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Lau, TSC

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Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme

Terry Shue Chien Lau a,b , Muhammad Rezal Kamel Ariffin b,c, Sook-Chin Yip d,* , Ji-Jian Chin c, Choo-Yee Ting a

a Faculty of Computing and Informatics, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya, 63100, Selangor, Malaysia
b Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Serdang, 43400, Selangor, Malaysia
c Institute for Mathematical Research, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Serdang, 43400, Selangor, Malaysia
d Faculty of Engineering, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya, 63100, Selangor, Malaysia
*e School of Engineering, Computing and Mathematics (Faculty of Science and Engineering), University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL 48AA, United Kingdom

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ABSTRACT

In recent research, Durandal, a signature scheme based on rank metrics following Schnorr's approach, was introduced to conceal secret key information by selectively manipulating the vector subspace of signatures. Later, an enhancement, namely the SHMW signature scheme, with smaller keys and signatures while maintaining EUF-CMA security, was proposed. Both Durandal and SHMW require adversaries to solve hard problems (i.e., Rank Support Learning, Rank Syndrome Decoding, and Affine Rank Syndrome Decoding) for secret key retrieval, in which the parameters are designed to withstand at least 128-bit computational complexity. The authors claimed that the security of the SHMW scheme is deemed superior to that of the original Durandal scheme. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to identifying weak keys within the Durandal framework to prove the superiority of the SHMW scheme. This approach exploits the extra information in the signature to compute an intersection space that contains the secret key. Consequently, a cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme was carried out to demonstrate the insecurity of the selected keys within the SHMW scheme. In particular, we proposed an algorithm to recover an extended support that contains the secret key used in the signature schemes. Applying our approach to the SHMW scheme, we can recover its secret key with only 97-bit complexity, although it was claimed that the proposed parameters achieve a 128-bit security level. The results of our proposed approaches show that the security level of the SHMW signature scheme is inferior compared to that of the original Durandal scheme.

1. Introduction

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has initiated efforts to establish standardization for post-quantum public-key encryption, key exchange protocols, and digital signature schemes. Code-based cryptography stands out as a significant contender among the alternatives evaluated for post-quantum cryptography. During Round 2 of the standardization process, out of the 17 candidates for encryption and key establishment, 6 were code-based. However, no code-based signature schemes were chosen...
as candidates for digital signature schemes. NIST issued a new call for additional digital signature schemes to be considered for standardization in August 2022. The primary focus of this call is on general-purpose signature schemes that do not rely on structured lattices.

Designing an efficient and secure signature scheme poses a significant and non-trivial challenge within the field of code-based cryptography. An alternative technique for constructing a signature scheme relying on code-based assumptions involves utilizing the Fiat-Shamir (FS) transformation [7], which can be implemented using two distinct methods. The first method entails the application of a protocol that establishes zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge and, via the FS transformation, transforms it into a signature scheme. Stern [21], Veron [23], and CVE [6] are examples of signature schemes that were constructed via this method in the setting of the Hamming metric. Similarly, FS transformation can be adapted in the rank metric setting to construct signature schemes such as rank Stern [9], rank Veron and rank CVE [3], cRVDC [4] and rank AGS [15].

The second way to consider the Schnorr approach [18] when trying to construct an FS-type code-based signature scheme. Specifically, it is possible to produce a signature containing a proof of knowledge regarding the small weight matrix based on a sparsely chosen challenge $c$, where we let $S$ be a secret matrix of small weight vectors and $H$ be a random matrix with the associated public matrix $T = SH^T$. Suppose $y$ is a randomly selected vector with a moderate weight that ensures the signature's randomization; such a signature would then take the form of $z = y + cS$. As such, the prover proves knowledge of the secret matrix $S$ due to the term $cS$ in the signature.

The primary difficulty in constructing code-based signature schemes is achieving non-disclosure of secret key information through the randomization component. In the Hamming metric, signature schemes such as RaCoSS [17] and Persichetti's signature scheme [16] were shown to be insecure as information leaks from the secret. More recently, the Schnorr approach has been considered in constructing rank metric code-based signature schemes such as RQCS [19], TPL [22], Durandal [2], MURAVE [13] and the SHMW signature scheme [20]. However, the RQCS signature scheme was successfully cryptanalyzed in [1]. Later on, generalization was made by Lau et al. on the attack vector of SHMW signature scheme [1], where the authors proposed two generic attacks (i.e., referred to as “LTP attacks”) on Schnorr-type rank metric signature schemes [14]. To be more precise, in LTP attacks, the objective is to derive either a basis for the original support of the secret key or a basis for extended support of the secret key based on the available signatures. Subsequently, it becomes possible to retrieve the secret key by utilizing the matrix linked to either the support or extended support constructed from the support basis and other publicly available information. Moreover, the authors also demonstrated the viability of using this attack on the TPL signature scheme, enabling the secret key to be retrieved in a matter of seconds.

To counter threats that leak secret key information in the signature, the original Durandal scheme was purposely devised to prevent the direct extraction of the support associated with the secret key. Within its design, methods aimed at decoding Low-Rank Parity Check codes do not disclose the support for the secret key. Moreover, the authors in [1] have shown that the Durandal signature schemes achieve EUF-CMA security. Later, Song et al. [20] proposed a modified version of Durandal with smaller key sizes and signature sizes, namely the SHMW signature scheme. The authors asserted that their scheme offers enhanced security compared to the original Durandal scheme. Using the proposed parameters of the SHMW scheme at 128-bit security level, it takes 148-bits to recover the secret keys by solving the rank syndrome decoding problem.

**Our Contribution.** As highlighted previously, the Durandal signature schemes were developed to prevent the direct retrieval of the underlying or extended support for the secret key. As a result, it is difficult to apply the LTP attacks on the Durandal signature schemes.

Taking a different approach, we show that it is easier to cryptanalyze the SHMW signature scheme instead. This is done by proving that the keys in the design are weak. Let $q$ be a power of prime, and we define $\mathbb{F}_q$ and $\mathbb{F}_{qm}$ to be finite fields consisting of $q$ and $q^m$ elements, respectively. Additionally, we consider an $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$-subspace with $\Phi$ of $\mathbb{F}_{qm}$ with dimension $m'$. Finally, we define $s$ and $t$ as integers such that $s \leq m' \times t$.

