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# How Fundraisers Solve Moral Dilemmas: The Role of Implicit Moral Identity, Moral Emotions and Moral Intuition

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# UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH

HOW FUNDRAISERS SOLVE MORAL DILEMMAS: THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT  
MORAL IDENTITY, MORAL EMOTIONS AND MORAL INTUITION

by

JESSICA LYNNE BURGESS

A thesis submitted to the University of Plymouth  
In partial fulfilment for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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### **Author's Signed Declaration**

At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Doctoral College Quality Sub-Committee.

Work submitted for this research degree at the University of Plymouth has not formed part of any other degree either at the University of Plymouth or at another establishment.

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Signed-Jessica L Burgess

Date -20 September 2020

## **Abstract**

JESSICA LYNNE BURGESS

HOW FUNDRAISERS SOLVE MORAL DILEMMAS: THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT  
MORAL IDENTITY, MORAL EMOTIONS AND MORAL INTUITION

This study explores the mediating affect of moral emotions on the relationship of implicit moral identity and moral intuition amongst fundraisers. The existing literature highlights the importance of ethical fundraising, as evidenced by criticism in the media (Hill, 2019). In many cases, fundraisers must make moral decisions under intense time pressure. These situations require quick, on-the-spot decisions, which often comes from instinct. The Moral Foundations Theory explains that moral intuition works automatically through innate processes during such situations (Graham *et al.*, 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). It also suggests that moral emotions influence intuitions. Additionally, how much an individual identifies as moral will influence their moral actions (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Within the moral psychology literature there are very few published studies that test the propositions of the Moral Foundations Theory or incorporate moral identity to explain intuition. This study integrated multiple concepts within moral psychology specifically in the context of fundraising. The research comprises two phases, which are exploratory semi-structured interviews and a large-scale questionnaire. The key finding is that neither implicit moral identity nor moral emotions effected moral intuition. Therefore the assumptions made by the Moral Foundations Theory may not necessarily be true across a broad range of circumstances. Additionally, other constructs might influence automatic decision-making amongst fundraisers. The study presents opportunities for further research in these areas.

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# Chapter One: Introduction

## 1.1 Introduction

Recently, fundraisers have been scrutinised by the media, with a particular focus on ethical practice (Hill, 2019). Examples of the importance of ethical fundraising are seen in the story of Olive Cooke, the Presidents Club annual charity event, and the Varsity Blues scandal (Hill, 2019). In the case of Olive Cooke, the media unduly attributed her suicide partly to the activities of being bombarded with requests to give money to charity, which was later falsified (West, 2015). Olive Cooke was a 92-year-old woman and Britain's longest-serving poppy seller. Her death sparked the beginning of in-depth scrutiny of the ethics of fundraising practices within the UK (MacQuillin & Sargeant, 2019). This scrutiny has identified wrongdoings and stimulated a focus on fundraising ethics in recent years (MacQuillin, 2016a; MacQuillin & Sargeant, 2019).

In the UK alone, there are upwards of 31,000 paid fundraisers working within 168,000 registered charities (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2018; Mohan & Breeze, 2016). These fundraisers face moral dilemmas as part of their everyday work. Moral dilemmas are scenarios when an individual must choose between two 'right' actions or two 'wrong' actions (Kidder, 1995). The charity sector has attempted to provide some support and guidance for fundraisers facing moral dilemmas through the creation of ethical codes and decision-making processes (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Fundraising Regulator, 2018c; Kidder, 1995; Marion, 1994). The ethical codes outline moral conduct standards within professional behaviour and cover a wide breadth of categories such as behaviour when fundraising, and accepting, refusing and returning donations. Decision-making processes provide detailed steps and questions fundraisers

can use to help them come to a moral decision when facing a dilemma. However, current industry evaluations have discovered gaps that must be addressed.

