.

These assumptions can then be represented in three straightforward propositions:

1) A performance is necessarily an interactive dynamic relationship between three things: performer, audience and space.

2) The dynamic is that of the processes of meaning-production, processes that are in themselves 'performatives'.

3) The dynamic of performativity can be seen as centred around the notion that: identity is the performance of meaning, meaning is the performance of identity; and that meaning identifies a performance, whilst a performance means an identity.

The first of these propositions, obviously, gives us our framework for looking at 'performance', for it states that every performance must be an interaction between three things - a performer, a space and an audience.

Now, there is an important issue to be clarified here, concerning the distinction between those acts which can be termed 'performatives', and those that are 'performances'. The clue to the nature of the distinction is given by the words themselves. Both include the term 'perform', a term which can be seen to be descriptive of the same event as the theatrical term 'acting'; and, therefore, as this thesis defines it, both describe what is a state of
reflexivity towards one's actions. However, in the case of a 'performative' act, this reflexivity can be either a public or a private event, whilst in the case of a 'performance', it is always a public one. In other words, 'performativity' describes what is a state of being, whilst 'performance' describes a state of affairs in the world.

To clarify this point further, we can refer to the fact that one of the drives of Schechner's establishment of a body of 'performance theory' over the last twenty years has been directed towards the extension of the concept of performance on the level of the microcosmic, which has been complemented by Victor Turner's construction of the macrocosmic importance of performance through his theories of the 'social drama' (2). Schechner and Turner have attempted in their writings to establish a concept of performance that is an effective scholarly instrument across a range of disciplines, and to this end they have engendered and encouraged the notion of a discourse of 'performance theory'.

The problem this leads to, for Schechner at least, and the one which the explication of terms above was intended to resolve, is that it motivates Schechner to describe microscopic activity in the brain, and events such as the opening of the Berlin wall, with the term 'performance' since, for him, they both contain an element of 'performativity' (3). He himself states that the main question

is whether a performance generates its own frame, that is, is reflexive (self-conscious, conscious of its audience, the audience conscious of the performer being conscious of being a performer, etc.); or whether the frame is imposed from the outside

(in Schechner & Appel [eds], 1990, p28);

and, as the above quote indicates, it does not appear that he is arriving at an answer to the question as much as simply generating new questions.

If there are answers to be had, it may be that they
can be provided by the nature of the structure that is being used to describe what is a 'performance' here; for, as the schema states it, there must be present the three, physically distinct terms - performer, audience and space - for the designation 'performance' to apply. So, even if it is a fact that the nature of self-consciousness is that it is reflexive in the same way as acting is, unless the three terms of the proposition are present in a physically distinct sense, the experience remains nameable only as 'performative', not as a 'performance'. It is, clearly, of the same nature as a performance, but it is, nevertheless, not one.

It seems evident that, if there is confusion over this issue, it is because the activity under review can be constructively looked at as operating the same systematic structure as a performance, whether it is visibly recognisable as a performance or not.

It is a fundamental contention of this thesis that this apparent interchangeability of the two terms is due to the fact that the one event - performance - is the concrete representation in the material world of the basic structure of the human experience of life, that of 'performativity'. The fact that a state of reflexivity towards one's actions is described by both terms does not mean, however, that they are therefore usefully viewed as commensurate. If they are viewed thus, the all-pervasiveness of 'performativity' in the human world often leads to the idea that the concept of performance is as widespread also, which is simply not the case.

It might be of use here to note that a large part of the extension of the concept of performance that has taken place in the thirty years since Erving Goffman (1959) introduced it into mainstream academic discourse, can be traced precisely to this conflation of its target of reference with that of the notion of performativity; and likewise, this notion of performativity has itself benefited from a burgeoning interest, itself dependent on the post-structuralist problematization of the notion of
the self (4), in the 'performative' character of meaning.

The basic argument of this approach to meaning is to see that where there is a limit to meaning there is also a limit to the human world, and that the two things - meaning and humanly-produced meaning - are not only co-extensive but are in fact the same thing. In other words, the view of meaning as 'performative' rejects the notion of 'innate' meaning, of the 'thing-in-itself' in the world, which interacts with the senses of the observer to produce an overall meaning of what the thing is, and replaces it with the idea that any meanings that can be attached to a thing are the result of the enactment of the processes of meaning-production around it, and are contained entirely within that process, leaving the object itself untouched and unknown. Obviously, it follows from this that if there is meaning, there must also have been the performative process necessary to achieve and produce it. In light of this, it becomes logically possible to state that where there is human interaction and activity that is meaningful, there is always also present the dynamic provided by performativity.

Better still, make the spectators themselves the object of the spectacle; make them into the the actors so that each sees and loves his own image in the others and thus all will be better united


Rousseau asserts above that a powerful performance will occur when an audience member sees and loves his own image in the others, when he/she is made the active producer of the import of the spectacle, and when that import relates to an extension of the self. This mirrors the manner in which meaning is said to be produced by the contentions advanced just now, in that it relies on an act of 'projection' rather than mere reception.

It will be remembered here that the second and third of our three 'propositions' concerning the nature of the
performance event indicated an apparent acceptance of this portrayal of meaning as 'performative', and in fact characterized this performative nature of meaning as being the dynamic aspect of performance, since the triadic structure represented in the first proposition was, as was stated, really little more than a containing device. As Eugenio Barba notes, "the condition for the germination of meanings is the existence of a performer-spectator relationship" (Barba, 1995, p105).

Now, although they are not 'fixed', and are therefore capable of alteration and transformation, the three points of the triad of performer, audience and space are indissoluble to the extent that they must be present, and in some sense distinguishable from one another, in order for the event being described with them to continue being registered as a performance, rather than just as performative. It is not a harsh rule, but it is one nevertheless since, unless there is some general framework for the common recognition of what constitutes performances, there is little point in retaining the concept as a useful one. In other words, although not straightforwardly referential in the sense that they always represent the very same referenced things, the terms of the triad are used in a referential way to point to the material structure of the human activity under question. This is clearly not an argument for the unproblematic nature of the three terms involved, attempting to suggest that the concepts 'performer', 'audience' and 'space' are finished and fixed entities always existing in the world; but it is a recognition of the fact that, in any event wanting to be accepted as a performance, there will, necessarily, be present the three points of the triad. Without this ability to have its elements subsumed within the structuration imposed by this performance triad, and to be seen to contain the elements that are referenced by its three terms, an event remains, for this thesis, not validly recognisable as a performance, even though it may be justifiably named as performative. In other words, the
performance triad is a methodological tool, relying on direct referentiality for its effectiveness which, as will become apparent, is a definite theme in the overall theoretical approach of this thesis.

In some senses, the other propositions in the trinity presented operate with a different theoretical emphasis, involving themselves with the characteristics of relativisation to an extent that the initial proposition does not. This is a result of their emphasis on performativity, which is nothing if not pure dynamic. As Hilton (1987) notes, the very nature of performance as a dialectic between being and representing means that "theatre is an analogue to the natural scientific concept of relativity" (p31). This performance dynamic, the energy produced by this 'dialectic', rests entirely on what might be called a necessary distance from the self.

It is around this issue that some interesting points begin to appear. For example, we have already seen how meaning can be advanced as being tied to 'performativity', and how both things can be seen as co-extensive and defining of the human world. It is possible now to add that performativity is a defining feature of the human world because it, in fact, describes what is a defining feature of human identity - a critical distance from the self. In other words, the structure of self-consciousness, with its distance from its object of attention - the self - is never anything but performative. Performativity is the central structure of the human experience of life. If this were not so, the world, it can be stated, would remain largely meaningless.

If we take a closer look at the nature of the 'performance dynamic' here, which my second proposition suggests can be found in the processes of meaning-production, it might help to clarify the point being made here.

The term 'performance dynamic' describes the active event of the production of meaning within the structure of the triad of performer, space and audience. It links
directly to the statements of the third proposition, and asserts the existence of an exchange of some sort between two of the points in the triad, the performer and the audience. As such, it accepts the relativity inherent in the conception of meaning as performative presented earlier, but works to contain it within a model that installs a notion of exchange between two distinct agencies. This is a crucial point, since it is on the back of this conceptualisation that the approaching defence of the ramifications of agency is mounted; and it is because of this representation of performance as an exchange between two referential points that a positive notion of dialogue, of social existence, can be asserted. This is why it is crucial to separate the notion of performativity from that of performance. The former represents a monologic existence, whilst the latter upholds the possibility of dialogue; and, as Lacan suggests, this is important because "in itself, dialogue seems to involve a renunciation of aggressivity" (Lacan, 1977, p12).

The drive within post-structuralism to discredit this sort of reliance on referentiality is a direct result of a desire to disturb what has been seen as the falsely established hierarchical structure of meaning, where meaning is viewed as flowing in one direction only, from the performer or author to the audience or reader. This is seen as placing audiences as the recipients in a communication model based on a simple sender-receiver schema (5), which supposedly asserts that the performer produces a series of actions that it is the job of the audience to interpret 'correctly', so that they might then glean the meanings from the performance that the performer intended them to. The possible parallels between this presentation of the performance event and the view of meanings as being 'innate' in things should be clear here. In opposition to this, post-structuralist theory has moved to wrest the means of production of the processes of meaning-generation from the hands that previously held them (the authors, performers, directors and so on), and
redistribute the potential wealth of these means amongst all participants in the event. Thus, the interpretive gaze has been re-described as unlimitedly active and capable of generating unlimited meaning, unless coerced to contain and compromise itself by old structures of authorial dominance, or, as Foucault called this function of the author, "the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning" (in Rabinow [ed], 1986, p119) (6). An early example of this type of approach to the interpretive gaze operating in Western theatre practice is discussed by Fischer-Lichte (1995) where, analyzing Reinhardt's 1910 production "Sumurun", she notes how it was constructed with the knowledge that the spectators' processes of reception depend on the subjectively determined conditions of each spectator and, thus, differ from spectator to spectator. Not only does the process of reception turn out to be a process of production but each spectator brings forth her/his own performance. The process of reception is realized as a subjective construction of reality (p102).

It is, then, the effectivity of agency that decides the specific functioning and particulars of a 'performance dynamic', which itself is the possibilities for the restriction, relaxation, containment, challenging and general mastery of the processes of meaning-production by the participants in the performance event. As Fischer-Lichte puts it, "theatre turns out to be a field of experimentation where we can test our capacity for and the possibilities of constructing reality" (p104). For the performer, the point of the performance is to display (directly, indirectly, deliberately, ironically, spontaneously and so on) his or her mastery of whatever aspects of the processes of meaning-production that he or she is involved with; and, depending on the form of the performance event, the audience member's mastery can range
from an enjoyment of aesthetic coding, to active participation, following of plotline, constitution of an interpretation and so on. Without the effectivity of agency, as can be seen, the notion of performance would generally be reduced beyond worth.

So far, then, there has been proposed here the existence of a structure for any performance which requires that there be present at the same time something that can be named 'performer', something that can be named 'audience', and something that can be named 'space'. Once this triad has been constituted, it has then been suggested that there will operate between these points a 'performance dynamic', which is a more fluid entity than the tied structuration of the triad, and denotes whatever particular practices are in occurrence that represent the general mastery of the processes of meaning-production by the participants of the performance event. This dynamic can range from the total dispersal of meaning into ambiguity right through to the recognition of strict codes and narratives of more formalistic performance events. The fluidity of this performance dynamic is inscribed by the nature of the performance itself and its internal attitude to its position as a producer of meaning. Generally speaking, the performers and audiences of a particular culture have available to them the semiotic resources that constitute their own cultural form. A culture's semiotic resources are taken to be the entire range of meanings, and the means to produce them, that are available at any one time in that culture; and as such they are never in a point of stasis, being in continuous interaction with other cultures and new developments in their own. This means that in any performance situation, the range of meanings that can be produced by, from, because of, and within it are largely malleable and generally incalculable, unless the performance is an example of one of the more formulaic types, whose purpose is the enactment of certain codes according to certain traditions; and even then, the range of meanings that will be generated across the audience base
can be seen as, to some extent, undefinable in advance, since the specific inclinations and resources of the individual audience members will act on the processes of meaning-production in essentially incalculable ways (7).

Obviously, this is a situation well known to any practitioner of performance, whose job is to edit, refine, manipulate and structure the raw materials of meaning to the end of constructing a piece that offers a certain range of meanings as opposed to others. Without this process of deliberate selection from the available semiotic resources, it is difficult to know what the point of a practitioner might be. As Sergei Eisenstein commented in 1926, the point of performance is the effort at "the moulding of the audience in a desired direction" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p88). In other words, to retain the idea of performance as an expressive activity, as a craft, as a practice that can be learnt and developed and achieved by focusing on certain things over others, it is fundamentally insensible to remove the notion of agency. Without the possibility of being able to effect the range of meanings likely to be developed by the audience on watching a performance, it is difficult to know why any performance practitioner would bother to continue working at all. The point here is that it is the effectivity of the agency of both performer and audience that constitute the particular character and dimension of any particular performance dynamic. Foucault, again, is clear about the ramifications of this "form of culture in which fiction would not be limited by the figure of the author." It would be, as far as he is concerned,

pure romanticism...to imagine a culture in which the fictive world would operate in an absolutely free state, in which fiction would be put at the disposal of everyone and would develop without passing through something like a necessary or constraining figure

(in Rabinow [ed], 1986, p119).
However, we have a third proposition to discuss yet, which states that the dynamic of performativity, what we have been calling the 'performance dynamic', can be centred around the notions that - identity is the performance of meaning, and meaning is the performance of identity; whilst a performance means an identity, and an identity means a performance. What might these statements be supposed to be suggesting?

Their function is to indicate several things. Firstly, that 'identity' is defined and structured in the same way as 'meaning'; and secondly that, essential to both of these things (which are in fact one thing) are the notions of performativity and performance (which, in fact, centre around one term, agency).

So what does it mean to say that 'meaning' and 'identity' are in fact one thing? It actually means little more than that what an identity is, whether it be the identity of a thing or a person, is what that thing or person means or, more accurately, is taken to mean. The identity of any thing is the meaning that it has for whatever is attempting to identify it. This is because, for every thing that registers at all in the human world (in other words, that has a meaning, even if that meaning is defined as a lack of meaning - for example, a void, a vacuum, nonsense and so on), the closest one could come to obtaining the complete identity of the thing would be to access every meaning that has ever been, and will ever be, attached to it at any time, for there is no sense in speaking of the identity of a thing without referencing what the thing is taken to mean (8).

Most things, of course, operate in the social realm and are commonly identified since what they mean has already been prescribed; and this is one of the functions of theatrical or performance space - as a potential site for the examination of the meanings that have been attached to things by the society, and as an opportunity to ponder why this might be so, and possibly to act as a disruptive influence (9). As Howard Barker (1989) puts it, "the task
of theatre is not to produce cohesion or the myth of solidarity but to return the individual to himself. Not, 'We must act!' but 'Are we thus?' (p20).

So, what is it that might be said to constitute identity, then? Where does it 'rest'? With the thing itself? Or in the public realm of the recognition of the thing for the thing that it is? (10)? And if this last is the case, and the locus of identity of any thing is outside of itself, is there any point of speaking of 'innate' identity? What might this imply for the notion of identity when applied to human beings? Are people simply the sum of meanings that are attached to them by themselves and others?

It might be helpful here if we go back to the notion of the 'thing-in-itself' that we touched upon earlier. In that earlier reference, I mentioned that an aspect of the relativisation of the processes of meaning-production was its reliance on a rejection of the notion of referentiality, of a level of reality that is outside of discourse. In the rejected theory, the world is proposed as 'objectively', 'innately' meaningful, but overlaid with the relativities of specific cultural locations, and is described as that level of reality that grounds the particulars of any act of evaluation or interpretation of the world. It is this same schematic - again problematised in post-structuralism - that represents the individual as having a 'real self', which is seen as somehow 'secreted behind', and directive of, the public 'expressions' of the individual. This 'real self' is, like the 'objective' world, that level of the thing that is held to be 'true', and therefore acts as a foundation (11).

However, accepting this simplified formulation of the notion of the self of an individual tends to mean that performative acts, and the concept of performance itself, are registered as 'indirect', and therefore less-than-complete or honest expressions of the self. This is a direct result of locating the 'truth' of the individual as somehow exterior to his or her performative acts; and is a
logical consequence of installing the 'ego' as a cohesive, unified entity beyond the reach of the effects of discourse. This notion of the self does the concept of performance a disservice by implying that where there is a distance between the self and its actions there is, necessarily, a lack of integrity about the acts of 'expression'. In other words, using such a conceptualisation of identity necessarily installs a value-system that locates performative acts as somehow more false than acts which are directly expressive of this mythological 'self'. It is, therefore, a schematic that is based on the false assumption that there are meaningful acts that are not in structure performative. In fact, it is the problems raised by a dualistic understanding of human beings that is being discussed here and again, this is an issue that has troubled Western theatre practitioners this century as they have searched for the 'authentic' in performance. Logie (1995) states that this search has focused on the body, and that it has encountered the problems automatically installed by a dualistic approach -

Some theories on expressive movement for actors have been published, but the discussion has tended to be confused and confusing. Hardly surprising, since the subject is the complex philosophical question of the relationship between mind and body.

(p255).

Such problematics can be approached differently, however. The description already given here of how meaning and identity are co-extensive and co-determinant, which explained how the generation and operation of the processes of meaning-production are always performative, is one such attempt to do so. The fact that this structuring of the matter represents, in fact, a structuring similar to that of self-consciousness means that human identity can possibly be seen as itself constituting a performance triad with the three points - performer, space, and audience -
all present in the sense of a metaphor. This notion of consciousness places performativity as necessarily inescapable, and relies on the acceptance of the distancing function of self-consciousness from its objects of attention (including its own 'self').

Now, if we focus again on the last of our initial propositions, we can see that if the possibility of innate meaning is removed from all things, then clearly nothing will register as meaningful unless it is made to do so, since it loses the ability to impress itself on consciousness in any meaningful way under its own power. For a thing to be meaningful, then, and therefore to have an 'identity' attached to it, the active consciousness of the individual must operate the processes of meaning-production around it.

Any theatre practitioner knows that the attachment of codes, or values, or meanings to any object is socially prescribed, but not fixed. As Peter Brook (1987) says, "man is more than what his culture defines" (p129). Any individual at any time can attach any meanings to any object, but in doing this he/she will inevitably always have access to only those cultural semiotic resources that are available to him/her at the time. No individual exists in an entirely alternative world, full of objects and entities that are held nowhere else in the culture, although he or she may indeed not operate their classificatory abilities in the 'usual' way.

So, presuming there are no innate meanings in things to dictate or at least be determinant to a degree of what the things are taken to mean, individuals must make the world meaningful by activating the stimulant dynamic supplied by the processes of meaning-production, which they will have acquired through socialisation in their culture. If this schematic is accurate, then it is impossible to describe the processes of meaning-production without utilising a notion of performativity. Following from this, it is unlikely that the activation of these processes could be achieved without the effectivity of agency. Identity
and meaning are always performed; and this, once again, is why it makes no sense to evaluate performative acts as somehow less valuable than acts that aren't performative. It is these acts themselves, and not some primary 'cohesive self' regulating them from the 'inside', that constitute the nature and extent of the identity of the person in question.

Agency - performativity - would appear to be the determinant factor in all this, and it might be interesting to finish with a brief description of what is meant by the term here.

Agency, the effectivity of which is the characterising feature of the individuality that can be traced in any collected examples of meaning-production from one source - one person - is two things: the ability to operate with some level of mastery the available processes of meaning-production to achieve acts of 'expression'; and the general trajectory of this operation, prescribed by the desires and drives of the individual in question. It is specifically in the field of the operation of agency that the activity of performance takes place, and it is specifically on the capacities of agency that performance is focused. As Brecht states it, the reason for theatre is "to put living reality in the hands of living people in such a way that it can be mastered" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p189).

We have, then, a concept of performance that relies on the effectivity of agency. What we need to do now is develop this concept further: what is the ability to operate the processes of meaning-production, and how can we describe the 'general trajectory of the drives and desires of the individual'? The next chapter begins an analysis of the concept of the self that attempts to answer these questions.

To conclude this chapter, we can summarise as follows: performativity describes the human state of self-consciousness, and defines the extent and nature of both meaning and identity; performance spaces, with their separation of performer and audience in a special space,
are the objectifications of this base structuration of experience, ones which, as the remainder of this thesis will argue, make manifest in material reality the basic form of human psychic existence.
CHAPTER TWO.
The Problematized, Performing Self.

Peoples were the creators at first; only later were individuals creators. Indeed, the individual himself is still the latest creation,

(Nietzsche, 1961, p85).

Post-structuralist theory is often seen as being largely concerned with the abolition of the 'subject' as 'founding principle', as the originary point of meaning in the world (1). Its aim in this is to replace this conception with a new one, which has become known as the notion of the 'de-centred' self (2) - a self which no longer occupies a central position in the process of the construction of the world as meaningful, but is instead dispersed, seen now as the result, not the cause, of the structuring principles of language. The motivation behind this attempt to transform the way that identity is conceptualised would seem to be of a not only radical, but a radically political, nature (3).

[Political revolution cannot be fulfilled until the very character structures inherited from the older, pre-revolutionary society, and reinforced by its instinctual taboos, have been utterly transformed,

(Jameson, 1977, p346).

As we saw in the introduction, the attempt to challenge historical notions of identity is present throughout radical theatre writing in the West, and can be seen in a range of texts produced by practitioners, from Kornfeld's 1918 call to escape "the cult of reality" via Expressionism (in Drain [ed], 1995, p258), to Artaud's demand that man "fearlessly makes himself master of the unborn" (1970, p6), through to Grotowski's performances, "conceived as a combat against traditional values" (1969, p90). All these practitioners, and many others besides, were clearly attempting to re-examine and re-formulate what it was that was defined as reality, and what it was that constituted identity. What follows below is a tracing out of how this
what it was that constituted identity. What follows below is a tracing out of how this problem of identity has been approached in the realm of theory in recent years.

Generally, allowing for the many guises in which the theory can be presented, it is broadly describable as materialist, meaning that it rejects the notion that there is some essence within things which transcends the material level of life; which is an approach that is similar to the conceptualisation of meaning outlined in the introduction.

**Early performance theory and the notion of the self.**

Performances 'take place' all along the continuum from brain events to public events of great spatial and temporal magnitude,

(Schechner, 1990, p32);

Featherstone (1991) points to the emergence of the notion of a 'performing self' around the turn of the twentieth century, as a new emphasis on 'personality' replaced the old concern with 'character' (4).

This new type of scrutiny held the 'self' to be, in essence, a performance, a performative ritual; and it gave rise to a body of theory - performance theory - capable of, and willing to, argue for its discreteness from the other disciplines concerned with the social behaviour of man, such as sociology and anthropology (5). Nowadays, as the above quote from Schechner intimates, it sees its field of inquiry as covering all, not just the obviously 'performed', aspects of social existence. Everything that happens is seen as in some sense 'performative', and not to be taken as necessarily revealing of the 'real'. Many writers within
performance theory believe this expansion of their field of inquiry is due to the fact that the conceptual tools being developed by them, their way of looking at things, is crucially relevant to the current drive by bodies of theory such as post-structuralism to transfigure the received notions of selfhood. The subject’s life in the meaningful world of discourse has come increasingly to be seen - at least in most performance theory - as essentially a matter of performance.

Now, this is not the simple viewing of performance as the thing in which people engage for specific, probably public, situations, when it is required that they present a ‘front’ to the world (which it is assumed is different from ‘who they actually are’). It is, as Wilshire (1990) explains, the conceptualization of performance as a fundamental element of the constitution of identity, whether that identity is at the time of a consciously performed nature or not:

There is, then, a particle of fictionality within the very actuality of human life. It is, moreover, a vastly important particle, for we do not have our nature set in advance, determined mainly by instinct; it must be formed through a kind of ‘performance’....'Performance', with its ineliminable particle of fictionality, is essential to our actuality as selves.

(p174).

This extension of the notion of performance is at the same time a reduction of the credence given to prior notions of the self which rely on a schematic containing the ‘ego’ (the real self) and the roles/masks/fronts that this ego ‘puts on’ for various reasons and with varying degrees of success. The idea that individuals have public and private ‘selves’, the one an authentic core which determines the structure of the other, has found itself under attack as ‘performance theory’ has disregarded the old constraints that reserved for it a function of designation of events only in the public realm and invaded the private life of the subject to
stake its claim for existence there too. The 'ego' - once complete in itself and sealed off from scrutiny (at least by the methodology of performance) - has been toppled from its directorial chair to find that what it once thought to be outside of it is now a part of it. That the ego 'plays parts' is accepted, but it is only a part of the playing of those parts. It does not exist in some exterior dimension to its roles, but is itself simply a role.

A landmark text in this enlargement of the notion of what constitutes a performance, and also in the separating off of performance theory as an identifiable discipline, is Erving Goffman's *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*, (1959), which set out to describe the nature of this 'performing self'. It is an early entry in the development of the concept of 'performativity', and this is evident in the extent to which a simple sender/receiver model of social communication operates to ground the analysis (7).

Goffman does, in fact, go no deeper into the primary motivating impulses of the 'performer' and his actions than to suggest that they are 'psychobiological' in nature (p246); although, to be fair, the task he set himself was the description of the structures of social interaction, not the exploration of the ontological reasons behind them. It is clear, though, that the analysis of what might be termed 'performative effects' - the actions of 'subjects' in the social world - is necessarily compromised by this exclusion of the principal forces ultimately responsible for their particular structuration. This means, basically, that Goffman settles for a public/private characterization of the 'self' much like the version discussed above, as is explicit in statements such as the following: "The expressive coherence that is required in performances points out a crucial discrepancy between our all-too-human selves and our socialised selves," (p63). This approach almost inevitably leads him to regard the ego
as a somehow ‘transcendent’, self-contained entity, undertaking the performances it requires to achieve fulfilment of its aims. The extent to which any individual invests his energies in a particular performance is therefore, for Goffman, a matter of personal choice throughout, being decided by the specific needs of that individual, so that “we often find that the individual may deeply involve his ego in his identification with a particular part, establishment, and group” (p236). This depth of involvement is, says Goffman, not always to be recommended, since the individual must remain “affectively dissociated from his presentation in a way that leaves him free to cope with dramaturgical consistencies as they arise” (p210).

Clearly, this seems to imply a schema of the self that states that it is the transcendent ego of the subject which is the director of all the performances it produces, so that if the proper distance is maintained, then the competent execution of the performance is more likely to be achieved. As has been indicated above, this is the type of picture of the self in action that post-structuralist theory has sought to dismiss, by advancing an alternative picture which places the self as dispersed within the meanings it forms a part of. In this version the subject is not a director at all, but an element of what is directed. Goffman does, however, seem to begin to problematise the notion of a coherent ‘inner’ self to some extent towards the close of his text. In a series of speculations, he begins to sketch the outlines of a ‘performing self’ that seems to move beyond the form of the self so disparaged by post-structuralism. This ‘performing self’, he argues, “does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene of his action, being generated by that attribute of local events that renders them interpretable by witnesses” (p244). The performer in this new schema is not the site of the self, “for he
and his body merely provide the peg on which something of a collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time." (p245); and it would therefore be a mistake to see this performer as the origin of the self that he performs. In this new formulation, it is the audience that imputes a self to the performer as a result of his successful manipulation of the elements of 'selfhood', and so this self is "a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it" (p245). In fact, it is only a matter of illusion, or rather shared 'suspension-of-disbelief', that "the firm self accorded each performed character will appear to emanate intrinsically from its performer" (p245).

It would seem in this that the kernel of the public/private schematic, the transcendent ego, is, in a manner comparable to that evident in post-structuralist theory, being offered up to the disseminating forces of meaning-making and revealed in its dissolution as simply a construction of social processes. An important distinction between the two approaches, though, is that Goffman emphasises the fact that the individual nevertheless retains a level of causality within these social processes; which is an aspect of the existence of the individual that is generally subject to reduction in post-structuralist readings. In effect, despite his problematization of the notion of the self, Goffman reserves a function for the creative agencies of his 'performers'.

The self, then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited,' (p245).

What Goffman moves towards describing in these assertions is a version of the self that seems similar
to the problematized conception offered by post-structuralist theory, and it is perhaps possible to suggest in light of this that he therefore provided the seeds which later performance theory was to germinate in order to provide itself with the notion of the self as 'pure performativity' that we have already encountered.

Perhaps, then, Goffman needs to be seen simply as having been happy to leave blank what post-structuralism has been intent to fill in - the 'essence' at the centre of this self. In a sense, as has been mentioned, to judge Goffman on his own agenda would be to grant that he characterises with some insight the processes by which the social actor seeks to be successfully received and the obstacles that can be encountered in this. For example, the anti-rationalist drive of post-structuralist philosophy would have no argument with the description Goffman gives of a 'social establishment' (read 'discourse') as "any place surrounded by fixed barriers to perception" (p231) This fixing of reality, Goffman says, limits the possibilities of credible ways of expression for the self and apparently is, "there are grounds for believing... a natural development in social organisation," (p37); and Lacanian theorists would, as we shall see, be happy to accept the statement that "underlying all social interaction there seems to be a fundamental dialectic" (p45), concerning the need to recognise and be recognised. However, it is with Goffman's positive description of each performance as "an expressive rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the moral values of the community" (p45), that the difference in radical intent between his project and post-structuralism's does become clear, since this constant re-inscription of the status quo is specifically what is critiqued by the latter. This use of the dynamics of identity-formation by the societal systems of normative regulation is also, as we have already touched upon, the reason for the attacks upon normalised identity that are found within radical theatre writings. Instead of
seeking to re-affirm the moral values of society at large, such writings generally attempt to de-stabilize or challenge them.

So, whilst it could be said that the foundation for a perhaps more radical critical project is there in Goffman, it might also be said that it is not built upon to any great extent; and therefore his theory remains, in the best scholastic tradition, non-interventionist. This is interesting because his field of inquiry is clearly so close to someone like Lacan's, and yet the end result can be read as much less incisive. This disparity in critical force between the two approaches seems to stem from the extent of the problematization of the notion of self practised by both parties. In his own words, Goffman set out to simply 'look at' "the individual's own belief in the impression of reality that he attempts to engender in those among whom he finds himself," (p28); whereas it is precisely this process of the self's relation to itself that is the object not only of attention, but also of deconstruction, in the Lacanian project.

So, although the notion of the self found in early performance theory such as Goffman's shares similar concerns with post-structuralist conceptions of identity, it is generally less radically motivated.

It will be helpful now to move deeper into the intricacies of what is involved in constructing a notion of the self, since this will enable a clarification of the initial sketch that we have analyzed in Goffman. This is likely to require that the nature of the discussion will become somewhat more abstract and a good degree more dense. It should be remembered, therefore, that what is being undertaken is simply the exploration in the discourse of contemporary theory of the same object of inquiry - the self - that has consistently been explored in many aspects of the discourse of radical theatre over the last century.
Problematizing the Self.

How is it best to approach 'filling in the gaps' in Goffman's theory of self-identity?

Using a selective dredging technique on Goffman's text, with the nets set to hold only the fleeting and indirect descriptions of the primary processes of the self that we are after - not the specific performances of the self, but the driving force behind them - will perhaps allow us to gather enough partial shapes and semi-forms to be able to construct at least an outline of what this primary self looks like to Goffman. We already know from him that the motivations of the performing self are "psychobiological in nature" (1959, p246); but now a closer look reveals that they are joined to "a capacity to learn" (p245), which is, Goffman tells us, innate. This 'capacity' is described as actually a natural predicative ability, which leads people to "rely on assumptions as to the persistence and generality of psychological traits as a means of predicting...present and future behaviour" (p13). Goffman's individuals then apparently use this ability, together with their memories of formere similar situations, to gauge the potential risks and benefits of the various events they take part in. That they do take part, despite what is apparently a constant risk of failure, is due to the fact that it is, as we have seen, fundamentally important to be credited as a successful performer. The self as Goffman presents it must have recognition from others in order to feel complete; and this recognition is sought out in performative interaction with others, which involves the self in a "fundamental dialectic" (p241). The context of operation for this 'dialectic' is the social world in which the self seeks to meet its needs, a place "surrounded by fixed barriers to perception" (p37).
This fixing of reality, Goffman says, limits the possibilities of credible ways of expression for the self and apparently is, "there are grounds for believing...a natural development in social organisation" (p37).

We have only to think of the efforts made by theatre practitioners to extend the possible ways of seeing the world to recognise the conservative nature of that last assertion. As Heiner Muller (1990), the radical East German playwright puts it: "The horrifying thing for me in this is the occupation of the imagination by cliches which will never go away. The use of images to prevent experiences, to prevent the having of experiences," (p165).

To contend, as Goffmann seems to above, that the delimiting of reality and identity is the result of a natural process tends to deny the possibility of alternatives. As we shall see, the starting point for radical theatre practice, and for theory such as Foucault's, is the belief that the social regulation of identity is far from being a natural phenomenon.

If we were to sum up Goffmann's portrayal of the primary level of human identity at this point, we could say that it is a picture of the human organism as a psychobiological 'thing', capable of learning by inference and desiring of recognition by others, that utilises the naturally-given possibilities of expression to gain the recognition that it needs in order to survive. Where does such a description lead us? And is it possible to clarify the terms involved to any greater degree?

**The Will to Power and the capacity to learn:**

[The capacity to acquire knowledge is the most important 'organ' of the body,

(Lash, in Featherstone et al, 1991, p270).]
It will be helpful to the discussion at this point to accept Goffman’s formulation of the self for a while, and to then accept it as having primary and secondary characteristics. Secondary in this schema would be the desire for recognition; whilst the description of the psychobiological nature of the self, and its capacity to learn, would be termed primary.

The analysis of the post-structuralist conception of the self developed below presents the self as following the same framework as Goffman’s although, as will become clear, there is some argument to be undergone before this can be asserted with any weight.

The first of Goffman’s primary features, the ‘psychobiological’ drive, will be postulated by this thesis as an innate ‘Will to Power’ - a term drawn from the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. This will to power is regarded as being inseparably joined to what might be termed the ‘innate capacities’ of the human form - those aspects of its form which make its expression and fulfilment at all possible. This will to power is therefore, in terms of the structure of the self just proposed, a primary rather than a secondary characteristic of identity. A major example of an ‘innate’ capacity is what Goffman termed the ‘capacity to learn’; and other examples would be the capacity to move, capacity to feel and so on. All of these features of the human form are primary attributes. The capacity to learn, it will be remembered, was presented by Goffman as a dialectic that operates between individual memory and new experience, thereby engendering the possibility of inferential deduction, which is its basic method of operation.

So, underway here is the construction of a theoretical model of the human form that presents it as consisting of primary and secondary characteristics. Up
to this point, we have a conception of that basic form as consisting centrally - in terms of psychic structure - of the two basic building blocks of a will to power and a capacity to learn. The 'blocks' will be dealt with in reverse order in the discussion to come.

Now, we have already seen how Goffman elucidates the capacity to learn no further in his text than stating that it is there, that it is of a certain fundamental character, and that it must be innate because it is something that everybody has. It might be helpful here, then, to seek out a body of theory that achieves what might be regarded as a more rigorous examination of this characteristic of human identity.