Using the definitions above, our contributions are as follows:

1. We define an algorithm, namely the RS-Algorithm to determine an extended support $V$ for the secret key. In particular, let $\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{Z}' \subset \Phi$ such that $\Phi = \mathcal{Z} + \mathcal{Z}'$ and $\dim(\mathcal{Z}) = t$. The RS-algorithm takes input $(\Phi, \mathcal{Z}, s)$ and outputs a random subspace $\mathcal{Y} \subseteq \mathcal{Z}'$ with $\dim(\mathcal{Y}) = s$ such that $\mathcal{Y} \cap \mathcal{Z} = \emptyset$.
2. We design a new approach (i.e., the first approach) to retrieve the secret key of the general framework of Durandal signature schemes. This is achieved by recovering an extended support basis for the secret key using the RS-Algorithm and then solving for an extended support matrix using the equations from the public key. Note that the first approach may not be more efficient than the existing approaches (solving RSD).
3. Nevertheless, we extend the idea of our first approach by applying the RS-algorithm to obtain extended supports $T_j$’s such that the vector space $E.F \subseteq T_j$. Note that $E$ is the secret in the scheme while $F$ is part of the generated signature. Since $F$ and $T_j$’s are available, we can compute an extended support $V$ for the secret $E$, i.e., $E \subset V$. Then, we can continue retrieving an extended support matrix for the secret keys in the general Durandal framework.

Then, our second approach is applied to the SHMW signature scheme. This approach requires only 97-bit complexity, which successfully cryptanalyzed their proposed parameters. In other words, the proposed parameters in the SHMW signature scheme do not fulfill the asserted level of 128-bit security, and the keys used in the SHMW signature scheme are weak.

Note that our approach only breaks the SHMW signature scheme, as the chosen parameter sets do not achieve the desired security level, while we use our approach to recover the secret key. On the other hand, the original Durandal scheme is still secure, as the complexity of our attack is higher than 128-bit with the chosen parameters.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 introduces basic concepts in rank metric coding theory. In Section 3, the specifications for the original Durandal scheme and the SHMW signature scheme are given. Then, we propose a new approach to retrieve the secret key by considering the structure of the signature scheme in Section 4. Then, we extend the idea of our first approach and recover some secret keys of the SHMW signature scheme in Section 5. Finally, we provide concluding remarks, summarizing the key findings and insights in Section 6.

2. Preliminaries & background

In this section, we describe some basic concepts in coding theory. Let \( q \) be a power of prime, and \( \mathbb{F}_q \) and \( \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \) are finite fields consisting of \( q \) and \( q^m \) elements, respectively. Then, \( \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \) is viewed as an \( n \)-dimensional vector space over \( \mathbb{F}_q \), having the basis \( \{ \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m \} \). Denote \( \langle \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_q} \) as the \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-linear span of \( \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m \), then \( \mathbb{F}_{q^m} = \langle \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_q} \).

2.1. Preliminaries

**Definition 1.** Let \( \mathbf{v} = (v_1, \ldots, v_n) \) be a vector with length \( n \) over \( \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \). We can write \( v_i = \sum_{j=1}^m c_{ij} \beta_j \) where \( c_{ij} \in \mathbb{F}_q \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \). Let \( C = \{ c_{ij} \}_{1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq j \leq m} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n} \). We can define the rank weight of \( \mathbf{v} \) as \( \text{rk}(\mathbf{v}) := \text{rk}(C) \).

**Lemma 1** ([11, Proposition 10]). Suppose that \( \mathbf{v} = (v_1, \ldots, v_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n_q \) with \( \text{rk}(\mathbf{v}) = r \). Then there exist \( \mathbf{\hat{v}} = (\hat{v}_1, \ldots, \hat{v}_r) \in \mathbb{F}^r_q \) and \( \mathbf{E}_v = v_{r+1} \mathbb{F}^r_q \) such that \( \mathbf{v} = \hat{v} \mathbf{E}_v \), with \( \text{rk}(\mathbf{\hat{v}}) = r \) and \( \text{rk}(\mathbf{E}_v) = r \). Denote \( \text{supp}(\mathbf{v}) := (v_1, \ldots, v_n) \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n_q \) as the support for \( \mathbf{v} \), \( \mathbf{E}_v \), as a support matrix for \( \mathbf{v} \), and \( \{ \hat{v}_1, \ldots, \hat{v}_r \} \) as a support basis for \( \mathbf{v} \).

**Lemma 2** ([14, Proposition 3]). Let \( \mathbf{v} = (v_1, \ldots, v_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n_q \) be such that \( \text{rk}(\mathbf{v}) = r < t \). Then there exists a vector \( \mathbf{w} = (w_1, \ldots, w_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t_q \) such that \( \text{rk}(\mathbf{w}) = t \) and \( \text{supp}(\mathbf{v} \cup \text{supp}(\mathbf{w})) \subseteq \text{supp}(\mathbf{v}) \), where \( \text{supp}(\mathbf{w}) \) is an extended support of \( \mathbf{v} \) with extended support basis \( \{ w_1, \ldots, w_t \} \) for \( \mathbf{v} \). Furthermore, there exists \( E \in \mathbb{F}^t_q \) of \( \text{rk}(E) = r \) satisfying \( \mathbf{v} = (w_1, \ldots, w_t) E \). We refer to \( E \) as an expanded support matrix for \( \mathbf{v} \).

**Definition 2.** A linear subspace \( C \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n_q \) is called an \([n,k]\)-linear code \( C \) of length \( n \) and dimension \( k \) if \( \dim(C) = k \). This means that there is a generator matrix \( G \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}_q \) with \( \text{rk}(G) = k \) such that \( C = \{ \mathbf{u} : \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{v}G, \forall \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^k_q \} \). Equivalently, there is a parity-check matrix \( H \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) \times n}_q \) with \( \text{rk}(H) = n - k \) such that \( GH^T = \mathbf{0} \) and \( C = \{ \mathbf{u} : \mathbf{u}H^T = \mathbf{0} \} \). \( G \) (respectively \( H \)) is in the systematic form if it is of the form \( [I_k \mid A] \) (respectively \( [I_{n-k} \mid B] \)) where \( B \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) 	imes k}_q \).