In a recent white paper, Rogare, the Fundraising Think Tank, have identified issues with how ethical guidance within the codes for fundraisers is piecemeal, does not stem from a single ethical theory, and inconsistently applies normative ethics to ethical codes (MacQuillin, 2016b). For example, the ethical codes are grounded in ethical theories based on rules (deontology) or the outcome (utilitarianism) but not on fundraiser character (virtue ethics) (MacQuillin & Sargeant, 2019). The white paper aims to develop a singular theory to inform fundraising ethics universally. Although helpful theoretically, Rogare's work remains abstract and has not been tested within practical settings to date.

Additionally, issues exist with the types of moral dilemmas the ethical codes and decision-making processes provide guidance for. In both instances, neither provide explicit guidance for moral dilemma scenarios where fundraisers would be required to give an instantaneous response. In fact, little academic research or formal training is in place to help fundraisers demonstrate instantaneous moral behaviour in their professional work (Hill, 2019; MacQuillin & Sargeant, 2019). For example, all of the decision-making processes include multiple steps, which require time, thought, reflection, and often conversations with colleagues or peers. Although applicable in some instances, this gap in the guidance leaves fundraisers at risk and unprepared.

In order to develop and implement appropriate ethical codes and theories, researchers must first explore what types of moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter on a day-to-day basis. These dilemmas should be used to underpin further theory and help discover

solutions that address the prevailing issues. It is crucial to ascertain which moral dilemmas require an immediate response from fundraisers to provide a more robust code and skill set that will help fundraisers. Once intuition-based fundraising dilemmas are explained, theories from the moral psychology literature can be used to categorise and help identify solutions that will help fundraisers when they must respond instinctually.

In the moral psychology literature, moral identity and moral intuition have been suggested as helpful contributing factors, which could be applied in fundraising (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Moral identity is a “a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits” that one uses to inform decisions and choices one makes related to morals (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p.1424; Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). Moral intuition is defined as “the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about a moral situation, without any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p.188). In combination, moral psychology literature posits that in solving moral dilemmas instinctually, moral intuition would work automatically through innate processes and moral identity would function within these processes; however, this relationship has never been tested.

This doctoral thesis seeks to address this gap in current knowledge by identifying examples of moral dilemmas requiring intuition and documenting empirical research that examines the relationship between constructs that should help fundraisers in such scenarios: implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition. The current chapter presents the research topic and aims, provides a summary of the literature review, defines key terms and critically evaluates the current state of the literature. The

justification for the current research is explained, and the steps taken to address the research are introduced. The chapter concludes with a description of the layout of the thesis chapter by chapter.

## **1.2 Research Question**

The overall research question for the current study was “What kind of moral dilemmas do fundraisers encounter that require intuitive responses, and how are they solved?”

## **1.3 The Research in context**

The following section provides context for the current research and emphasises the need to understand the relationships between constructs within moral psychology.

### **Ethical Theories, Philanthropy and Fundraising**

Throughout history, philosophers have proposed different theories to explain ethics. The three theories of interest for the current research are Aristotle’s virtue ethics (Aristotle, 350 BC; Aristotle, 2009), Kant’s deontological ethics (Kant, 2002) and Mill’s utilitarian ethics (Mill, 1863). Virtue ethics proposes that ethics are based on the constant practise of virtues (Aristotle, 350 BC). Deontological ethics proposes that ethics are rooted in one’s duty to follow universal laws, or rules of morals that apply to all people all of the time (Kant, 1785). Utilitarian ethics emphasises the importance of outcomes in ethics such that people should choose to act in a way that promotes happiness for others (Mill, 1863).

Each of the above ethical theories can be applied to all walks of life – personal, familial, communal, professional, etc. (Kidder, 1995). For the current research, the philosophies were applied to professional work in regards to non-profit fundraising. To better understand how individuals' apply the ethical theories to their work, understanding the definitions of key concepts is important, mainly philanthropy, charity and fundraising. Robert L Payton defines philanthropy as “voluntary giving, voluntary service and voluntary association, primarily for the benefit of others; it is also the ‘prudent sister’ of charity since the two have been intertwined throughout most of the past 3500 years of western civilization” (Sargeant & Jay, 2014). Philanthropy is important to maintain the work of charities. The definition of a charity is an institution, which is established for charitable purposes only and is for the public benefit (Gov.uk, 2013). Fundraisers are professionals employed by charities whose purpose is to engage in soliciting money for philanthropic purposes.