David Best is a writer whose philosophical project can be described as of the Wittgensteinian school (8). A major aspect of the conceptual framework that Wittgenstein developed in his philosophy was a concerted attack on the notion of a 'private' self that expressed its own unique thoughts through the medium of language but was otherwise invisible to public scrutiny (9). This critique was encapsulated in what has become known as the 'private language' argument, of which Best's work is a development. (Hopefully, it is clear that, as such, his work centres on, and scrutinizes, the type of dualistic notions of selfhood that were touched on in Chapter One). Philosophy and Human Movement (1978), for example, is an attempt to demonstrate that the expressivity of dance is not due to the fact that movements express the inner emotions of the dancer, but is instead the result of the fact that the movement and the expression are the same thing - the insertion of a space between them is simply the inscription of a dualism where none exists (10). In other words, it might be said that Wittgensteinian philosophy is 'materialist' in the sense that it seeks to remove the need to refer to some inner essence or self in the attempt to understand the public utterances of individuals. It takes this stance because it
understands that the idea that language expresses the pre-formed 'thoughts' of subjects will inevitably install a divide between what it is that can be thought and what is, after this, expressible in language. This is seen to necessarily posit an 'identity' that is prior to the public medium of its expression, and it is this idea exactly that Wittgenstein, and therefore Best, are concerned to debunk in their writings. In doing so, it is surely not difficult to see how they might offer new conceptual tools to those involved in the critique of traditional notions of identity, whether the method of critique is the creation of theoretical writings or the development of theatrical practices. They are an instance of what Muller (1990) terms the effort to dismantle the "prefabricated cliches" of identity (p188).

Best introduces his work as building on Wittgenstein's later philosophy, where language is presented as "a development from, sometimes replacing, various ways in which human beings instinctively act and respond" (1985, p3). This conception of language includes the view that "language itself is a network of forms of behaviour, but it is underlain by pre-linguistic behaviour" (p3). In following through the logic of the 'private language' argument, Best uses his texts to develop the notion of language as a response just as immediate as instinctual actions, and therefore not productively viewed as indicative of a distance between experience and its 'expression'.

Of particular interest to this thesis is Best's formulation of the process through which the individual acquires linguistic capability. For example, he states that "the change from non-linguistic to linguistic behaviour consists in the learning of different behaviour" (p3). This may seem a statement so undemandingly obvious as to seem of little consequence perhaps; but it is pulled from its context and held up here because it represents the first mention of a
capacity to learn in another theory since we moved on from discussing Goffman. Best then goes on to explain after this how the act of 'learning' is based on certain 'natural responses' "which are instinctive, and to which appeal must be made for any learning to be possible" (p3). For Best, these 'natural responses' are absolutely fundamental to human development, since "unless there were something which humans just do, some innate, instinctive response, there would be nothing to which learning could appeal, nothing on which reason could get a grip" (p4).

There are, according to Best, two main examples of these 'natural responses', which are the innate capacities that underly learning. The first of these capacities is 'induction', and the second is the notion of the 'reactive attitude'. Best describes how induction 'hooks onto' the (already present) human 'expectation of continuation', and this means that the innate human capacity of induction can be seen as "rooted in the instinctive expectation, revealed in immediate ways of acting and responding, that things will continue in the future as they have in the past" (p4). The 'reactive attitude', Best goes on to say, "consists in the ways we act and respond to other people" (p8); and it is "an essential part of understanding other people and living in a society...[because]...it gives sense to the notion of reasons in relation to them" (p9). It is, he says, "ultimate, in that it is not underlain by reason or hypothesis" (p9).

Now, of the two notions being discussed here, this one seems to be somewhat the weaker, since it does appear to be edging towards a description, much like Goffman's, of social structures as naturally engendered; because of this, it is not adopted here as being able to add anything useful to the position being developed.

This leaves us with Best's formulation of an innate inductive ability (the capacity to learn) in human
beings; and this is presented as acting as a determining influence on, and grounding for, the world of concepts, language and reason: "The roots of concepts and the reasons which express them are, then, ways of acting and responding which have been absorbed as the norms of the way of life of a society" (p7). Developing this idea, Best says it is possible to state that even in the case of obviously learnt behaviour, where there may well have been training, that training still "needs something on which to work, in that a child must already share attitudes and responses with us if the training is to be possible at all" (p7). It is perhaps clear that a major aspect of this 'shared' dimension must, necessarily, be the infant's experience of practical interaction with the physical environment that it shares with other human beings. In other words, it shares its sphere of practice in the empirical world.

Now, despite rejecting one aspect of Best's thesis, it is still useful to have found a basic 'capacity to learn' advanced from within another materialist postion. That it is characterised as a concept in the same way as Goffman's was - as a structure of induction - is perhaps a return that justifies the space given to it, if only because it shows that the positing of a prior capacity to learn in humans is justifiable on materialist grounds.

It might be worthwhile to note here, in light of the 'realist commitment' that it was signalled at the start of this chapter would underlie the model of the self to be presented by this thesis, that Best uses such a model himself (11). Although he does in fact attack realism - which he describes as a belief in a singular 'real' world - what he is actually criticizing is the idealist version of that philosophical position, one which holds out for the existence of a prior, 'real' world which is unsuccessfully mirrored by language, and which it should be the object of knowledge to reach towards so that human experience can finally come to
know in an unmediated fashion the "pre-existent, pre-conceptualised phenomena" that supposedly comprise reality (p22). Best dismisses this version of realism for supposing that "there are facts about the world which are independent of, and determine, the concepts expressed in language" (p22). However, if, as can happen, Best's attitude to the 'real' world is taken to be one which rejects the idea of any notion of an objective world entirely, then it becomes difficult to make much sense of his claim for the 'ultimacy' of the 'reactive attitude'; since what he is surely claiming with such a notion is that it is a 'fact about the world' which is 'independent of', and determines, 'the concepts expressed in language'. Indeed, if his rejection of the 'real' world is presumed to be of an absolute kind, then it becomes similarly hard to decipher any longer the notion of induction he is advancing - the 'intrinsic expectation...that things will continue in the future as they have in the past' - since it would clearly no longer be possible to view it as the dialectic between the infant and the things about which it is forming expectations, which in this case are its own physical form and the way this relates to the world around it. Clearly, this makes no sense. For the concept of induction, as Best is using it, refers to the process of observation, projection, interiorisation and reflection conducted by the infant, and it follows from this that what the infant interacts with will, in all probability, have a determining effect at some level on what, and even and why it observes, projects, interiorises and reflects upon. It is clear from this that it can be said to be logically necessary to posit the existence of a world external to the infant which, from the stage of pre-linguistic maturation to beyond, is determining to the extent that it forms part of the dialectical process by which humans relate to the world. In light of this, it can be asserted that the 'realist commitment' adhered to by this thesis is not an
idealistic version, and in fact closely follows the same assumptions that best bases his work on, making it, also, a properly materialist position.

We can possibly clarify the problematics of this issue further if we expand the discussion for a little while longer. Firstly, it can be proposed that the experiential context of each new infant in the world is equally unique and equally valid. This would, if accepted, also propose that there can necessarily be no one, 'real' world, since the potential for variation in what this world might be held to be must be of the same proportion as the possible number of perspectives, which in this case is, possibly, infinite.

(Again, it will hopefully be seen here how this issue relates to the rejection of the notion of 'innate' meaning which was discussed in Chapter One. This should indicate the methodological progress of this thesis, whereby the initial concepts and problems are being re-worked, extended and made more complex, as their philosophical and theoretical ramifications are scrutinized in more depth).

So, if it can be said that there is no such thing as the 'real' world, this is because it needs to be acknowledged that there are any number of variations of what the world is, since there any number of ways of experiencing, and therefore interpreting, it; and the concept of relativity suggests that no single interpretation can be held to be the 'right' one. It therefore becomes impossible to assert that any particular experienced world is, in fact, the 'real' one; and this makes the very notion of a 'real' world extremely problematic.

Against this position, though, we can assert the results of empirical observation and state that, despite the possibility of infinite variation in the approaches taken to, and responses engendered by, these singular worlds, the observable actions and reactions of pre-linguistic infants are of such a regularity as to
foster the strong suspicion that they experience the world in suprisingly similar ways, which in turn leads to the thought that the world might be of a standard character for them, and perhaps even they for it. Thus it becomes possible to re-assert the existence of some sort of prior 'objectice' world outside of the influence of personal interpretation.

Actually, it is possible to extend the argument here by using Best's own methodology against him, as it were, to assert the necessary existence, alongside the 'natural reponses' of the infant he has already described, of an assortment of 'natural facts' about the world. These might include, for example, the existence of matter and non-matter, light and dark, hot and cold and so on (all of which it might be noted are rooted in the sensual experience of the materiality of the world). The argument that these 'natural facts could be used to support would progress by maintaining that, in just the same way as Best's 'natural responses', these 'natural facts' have 'been absorbed as the norms of the way of life of a society', and underlie the developments of language and reason. It would be possible to assert, given this, that the 'natural responses' Best describes are actually nothing more than examples of such 'natural facts'.

That there are 'natural facts' about human existence in the world, and that they act as a determining factor on human life is, as has been stated, the character of the realist commitment of this thesis.

To deepen the idea of what a realist commitment involves we can turn our attention at this point to an essay by the anthropologist Norbert Elias, entitled, "On human beings and their emotions" (12). In it, Elias employs a set of 'facts' about the world (facts of human existence such as birth, death, climate and so on), since he sees them as useful 'markers' - useful in that they provide a common frame of reference for commonly experienced objects and events in the world. His basic
proposition is that, whereas biological evolution created
generic diversity as the method of dominance in other
animals - different species of the generic grouping
'birds' fly at different heights and speeds, eat
different things, live in different climates etc. to
ensure their combined survival - and thereby fostered a
vast number of distinct species within generic groups of
the same animal to cope with different settings, "in the
case of humans, the same species adapted itself to vastly
different conditions on earth mainly by means of social
differentiation," (in Featherstone, M. et al [eds], 1991,
p107). The argument of the essay characterises all life
forms as being comprised of two basic methods of
development: 1) a capacity to enact unlearned
(instinctual) conduct; and 2) a capacity to learn. Human
beings, for Elias, represented an evolutionary
breakthrough because, in all other animals, "although the
scope for learning in relation to the scope for unlearned
conduct has been growing...the unlearned genetic
programme of reactions remained dominant" (p108). This
mean't that "in all pre-human forms of living, steering
conduct with the help of individually made and remembered
experiences remained subordinate to unlearned forms of
steering conduct" (p108). In contrast to this, Elias
says,

the learning potentials of humans had grown
to such an extent that they, and they alone,
came to be totally dependent on learned forms
of knowledge for their dominant form of
communication and for their orientation in
the world,

(p109).

So, Elias is clear that not only is this 'capacity
to learn' an innate quality possessed by humans, it is
the possession of this capacity to the degree that they
do possess it that defines things as human. It - the
capacity to learn - forms part of the 'natural
structures' that mark something as being specifically
'human': "Learning, accumulating experiences, acquiring
knowledge - they are all based on the utilization and patterning of natural structures" (p112). This concept of 'natural structures', it will be seen, describes those things that this thesis has just described as 'natural facts'. For Elias, his term refer to those structures "which are completely inaccessible to change as a result of stored and remembered experience - that is, as a result of learning" (p110) and covers such things as the limitations of the human form as prescribed by the fact of its being a warm-blooded mammal, for example. He also goes on in his discussion to make the related point that it is a logical necessity to allow for the existence of a world exterior to the individual since "most attributes and properties of a human being have functions which can only be understood if one considers people's relationships with existences other than themselves" (p117). The example he cites as an illustration of this is 'the stomach and food', which is a case, he maintains, where the one is not comprehensible without the other.

Elias's points help to add to the developing picture being presented here of the human infant as operating, as a basic method of maturation, a capacity to learn. It becomes more possible to suggest, if his analysis is accepted, that such a capacity might indeed be a defining feature of the human species, and that it has the character of a dialectical engagement with an exterior 'objective' world.

Perhaps it is becoming clearer now why a certain 'realist commitment' might need to be seen as a prerequisite for a theoretical position that intends to posit a 'capacity to learn' as innate to human beings. The postulating of such a capacity, if it is defined as a form of interactive dialectic as it has been above, presupposes certain assumptions. These assumptions take the form of an acceptance of certain 'facts', such as:

1) The infant exists as something.
2) The world exists as something.
3) The infant exists in a dialectical, mutually defining relationship with this world.
4) The infant perceives the world through its senses.
5) The infant has an innate 'capacity to learn'.
6) This capacity to learn involves the ability to infer 'events' and recognise 'causes' in what it observes.
7) This ability to infer involves observational, analytical, classificatory and memory ability.
8) The data collected by these senses and abilities can be individually made and remembered.
9) The ability to infer is rooted in a human expectation of continuation (forms a circuit with 6, 7 & 8).
10) The world is determining of the infant to the extent that it forms part of a dialectic, established by the infant's perceptual methods and capacities.

(It might be highlighted here that later discussion of the nature of the 'will to power', the second 'building block' of identity, will lead us to want to posit another characteristic to be added to this list, one which we encountered in the Introduction and which is, arguably, also a defining feature of human beings, namely that human consciousness is reflexive, and represents the world to itself in symbolic form, [13]).

This above list, then, provides examples of the type of assumptions that are necessary to ground the postulation of something being called here the 'capacity to learn'. Describing them as empirical means that, in the view of this thesis, they are facts which are not available to be relativised. They are prior to the particular transformations of any cultural imposition, and, in fact, must be present to act as the foundation for all the variations to be found in specific societal formulations of what being a human being involves.

Therefore, as a concept, the capacity to learn as it is offered now is an expanded account of what Goffman described in his text as simply the 'capacity to learn'; and thus we still have the same concept, but now in a more defined and useful form.

The discussion to this point has shown how, as a natural structure, the capacity to learn is prior and therefore needs no rational justification for its
existence. It is, in Best’s words, ‘something which humans just do’. The level of determinacy and objective existence being advocated for the external world through this is, it might be seen, not necessarily a bar to radical readings of the processes of identity formation such as would be found in post-structuralist theory, then, in as much as such theory implicitly operates with it anyway, since the nature of the objective world being postulated places it prior to the objects of inquiry of such theory.

On a political note, it is arguable that such an explicit commitment to certain empirical facts about the world and the life-forms that constitute a part of it should be defended on the grounds of necessity. Kate Soper, for example (14), points out how political action always operates from a system of values that define the worth of human beings (15); and notes that the current academic debate about value engendered by postmodernism is due to the latter’s “repression or evasion of the realist commitment that may be essential to sustaining any consistent argument over values” (in Squires, J. (ed), 1993, p19). In another essay (16), she highlights how, in implementing political projects of social reform of whatever character, “overcoming scepticism about the universal and objective quality of human needs may be an essential first move” (1993, p115). Both of these points are important ones.

The assertion of the dialectical nature of the capacity to learn possessed by humans can then be seen as an explicitly ‘political’ strategy, which allies it to the Marxist notion of ‘practice’ (17), defined by the philosopher Chris Harman (1983) as ‘interaction with an external reality’. Harman quotes Marx in order to show where his formulating of ‘interaction with an external world’ as being the foundation of human thinking has been taken from:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question
of theory but a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality and non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question... All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory into mysticism find their rational practical solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

(Marx, in Harman, 1983, p74).

After this, Harman moves on in his essay to criticise another writer within Marxism, Alex Callinicos, for making what he sees as

the mistake characteristic of much academic philosophy of seeing the development of concepts and the development of practice as two different things - and then getting involved in endless worries about how concepts can relate to reality,

(p79).

According to the line of argument Harman is following, it is because human beings are actively involved with reality, through practical interaction to transform it, that they come to know which ideas about it are true and which are not. He notes that “concepts do not come out of nowhere. They are generated by human beings’ interaction with each other and with the world” (p79). It becomes possible, on this basis, to say that it is human practice which is determining of the ideas accumulated about reality by a society, and this then leads inevitably to the acceptance of the existence of an external world since, “by definition, practice involves human beings interacting with an external reality” (p81).

As a recapulation, then, we can say that the concept of human identity advanced so far in this thesis states that the human infant, comprised of a body, a capacity to learn and a will to power, interacts via practice with an external reality, and this practical
interaction forms the basis of its later development of
the conceptual apparatus with which reality is
interpreted.

We can perhaps move on from this now to a firmer
encapsulation of what this picture of the human infant
represents. To achieve this, we need actually only
borrow from Best the structure of one of his proposals
and re-write it to fit the facts as they now stand. In
other words, where Best insists that ‘unless there were
something which humans just do...’, we can respond by
insisting that it should, instead, read as: ‘unless
there were something which humans just are...’, (which
is really not a re-writing at all, but is certainly a
change of emphasis). The full hypothesis of this thesis
so far could then be read as: ‘Unless there were
something which humans just are, there would be no
explanation for the coincidences of acting and
responding that are empirically observable in human
beings’ interaction with the external world. Therefore,
there are certain ‘natural structures’ of the human form
and the material world that it interacts with that are
determined features of existence for it.’

Having established this as the basic schematic of
identity that this thesis has constructed so far, it
will help to broaden the discussion if we undertake an
analysis of the conceptions of identity found in Michel
Foucault’s and Jacques Lacan’s texts. This will enable
us to do several things. Firstly, it will introduce
into the debate some primary post-structuralist
contentions, and allow us to see what aspects of the
schema of self developed up to now may, or may not, be
under threat from these contentions. The analysis
conducted should also serve to clarify and deepen the
whole question of self and ‘subjecthood’, and will
highlight some of the areas of interest for those
theories working to problematise received societal ideas
of what it is that constitutes self, and social,
identity. It will also act to contextualise the
discussion just conducted, and show the relevance of trying to discover the sensible extent of the drive to relativise all aspects of human existence. It is intended that, by the close of this investigation into the writings of Lacan and Foucault, a better understanding will have been gained of just what it means to 'problematise' the notion of the self; and of what positive paths of action there are available to individuals in the aftermath of such problematization.

The simple fact that man can be recognised in a certain way creates a sense of triumph, and the fact, too, that he can never be recognised completely, never once and for all, that he is not so easily exhaustible, that he holds and conceals so many possibilities within himself (hence his capacity for development), is a pleasurable recognition. That man can be changed by his surroundings, and can himself change the surrounding world, i.e. can treat it with consequence, all this produces feelings of pleasure,

(Brecht, in Benjamin, 1966, p13).
CHAPTER THREE.
The Problematized, Post structuralist Self.

Every person carries within him a hierarchy of values according to which he approves or condemns. The theatre offers the possibility of seeing whether these values have been imposed from the outside or whether they are truly part of one's convictions,

(Brook, 1987, p235).

What the post-structuralist critique of the 'subject' represents on one level is a systematic interrogation of the rationalism that has dominated and defined the development of human societies from the time of Plato to the present day. This is often manifested, and more importantly perhaps is seen as manifesting, in a rejection of the notion of 'value' - the differentiation of things according to a system of evaluative criteria; a rejection which is motivated by a disregard for the appeals to unjustifiable qualities that most valuations implicitly employ (1). The grounding for this refusal to ascribe value to objects is the perception of the world as possessing no particular innate qualities whatsoever, having no defined shape or purpose, and therefore being unusable as a support for any statements about the value of any one aspect of it in regard to others (2). In just the same way as it removes the referential effectivity of language, proposing that it never refers to anything other than itself, least of all a 'real' world, post-structuralism views the system of value ascription as generally justified by nothing other than its own discourse. However, as Steven Connor points out (3), any 'critique' of rationalism is, of necessity, likely to be a paradoxically loaded endeavour.
The various versions of such a critique need to be taken very seriously indeed, but it is precisely their force and seriousness, which is to say, the rational and ethical claims that they exercise, that reveals them to be value-claims in themselves,


As we move through the work of Foucault and Lacan, the strains exerted on their theoretical structures by this resident paradox will perhaps become clear.

Firstly, however, it will be useful to clear up one particular aspect of the notion of identity so far proposed by this thesis.

The core of natural structures that have been identified so far as defining human beings are, obviously, 'universals', in that they can apply to all beings that can be named as 'human' to some degree or other (4). These universals are, as has been explained previously, those concrete facts of existence that have been arrived at by a process of interaction with, and observation of, the material world; and as a grounding for actions and decision-making they will therefore be utilised or departed from according to the same process. They constitute, then, a collection of 'contingent facts', and they retain the power and status of facts only for as long as they prove their effectivity and functionality in that role as regards human practice (5). The ability of these universals to have their status as facts removed at any time is actually what makes them effective as such in the first place. (As Nietzsche himself teaches, "Truth has never yet clung to the arm of an inflexible man," [1961, p79]).

So, the universals put forward here as 'facts' of existence need to be seen as knowledge gleaned by humanity from the dialectical process of interaction with the material world. They are therefore not
necessarily the basis for any essentialist hypothesis about the character of human nature; but are rather a collection of observations about the structure of the physical world which can serve as the framework for the advancement of a materialist theory. The nature of their universality is not such that they can be the target for relativist dissatisfaction, since relativity is, in fact, inscribed in them by their relation to practice. As Harvey points out, “universality must be construed in dialectical relation with particularity. Each defines the other in such a way as to make the universality criterion always open to negotiation through the particularities of difference” (in Squires, [ed], 1993, p116). With that clarified, we can now move on to an analysis of Michel Foucault’s particular critique of rationalist subjectivity.

Nietzsche, acknowledged by Foucault as an influence, had a clear vision of what Mankind’s destiny ought to be, and wrote that “it will have to be the will to power incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, draw to itself, gain ascendency - not out of any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because life is will to power” (1973, p194). As we shall see, the difference between Nietzsche’s position and Foucault’s as regards the potentiality of this will to power lies in their respective optimism concerning its eventual liberation. For Foucault, the history of humanity was the history of the continual expansion of an accretion to Man’s basic potential, which had taken the ‘toxic’ shape of what he called a ‘will to knowledge’ : “History is the concrete body of a development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells...” (1984, p80). And, for Foucault as for Nietzsche, this history of Man’s development was something to be viewed negatively, since the essential character of this ‘will to knowledge’ acted as a cancerous growth within mankind, its debilitating
effects causing other possibilities of living to fade and die. This is the purpose behind Foucault’s inscription of power as ‘power/knowledge’, by which he intended to highlight the fact that the one thing (power) has found an effective point of articulation and expression in the other (knowledge) but, crucially, not the only possible one (6):

You have to understand that when I read - and I know it has been attributed to me - the thesis, “knowledge is power”, or “power is knowledge”, I begin to laugh, since studying their relation is precisely my problem...The very fact that I pose the question of their relation proves clearly that I do not identify them,


In other words, it is not so much why the will to power has manifested as a certain type of rationalism that Foucault is examining, as much as it is the precise nature of this manifestation - how it has been achieved. What interested Foucault “were precisely the forms of rationality applied by the human subject to itself”; and this in order to discover “at what price...subjects speak the truth about themselves”, (p202). The essential task in this investigation seen as being to isolate “the form of rationality presented as dominant, and endowed with the status of the one-and-only reason, in order to show that it is only one possible form among others”, (p201).

This, it might be noted, places Foucault’s project in proximity to Howard Barker’s notion of the role of the artist, whom he saw as being someone who “uses imagination to speculate about life as it is lived, and proposes, consciously or unconsciously, life as it might be lived” (1989, p33). It also seems reminiscent of what Artaud intended by his call for the theatre to ‘reconquer’ “the signs of existence” (1970, p46). What is common to all these writers is the focus on the need
to indicate, or create, alternatives to the dominant version of reality. Foucault said that what he sought to do in writing his genealogies was "give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom" (1980, p46). Nietzsche, similarly, saw himself as calling out to "the heart of him who still has ears for unheard-of things" (1961, p52).

Foucault's texts can be represented as an analysis of the functioning of norms, their methods of operation and naturalising function, and as intended to reveal how something called the 'will to knowledge' has constructed a network for the observation, naturalisation and construction of its objects of attention (looming large amongst which is, clearly, the 'self'), which operates in such a way as to leave its inscriptive presence effectively concealed (7). His conceptualisation of the productive function of norms is due to his perception of them as constituting the objects on and from which they then operate. This productivity, according to Macherey (8), is characterised by Foucault as

like an extensive movement which, progressively withdrawing the limits of its domain of action, itself effectively constitutes a field of existence in which norms find their application ....the norm itself 'produces' the elements on which it acts, at the same time as it elaborates the procedures and the real means of this action - that is to say, it determines their existence by means of the very fact that it undertakes to master them


This returns us to Foreman's desire, mentioned earlier, to 'reconstitute our very way of being human', and meets it with the argument that societal processes may be so deeply ingrained in the workings of human identity as to make such a reconstitution very difficult indeed.

The intent of Foucault's analyses (or, as he called them, 'genealogies') can be represented as :-
exposure of the processes of a 'will to knowledge' that constructs for itself 'subjects' out of the raw material of life, to show how these 'subjects', the selves that individuals regard as natural to them, are, in fact, the constructions of a particular power formation, a particular form of rationalism. In attempting this task, Foucault is, in what is now seen as a 'post-structuralist' fashion, seeking, like Nietzsche, to remove the 'subject' from its perceived position as the 'maker-of-meaning' in the world. Such a critique works on the premise that individuals believe themselves to be the creators of their own meanings, but that this experience of originatory and centralised 'being' is actually the effect of a web of techniques and strategies - generally called 'discourses' - installed in human beings by a symbiotically entwined power/knowledge relationship that the individual has internalised and naturalised. What this might be taken to mean in practice is that each individual human being - essentially, remember, a will to power with a capacity to learn - must make of itself a 'subject' in order to be allowed to exist at all. This 'subjecthood' can be achieved only by following, or conforming to, the particular possibilities of being that are made available by whatever specific set of prescriptive and prohibitive norms are operating, at that time, in the society in which it finds itself, for it is these, rather than any such thing as a 'soul', or 'human nature', that prescribe what and how it is possible to be in order to be accepted and recognised in a social world.

Foucault's efforts to reveal these systems of the containment of individuals can be seen as similar in emphasis to Brecht's attempts to use his dramaturgy to expose the cultural forces which shaped the actions of the characters in his plays. The prologue to The Exception and the Rule, for example, calls on the audience "expressly to discover, that what happens all
the time is not natural" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p110); and this desire to offer up the workings of society for scrutiny, in its acknowledgement of the naturalised status of social mechanisms, and of the need to remove this status from them, is a parallel concern for both writers.

In the Foucauldian schema of identity, then, the range of possibilities of Being — what Nietzsche calls the "will to the concievability of all being" (1961, p136) — has been, is, and will continue to be controlled and reduced by an opposing will to knowledge. This will to knowledge, says Foucault, uses its most effective weapon —normalisation— to structure and confine the experience of this 'will to the concievability of all being' in the shape of the unitary 'self' of the 'subject'. It is this insight, which Foucault acknowledges as deriving from Nietzsche, that can be seen to underlie Foucault's entire project:

Raulet: At any rate, Nietzsche represented a determining experience for the abolition of the founding act of the subject.

Foucault: Exactly"

(Raulet, 1983, p199), (9).

In fact, it is possible to trace Nietzsche's principal insights onto the form of the total inquiry conducted by Foucault. The terms are not always identical in the description of specific elements in their work, but the things being described are nevertheless largely equivalent. What, for example, Foucault calls 'power' in its manifestation as the will to knowledge, is present in Nietzsche as 'the Good' (10); and Foucault's description of the structures of regulation imposed by the operation of the 'norm' is likewise translatable to the Nietzschean concept of a 'table of values'.

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A table of values hangs over every people.
Behold, it is the table of its overcomings;
behold, it is the voice of its will to power,

(Nietzsche, 1961, p84).

There is, it can be argued, encapsulated in the above quote, the same perspective as is found in the Foucauldian examination of the will to knowledge's installations of webs of discourses, where each is a register of an area of life that has been colonised and made to speak itself as an object of, and for, knowledge, rather than as 'itself'. This is the sense in which those areas of life have been 'overcome'. For Nietzsche and Foucault, where there is a table of values - a system of norms - there is also always in place the system of evaluation that this represents in practice, and as soon as a thing enters such a system it becomes not what it is, but what it is presented, or made to present itself, as being. In this way, the table of values which each generation bequeaths to the next during socialisation, denies the individual his/her own 'true' life by bestowing all that s/he can be upon her/him. It is in this respect that Nietzsche notes that "[i]t is dangerous to be an heir" (1961, p102). This inherent antagonism towards the conformity imposed by social existence is, as we shall see, a clear thematic concern for both Foucault and Nietzsche: "Almost in the cradle we are presented with heavy words and values; this dowry calls itself 'Good' and 'Evil'. For its sake we are forgiven for being alive" (p211).

Nietzsche was also, if we cast the matter for a moment in a Foucauldian light, concerned to examine the process of the 'naturalisation' of the norm's functioning, since it was only by doing this that normative regulation's practice of obscuring any other possibilities for living could be exposed. For Nietzsche, there is nothing that can be named - not one object of and for power/knowledge - that does not take part in this limiting structure, since each 'name' is
"really no more than a fat word taking the place of a vague question mark" (1956, p266). The task of criticism, then, becomes to show that all statements of value, all judgements and definitions, all 'objective' facts and 'truths', whether made by 'scientists', 'artists', 'philosophers' or anyone else, are never neutral, and never objective. They are 'perspectival' (11), and as such they can only ever represent a point of view, never the 'whole'. It is necessary, says Nietzsche, to see that in every statement of fact that results from an individual's research in any field

there is something arbitrary in the fact that he stopped, looked back, looked around here, that he stopped digging and laid his spade aside here - there is also something suspicious about it. Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding place, every word also a mask

(1973, p216).

This sense of the necessarily arbitrary reality of any world-picture presented as founded on the 'truths' of existence is, as we have seen in this thesis so far, often the insight that lurks behind the post-structuralist attempts to deconstruct such pictures. In possible contrast to this approach is the work of theatre practitioners such as Richard Foreman who, despite an awareness of the limited nature of any perspective, do not seek to thereby disparage the creation of pictures of the world. For Foreman, the acceptance of the relativity inherent in perception is always already acknowledged by art:

Art is a perspective; all perspectives are lies about the total truth; so art is a lie that, if it is strategically chosen, wakes people up. Art is a lever to affect the mind. The truth of art is in the audience's, the individual's, awakened perception. It is not in the work of art,

(in Drain [ed], 1995, p68).
This positive approach to the problems raised by the relativity of perception, such as the inability to postulate with conviction the existence of ‘truth’, is an example of the affirmatory energy generally present in the activities of radical theatre. It is a positivity that, as we shall see, is advocated strongly by Nietzsche, but which Foucault and Lacan seem to find harder to support.

According to Foucault, his genealogies oppose History since their task ‘is to discover [against History] that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents’ (in Rabinow, 1984, p81). Nietzsche seems to be making the same point when he states that:

That which we now call the world is the result of a number of errors and fantasies, which came about gradually in the overall development of organic beings, fusing with one another, and now handed down to us as a collected treasure of our entire past - a treasure: for the value of our humanity rests upon it


This apparent similarity of intent and of form in the two writers continues in their attitudes towards the concept of the ‘self’. For Foucault, the ‘self’ was an "empty synthesis" (1984, p81); and for Nietzsche it was "the synthetic concept ‘I’" (1973, p49); and both worked to reveal the paucity of the concept against its standing as a founding ‘truth’ of existence.

Foucault did so in a rigorously systematic manner in his main texts, covering the mobilisation of the techniques of confession by Christianity (1978); the exclusion of unreason (1967); the containment of criminality (1977); the construction of sex and sexuality as the registers of identity (1978); and the specific techniques of self-formation in the Roman (1987) and Greek (1989) eras, to show how the will to knowledge had demarcated the boundaries of possibility.
for life in accordance with the demands of the particular social formation (12). For example, 'bio-power' was Foucault's term for the specific techniques of power/knowledge that were made both necessary and possible by the removal, by better technology, of the immediate threat of death from the lived experience of most people (13). This new level of normative regulation was, says Foucault, achieved through the systematic imposition of the effects of these advances in technology, and proved, also, to be an essential tool in the advancement of industrial capitalism:

This bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes, (1978, pp140-1).

The rigorous systematicity of Foucault's work, and the field of its areas of inquiry, means that it can be seen to represent a penetrating exploration of Nietzsche's original insights into what the notion of the 'self' represented in rationalism. Nietzsche himself, it might be felt, was far from being thorough in the same way (14). He wrote on specific topics such as morals (1956); tragedy (1973); religion (1990); but many of his major works (1984, 1973, 1961, 1968) were more general philosophical outpourings than they were disciplined examinations. Nevertheless, it is these 'outpourings' that provided the foundation upon which Foucault seems to have constructed his critical project.

In the same way that Foucault regarded power/knowledge's ability to naturalise its structures within individuals as its most insidious characteristic, so too did Nietzsche speak out against the Good's secretion of its table of values within people. For Nietzsche, the individual's 'creation' of a 'self' was
the imposed, but disguised, construction of a prison for the pure 'will to power' that was human life.

Perhaps the most illustrious and famous example of the myth of self that both Foucault and Nietzsche were attempting to dispel was the essentialist notion of some sort of ineffable 'essence' that formed the core of human identity. This 'essence' was, and is, generally described by such theories as a 'soul' that gazes out at the world from inside the body, having a specific 'character' of its own. It is this soul, or the extent that people act as an expression of it, that determines the nature of individuals, and therefore effectively determines what human nature is. It was against this type of characterisation that Foucault moved to describe the soul as, in fact, "the prison-house of the body" (1974, p30), intending by this to illuminate the practice of the strategic containment of embodiment within a set of discourses, a structure, designed to silence the thing itself as a representation of it was offered. Nietzsche, also, was clear that it was only a subjugation of the body that made the construction of the individual's experience of a soul possible in the first place: All instincts that are not allowed free play turn inward. This is what I call man's interiorization; it alone provides the soil for the growth of what is later called man's 'soul'" (1956, p217). It was, for Nietzsche, entirely logical that, as a result of the repression of the body's natural drives, one would find the type of extraordinarily perverted evolutionary development that was evident in human history - "What strange notions occur to him, what bestialities of idea burst from him, the moment he is prevented ever so little from being a beast of action!" (p226).

It is, however, despite their clear similarities of approach and focus around this issue of the body that the apparent point of division between the two thinkers signalled earlier is seen, by some writers, to make its
loudest claims for recognition (15), concerning the fact that both Nietzsche and Foucault site the pure 'will to power' as in the body, in its libidinal drives and multiple nature, but do so with different emphases.

In the sphere of performance, too, the body was gaining attention as a possible site of the ‘truth’ of human identity from early this century, leading Adolphe Appia to exclaim in 1902 that it was, in fact, “the one reality worthy of the theatre” (in Drain [ed], 1995, p16). This was an attitude and attention that was to be mirrored in a constellation of theatrical experiments ranging from those of Meyerhold and Craig, to Artaud, through to Grotowski, the work of companies such as The Performance Group and The Living Theatre and onwards into the present-day work of performance artists such as Carolee Schneeman, Rachel Rosenthal and others. In all of this work, the body has been centralized as the instrument of performance in the belief that it gives access in some way to a new level of the ‘reality’ of the human condition; and in this sense it joins Nietzsche in viewing the body as a genuine site of liberatory potential.