**Notation 1.** In this paper, the subsequent notations are employed:

- A vector \( \mathbf{a} = (a_0, \ldots, a_{k-1}) \) over \( \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \) can be regarded as a polynomial \( A(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} a_i X^i \) by abuse of notation.
- Denote \( \mathcal{C}_{m,n,r} := \{ \mathbf{x} : \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^n_q, \text{rk}(\mathbf{x}) = r \} \).
- Let \( a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{F}^k_q \) and \( P(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{F}^k_q[\mathbf{x}] \) be an irreducible polynomial of degree \( k \). Let \( A_1(X) \) and \( A_2(X) \) be the polynomials associated respectively with \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \). We denote \( a_1, a_2 \mod P := A_1(X)A_2(X) \mod P \).
- Denote \( 1 = (1, 0, \ldots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^k_q \).
- Denote \( \mathbf{a}^{-1} \in \mathbb{F}^k_q \) as the polynomial such that \( 1 = \mathbf{a} \mathbf{a}^{-1} \mod P \). We say that \( \mathbf{a} \) is invertible if \( \mathbf{a}^{-1} \) exists.
- Let \( \mathbf{w} \) be a vector over \( \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \) and \( W = \text{supp}(\mathbf{w}) \). Denote \( V^{-1} := \text{supp}(\mathbf{v}^{-1}) \).
- Consider a finite set \( B \). Let \( b \in B \) represent the assignment of a randomly selected element from the uniform distribution on \( B \) to the variable \( b \).
- Let \( \Phi \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \) be an \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-subspace of \( \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \). Denote \( \text{Gr}(d, \Phi) \) as the set of all \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-subspaces of \( \Phi \) with dimension \( d \).
- Let \( c \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} \), \( E = (e_1, \ldots, e_r) \in \text{Gr}(r, \mathbb{F}_{q^m}) \) and \( F = (f_1, \ldots, f_d) \in \text{Gr}(d, \mathbb{F}_{q^m}) \). Denote the product \( c.E = (ce_1, \ldots, ce_r) \) and the product space \( E.F := (c_1 f_1, \ldots, c_r f_d) \) as a subspace with dimension \( \leq rd \).

2.2. Ideal codes

We define a \([2k,k]\) ideal code as follows:

**Definition 3** (Ideal Codes). Let \( P(X) \in \mathbb{F}_q[X] \) be a polynomial of degree \( k \) and \( g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{F}^k_q \). For \( 1 \leq j \leq 2 \), let \( G_j(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} g_{ji} X^i \) be the polynomials associated respectively to \( g_j \). The \([2k,k]\) ideal code \( \mathcal{C} \) with a generator \((g_1, g_2)\) is a \([2k,k]\)-linear code with generator matrix...
\[ G = \begin{bmatrix} X^0 G_1(X) \mod P & X^0 G_2(X) \mod P \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ X^{k-1} G_1(X) \mod P & X^{k-1} G_2(X) \mod P \end{bmatrix}, \]

i.e., \( C = \{ (xg \mod P, xg_2 \mod P) : \) for all \( x \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n_k} \}. In the case where \( g_1 \) is invertible, it is possible to represent the code in a systematic form, denoted as \( C = \{ (x, xg) : \) for all \( x \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n_k} \}. Here, \( g = g_1^{-1} g_2 \mod P \) serves as the generator, along with \( P \), for this code \( C \).

Remark 1. Suppose we have an ideal code \( C \) with a generator \( (g_1, g_2) \), representing a \([2k, k]\) code. The polynomials \( (h_1, h_2) \) and \( P \) define a parity-check matrix for \( C \) if \( H = [H_1 \mid H_2] \) serves as a parity-check matrix for \( G \) as defined in equation (1) where

\[ H_1 = \begin{bmatrix} X^0 h_1 \mod P \\ \vdots \\ X^{k-1} h_1 \mod P \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad H_2 = \begin{bmatrix} X^0 h_2 \mod P \\ \vdots \\ X^{k-1} h_2 \mod P \end{bmatrix}. \]

Likewise, when \( h_1^{-1} \) is invertible, we designate \( h = h_1^{-1} h_2 \) and \( P \) as the generator for the parity-check matrix of the ideal code \( C \).

2.3. Hard problems in coding theory

In cryptographic systems based on rank metric codes, their security often hinges on challenging problems unique to the rank metric. One of these problems, a modification of the classical syndrome decoding problem, can be stated as follows in the rank metric.

Problem 1 (Rank Syndrome Decoding (RSD) Problem). Let \( H \) be an \((n-k) \times n\) matrix over \( \mathbb{F}_{q_m} \) with \( \text{rk}(H) = n - k \), \( s \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k} \) and \( r \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \). The Rank Syndrome Decoding problem \( \text{RSD}_H(q, m, n, k, r) \) requires finding a vector \( \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{E}_{m,n,r} \) satisfying \( H \mathbf{x}^T = s^T \).

The widely recognized syndrome decoding (SD) problem in the Hamming metric has been formally shown to be NP-complete by Berman, Moody, and Tolhuizen [5]. In a more recent development, Gaborit and Zémor [10] demonstrated that if a probabilistic algorithm existed for solving the RSD problem in polynomial time, it would consequently enable solving the SD problem in the Hamming metric using a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Hence, the RSD issue stands as a suitable hard problem for rank metric cryptosystems.

The problem described in [8] is analogous to the RSD problem, with the distinction that it involves additional syndromes of errors sharing the same support.

Problem 2 (Rank Support Learning (RSL) Problem). Let \( H \) be an \((n-k) \times n\) matrix over \( \mathbb{F}_{q_m} \) with \( \text{rk}(H) = n - k \) and \( r \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \). Consider \( E \), a random subspace of \( \mathbb{F}_{q_m} \) of dimension \( r \), and \( s \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k} \) where the vectors \( s_i \) are randomly selected from a space \( \mathbb{E}^n \). The objective of \( \text{RSL}_H(q, m, n, k, r, N) \) is to retrieve the subspace \( E \) using solely the oracle \( \mathcal{O} \). Specifically, an instance of the RSL permits \( N \) oracle calls, resulting in a sequence \( (H, Hs_1^T, \ldots, Hs_N^T) \).

The next problem is a variant of the RSD introduced in [2].

Problem 3 (Affine Rank Syndrome Decoding (ARSD) Problem). Consider a parity-check matrix \( H \) for an \([n, k]\)-linear code, an \((n-k) \times n'\) random matrix \( H' \) over \( \mathbb{F}_{q_m} \), an \( F_q\)-subspace \( F \) of \( \mathbb{F}_{q_m} \) with dimension \( r' \), a vector \( s \) in \( \mathbb{F}_{q_m}^{n-k} \), and an integer \( r \). The ARSD \((q, m, n, k, r, n', F)\) problem aims to discover vectors \( e \in \mathbb{F}_{q_m}^n \) and \( e' \in \mathbb{F}_{q_m}^{n'} \) such that

\[ H e^T + H' e'^T = s, \quad \text{rk}(e) = r, \quad \text{supp}(e') \subseteq F. \]

The RSL problem has been established to possess comparable complexity to the RSD problem [8]. Furthermore, for large values of \( m \), the ARSD problem exhibits equivalent difficulty to the worst-case RSD problem [2]. Therefore, these two problems are accepted as difficult problems on which the rank metric code-based cryptosystems are based.