For fundraisers to operate, they should obey the law and ethical codes. Both areas provide guidance and direction for appropriate, professional behaviour. Additionally, there are several suggested decision-making processes that fundraisers can follow when they encounter a moral dilemma. These processes include Kidder's principles (Kidder, 1995), Marion's roadmap (Marion, 1994), Anderson's principles (Anderson, 1996), and Fischer's chart (Fischer, 2000). However, sometimes fundraisers find themselves in situations where the law, ethical codes, and decision-making processes do not help. In these situations, fundraisers must use other tools to solve moral dilemmas. Based on the historical study of moral psychology, these tools include moral intuition and moral identity.

### **Moral Intuition**

Moral intuition was introduced as part of the Social Intuitionist Model explanation of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2000). Moral intuition is defined as “the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about a moral situation, without any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p.188). Moral intuition is viewed as automatic, quick, and accompanied by emotional reactions such as anger or disgust (Weaver, Reynolds & Brown, 2013).

According to the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), different moral intuitions are linked to distinct foundations. There are five foundation categories, including harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). According to MFT, when someone faces a moral dilemma that aligns with one of the moral foundations, they experience moral emotions, which result in innate, intuitive judgments and reactions. Each of the five moral foundations is linked to one or more moral emotion. Harm/Care is linked to compassion; Fairness/Reciprocity is linked to anger, gratitude, guilt; Ingroup/Loyalty is linked to group pride, belongingness, rage at traitors; Authority/Respect is linked to respect and fear; and Purity/Sanctity is linked to disgust (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). The experience of these emotions triggers intuitive responses that relate to the linked moral foundation.

### **Moral Identity**

Another explanation of how people solve moral dilemmas is through activated identities. Specifically, moral identity is defined as “a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits” (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p.1424). According to identity theory, identities influence behaviour based on the importance of the identity to the person, and

the person's efforts to meet the expectations of the identity (Stryker & Burke, 2000). When an individual holds a moral identity to a high esteem, that individual will make an effort to meet the expectations of being a moral person. When an identity is used frequently, it will dictate the person's reactions to situations. This frequency also increases the identity's salience so it will function in the individual's subconscious, thereby being expressed through reactions, instincts and immediate responses (Carlston, 2010).

The combination of implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition could be used to help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas when the law, ethical codes and decision-making processes cannot. The purpose of the current study is to learn more about the situations where fundraisers need moral intuition and how the relationship between these constructs plays out in practical settings.

#### **1.4 Critical evaluation of the current state of literature and the gaps**

Moral psychology research has grown in the past few decades, resulting in an increase in learning about many moral constructs (Aquino *et al.*, 2009; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012; Jennings, Mitchell & Hannah, 2015). However, although advancements have been made in particular areas such as moral self, moral identity and moral judgment (Aquino *et al.*, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2011b; Jennings, Mitchell & Hannah, 2015), there are still gaps within the academic knowledge. There are four such gaps that this research attempts to fill. The first is the gap between the decision-making processes provided for fundraisers and what is practical for fundraisers in real-life situations. The second is the gap that the dilemmas used to measure moral intuition exclude virtue ethics as a guide for moral judgments.

The third is the gap in applying Moral Foundations Theory to practical settings and testing its influence. And the fourth is the gap between the moral dilemmas currently used to measure moral intuition and the moral dilemmas that people practically encounter.