Foucault’s conception of the situation of individuals is usually seen as more pessimistic than this, with the discourses of power/knowledge presented as all-pervasive (16). Nietzsche’s is seen as more positive since it offers, amongst other things, a vision of what he terms the ‘Übermensch’ - that individual who has passed ‘beyond Good and Evil’ and therefore beyond the hold of power/knowledge. As Scott Lash points out, the discrepancy between the two positions is clear, since “to argue as Foucault does that ‘desire’ is a servant of power, is effectively to break with Nietzsche” (in Featherstone et al., 1991, p260). This characterization of desire as contained registers as a breaking with Nietzsche since it is usually seen that it was in the body’s drives, passions, and desires that Nietzsche saw the shape of the true
will to power; and he does not, as Foucault does, regard the body as itself constructed by its specific insertion into the political economies of Western societies and therefore, in some senses, written out of existence. Indeed, Nietzsche goes so far in this affirmation of the materiality of existence, as to move to contain all aspects of human identity within the extent of the body. He says of the 'ego' - "And this most honest being, the Ego -it speaks of the body, and it insists upon the body, even when it fables and fabricates and flutters with broken wings" (1961, p60); and then moves on to state that "there is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom" (p62).

Nietzsche, however, was as aware as Foucault that existence in a rationalistic society represented an imposed perversion of the force and multiple potentiality of what human life might be. It was because of this sense of oppression through alien forms that Nietzsche condemns language as the process by which the indifferent flux of life is categorised, reduced and structured. It was clear to him that "the history of language is the history of a process of abbreviation" of life's possibilities (p205). Language, to Nietzsche, represented the domination of all possible forms of life by a single actualisation, acting as a filter on perception and closing off other possibilities of perception until they became unattainable, and therefore unimaginable. He presented the basic character of language as being that of a centering pull, structured around a unifying impulse within the individual; and said that, because of this, it was possible to recognise the operations of the will to knowledge - of rationalism - in every area where there appears to have been a solidification, or resolution of life's flux into the controllable units of logic or facts - "Out of multiplicity it has the will to simplicity, a will which binds together and tames, which is imperious and dominating" (1973, p160).
This characterisation of rationalism leads Nietzsche to the recognition, which he shares with Foucault, that, having colonised and invested the body, rationalism has created in individuals what Foucault was to term a ‘symbiotic’ relationship between power and pleasure. This is a presentation of human existence which states that rationalism, unable to neutralise the fact of embodiment as a site of sensory experience, and therefore of meaning, for individuals, has constructed ‘subjects’ out of these individuals; a strategy which has acted to establish a containing structure within the drives and desires of their bodies, a structure that registers as a system of internal ‘valves’ and ‘circuits’ which act as a cohesive influence on the anarchy of the various somatic energies. The intention behind this, says Nietzsche, “is the incorporation of ‘new’ experiences’, the arrangement of new things within old divisions - growth, that is to say; more precisely, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power” (1973, p160).

However, in Nietzsche’s schematic of existence the bodily drives can never be fully neutralised, “for every drive is tyrannical” (1973, p37); and the interplay of the releas and containment of these drives therefore forms the structure upon which any containing device for the production of the ‘sensual natures’ of human ‘subjects’ must be based. In this way, it can be seen that Nietzsche is asserting that it is the ‘real’ of the body’s materiality that supports the forms and structures imposed upon embodiment by the classificatory strategies of rationalism, since it - the body - must be included as context and content of any effort to represent it (17). As Nietzsche points out, the whole edifice of rationalism is built on this material basis since “all belief is based on the feeling of pleasure or pain in relation to the speaking subject” (1984, p25); and therefore rationalism cannot establish itself more succesfully, and naturalise its operations more
completely, than by effecting a circuit where a feeling of empowerment, of pleasure, for the 'subject' is the register of its own extension of form. This is akin to the concept of the 'symbiotic relationship' of knowledge and power that Foucault uses his analysis of sexuality to describe. That such a structure exists in the individual is, for both Nietzsche and Foucault, the result of rationalism's recognition of its need to take account of the primacy of the body in the lived experience of subjects. As Nietzsche put it, there would be "no life without pleasure, the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life" (1984, p73).

It can be said, then, as we have seen, that Nietzsche drew on the body as the source of inspiration for the vision he presented of the overcoming of the will to knowledge by the attainment of the state of the 'Übermensch' (18). This 'superman' would be, it seems possible to say at this point, the creativity and spontaneity of the liberated drives and desires of the body, and would therefore be undefinable, unrecognisable, unspeakable and unimaginable within the terms laid down by rationalist discourse. In other words, the individual freed from the human into the inhuman. This type of being was what, for Nietzsche, lurked under the 'rectitude' and 'righteousness' of the moral order of rationalism; and to misunderstand this was to ascribe to that morality a purity that it was far removed from having the right to claim for itself. Indeed, the historical institutionalization of that moral order was, for Nietzsche, little more than the historical triumph of particular acts of violence:

Force precedes morality; indeed, for a time morality itself is force, to which others acquiesce to avoid unpleasure. Later it becomes custom, and still later free obedience, and finally almost instinct; then it is coupled to pleasure, like all habitual and natural things, and is now called virtue

(Nietzsche, 1984, p69).
In terms of thinkers who have attempted to work through similar ideas in the sphere of the theatre, it is surely Artaud who most closely meets the extreme radicalism we see here in Nietzsche. His widely taken up notion of actors as a whirl of 'moving hieroglyphs' was an attempt to find a metaphor for that theatrical form which would act on the spectator "violently enough to make any transactions into logical discursive language useless" (1970, p39). This effect was needed, Artaud maintained, since "the unendingly repeated jading of our organs calls for sudden shocks to revive our understanding" (p66); this 'understanding' being that which brought the audience "back to the subtlest ideas through their anatomies" (p62), and these 'subtlest ideas' being to do with what it is to be human. For Artaud, the purpose of the theatre was to be an "enraged and scrupulous pounding" of the "insufficiently refined and matured forms" (p36) of a rationalistic presentation of life. In this sense, Artaud's notion of theatre clearly reaches towards new visions of the possibilities of the human form in the same way as Nietzsche's philosophy does.

Foucault, on the other hand, although granting the body a similar status to that afforded it by Nietzsche, seems unable to offer a positive vision that is the equal of his predecessor's. The reasons for this apparent lack might involve Foucault's particular conception of power/knowledge; and it might be productive here, having briefly sketched out some of the points of relation and divergence between Nietzsche's project and Foucault's, to take a more specific look at some of the insights and inconsistencies internal to the Foucauldian discourse (19).

There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees,
is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all.

(Foucault, 1987, p9).

It might be said that Michel Foucault's work stands as both a blessing and a curse to a desire for the fulfilment of the type of vision of freedom that we have seen in Nietzsche's writings. A blessing in its ability to penetrate and reveal previously undisclosed techniques and strategies of rationalism - or as he usually termed it, the will to knowledge - but a curse in its seemingly concomitant evacuation of the bases for any possible retaliatory action. This apparent inability to forward a vision of what might be beyond the webs of power/knowledge stems, it can be argued, from the fact that the same type of symbiotic relationship that Foucault shows as existing between power and knowledge, in the individual and in society itself, is present in his own work in the form of a central paradox. The effect of this paradox is, as will be shown, to establish a sort of logical 'loop', which leads Foucault to the problem that the more valid his arguments are, the less tenable his project can be held to be.

This is because the knowledge that Foucault works to uncover in his genealogies is - and must be if it is to act in accordance with his own criteria - setting itself against the assumptions of the powers of resistance. It might even be argued that Foucault's work carries upon the back of its seeming radicality a huge force of reaction (20). According to Foucault's own schema, the project he undertook might have to be seen not as a resistance of power, whether positive or negative, but simply as an extension of it.

It is clear, despite a somewhat infamous cultivated 'ambiguity', Foucault's work was politically motivated in a fairly straightforward, non-relativised sense (21). As we have already seen, he himself saw his task as being to separate out,
from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom,

(in Rabinow, 1984, p46).

It goes without saying that this 'work of freedom' cannot be entirely 'undefined', since it is what caused Foucault to produce the particular texts that he did; and, in fact, part of the purpose of this focusing in on his project in this thesis is to show that his apparent silence in the spaces where Nietzsche can be heard preaching of the 'Übermensch' is, whilst not empty as a gesture, certainly not to be taken simply at face value. The political goal of his work may be more 'obscure' than is usual, but it is certainly not simply absent. It is present, as is usual in politically motivated writing, as the underlying impetus that shapes, directs, engages with and judges the data.

Foucault's apparent reluctance to acknowledge this aspect of his work perhaps has its root, as has been indicated, in a difficulty within the work itself. The logic of his theoretical structure is such that it eventually problematizes its own initiating impulses, which means that its radicality of purpose inevitably leads it to disrupt and destroy that which gave it intent and form in the beginning. So, in refusing to explicitly acknowledge a political goal for his own work, it can be said that Foucault is not thereby necessarily revealing a flaw in his theoretical position. This position was, as Foucault stated it, centred around one crucial question: "What is at stake, then, is this: How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?" (in Rabinow, 1984, p48).

This is perhaps the issue that is central to an understanding both of Foucault's work, and of the
problems that seem, at times, to beset it. It is also, once again, an issue that is, and has been, of importance to those theatre practitioners attempting to challenge the ideological formulations of the societal 'status quo'. How does one enter the economy of exchange without being at the same time entirely subsumed within it and thereby rendered, in effect, harmless? The most extreme answers arrived at so far in the theatre, other than Artaud's, were probably the 'anti-art' activities of the Dadaists in the early decades of the century; but, as Kershaw (1992) shows, it is still a problematic issue for contemporary practitioners. He states that the task of radical performances remains the successful negotiating of "the dialectic between successful opposition and debilitating incorporation" (p8).

To enlarge upon what, for Foucault, the possible resolution to this problem was, it can be stated that he attempted to develop theoretical models of those areas where rationalism had confronted aspects of life which were unknown to, opposed to, sometimes a part of, or simply exterior to and in no relationship at all with, itself. He attempted, therefore, to describe the manner in which the will to knowledge had tried, by making discursive objects of these areas, to gain control of them for its own uses. The most effective strategy employed to gain this end, as we have seen, has proved to be the establishing of situations and methods whereby the objects of rationalism's attentions internalise and naturalise its prescriptions, becoming its points of expression and maintenance within the societal network. It is arguable within this that Foucault believed that it was in what he called the 'deployment of sexuality' (22) that rationalism had achieved its most effective integration into the object of its attention, since it was able to construct there a complete synthesis of power and pleasure which ensured its access to areas of being that had hitherto been
denied it. As has been shown earlier in this thesis, the major weapon in this development of rationalism's domination has been the normative regulation of life.

Foucault found the physical expression of this paradigm of what he called the 'power/knowledge' network in Bentham's concept of the 'Panopticon' (23), an architectural vision of the 'ultimate' prison which could, induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers,

(1974, p201).

For Foucault, this envisaged prison encapsulated in concrete form the ultimate desire of knowledge/power's control of life, in that it showed to what extent that control could operate. Knowledge/power, in its perfection, would be exerted from the inside rather than imposed from the outside, through the individual's own constant imposition upon him/herself of behaviour that accorded to the postulated norm. As has been explained, Foucault's whole genealogical enterprise can be described as a descriptive project intended to articulate the methods visible in history by which a certain type of rationalism has confronted and gained control of an object external to it, namely life. As such, his work contains characterisations of this rationalism, and examinations of its techniques and strategies of domination and expression over and within various of its objects of attention. The nature of what he called this 'regime of normalisation' was of
paramount importance to Foucault because he saw that it was through the use of this 'regime' that knowledge/power generally sought to gain access to, and subjugate, all areas of lived experience.

Now, the radical intention of Foucault's project meant that it focused on those areas of life - unreason, illegality, and desire - that not only presented power with its greatest objects of desire, its 'Other' (24), but also held a potential for, if not liberation, then at least reversal. (It is worth comparing here Nietzsche's list of the Good's three 'most-cursed' things: “sensual pleasure, lust for power, selfishness” [1961, p206]; since this surely at least partially encapsulates the qualities one might expect to be visible in their most extreme forms in Foucault's 'insane', 'criminal', and 'perverted'). In this respect, Foucault is actually quite clear about where the site of a potential refusal of rationalism's domination might be, stating that it will occur in the form of "a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression" (in Rabinow, 1984, p45). It does not seem unreasonable to say that there is some sort of radical and positive agenda evidenced by these references and points of focus. In fact, despite his reputation as a 'pessimist', Foucault obliquely sketches for us in his works his ideal figure of resistance; and in a sense it is a more attainable one than its Nietzschean counterpart the 'free spirit', since it has existed in societies throughout history, including our own. These Foucauldian 'Ubermensches' are those figures that Enlightenment rationality has categorised for our own time as the 'criminally insane'. It seems, then, that Foucault is suggesting that it is within the bodies of these 'social outcasts' that his notion of the transgressive act finds its most certain expression. For it is here that the norm, the voice of knowledge/power, falls on ears no longer willing or able to hear it, since they are occupied instead in listening...
to the ‘unheard-of things’ that Nietzsche spoke about (25). In approaching a clearer definition of what this obscure activity might consist of, he states that:

[I]t has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them,

(in Rabinow, 1984, p50).

That it is precisely this type of ‘experimenting’ with limits that has been the conscious purpose of much Western avant-garde theatre practice and writing should, by now, be clear. As Raymond Williams (1989) noted, the avant-garde defines itself in opposition to bourgeois society - which in this context we have been defining as rationalism - "on the grounds of its monopoly of consciousness: a monopoly typically expressed in its forms of language and of representation" (p93). So, the avant-garde can be seen to be involved in the same examination of the methods by which individuals represent themselves to themselves that Foucault is.

Perhaps, in light of these different methods of approaching the same issue, we can say that distinct from radical theatre's practical presentation of alternative forms, it is the intensity of focus of Foucault's description of rationalism's 'techniques' of subjugation that should be seen as his most original contribution. Foucault's analyses add a definite weight of form to the bones of what was advanced by Nietzsche, and thereby help to advance a radical critique of the functioning of social identity in the contemporary Western world, as well as deepening and intensifying it.

Now, if we refer to the criticisms that have been aimed at Foucault's apparent 'a-politicality', it will be seen that it was in keeping with the logic of his work for Foucault to establish for himself a position not only outside of the radical politics of the 'Left',

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but largely unapproachable by it. In an interview and debate with Noam Chomsky in 1971, Foucault consistently confounded and irritated the linguist by refusing to postulate any goal for progressive politics. Chomsky himself was happy to state the vision of liberatory politics as that which worked to establish a society that was the best available for meeting the needs and desires of all of its members; and happy also to accept that the blueprint for such a society would, and must necessarily, always consist of a notion of what human nature is, with a design traced out from this which, it was intended, would allow the best aspects of that nature the fullest expression. Foucault's refusal to join in the speculation of what this society might look like was seen, during the interview, largely as posturing. In fact, it was the perfectly coherent expression of the thesis that we have seen Foucault to be following throughout his work. In his terms, the appeal to those aspects of humanity that were repressed, buried, abused, hidden, controlled, or otherwise contained by the present political situation in order to establish a new society - a new regime of norms - would always be fundamentally erroneous, since the values and concepts that were being appealed to, rather than being capable of outlasting or challenging power, were in fact creations of its own making. In these circumstances, Foucault believed, it would be simply illogical to believe that you spoke against power/knowledge when you could only ever speak as it.

Foucault's comments on the concept of the modern 'soul' may help to throw more light on this, so it might be helpful to re-introduce them here in fuller form. He maintained that:

This real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and
knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power.... On this reality reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness etc.; on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism. (1977, pp29-30).

If this is accepted, if the constructed nature of most of the 'facts' of human identity is established, then, says Foucault, it would clearly be a foolish act to turn to these notions— notions such as there being a 'primal nature' in humans, or a 'real self' in people, or such a thing as 'common humanity'— for the necessary support of some political, ethical, or moral project designed to achieve the liberation and fulfilment of things that don't exist. For no such things exist of themselves; they are constructs; and their function, as Foucault described it, is to act precisely to preclude any other possibilities of what life might be from occurring. It was from this perspective that Foucault regarded the entire, supposedly progressive, 'emancipation from ignorance' supposedly represented by the advance of Enlightenment rationality throughout history. For him, this progression was simply the ascension to dominance of a particular form of the will to power, a particular driving force, that has tied itself to the accumulation and consolidation of knowledges, thereby becoming a will to knowledge, a particular form of rationalism. It is this accumulative force that always acts as the motivating energy behind all the machinations of rationalism in its confrontation with the sheer physical fact of life.

As the example of the Panopticon was designed to show, the concept of the will to knowledge presented by Foucault reaches its most effective and productive point when the object of its processes of subjugation becomes also its means of expression. This effectively means that a process needs to occur whereby the will to knowledge creates the circumstances that result in it
becoming necessary to its object of attention and/or desire. It is in this way, then, that the will to knowledge is characterised as formative of 'subjects', since it forces individuals to speak themselves as subjects in order to silence their 'other-ness', which it otherwise could not properly contain.

Foucault shows this most clearly in the three volumes that comprise his *History of Sexuality*. For Foucault, as we have seen, this is the will to knowledge's most effective area of integration into individuals, since it is here where it has succeeded in establishing a power/knowledge network that is central to almost all aspects of any individual's social identity. By putting the body into discourse via the 'deployment of sexuality', the will to knowledge, says Foucault, has secreted itself into the very heart of life, creating naturalising myths to disguise its presence. This means that it has, in practice, made its own fictions the 'real' grounding that people turn to in constructing their identities. He notes that, "it is through sex - in fact, an imaginary point determined by the deployment of sexuality - that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility" (1978, p155).

This repeated idea, that all the values and notions that people turn to as a resource against the dominance of the will to knowledge are in fact simply illusions that it is responsible for creating in the first place, is fundamental to an understanding of what was mentioned earlier as a possible problematic in Foucault's theory. It is by keeping sight of this point that an appreciation can develop of the paradox that Foucault might have presented himself with. For there is little doubt as to the value of his excavation and analysis of the methods and techniques of the will to knowledge's manipulation of individuals; and also of the practical histories that he produced on the development of the modern methods of treating the insane and the offender;
and yet it might be the case that there are unresolved tensions within his work which strain his own argument enough to raise doubts as to its overall import as a critique.

Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. .. Resistance do not derive from a few heterogeneous principles; but neither are they a lure or a promise that is of necessity betrayed. They are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite,

(Foucault, 1978, pp95-96).

The issues that engender these postulated tensions seem to be to do with the possibility of autonomous action by individuals, and are perhaps raised to the status of a problem by Foucault's own characterisation of the extent of the will to knowledge's effects.

It is possible to present this problematic by describing Foucault's theory as in some sense 'mirroring' the object of its attention. In other words, like the practices of discourse of rationalism it describes, it can, in itself, be seen as forming a network of strategies and methods that all pass through a central deployment - in this case the conception of the will to knowledge. It is this central 'axis' that, if this analysis is right, acts to enable all that passes through it at the same time as it strips it of any effectivity beyond its confines. In this sense, in a process similar to that undergone by the constructed 'subjects' of the will to knowledge, Foucault's concept of the will to knowledge carries his own genealogies to the points of inquiry that marks them as radical and effective - granting them the capacity to reveal and explain the machinations and naturalisations they come across - but, at the final stage, when they stand in a position to deliver a blow and strike out against the object of their critique, the same conception needs, if it is to be inclusive, to reveal their force of
radicality and incisiveness as probably already contained and therefore illusory, since they are themselves produced within the discourse of rationalism. In other words, the concept of the will to knowledge, which characterises it as that which produces both power and its possible resistance, seems to disable the possibility of genuine acts of opposition. Such acts become simply products of the expansion of the will to knowledge's hold on life, instead of refusals of it.

However, there are clear points in Foucault's work where he does seem to attempt to indicate possible pathways out of this problematic, and where he references what he believed to be examples of genuinely transgressive acts. For example, he was clearly excited by the anarchists' concentration on delinquency (26), and saw it as an attempt to recognise in it the most militant rejection of the law; when they tried not so much to heroize the revolt of the delinquents as to disentangle delinquency from the bourgeois legality and illegality that had colonized it; when they wished to re-establish or constitute the political unity of popular illegalities,

(1977, p292).

There certainly does seem to be some sort of positive attitude towards a political agenda in evidence here, which in turn suggests that Foucault had not, as Chomsky and others believed, entirely abandoned the search for political alternatives. There is little doubt, though that he was extremely wary of the act of formulating such things on a societal scale, and was distrustful of their capacity to produce positive consequences.

There are, in fact, clues to what Foucault's 'positive political agenda' might have been, but these are gleaned more by noting the targets of his critiques than they are by registering explicit declarations. For example, there is present across Foucault's writings
what is an intense antipathy towards the effects of normalization, which suggests an attachment to some notion of genuine differentiation. There also seems to be a cynicism towards visions of the future that rely on myths for their basis, which might register as the voicing of a belief that these things are only valuable when founded on a different kind of truth. We have also seen expressed a contempt for the way instrumental rationality has confined and subjugated unreason, which might be read as a desire to see unreason’s spontaneity unleashed; and have witnessed a critique of the ‘myths’ of sexuality and sex, which could be viewed as an attempt to point to the body as a site of resistance by revealing how it has been turned into an object of discourse.

It is perhaps possible to distinguish in all this the shape of the ‘Other’ that Foucault was seeking to extricate, or even defend, with his critical analyses of the dominating strategies of rationalism. This ‘Other’ appears in the shape of a more radical conceptualization of the truth of human identity. In other words, it represents an effort to indicate the prior, or initial, form of the object - the human organism - that the will to knowledge has moulded into ‘subjects’ in accordance with its own needs. It does not, as such, correspond to notions such as a ‘true human nature’ or a ‘real self’, since such notions tend to act as supports of the rationalistic structures of the existing social world in a way that this ‘Other’ clearly would not. It represents, rather, a picture of where the primary forces of the human organism - the will to power in its ‘pure’ form - have conflicted with, and been subsumed by, the operations of rationalism. For Foucault, the ‘History’ of humanity is the history of the manifestation, and subsequent domination, of this rationalism. He attempts in his genealogies to show how this rationalism, which he terms the will to knowledge, has invested life to the extent that it has become the
source of all the possibilities of individual identity available within society.

In doing so, he has also attempted to reveal how the limits of the will to knowledge's containment of individuals are the site of constant irruptions and inversions, as the force of individual agency, or desire, seeks for itself extended avenues of expression. The point was to search out those acts which are genuinely trangressive, as opposed to those that simply extend the containment of the individual and act to further the processes of the will to knowledge. For Foucault, every time genuinely progressive potential is blocked, or channelled, or made to express itself in conformity with an imposed structure, the process of perversion and interiorization that supports the construction of the individual as a mythical 'subject' is continued.

In light of this, it might be possible to say that Foucault is, in effect, locating a force which might be characterised as similar to a will to power as, in some sense, primary in individuals. Following from this, it can be asserted that this will to power is placed by Foucault as a 'fact' of the human condition prior to the workings of rationalism which have, to contain and direct it, placed it within the processes of a will to knowledge that define the shapes it is possible for it to take. The question Foucault was concerned to ask of this situation was: Why, from all possible alternatives, did the 'will to power' effect itself as the will to knowledge? And what is the nature of this relationship between the 'will to power' and the will to knowledge? He believed that it was possible to name this will to knowledge as just one form of rationality, or rationalism; and was concerned to point out that his critique of it could not be translated as an attack on Reason per se, since "no given form of rationality is actually Reason" (in Raulet, 1983 p205).

Now, what should be noted here is the grounding
this 'defence' of Reason in Foucault's work offers for the conception of the capacity to learn advanced earlier in this thesis, since the installation of such a capacity as innate in human beings is, as we saw, the positing of Reason as a natural human capability. In other words, as a concept it is a different way of arguing, just as Foucault does, for the arbitrary nature of certain forms of rationalism, but not against the containing structure of Reason itself. This is an important point to make, since it suggests that it is only by retaining the structures of Reason that individuals can have a sphere of operation for their desires. The realm of Reason therefore becomes the only site of play for individual creative agency, and subsequently the only arena for the extension of liberatory potential. That this is so becomes acceptable once it is realized, as Foucault explains, that Reason is a site of being that particular strains of rationalism are developed from, and do not completely encapsulate. In other words, there is more to Reason as a means of existence than its manifestation as rationalism.

In this sense, then, the anti-rationalistic, or irrational, drive of theatre forms such as Surrealism and Expressionism, which attempted to reach beyond the conscious mind into the more 'chaotic' unconscious, can be seen as attempts to develop the perception of a new order, surpassing that of rational coherence, embodied in the more 'sublime' Reason of the 'archetypal' mind. Artaud, for example, made clear that "true culture" was simply "a rarefied way of understanding and exercising life" (1970, p3), and that "this leads us to reject man's usual limitations and powers and infinitely extends the frontiers of what we call reality" (p6). The end point of this would be what he termed "active metaphysics", by which he meant "thought adopting deep attitudes" (p31). Not the banishing of thought, then, but its enlargement and extension beyond rationalism.

If we return to the conception of human identity offered earlier in this thesis at this point, we will
remember that it was a description of the structuration of human identity that stated that an infant's experiential data is pulled together into a 'pool' via the capacity for individual memory, which sets up a dialectical input/feedback circuit that processes, informs, and directs the infant's interaction with the materiality of the world, which is 'willed' at only the most primary level, the level of the needs and desires of the somatic drives. From the preceding analysis of Foucault's work, we can see that, the infant's initial existence as the undifferentiated materiality of the body can be presented as the stage of its presence as 'pure' will to power, whilst its subsequent maturation is the process of its removal from this phase of its existence into existence as the will to knowledge.

What the discussion of Reason above indicates is that there is already present as a natural feature of the originary will to power an impulse towards the unifying of experience, since a capacity to learn includes an ability to remember, and an ability to remember presumes a continuous site of experience, a 'centre'. We begin to see, then, that the attempt to 'de-centre' this self may meet a resistance from the materiality of the body itself, in its dialectical relationship with the world around it.

Nietzsche, for instance, made it clear that the sense of cohesion and unity experienced by the 'subject' is rooted in the materiality of the body and is, in fact, an essential pre-condition of life (27).

However, it needs to be made clear that adopting a schema of human identity that includes a certain tendency in the organism towards cohesion of experience is in no way to embrace recognisably the same concept as that of an unproblematised Essentialist notion of a 'real self'. The latter concept has information to give about the 'character, or 'personality' of the individual in question, whereas the notion of the 'centred' self advanced by this thesis is rooted in the materiality of the body and gives no clues as to any possible ethical, or emotional, trajectory. In other words, it regards the 'self' as a
secondary phenomenon, and individual 'subjects' as structures created by and for the demands of particular socio-economic political situations.

That there has been, and is, variation in the specific forms of these identity structures maintained and validated by different civilisations at different times clearly bespeaks the contingency of what particular cultures tend to represent as absolute, or natural, concerning what it is to be human (to qualify as a member of that microcosmic culture/world), and this can only act as a foil to notions of essential 'selves' that exist exterior to any particular cultural context. Indeed, a certain malleability of form is generally accepted as a defining characteristic of what is denoted by the term 'human', since it is this that acts as pre-requisite for the existence of cultural diversity. This, in itself, adds weight to the proposition that there is more potential for variation in the forms of human identity within the realm of Reason than is offered by Western instrumental rationality; and supports, surely, the efforts to give voice to those unexplored possibilities undertaken by avant-garde theatre practitioners. As Paul Kornfeld, the Expressionist dramatist said, the search is for "that seed of madness that is not the overthrow of Reason but its surpassing" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p259).

So, in conclusion to this analysis of the problematisation of the notion of the 'self' offered in the writings of Michel Foucault, we might say that in setting out to illuminate how a certain relationship between power and knowledge had created the forms of the 'self' found in certain historic manifestations of Reason, Foucault was attempting to answer the question of how the primary will to power had engaged what he termed the will to knowledge as its means of expression, and with what results.

The developing conception of human identity advanced by this thesis proposes, as we have seen, that the evolutionary trajectory of human beings is, in fact, pre-determined towards certain forms rather than others. For example, a certain determining factor in this evolution is
the nature of human embodiment, an aspect of which is the ability provided by the innate capacity to learn - itself a characteristic of the primary will to power - to create a continuity of experience over time which is individual. This is another way, perhaps, of saying that the experiencing of life as a ‘centred’ being is, at a basic physiological level, innate in humans.

We can take this interrogation of what constitutes the structures and forms of human identity further now by moving to examine the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan. Lacan’s work is of interest here since it constitutes an attempt to remove the body as a determining influence on identity; which effectively means that its target is precisely the type of formulation of human identity just forwarded above. An analysis of his theory should lead, then, to a testing of that formulation’s viability. His writings are notoriously difficult to decipher, but what follows should make clear his importance in the present discussion. In a sense, the analysis will allow us to effect a return to Goffman’s original interrogation of the self-as-a-performative-event, only in a different context and amidst different terminology. It will therefore enable a new dimension to be added to our developing notion of how the concept of the self is best characterised.

The great big gap between what a performance is to people inside from what it is to people outside conditions all the thinking about performance. These differences can be as great within a single culture as they are across cultural boundaries,

(Schechner, in Schechner & Appell (eds), 1990, p27).
Lacan and the total Will to Knowledge:

Such is the fright that seizes man when he unveils the face of his power that he turns away from it even in the very act of laying it bare,


The object is to pry the human soul loose from its joints, to sink it deep in terror, frost, fire, and transports until it suddenly rids itself of all its dullness, anxiety, gloom,

(Nietzsche, 1956, p276) (28).

It is possible, as it was with Foucault, to trace the Nietzschean notions of a 'table of values' and 'the Good' onto Lacan's notion of a 'symbolic order' (29), and see both sets of notions, at the same time, as parallel to the Foucauldian 'power/knowledge' network (30). Following this imposition, we can then describe the field in which the infant becomes a 'subject' - what Lacan terms the 'symbolic order' - as the realm created and maintained by the will to knowledge (instrumental rationality). Lacan's notion of the 'Real' then names what we have until now been calling the stage of the pure 'will to power'.

This tracing on of forms can be continued by describing Lacan's concept of the 'imaginary' - the stage of what he calls the 'mirror phase' - as the first manifestations of the drive to a cohesive self that registers what we have been calling the will to knowledge. This allows us to place Lacan's main theoretical terms within the context of this thesis so far.

As has already been noted, the central point of interest in this examination of Lacan's work is the attempt within it to remove the body as a determining influence on the lives of individuals, other than at an unattainable level. This attempt would, if successful, clearly
invalidate the positive vision of the body's liberatory potential which we have seen offered by Foucault and, more especially, by Nietzsche.

Between the infant's image as recognised in the mirror and her lived experience of a fragmentary and minimally controlled bodily self is a gap apparently fully present to the infant's consciousness. The fundamental alienation that results from her identification with her mirror image is, thus, something essentially 'felt' by the young child, and Lacan would seem at this point to be committed to the claim that some such alienating feeling must be a more or less permanent characteristic of human consciousness.

(Lee, 1990, p30).

Jonathan Lee, in his examination of Lacan's opus (31), charts what he sees as Lacan's attempt to steer a path between linguistic idealism and a naive belief in pre-linguistic experience. In the former, language - and it will be helpful to the later discussion to note here that the term 'language' in the Lacanian schema refers to what this thesis has been describing as the world as constituted for individuals by the will to knowledge - is seen as a closed, all-encompassing circuit, having and needing no access to areas of experience outside of itself; the latter presentation, on the other hand, describes an experiential realm that is available to individuals outside of such a linguistic circuit. Lee attempts in his text to map the course that Lacan followed in manoeuvring between these two extremes, and indicates that it is not a tension easily resolved. For example, Lee points out how Lacan:

wants to defend the intelligibility of a kind of cognitive experience of the real that avoids the extreme intellectual heights of 'savoir' - complete mediation by the symbolic structure of language - but also avoids falling into the extreme intellectual depths of 'connaissance' - absolutely immediate contact without any mediation by language.

(1990, p194).
It is fundamental to Lacan's general theory of subjectivity - of what we have been calling existence as the will to knowledge - that alienation and lack are its defining characteristics. As such, Lacan's theory relies upon a notion of the Real - what we have called the state of existence of the 'pure' will to power - and the symbiotic relationship with the mother, as irretrievably lost to the subject due to the transfiguring and alienating effects of the mirror and oedipal stages. By formalising the subject-making process in this way, Lacan can be seen to be building into his theories the persistent nature of a 'Real' which the enclosed 'signifying chains' of the Symbolic would have no need of. It can be suggested that this develops into a problem for Lacan's thesis precisely because of his refusal to remove the experiential potency of the body from the picture, which, as we have just seen, is often postulated as the site of this pure will to power, or the 'Real' level of existence.

In other words, in the attempt to remove any resort to the notion of biological determinism from his theory (32), it may be that Lacan did not quite manage to account for what must, after all, be a compromise between two givens - the organism and language. For it would be strange, surely, for a theory that establishes itself on a claim for the longevity of certain bodily experiences (the loss of which are the root of the subject's alienation and sense of lack), to claim in the same, or even a later, breath that bodily lived experience, the temporally continuous presence of the body in the Real, has no determining effect on the 'subject', whose horizons of experience are those prescribed by the Symbolic. It would seem at times, though, that this is precisely what Lacan is, in effect, claiming:

The child's identification with its specular image impels it nostalgically to seek out a past symbiotic completeness, even if such a state never existed and is retrospectively imposed on the pre-mirror phase; and to
seek an anticipatory or desired (ideal or future) identity in the coherence of the totalized specular image....It is the dual, ambivalent relation to its own image that is central to Lacan’s account of subjectivity,

(Grosz,1990, p39).

What makes the issue more perplexing here is the contradictory characterisations within Lacan’s texts (and in Grosz’s) of what the Real is as an experience for the pre-mirror phase infant. Lacan characterises the Real as a place that ‘lacks nothing’, in opposition to the imaginary and symbolic which are, by definition, lacking of this lack of nothing (33); and yet, at the same time, his theories rely on a notion of the experience of the Real as the motivation for the alienating transfiguration of his hypothesis of the ‘mirror stage’ (34). In this formulation, the ‘mirror stage’ represents that phase of existence when the infant is impelled to identify itself as its image because of the unity promised there, a promise which is, apparently, sufficient because it offers relief from the infant’s uncomfortable experience of its ‘body-in-bits-and-pieces’ (35), a discomfort having supposedly been created by the prematurity of its birth. For the infant, says Lacan, the mirror-stage image represents an ideal unity, a salutary ‘imago’; it is invested with all the original distress resulting from the child’s intra-organic and relational discordance during the first six months, when he bears the signs, neurological and humoral, of a physiological natal prematuration.

(1977, p19).