3. The original Durandal scheme and the SHMW scheme

In this section, we recall the specifications of the original Durandal and the SHMW signature schemes. Besides, we also include the proposed parameters for the mentioned signature schemes achieving a 128-bit security level.

3.1. Durandal signature scheme

We first give some terminologies required in the general Durandal signature scheme framework.
Definition 4. Let \( E \in \text{Gr}(r, F_{q^m}) \) and \( F \in \text{Gr}(d, F_{q^m}) \). A filtered subspace of \( E.F \) of dimension \( rd - \lambda \) is a vector subspace \( U \) such that

- \( U \subset E.F \) with \( \text{dim}(U) = rd - \lambda \),
- for every non-zero \( x = ef \) with \( e \in E \) and \( f \in F \), we have \( x \notin U \).

The original Durandal signature scheme is summarized in Algorithm 1.

**Algorithm 1** Durandal Signature Scheme.

```
Durandal.KeyGen(q, m, n, k, l, w, r, d, \lambda)
Input: A public parameter \((q, m, n, k, l, w, r, d, \lambda)\) depending on the security parameter \(1^k\)
Output: The public-secret key pair \(pk, sk\)
\[ E \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Gr}(r, F_{q^m}) \]
\[ S \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Gr}(d, F_{q^m}) \]
\[ H \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ideal } \mathcal{A}_{T^{\lambda}}, T \leftarrow SH^T, T^{\prime} = S^{\prime}H^T \]
\[ pk \leftarrow (H, T, T^{\prime}); sk \leftarrow (S, S^{\prime}) \]
Return \( pk, sk \)
```

```
Durandal.Sign(pk, sk, \mu)
Input: The secret key \( sk \) and a message \( \mu \in \{0, 1\}^* \) to be signed
Output: A signature \((z, F, c, p)\)
\[ W \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Gr}(r, F_{q^m}) \]
\[ F \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Gr}(d, F_{q^m}) \]
\[ y \leftarrow (W + EF^t, x \leftarrow yH^T \]
\[ c \leftarrow H(x, F, \mu) \]
\[ r \leftarrow \text{filtered subspace of } E.F \text{ with dimensions } rd - \lambda \]
\[ z \leftarrow y + cs^{\prime} + ps \in W + U \text{ where } p \in F^d \]
Return \((z, F, c, p)\)
```

```
Durandal.Verify(\mu, z, F, c, p, pk)
Input: The public key \( pk \), a signed message \( \mu \in \{0, 1\}^* \) and a signature \((z, F, c, p)\)
Output: Accept or Reject the signature \((z, F, c, p)\)
\[
\text{if } rk(z) \leq w + rd - \lambda \text{ and } rk(z) \leq w + rd - \lambda \text{ then}
\[
\text{Return Accept}
\]
\[
\text{else}
\[
\text{Return Reject}
\]
```

Remark 2. The main difference in the design of the original Durandal and the SHMW scheme is the choice of parameters \( l, l^{\prime} \) and \( \lambda \). In the original Durandal scheme, choosing the appropriate value of \( l^{\prime} \) is essential to guarantee that the entropy of \( e \) reaches a satisfactorily high level. In their parameter setting, it is consistently adequate to choose \( l^{\prime} = 1 \) to satisfy the condition \( l^{\prime}dk > 512 \). Moreover, \( l = 4 \) and \( \lambda \geq r + d \) are carefully determined to enhance the difficulty of attacks on both the RSD and RSL problems.

In the SHMW signature scheme, \( l \) and \( l^{\prime} \) are always fixed at 1, i.e., \( l = l^{\prime} = 1 \). That is why they have omitted the terms \( l \) and \( l^{\prime} \) in their proposed parameters. Moreover, there is no restriction on the parameter \( \lambda \) such that it must satisfy \( \lambda \geq r + d \). Their \( \lambda \) was chosen to satisfy \( \lambda \leq \left\lfloor \frac{d}{2} \right\rfloor \).

3.2. Proposed parameters for the original Durandal and the SHMW signature schemes

To reduce the public key size of the original Durandal and the SHMW signature scheme, the authors in [2,20] considered \( n = 2k \) and \( H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{r\times m} \) to have an ideal structure as in Definition 3 for an irreducible polynomial \( P \). Consequently, each equation of the form \( t = siH^T \) and \( t^{l^\prime} = s^lH^T \) can be shifted modulo \( P \) to generate \( k \) syndrome. Thus, the matrix \( S \) and \( S^{\prime} \) are constructed by assembling all \( s_i \) and \( s_i^{\prime} \) vectors along with their ideal shifts. In the case of the original Durandal scheme, the public keys \( T \) and \( T^{\prime} \) are expressed solely using the vectors \((t_1, \ldots, t_l)\) and \((t^{l^\prime}_1, \ldots, t^{l^\prime}_l)\) respectively. In the SHMW signature scheme, the public key can be described using only the vectors \( t \) and \( t^{l^\prime} \) when \( l = l^{\prime} = 1 \).

Table 1 presents an overview of the suggested parameters for the original Durandal and the SHMW signature schemes for the security of \( Sec = 128 \) bits. The sizes of the public keys, signatures, and the security level of each scheme are denoted as “size\( pk \)”, “size\( s \)”, and “Sec” respectively.

4. A new approach to recover secret keys of the Durandal framework

In this section, we determine the conditions to recover secret keys in the general Durandal framework. This approach does not aim to solve for the secret key \( S \) and \( S^{\prime} \) via the RSL or the RSD method. Instead, our approach aims to recover extended support containing the secret \( E \) via the LTP approach.
Table 1: Parameters for the original Durandal and the SHMW schemes in [2,20].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>((q, m, k, l', l, d, r, u, \delta))</th>
<th>(\text{size}_n)</th>
<th>(\text{size}_s)</th>
<th>Sec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durandal-I</td>
<td>(2,241,101,4,1,6,6,57,12)</td>
<td>15.25 kb</td>
<td>4.06 kb</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durandal-II</td>
<td>(2,263,113,4,1,7,7,56,14)</td>
<td>18.61 kb</td>
<td>5.02 kb</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHMW-I</td>
<td>(2,229,83,1,1,7,3,59,3)</td>
<td>11.88 kb</td>
<td>3.23 kb</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHMW-II</td>
<td>(2,233,89,1,1,8,3,58,4)</td>
<td>12.96 kb</td>
<td>3.40 kb</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1. LTP second attack on Schnorr-type rank metric signature schemes

We will revisit the core concept of the LTP second attack proposed in [14]. This attack capitalizes on two aspects of the design of Schnorr-type signature schemes:

1. The determination of whether a generated signature with a low rank inadvertently reveals any information about an extended support linked to the secret key. If such leakage is identified, it becomes feasible to deduce the extended support (with dimension \(t\)) and its underlying basis for the secret key.
2. If the inequality \(tn \leq (n-k)m\) holds, it becomes possible to solve for an extended support matrix that corresponds to the secret key, as the number equations in the linear system (over \(F_q\)) derived from the public key is sufficient.