The first gap in the literature is two-fold. To help fundraisers with moral decision-making, several processes have been published (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Rosen, 2005). Each process includes questions and steps for fundraisers to follow to evaluate moral dilemma situations and come to a decision about what they ought to do. Although these processes can be useful for fundraisers, there are two areas where the literature is lacking. The first is that there has been no published academic evidence to support the efficacy or usefulness of any of the processes. Without any testing, it is difficult to understand why professionals should be encouraged to know and implement the processes. The second area is that the processes all require fundraisers to have conversations with others and to set aside dedicated time and cognitive space for contemplation and reflection. In instances where a fundraiser must solve a moral dilemma quickly, working through any of the above processes would be impossible. So although they are helpful tools for fundraisers in certain situations, there are no processes or suggestions to help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas when under time pressure.

The second gap excludes virtue ethics from moral intuition. Instead, research to date has only examined moral judgments as they align with deontological or utilitarian judgments (Greene *et al.*, 2008). In recent studies, researchers have theorised that duty-based moral judgments would correlate with moral intuition and that utilitarian

judgments would correlate with reasoning. Intuition and reasoning were measured using a combination of cognitive load and response time. Results of this study, however, have only partly supported the theory. Without the inclusion of virtue ethics, research is missing the examination of how virtues might influence moral intuition. For example, suppose a moral virtue such as compassion is highly important to an individual and is regularly used to influence their behaviour. In that case, this virtue, rather than following a rule as within duty-based ethics, would be responsible for intuitive moral judgments and behaviours.

The third is the gap in applying Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) to practical settings and testing its influence. MFT was introduced into the study of moral psychology in 2004 (Haidt & Joseph, 2007, p.8; Marcus, 2004). Since then, follow-up studies have developed a self-reporting measure to test the importance and relevance of the foundations (Graham *et al.*, 2013). This measure has been used to correlate particular moral foundations to political affiliations and stances on climate change (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Wolsko, Ariceaga & Seiden, 2016). However, no studies exist that test and affirm the relationship between moral foundations and moral intuition in any setting. Researchers haven't yet demonstrated whether or not moral foundations have an effect on intuitive moral judgments or behaviours.

The last gap in the literature is that the moral dilemmas that are used to measure moral intuition are unrealistic and impractical for real-life. One commonly used example of a dilemma used is the footbridge dilemma where a research participant must imagine they are standing on a bridge watching a runaway trolley approach. The participant must decide to push a stranger onto the tracks to stop the trolley. This dilemma asks the participant if they would rather push someone to their death (or at least injury) to save

five workers, or leave the stranger alone and watch the five workers get injured (or die) if the trolley carries on and hits them. Scenarios such as this simply are not practical. With today's health and safety regulations, how frequently are rogue trolleys rolling along at pace along train tracks? How often are people standing on bridges watching trains and trolleys pass by? And what protections are in place to keep workers safe while they are working on the railways? More importantly, how often are fundraisers in situations like these? For this reason, using moral dilemmas like the footbridge dilemma would be inappropriate for studying moral intuition within fundraising settings.

Upon extensive review of the literature, several gaps had occurred to the current researcher; however, four of these gaps stood out as the most pressing. These gaps must be addressed for moral psychology research to progress in the domain of fundraising. The researcher has proposed to fill each gap strategically based on theories and empirical work. To fill the first gap, research must help understand the tools and resources that fundraisers can use when encountering moral dilemmas where the law, ethical codes and decision-making processes cannot be applied. Incorporating virtue ethics into the exploration of moral intuition should fill the second gap. Understanding the actual relationship between moral foundations and the use of moral intuition could fill the third gap. And identifying practical, applicable moral dilemmas to use in self-reporting surveys could fill the final gap. Addressing these gaps could be applied to many groups and populations, but will specifically help professional fundraisers.

#### **1.4 Research Question, Aims and Objectives**

The overall research question for the current study was “What kind of moral dilemmas do fundraisers encounter that require intuitive responses, and how are they solved?”

The research aims include:

1. To explore the role of moral intuition amongst fundraisers facing moral dilemmas in the workplace
2. To determine the role of moral foundations and moral intuition within moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter
3. To investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition in the context of solving moral dilemmas.