However, it is difficult to know, and it certainly does not seem to be made absolutely clear, how, or why, such a supposedly uncomfortable experiential phase as the pre-mirror stage - which is existence as the ‘pure’ will to power, remember - could become a universal point of nostalgia for human subjects marooned in the endless chains
of language. If, as Grosz suggested above, the sense of 'symbiotic completeness' never did exist, and is imposed retro-actively, it is not then immediately apparent why this should be so; and again, the point is never particularly clarified. What would be the purpose of such a presentation of experience as this? In order to serve an innate nostalgia? Or is it just another of what Lacan terms desire's 'objet petit a's', towards which it reaches, but which it can never possess (36)?

For something must indeed motivate the infant to leave its 'lack of lack' in the Real and enter the 'primary alienation' of the identification with its image in the mirror; and since what the image offers is spatial cohesion and unity, it might be presumed that the infant identifies with the image in order to gain these things which, despite its lack of lack, it lacks. This suggests the possibility that the infant seeks the distance from its own experience that the mirror offers in order to effect escape from what is an intensely uncomfortable position. However, it is also possible that the infant uses this structure of self-as-image as a means to establish within itself the distance - the reflexivity - necessary for the operation of power over its own body. This is an important point, and we shall return to it again later.

Following from this, it can be seen that if it is indeed an affective bodily experience that motivates the infant towards specular identification with its own image via a 'mirror stage', then the problem discussed above, of the presence of the body in the Real/Symbolic synchronistically clearly needs to be answered; and it also surely needs to be made clear what the character of this initial and continuing bodily presence was, and is. This would then allow the possible existence of a 'nostalgia' for the Real in the human 'subject' to be better explained.

For Lacan, identity does not derive from genetic dispositions, nor from an unfolding of neuro-physiological developmental sequences; nor is it the product of a war between biological and cultural forces, nor the reflection of collective archetypes. Identity is built up as a composite of
of images and effects - i.e. mental representations - taken from the outside world from the start of life, which are developed in relation to the Desire for recognition and the later social requirements for submission to an arbitrary Law,

(Ragland-Sullivan, 1982, p7) (37).

To explore the possibility of an inconclusive resolution of the presence of the Real in Lacan's theory is far from an intended dismissal of his findings. It is, rather, an attempt to discover the exact nature and status of this realm of experience for the 'subject' supposedly constituted in and by the Symbolic. For according to Lacan, the Real is, as we have seen, that source of the sense of lack and alienation from his/her own self that haunts the subject throughout life. It is the reason why Desire has the character in human beings that it does, being always only partially satisfiable through the extension out to, and return from, the unpossessable 'objet petit a'; and it is also the site of what he terms bodily 'jouissance', the ultimate sensory experience (38). The 'Real', then, might be said to be, for Lacanian theory, the absolute reason underlying existence. As he himself says, "what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter - an appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us" (1979, p53). Belsey (1993) makes clear the importance of this elusive 'Real' as the object of unconscious desire in adults when she notes that:

Every object of adult desire is always only a substitute for an original object which is forever lost, and which it represents. Since each substitute, each representation, is always only that and no more, it can never fully be the object of unconscious desire. Loss returns as the impossibility of perfect satisfaction,

(p391).

It is arguable, in light of this characterisation of the 'Real', that the tension recognised by Lee in Lacan's
work, which apparently caused him to oscillate with some indecision between the two poles of naive reduction and linguistic idealism, is the logical outcome of this attitude towards the twin realms of the 'will to power' - the Real - and the will to knowledge - the Symbolic Order. For Lacanian psychoanalysis makes no sense, has no purpose even, if a more valid realignment of actions in the Symbolic to their true root in the Real is not seen as the desired end of the process of analysis.

If this is the case, then an argument for the determining nature of the Real is surely being forwarded. However, this reading is problematized by the fact that it is implicit in most presentations of Lacanian theory, and in the overall sense of Lacan's writings themselves, that it is, in fact, the Symbolic which is fully determining once it is entered. There is, within this presentation, "no lost golden world outside 'civilization' or culture" (Belsey, 1993, p392), which might be looked to as an area free from the necessary loss and alienation inflicted on the subject by its entry into language. All activity in the Symbolic, says Lacan, is generated by the primal loss and alienation experienced by the infant in its passage from the Real to the Symbolic; so that the history of subjects in analysis, or out, is presented in Lacanian theory as the unconscious inscription of their desire for the totality represented by the Real onto the Symbolic. In the terms used by this thesis so far, this would read as the presence of the 'will to power' as the contained energising force which propels the will to knowledge and shapes its biographical 'destiny', forcing it to seek ever fuller expression and ever greater 'overcomings'. This is similar, perhaps, to what Nietzsche meant when he noted that "in the final analysis one experiences only oneself" (1961, p173).

The life of the human 'subject', then, is characterised by Lacan as a narrative of the finding of desired objects in the Symbolic - the 'objet petit a' - that never more than partially fulfil the subject's true
Desire, which is for a return to the symbiotic wholeness and 'lack of Lack' represented by the pre-mirror phase relationship with the mother, which is also the stage of its pre-existence as 'pure' will to power.

It is important to recognise here the fact that the infant, at this first stage, is limited in its physical and psychical ability by being constrained within the form of its embodiment, and is therefore restricted in its ability to meet its own needs, suggesting an aspect of this early existence as will to power - an absolute vulnerability, a state of disempowerment - that it is important to note and which will be returned to in later discussion.

So, in Lacan's theoretical structure, the basic human experience is a longing for, and constant search to replace, the determining factor of human activity in the Symbolic - the Real. This Lacanian 'base' is, of necessity, forever lost. It can neither be known nor grasped, and exists only as that which no longer exists. This means that, in effect, the Real is positioned as determining nothing, since it is non-existent; and yet it is this very non-existence, and the human urge for things to be otherwise, that does, apparently, act as a determinant on all activity that takes place 'beyond' it.

It is, of course, difficult not to see the debilitating effects of an Idealism present in the manufacture of this paradox, and it is towards a possible resolution of this that we will now turn.

The subject is born in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other. But, by this very fact, this subject, which was previously nothing if not a subject coming into being - solidifies into a signifier....The subject is this emergence which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier,


Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1982) is an example of a defender of Lacan's structuring of the formative process of individuation, on the grounds that his work seeks,
correctly, to reject the traces of biological determinism still present in Freud's work. She quotes Lacan in noting that "in the psyche, there is nothing by which the subject may situate himself as a male or female being" (Lacan, 1979, p204). After this, however, she goes on to make the slightly curious comment that "Lacan is interested in what structure and language make of our bodily natures" (1982, p17). It seems at the least ambiguous, for an argument which claims to be rejecting the notion of the importance of biology in the differentiating practices of social sexuality, to allow within the argument for such a thing as 'bodily nature'. And it is surely even more surprising to find it somehow 'bracketed off' from the individual's psychical experience. There would appear to be a risk here, perhaps generated by Lacan's own unresolved attitude towards the matter of the Real, of running dangerously close to a dualistic framework of understanding. For instance, individuals are neutrally characterised as far as psychic topography is concerned, being essentially a blank sheet where any differentiation is culturally created rather than the result of innate form, and yet these same cultural forces - the structures of the Symbolic Order - are then, apparently, forced into a more difficult and never fully resolved compromise with the already present bodily natures of human beings, since the same original 'neutrality' of form is simply not advanced in this instance. This implicit tracing of an innate character onto the body but not the psyche of the infant is engaged in, not only by readers of Lacan such as Ragland-Sullivan, but by Lacan himself; and it allows him to advance a host of assumptions that act as groundings for further hypothetical propositions.

For example, Lacan presents the material structure of Desire in the Symbolic Order as supplanteeing the original and primary drives of need gratification operative in the realm of the Real by building upon energy paths that flowed out from the body then, and which, in the Symbolic, move out to penetrate to some degree the rim of an 'objet petit
a' before returning to the body.

This same pattern of structuration of the body, which is reliant on a re-tracing and re-alignment of an already present form, can be seen in many aspects of Lacanian theory. For example, the human infant is presented as 'premature' at birth, which, if it does nothing more specific, surely causes its bodily/psychical experience to be of a certain manner rather than another. Bodily 'jouissance', also, is characterised as concentrated on orifices and rims - the eyes, ears, mouth, anus, genitals - and all those areas that stand as border points between the body's surface and the external world. The infant experiences its body as a 'body-in-bits-and-pieces', rather than as a unified whole; and it is incapable initially of installing distance between its own 'self' (which does not yet exist) and the world outside it. Of all the active nodes of concentration of bodily 'jouissance', the infant can recognise the centrality of the genital site, presumably due to its prominence as a site of sensation. All of these characterisations cannot help but reveal an assumed form of the body that is implicitly accepted by Lacanian theory as prior to its own formulations. Indeed, without this 'prior' structure, the theory would have nothing to extrapolate out from.

However, the psyche of the infant is, if we are to believe Lacan, essentially form-less at this stage. It is useful to remember here, then, that the level at which this 'prior form' of the body is posited as existing is also that level at which our notion of the capacity to learn was presented as existing also. It therefore stands as one of the innate, 'objective', and necessary pre-conditions for the human life-form, (39). So, perhaps against Lacan, we would argue that it is necessary to argue for the existence of a 'prior' form in the human psyche also.

There is a further, crucial point to make here, concerning what we have characterised as the 'will to power'. Inserting the notion of such a driving force into Lacan's schema, and suggesting that the drive towards the
transfiguration of the mirror stage, if it happens at all, develops in the infant out of the need for this force to assume control over its environment and empower itself, might possibly help to explain what, at times, seems the quite remarkable astuteness, however unconscious, that Lacan ascribes to the human infant, in its ability to see what is required of it and to what end. This ‘will to power’, it can be argued, is what impels the infant to enter the psychic positions offered it by the mirror and oedipal stages, and to accept its eternally ‘alienated’ state as will to knowledge in return for social recognition as a cohesive, unified identity. Looked at in this way, the infant can be seen to be surrendering its ‘lack of Lack’ in the Real for the ability to possess a self which it can then reflect upon. This point was also crucial to Foucault, who saw his genealogies as “an analysis of the relation between forms of reflexivity - a relation of self to self - and, hence, of relations between forms of reflexivity and the discourse of truth, forms of rationality and the effects of knowledge” (1983, p203).

The issue to re-assert here is that it was not Foucault’s intention to attack Reason itself by investigating certain manifestations of a type of rationalism, and neither was it his intention to suggest that reflexivity - the basic structure of Reason - was, of itself, a subject for critique. It was, rather, specific forms of reflexivity, not reflexivity per se, that were the proper objects of inquiry.

It might be possible to state, then, that this ‘self’, capable of reflection upon itself, is indeed one necessarily alienated from itself, but that it is this very ability to reflect and act upon its object from a distance (even if this distance is internal to the object in question), that is the first pre-requisite for the operation of power in general, and of the ‘will to power’ in its human form in particular. In this presentation of the matter, the infant would be entering the ‘alienating’ transfigurations of the oedipal and mirror stages in order
to become empowered. Indeed, writers such as Ragland-Sullivan and Grosz acknowledge this fact at some level by their focus on the particular qualities of empowerment ascribed to the different gender positions covered by the oedipal rite of passage. It could be, then, that the relationship Lacan describes between the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic in the subject, the perpetual exchange of imagery and energy between the conscious and the unconscious, can be characterised as the insistent striving of this 'will to power' towards full expression, towards a total and complete empowerment of its form, which is hampered always by its own essential type, and by its distance from its object of attention - the lived body. Actually, to cast it thus really does no more than give form to a presence that Lacan clearly recognised: "It is in this erotic relation, in which the human individual fixed upon himself an image that alienates him from himself, that are to be found the energy and form on which this organisation of the passions that he will call his ego is based" (1977, p19).

We can now move on to a different aspect of Lacan’s theory, which is a concentration on language.

A major premise of most psychoanalytic theory is that what language finds unrepresentable it represses, thereby forming the unconscious. This repressed, 'unexpressible' force is constituted of the drives and urges of the body.

In Lacanian theory, the unconscious is formed not only by language but as language, as a sort of inverse, or negative, of the ‘developed’ picture that is conscious discourse. This process does not happen in a vacuum, and language does not create matter out of a void so much as instill rupture into a continuity. Lacan argues that language creates the totality of meanings and possible discourses, and that it is prior to, and formative of, the 'subject'; but he also stresses that what language works on, the raw material out of which it fashions human subjects, continues to inform, colour, and disrupt language itself. Lacan’s working of the concept of the unconscious
therefore makes clear that it exists as a sort of 'dialectic', where language - the conscious - is constantly forced to accommodate and bear witness to that which it has deemed unspeakable and therefore repressed. This repressed material is, as Sheridan describes it, "that which is lacking in the symbolic order, the ineliminable residue of all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the symbolic" (in Lacan, 1977, px); and Lacan himself makes clear that "if repression there must be, it is because there is something beyond that is pressing in" (1979, p162).

This 'something', which strains and pushes at the structures of the Symbolic - of the will to knowledge - is, essentially, what Lacan presents as the Real, and this thesis has called the will to power, and it is rooted in the body's drives and desires.

In Lacan's theory, the body is, as we have seen, the site of 'jouissance', that manner of experience that is, as he says, 'beyond the Phallus'. It is also the foundational support for the structure of Desire. So when he talks below of objects that are 'of use', Lacan is referring to those things required by the body. It is the body and its needs and drives that first sketch what will become the eventual topography of the human psychical realm; and the body which hierarchizes and draws forth from the 'inaugural continuity' of existence in the Real those things that will be included within the Symbolic Order. It is, therefore, the body that originally decides the parameters of 'meaning', and so the form and context of the operations of the will to knowledge in the Symbolic. The body, in fact, forms the world of subjects and objects as Lacan makes clear: "[T]here would be no emergence of objects if there were no objects of use to me. This is the criterion of the emergence and distribution of objects" (1979, p191). He also notes that "before strictly human relations are established, certain relations have already been determined. They are taken from whatever nature may offer
as supports" (p20). In other words, the body, in dialectical engagement with the material world, predetermines the shape of things to come.

It can perhaps be seen from this brief analysis of Lacan’s thesis so far that it would be claiming a lot to state that the lived experience of the body has been successfully removed from a schema of the passage of infants into ‘subjecthood’; and this suggests that a retention of a determining capacity for the body in the objective world may be a valid theoretical option, if only because it avoids the paradox involved in trying to remove it. This can then lead to a reinstatement of the body as a ‘factual’ entity, and with this factual, material body comes, necessarily, a factual, material world. In terms of the ontological positions operating as supports of the type of theatrical practices we have touched upon so far in this thesis, this re-assertion of the body would seem to help to defend, in theory, those performances that look to the body as a power for liberation, or at least some deeper level of the ‘truth’ of identity.

At this point, an initial summation can be made that states that we have seen, across the writings of both Foucault and Lacan, a formulation of a pre-linguistic experiential substratum — what this thesis names as the will to power — and a subsequent description of its evolution into the delineated and divided ‘subject’ of the will to knowledge. This fundamental, dual-level structure is employed by both Lacan and Foucault as a framework within which they place their objects of attention, in order to focus, essentially, on the manner in which the will to knowledge exists as a containing device for the amorphous will to power. To this extent, it is possible to say that the conception of identity offered by this thesis still appears as a coherent one, and has not yet come into conflict with the radical problematization of the self offered by post-structuralism.

I want now to start drawing out a closer comparison between the Nietzschean and Lacanian projects. Lacan needs
to be seen as postulating for us, in exactly the same way as we have described Foucault as having done, the nature of the subjugation of the will to power in rationalist societies. In doing this, he also starts from a point akin to Nietzsche’s basic ontological position, and it may be informative to see if the comparison can be extended further. We can begin to do this by focusing on Nietzsche’s approach to the conscious discourse of individuals.

The intention is only a sign and symptom that needs interpreting,

(Nietzsche, 1990, p63).

The decisive value of an action resides in precisely that which is not intentional in it, and all that in it which is intentional, all of it that can be seen, known, ‘conscious’, still belongs to its surface and skin,

(p63).

The basic picture of human life that both Lacan and Nietzsche advance is that of ‘subjects’ whose awareness of their own motivating desires and drives is at the best partial, but more usually simply completely lacking. The purpose of Lacanian analysis, therefore, and, within it, the role of the analyst’s silence (40), is to act as a wall against which the ‘self’ of the analysand will be thrown as its discourse is not responded to in any way, until that self begins to break down and crumble, inducing in the ‘subject’ a “controlled paranoia” (Lacan, 1977, p15). This is intended to act as an intense destabilising of all the points of reference that the analysands had up until then used to guide their presentations of themselves to themselves, which in turn is intended to reveal to them that the stories which they have been telling themselves
about their lives are just that and no more - simply stories and fictions. Through the ongoing process of analysis, what will then become clear to these individuals is the nature of the forces that lie behind all their actions and decisions, inscribing their narrative - which is the only true narrative - into the fibres of their lives. Clearly, this can be compared to Nietzsche's prophet-figure Zarathustra calling for men to experience the "hour of the great contempt", where everything that they are, think, do, "even" their happiness becomes "loathsome" to them (1961, p79). For Nietzsche, this was the first step towards an authentic existence as a 'free spirit'.

For both writers, the point is that what the 'subject' takes him/herself to be is not actually what s/he is. As Lacan puts it, "it is not a question of knowing whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather of knowing whether I am the same as that of which I speak" (1977, p165).

Clearly, then, both Nietzsche and Lacan would not take at face value the story that any 'subject' were to tell them of 'who' they were, but would instead search in the ruptures and cracks of the discourse they chose to utter themselves as for the 'real' being - the will to power - to reveal itself. This is the meaning behind Zarathustra's warning that "it is not only he who speaks contrary to what he knows who lies, but even more he who speaks contrary to what he does not know" (1961, p87).

If we remember how Goffman simply described the nature of self-identity as a continuous 'performance' and did not really seek to dismantle this structure, it should be clear that what we have in Lacan and Nietzsche is a much more radically critical approach to the same issue. Where Goffman seemed content with a description of the situation, Lacan and Nietzsche are, to some extent, more involved in a deconstruction of it. We might look at Lacan's description of the unconscious as structured by, and as, a 'language' for furtherance of this idea.
Within this formulation, the conscious/unconscious division of the human mind is redefined in the sense that they are presented as defining each other, the topography of the one being determined by the presence of the other. Lacan’s own metaphor for the anchoring agent of the conscious mind, that which causes it to have the structure it does, is what he terms the ‘points de capiton’, which Lee translates as the “‘buttons’ that keep upholstery attached to the framework of a piece of furniture” (Lee, 1990, p61). These ‘points de capiton’ are described by Lacan as situated wherever a particular signifier has been repressed; and to understand these references of Lacan’s to the unconscious being structured ‘as language’, one need only follow this particular metaphor through. The visible surface of the piece of upholstery, for example, with its navel-like ‘points de capiton’, is the conscious mind, whilst the reverse side – which will reproduce in exactly inverse form the topography of the ‘out’ side – is the unconscious. The material of the upholstery, which is what actually creates, contains, separates and constitutes the two sides, is language. This fabric is not opaque, and its function is to act as a filter of the unconscious, the non-visible side, which is constantly straining to get through, especially around these ‘points de capiton’. This it succeeds in doing in the manner of the irruptions into consciousness of dreams, and of over-invested language forms such as metaphor and metonymy. In Lacan’s schema, the ‘subject’ mistakenly takes the visible surface of the upholstery – the conscious mind – to be the entire ‘shape’ of his/her self; and so what Lacanian analysis seeks to do is illuminate the positioning of the repressed signifiers – the ‘points de capiton’ – of the subject’s visible ‘shape’, since they are “the signifieds for the signifying chains of the subject’s discourse” (Lee, 1990, p61, emphasis added). In other words, these ‘points de capiton’ represent that which has caused the ‘shape’ of consciousness to appear the way it does, since they are always in place where there is a signifier that language has repressed because it cannot,
or will not, be made to speak it; and it is this act of repression, this drilling-in of 'buttons' to hold the fabric down, which creates the topographic structure of both the unconscious and the conscious simultaneously. So, as Lee explains, "to fix the ultimate meaning of any discourse is to determine the signifiers that have been repressed by that discourse" (p62). This act of fixing, for Lacan, is not something that 'subjects' themselves will be capable of, and hence his system of psycho-analysis (41).

In a sense, then, unlike Foucault's analysis of the macrocosmic workings of power/knowledge, it is possible to see Lacan as having been examining the microcosmic effects of the will to knowledge's operation within the subject's consciousness, and asking of it the question: How did the will to knowledge - the symbolic order - effect the containment of the will to power - the Real? His answer was, as we have seen: As language. Foucault, on the other hand, by focusing on the macrocosmic workings of the will to knowledge in its social regulation of 'subjects', was asking: How can the will to knowledge's 'points de capiton', those places where it has most stringently sought to subjugate the potentiality of the will to power, be recognised? And his answer was: By the intensity of the regimes of normalisation around those points. It can be seen from this that the field of inquiry for both writers was recognisably the same - the processes of containment of the human life-form within social structures of identity, most notably the concept of 'self' involved in subjecthood.

Now, before finally drawing the theories of Lacan, Nietzsche and Foucault together more fully to look at what is suggested by the questions they were asking of the will to knowledge, it will be constructive here to first cast an eye over how similar Nietzsche's and Lacan's conceptions of desire are, since it is desire which is recognised by post-structuralism as what might be termed the 'voice' of the will to power, and Lacan's work offers what is probably the most systematic exploration of the concept from a post-structuralist position.
Ultimately one loves one’s desires and not that which is desired...


It is the truth of what this desire has been in his history that the patient cries out in his symptom,


It is really no more than a progression of logic for Lacan to develop a notion of desire as necessarily frustrated, since his situating of the Real as the ‘impossible’ of Being, that which constantly presses in on the consciousness of the ‘subject’, would seem necessarily to demand such a conception. We have already seen the probable failure of Lacan’s theory to reduce the determining influence of the Real in the symbolic order – his postulation of the workings of the circuitry of desire can be seen as one aspect of the attempt within that theory to describe, or even resolve, this problematic.

For Lacan, there is a ‘self’, which is the necessary creation of the will to power as it seeks fulfilment; and this self is marooned at some distance from the state of being – Lacan’s Real – that motivates its actions. This state of being, which is the flux of the libidinal drives, is the real force behind the directives that guide the self’s decisions, in that the self strives endlessly to locate this state of existence since it mistakenly believes, at an unconscious level, that what it is looking for is somewhere other than where it, itself, presently is. The self is driven to seek this state of being in order to experience again the sense of unity and concreteness of identity that it believes can only be provided there. This is why Lacan says that the self’s desire is for “the desire of the Other” (1979, p235). What he means by this is that for the self, aware as it is of its own divided existence
since the mirror-stage, the recognition that being so desired by another would imply would grant it the solidity that it desperately craves. It would grant it a sense of being 'real', of being recognisably and concretely present. This recognition, because it would be afforded by the Other - the "one supposed to know" (42) - who is imputed by the self as occupying a more 'real' state than its own, lends the authority of that state to what it recognises and desires. In other words, it confers onto the self the status of being 'real' that the self alone is incapable of doing. The fact that the sense of being real achieved through recognition by the Other is illusory is precisely what the non-recognition by the "one supposed to know" - the analyst - of Lacanian analysis is designed to expose. The 'subject' is intended through this non-recognition to be shown how his/her objects of desire are not the truth of that desire. This, for Lacan, is a fact already sensed in the self's unconscious acknowledgement to itself of its failure to achieve its desire in any of its objet petit a's; an acknowledgement which, in all probability, is what has led the 'subject' to enter into analysis in the first place. It is this same process of the continual forming of the subject's life around the convolutions of his/her own desire that Nietzsche is referring to when he comments that man ultimately, "reaps nothing but his own biography," (1984, p238). This recognition leads to the need, perceived by both writers, to examine the specific forms with which the self tells the story of what it is to itself; and this, in essence, returns us to the question Foucault was also attempting to answer, namely how does the will to power create of itself the will to knowledge.

It was a matter of analysing, not behaviours or ideas, nor societies and their 'ideologies', but the 'problematizations' through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought - and the 'practices' on the basis of which these problematizations are formed,

(Foucault, 1984, p11).
We have said, then, that both Foucault and Lacan were intent on analysing the processes by which the will to power came to represent itself in the world as the channelled network of drives and desires that constitute the lived somatic existence of the ‘subjects’ of the will to knowledge. The crucial question for Foucault in this analysis was how the human life-form made of itself the particular object for reflection that it did. As we have seen, he located the roots of the modern ‘self’ in the possibilities offered to a specific form of the will to power — the will to knowledge — by the distancing of the threat of death from the everyday life of individuals via technology. Human life then assumed a role as the object of/for this will to knowledge that was articulated through a conglomeration of normative prescriptions installed within in the political and socio-economic networks of society which worked together to define the set of possibilities of what forms human life could find itself granted access to. His series of ‘genealogies’ stand as investigations into the particularities of these changes in the regimes of normalisation operating on ‘subjects’ in particular epochs.

Lacan, on the other hand, had no particular desire to historically locate the practices he was defining, those practices of the processes of socialisation that determined that human life would become the particular type of object of attention for itself that it did, installing in itself a divide between its ‘true’ state of existence and the alienated site of its existence as a ‘self’. He traced this process through with his hypotheses of the infant’s imaginary relation to itself in the mirror-stage, and its later postioning within the symbolic order via the ‘resolution’ of the Oedipal complex.

We have already discussed the problematic resident in
Lacan’s projection of a state of distress in the infant — the body experienced as a ‘body-in-bits-and-pieces’ — as the motivating factor of this drive to ‘misrecognise’ the image as the ‘self’, and have seen how there is a failure within such a conception to fully explain how this initial existence in the Real, which apparently lacks nothing, can therefore foster a sense of the needfulness of a sense of unity in the infant. It would perhaps avoid this problematic if the Real were instead presented simply as a site of bodily distress from which the infant moves in order to seek the unity that its mirror-image seems to offer. Lacan seems genuinely unwilling, however, to drop the notion of the Real as also a positive experience, in that he wants to retain an idea of it as that state which is devoid of the lack that marks later life. There is a certain logic to this stance, since there must necessarily have been a state of ‘non-lack’ at some time for the idea of a later state of lack characterized by a yearning for the former state to operate properly.

It does seem that this ambiguous characterisation of the Real remains a problem in Lacan’s theory. Nevertheless, his hypothetical ‘mirror-stage’ is in some senses crucial to this thesis, in that it offers a description of a truly pivotal point in the development of individual identity. In the schema used by this essay, Lacan’s mirror-stage describes the border over which the will to power passes to become the will to knowledge. In this sense, what Lacan seems unclear about is what has to be left behind for the crossing to be made; and what he in effect describes is a picture of a traveller leaving a detested place to reach a promised land who, having achieved this goal, then searches the new homeland for something approximating the one just left behind. It may be that Lacan was attempting through this to signal an innate perversity in human beings; but since this is never stated, it probably should not be assumed to be the case.

Coward and Ellis (1977) note, in their treatment of Lacan’s theory, how “the mirror-phase is seen by Lacan to
be the moment at which the infant’s first movement towards a unified sense of self is put in motion” (p109). In Nietzschean terms, this would be describable as the first flexing of that ‘will to simplicity’, with its need to ‘bind together and tame’, that signals the presence of the will to knowledge. Lacan, as we have seen, characterises the impulse to make this move as deriving from the psychophysical sensation of discomfort engendered by the infant’s “physiological natal prematuration” (1977, p19). Coward and Ellis go on to describe how it is the differentiation of the world into ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ that provides the necessary structure for what will eventually be the site of language’s functioning, noting that “the positionality which characterises language - in which meanings exist for a subject who functions as the place of intention of those meanings - commences with the separation of subject and object” (1977, p111). They then show how this process of separation is enacted according to the pleasure principle as hypothesised by Freud, whereby the imaginary ego of the infant accepts or rejects things as a result of the feelings of pleasure or pain that they produce in it. It is in this act of expelling from itself what it will not accept that the infant begins to form a divide between what is it and what is ‘other’, and thereby creates a world structured as subjects and objects.

This does nothing, of course, to explain why, if the infant is the sole determining agent in this construction of the world as inside/outside, and therefore operates this ability of creating the world exterior to it only in order to hold what it will not accept into itself at a distance from it, the exterior world as so constituted is not simply a repository for all that is negative for the infant, and how it is that it can also contain objects of desire for it. It does not, either, offer an explanation for the existence in itself of the pleasure principle, which surely seems to carry with it the voice - in this schema the dictatorial voice - of the body. What these criticisms are
intended to imply is that there is a need to consider the possibility, touched on already, that the ‘centering’ of experience within human beings is a manifestation of the healthy functioning of the organism according to its biologically-determined optimum mode of functioning. This point will resurface later, since it is an important one.

In furthering the explication of this formation of the world as subject/object, Coward and Ellis go on to explain how, for the infant, the proposed,

dialectic of introjection/projection is the movement which can eliminate unbearable tension by the setting up of an outside that is radically other than the ego...and it is this which in creating an outside, builds the ego and places the subject in a position of possible predication,

(1977, p139).

They state that this leads to the need to master symbolic discourse since,

by this movement of projection/expulsion, the object which has been projected is definitively separated from the body of the subject; it is thus situated as ‘out there’, and as such only one relationship is possible in order to master this exteriority and gain satisfaction of needs. This is the acceptance of the sign, that is symbolic relations and learned language. Acceptance makes it possible to represent the object in its absence, and therefore enables mastery of that absence,

(p141).

So, the infant’s formation of a discrete ‘self’, its positioning of itself as a ‘subject’ that is certain things whilst it is not others, is what gives to it the possibilities of predication, which is also the ability to be represented as a subject-position in language, as well as the means to master absence. This is, in fact, implicitly acknowledged as an act of empowerment for the
infant by Coward and Ellis, and can only be portrayed as negative if emphasis is placed on the fact that it is gained at the cost of a non-divided existence in the Real.

It is possible, though, against the pessimism implicit in such a reading, to advance a case for the infant's division of itself from the world and itself as deriving from natural capacities in human beings which in fact enhance, rather than diminish, its potential in life. As we shall see, this seems to be the path that Nietzsche took; and he did so by dint of a rejection of the notion of the real as simply an idealism. This, essentially, is also what this thesis has been attempting with the particular presentation of identity that it has been offering.

Bryan Turner notes how "the fact of human embodiment (or more technically the fact that humanity is in evolutionary terms a warm-blooded mammal, a species being) gives rise to certain problems which must be satisfied in order for Man to survive" (in Featherstone, 1991, p1); and goes on to describe how the particular paths of development followed by different groups of the human species have engendered different regulatory structures, since "the growth of civilization requires simultaneously the restraint of the body and the cultivation of character in the interests of social stability" (p15). This, he says, can be sought in a variety of ways, depending on the nature of the society in question. Perhaps it will be remembered that this is the process which Goffman was happy to call 'natural', seeing the development of civilisation as 'probably a natural process', rather than, as Foucault saw it, a reflection of the workings of particular relationships between power and knowledge. In the West, Turner notes, rationalism was the chosen regulatory structure designed to overcome the crises and threats that confronted the efforts of this geographical coagulation of the human species to survive and extend itself. He goes on to explain that what is seen as the gathering degeneration of the effectivity of this structure as a containment device and provider of solutions has begun to mean that
it is no longer clear that dependence on human rationality will be sufficient in principle to respond to these global crises, precisely because there is the suspicion that the crises are actually produced by the same instrumental rationality,


The point here is not whether rationality will be sufficient 'in principle', but that it is not proving to be so in practice. Rationalism has developed and extended as a framework for human existence as a result of human interaction, and therefore as a result of the dialectical relation between practice in the material world and the practice of the formation of concepts about that practice. So, if it is true that strains are beginning to show in the conceptual apparatus offered by instrumental rationality in the contemporary world, it is primarily because it is proving to be insufficient to meet the problems issuing from current human practice, and only secondarily - in fact only as a result of this - because of a problematic being discovered as regards its founding principles. This takes us back to Harman’s insistence, dealt with in Chapter Two, that concepts must be seen as deriving from human interaction with the physical world, rather than from nowhere; which in turn leads us back to the ambivalence towards the Symbolic due to a certain nostalgia for the ‘lost’ real which we witnessed in Lacan.

It can be said that underlying Lacan’s acceptance of the impossibility in adulthood of ever being able to experience this Real directly, in an ‘unmediated’ fashion, is the idealist assumption that something is lost in the human conceptualisation of the world, and that this something is something worthwhile. As Peter Dews explains it,

subjectivity presupposes reflection, a representation of experience as that of an experiencing self. But through such representation, which depends upon the
 synthesizing function of concepts, the
original fluidity of intuition, the
communication between the human and the
specular world, is lost. Consciousness
becomes a kind of self-contained theatre,
divided between stage and auditorium:
energy is transformed into the thought of
energy, intensity into intentionality,

(1986, p31, emphasis added).

It is this 'lost realm' of experience, this 'original
fluidity of intuition' that seems at times to haunt Lacan's
work; and we have seen how, like Foucault, he intimates
that it is the innate multiplicity of the body and its
drives that speaks this 'lost' level of life most
truthfully. However, as we have seen, a system of
reflexivity - or consciousness - is a defining feature of
being 'human'. This reflexivity is, as Lacan himself has
shown, the division of the world into 'subjects' and
'objects'; which is, in turn, the grounds for the
'symbolisation' of the world - the re-presentation of it by
the subject in symbolic form. This translation of the
world into symbols can then be seen to be the method by
which the 'will to power' seeks to gain control over its
environment in a context - that of embodiment as a social
animal - where totality of control and influence is
necessarily beyond it. Symbolisation, then, needs to be
seen as the means by which the will to power seeks to
become the whole of something of which it is only, in fact,
a part. If we can note Lacan's point about man needing to
'impress his image in reality', we can now see that he/she
does this so as to effectively 'own' the whole, to become
it, and to extend the form of themselves beyond the
boundaries of embodiment into the atoms and the stars
(43). In this sense, it can be claimed that symbolisation
is the will to power at play.

As a counterpoint to Lacan's pessimism, then, the
position of this thesis asserts the possibility of viewing
instrumental rationality as successfully serving the will
to power. On top of this it suggests, with Foucault, that
rationality is an outgrowth of will to power which enables it to extend itself into the world and overcome the limitations of its form to a greater extent than would have been possible without it. It is clear that when that form of rationality which has been chosen as the path to empowerment becomes a disabling, rather than enabling, factor in its overall development, a situation that will be revealed in the effectivity of the practice it engenders, it will then undergo alteration.

So, even if Lacan's formulation of human life as the experience of the alienation of the 'self' from a valid level of its own existence is accepted, then a striving for positivity suggests that this state of affairs needs to be seen as the result of biological imperatives, as a natural, unalterable 'fact' of existence as a social human animal, rather than necessarily as a cause for distress.