As mentioned above, the direct application of Step 1 in this attack on the Durandal signature scheme is difficult, as applying techniques derived from Low-Rank Parity Check code decoding will not expose the support associated with the secret key. Consequently, it becomes necessary to devise an alternative approach for determining the extended support \(V\) associated with the secret key. Furthermore, to apply Step 2, we need to ensure that such \(V\) determined has its dimension \(\dim(V) \leq \frac{(n-k)m}{n}\).

4.2. A probabilistic algorithm for our approach

We first introduce some preliminary results required for our approach.

**Lemma 3.** [12, Lemma 3] Consider \(U \in \text{Gr}(r_1,F_q^n)\), \(V \in \text{Gr}(r_2,F_q^n)\) and \(W \in \text{Gr}(r_3,F_q^n)\) such that \(U \cap V = \emptyset \) and \(W \cap V = \emptyset \). Let \(Z = U + V \) and \(Y = V + W\). If \(r_1 + r_2 + r_3 \geq m\), then \(\dim(Z \cap Y) \geq r_1 + 2r_2 + r_3 - m\).

**Lemma 4.** Let \(W \in \text{Gr}(w,F_q^n)\), \(E \in \text{Gr}(r_1,F_q^n)\) and \(F = (f_1,\ldots,f_d) \in \text{Gr}(d,F_q^n)\) such that \(W \cap E = \emptyset\). Consider \(U\) a filtered subspace \(E.F\) such that \([e.f : e \in E, f \in F] \cap U = \emptyset\) and \(\dim(U) = rd - \lambda\). Let \(Z = W + U\) and \(Z'\) be a complement space of \(Z\) in \(F_q^n\), i.e., \(Z' = Z + Z'^c\). Then for \(1 \leq i \leq d\), there exists \(V_i \in \text{Gr}(r_i, f_i^{-1}.Z'^c)\) such that \(E \subset f_i^{-1}.Z + V_i\).

**Proof.** By definition of \(U\), a vector subspace \(T \in \text{Gr}(\lambda, Z'^c)\) exists such that \(E.F = U + T\). Thus, the subspace \(f_i^{-1}.(E.F) = f_i^{-1}.(U + T)\) contains \(E_i\), i.e., \(E \subset f_i^{-1}.(U + T) = f_i^{-1}.U + f_i^{-1}.T \subset f_i^{-1}.Z + f_i^{-1}.Z'\). Since \(\dim(E) = r\), we require only a subspace \(V_i \in \text{Gr}(r_i, f_i^{-1}.Z)\) such that \(E \subset f_i^{-1}.Z + V_i\). This completes the proof for the statement.

The next result gives a generalization for [12, Lemma 4].

**Lemma 5.** Given \(\Phi \in \text{Gr}(m',F_q^n)\). Let \(X \in \text{Gr}(r, \Phi)\), \(Y \in \text{Gr}(s, \Phi)\) and \(U \in \text{Gr}(u, \Phi)\) such that \(U' = X + Y\) and \(X \cap Y = \emptyset\). Given a vector subspace \(Z = Y + W \in \text{Gr}(t, \Phi)\) such that \(Y \cap W = \emptyset\), the probability that a random \(V \in \text{Gr}(s, \Phi)\) such that \(s \leq m' - t\), \(V \cap Z = \emptyset\) and \(U' \subset V + Z\) is approximately \(q^{-(m' - t - s)}\).

**Proof.** The number of subspaces \(V\)'s in \(\Phi\) such that \(\dim(V) = s\), \(V \cap Z = \emptyset\) is \(\binom{m' - t}{s} q^s\). Now, let us determine the number of subspaces with dimension \(s\) which contains \(X\). Since \(U' = X + Y \subset Y + Y + W\), the remaining of the basis for \(Y\) can only be chosen from the remaining \(m' - t - r\) choices. This gives us the number of subspaces of \(\Phi\) with dimension \(s\) that contain \(X\) is \(\binom{m' - t - r}{s - r} q^{(m' - t - r)}\). Thus, the desired probability is

\[
\frac{\binom{m' - t - r}{s - r} q^s}{\binom{m' - t}{s} q^s} = \frac{1}{q^{m' - t - s}} \quad \square
\]
Remark 3. If \( Z = 0 \), we have \( t = 0 \) and \( U = X \subset Y \). The desired probability is \( q^{-r(m-s)} \), which is the exact case in [12, Lemma 4].

The subsequent algorithm is crucial in our approach:

**Algorithm 2 RS-AlGORITHM.**

Input: An \( \mathcal{F}_q \)-subspace \( \Phi \in \text{Gr}(m', \mathcal{F}_q) \) where \( m' \leq m \), an \( \mathcal{F}_q \)-subspace \( Z \in \text{Gr}(t, \Phi) \).

Output: An \( \mathcal{F}_q \)-subspace \( V \in \text{Gr}(s, \Phi) \) where \( s \leq m' - t \) and \( V \cap Z = \emptyset \).

Compute a complement space \( Z' \) for \( Z \) in \( \Phi \).

\[ \triangleright \text{Choose randomly a subspace } V \text{ with } \dim(V) = s \text{ from } Z' \]

\[ V \leftarrow \text{Gr}(s, Z') \]

Return \( V \).

By Lemma 5:

**Corollary 6.** Suppose \( \Phi \) is an \( \mathcal{F}_q \)-subspace in \( \text{Gr}(m', \mathcal{F}_q) \). Let \( U, Y, W, X, Y \subset \Phi \) be \( \mathcal{F}_q \)-vector subspaces such that \( X = U + V \) with \( \dim(U) = r \), \( Y = Y + W \) with \( \dim(Y) = t \), \( U \cap Y = \emptyset \) and \( V \cap W = \emptyset \). The probability that \( RS(\Phi, Y, s) \) will output a random subspace \( Z \leq \Phi \) such that \( \dim(Z) = s \leq m' - t \), \( Z \cap Y = \emptyset \) and \( X \subset Z + Y \) is \( q^{-r(m'-s)} \).