Limited research within psychology and sociology has been conducted into the factors influencing moral intuition. While theories have been published that suggest relationships and influencers, no verifying empirical evidence exists. Additionally, research has not been conducted within the population of interest for the current study, who are involved in scenarios requiring the use of moral intuition as part of their occupational roles. A theoretical framework based on the literature review was created to demonstrate a moderated-moderated-mediation relationship between constructs. However, before testing this framework, qualitative research was needed to understand the type of moral dilemma scenarios fundraisers encounter. This research was comprised of semi-structured interviews and sought to achieve the following objectives:

1. To obtain tangible, realistic example moral dilemma scenarios fundraisers encounter in the workplace.
2. To create a measure that uses practical, applicable moral dilemmas to measure moral intuition amongst fundraisers.
3. To develop hypotheses that test what mechanisms help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas.

The results of the semi-structured interviews provided practical moral dilemma scenarios that were used to create a scale used in Phase 2 of the research. Results also revealed that dilemma scenarios aligned with two moral foundations. The scale developed from this phase of the research was used to measure the speed and strength of responses to these moral foundations, namely harm/care and ingroup/loyalty.

The second phase of the research consisted of a large-scale survey. Based on the literature review, and incorporating findings from Phase 1, the objectives for this phase of the research are:

1. To establish the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.
2. To determine how this relationship varies based on the experience of moral emotions.
3. To determine whether the effect of moral emotions varies based on gender.
4. To establish whether the effect of moral emotions aligns with moral foundations.

The next section briefly discusses the layout of the thesis.

## **1.5 Thesis structure**

The thesis is laid out over seven chapters, each describing different stages of the research conducted. There are appendices and references provided following the last chapter of this thesis. The following section provides a brief explanation of each chapter's role within the thesis.

### **1.5.1 Chapter Two: The Literature Review**

The literature review in Chapter Two begins with a philosophical review of ethics then explains key terms that form the foundation for the thesis, including philanthropy,

charity, and fundraising. The gap within the tools available that help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas is explained. Next, historical research including the study of moral development, moral judgment and moral intuition is introduced. Following this, the chapter drills down into moral intuition, describing the theory and contributing factors to the construct. Finally, the constructs of self, identity and moral identity are described, providing a complete picture of multiple constructs that relate to the current research.

The chapter finishes by identifying weaknesses and gaps in the existing literature, providing an opportunity for exploration of which the current research undertakes. Findings from the literature review are used to create a model framework that clearly demonstrates how the key constructs influence one another. This framework is then tested through hypotheses examined in Phase 2 of the research.

### **1.5.2 Chapter Three: Methodology**

The methodology presented in chapter three clearly explains the research question and aims used to inform the current research project. After describing the research strategy, the chapter presents the research philosophy. Philosophies of paradigms and research methodologies are evaluated, and the researcher's stance is described. This justifies the researcher's use of mixed methods research conducted in two phases.

After stating the research aims, objectives and strategy, research philosophy is reviewed and evaluated. Methodology is the process an investigator uses to discover what he/she believes can be ascertained (Howell, 2013). In alignment with methodology, research methods are the techniques used to collect data. There is a review of the conflicting views of using paradigms to conduct research. Next, the different definitions of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research in the literature are examined. This

follows with a discussion of the conflicting views of how paradigms are used in mixed methods research. After critiquing four perspectives used for mixed methods research, the researcher justifies her position using the post-positivist paradigm to inform the research.

To answer the research questions and test the hypotheses, mixed methods were used sequentially, with Phase 1 including qualitative methods followed by quantitative methods in Phase 2. Phase 1 of the research was a qualitative study that was used to understand the moral dilemmas fundraisers experience, formulate a scale, and inform hypotheses that could be tested in Phase 2. Phase 1 participants and procedures are described. Procedures include those before, during, and after data collection.