As this thesis has argued, the individual's experience of being a source of events in a world that exists beyond it needs to be read as an early feature of its nature as a corporeal presence in that world; and this basic structure - of an experienced, discrete continuity - is what the 'secondary' networks, the particular societal formulations of identity, actually build upon, hence the clear commonalities of form amongst what are, effectively, alien cultures. A schema of identity such as this is valuable because it is capable of revealing the arbitrary nature of particular societal discourses to do with identity formation in a radical way, at the same time as being capable of installing the necessary grounds for the formulation of alternative configurations. What these possible 'configurations' might be will depend on taking as read the structures indicated above which are imposed on human development by the human form itself. As we have been discovering, one of the most important of these structures is the self's necessary representation of the world to itself and others in symbolic form. Now Foucault was aware that

the fact that man lives in a milieu which has
a conceptual architecture does not prove that he has turned away from life through the process of forgetting, or that a historical drama has separated him from it; but only that he sees things in a certain way...Forming concepts is a way of living, not of killing life,

(in Armstrong, 1992, p188).

Foucault makes clear here that the fact that humanity creates for itself a 'conceptual architecture' is not the cause for an argument for, or a mourning of, the 'petrification' of life into an 'alien structure'. The point about this conceptual structure is that it does exist, but that it forms a dialectic with human practice and is essentially plastic. It therefore can be, and is, continuously altered; which suggests a level of indeterminacy and potential for re-definition. This point is crucial, since it returns us to an idea of the importance of human agency. It is this force which is capable of re-formulating and testing the limits imposed upon the human organism in any particular societal situation.

The ramifications of this 'creative agency' were studied by both Lacan and Foucault and, as we have seen, it is possible to read the former as the more pessimistic with the regard to its potentiality as a force for liberation. Nietzsche, as we are about to go on and see, moves beyond the caution of both, by advocating the 'self' as the proper sphere of practice for the will to power, as a result of its being the only one available. One of the major reasons, however, for this turn to these affirmatory writings is the fact that it is particularly in the sphere of artistic practice that Nietzsche located the paradigm case of this type of practice of the 'will to power'.

A final recap, then.

This chapter has shown how a picture of human identity that states that there are objective facts about the world and the human form is not, necessarily, in conflict with a radical post-structuralist scepticism. It has also constructed a theory that follows the post-structuralist
problematising of 'self'; and yet accepts at the same time that there are basic facts of existence which determine that the 'centred' self is, in some senses, nevertheless an innate phenomenon of being human. The next chapter will show how the addition of a developed concept of a will to power into this theory of subjecthood is the pathway to a positive description of the performative nature of the self, one which avoids the tendency towards nostalgia for a non-present 'Real', noticeable in theories like Lacan's, which seem not to have acclimatised fully to the pervasiveness of appearance over this 'Real'. As more contemporary performance theory is introduced, it will become clear that the theory of self offered by this thesis does little more than place in a different conceptual context the underlying ontological approach to human identity of experimental western theatre practitioners in this century.

Human beings must invent themselves in the midst of an infinity of possibilities, instead of passively accepting their roles because they think they could not be other than they are,

(Boal, 1992, p209).
CHAPTER FOUR.
The Problematized Self as a Performance Event.

Fundamental thought: the new values must first be created - we shall not be spared this task!
- p 512.

...the great conception of man, that man becomes the transfigurer of existence when he learns to transfigure himself,
- p 434.

[Art] is the great means of making life possible, the great seduction to life, the great stimulant of life,
- p 452.

(Nietzsche, 1968).

This chapter operates from the premise, present throughout this thesis, that many of the specificities of the attack on the notion of the cohesive self that we found in the work of Foucault and Lacan derive in no small part from the approach towards the problem of individuals and their social identities found in the writings of Friederich Nietzsche. As referred to in the Introduction, the adoption of Nietzschean philosophy for its affirmatory approach to the issues covered is not unique to this thesis.

As we have also seen, the distinct projects of Nietzsche, Foucault and lacan can be presented as parallel to each other in many respects. It is the task of this chapter to show how the project that Nietzsche attempted to encourage his readers to undertake, the 'freedom' he offered them - having defined freedom as "a facility in self-direction" (1968, p375) - might be found in no place more than in the dynamics and possibilities of the theatrical event.

This is something that Nietzsche, with his concept of the 'theatre-eye' as "the great third eye that looks out into the world through the other two" (1982, p206), seems
to have recognised. In fact, his attitude towards art and artistic practice, the plastic arts especially, might be characterised as celebratory of their potential to approach a level of the 'divine'. For Nietzsche, "we possess art less we perish of the truth" (1968, p435); and 'art', for him, is "essentially affirmation, blessing, [and] deification of existence" (p434).

It is important not to ignore the positive and affirmative drive of this attitude to art, since it is to art that Nietzsche turned for a "laboratory of the social imagination" (Birringer, 1991, p178); and many practitioners and theorists of radical performance can be seen to have approached the whole idea of the purpose and function of theatre from very similar standpoints; which suggests that the 'undefined work of freedom', first indicated by Nietzsche and then worked upon by Foucault, has been, and is, underway today in some form in our theatres and performance spaces.

If this is true, if "it's art when man produces himself" (Brecht, 1965, p95), then it might be possible to assert that theatrical activity is a prime site and tool in the effort towards what Nietzsche saw as the pre-condition of a new freedom - a 'transvaluation of values'. If this is accepted, it then becomes necessary to ask how and why this might be so. Why is it that a critical attitude towards the notion of self is such a feature of theatre? And what makes practitioners and theorists (and Nietzsche) trust action in the theatre as an effective tool for self-development? Is it because, as Peter Brook states, "a new truth emerges only when certain stereotypes are broken" (1987, p239)? As we shall see at the close of this chapter, the solution may well rest in theatre's basic form, which demands that the Self take on board Others as though they were Self, at the same time requiring that the Self represent itself as Other. Theatre, or performance, in this respect, becomes one of "the highest and most illustrious human joys, in which existence celebrates its own transfiguration" (Nietzsche, 1968, p540); and, as we
have already seen above, mankind becomes the 'transfigurer of the world' by partaking in such activity. In other words, theatre offers individuals the opportunity to attempt a 'transvaluation of values' - a phrase which, if it indicates anything, suggests that it is the act of valuing that will be examined, and this entirely by and through the careful taking of different value into the entire field and structure of value. (Value in this sense being the web of discourses that support and produce 'defined' individuals in a 'known' world - what Nietzsche, as we have seen, called the 'table of values').

Before approaching an eventual clarification of this potential 'force' of theatrical activity, I intend initially to take what is a necessary detour through Nietzsche's concept of the will to power - the second, it will be remembered, of what this thesis has called the two primary 'building blocks' of identity. This will also allow the will to power's relation to theatre and performance activity to be made clearer and more relevant to later discussions of the work of theatre theorists and practitioners. The basic approach will be to flesh out what the will to power was held to be by Nietzsche, and why it was that a site of its optimum functioning was posited by him as the world of art. As Nietzsche said, "What is essential in art remains its perfection of existence" (1968, p434).

Initially, though, it may be worth explicating, in the same way as was done with Foucault and Lacan, the reasoning behind what, later in this Chapter will, effectively, be the placing of the writings of diverse theatre practitioners within a Nietzschean 'frame'.

What should become clear, as the analysis of aspects of their texts unfolds, is that it is a conception of human identity that they hold in common with Nietzsche, even if, as is arguably the case with Brecht and Boal, it might be expected that they would stand in opposition to his celebration of those 'free spirits' that pull themselves away from existence in 'the herd' (as he was wont to refer
to the masses as). Clearly, it would be a misrepresentation of the thinking of both Brecht and Boal to argue that they held a 'Nietzschean' outlook on life. It is not the aim of this thesis to offer such a representation. What is offered is an examination of the type of conceptualization of human identity that can be seen to lie at the centre of their thinking on other issues, together with an assertion that this conceptualization can be said to be commensurate in many respects with that which rests at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy. The point being that, as practitioners, their approach to their work would not be as it is without such a conceptualization. What they share in common with Nietzsche is a view of the human form as more variable than society at large presents it as being, and a desire corresponding to this to do something to alter this state of affairs. On a more general level they, together with Grotowski, share a belief in art as a forum for the examination of, and experimentation with, the possibilities of the human form which, as we shall see shortly, is a central tenet in Nietzschean philosophy.

**The Will to Power in practice.**

We are experiments: let us also want to be them!


Theatre is a way of experimenting with life - a kind of research-and-development department for the culture at large,

(Charles Ludlam, in Drain [ed], 1995, p149).

Against what he saw as the prevailing idea of the individual as a cohesive and continuous entity, the truth of whom could be discovered in the nature of his/her 'immortal soul', Nietzsche proposed as the "most useful
achievement" of "the promotion of knowledge" the "abandonment" of just this idea (1982, p204). In its place he offered "My hypothesis : The subject as multiplicity" (1968, p270). This was intended to indicate the unfixed and essentially undecidable quality of human life, the potential variety of which Nietzsche saw as severely curtailed by the operations of morality upon individuals.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that what Nietzsche was advocating was a rejection of the act of valuing (that activity which installs moral order in the world) since, for him, the "only possible" critique of morality was "a brave and rigorous attempt to live in this or that morality" (1982, p196). If we combine this statement with his earlier definition of freedom as 'a facility in self-direction', it becomes clear that 'living in this or that morality' is essentially an act of self-governance, self-discipline, self-creation and, in reality, a profound type of self-ishness - "Let your self be in the action, as the mother is in the child : let that be your maxim of virtue!" (1961, p120). In other words, it is the "independence of self" from the constraints of public and traditional morality - or 'regimes of normalisation' as Foucault would have called them - that is the "first condition" of the freedom that Nietzsche seeks for people, (Barker, 1989, p75).

This theme of the restoration of responsibility, specifically moral responsibility, to individuals - in the case of theatre, the individual audience members - is one that we have, and will, find evidenced in almost all the writings of experimental theatre practitioners. Its common presence in apparently widely divergent approaches to the theatrical medium will be seen to stem from the basic structures and dynamics of representational form itself, as an unavoidable aspect of the commitment involved in acts of communication between individuals in a public medium, where the field of the discourse runs on the dynamic produced by the constant confrontation between the Self and what is Other to it. This is a point which reasserts the
importance of defining what qualifies as a performance as opposed to a performative event. The existence in a performance of at least two perspectival points - the performer and the spectator - introduces an ethical terrain that need not be insisted on to the same degree with events that are simply performative. Freedom, in this situation, becomes then the responsible governance of oneself in relation to oneself and to Others; whilst the acceptance of responsibility for one’s impact on Others becomes an act of some truth only when one can justifiably claim to have guided and produced one’s own actions in their entirety. If the latter is not the case, if one’s actions in the world are the product of unacknowledged and undisciplined drives, there is really little sense in the claim that one is responsible - “We unlearn responsibility for ourselves, since we as conscious, purposive creatures, are only the smallest part of us” (Nietzsche, 1968, p357).

This means in practice that the nature of the act of valuing, of judging the ‘rightness’ or otherwise of actions, can be seen to become increasingly anachronistic the more the scope of an individual’s self-knowledge is refused. If an individual does not know what it is that he/she is, how can it then be possible for her/him to assume to know the cause of what they do? And surely it is only by reading back from an effect to an undeniable cause that a structure of ‘responsibility’ can be erected? In Nietzsche’s proposition, personal responsibility does not easily extend beyond the Self, since installing it in the inter-subjective realm demands immediately, for the structure to operate effectively, that the two parties be commensurate to some large degree. In the extreme individualism of Nietzsche’s philosophy, such a levelling out of the Self to common dimensions is nothing but anathema.

This question of the ethical terrain surrounding acts of confrontation between the self and others is, it can be seen, an important one.

But what, then, is to guide the individual as he
transvaluates his inherited values and transfigures himself and the world? Is she/he to allow her/his drives and desires free reign, ignoring others' judgements concerning her/his actions, since the table of values they operate in judging her/him is no longer applicable? Nietzsche answered potential questions along these lines by developing his concept of the 'Will to Power', which, for him, was nothing more or less than Life itself:

[T]his, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying...my "beyond good and evil"...This world is the will to power - and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power - and nothing besides!

(1968, p550).

It becomes important, then, to establish how Nietzsche characterised this 'will to power', since it was through mastery of this essential driving force that mankind was to enter upon the journey towards the 'Übermensch' and overcome her/himself.

It is interesting, from our point of view, to note that it was to the arts that Nietzsche most often went when in need of a paradigm for the individual embarked on a project of 'self-overcoming'. For him, art offered a means to deify life, as against other practices of deification, which belittled the idea of the individual by installing the idea of something far greater and more powerful into the individual's world than the individual him/herself:

"One must shatter the all; unlearn respect for the all; take what we have given to the unknown and the whole and give it back to what is nearest, what is ours" (1968, p181). But what then was to happen, if individuals accepted their right to absolute individuality and integrity of expression? How would entirely distinct entities, which individuals relieved of the need to use public forms for their self-expression would stand to become, be able to relate to each other? What are the results of accepting that "all seeing is essentially
perspective, and so is all knowing" (Nietzsche, 1956, p255)? It does not immediately bode well for the intricate structures of inter-subjective communication to allow every individual the right to bespeak the world in a unique way; for what path back to satisfying communication — with its affinity to notions of communion and community — between individuals might there be left available? "[W]ords make the uncommon common," Nietzsche complained, (1968, p428); and it is difficult to know how, when language is the basic communicational tool, such a reducing effect might be avoided. In other words, granting the individual clear autonomy with expressive means might allow them to 'exteriorise', to make visible to others, what they are; but there has to be some doubt as to how satisfying the 'expression' will be when the object of it, the Other, does not comprehend the nature of the highly specific signs being used, which would be the case in this hypothetical instance.

This was a dilemma that Nietzsche was aware of, and one that he needed to overcome, since it might be possible, reading out from some of his comments, to conclude that inter-subjective communication always does a disservice to the subjects involved. Clearly, this is the view of schools of thought such as psycho-analysis, which maintain that the individual speaks her/his desires and drives into the world unbeknown to her/himself, and without hope of full 'remedy'. Nietzsche, however, was generally concerned to offer the individual more hope (and with it more scope) than a psycho-analytic reading seems to allow; and his approach to the problematic of inter-personal communication is simple, strong, and effective.

Alexander Nehamas, in his Nietzsche : Life as Literature (1985), offers a delicate reading of the Nietzschean concept of perspectivism (1), which makes clear that perspectivism is not the same thing as relativism, and therefore does not lead to the problems of incommensurability that can effect projects growing out of the latter position (p49). Perspectivism, according to
Nehamas, does not assert that every individual exists in an entirely unique way - although that is an aspect of its thematics - what it suggests is that there is no other, or, more importantly, no better way of knowing the world than interpretation (p67) - "As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective!" (Nietzsche, 1968, 'p305).

This insight leads Nehamas to a discussion of interpretation and its outcomes, and it is interesting here because it re-introduces, under a different name, the 'capacity to learn' that we saw developed earlier in this thesis. Nietzsche said of this drive - "[T]he instinct for the utility of inferring as we do infer is a part of us, we almost are this instinct", and didn't hesitate to refer to it as a "biological compulsion" (1968, p278).

Unlike the sombreness of the approach to this issue that we saw in Lacan's work, where a lost "Real" haunts the spectral interplays of the Symbolic Order, making life always an instance of 'lack', Nietzsche exhibits a pragmatism in his account that calls for no sense of loss, just knowledge of how to work the situation to advantage:

One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws...as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is possible,


Within this pragmatism, Nietzsche develops his notion of individual agency and autonomy, and the nature of his concept of perspectivism allows him to postulate interpretation, or evaluation, as that capacity which gives individuals the powers to be creators - "Evaluation is creation: hear it, you creative men! Valuating is itself the value and jewel of all valued things," (1961, p85).

This is, in some senses, crucial to the whole hypothesis of this thesis, since it inserts the individual's capacity to interpret, to evaluate, as the
source of creative power for that individual.

This, then, is the practical drive of the call for a 'transvaluation of value' - it is not an attempt to jettison the act of evaluating, of establishing 'tables of values' entirely, but rather the attempt to reveal to individuals that they themselves are of a certain form, and that this form can be used to their advantage through a process of mastery. So, far from advocating the smashing of every table of values, Nietzsche (paralleled today by Postmodernism's call for attention to be paid to the voices of marginalised minorities) is calling for the proliferation of such tables, but at an individual, rather than societal, level. For Nietzsche, the creation of a table of values is the right of every individual; and reflection upon the particular character of any table by others can lead to a recognition of the shape of the particular will to power that founded it - "A table of values hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power," (Nietzsche, 1961, p84).

That Nietzsche can posit the creation of a table of values as a positive act is a consequence of his acceptance that any "standpoint of value" is necessarily "the standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement" for "complex forms" of "relative life-duration" (1968, p380). In other words, a table of values is always a reflection of the needs of a particular form of life, and has no recourse to entities outside of that (such as 'God', 'Nature' and so on) as justification, or proof. This being the case, it can be seen that the creation of an individual table of values is an effect of the successful carrying out of one's moral 'responsibility' to oneself.

For Nietzsche, the strongest guide in this effort to re-interpret the world is the "richer, clearer, more tangible phenomenon" (1968, p270) of the body; which is why, for him, the body and its physiology are "the starting-point" (p271). In Nietzsche's pragmatic materialism ('would it not be more materialist to start
with the question of the body? - asked Foucault), "value-words are always banners raised where a new bliss has been found - a new feeling" (p380).

A picture is beginning to emerge here, perhaps, of the basic structuration and possibilities of the individual in Nietzsche's philosophy. It is the conception of human life in the living that, out of the theorists analysed so far in this thesis, comes closest to what is desired here, in that it clearly proposes several readings of the relevant issues that allow individuals room for positive manoeuvring once the theorising is done. In Nietzschean philosophy, what Foucault referred to as the necessarily 'undefined work of freedom', is laid out quite cleanly and clearly, and is, in fact, nothing short of the overcoming of the Self and the recreation of the world in one's own image. This is why "religious awe" before oneself is "the condition of prophets and poets" (1968, p405), and it is also why "nothing is rarer than a personal action" (p472).

This latter statement reflects Nietzsche's summation of the state of his fellow men, whom he saw as largely labouring through life with moral perspectives that were imposed from above rather than manufactured from within; and this, to him, was nothing but a surrendering of one's moral responsibility to oneself, for one can only interpret, and interpret morally, and therefore to have no say in one's morality is to see the world not as oneself. This is similar, it would seem, to Grotowski's vision of his 'Poor' theatre as that which proposed "the substitution of material wealth by moral wealth as the principal aim in life" (Grotowski, 1969, p44). So, in Nietzsche's view, an individual's will to power could be held to be strong only when it sought to overcome itself as it had been formed in its life so far, and continued to do so until its death, for it was only through the constant overcoming, the constant mastery, of self that a 'Mensch' might become an 'Übermensch'. Without the claiming of this right to re-interpret the world according to one's own desires - a focus that was present in Lacan, too - there was, for
Nietzsche, nothing left of life worth living - "To live as I desire to live or not to live at all," (1961, p285). It is this which leads him to acknowledge the fact that "only the doer learns" (p279). And it is also this that pulls us back to how it is that the will to power appears in practice.

We have already seen that Nietzsche contends that inference, the 'capacity to learn', is a "biological compulsion" that is "almost" all of what we are. He is, then, operating a schematic of 'being human' that includes what was earlier in this thesis referred to as one of the two 'building blocks' of identity. Obviously, he also works with a hypothesis that utilises the other 'block', since it is this thesis that has borrowed it from his writings - namely the concept of 'will to power'. Nehamas points out that Nietzsche also proposes what can be seen as the same basic structuration of experience as has been forwarded here, in that he defines the human world as a joint product of external forces and human interpretation (p232); which is a parallel account in some ways to the recurrent stress placed earlier in these pages on the dynamic relationship between the external world and the human organism, one that offers back to the world some determining capacity in terms of the subject. What is important here is that this determining capacity is not one-way. It is, according to Nietzsche, within the powers of human beings to determine the world they live in, too. How is this done? His answer, as we have been seeing, is via interpretation. Or perhaps we might, as we did earlier, call it creative agency.

We have again taken back the predicates of things, or at least remembered that it was we who lent them to them:-- let us take care that this insight does not deprive us of the capacity to lend...

(Nietzsche, 1982, p133).

The idea that individual human agency is an effective force for the transfiguration of self and the world is, it
should by now be clear, a necessary one in terms of the theoretical proposals of this thesis. More importantly, perhaps, it is, as has been shown, absolutely crucial to the retention of a useful concept of performance.

Nietzsche, unlike Lacan and beyond the more wary Foucault, maintains the positivity to be able to advance such a view of the power of agency from within a characterising of the world, and the lives of individuals within it, that is very similar to that held by the other two writers. He does so basically by dispensing with the idealism (what he terms, in reference to it somewhere else, "a moral-optical illusion" [1990, p49]) that provided Lacan with his notion of the lost 'Real'. For Nietzsche, "the apparent world is the only one: the 'real' world has only been lyingly added" (1990, p46); and as Nehamas points out, Nietzsche's ability to dismiss realism/idealism so entirely stems from his staunch refusal to acknowledge the possibility that there can ever be one 'real' view of things (pp83-4), an attitude provided by his concept of perspectivism. In short, Nietzsche works to describe a range of powers available to the individual in the situation from which Lacan especially, but also Foucault, could find little to celebrate. But then, this is to be expected from a man whose self-confessed "instinct" was, in opposition to Schopenhauer's, "towards a justification of life" (1968, p521), and whose list of 'affirmative affects' included:

...will to power, gratitude toward earth and life - everything that is rich and desires to bestow and that replenishes and gilds and immortalizes and deifies life - the whole force of transfiguring virtues, everything that declares good and affirms it in word and deed...

(p533).

So, again, what is the form of this will to power in praxis? How does it occur? It is, of course, since what we are is will to power, simply what we are; which may not
seem to be saying much but is entirely logical, since Nietzsche would have felt it a disservice to us to send us off into the unknown to look for something we did not already possess and which did not actually exist. The point for him was simply that we had not sought to master ourselves at an individual level—"[E]very achievement of knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself, of cleanliness toward oneself..." (p536). No doubt the reasons why Nietzsche viewed art (and within that the plastic arts such as theatre) as a paradigm example of human creative activity are beginning to indicate themselves.

Nietzsche's whole philosophy tended toward an investigation of the paucity of the forms of existence, of the "possibilities of being", that were on offer to individuals in society. It is indeed difficult to think of another human activity that concerns itself with form and perception, interpretation and evaluation, on quite such a profound scale as art does; and within the arts, it is difficult not to advance theatre, performance, or drama as the generic forms that deal in the fullest sense with the subject of human form and identity. If what is required were a 'laboratory for the social imagining of the self and its possibilities', then the theatre would definitely have a staunch case to make for itself. As we shall see, this is something that its practitioners already know. It is why they are there.

But before we move on to that, it might be helpful to take a final look at what the individual as will to power is like, and what his/her course of action is likely to be. This will also take us into a more detailed examination of the Nietzschean concept of art.

That lies are necessary in order to live is itself part of the terrifying and questionable character of existence...

(1968, p451).
The Individual as Will to Power:

The world revolves, not around the inventors of new noises, but around the inventors of new values; it revolves inaudibly...

(Nietzsche, 1961, p154).

In Thus spoke Zarathustra (1961), Nietzsche reveals how life (the will to power) had come and revealed to him its secret, that secret being that it, life, was "that which must overcome itself again and again" (p138). This continual 'overcoming', with its connotations of victory, of mastery, was the unforeseen pathway to the highest ideal of man, that of the 'Übermensch'; and because of the centrality given in his writings to the concept of perspectivism, the individual seeking to 'overcome' was invariably what Howard Barker has called the "struggler with self" (Barker, 1989, pp36-7). This is because, for Nietzsche, the distinctions between subject/object, self/other, and so on were "conditions of life" but nonetheless "false" (1968, p268); and it was therefore a mistake to regard things in isolation from one another because, in reality, (or rather, in the reality of Becoming), all was a part of the whole and therefore separable only as a means to an end, not as an act that might claim 'truth' for itself. In other words, working to overcome the Self was working to overcome the world, since the two were aspects of the same thing. Thus 'whoever transfigures themselves, transfigures the world'. As a logical consequence of this, Nehamas points out, re-interpretation and re-evaluation - the two themes of transfiguring values - become the individual's "most powerful weapon" (pp97-8). If the individual is able to forge new truths for him/herself, if they are able to re-interpret and re-value the world from a self-created perspective, then they do more than simply offer a new way.
of looking at the 'old' world - they actually create new aspects of the world through their overcoming of it and themselves, (Nehamas, 1985, pp58-60). This is why, for Nietzsche, 'valuing is creating'.

It is important here to understand how central the notion of perspectivism is to the whole logical edifice of Nietzsche's writing. Without it, the central cohesive force of his argumentation would be severely retarded, since it is the absolute fact of the inescapable and necessary existence of perspective in all seeing that underwrites his attacks on morality and universalism - (what he terms "one of the hereditary madnesses of human pride" [1968, p305]) - and moves him to advocate the re-possession of this faculty by all individuals, since it is in developing their own perspective on things, one that is 'beyond good and evil,' that they will be able to act with the greatest power. Again, this is mirrored in Grotowski's assertion that underlying his theatrical practice was the understanding that "we must gradually learn to be personally responsible for all we do" (1969, p160). For Nietzsche, there was a fundamental first step in ascending to one's capacity as a creator, and it was not only a birth-right that had been stolen by the invention of God, but also remarkably simple - "I wish men would begin by respecting themselves: everything else follows from that," (1968, p486).

So, supposing the individual achieves this act of self-respect, what happens then? What does a self-respecting will to power do to begin overcoming itself? As already indicated above, Nietzsche’s advice is clear - "Essential: to start from the body and employ it as a guide," (1968, p289). This is because consciousness "is not the directing agent, but an organ of the directing agent" (p284), and also because "the criterion of truth" resides in the body, in "the enhancement of the feeling of power" (p290). This might seem at first to suggest that Nietzsche is advocating a type of hedonistic indulgence of every physical and sensual whim, but there are points to
be remembered here. Firstly, there is, for Nietzsche, no
distinction between mind and body, both are aspects of the
pulse of energy in the physical human form, energy that we,
with our notion of 'willed' actions, think we dispose of
but which, in reality, "disposes of us" (p518). The name
of this energy is will to power. In this respect, then,
Nietzsche is not calling for the indulgence of the body,
but is asking rather that the real state of affairs of
human life be looked at squarely and recognised. We are
already will to power and nothing else besides, Nietzsche
says, it is what directs and guides our lives, but we have
believed the story that says we are something else,
something more mastered, something that exists, like God,
somehow removed from the material world. Nietzsche's
materialism means he refuses that as a possibility, and
refuses also any trace of essentialism, and this allows him
to state that the senses, the drives and desires, of the
organism are the deepest level of truth available - "Our
most sacred convictions, the unchanging elements in our
supreme values, are judgements of our muscles," (1968,
p173). For him, as we have seen, "nothing is 'given' as
real except our world of desires and passions....We can
rise or sink to no other 'reality' than the reality of the
drives" (1990, p36). This effectively means that to live
in any sense true to oneself, one must live with constant
and clear knowledge of what one's drives and desires are,
which is where the need for the overcoming of self comes
in. Essentially, the task required of the individual who
seeks to live as will to power is to become that which will
to power desires to be, which is, simply, powerful. It is
an overcoming of self because 'conscience', 'cohesiveness',
the drive towards 'unity' and so on, all act to contain and
repress the desires of the individual seeking empowerment,
through what Foucault described as the processes of
normalisation. But once these obstacles are mastered, what
direction does a liberated will to power take? If
healthy, says Nietzsche, it will always be towards an
extension of the effects of its own form in terms of impact
on the world and the sensation of pleasure felt by the organism at its own extent.

A condition once achieved would seem to be obliged to preserve itself if there were not in it a capacity for desiring not to preserve itself...It can be shown most clearly that every living thing does everything it can not to preserve itself but to become more, (1968, p367).

Essentially, Nietzsche's conception of the will to power states that life is nothing but the clash of driving forces of different organisms in various states of empowerment, and that "all driving force is will to power ...there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this" (p366). However, an operative will to power does not work in a void, careering through life unchallenged and unobserved. It must, in order to know its own extent and power, meet and overwhelm resistance, both within itself and without, for it is only through conflict that a will to power can experience one of the "two kinds of pleasure", that of "victory" (the other being "falling asleep"), (p374). This is why Nietzsche can state that "the mature man has, above all, weapons : he attacks" (p385). If we remember that 're-interpretation' is the 'greatest weapon' available to the individual, we might begin to understand Nietzsche's insistence on individualism. With the power to transvaluate values, individuals become what Nietzsche warned they were capable of being - "the danger of dangers" (1982, p185), willing to disregard a larger morality in favour of their own, forged from the enjoyment of existence as a will to power, and indifferent to others' moral contempt, which, says Nietzsche, "causes greater indignity and harm than any crime" (1968, p393).

Perhaps it might seem at this point as though Nietzsche has not dealt adequately with the problematics of the intersubjective world to any extent because of the
extremity of his advocacy of individualistic practice. It quite possibly is the case, as it was with his prophet-creation Zarathustra, that Nietzsche vacillated between not being able to reconcile individual autonomy with collective habitation at all, and then advocating a society where the 'herd' were ruled despotsically by an elite of 'free spirits'. However, it is clear, despite the strength of his rhetoric on occasions, that he did not particularly require the destruction of the communal world in order to see his vision fulfilled. He is unambiguous on several occasions, (and was so long before post-structuralism arrived to study the issue in depth), that there is little point to the complete dismantling of the artifices of rationality that constantly signal a world of 'reality' behind that of appearances, even if they are plainly seen to be fabrications that serve the purposes of powers antagonistic to 'free spirits'.

The existing world, upon which all earthly living things have worked so that it appears as it does (durable and changing slowly), we want to go on building - and not to criticize it away as false!

(p538).

This is the meaning behind the first of the three quotations with which this chapter started, where Nietzsche warns that we will not be spared 'the task' of creating 'new' values. Without this effort, he suggests, there will be an inevitable spiral into nihilism. It was Nietzsche's argument, against the possibility of this approach, just as it was Foucault's, that it was the particular categories of reason, not the world itself, that needed to be dispensed with: "[T]he demonstration that they - [categories of reason] - cannot be applied to the universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the universe" (p13). For him, the knowledge that all facts and judgements were conditional did not lead inexorably to a loss of faith in individual judgement, since there was, in fact, no level of
truth beyond the individual one. Again, it is the concept of perspectivism that enables Nietzsche to operate positively within the world that others have despaired of.

One can refute a judgement by proving its conditionality: the need to retain it is not thereby removed...One must grasp the need for their existence: they are a consequence of causes which have nothing to do with reasons,

(p151).

It is, in fact, the extent of Nietzsche's materialism, combined with his notion of perspectivism, that moves him to an acceptance of appearance over 'reality'. Without the ambitions of idealism towards a deeper level of 'truth' about the world, the Nietzschean individual is freed to operate with the surfaces of things, knowing that there is no other aspect of existence available to them, simply because what they are is a thing that does not truly function at any other level. It is, of course, the 'subject' which has been the focus of post-structuralist scrutiny that is in fact being presented and defended here, and Nietzsche's attitude towards it is again interesting for this thesis, because of the positivity of his approach. He says of the 'I' that 'thinks':

However habitual and indispensable this fiction may have become by now - that in itself proves nothing against its imaginary origin: a belief can be a condition of life and nonetheless be false,

(1968, p268).

It is largely this same recognition of the falseness of the concept of the 'centred' subject that has led to the drive to problematise it within post-structuralism. However, a longing for a life without 'lack', with real 'presence', has sometimes meant that it has failed to match
the materialism of the Nietzschean thesis, and consequently lost the capacity to suggest more positive paths of action. On a secondary plane, the drive inherent in idealism to claim the world with its view is undone precisely because it takes the world, and not the individual, as its object of desire. Nietzsche, on the other hand, attempts to offer his followers a truth that is not 'beyond', but in their bodies, in the warp and twist of their desires - "All respect to your opinions!" he says, "But little deviant acts are worth more!" (1982, p105).

If it is a concentration on the individual that helps Nietzsche avoid possible pitfalls in his philosophy, it is that same concentrated focus that leads him, and therefore us, to his particular attitude to art - the site of the creation of human forms.

It is a measure of the degree of strength of will to what extent one can do without meanings in things, to what extent one can endure to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of it oneself,

(1968, p318).

The Artistry of the Will to Power:

No-one tells me anything new; so I tell myself to myself,

(Nietzsche, 1961, p214).

Communication is necessary,

(1968, p306).

The other 'entities' act upon us; our adapted apparent world is an adaption and overpowering of their actions; a kind of defensive measure. The subject
'The subject alone is demonstrable'. What might be the meaning of this statement? If it is combined with the statement that 'communication is necessary', the nature of its intent may become clearer. Communication has to happen, it is a required part of a healthy life, says Nietzsche, without which individuals would lack an important part of their power, since impact and effect on others is a root source of much of the pleasure involved in power. The will to power, he asserts, always registers as "an insatiable desire to manifest power" (1968, p333).

Basically, the extent of one's power is gauged through the power of one's extent - "My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force [- its will to power] and to thrust back all that resists its extension" (p340).

Adding to this basic form the idea that the one thing that is available in terms of communication, the one thing that one can use to extend one's reach in the sphere of intersubjective discourse, is the subject, ('the subject alone is demonstrable'), leads to the realisation that it is very unlikely that Nietzsche would have wanted to advance the notion that abandoning the self as 'subject' was a worthwhile move. It is more likely that he was offering possibilities of what the self might be outside of the constraints of the morality of Being, specifically inside, or at least closer to, the reality of the flux of Becoming - "Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the luxuriance of a prodigal play and change of forms..." (1990, p56) - and this clearly begins to point towards an activity of experimentation with the possibilities of self that we have seen is well-known to any actor or theatre performer, whose skill is that of the adoption of 'multiple selves'. For if there is a prime example of subjects who exist "as multiplicity" then surely actors, those who adopt personae for a living, must rank as in the running to claim...
the title. Obviously, another clear contender would be those individuals classified today with the term 'schizophrenic', who are viewed as suffering from a particular form of 'neurosis'. Interestingly, Nietzsche seems to have seen the similarity himself between these two types of states of mind, since he argued that artists "understand a quite different sign language - and create one", which is a condition, according to him, "that seems to be a part of many nervous disorders" (1968, p429).

So, communication must take place, and it must take a form that is that of the self as subject, since it is that alone which is demonstrable, which can be communicated. What then does the artist, who creates something with the intention of communication, work with, and how? In Nietzsche's view, an artist "accords no value to anything that cannot become form (- that cannot surrender itself, make itself public-)" (p433). In other words, the artist pulls from him/herself, or from the world around him/her, that which s/he can fashion in his/her own image, which s/he can turn from hidden or abstract sensation or thought and make real for others, thereby impacting upon them through the careful manipulation of form in the public medium. This is the will to power as demonstrated form, (or perhaps we might say 'style').

Where is innocence? Where there is will to begetting. And for me, he who wants to create beyond himself has the purest will.

Where is beauty? Where I have to will with all my will; where I want to love and perish, that an image may not remain merely an image,


And if there is a goal, or most desired state, to be obtained from the creation of form - and for form, we might want to read 'self-as-sign,' or 'sign-as-self', a sign being always that which registers the existence of public
meaning, and therefore signals the intersubjective world - it is "to create the world before which you can kneel", a desire which Nietzsche sees as the "ultimate hope and intoxication" of all individuals, (p136).