4.3. General idea for our first approach

Now, we describe the general idea for our approach to recovering secret keys. We consider the second approach in LTP attacks and aim to recover extended support containing the secret \( E \) via the LTP approach. For each \( 1 \leq i \leq l \) and \( 1 \leq l' \leq l' \), we have syndromes \( s_i = s_i H^T \) and \( s_i' = s_i' H^T \). By Lemma 2, there exists an extended basis vector \( \sigma \in \mathcal{E}_{m,n,r} \) and an extended support matrix \( \Sigma_i \in \mathcal{T}^{r \times n} \) such that \( s_i = \sigma \Sigma_i \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq l \). Similarly, there exists an extended support matrix \( \Sigma_i' \in \mathcal{T}^{r \times n} \) such that \( s_i' = \sigma \Sigma_i' \) for \( 1 \leq l' \leq l' \). Our approach consists of two main stages:

1. Retrieve an extended support basis vector \( \sigma \) for \( s_i \) and \( s_i' \). We perform the RS-algorithm multiple times to obtain an extended support of dimension \( w + rd - \lambda + \hat{r} \) that contains \( E \). Next, we perform intersect operations on these extended supports to retrieve a vector space \( V \) of dimension \( r' \leq \frac{m-n-k}{n} \). Finally, we compute a basis for \( V \).

2. Retrieve an extended support matrix \( \Sigma_i \) for \( s_i \) from \( i = 1 \sigma \Sigma_i H^T \) and an extended support matrix \( \Sigma_i' \) for \( s_i' \) from \( i = 1 \sigma \Sigma_i' H^T \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq l \) and \( 1 \leq l' \leq l' \). By examining the linear system defined over \( \mathcal{F}_q \), the system comprises \( m(n-k) \) equations over \( \mathcal{F}_q \), and unknown variables pertaining to \( E \) over \( \mathcal{F}_q \). When the inequality \( r'n \leq m(n-k) \) is satisfied, retrieving the support matrix \( E \) becomes feasible.

We now describe our first approach to recovering secret keys on the Durandal framework. We first determine the maximum integer \( r' \) such that \( r'n \leq m(n-k) \). Then, we try to determine an extended support \( V \) such that \( E \subset V \). This is done by intersecting the vector spaces \( E_j \) of \( \dim(E_j) = \hat{r} > r' \) which contains \( E \). This yields \( V = \bigcap_j E_j \). Finally, we can proceed to retrieve an extended support matrix for \( s_i \) and \( s_i' \).

**Correctness and Complexity of Algorithm 3.** Let \( z, f, c, p \) be a signature of Durandal and \( Z = \text{supp}(z) \). We can first determine the maximum integer \( r' \) that satisfies \( m(n-k) \geq r'n \), i.e., \( r' = \left\lfloor \frac{m(n-k)}{n} \right\rfloor \).

Recall that \( Z = W + U \), where \( U \) is a filtered subspace of \( E. F \) with dimension \( rd - \lambda \) and \( Z = f_1Z_1 \). Let \( (Z')^T \) be a complementary space of \( Z' \) in \( F_q \). By Lemma 4, there exists a subspace \( X \in \text{Gr}(r, (Z')^T) \) such that \( E \subset Z' + X \). We can apply RS(\( F_q,m,n,r \)) to obtain a subspace \( E_j \in \text{Gr}(r, (Z')^T) \) such that \( E \subset Z' + X \subset Z' + E_j \) with probability of \( q^{-r(m-(w+rd-\lambda)-p)} \).

By Lemma 3, we have \( \dim((E_1 + Z') \cap (E_2 + Z')) = 2(r + w + rd - \lambda) - m \) and \( \dim((E_1 + Z') \cap \ldots \cap (E_j + Z')) = m - j(m - (r + w + rd - \lambda)) \). Let \( j_0 \) be the minimum integer such that \( m - j_0(m - (r + w + rd - \lambda)) \leq r' \), i.e.,

\[
    j_0 = \left\lceil \frac{m-r'}{m-(r+w+rd-\lambda)} \right\rceil .
\]

Therefore, the complexity to compute the subspace \( V \) is \( O(j_0(m-(w+rd-\lambda)-p)) \).

Let \( \dim(V_{\text{int}}) = i \), we can compute a basis \( \{v_1, \ldots, v_i\} \) for \( V_{\text{int}} \). For each \( 1 \leq i \leq j_0 \), we can solve for \( \Sigma_i \) from the equation \( t_i = \langle v_1, \ldots, v_i \rangle \Sigma_i H^T \) over \( F_q \). We can compute a unique solution for \( \Sigma_i \) since \( i \leq r' \leq \frac{m(n-k)}{n} \). Similarly for \( 1 \leq l' \leq l' \), we can solve for a unique \( \Sigma_i' \) from the equation \( t_i' = \langle v_1, \ldots, v_i \rangle \Sigma_i' H^T \) over \( F_q \). The complexity to solve for these is \( O((l+l')m^3) \).

Consequently, the total complexity of Algorithm 3 is

\[
    O((l+l')m^3q^{-r(m-(w+rd-\lambda)-p)}) .
\]

**Remark 4.** From the formula in (3), observe that the complexity of the above approach will decrease if the value \( r \) decreases.
Algorithm 3 Our First Approach to the General Durandal Framework.