Phase 2 of the research involved a large-scale electronic survey to collect quantitative data. The survey was developed to measure the constructs of implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition. Phase 2 participants and procedures are described. Procedures include those before, during and after data collection.

### **1.5.3 Chapter Four: Phase 1 Findings**

Findings from the semi-structured interview analysis are relayed in chapter four. A total of ten interviews were conducted with experts in the field of fundraising. The chapter begins with a description of participants and follows with thematic analysis findings. The analysis was grouped into two segments, theoretical findings and practical findings.

Theoretical findings confirmed that fundraisers use moral intuition while solving moral dilemmas. Findings also revealed that the moral dilemmas described represented a conflict between two moral foundations, that of harm/care and ingroup/loyalty.

One of the objectives of Phase 1 was to develop hypotheses that could be tested in Phase 2 of the research. Upon developing said hypotheses, it was discovered that the moral foundations theory does not provide definitions for key terms within the foundations. Neither care nor loyalty was defined as part of the theory. As such, applicable definitions are proposed to use as part of Phase 2 of the research. The chapter concludes with further development of complex hypotheses that incorporate Phase 1 findings, literature, and created definitions.

#### **1.5.4 Chapter Five: Phase 2 Findings**

Chapter five begins with a preliminary analysis of the moral dilemma scale developed from Phase 1 findings and then presents the results from hypotheses examination. The survey used in this phase was created to investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition in the context of solving moral dilemmas.

Descriptive statistics are shared. The profile of participants is analysed to ensure they are representative of the population of fundraisers. Next, measures are examined for normal distribution. Overall there was some skewness and kurtosis amongst the findings; however, this was deemed irrelevant based on the data analysis procedures employed.

Findings from the preliminary analysis provided evidence that the moral dilemma scale reliably measured care and loyalty as separate factors. With this assurance, the results of moderated moderated mediation used for each hypothesis is reported. PROCESS for SPSS was used to conduct a moderated moderated mediation analysis. Findings

revealed that increased implicit moral identity did not have a positive relationship with moral intuition as predicted based in theory. Additionally, findings did not indicate that experiencing moral emotions moderates the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition for any moderator group.

### **1.5.6 Chapter Six: Discussion**

The discussion in Chapter Six includes considerations of all results of Phase 1 and Phase 2 according to research aims and objectives. To begin, the research is deliberated according to how each phase answers the research aims and research objectives. Next, the results of the thematic analysis of Phase 1 are discussed. Following this, each hypothesis used for Phase 2 is discussed separately.

### **1.5.7 Chapter Seven: Conclusion**

Chapter seven considers the limitations of each phase of the study. Next, implications for theory development, practice, and education and training are presented. The chapter ends with recommendations for future research and a conclusion.

## **1.6 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has provided a synopsis of the current research undertaken. The following chapters present the context, justification, methodology, and outcomes of the research. Moral intuition has only recently been examined in the psychology literature, with little evidence to understand influencing variables and relationships according to theory. Additionally, these relationships have not been studied within the population of charity fundraisers. In applying the moral psychology concepts to the practical experience of

fundraisers, new research has been conducted. The following chapters are sequential and structured according to the layout described above.

# Chapter Two: Literature Review

## 2.1 Introduction

This chapter will review relevant literature to examine and critically evaluate academic knowledge for the current research project. The literature will examine fundraising across the disciplines of philanthropy, psychology and ethics. Topics included are ethical theories, how fundraisers currently solve moral dilemmas, moral development, moral intuition, and moral identity. Examining these areas of literature will provide a firm grounding from which to answer the research aims.

As stated in Chapter 1, the overall research question for the current study is “What kind of moral dilemmas do fundraisers encounter that require intuitive responses, and how are they solved?”

The research aims include:

1. To explore the role of moral intuition amongst fundraisers facing moral dilemmas in the workplace
2. To determine the role of moral foundations and moral intuition within moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter
3. To investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition in the context of solving moral dilemmas.