Essentially, of course, this is nothing short of a desire to deify oneself; which, coming as it does from within a philosophy that views the concept of a 'God' beyond human beings themselves as a manufactured "reproach against existence" (1968, p377), is entirely to be expected. Having removed the idea of God from the world as nothing but a malicious nonsense - "What thinking person still needs the hypothesis of a god?" (1984, p33) - Nietzsche needs to, and does, feel no compunction at all about indicating self-deification as an appropriate use of what is clearly a human capacity - the capacity for belief, or idealization. This is why he can state that the function of art is: "To bring to light 'basic idealizing powers' (sensuality, intoxication, superabundant animality)" (1968, p447); which seems closely parallel to Artaud's call for word-bound playwrights to give way "to specialists in objective, animated enchantment" (1970, p55). It is important for a proper understanding of Nietzsche's position here to remember that, to his mind, there was absolutely no separation between the functions of the body and those of the 'mind', in that all aspects of an individual's persona were the effects of feelings experienced by that individual - an attitude which is in fact, as we have seen, the founding premise of modern psycho-analysis. ("All belief is based on the feeling of pleasure or pain in relation to the feeling subject" [1984, p25]). Belief becomes, then, not a matter of a rational analysis of data in the search for proof but a reaction to feeling, and in this it is no different from knowledge, opinions, or 'consciously-felt feelings,' since all are the result of processes that are beyond the realm of Reason entirely - "Out of passions grow opinions; mental sloth lets these rigidify into convictions," (p266). So, having returned the human capacity for belief to 'what is ours',

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to the task of deifying the self, Nietzsche then sets out how to best achieve this, and what the function, or purpose, of such a retrieval might be: the will to power as god-like form, with a reach and extent of effect on the world that is enough to place one, and others, in awe of oneself. The skill, or artistry, of the will to power then appears as that oldest of intoxicating actions, the art of seduction: "It is not enough to prove something, one has also to seduce or elevate people to it," (1982, p162). As Sergei Eisenstein commented in 1926 whilst discussing the "moulding of an audience in a desired direction", the instrument for achieving this end consists "of all the parts that constitute the apparatus of theatre...because, despite their differences, they all lead to one thing - which their presence legitimates - to their common quality of attraction" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p88).

It begins to become clear, then, that the artistry of the will to power consists in making of oneself an image which has been mastered so well as to appear real, and which seduces both oneself and others into believing in its reality, thereby extending the self further into the world and conquering the senses of others so as to hold them in respectful thrall to one's strength as a creator: "Life is not the adaption of inner circumstances to outer ones, but will to power, which, working from within, incorporates and subdues more and more of that which is 'outside'" (Nietzsche, 1968, p361).

Again, the similarity to the craft of acting and its intended effects is clear. It also seems clear that Nietzsche viewed art, in which acting was implicated, as that state of mind, or activity, which offered individuals the greatest opportunities for operating their natures as 'experiments'. This is the meaning behind what at first seems, for a philosopher who advocated 'becoming' over 'being', a somewhat odd statement to make, namely that "to impose upon becoming the character of being - that is the supreme will to power" (p330). If we recall Foucault and Lacan's attitude to the necessary entrapment of the
energies of individuals within the structures of socialisation, we will remember that they found themselves unable to offer much in the way of positive or efficacious actions which the individual might undertake to retain for themselves any level of genuine 'freedom' in such a situation. For Nietzsche, this existence as being - as a 'self' - is also an unavoidable fact, but his reaction is to celebrate it as the finest achievement will to power (or becoming) has been capable of so far. To use the forms of life to one's advantage, to experiment with them, is the possibility he offers, and he does so because he believes that in practising this, in making and re-making one's form, one approaches the fundamentals of human life:

Ultimately, the individual derives the values of his acts from himself; because he has to interpret in a quite individual way even the words he has inherited. His interpretation of a formula at least is personal, even if he does not create a formula: as an interpreter he is still creative,

(p403).

Nietzsche's affirmatory attitude here can be further contextualized if we remember that it was to appearance, rather than to some deeper level of 'truth', that he turned when seeking to indicate the worth of something, and since being is all appearance and no 'truth' whatsoever, it is the perfect platform for self-responsible action. For him, it is clear that "if there is anything that is to be worshipped it is appearance that must be worshipped, that the lie - and not the truth - is divine!" (p523).

That this leads him to view art as a paradigmatic activity is really no surprise, then; but in fact his conception of art is such that it is actually life, not art, which he is referring to when he speaks of the latter. As far as he is concerned, when people speak of life they are referring to "the artistic basic phenomenon that is called 'life'" (p538). In effect, this means that the
activities which we term ‘art’ are forays into life as it really is, beyond the constraints of morality, beyond good and evil, where individuals exhibit and practice a “refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of the enigmatic” (p262). Art, for Nietzsche, pulls individuals away from mundanity and enters them into a world rich in the potential to create the unknown, to offer out to others ‘unheard-of things’:

The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living creatures - it is the source of languages, (pp427-8).

Unsurprisingly, it follows from this conception of ‘art’ as life itself, and ‘life’ as nothing but art, that Nietzsche should then go on to suggest a particular role for individuals who, as a part of life, as the interpreters and therefore creators of it, have little choice (if existing in a self-directed way) but to acknowledge their status as artists. Again, it is Nietzsche’s acceptance of the impossibility of ‘getting behind’ appearances that leads him to this conclusion, for a cultured appearance wrought from mastery of life (art) will always be nothing but artifice, a fact that Nietzsche wants to place as a cause of affirmation rather than despair: “‘Life ought to inspire confidence’ : the task thus imposed is tremendous. To solve it, man must be a liar by nature, he must be above all an artist” (p451).

What we now have, following through Nietzsche’s conception of art and the individual will to power, is the notion that individuals, existing as they do at the level of appearances, can do little better for themselves than to practice their self as though it were the text and they the writers, or it the picture and they the artist, or they the actors and their lives the roles and so on. Nehamas (1985)
actually treats Nietzsche's own writings in this way in his text, analysing them as carefully sculptured forms of expression which are diverse in their range and variety of style, and were deliberately created to represent a different version of the self that was Friederich Nietzsche to the world.

In offering this type of 'liberty to experiment' to individuals, however, Nietzsche also moves to retain the forms and structures of individuation that are available at any given time in specific settings, since he is clear that without them, there is no basis for the creation of form at all. (This fact, together with Nietzsche's stress on the potential empowerment offered by the adoption of 'self' by individuals, seems reminiscent of the claim made earlier in this thesis, in the discussion of Lacan, that entry into subjecthood might be an empowering, rather than debilitating, move for individuals to make). In light of this, it might be wise to assert, remembering the earlier separation of performance and performativity, that Nietzsche is arguing for the need to view the self, and subjecthood, metaphorically, as forms of art like any other; a proposal which makes more sense once it is remembered that life and art, for Nietzsche, are one and the same thing, which itself makes practising the self a form of artistic practice. With this in mind, we can look upon Nietzsche's attitude to artistic conventions as being concerned also with the conventions and conditions of the forging of personal identity. As he notes, "every mature art has a host of conventions as its basis - in so far as it is a language. Convention is the condition of great art, not an obstacle," (p428).

Of course, Nietzsche does not need to reject the conventions of form outright since, in his philosophy, it is precisely these conventions that make communication between absolutely distinct individuals possible; and the act of communication with others is, as we have seen, fundamental to the health of the human organism, since the dynamic relation between self and other is the site of the
operation of desire, which, as we have also seen, is the proper guide for a well-lived life. It would therefore make no sense for Nietzsche to reject these conventions of form outright. Again, it must be remembered that the concept of perspectivism, with its access for individuals to the power of re-interpretation, means that the edifice of conventionality that contains the forms of expression is never static, and therefore always in the process of change. This is why - ('new interpretations create new worlds') - Nietzsche can state that "history always enunciates new truths", since he holds that "a fact, a work is eloquent in a new way for every age and every new type of man" (p511). This then offers tradition, convention, the norm, as a potential resource, rather than a constriction, much as Foucault always maintained it was, a resource which is reliant for its effectivity on the individual's capacity to re-evaluate, rather than on the content of the conventions as they already stand. In Foucauldian terms, we might say that the operation and hold of the norm is altered and adapted through the active genealogical investigation of its historical transfigurations conducted from the viewpoint of the willed self-direction of the individual. Nietzsche believed that this attitude allowed him to claim that his work was "even anti-pessimistic... in the sense that it teaches something that is stronger than pessimism, 'more divine' than truth: art" (p453).

This reference to art as 'divine' is not to be taken lightly, since by dismissing belief in God as a mistake, Nietzsche is not then intending to remove from the world the human capacity for deification, but simply to re-direct it, as we saw earlier. So, for him, art is the "real task of life", as well as being its "metaphysical activity" (p435), and this is because there is an absolute need to find "a conception of this world as the actually-achieved highest possible ideal" (p527). The logic to this is painstakingly clear: Life is art; Individuals are a part of life, and therefore art; The practice of the self is
therefore the practice of an art form; As an art form, life offers the individual the opportunity to craft and perfect him/herself; This practice of perfecting ought to lead to deification of the form achieved; Life then becomes the highest possible ideal, since perfection is achievable from within it.

So, in this sense, by naming art as 'life's metaphysical activity', Nietzsche is simply saying that whereas before the striving for perfection was directed towards some idea beyond the human world - (such as God) - now it can be practised in its more proper sphere, that of the inter-subjective world. In this way the "curse on life" of "the god on the cross" can finally be removed (p543).

One might reasonably ask, though, where the site of a 'materialist metaphysics' might be? Possibly it is already clear that it will focus on, or centre in, the body: "[P]erhaps the entire evolution of the spirit is a question of the body; it is the history of the development of a higher body that emerges into our sensibility" (p358).

Of course, it is not immediately clear what form this 'higher body' might take, but it seems that Nietzsche intends to indicate it as present in the 'aesthetic' state of mind, as a sort of "intelligent sensuality"; a concept he fleshes out by referring to "the demand for art and beauty" as "an indirect demand for the ecstasies of sexuality communicated to the brain" (p424). In respect of this Nietzsche desires "for myself and all who live" what would be, in effect, "an ever-greater spiritualization and multiplication of the senses" (p434). This is achieved when, in the most perfect men, "the most sensual functions are finally transfigured by a symbol-intoxication of the highest spirituality" which leads these individuals to "experience a kind of deification of the body in themselves" (p540). In other words, - and surely the name of Artaud keeps coming back to one here - Nietzsche is offering art as a transfiguring experience that elevates the individual beyond the constraints of dualistic self-
hood, beyond good and evil, to a state of existence where the complexity, power, and sensation of one's form is revealed to one in an awe-inspiring way. And this is not a state of sensual indulgence, remember, since it is one of 'symbol-intoxication', where the 'intelligent sensuality' of the individual is the experiential state, as opposed to the more usual configuration of either body or mind. Art, for Nietzsche, should reveal to individuals that the site of the divine is themselves, in all their multiplicity, and to this extent it is revelatory in the sense of the term used by religious creeds: revelation leads to belief, belief to deification, deification to power - "One should not play with artistic formulas: One should remodel life so that afterward it has to formulate itself" (p447).

It seems difficult, in light of this, not to propose Artaud as a practitioner who strove to realize this Nietzschean vision of art in the theatre and, following from this, to then advance the existence of a common ontological attitude amongst those other practitioners, such as Grotowski, Barba, Schechner and Brook, whose work appears to have been influenced by Artaud's own vision. Artaud was clear, for instance, that what he termed 'true culture' acted "through power and exaltation" (1970, p4), and that this could only happen "the moment the inconceivable really begins, where poetry taking place on stage nourishes and superheats created symbols" (p17). Just as Nietzsche claimed deification as the object of art, Artaud believed that theatre should exist "to bring to all of us a natural, occult equivalent of the dogma we no longer believe" (p21), and that its function was therefore to "allow us to reach the sublime once more" (p36); only this time the sublimation of life would be achieved by the disintegration of the coherent self of the state of Being because "the highest possible concept of theatre is one which philosophically reconciles us with Becoming" (p83). This 'attack' on the self in some senses encapsulates the type of cruelty Artaud was envisaging, since it is clear that he viewed his ideal theatrical event as a site where
"life is continually lacerated, where everything in creation rises up and attacks our condition as created beings" (p71), and such a transfigurative experience was bound to be to a certain extent uncomfortable. Artaud was not the first practitioner, however, to search out such efficacious power for the theatre. As early as 1907, Meyerhold was complaining about the ineffectiveness of what he saw happening in the theatres around him: "The stage is no longer infectious", he said, "it no longer has the power of transfiguration" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p243); and this notion of an 'infectious' stage is clearly echoed in Artaud's vision of theatre as a 'plague'. There is a clear commonality in terms of the approach and the targets of such radical theatre writings, then, and it seems to be grounded in a similar ontological viewpoint to that we have discovered in our analysis of Nietzsche. Indeed, as Innes (1993) makes clear in his overview of avant-garde theatre in the last hundred years, there is little doubt that, despite the divergent approaches exhibited in the movement, the avant-garde is essentially a philosophical grouping. Its members are linked by a specific attitude to western society, a particular aesthetic approach, and the aim of transforming the nature of theatrical performance; all of which add up to a distinctive ideology.

(p4).

The particular aim of this thesis in respect of this, as should be clear by now, has been to indicate and explore the notion of self-identity as a particular concern within such avant-garde practice, and to provide a coherent theoretical model of the type of notion of identity that such practice appears to have been seeking out.

(The subject alone is demonstrable. Communication is necessary). Birringer (1991) at one point describes postmodernism as "a cultural struggle over the perception and evaluation of the historical moment in which we live" (p169). It is difficult to know whether he meant to signal the 'postmodern condition' as somehow different from other
epochs because of this, (which being the case, he might well be viewed as holding a somewhat naive approach, it being clear that every epoch is always such a struggle); or whether, (which would be more useful), he was referring to the state of consciousness that attends this struggle in the contemporary moment. He also refers to what he calls the "political economy of signification" (p186), and this is very much the field of battle in a range of discourses at the present time, including performance theory. It is generally the case that writers whose work is informed by critical theory, such as Birringer, are concerned in their texts to open up the notion of 'economies' of representation and to show how these operate to repress, or dominate, the desires and powers of individuals in modern Western society. If we remember from our discussion of Nietzsche that representation is always also demonstration of self, then we might begin to understand why the notion of an 'economy of representation' is important. For if it is true that 'the subject alone is demonstrable', then the unit of exchange in an economy of representation, the 'currency' that circulates within it, can consist of nothing else but the self. Further to this, it can be added that, since the exchange of these representations forms an economy which takes its place within the various economies of late twentieth century capitalism in the West, Marx's analysis of the basic exploitative structure of all capitalist markets tells us that this exchange of representations will turn a profit for someone, somewhere, at the expense of someone else. It therefore becomes possible to see the drive to re-define what constitutes human identity, to offer the possibility of self-determination back to people by dismantling accepted versions of the nature of identity, as a radical political action; an action which is designed to hand the means of production of selfhood back to individuals by attacking the hegemonic control of perceptual and interpretive choice. Keeping the political nature of these interventions in mind, we can now go on to look at the work of several
practitioners and theorists of performance to show how there is, within what is a diverse range of approaches, what might be called a 'thematics' to the notions of self advanced by them, as well as a consistency of attitude towards the role and function of performance events.

There are several major assumptions which will direct this analysis, these being: that the political intentions of the practitioners analysed can be traced back to an image of the self not too dissimilar to that advanced by Nietzsche; that Nietzsche recognised the performing arts as a paradigm activity in terms of self-experimentation, and that there are practitioners who recognise Nietzschean philosophy as a paradigm approach to the self; and that it is as a site for the deliberate entering into confrontation with self and others that the theatre and performance have always operated as the stock exchange of the political economy of signification, in this respect pre-empting postmodernism by at least a matter of centuries.

Whereas populism seeks to impose restrictive definitions of the self, the polar opposite force might be desire, which challenges even the self-defined limits of the self in a surge of derationalising intuitive legitimacy, a liberation available to all yet defying generalisation.

(Barker, 1989, p76).

In terms of the possibilities for the individual as will to power that were discussed above, the theatre (and it might be more inclusive in the present state of things to use the term 'performance' instead) has always offered itself, in some senses, as a powerful weapon, taking place, as it does, entirely within a dynamic established between presentation, perception and evaluation. Performance, as an event, always functions as an offering of something to the perceptive capacities of the audience; and since the subject alone is demonstrable, what it always offers up for evaluation is the subject, or to be more accurate, those marks and signs which cannot be other than the traces of
subjecthood. Jerzy Grotowski seems to touch on just this point when he states that "when I do not perceive, it means there are no signs" (1969, p193), at least in so far as he suggests that it is signs which are the only perceivable things. We have already seen how a sign can only function as part of a sign-system, and that sign-systems only exist at the inter-subjective level, and this all goes to indicate that an act of performance is always a demonstration of self offered up to the evaluative gaze of the audience for their interpretive drive to feed on. As Eugenio Barba puts it, "showing something engenders interpretation" (1995, p25). Performance, then, becomes a major site in society where individuals can find themselves being handed back their 'greatest weapon' and asked to use it to reflect on, and possibly reformulate, their conceptions of the world. This is not a minor point: Nietzsche was clear that re-interpretation was the greatest weapon available to the individual will to power, and Western theatre, in its very structure as an event, has no other manner of operating than on the dynamic energy of the audience's constantly evolving interpretive processes. "Rearranging information is the main way of changing experience", writes Schechner, (1982, p99); and if we acknowledge that the making of theatre is never not a process of re-arranging information, and that changing experience is, for Nietzsche, changing the world, then we might see that what a performance always does, indeed has to do, is create new worlds and new truths. In this sense, the act of making performances is absolutely inseparable from the transvaluation of value; a fact which Turner (1990), with his concept of 'liminality', and of performances as happening in the 'liminal phase' - the "subjunctive mood of culture" (pp11-12) - seems to have been aware of. Turner describes a 'liminal phase' as that which provides a stage for unique structures of experience...in milieus detached from mundane life and characterised by the presence of ambiguous ideas, monstrous images,
sacred symbols, ordeals, humiliations, esoteric and paradoxical instructions, the emergence of 'symbolic types' represented by maskers and clowns, gender reversals, and many other phenomena and processes...

(p11).

Little deviant acts are "worth more" than opinions was Nietzsche's reckoning, having already made clear that it was only 'the doer that learns', and it is difficult not to see the types of activity that Turner is describing as 'liminal', as happening in the space where performance always happens, as a set of doings whose effect is to take a different notion of value into the whole field of established valuations and hierarchies - in other words, to transvaluate.

This seems to be one of the reasons for the clear demarcation in terms of intention between Naturalistic performances and non-Naturalistic ones. As Barker puts it, the theatre that he believes to be close to the true function of theatre "is not about life as it is lived at all, but about life as it might be lived, about the thought which is not licensed, and about the abolished unconscious" (1989, p52). In opposition to this, Naturalistic theatre presents, (or at least intends to present), an accurate reflection of life as it is lived outside of the performance event; a practice which Barker, and the rest of the theorists dealt with here, tend to reject, seeing that it is "futile to rest a theatre on given things" (p16). Interestingly enough, although thematically linked by their rejection of a Naturalistic methodology in the crafting of theatre, it is the basic conception of self used that is the largest site of similarity between the various non-Naturalistic practitioners, rather than the ultimate intended effects of what they present to audiences.

We might initially illuminate this by focusing on some of the writings of two practitioners who are generally accepted as working, or having worked, within the same tradition - namely Bertolt Brecht and Augusto Boal. It

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will be important here, and throughout the discussion as it develops further, to recall the characterisation of self offered by Nietzsche. This characterization highlights: the self as multiple; the need to experiment; the antagonism towards general moralities; the acknowledgement of the function of communication with others; the importance of the creation of new values; freedom defined as 'capacity for self-direction' and 'will to self-responsibility'; the highest ideals as being to create that which puts oneself and others in awe of oneself; the strongest desire as being to make a desired image real for oneself and others; and the need for mastery over one's drives and desires in order to achieve this. All of this will be seen to return again and again within the writings of the practitioners under discussion, even those who might have been expected to be antagonistic in the extreme to the radical individuality of the Nietzschean model of the self, such as Brecht and Boal.

The model of self as the root of theatrical forms.

[Human beings are] shifting raw material, unformed and undefined....

(Brecht, 1965, p54).

At first sight, it might seem an extraordinary move to introduce Brecht and Boal into a discussion that revolves largely around Nietzschean philosophy; and it certainly would be true to say that the latter's radical individualism is in direct opposition to the declared social aims of the two practitioners. Why, then, are they under analysis here? The answer is, quite simply, so that they can be used to show how their ontological bases have
within them aspects of what should, by now, be recognisable approaches to the problem of what it is that constitutes the 'self' of individuals in society.

Philip Auslander, in his essay, "'Just Be Your Self' : Logocentrism and difference in performance theory" (in Zarrilli [ed], 1995), makes what is a somewhat crude attempt to cover the same ground by analysing the various ontological idiosyncrasies of three major practitioners - Stanislavski, Brecht and Grotowski - through a deconstructive lens provided by the French contemporary philosopher, Jacques Derrida. Towards the end of the essay, in which he has appeared to reject the work of the three theorists as inadequately radical in terms of approaches to the notion of self, Auslander reassures us that "it has not been my purpose to discredit the theories under discussion here. I want to indicate their dependence on logocentrism and certain concepts of self and presence" (p65). He goes on from this to criticise the current state of most performance theory as well, making it clear that, to him, its debilitated condition is due to its failure to meet the challenge set down by Derridean criticism:

Having lost what we still suspect was the only valid theatre, the theatre of communal ritual, we either rhapsodize about theatres of other times and places or attempt to ground theatrical activity in versions of presence which bear the stamp of secularism, psychology or political analysis in the place of religion,

(p66).

In opposition to this, he states that truly radical, 'deconstructive' theatre would know that "an affirmation of the play which makes meaning at once possible and impossible is the alternative to the yearning for presence" (p66).

It seems ironic, however, that Auslander should lambast his subjects of inquiry so thoroughly with Derridean philosophy to such an end, if only because it is
so unnecessary, considering how Derrida himself finished off the idea of genuinely 'radical' theatre in an essay on Artaud some twenty years before. In it, he stated that

Artaud kept himself as close as possible to the limit: the possibility and impossibility of pure theatre. Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence, has always already begun to represent itself, has always already been penetrated. Affirmation itself must be penetrated in repeating itself,

(Derrida, 1978, p249).

This, following as it does an argument designed to represent repetition and non-repetition as the marks of presence (logocentrism) and non-presence (difference) respectively, effectively states that there is no possibility, in Derrida's view, of avoiding the "gratuitous and baseless necessity" (p250) of repetition (or representation). In other words, Derrida wrote, years before Auslander, that it was a fact that precisely what Auslander was arguing in favour of - (what he terms "post-Derridean" acting [1995, p67]) - is, because of the nature of theatre, always already an impossibility. One might begin to wonder, given this discrepancy, how far Auslander himself had understood the arguments he was advancing as misunderstood by others.

For example, at one point, Auslander argues that it would be Derridean to "use the vocabularies of conventional acting methods and styles and undermine them", and he then goes on to state that

Brecht obviously moved in this direction, but although his theory allows for the creation of many, even contradictory meanings in a performance, the implication is that a resolution of these conflicts is possible and desirable since that would imply the resolution of social conflicts,

(p67).

Now, to start with, what is 'the implication' that
Auslander refers to? Is it an expressed, or an assumed, one? Certainly Brecht intended his theatre to be "of such a kind that as many as possible of the interventions which society had made at one time or another became visible" (Brecht, 1965, p43), but this is a long way from requiring everything on stage to eventually lead to the resolution of social conflicts in order to gain its place on the stage. Essentially, this is where the crudeness of Auslander's approach becomes most visible, since it is clear that he can dismiss the theories of the three practitioners he deals with as succinctly as he does only by treating their conceptual armoury as cruder than it is. For instance, he sums up his dismissal of Brecht's working practices by saying:

Brecht would have the actor partly withold her presence from the character she plays in order to comment on it. To do so, however, the actor must endow another fictional persona with the authority of full presence, a theoretical movement that makes Brecht's performance theory subject to the same deconstructive critique of presence as Stanislavsky's, (p66).

This, of course, does not allow for Brecht's expressed view of human beings as consisting of 'shifting raw material, unformed and undefined', and instead presumes that Brecht was not aware of the constructed, or fictional, nature of the actor's 'self' that watched the presentation of the role. To take Auslander's word for it, we would have to assume that Brecht did not mean what he said about the nature of human beings. It would also be to dismiss his comment that "man is the sum of all the social conditions of all times" (Brecht, 1965, p63), as an only apparent acceptance of the formed nature of the human animal, which hid beneath it a covert belief in such 'prior' things as self, human nature and so on. On top of this, it would be to assume that the careful and skillful manipulation of information that went on before a play was performed for an
audience was, essentially, constricted by wrong thinking. Listen to this paragraph:

[If the audience is to be shown how to handle the character, or if people who resemble it or are in similar situations are to be shown the secret of their problems, then he [the actor] must adopt a standpoint which is not only outside the character's radius but also at a more advanced stage of evolution,

(p76).

Now, we have already seen Auslander criticise this use of a 'fictional' self as a falling back into 'logocentric' ways of thinking; but there are two points to be made here. Firstly, the 'fiction' is clearly a crafted one - the 'standpoint' (a place, perhaps temporary, where one stands) is 'adopted' (i.e. it does not belong to one, it is not one's own, but one claims it and treats it as such) - and this indicates acute reflexivity over the particular 'fiction' chosen; and secondly, the fictional point of view should be 'at a more advanced stage of evolution', which is not a property of self that most human beings can choose to endow themselves with as and when they please. That Brecht and his actors could do it is entirely to do with the fact, somehow ridden over by Auslander, that Epic theatre was "a social measure" (1965, p104), and that it was Brecht's view that "if lives are worth anything, it is for and by means of society" (p78). Add to this his statement that "the unknown can only develop from the known" (p79), and possibly there might begin to surface the idea that in serving that end, Brecht felt free to operate comprehensible forms of representation purely on the strength of their range of availability to the members of his audiences.

As a final point, and as a foil to Auslander's perception that Brecht always implied that 'a resolution of conflicts' was 'possible and desirable', let us finish with another quote from Brecht himself:
Our new task demands that we put forward whatever takes place between people, fully and completely, complete with all contradictions, in a state that can or cannot be resolved. Nothing is irrelevant to society and its affairs. The elements that are clearly defined and can be mastered must be presented in relation to those that are unclear and cannot.

(p46, emphasis added).

This seems to make clear that Brecht was not concerned to simply exclude the irresolvable from his theatre, and suggests that the apparent implication that Auslander recognised in his work was provided not by Brecht, but by Auslander himself.

It is clear, as we have seen, that Nietzsche also intended to produce a radical critique of the self, and equally clear that he had no intention of thereby denying individuals access and rights to what they had come to regard as their ‘selves’, since it was as a result of such access that he hoped that individuals would be enabled to enter a process of the continual ‘overcoming’ of the constraints and limits imposed by their ‘subjecthood’. In effect, he was at pains not to advocate the abandonment of the structures of self, at least not until some point in the very distant future, and even then it would be a methodology of living available only to the select few, the ‘free spirits’. For Nietzsche, the ‘synthetic concept ‘I’’ was a ‘condition of life’ and therefore not sensibly abandoned, it being assumed that a condition of life is a necessary pre-requisite for that life to exist at all. This is what he meant when he stated of the intellect that “[W]e would not have it if we did not need to have it, and we would not have it as it is if we did not need to have it as it is, if we could live otherwise” (1968, p273). And interestingly, Nietzsche’s advocacy of the ‘synthetic concept ‘I’’ goes beyond the purely abstract too, in that he seems to affirm that the ‘centring’ of experience is a necessary, and even evolutionary, process, as in the
passage below:

Consciousness - beginning quite externally, as co-ordination and becoming conscious of 'impression' - at first at the furthest distance from the biological center of the individual; but a process that deepens and intensifies itself, and continually draws nearer to that centre,

(p274).

This ties in to statements such as that which relates that "every centre of force adopts a perspective towards the entire remainder" (p305), all of which adds force to the view that individuals should not abandon their structures of subjectivity. For, as is clear, it is only a 'centre of force' that can possess a point distinct from all others from which to perceive (and therefore interpret and evaluate), and it is only this capacity for individual perception that guarantees a will to power its 'greatest weapon'. In other words, without the notion of a centering of experience so distasteful to theorists like Auslander, Nietzsche's argument is that the individual would have less, rather than more, power to operate in the world. As we are going to move on and see, every practitioner encountered on these pages seems to operate from a largely similar standpoint on the issue, no matter what their particular formal or methodological approach; and this coincidence of attitude, as will become clear, gains in importance directly in relation to its roots in what might be termed political thinking.

Human beings must invent themselves in the midst of an infinity of possibilities, instead of passively accepting their roles because they think they could not be other than they are,

(Boal, 1992, p209).

Nietzsche once asked what would happen if it were
discovered to be true “that all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text?” (1982, p76). It was a question along the same lines as his statement that ‘all belief is based on the feeling of pleasure or pain in relation to the feeling subject’, and it was intended to push home his point that all the effects of Reason - intelligence, understanding, knowledge, conviction and so on - are simply the indirect results of the repression or expression of the drives and desires of the individual in question. Brecht, it might be argued, is generally assumed to have approached the problem of individuality from a much more rationalist perspective, caught up in the Enlightenment project of which Karl Marx’s writings were simply an instance. However, such a viewing of Brecht’s attitudes in this area can quickly be shown to be not strictly correct.

“People do a lot that is reasonable, but has never been subjected to their reason”, says Brecht at one point, (1965, p50), before going on to discuss why he constructed his characters as he did, taking it as said that the basis of his characterising was a view of human beings as ‘shifting raw material, unformed and undefined’.

> It’s only when confronted by such characters that they will practice true thinking; that is to say thinking that is conditioned by self-interest, and introduced and accompanied by feelings, a kind of thinking that displays every stage of awareness, clarity and effectiveness. (p54).

Clearly, if this is a rationalist conception of the process of ‘true thinking’, then it is an unusual one, for it states that true thinking only occurs when ‘feeling’ introduces it, makes the initial impulse in the body from which ‘thought’ develops, and that it then develops properly only when it is ‘conditioned by self-interest’.
('Selfishness', we might remember, is what Nietzsche ironically called one of the "three most cursed things" - along with "sensual pleasure" and "lust for power" [1961, p206]). So, if it is possible to take this conception of thinking as indicative in any way in terms of this thesis, we might want to say that Brecht, different as he was to Nietzsche in his declared aims for society - (and Nietzsche eschewed 'socialism' for what he saw as its shrewd manipulation of the "Christian instinct" (1965, p401)) - seems to have operated the same basic schematic as regards the nature and structure of individuals as Nietzsche did, at least in terms of what it means to 'think'. If we are happy to accept that what it means to think, in other words what consciousness is like as an experiential state for individuals, is an important question in the field of inquiry into the human life form (in the human-ities), then we might also be happy to accept that when Brecht and Nietzsche can be seen to share similar views about it, then what is being witnessed is a coincidence of form of some proportion in their outlooks.

It is a long time since I experienced the reasons for my opinions.
Should I not have to be a barrel of memory, if I wanted to carry my reasons, too, about with me?

(Nietzsche, 1961, p149).

This may seem to be saying entirely nothing of any import, other than in terms of abstract forms, about the works and writings of either Brecht or Nietzsche; but it is surely quickly apparent that the conception Brecht used of what his audience consisted of as human beings would define and delimit his approach to the creation of objects for them to perceive. It goes further than that, though. The entire mise-en-scène of Epic theatre, looking at Brecht's creations in Nietzschean terms, (where all the effects of the individual reflect to, and for, the individual), was, and is, structured around this conceptualisation of human beings.
Epic theatre, (like all skilled theatre taking place within a similar physical structuring of audience-space-performer), is a confrontation between self and other that has been stringently pre-ordained by one party and to which the other has agreed to submit upon entering. This is why Brecht made it clear that "the kind of experience the theatre communicates isn't doing things yourself" (1965, p33). In effect, this means that Brecht, as playwright and director, attempts in making a performance to occupy the position of the audience as perceiver of what is on stage, and through this to guide their perceptive processes to his desired ends come the time of the performance. There is a very real sense in which the craft of theatre for the director or playwright consists in large part in this deliberate attempted manipulation of the perceptive capacities of the audience by their own. It is the same sense in which theatre is always the confrontation between self and other where self is surrendered to the other in the belief that belief will return the other to one as self. It is also the same sense where 'understanding', standing under, supporting, is accomplished through belief - the 'suspension of disbelief' - for the eventual reward of containing the whole, of becoming equal to it. In other words, instead of leaving their weapons on the threshold, the audience in the Epic theatre are asked to bring them in and use them with the utmost skill. In terms of basic structure, this might be seen as the occupation of the space of the other (the use of their perceptual position by an alien form - that of the director, performer or playwright) for the purpose of their eventual empowerment in the dynamic meaning-producing confrontation of the performance. In this way, it becomes possible to state that Brecht's theatre was based entirely on empathy at one level, just as every other form of theatre is.

(As we will see later, and as we touched on before, the problem of commensurability and its reductive effect on autonomous individuality is always a central one for performance, which relies on it for any semblance of
effectivity. Communication is necessary; but it is, of course, before that possible. There is little doubt that every practitioner of performance discussed in these pages also views it as desirable).

(F)eelings are necessary if representations, imitations of events from people's social life are to be possible; also that such imitations must stimulate feelings,

(Brecht, 1965, p15).