Input: A signature \((z, F, c, p, r')\), \(r' < r \in \mathbb{Z}\), \(pk = (H, t_1, \ldots, t'_i, t'_j, \ldots, t'_n)\)
Output: The secret key \(s_1, s_1', s_2, \ldots, s'_n\)

\(\triangleright\) Step 1: Retrieve an extended support basis for \(s_1, \ldots, s_1', s_2, \ldots, s'_n\)
Determine a basis \(\{f_1, \ldots, f_j\}\) for \(F\)

for \(i = 1, \ldots, n\) do
  Compute \(z' = f_j^{-1} z_i\)
end for

Compute \(Z' = (z'_1, \ldots, z'_{n})\)
\(V_m \leftarrow F_{m}\) as an \(m\)-dimensional vector space
\(j \leftarrow 0\)
while \(\dim(V_m) > r'\) do
  \(j \leftarrow j + 1\)
  \(E_j \leftarrow \text{RS}(F_{m}, Z', \hat{r})\)
  Compute \(V_m \leftarrow V_m \cap (E_j + Z')\)
end while

\(l \leftarrow \dim(V_m)\)
Determine a basis \(\{v_1, \ldots, v_l\}\) for \(V_m\)
\(\triangleright\) Step 2: Recover support matrices for \(s_1, \ldots, s_1', s_2, \ldots, s'_n\)

for \(i = 1, \ldots, l\) do
  Recover \(\Sigma_i\) from \(t_i = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i H_i^{T}\) over \(F_3\)
  Compute \(s_i \leftarrow (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i\)
end for

for \(i' = 1, \ldots, l'\) do
  Recover \(\Sigma_{i'}\) from \(t_{i'} = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_{i'} H_{i'}^{T}\) over \(F_3\)
  Compute \(s_{i'} \leftarrow (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_{i'}\)
end for
Return \(s_1, s_1', s_2, \ldots, s'_n\)

Table 2
Complexity of our First Approach to Determine secret keys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>((r, \lambda))</th>
<th>(r')</th>
<th>(\hat{r})</th>
<th>Succ. Rate of RS-Algorithm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Theoretical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durandal-I</td>
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<td>2-6</td>
<td>2.4001</td>
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<tr>
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<td>159</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2-12</td>
<td>2-12.041</td>
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<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-18</td>
<td>2-18.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durandal-II</td>
<td>(7,14)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>2-7.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>170</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>2-14.007</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>2-21.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHMW-I</td>
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<td>114</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-3.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2-6</td>
<td>2-6.001</td>
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<td>2-9</td>
<td>2-9.947</td>
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<td>SHMW-II</td>
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<td>2-3</td>
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<td>152</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-9</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

4.4. Results of our first approach on the Durandal and the SHMW schemes

We implement our first approach on the Durandal and the SHMW signature schemes for all the parameters proposed. We consider different values for \(\hat{r}\). We executed the RS-Algorithm with parameters \((F_{m}, Z', \hat{r})\) in Magma V2.20-5, on a 3.4 GHz Intel (R) Core(TM) i7 processor with 16 GB of RAM. In particular, we calculated the number of iterations required for the RS-Algorithm to be successful for 1000 instances. Our experiment results coincide with the theoretical success rate of the RS-Algorithm as in Corollary 6.

We now summarize the complexity of our first approach (denoted as “1st KRA”) in Table 2. Based on 2, it is evident that our first approach is not as efficient as the key recovery attacks (solving RSD in Table 2) proposed in [2,20]. Nevertheless, our first approach can be further improved with some modifications, as explained in Section 5.

5. An improved approach to retrieve the secret keys of the Durandal framework

In this section, we improve our first approach to recover the secret keys of the Durandal framework.

5.1. General idea for our second approach

Now, we describe the general idea for our second approach to recovering secret keys. Our second approach is similar to the first approach, except for the details of recovering an extended support basis vector \(\sigma\) for \(s_i\) and \(s_i'\). In particular, instead of recovering
directly a vector subspace that contains $E$, we first try to recover a vector subspace $EF_j$ of $\dim\(EF_j\) = r' > r'$ which contains $E_F$, i.e., $E_F \subset EF_j$. Then, we proceed to compute $V_j = \cap_{\mu=1}^{r'}(EF_j + Z)$, and intersect $V_j$'s to obtain $E \subset V = \bigcap_j V_j$. Finally, we can retrieve an extended support matrix for $s_j$ and $s'_j$.

The following is the specification for our second approach.

**Algorithm 4** Our Second Approach on the General Durandal Framework.

**Input:** A signature $(z, F, c, p)$, $r' < r \in Z$, $pk = \(H, t_1, \ldots, t_l, t'_1, \ldots, t'_l\)$

**Output:** The secret key $s_1, \ldots, s_l, s'_1, \ldots, s'_l$

\[\triangleright\text{Step 1: Retrieve an extended support basis for } s_1, \ldots, s_l, s'_1, \ldots, s'_l\]

\[\text{Compute a basis } \{f_1, \ldots, f_k\} \text{ for } F\]

\[V_{\int} = F_{\omega} \text{ as an } m\text{-dimensional vector space}\]

\[j = 0\]

\[\text{while } \dim(V_{\int}) > r'\text{ do}\]

\[j = j + 1\]

\[EF_j = \text{RS}(F_{\omega}, Z, r)\]

\[T_j = EF_j + Z\]

\[\text{for } \mu = 1, \ldots, d\text{ do}\]

\[\text{Compute } V_{\int} = V_{\int} \cap f_{\mu}^{-1} T_j\]

\[\text{end for}\]

\[\text{end for}\]

\[i = \dim(V_{\int})\]

\[\text{Determine a basis } \{v_1, \ldots, v_l\} \text{ for } V_{\int}\]

\[\triangleright\text{Step 2: Retrieve support matrices for } s_1, \ldots, s_l, s'_1, \ldots, s'_l\]

\[\text{for } i = 1, \ldots, l\text{ do}\]

\[\text{Recover } \Sigma_i \text{ from } t_i = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i H^T \text{ over } F_q\]

\[\text{Compute } s_i = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i\]

\[\text{end for}\]

\[\text{for } i' = 1, \ldots, l'\text{ do}\]

\[\text{Recover } \Sigma_i' \text{ from } t'_i = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i H^T \text{ over } F_q\]

\[\text{Compute } s_i = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i\]

\[\text{end for}\]

\[\text{Return } s_1, \ldots, s_l, s'_1, \ldots, s'_l\]

**Correctness and Complexity of Algorithm 4.** Let $(z, F, c, p)$ be a signature of Durandal and $Z = \text{supp}(z)$. We can first determine the maximum integer $r'$ that satisfies $m(n - k) \geq r'n$, i.e., $r' = \left\lfloor \frac{m(n - k)}{n} \right\rfloor$.

Recall that $Z = W + U$, where $U$ is a filtered subspace of $EF$ with dimension $rd - \lambda$. By definition of $U$, there exists a vector space $U'$ of $\dim(U') = \lambda$ such that $EF = U + U'$. We can apply $\text{RS}(F_{\mu}, Z, r)$ to obtain a subspace $EF_j \in \text{Gr}(r, Z')$ such that $EF \subset Z + EF_j = T_j$ with the probability of $q^{-\lambda(m - (w + rd - \lambda) - l)}$.

Since $EF \subset T_j$, for each $1 \leq \mu \leq d$, $E \subset f_{\mu}^{-1}(EF_j) \subset f_{\mu}^{-1} T_j$. By Lemma 3, we have $\dim\(\cap_{\mu=1}^{d} f_{\mu}^{-1} T_j\) = m - d(m - (r + w + rd - \lambda))$ and

\[\dim\(\cap_{\mu=1}^{d} f_{\mu}^{-1} T_j\) = m - \frac{d(m - (r + w + rd - \lambda))}{n}\]  

Let $j'_0$ be the minimum integer such that $m - j'_0d(m - (r + w + rd - \lambda)) \leq r'$, i.e.,

\[j'_0 = \left\lfloor \frac{m - r'}{d(m - (r + w + rd - \lambda))} \right\rfloor . \quad (4)\]

Therefore, the complexity to compute the subspace $V_{\int} = \cap_{\mu=1}^{d} f_{\mu}^{-1} T_j$ such that $E \subset V_{\int}$ and $\dim(V_{\int}) \leq r'$ is $q^{j'_0\lambda(m - (w + rd - \lambda) - l)}$.

Let $\dim(V_{\int}) = i$, we can compute a basis $\{v_1, \ldots, v_l\}$ for $V_{\int}$. For each $1 \leq i \leq l$, we can solve for $\Sigma_i$ from the equation $t_i = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i H^T$ over $F_q$. We can compute a unique solution for $\Sigma_i$ since $i \leq r'$ $< \frac{m(n - k)}{n}$. Similarly, for $1 \leq i' \leq l'$, we can solve for a unique $\Sigma_i'$ from the equation $t'_i = (v_1, \ldots, v_l)\Sigma_i H^T$ over $F_q$. The complexity to solve for these is $(l + l' )n^3$.

Consequently, the overall complexity of Algorithm 4 is

\[O\(n^{(l' + l)n^3} q^{j'_0\lambda(m - (w + rd - \lambda) - l)}\). \quad (5)\]

**Remark 5.** From the formula in (5), observe that the complexity of the approach will decrease if:

- The value $d$ increases. This results in the decrease of value $j'_0$ and thus lowers the complexity.
- The value $\lambda$ decreases, which lowers the complexity.
5.2. Results of our second approach on the Durandal and the SHMW schemes

We implement our second approach on the original Durandal and the SHMW signature schemes for all the parameters proposed. We consider different values for \( r \). We executed the RS-Algorithm with parameters \((152\, q_m, Z', \tilde{r})\) in Magma V2.20-5, on a 3.4 GHz Intel (R) CoreTM i7 processor with 16 GB of RAM. In particular, we calculated the number of iterations required for the RS-Algorithm to be successful for 1000 instances. Our experiment results coincide with the theoretical success rate of RS-Algorithm as in Corollary 6.

We now summarize the complexity of our second approach (denoted as “2nd KRA”) in Table 3.

From Table 2 and Table 3, we observe that our second approach improved the efficiency of our first approach. Furthermore, the second approach is more efficient than the proposed key recovery attack (Solving RSD in Table 3) in [2,20].

In particular, for SHMW-I, our second approach requires only \( 2^{97} \) complexity compared to the proposed key recovery attack of \( 2^{148} \) to solve the RSD problem. For SHMW-II, our second approach requires only \( 2^{106} \) complexity compared to the proposed key recovery of \( 2^{150} \). Consequently, our second approach shows that both proposed SHMW-I and II do not achieve the claimed security of 128-bit.

As mentioned above in Remarks 4 and 5, the parameters \( r \) and \( \lambda \) chosen in the SHMW signature scheme are lower than those in the original Durandal scheme, resulting in lower solving complexity of our approaches on the SHMW signature scheme. This implies that when \( r \) and \( \lambda \) are high, the key recovery attack by solving the RSD approach would be more efficient than our approaches.

Furthermore, the reason behind the increased efficiency of our second approach compared to the key recovery attack through solving the RSD approach and our first approach is that our second approach leverages the additional information provided by \( F = \langle f_1, \ldots, f_d \rangle \) to minimize the number of iterations necessary for reducing the dimension of \( V_{\text{ext}} \). In particular, the term \( d \) in (4) reduces the value for \( j_0 \) and thus reduces the complexity required for the attack algorithm, as compared to the value for \( j_0 \) in (2).

6. Conclusion

The Durandal signature scheme offers a promising new idea using the Schnorr approach to construct rank metric code-based signature schemes. Nevertheless, it is essential to exercise caution, as we have demonstrated the feasibility of conducting the LTP second attack on the rank metric code-based signature scheme. In particular, we exploited the fact that we can apply the RS-algorithm to determine extended supports that contain the secret support \( E \) or the secret product space \( E.F \). Taking sufficient intersections for these collected extended supports, we can evaluate extended support with a dimension small enough to satisfy the inequality in solving for an extended support matrix from the linear system over \( F_q \).

With regards to the second approach in this paper, one notable remark is that it exploits the information on \( F \) and improves the complexity of recovering the SHMW signature scheme’s secret keys. In particular, as all the \( d \) elements in a basis of \( F \) could be used, the intersection steps can be repeated \( d \) times to filter out the extra vector spaces that do not contain the secret key space, in contrast to only one intersection taken for each RS-algorithm executed in the first approach. As a result, the iterations to execute the RS-algorithm can be reduced, thus lowering the attack’s complexity. Notably, in the original key recovery attacks proposed in [20], none of the information on \( F \) was used to solve the RSD problem, thus recovering the secret key.

Our second approach has successfully cryptanalyzed the proposed parameters of the SHMW scheme with 97-bit complexity. This implies that their proposals have weak keys and that the claimed 128-bit security is false.

At this point, it is unclear whether the extra information on \( F \) given in the signature will further reduce the security of the proposed schemes or not, as our second approach exploits this information on \( F \) to reduce the complexity of recovering the secret key. Further investigation into the matter shall be left as future work.
Ethics declarations

Review and/or approval by an ethics committee was not needed for this study because the study solely focused on the analysis of algorithms, code and did not involve human subjects in any way. Informed consent was not required for this study because no personally identifiable information was used.

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CRediT authorship contribution statement

Terry Shue Chien Lau: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. Muhammad Rezal Kamel Ariffin: Writing – original draft, Validation, Supervision, Resources, Formal analysis. Sook-Chin Yip: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Supervision, Resources, Project administration, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis. Ji-Jian Chin: Formal analysis, Conceptualization. Choo-Yee Ting: Resources, Formal analysis.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they do not have any known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have influenced the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

The datasets produced and/or analyzed during the present study are not deposited into any publicly available repository. Data will be made available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

References