We ought to note here that it would be a misreading to think that Brecht is saying in the above passage that representations are always, necessarily, 'imitations of events from people's social life', since that would be forgetting that he is talking about his Epic theatre, which was a 'social measure'. As such, it was concerned with the social, and therefore dealt in the sphere of the social, using social means to achieve social ends. The more abstract comment, in which the reference to the social is sandwiched, is that 'feelings are necessary if representations...are to be possible'. Now, considering that representation is a method of communication between human beings, and that human beings are, despite the guiding hand of language, indivisible feeling/thinking entities - ("One thinks feelings and one feels thoughtfully", says Brecht [p92]) - it might seem nothing more than obvious to state that feelings are necessary for representation to occur. But we have already seen that Brecht based his theatrical form on his conception of the individual in the world, and seen how that conception shares many aspects of itself with those advanced by Nietzsche - the subject as multiplicity; feelings (drives-desires) introduce thought; communication is necessary; interpretation (and the ability to guide it) the most powerful weapon - (Brecht worked in the theatre, after all, a field, like all the arts, for the active engagement of interpretation); self-interest (selfishness, self-directedness, self-responsibility) should 'condition'
thinking; - all of these can be said to be present in both. On top of this, it can be shown - (disregarding even the wealth of examples where Brecht, seeming to reverse exactly the situation Nietzsche bemoaned, attempted to make the common ‘uncommon’ again, to alienate it from the normative context that ‘defined’ it, and remembering that Brecht’s choice of theatrical form was designed for a specific function and reflected that function) - that Brecht’s conception of reality bears affinities with Nietzsche’s radical perspectivism. At one point, for instance, he defines the ‘really’ of “being really interested in something” as “i.e. deeply and many-sidedly” (pp38-39), and he then goes on to suggest that, when constructing a character, he “had to portray him as a basically alterable personality” (p43), in order to ensure that it would be an effective characterisation: “I had to make him take every step as if there was an explanation for it; and at the same time to have an inkling of some different step for which there would have been an explanation too,” (pp43-44). This, then, can be connected to a passage where Brecht states that “above all knowledge manifests itself in knowing better, i.e. in contradiction” (p89) - which might remind us of Nietzsche’s definition of ‘free spirits’ as those that were capable of ‘changing their opinions’. Taken together, these references to the multiplicity of forms and viewpoints available to each individual in society might then be taken to indicate that Brecht’s basic view of the world and individuals was, like Nietzsche’s, that they were capable of transformation, initially by a process of transvaluation. The aim of this transvaluation was, for both Nietzsche and Brecht, freedom. Freedom, for Nietzsche, was self-responsibility and self-directedness, and this is perhaps similar to what Brecht was referring to when he said that the Epic theatre was “meant only for our own day, precisely for our own day” (p99), and that, in that context, it was “simply a theatre of the man who has begun to help himself” (p103). These parallels do not, of course, imply either that Brecht and Nietzsche believed the
same things, or that they intended the same effects, were doing the same things, or desired the same ends. What it does do is suggest the role of theatre, whenever it takes place, as a crucible for the interpretive processes, and highlight that it is for that reason that Brecht was involved in it. It also begins to suggest ways in which the conception of self advanced within Nietzschean philosophy has its echoes in theatre practice of the last century, and that the different methodologies of the various practitioners will inevitably reflect an overall perspective on stage, which can be seen as the mark of a particular form of the self, since the subject alone is demonstrable. A final bonus, also, is that it allows us to argue that Auslander's criticisms of Brecht were unfounded, since they gave no credence to his own viewpoints as expressed in his writings.

The rationalisation of emotion does not take place solely after the emotion has disappeared, it is immanent in the emotion, it also takes place in the course of an emotion. There is a simultaneity of feeling and thinking,

(Boal, 1992, p47).

Interestingly, Augusto Boal, a contemporary theatre practitioner following in the methodological footsteps of Brecht - at least in terms of the intended effects of his chosen theatrical forms - also displays a similar conceptualisation of human beings and the world they live in. That - (in the case of Brecht and now also with Boal) - this should seem at all odd is largely to do with their declared intentions as concerns their use of the theatrical medium, which they desired to use to initiate in their audiences a sense of their capacity for social action. It is because of the scale of this desired end, the fact that it was change on a social, rather than individual, level that they aimed for, that the notion that they are therefore antagonistic to all breeds of individualism seems to make sense. But, as we have already seen, Brecht was very clear that 'self-interest' was of paramount importance
if the individual were to practice true thinking. He was also of the opinion that it was feelings, rather than a somehow abstract 'intelligence', that engendered and 'introduced' thoughts in the first place; and it is difficult to know how he can have intended to diminish the role of the individual by inserting the individual's drives and desires in a central position in the formation and continuation of consciousness. The point to be grasped here, perhaps, is that Brecht (and Boal) both operated a schematic of the self that is explicable in Nietzschean terms, but located it within a context that stressed the individual's relation to the social world, possibly causing their conceptions of individual identity to fall into the background slightly. Certainly, Nietzsche's call for 'creators' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra seems to be answered by Boal's comment that "this is how artists should be - we should be creators and also teach the public how to be creators" (1992, p29).

Boal, in fact, seems to structure his theatrical forms around a conception of reality and the self that is remarkably close to that which Nietzsche might have described; and this makes the assertion that it is not necessarily the conception of self that is different, but the end to which it is put, very much stronger as an opinion. So, Boal can state that "we are what we choose to be" (p209), and explain that "the personality is only one possible manifestation of the person" (p205); at the same time as he can know that "theatre is an ideological representation of images of social life" (p210, emphasis added). These views allow him, like Brecht, to manipulate and represent for specific ends what is essentially, according to his own attitudes, unrepresentable due to its multiple and transitory nature. The human form is a multitude of possibilities, says Boal, but we can use types, representative forms, because of the project of our preferred ideology, around which we can base dramas that are comprehensible within society, in order to encourage the capacity for active evaluation of the audience members.
and help them “make breaches” and “open up paths of liberation” for themselves (p225). And so, like Brecht, Boal approaches his ‘Forum theatre’ as a ‘social measure’.

A point of interest here is Boal’s assertion that the personality is only ‘one possible’ manifestation of the person, since he goes on to add that “[t]he character, the dramatis persona, is another possible manifestation” (p205). This illuminates again the narrowness of Auslander’s approach to the matter of Brecht’s use of ‘outdated’ notions of the self by highlighting the provisional nature of all selves; and begs the question of whether the ‘self’ as a concept serves a useful function at all, even when, as in post-structuralist thought, it is held to be entirely a fiction. As this thesis has argued, the individual goes through a biological process of centering, the nature of which shapes the conceptualisation of the world and self, and so there is little point in seeking to abandon the habit of centrism entirely. On top of this, it seems entirely likely that the structure of identity known as the self serves its function in many different contexts of belief, and that the evacuation of faith in the metaphysical substance of the self need necessarily do no real damage to the ability of the concept to serve as a tool for empowerment, it being a fact that it is the self that grants the individual access to a perspective - one’s only birth-right in the Nietzschean world-view. It seems to be to exactly this area of experience that Grotowski was referring when he pointed out that “a secular consciousness in place of the religious one seems to be a psycho-social necessity for society. Such a transition ought to take place but that does not necessarily mean that it will” (1969, p49). It is arguable that it is the secular, rather than the religious, consciousness that tends to meet the view of the self as multiple with the more affirmatory energy. In light of this, we can see that Brecht’s (and Boal’s) materialism means that they can accept a view of the self as multiple, and within that view the separate ‘selves’ themselves as
transitory or dispensable, which allows them to utilise versions of the ‘logocentric’ self without importing (as Auslander supposes), all the failings of the theological viewpoint with it.

The fundamental concept for the actor is not the ‘being’ of the character, but the ‘will’. One should not ask ‘Who is this?’, but rather ‘What does he want?’. The first question can lead to the formation of lakes of emotion, while the second is essentially dynamic, dialectical, conflictual, and consequently theatrical,

(Boal, 1992, p51).

Apart from his acceptance of the same basic structuration of self as Brecht - subject as multiple, feelings and reason inseparable and so on - Boal’s most convincingly ‘Nietzschean’ attitude is visible in his characterisation of ‘conflict’ as the “source of theatricality” (p51). This characterisation rests on the assumption that “[t]he will is the essence of the motivation” of the character; which in turn takes its substance from the assertion that “idea = concrete will” (p52). That such a view can be described as Nietzschean should by now be clear, since Nietzsche was at pains to point out that all life was ‘will to power and nothing besides’.

Now, it is not clear that it is the will to power as explicated by Nietzsche that Boal is referring to when he uses the term ‘will’, but it seems safe to assume that, because of the correspondence between their conceptions of the self in other respects, the function and nature of the will in Boal’s version of the self is close to, if not the same, as that which we find in Nietzsche. So, where Nietzsche could state that it is ‘only the doer that learns’, Boal is able to say that the ideal of Forum theatre is that “[a]t best, it liberates the spect-actors. At best, it stimulates them. At best, it transforms them into actors. Actor - he or she who acts” (p39). If we are
happy to accept that to ‘act’ is the same as to ‘do’, then we can see that the view of the individual in both cases is more than roughly parallel. Indeed, Boal goes on to say that:

[O]ur aim is not to exhibit static emotions, but to create rivers in flux, to create a dynamic. Theatre is conflict, struggle, movement, transformation... It is a verb, not an adjective. To act is to produce an action, and every action produces a reaction - conflict.

(pp50-51).

This, of course, is what Nietzsche was referring to when he said that it was a sign of a ‘mature’ man that ‘he attacks’; and it was what he was referring to when he noted that force must meet resistance to expend, or overcome, itself. In basic form, these points do nothing but follow a logic that Nietzsche himself has installed, since, as will to power, there is nothing in life that is not continually striving to attain its optimum functioning by overcoming the resistance (the will to power) of all other aspects of life; and this effectively means that all the dynamism of life consists entirely of various levels and styles of conflict - a view that Boal, as we shall see, shares absolutely.

Man does not seek pleasure and does not avoid displeasure... Displeasure, as an obstacle to its will to power, is therefore a normal fact, the normal ingredient of every organic event; man does not avoid it, he is rather in continual need of it; every victory, every feeling of pleasure, every event, presupposes a resistance overcome,

(Nietzsche, 1965, p373).

"The will is the essence of motivation", says Boal (1992, p52), before going on to state that "idea = will = emotion = theatrical form" (p54); and this eventually leads him to the general ‘rule’ that "the essence of theatricality is the conflict of wills" (p55). Care should be taken here to ensure that the ‘will’ which Boal is
referring to is not taken to be the sort of 'free will' that, together with a dialogue with 'conscience', provides 'autonomous' individuals with direction and ethical guidance. In the Nietzschean schema, will is always the will to power - "All driving force is will to power...there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this", says Nietzsche (1968, p366) - which, unlike 'free will', has little or no relation to abstracted and removed ruminations on life and its possibilities. Will to power is the primary driving force which, as we have seen, makes accommodation for nothing and seeks to overcome everything, and to which we are answerable, rather than vice-versa. In this respect, it is a material, a biological, force, as opposed to an abstract, 'spiritual' one. There is little doubt that Boal is working with a conception similar to this when he uses the term 'will' also.

For instance, he states that "[t]he internal conflict of will and counter-will creates the dynamic, creates the theatricality of performance" (1992, p56). Now, clearly, since he has already stated that the dynamic created by 'willing' is the 'essence' of theatricality, and included willing in a necessary and sufficient process of theatrical creation - (idea - will - form) - to state that it is the dynamic produced by the confrontation of opposing 'wills' that creates the theatricality of theatre is placing the notion of will very centrally indeed. For it becomes impossible, following Boal's conception of theatre as so far expressed, to point to an act of dynamic performance without being able to point at the same time, in the same object, to a visible manifestation of the dynamism of willing. If we were to use other words here, we might say that theatre as described by Boal runs close to life as described by Nietzsche, the latter being happy to say that life is present when will to power is. So, if we were to follow a Nietzschean characterisation of will, we might like to say that the theatricality of theatre, the dynamism of any performance, the effectivity of it, depends on its capacity to manifest an active will to power at some level.
Of course, in a sense, any performance that has an audience can rely on an active will to power in the guise of that audience, and must meet it and attempt to overcome it with the strength of its stylised presentation of itself, in order to seduce it into a state of awe before the reality of the image that one is presenting, to ‘create the world before which one can kneel’.

"Nothing of what is human is barred to anyone", states Boal at one point (p209), - echoing Brecht’s comment that “[n]othing human can possibly lie outside the powers of humanity” (1965, p32) - before going on to argue, in relation to his approach to the making of characters and plays, that “the premise is the notion that each of us is capable of feeling, thinking and being, in ways infinitely more various than we do these things in our daily lives” (1992, p208).

In taking stock so far, then, we can see that Boal has what might be seen as a conception of the self similar to Brecht’s (and Nietzsche’s) and that, worked around a notion of will as central, this ‘self’ is offered possibilities for itself through a process of confrontation of prepared images of itself - (‘representations from social life’) - that have been deliberately crafted and stylised for that specific purpose. In this sense, Forum theatre works at, and with, the intersection points of various ‘wills’, or perspectives, in order to initiate confrontation and re-evaluation at precisely those points. It is, because of this, another instance of performance as paradigm as far as the liberatory potential of perspectivism is concerned, where both actors and ‘spect-actors’ are asked to “sound out” their “possibilities” (1992, p209); and where the objective “is to encourage autonomous activity, to set a process in motion, to stimulate transformative creativity” (p245). The desired end result being, established as it is by Forum theatre’s two ‘fundamental principles’, that “spect-actors must be the protagonists of the dramatic action and these spect-actors must prepare themselves to be the protagonists of their own lives” (p242).
Once again, then, we can see that the emphasis is on a notion of freedom as self-responsibility and a 'capacity for self-directedness', where respect for their own potentiality - ('I wish men would begin by respecting themselves; all else follows from that') - is offered as an initial impulse into social action. It is worth noting that this process of self-respect is initiated, in Forum theatre, by enabling the individual audience members to wield their 'most powerful weapon' in public and have their skills with it acknowledged and paid heed to. In a sense, Forum theatre makes individuals exert their force on the world, and coerces them into displaying their will in concrete form, as an image made real for others; a practice the end effect of which we have seen Nietzsche praise as being every individual's 'greatest desire'.

We want to experience phenomena, but above all we want to know the laws which govern these phenomena. And that is the role of art - not only to show how the world is, but also why it is thus and how it can be transformed.

(Boal, 1992, p47).

Now, if we return for a while to Nietzsche's view that 'man learns how to transfigure existence when he learns to transfigure himself', we will remember that it is through a transvaluation of the notion of self that Nietzsche believed the world would be transfigured. It is in this context that it is important to collate the image of self that practitioners in the theatre are working with, at least in so far as doing so will emphasise their points of departure from more 'traditional' notions such as the 'soul', or the mind/body 'dualism' which we noted still seemed to be present in Goffman's text.

Brecht, for instance, made clear his distance from such notions when he commented that he now saw thinking "just as a way of behaving, and behaving socially at that. It's something that the whole body takes part in, with all its senses" (1965, p90); thereby signalling, in effect, his rejection of the rationalist view of the individual. He
also asked, "[w]hy should I want to knock out the whole realm of guessing, dreaming and feeling?", since he was confirmed in the belief that "people do tackle social issues in these ways" (p92). Apart from this, he also held a more complex view of the individual in society than might be allowed for if his affiliation to Marxism is allowed prominence in the picture of him presented; and indeed seems to have acknowledged the strength of the burgeoning individuality that Nietzsche - like Foucault - felt to be the favoured strategy of the discourse of rationalistic capitalism (or 'knowledge/power'). This is evidenced by his references, this time genuinely of an implied nature, to the difficulty of aiming for the public arena in order to communicate on a social level in the midst of a well established society based on individualism. He noted that it was "difficult to grasp very much without seeing beyond the individual to major group conflicts" (1965, p32), and rallied himself with the fact that "there's a lot that we share, even now" (p78, emphasis added); but he then seems to reach a somewhat weak conclusion, saying simply that "art can create a certain unity in its audience" (p94, emphasis added); which inevitably seems a little removed from the image of Epic theatre as a preparation, or catalyst, for massive, co-ordinated social change. So, perhaps these are tensions in Brecht's ontological outlook; and if this is so, it might be that they are caused by the strain of trying to contain a strong individualism within a social project to which individuality must, to some extent, succumb. If so, it makes more interesting the question of the degree of influence exerted by the utilised concept of self on the theatrical forms of different practitioners.

Boal, for instance, goes so far with his notion of the confrontation of 'will' and 'counter-will' as the essence of theatrical dynamism, as to characterise the dynamics of the body, of visible movement, in the same way. For him, "the most important element of theatre" was "the human body" (1992, pxxx), because "all ideas, all mental images, all emotions reveal themselves physically" (p61). This is a
comment that should not surprise us, considering Boal’s
closeness to Brecht in terms of approach, and if we
recollect Brecht’s conclusion that thinking involved ‘the
whole body’. For Boal, theatre necessarily treated the
body as its ‘most important element’ since - and here,
which would no doubt seem odd to Auslander, he claims to
have been following knowledge handed down by Stanislavski -
“a bodily movement ‘is’ a thought and a thought expresses
itself in a corporeal form” (p61). All of which points
towards a schematic of the self as the sort of indivisible
whole that Nietzsche always maintained it was. (He did, at
one point, remark that “[o]ne never communicates thoughts:
one communicates movements, mimic signs, which we then
trace back to thoughts” [1968, p428] ).

In fact, it was upon the certainty of this absolute
indivisibility, or undifferentiatedness, of form that
Nietzsche based his rejection of morality, since he
believed that differentiation was tied to evaluation, and
evaluation was an aspect of being, as opposed to becoming.
Indivisibility, in this particular sense, is the acceptance
(in Derridean terms) of indeterminate differance; as well
as being the rejection of that differentiation, called
morality, that seeks to find equivalent values for non-
equivalent things. In other words, treating the individual
as an indivisible whole, as Brecht and Boal certainly do,
can be seen to be a logically effective strategy, and might
be held to have gained credence as an approach due to the
influence of the Nietzschean view of the individual.

Becoming is of equivalent value every moment;
the sum of its values always remains the same;
in other words, it has no value at all, for
anything against which to measure it, and in
relation to which the word ‘value’ would have
meaning, is lacking. The total value of the
world cannot be evaluated; consequently
philosophical pessimism belongs among comical
things,


In order to add to this trajectory of etching out the
configurations of self operative in the approach to form of various practitioners, it will be helpful here to move on and focus on the work of two practitioners writing from a different perspectival position than either Brecht or Boal. To this end, we will look at some of the theory of Jerzy Grotowski and an early pupil of his, now established as a ‘name’ in his own right, Eugenio Barba. Hopefully, this will allow the strategy of this thesis - (which at this point is the illumination of the workings of models of the self in the manufacture of theatrical form) - to continue its process of justification and clarification.

The theatre can be a kind of anthropological expedition which leaves the obvious territory behind, abandons recognized values...

(Barba, 1995, p82).

A confrontation is a ‘trying out’, a testing of whatever is a traditional value...

(Grotowski, 1969, p90).

[A] performance conceived as a combat against traditional values (whence ‘transgression’) -

(p90).

In fact, it is with Barba that a stress on the importance of the performer as form becomes paramount. This is clear in his attitude to what constitutes the ‘raw material’ of theatre - which we saw described by Boal as the dynamism of conflict generated by will and counter-will - which Barba describes as “not the actor, nor the space, nor the text, but the attention, the seeing, the hearing, the mind of the spectator”, leading him to state that “theatre is the art of the spectator” (1995, p39). In accordance with this characterisation, Barba is led to focus on the visible representations offered to the senses of audiences by performances, in order to stress the fact that it is the nature of the visible representation, the
form, that is important, not the ‘meaning’ that is supposed to be perceivable ‘behind’ it. In other words, it is, for Barba, not some abstract level of ‘sense’ that makes a performer’s actions ‘real’, but “the quality of the action’s energy” (p87). This ‘energy’, and its controlled presentation, is what makes a performance effective or not. So, Barba says, “on the perceptible level, it seems they [the performers] are working on the body and the voice. In fact, they are working on something invisible: energy”, an energy he defines as “a personal temperature-intensity which the performer can determine, awaken, model” (p62) which, in its basic material form, “is muscular and nervous force” (p70). What is interesting for Theatre Anthropology, says Barba, “is the way in which this biological process becomes thought, is re-modelled, made visible to the spectator” (p71, emphasis added), for it is this crafting of form that gives the performance its reality, that allows the energy to ‘dance’.

(Sats, by the way is Barba’s term, used below, for “the moment in which the action is thought/acted by the entire organism, which reacts with tensions, even in immobility” [p55]).

The exactness with which the action is designed in space, the precision of each of its characteristics, a series of exactly fixed points of departure and arrival, of impulses and counterimpulses, of changes of direction, of sats: these are the preliminary conditions for the dance of energy.

(p71).

Now, if we recall Nietzsche’s comment that “[a]ll art exercises the power of suggestion over the muscles and senses” (1968, p427), and recollect his praise of those “who accord the senses a more fundamental value than to that fine sieve, that thinking and reducing machine, or whatever we may call what in the language of the people is named ‘spirit’” (p538), we may begin to see that Barba is also a practitioner who appears to be approaching the
making of theatre with a perspective on the role of art that shares aspects of itself with a Nietzschean view. This can perhaps most plainly be seen in Barba’s noting that it is the performer’s task to create an image so real that it seduces the spectator into believing in it:

A performer ‘in-life’ becomes sensual. S/he seduces the spectators, leads them to the meeting between experience and reflection. This sensuality attracts, captures, ‘enamours’ the spectators, makes them react emotionally, transforms their reactions into reflection,

(Barba, 1995, p172).

Another important aspect of Barba’s concept of performance is his stress on the manufactured nature of meaning, which he continually stresses is not something ‘in-itself’ which the performer ‘expresses’ and the audience ‘receives’, but is rather the result of the interactive process of the performance situation, which is the constant interplay between presentation, perception, and evaluation.

It is not the action itself which has its own meaning. Meaning is always the fruit of a convention, a relationship. The very fact that the performer-spectator relationship exists implies that meanings will be produced. The point is whether or not one wishes to programme which specific meanings must germinate in the spectator’s mind, (pp104-105, heavy emphasis added).

Add to this Barba’s view that “[t]he performer’s body reveals its life to the spectator by means of a myriad of tensions between opposing tensions” - what he names the “principle of opposition” which “all performers use, consciously or unconsciously” (p24) - and there begins to build up, as it was suggested there might, a recognisable picture of the self underlying Barba’s methodology. It is, in effect, a self given over to the transvaluation and transformation of itself purely for the purposes of convincing others of the reality of the image of itself.
that it has created, of seducing them into belief in "a naturalness that is the fruit of artificiality" (p104). In such a way, says Barba, the performer can transfigure him/herself beyond the constraints of the socially prescribed.

So, extrapolating out from these brief parallels, is it possible to suggest that Barba uses a conception of the self, and of the practice of theatre/performance that makes sense within a Nietzschean perspective? It does seem more than likely: the individual viewed as a non-dualistic 'whole' (‘body-mind’ is Barba’s term for the non-dualised self); theatre as the opportunity for the individual to transfigure him/herself; the effectiveness of this dependent on an ability to seduce one’s audience; meaning residing in the confrontation between performer and audience (between one perspectival position and another); the manipulation of form, of appearance, as paramount; art as that which works on the muscles and the senses - all of these would be at home in a Nietzschean characterisation of the theatre event, and all are present in the ontological viewpoint from which Barba constructs his performances. In this sense, then, it seems acceptable to begin to characterise Barba’s approach to theatre as reliant on a concept of self, and of the theatre event itself, that has some affinities with Nietzsche’s attitudes to these things, just as we were able to do with Brecht and Boal.

This allows the argument for an implicit problematisation of the notion of what constitutes human identity being present in the thinking of these practitioners to be further advanced, perhaps so much so that it can be seen as to some extent dictating their approach to the theatrical medium itself. There seems to be a common acceptance within the writings analyzed here of a view of the performance event as an optimum site for the active working of the interpretive capacity, and this seems to be tied to a general viewing of human identity as more various than it is proposed as being outside of the theatrical space. The distinct projects of these
practitioners can, because of this, be seen as meeting at the level of broad purpose despite what may be very particular intended ends; and this broad purpose might be characterized as the manipulation of perception via the creative re-arrangement of form. As Barba states it, “to direct or choreograph means steering the spectator’s perception by using the performer’s actions” (1995, p168), and, as he makes clear, an action is “that which changes me and the perception the spectator has of me” (p156). This is a clear endorsement of the proposition that it is the signs of agency that install meaning in the world, and that it is through the effects of agency that humanity can change that world. This appears to be accepted at the level of a fact by not only Brecht, Boal and Barba, but by every practitioner that we have encountered in this thesis. It can act as justification, then, of the central placement of agency in the theoretical model of performance offered in Chapter One. It should also be clear by now that this installation of agency as a central feature of a model of human identity does not, of necessity, act as a boundary to definitions of what this identity can be held to be. Such a conception, as we have seen, is composed of a will to power and a capacity to learn, and both of these attributes are essentially neutral factors in the cultural construction of identity. Barba signals his awareness of the basic neutrality of the primary human form, and of the liberatory possibilities granted by this, when he discusses what he terms the ‘fictive body’, the body which the liminal position of the performance space can, uniquely, allow for:

The performer’s extra-daily body technique dilates the body’s dynamics. The body is re-formed, re-built for the theatrical fiction. This ‘art-body’ - and thus ‘non-natural body’ - is neither male nor female in and of itself. On the stage, it has the sex it has decided to represent, (p62).

There is little doubt that this conceptualization moves
close to Lacan’s view that the human form is psychologically non-distinguishable in terms of female/male typology in its primary state. For Barba, the truth of any particular performance action springs from its connection to the ‘pre-expressive’ level of the performer’s being, and masculine or feminine characterization “does not belong on the pre-expressive level” (p65). The focus on this primary level of being in Barba’s work then reflects an attempt to move beyond the forms of identity in operation in later stages of socialization, in an effort to reveal the essentially transient, dynamic quality of the human form. In this respect, Barba’s work shows the same critical attitude to social forms of identity as we found in Brecht and Boal, and maintains a similar effort to avoid the hegemonic influence that such forms are capable of exerting. If we move on now to look at the writings of Jerzy Grotowski, we can attempt to see if this thematic appears to continue there too, or not.

The theatre must attack what might be called the collective complexes of society, the core of the collective subconscious or perhaps superconscious (it does not matter what we call it), the myths which are not an invention of the mind but are, so to speak, inherited through one’s blood, religion, culture and climate,

(Grotowski, 1969, p42).

In fact, moving on to discuss the philosophical premises underlying the theatre practice of Jerzy Grotowski moves us into the core theoretical area of this analysis of performance theory, since it introduces into the argument that aspect of the performance dynamic signalled by the initial title of this chapter, the relationship of Self to Other. As we have seen, the dialectical processes in occurrence during the creation and then endless maintenance of the topography of this intersubjective realm is the field of operation for the desire of the will to power, and therefore the site of ultimate fulfilment for individual creative agency, or force. As Nietzsche said, it is not
enough just to offer "the humble expression" that "everything is merely subjective", since it is necessary now to say "it is also our work! - Let us be proud of it!" (1968, p545).

Grotowski becomes important to this thesis here because of his emphasis on the idea of the actor as making "a total gift of himself" to the audience member (1969, pl6); and his influence on Barba can be seen in what was just shown as Barba's stress on the craft of the performer (i.e. one who makes forms, a per-form-er). On the same matter, Grotowski makes it clear that he considers "the personal and scenic technique of the actor as the core of theatre art" (pl5), and it will be helpful here to recall Nietzsche's stress on the artist as one who 'accords no value to anything that cannot become form.' Adding to this the characterisation of any sign as a reflection of the self - 'The subject alone is demonstrable' - should lead us to see early on that Grotowski did not move away from this schematic in developing his theatre forms, but in fact moved to encompass and occupy it to a radical extent.

If there is an overall sense, or theme, to Grotowski's approach to making theatre, it could be held to lie in his attitudes towards what he felt comprised the actuality of the performance event, and towards what he saw as its function, or purpose. For example, he was clear that the actor's task was, essentially, "the expression of signs", and that this 'expression of signs' always "equals 'artifice'" (p17). This highlighting of artifice as the purveyor of what was meaningful in the performance seems similar to Nietzsche's approach to truth, where appearance is valued above some invented notion of a 'reality' beyond the surface. In fact, the correlation between their attitudes towards created form is far stronger than that, as Grotowski indicates when he states that "[w]e find that artificial composition not only does not limit the spiritual but actually leads to it" (p17). Now, if it is remembered here that Nietzsche termed art life's 'metaphysical activity', and that he sought a
'spiritualisation' of the senses and saw artistic activity as 'more divine' than life, then it might be possible to see the link between Grotowski's use of the term 'spiritual' and Nietzsche's. Both used the term without intending to refer to any type of theological institution or practice, but rather to indicate a state of being (for Nietzsche one of 'symbol-intoxication', and for Grotowski one of 'trance') that, once experienced by the individual, would be recognised as a most 'divine' state of being. If we are unconvinced of this in respect of Grotowski at this point, it would be well to recall his insistence that a 'secular consciousness in place of a religious one' was 'a psycho-social necessity for society' as far as he was concerned; and this, in effect, leads to the re-directing (or self-directing) of the human capacities for belief and deification - or what Nietzsche called the 'basic idealizing powers'. For Grotowski, the "theatre only has a meaning if it allows us to transcend our stereotyped vision, our conventional feelings and customs, our standards of judgement..." (1969, p213, emphasis added).

To contextualize Grotowski's attitude here further, we can note that Artaud, too, was in no doubt about the transcendent nature of art. He noted, for instance, that "art is not the imitation of life, but life is the imitation of a transcendent principle which art puts us into communication with again" (in Derrida, 1977, p234); and in the same way that Grotowski describes a state of 'trance' in the actor that is powerful enough to force the spectator into a profound response, so does Artaud describe stage acting as "a delirium like the plague [which] is communicable" (1970, p16). There is also a strong emphasis in Artaud's writing as well on the fact that this profound theatrical experience could only be achieved within the discipline of crafted form, where expressions "resembled distilled gold" (p37) and where the sign was "raised to the nth power and absolutely stylised" (p43). For Artaud, the power of such a disciplined crafting of form demonstrated "the effectiveness and greater active value of a certain
number of well-learnt and above all masterfully applied conventions" (p39); and these in themselves led to a new vision of theatrical practice: Artaud was clear, like Grotowski, that the theatre's purpose ought to be the actualization of new levels of being via the deliberate mastery of form—"what matters is that our sensibility is put into into a deeper, subtler state of perception by assured means, the very object of magic and ritual, of which theatre is only a reflection," (p70). It seems clear, then, that both Artaud and Grotowski can be seen to have accepted the Nietzschean premise that it was at the level of appearance—of artifice—that the most profound truths would be available, making it pointless to seek to do away with the mediated as a result of a quest for the absolutely 'real'. If artifice, or appearance, is all there is, then the manipulation of those elements that constitute it is, as we have noted before, the transfiguration of all there is.

So, working from a basic schematic that holds expressivity to be always the presentation of signs, and of theatre as a confrontation between self and other, how does Grotowski operate the mise-en-scène, and to what end? It seems that the core of the answer to the latter question consists of an emphasis on the discipline of the actor's craft, which indicates that in the discussion to follow, Nietzsche's presentation of freedom as a 'capacity for self-direction' and a 'will to self-responsibility' would be best kept in mind.

We believe that a personal process which is not supported and expressed by a formal articulation and disciplined structuring of the role is not a release and will collapse in shapelessness.

(Grotowski, 1969, p17, emphasis added).

For Grotowski, this basic conception of the theatre event is combined with a belief in theatre's function as "an act of transgression" (p19), and supported by the view
that the theatre, with its "full-fleshed perceptivity" is always "a place of provocation" (p21). This provocatory status is attained because the theatre is "capable of challenging [overcoming] itself" and "violating accepted stereotypes of vision, feeling, and judgement" (p22). In other words, the theatre offers new ways of being, new aspects of existence, to its performers and audience members. It seems clear that there is again present here a conceptualisation of human beings as more multiple than they are generally perceived as being. That this is presented as an 'offering' within the theatre situation is reliant upon taking the nature of performance to be that of an act of communication (and communion), a dialectical exchange normally predicated, at least in the theatre, on 'active' and 'passive' polarities where one 'gives' and another 'receives'; and this does seem to be an attribute that all the practitioners discussed, including Boal, take as a given for the performance event. Grotowski, supporting a notion of performance as an event during which the actor makes a "total gift" of himself to the audience, clearly holds this view to a radical degree.

So, if we read 'revelation' in the passage below as 'transformation', (remembering that a new perception creates a new truth, and a new truth a new world, thereby introducing transformation into the individual), we can see this attitude expressed by Grotowski as a principle of form.

If the actor, by setting himself a challenge publicly challenges others, and through excess, profanation and outrageous sacrilege reveals himself by casting off his everyday mask, he makes it possible for the spectator to undertake a similar process of self-revelation,

(p34).

The actor, then, in Grotowskian theatre, enters a process of the overcoming of self and then presents this to an audience with the desire that it initiate a similar process in them. In this sense it, and all other theatre, becomes
a concrete version of the transvaluation of value that Nietzsche was calling for a hundred years ago. For Grotowski at the time of his work with his notion of 'Poor Theatre', the "decisive principle" of theatre remained the same as it had always been, namely -

The more we become absorbed in what is hidden inside us, in the excess, in the exposure, in the self-penetration, the more rigid must be the external discipline; that is to say the form, the artificiality, the ideogram, the sign. Here lies the whole principle of expressiveness,

(p39).

Now, clearly we are not talking here about 'expressiveness' as it can be attached to infants or to children, for example, since they are undeniably 'expressive' in some way, but cannot be held to have mastered an 'external discipline' to any great extent. The expressiveness Grotowski is referring to is the mastered exteriority of the actor, those whose profession it is to overwhelm their impulses and drives in order to craft of themselves something credibly presentable. It is their task, as Nietzsche wished it were everyone's task, to accept the truth of appearance, mould it according to one's truth, and present it to the world as the truth. And for Grotowski, this mastery of self (or 'care of the self' as Foucault might have called it), involved a striving to reach 'beyond good and evil':

We are concerned with the spectator who does not stop at an elementary stage of psychic integration, content with his own petty, geometrical, spiritual stability, knowing exactly what is good and what is evil, and never in doubt,

(p40, emphasis added).

This, then, was Grotowski's 'Poor Theatre' - which was 'poor' because it "proposes the substitution of material
wealth by moral wealth as the principal aim in life" (p44) - a place where those who have sought to 'overcome' themselves and craft themselves into living 'truths' offer their overcoming to the perceptual senses of others, in order that they might be helped to do likewise. It is, in other words, 'active' transvaluation (or, as Artaud called it, "active metaphysics" [1970, p31]) - that activity which involves those present in what Nietzsche saw as the fundamental aspects of life, and asks them to recognise as much. For Grotowski, this is because "we must gradually learn to be responsible for all we do" (1969, p160); and is there any doubt, following his comments on the need for a 'secular consciousness', that his emphasis on self-responsibility is closely parallel to Nietzsche's? Through self-responsibility comes freedom is the message from both it seems, and in one it is reflected in writings, in the other in theatrical practice. Other than that difference of the specific field of activity, the basic philosophical premises seem to be very much of the same design in both cases.

We can chase this theme of similarity a little further by noting that Grotowski, like the other practitioners, shares with Nietzsche a view of the human organism that attempts to return to the body its function as the site and source of expression. For instance, Grotowski was clear that "the essential thing is that everything must come from and through the body. First and foremost, there must be a physical reaction to everything that affects us" (p172); and this is surely similar to Nietzsche's insistence that our 'most profound judgements' are judgements 'of our muscles', and to his call for people to 'start from the body' and 'employ it as a guide'. These are again parities of approach that are clearly identifiable between the two, and as such they act to establish the theme of linkage at the level of ontology that we have been looking at with all the practitioners discussed. What is particularly interesting in Grotowski, the more so perhaps because it is absent from the writings of the others, is his specific
focus on the dynamics of theatre seen as a ‘confrontation’, a characterisation that, with its echoes of conflict and peril, hints at a realm within which the will to power, with its drive for victory and extension, might readily feel at home.

This act of the total unveiling of one’s being becomes a gift of the self which borders on the transgression of barriers and love. I call this a total act. If the actor performs in such a way, he becomes a kind of provocation for the spectator,

(Grotowski, 1969, p99).

Philosophy consists of the gradually increasing dominance of an ontology of the same, in which a knowing self struggles to subordinate the alien objects of its thought to its dominion,


Grotowski viewed ‘self-research’ as “simply the right of our profession, our first duty” (1969, p200), and stated that “creativity, especially where acting is concerned, is boundless sincerity, yet disciplined; i.e. articulated through signs” (p217). Now this characterisation of disciplined sincerity as meaning sincerity that is ‘articulated through signs’ is crucial to an understanding of the discussion to follow, which, in itself, is an outgrowth of the Nietzschean hypothesis that ‘only subjects exist’. This hypothesis of Nietzsche’s can be seen to make sense if it is remembered that Nietzsche was not intending by making it to mean that the ‘objective’ world was non-existent; but was instead pointing to the self-contained nature of the world of human meaning, which; it will be remembered, we have already discussed.

For Nietzsche, however, “the world exists” because “it is not something that becomes, not something that passes away” (1968, p548); and this therefore places it in a different order of existence than human life, where a sense of ‘solidity’ has been achieved only by the imposition on the state of Becoming of a sense of Being, which has been
bequeathed by the 'supreme' will to power. In other words, appearance is to be worshipped above the 'Real', because appearance is the true realm of existence for the human life-form, since there is none other available to it.

If there is then added to this Nietzsche's conception of the great 'third eye', the 'theatre eye' which looks out 'from behind the other two', it should begin to become clear that Nietzsche, by arguing that only the subject exists - and that only the self was 'demonstrable' - is effectively saying that the nature of self-consciousness is its structuration as a viewed performance of itself, and that this structure is inescapable, total and reflective. Lacan, of course, was making the same point when he stated that

the whole ambiguity of the sign derives from the fact that it represents something for someone...Any node in which signs are concentrated, in so far as they represent something, may be taken for a someone. What must be stressed at the outset is that a signifier is that which represents a subject for another signifier,

(Lacan, 1979, p207).

This, then, is the crux of Nietzsche's advocacy of appearance over the 'Real'. Having rejected the notion of a 'real' self - the 'signified' that is assumed to exist under any 'signifier' - Nietzsche had to construct a philosophical system that presented as positive this lack of a deeper reality. He did so, as we have seen, by advocating the disciplined and crafted use of the signifying structure known as the 'self'. In other words, as Grotowski was noting, the most 'truth' that can be obtained from existence as a 'self' will not rest in the directness or otherwise of access to the 'real' self, since this does not exist, but will, instead, be found in the self-conscious and disciplined structuring of the signifying system that constitutes the 'self'. It is appearance that is, as Nietzsche maintained, the site of the 'divine'. In this sense we can see that Nietzsche's
philosophical working through of the disappearance of the 'Real' from a schema of existence in fact occupies the same field of inquiry that Goffman touched on in his exploration of the performative nature of the self. However, whereas Goffman simply highlighted the fact that the self was constantly 'produced' in interaction with others rather than a reflection of some constant 'inner self', Nietzsche provided a philosophy designed to underwrite both the acceptance, and the powerful manipulation, of this fact.

Now, there are two points that it will be helpful to understand here. The first is Lacan's assertion that "the I is an Other" (1977, p23) - which is really another way of stating Nietzsche's concept of the 'theatre-eye'; and the second, which is an outgrowth of this first, is that it is on this terrain, of the relation between self and other, that what might be called the 'ethics' of selfhood, and therefore subjectivity, are constituted (2).

Lacan's notion of 'the I as an other' derives from his concept of the 'imaginary' relation of the self to its own image, which dictates that the self is always constituted as at a distance from itself, viewing itself simultaneously as both 'self' and 'other'; and since this structuration is total and inescapable, this necessarily means that the subject, in dealing with the world outside of itself, structures it according to the same schema, seeing all things within the casts of 'self' or 'other'.

Elin Diamond (1992) notes that this characterisation of identity has ramifications for the notion of identification, ramifications which, in Lacanian theory, tend to be portrayed in a negative light. She says that, in Lacan identification, always in the register of the imaginary, is always narcissistic; the perceived other is always a version of me. Difference, contradiction are all occluded in the subject's initial and continuing capture in the mimetic mirror,


It is possible to present the same problem in Nietzschean terms by explaining that the 'will to power',
whose extent is the extent of its own form - what is 'self' rather than what is 'other' - is portrayed in the Lacanian schema as unable and unwilling, unless forced to do so, to shrink its own form in order to accommodate the existence of an other. It will, therefore, subsume this 'otherness' under the guise of 'sameness' through the process of identification, thereby effectively abolishing the other and installing itself in their place.

Diamond points out, however, how Freud viewed identification more as a two-way model, or dialectic, where "we are continually taking in objects we desire, continually identifying with or imitating these objects, and continually being transformed by them" (p396, emphasis in original). She goes on then to concentrate on the positive nature of this conceptualisation, stressing how it maintains that identification is,

an assimilative or appropriative act, making the other the same as me or me the same as the other, but at the same time it causes the I/ego to be transformed by the other. What this suggests is the borders of identity, the wholeness and consistency of identity, is transgressed by every act of identification.

(p396).

Now, considering the professed position of this thesis, which has maintained a commitment to the dialectical nature of the human organism's relation to the world outside of itself, it is clear that it is Freud's, rather than Lacan's, presentation of the structure of the identificatory process that will be viewed as the more acceptable proposition, since it is seen to grant adequate status to the propensity of the 'exterior' world to effect change in the world of the subject. It is also, clearly, a characterisation that, through its insistence on the existence of an 'innate' dialectic in the relationships of self to other, creates a theoretical space for the functioning of an activity such as performance, which is founded on the possibility of the potency of this relationship.
This notion of the ramifications of the processes of identification begins, then, to return us to Grotowski's characterisation of a performance as being always a 'confrontation' between the audience and the performer.

For, in the performance event, the performer can be seen as offering him/herself up to the interpretive scrutiny of the audience, generally in the hope that their reception of what is presented will act upon them in desired ways; and in this sense, performers can be portrayed as working to attain the mastery that will enable them to work this innate 'violence' supposedly involved in the appropriations of identification to their own ends which, at least in the practitioners we have encountered in these pages, seem to be describable as somewhat 'altruistic' in nature.

Again, it is possible to define this situation in Nietzschean terms as the refusal by the will to power to be subsumed within the active desire to create sameness of the audience, by offering them instead the sincerity of a non-aggressive otherness - this non-aggression being instituted, at least partially, by the physical structure of the performance event, with its separation of the performer and audience. In this sense, then, the craft of the performer exists in their ability to stand before the appropriative gaze of the audience as the somehow irreducibly other.

It is this same mastery that Nietzsche believed should be extended into the everyday practice of the self, since it was in the experience of the disciplined portrayal of self that the individual will to power would find its greatest strength, becoming capable of withstanding confrontation with the other due to the truth - the discipline - that was contained within the crafted form that was being offered up for scrutiny.

Working through this presentation of the performance event it becomes possible to see that it is in this manner that the self, which is nothing more than the structuration of consciousness, can be most legitimately viewed at the
level of metaphor as a performance event. As a result of this it can be suggested that it is therefore necessarily in an actual performance event that the will to power finds its most potent, its most concrete, field of existence. It is in the interplay of identification and non-assimilation, in the affective tensions produced by this manufactured conflict, that identity is focused and indeed tests out its limits. As Nietzsche was aware, "all associations are good that make one practice the weapons of defense and offense that reside in one's instincts" (1968, p486).

To begin to draw the discussion in, then, it is possible to state that the basic structuration of self-consciousness, imprinting all things with the same nature of self/other that obtains for itself, can accommodate and subsume otherness, and in fact extends itself by doing so. This characterisation of the self allows it full access to the process of identification, with the violence implicit in appropriation of the other as 'same', since it portrays the intersubjective field as the open field of play for the will to power, and suggests self-responsibility and self-directedness as the methods by which the risks of involvement in this field can be traversed successfully.

This, in turn, suggests that the activity of performance is based on an implicit acceptance of the necessity for the realm of the intersubjective in the healthy functioning of the human organism - 'communication is necessary' - as well as suggesting that it is in the nature of this particular activity to offer individuals some of their most potent experiences.

As the introduction suggested might be the case, then, performance writing in the West in the last century, as represented by the practitioners mentioned, seems to embody an approach to the notion of the self that, to a large extent, mirrors that which is found in Nietzschean philosophy. This apparent similarity seems, also, to be argued for by the affirmatory attitude towards this 'problematized' self that is the basis of all the
practitioners' efforts in the sphere of performance activity, an attitude which we have seen effectively defines both the direction and the import of their performance practice. For all of them, it appears to be the performance situation which offers, through a careful manipulation of the function and processes of identification, of the interpretive processes, a paradigm site within which the limits of the self can be exposed, tested and, possibly, reconstituted.

(T)he subject has no prior identity; rather, identity is formed in the crucible of identifications; the subject is 'specified', distinguished from all other subjects not by his immortal soul but by his identifications, and these identifications stem not from disciplined reason but from desire...

(Diamond, in Roach & Reinelt [eds], 1992, p392).
CONCLUSION.
CONCLUSION.

Theatre is the capacity possessed by human beings - and not by animals - to observe themselves in action,

(Boal, 1992, pXXXvi).

While constructing a reality of our own, we become aware of doing so and begin to reflect upon it. Thus, theatre turns out to be a field of experimentation where we can test our capacity for and the possibilities of constructing reality,

(Fischer-Lichte, 1995, p104).

The writings produced by and about Avant-garde theatrical practitioners in the West this century have consistently attempted to problematize received notions of the structure of human identity, and to offer in their place new versions of, and possibilities for, the nature of human reality. As Phelan (1993) notes, "the belief that perception can be made endlessly new is one of the fundamental drives of all visual arts," (p161); and it is this drive to present alternative versions of a hegemonically constrained reality that, in effect, characterises performance practices as radical. Artaud (1970) was clear that such practices attempt to "lead us to reject man's usual limitations and powers," and that in doing so they activate an experience which "infinitely extends the frontiers of what we call reality," (p6). In essence, then, such experiences offer a chance to reclaim a
level of fluidity and morphological instability for the human form, a strategy which represents an attempt to refuse the restraining influences of the normative regulation of perception and interpretation that operates outside of the theatrical space. This is true even in the case of practitioners such as Brecht and Boal since, although it cannot be said that they attempt a total deconstruction of the structures of the social reality as much as they do a revelation of them, it is nevertheless clear that it is a re-constitution of the individual's concept of the reality that contains them that is aimed for. The depth of the problematizing impulses needs to be seen as simply limited in such cases by the specificity of the envisaged social project, which is by nature context-dependent and therefore less driven to reject that social context entirely. This characteristic clearly does not mean that such practices should be entirely displaced from the spectrum of performance practices which share a common ground in attempting to problematize the translation of reality into commonly-held representations. It simply means that they can be viewed as occupying a different position within that spectrum from other particular practices; and, as we have seen, such disparities as become visible between particular practices when it is their specific forms which are the object of attention, tend to recede somewhat once it is the ontological premises upon which they are built that are foregrounded. In this sense, an experimental attitude to
form can generally be said to indicate a problematized notion of what constitutes reality, as well as an attempt to offer a re-interpretation of it. For instance, Boal (1992) states that "we want to experience phenomena, but above all we want to know the laws which govern these phenomena," before going on to assert that this "is the role of art - not only to show how the world is, but also why it is thus and how it can be transformed," (p47). Now, a clear contrast to Boal's approach to theatre would seem to be the work of, for example, the American experimental troupe The Wooster Group, whose productions are much more concerned with the complexities of textual interplay than they are with direct social intervention. However as Savran (1986) notes, their pieces tend to "insist on a complexity of vision and refuse the moral highground," (p55), which effectively forces the spectators to analyze their own associative choices regarding the material of the performances; and since the material is often of a controversial nature, this scrutiny of their own interpretive preferences can often be an uncomfortable experience. Savran cites the piece "Route 1&9" as an example of such a process:

perhaps the most powerful effect of "Route 1&9" is that it leads admirers and deprecators alike to re-examine racial attitudes, not simply on a gross cultural level, but in one's minute personal interactions, not with a view toward an impossible escape from racism but towards an understanding of how it functions and how it corrupts us,

(p40, emphasis added).
So, in the case of both Boal and The Wooster Group at least, the difference in the type of theatrical practice is subsumed within what might be termed the common purpose behind them - which is in some way to initiate a re-examination of a generally accepted reality, a re-examination that destabilizes the representation of that instance of reality within comfortable normative criteria. This adds weight to the proposal that radical theatre practice shares a common agenda.

As this thesis has made clear, it can also be stated that the effectivity of any type of performance, whether it takes the form of the physical involvement of the spectators in the action or in the encouragement of a reflexive attention towards their own production of meaning, could not occur without the impulse supplied by the creative agency of the performers and the audience. This makes it evident that agency needs to be seen as a pre-condition for the existence of a performance of any type, since it is agency alone which is capable of effecting a deliberate presentation of form. Now, since performance is always a deliberate presentation of form, it is always also the result of agency. This in turn allows us to see that the theoretical model of the performance event provided in Chapter One seems adequate as a description of the basic structure of what are widely divergent instances of performance practice, since it
provides this central role to the effects of agency. It then becomes possible to say that the writings of radical performance practitioners in the West seem to display an intention to involve spectators in an active transfiguration, or re-conceptualization, of what is normatively prescribed as an unproblematic 'reality', by establishing performance modes which seek to engage their interpretive capacities in new ways. Any differences between specific practices therefore do not occur at this basic level, but at the level of the specific targets they wish to present for scrutiny. In a sense, this can be seen as self-evident in that 'Feminist' theatre, for example, will clearly focus on received notions of women as its target in a way, and to an extent, that, perhaps, 'Forum' theatre might not. Again, what joins these practices is their common strategy of using their performances as chances to disrupt, rather than simply enter, the dominant economy of representation; as Phelan (1993) notes, "to the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology," (p146). A certain feature of the fundamental ontological position of radical performance is its positive endorsement of the creative agency of its spectators. This seems very clear.

What, then, of the model of self-identity developed by this thesis? Does it offer itself in the same way as a theoretical structure that can contain the various
directions and ways in which the notion of the self has been tested and attacked in theatre practice in the West over the last hundred years or so? Is it a model that can operate in the midst of the critique of the notion of the coherent, centred self that has been such a feature of that practice? The answers to these questions are: yes, it does and yes, it can. The concept of the self presented in these pages is, as has been explained, the pre-social, prior structure with which different societies work to produce the different cultural variants of self-identity. What have been called the 'basic building blocks' of a will to power and a capacity to learn are those, essentially neutral, characteristics which are the pre-conditions of the specificity of the human form. It is not they, but the social contexts in which they are developed, that determine the particular structures of the human form later on in life; and just as social contexts are dynamic and variable, so are the possibilities of the forms of identity produced within them. It is this fact - that identity is a variable phenomenon - that might be called the central ontological assumption underlying radical theatre practice, and it is not an assumption that is contradicted by the model of the self offered by this thesis, which places particular social constructions of identity as secondary phenomena which are, by definition, subject to constant reformulation.

Clearly, the cross-over term here is agency, since it is agency (or practice) that effects change both within and
outside of performance spaces. This was the reason for the constant emphasis on the need to centralize the concept of agency during the earlier development of the model of the self - if it is marginalized or refused as a positive force, the possibility of liberatory action is seriously reduced; and it is difficult to know how to characterize the theatre practices we have discussed if not as attempts at liberatory action.

So, the model of the self presented by this thesis can be seen as a theoretical support to the activities of the avant-garde this century, one which underscores their field of practice as a site of genuine liberatory force and affirms their effectivity as a radical critique. At the same time it highlights the need for some sort of irreducible basic structure of the human form, a structure that is not dispensable or alterable in the way that particular societal configurations might be. There is therefore nothing in such a model of the self that acts as a bar to the drive to experiment with the structures of identity that is so central a feature of radical performance practice. In fact, the model of the self presented deliberately calls into question the social formation of identity by emphasising its status as a construction. By doing so, it highlights this process of construction as an ideological product, and thereby marks attempts to interfere in this process as a valid political strategy, one which intends to rupture the fixed representations of the social
prescriptions of identity. As Coward and Ellis (1977) note, such a system of representations “has the character of tending towards a structural closure: it defines the limits for, and works to fix the individual with, a certain mental horizon,” (p74). The interventions of radical performance practice, with their manipulations of the systems of representations to alternative ends, are an effort to re-open the available horizon, in that they offer individuals the chance to re-interpret, or re-evaluate, aspects of themselves and their world. The model of self advanced by this thesis takes care to place the capacities of interpretation and evaluation in an absolutely central position.

Perhaps the last central strand of this thesis is the contention that the basic structure of consciousness is mirrored in the concrete structure of the performance event, allowing it to be viewed, like performance, as dependent on the dynamic produced by the relation of self to other. It has been suggested that it is at the point of this meeting, played out (and on) again and again in performance, that identity is constantly tested and formed, making an understanding of performance central to a proper understanding of the workings of identity. As a characterising of identity-formation, this is clearly related to the type of schematic advanced by Goffman, where the self is seen as the constantly evolving joint-product of the social interaction of individuals; but
it advances beyond Goffman's formulation by investigating in greater depth the complexities of this transferential matrix, doing so largely by the inclusion of psychoanalytic theory such as Lacan's, where the specific field of focus is the relation of self to others and self to self-as-other. This particular field of inquiry is one of the most prevalent in contemporary performance theory and practice in the West (1), and plays itself out in a more concentrated attention to the intricacies of representation and reception, giving rise to a growing interest in the problematics of reflexivity. Savran (1986), for instance, notes the presence of such an interest in the productions of The Wooster Group, explaining that the work "proceeds not from the self-identical, but from division within consciousness and explores the 'other' within the self... It defines the self as 'the-many-in-the-one' and performance as the pre-condition of being." and in doing so it registers "a break with the mimetic tradition by positing the self - constituted by a freeplay of forces and moods - as always already immersed in performance, in schism : representation to, of and by self." (p64). It is this type of conceptualization of the self-as-multiplicity, as a dynamic performative event, that this thesis has, through its importation of Nietzschean philosophy, provided a model for. The focus on the importance of the relation between self and other inscribed within this model allows the malleability of the human form to be foregrounded and, perhaps more
importantly, asserts that the true site of the self is the inter-subjective realm rather than the 'inner world' of individuals. This in turn suggests that the chosen manner of self-presentation will be guided not by some 'inner nature' which demands expression, but by whatever forces are operating to contain and license presentations in the inter-subjective realm, in the social world. This is the particular process that Foucault was attempting to examine in his writings, and the analysis of his work conducted in Chapter Three allowed the discussion to move beyond Goffman's characterisation of social structures as a "natural" phenomenon.

In conclusion, then, it can be stated that the central assertions of this thesis propose a theoretical model of the self that is offered a paradigmatic site of liberatory practice through radical performance events. These events, by deliberately intervening in the fundamental processes of meaning-construction, act to subvert the functioning of these formative processes and thereby destabilize and weaken any attempt to interpret what is presented according to normative criteria. This problematization of meaning generally aims to call the interpretive capacities of the spectators into a more active role, and therefore relies on the power of creative agency at the same time as it seeks to extend the sphere of influence of such agency. In their insistent reformulations of reality, such performances can be seen to be clearly seeking to address those 'who still
have ears for unheard of things', and by doing so, they surely continue 'the undefined work of freedom'.

As soon as we are shown something old in the new, we are calmed. The supposed instinct for causality is only fear of the unfamiliar and the attempt to discover something familiar in it - a search not for causes, but for the familiar,

REFERENCES.
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INTRODUCTION:

1) There is, of course, due to the fortunes of Nietzsche's writings in the last century, the possibility here that some support is needed to validate this use of his philosophy as a positive and affirmative force. As Berkowitz (1995) points out, "Nietzsche's thought has by now been transformed into a collection of cherished convictions, a vast standing reserve of slogans and ideas for those who wish to champion favored (sic) causes and to justify partisan political projects" (pxii). It is not intended, through the manipulation of his writings within this text, that his thinking should be to any extent misrepresented. For a positive reading of Nietzsche's moral standing, see Berkowitz, P. (1995) Nietzsche : The ethics of an immoralist, (London : Harvard University Press), where an attempt is made to defend Nietzsche against critics who point to the adoption of aspects of his thought by the German Nazi party in the middle decades of this century. For another positive reading of Nietzsche's ethical trajectory, see Ansell-Pearson, K. (1994) An introduction to Nietzsche as a political thinker, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), especially Chapter Two, pp23-56. And for a less sympathetic reading, which places more of the burden for the destiny of his work firmly in the hands of Nietzsche himself, see Bernstein, J.A. (1987) Nietzsche's moral philosophy, (London : Associated University Press), especially Chapter Seven, pp122-148.

CHAPTER ONE : THE PERFORMANCE EVENT:

1) David George attempts the same thing in his essay on Goffman, by working to reduce the expansion of the concept of performance beyond useful proportions. george puts this over-expansion down to Goffman's conflation of the two terms 'self' and 'role', whereas here it is portrayed as the lack of a proper distinction between 'performance' and 'performativity'. For George's argument, see his, "Letter to a Poor Actor," in New Theatre Quarterly, vol. II no. 8, November 1986, pp352-363.

2) For a quick example of this tendency in both writers, see their respective essays in Schechner, R. & Appel, W. (eds), By Means of Performance : Intercultural Studies of theatre and ritual, (Cambridge : CUP, 1990); Turner's "Are there universals of performance in myth, ritual and drama?" is
on pp8-18, Schechner’s "Magnitudes of Performance," on pp19-49.

3) See his essay, "Magnitudes of Performance," (ibid. 2 above).

4) The form of this problematisation is dealt with in depth in Chapters Two and Three, pp20-155.

5) Again, see Schechner’s "Magnitudes of Performance".


7) For an acknowledgement of the problems - for theory, at least - caused by this 'infinite potentiality' of performances to generate meanings, and a good discussion of the reasons for this, see Koppen, R.S., "The Furtive Event: Theorizing Feminist Spectatorship," in Modern Drama, vol.XXXV no.3, September 1992, pp378-394.

8) This characterisation of meaning is, basically, an outgrowth of Nietzsche's concept of 'perspectivism', which is dealt with in more depth throughout Chapter Four, but see especially pp164-165.


10) This notion is developed into a theory of the dependence of the self on the recognition of others for its meaningfulness by Lacan and, to some extent, Goffmann; and both of their approaches to this issue are covered in the coming chapters, (Goffman’s in Chapter Two, and Lacan’s in Chapter Three).

11) Whilst the relativity of the presentation of meaning as performative is accepted here, it will become apparent as this thesis develops that its relativity is deliberately contained, and countered, by several of the assertions that underpin the theoretical composition of the position advanced. As will be clear, the concept of an 'objective' world is allowed for in the later theoretical formulations, since it is not held to be of the same nature as the concept of the 'objective' world under discussion here.

CHAPTER TWO: THE PROBLEMATIZED, PERFORMING SELF:

1) See Lewis, P. "The Post-Structuralist Condition," *Diacritics*, vol.12, 1982, pp2-24, for a rejection of the radicality of the post-structuralist problematization of 'self'.


3) For discussion of the political potentialities of postmodernism, post-structuralism, see Hal Foster's introduction to Foster, H. (ed), *Post-modern Culture*, (London: Pluto Press, 1985); and Rennger, N.J. "No time like the present? Postmodernism and political theory," in *Political Studies*, vol. XL no.3, Sept. 1992, pp561-570. For a defence of humanism against post-structuralism, see Wilsmore, S.J. "The new attack on Humanism in the arts," in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol.27 no.4, Autumn 1987, pp335-344; and for a critique of postmodernist extremism, specifically that of Jean Baudrillard, see Norris, C. "Lost in the Funhouse: Baudrillard and the politics of Post-

4) This, (along with several other useful essays on 'the body'), can be found in Featherstone,M., Hepworth,M. and Turner,B.S.(eds), The Body : Social Process and Cultural Theory, (London : Sage, 1991), pp170-196.


9) For Wittgenstein's main theses, see his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (London : Routledge, 1990); and Philosophical Investigations, (London : Fontana, 1971). For clarification of the issues at play in Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of a 'private' language, and how it operated as a critique of Descartes' working through of the matter, see Scruton, R. (1994) Modern Philosophy (London : Sinclair-Stevenson), pp46-54; and Pears,D. False Prison : A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Volume Two, for an analysis of how what came to be called the 'private language argument developed out of the series of lectures contained in the published lecture notes known as the 'blue' and 'brown' books, which make up the material of Wittgenstein's text, Philosophical Investigations.

10) For this argument, see especially pp15-18.

11)


13) The later discussion of Lacanian theory (especially pp102-128), and Chapter Four are the places where this idea is examined in depth in this thesis. For a good, but difficult, discussion of the nature of the Symbolic in Lacanian theory, see Jameson, F., “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan,” in *Yale French Studies*, nos. 55/56, 1977, pp338-395. Alternatively, for a Wittgensteinian reading of the nature of symbolism, and the body’s place as a ‘wild’ element in it, see Ludeking, K., “Pictures and Gestures,” in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 30:3, July 1990, pp218-233.

14) For a good discussion of the general political pros and cons of relativism, see Jarvie, I.C., “Rationality and Relativism,” in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol.34 no.1, March 1983, pp44-60. For a defence of relativism, see Unwin, N., “Relativism and Moral Complacency,” in *Philosophy*, vol.60 no.232, April 1985, pp205-214; and for a confrontation with the relativising tendency in Post-structuralism from a Marxist position that attempts to subsume the findings of the former in its own, see Callinicos, A., “Postmodernism, Post-structuralism, Post-Marxism?”, in *Theory, Culture and Society*, 2:3, 1985, pp85-101. Also, see “Postmodernism, Subjectivity and the question of value,” which is a slightly altered version of a 1991 essay of the same title and can be found in Squires, J. (ed), *Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the rediscovery of value*, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993), pp17-30.

15) A point which is discussed later in the text, in the analysis of Foucault’s reluctance to make explicit ‘political’ statements, especially on pp85-87.


CHAPTER THREE: THE PROBLEMATIZED, POST-STRUCTURALIST SELF.


2) See the last chapter, "The problematized Self as a Performance Event," for a discussion of Nietzsche's notion of 'perspectivism', which is one of the strongest examples of this line of argument.

3) Ibid. reference 1) above, pp35-49.

4) Ibid. reference 1) above, pp85-120.

5) Again, see the last chapter for further discussion of the 'necessity', according to Nietzsche, of supporting a collection of contingent facts that function as 'pre-conditions of life', especially p178.


8) See Macherey, P., Ibid. 8 above.

9) See Raulet, G., "Interview with Michel Foucault," in Telos.
Spring 1983, no.53, pp195-211, for a very revealing discussion of Foucault's attitudes towards his own early influences. James Miller's The Passion of Michel Foucault, (London: Harper Collins, 1993), is a fairly exhaustively researched examination of the driving forces behind Foucault's genealogical investigations, and is a persuasive biographical account which makes clear the linkage between the personalism of Nietzsche's and Foucault's philosophical approaches. This thesis owes a debt to Miller's working through of Foucault's motivational desire throughout its discussion of his work. Another, less opinionated but well researched, biography is Eribon, D., Michel Foucault, (London: Faber & Faber, 1989).


11) Again, for a fuller discussion of the ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of 'perspectivism', see the final chapter.

12) See especially Foucault's History of Sexuality (vol.1), (London: Penguin, 1990), for a systematic working through of the process of articulation and regimentation that accompanies the construction of a structure of normative regulation.

13) Ibid. 13) above, specifically Section 5, "The Right of Death and Power over Life," for discussion of the synthesis 'bio-power', which describes the same sort of structure as Foucault's concept of 'knowledge/power'.

14) For one among many dismissive accounts of Nietzsche's philosophical project, see Tanner, M., Nietzsche, (Oxford: OUP, 1994).

15) See, again, Scott Lash's "Genealogy and the Body: Foucault/Deleuze/ Nietzsche," in Featherstone, M. et al.(eds), (1991), pp256-280, for a reading that describes Deleuze's concept of desire as more properly Nietzschean than Foucault's, at least in terms of its affirmatory potential.

16) For an example of Foucault's ability to be cast in a 'negative' light, see the account of his television appearance with Noam Chomsky - dealt with later in this chapter - in Elders, F., Reflexive Waters: the basic concerns of Mankind, (London: Souvenir Press, 1974); and for an interestingly different presentation of the reasons behind Foucault's muted presence in the interview, see

18) For different opinions as to what the concept of the 'Ubermensch' was intended to mean by Nietzsche, see Nehamas,A., *Nietzsche : Life as Literature*, (London : Harvard, 1985), for what seems to be a positive and contextualized reading, and Tanner,M. (1994), for a less accepting viewpoint. The term is discussed again in the final chapter of the thesis.


21) See Miller (1989) for vivid accounts of Foucault's political activities, such as his early membership of the Communist Party, his brief affiliation with the French Maoists, and his setting up of, and work for, GIP (Groupe d'information sur les prisons) - which concentrated on enlarging the rights of those in custody - as just some examples. Foucault was basically politically engaged throughout his adult life and said, again during the debacle with Elders and Chomsky in 1971, that politics, "was probably the most crucial subject to our existence," (Miller, 1993, p202).

22) See the section of the same title in Foucault's *History of Sexuality* (vol.11, (1990), for clarification of this term.

24) The term ‘Other’ is generally a psychoanalytic one, used to describe that which is different to what is the same, and is, at times, complicated and difficult to use. It recurs again in the approaching discussion of Lacan, and is dealt with in detail in the close of the final chapter. It is enough now to note that it is along the slash of the phrase self/other that the dynamics of identity, meaning and performance run; and in this sense, the term ‘self/other represents a symbiosis in the same way that Foucault’s ‘knowledge/power’ does.

25) The ethical quandary involved here, over the violence of ‘appropriation’, is one that is troubling many writers at the moment, and is dealt with in the final section of the closing chapter. For examples of the debilitating effects of not overcoming the paradoxical nature of this conception of power/knowledge, and therefore of falling prey to its capacity to undermine any self-conscious positionality, starting with one’s own, see, in order of demerit, Philip Auslander’s review of Mann and Birringer, in The Drama Review, vol. 37 no.3 (1139), Fall 1993, pp196-200; and Belsey,C., “ Desire in Theory : Freud, Lacan, Derrida,” in Textual Practice, vol.7 no.3, Winter 1993, pp384-411; and Birringer,J., Theatre. Theory. Postmodernism, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991); and for a short, but effective, critique of this tendency, see George,D.E.R., “Postmodernism and the Academics : A collision of cultures,” in Music/Theatre/Dance, no.3, Winter 1991, pp42-44.


27) It is important to understand here that when Foucault refers to Reason, he can be held to be referring to that which has been termed by this thesis the ‘capacity to learn’, or the propensity for inference. For example, he refers, in Madness and Civilization, to madness as, “reason dazzled,” (1967, p108); and goes on to state that, “unreason is in the same relation to reason as dazzlement to the brightness of daylight itself,” (ibid., p109).

David Cooper, in the introduction to this edition of the text, describes Foucault’s concept of madness as, “a form of vision,” (ibid., pvii), and it is crucial to realize that the non-removable term here is Reason - or the ‘capacity to learn’ - which Foucault places always as the irreducible crux around, and through, which the various strains of self-reflexivity must manifest. As the final chapter shows, Nietzsche placed the same propensity of the human form in exactly the same position as Foucault does.


30) For a fuller account of Foucault’s genuinely ambivalent attitude to the discourse of psychoanalysis, see Miller (1993), especially pp76-77. Foucault himself, in The History of Sexuality (vol.1), (1978), characterises the entire historico-political critique of sexual repression that developed within psychoanalysis as representing, “nothing more...than a tactical shift and reversal in the great deployment of sexuality,” (p131). It is arguable that Foucault regarded psychoanalysis as simply a privileged bourgeois head-game - “Those who had lost the exclusive privilege of worrying over their sexuality henceforth had the privilege of experiencing more than others the thing that prohibited it and of possessing the method which made it possible to remove the repression,” (1978, p130, emphasis added).

31) See Lee, J., Jacques Lacan, (Boston: Twayne, 1990). Because the subject matter is so dense, the book can hardly be said to be straightforward reading, but of the range of texts on Lacan referred to here, it is probably the most incisive, and seems to offer a genuinely complete understanding of a very difficult theoretical position.


34) Lee’s text is by far the better on the context and ramifications of Lacan’s notion of the mirror-stage, see especially pp18-19.
35) Again, for working definitions of all these Lacanian terms, Sheridan’s ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to Lacan, (1977) offers perfectly adequate summations.


38) Lee defines ‘jouissance’ as, “ultimate sensual enjoyment or bliss,” (1990, p141), and locates it in the sphere of the ‘Real’, opposing it to the state of ‘plaisir’, which is the Symbolic Order’s approximation of the ecstatic state available in the ‘Real’.

39) The phrase ‘pre-conditions of certain life-forms’ is Nietzsche’s, and the notion of their existence, extensiveness and effectivity is explored more fully in the next chapter.

40) For a discussion of the practical actualities of Lacanian analysis, see Lee’s (1990) account, pp87-98.

41) Nietzsche, on the other hand, believed that the will to knowledge could be overcome, and that the path of development towards the ‘Übermensch’ was a necessarily individual one.

42) For a good discussion of this notion of the other as ‘the one supposed to know’ and, at the same time, one of the best readings of Lacan’s work onto the theatre event, see Randi.S. Koppen’s, “The Furtive Event: Theorizing Feminist Spectatorship,” in Modern Drama, vol.XXXV no.3, September 1992, pp378-394.

43) This notion of ‘self-extension’ is widened and expanded
more fully in the chapter coming up.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PROBLEMATIZED SELF AS A PERFORMANCE EVENT.

1) For Nietzsche's view on this notion, see especially The Genealogy of Morals, (New York: Doubleday, 1956).

2) For a very good discussion of the potential violence involved in appropriative discursive inclusions of 'other' voices, and the possibilities that exist for avoiding it occurring, see Peggy Phelan's Unmarked: the politics of performance, (London: Routledge, 1993). For a clear exposition of the ramifications of the ethical questions involved in the whole question of inter-personal relations, see an interview with Foucault, entitled "The Ethics of the Concern for Self", in Lottringer, S. (ed), (1996) Foucault Live, (New York: Semiotext(e)), pp432-449; and for a cogent analysis of how this issue is central to the recent work of Derrida, and is developed in the writings of Levinas, see Steven Connor (1992) Theory and Cultural Value (London: Routledge). For an analysis that argues for the inescapability of the ethical dimension in any act of deconstruction, see Harpham, G. "Derrida and the ethics of criticism", in Textual Practice, vol.3 no.2, Summer 1989, pp159-172; and for a negative portrayal of the relativism of the ethical approach of post-structuralism, see, for example, Dews, P. "Adorno, post-structuralism and the critique of subjectivity", in New Left Review, no.157, May/June 1986, pp28-44.

CONCLUSION.

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