The literature review is divided into four sections. The first section will review ethical theories and apply them to fundraising moral dilemmas. Philanthropy has expanded incredibly over the past 3500 years of western civilisation. Fundraisers have been employed by charities to encourage philanthropy amongst communities for particular

causes. As part of this work, fundraisers encounter moral dilemmas. The literature reviews the tools currently available to help fundraisers in such situations.


The next section of the literature review provides background into the historical examination of moral psychology. This area of research began with the investigation of moral development. Several theories were proposed which will be briefly summarised and critiqued. However, these theories were based in cognitive-development principles. This was challenged in the research by the introduction of the social aspect of morality. A further challenge occurred when researchers discovered the role of intuition in making moral judgments.

The role of intuition is further explained and applied in the third section of the literature review. This section summarises the limited research currently available that studies moral intuition. It then further introduces the main theory used to explain moral intuition and reviews the application of emotions within this theory. No previous studies could be identified that have established the role of positive emotions within moral intuition, which provided an opportunity for further research conducted within this work.

The last section of the literature review introduces identity theory and moral identity in the context of moral behaviour. The limited studies examining this relationship have demonstrated a positive relationship between the constructs of moral identity and moral behaviour; however, moral identity has not been considered as a possible influence on moral intuition. This provided an opportunity for research, which was addressed in the current study.

The chapter concludes with a summary of the literature that justifies the need for the current study and lays out primary hypotheses for testing.

**Figure 2.1 Structure of the Literature Review**



## 2.2 Ethics, Philanthropy and Fundraising

### 2.2.1 Ethical Theories

For thousands of years, philosophers have explored and theorised about ethics and morals (Aristotle, 350 BC; Frimer *et al.*, 2011; Mill, 1863). To begin, it is essential to differentiate between ethics and morals. Ethics are defined as a theory of right and wrong conduct, consisting of principles (Billington, 2003). They involve the values that a person seeks to express in a given situation (Billington, 2003). Morals are defined as the practice of ethics, of right and wrong conduct; thus, morals are the ways a person expresses values in certain situations (Billington, 2003). So to summarise, ethics are the principles of human behaviour and morals are the application of these principles in day-to-day behaviour (Billington, 2003).

Within the realm of moral psychology research, three ethical theories are often cited as theoretical bases that serve as a foundation for the academic work (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; de Colle & Werhane, 2008; Jeong & Han, 2013; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Moral psychology is the investigation of human functioning – thoughts, reasoning, behaviour – within the context of morality (Doris & Stich, 2014). The three ethical theories are Aristotle’s virtue ethics (Aristotle, 350 BC; Aristotle, 2009), Kant’s deontological ethics (Kant, 2002) and Mill’s utilitarian ethics (Mill, 1863). Each theory proposes different ethical principles, which people should practice in their day-to-day living. Due to the vast influence these theories have had on moral psychology this chapter will review each theory and apply it to the current research (Haidt, 2013; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Lapsley, 1996; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005; Narvaez, 2005).

Through this further examination, the strengths and weaknesses within each theory will be explained, demonstrating the use of particular theories for the current work.

## **Virtue ethics**

### *Philosophical Views*

Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics (EN), more commonly known as virtue ethics was the earliest theory of ethics that has been applied to moral psychology (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). As the name infers, virtue ethics are rooted in practising virtues until they become habit and part of one's character. It states that all things (knowledge, inquiries, actions, pursuits, arts, etc.) aim to the good. Good, according to Aristotle, means the highest good for all human activity to aim. This definition of good goes beyond material goods or other good things, such as having friends, health and pleasure. To Aristotle, the *highest* good is happiness.

Aristotle "assumes that the highest good...has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake" (Kraut, 2014, , 2, para 1). According to Aristotle, the good of a human being is what differentiates humanity from other species and allows humans the potential to live a better life (Kraut, 2014). With the capacity to reason and guide oneself, humans can direct their conduct and provide fulfilment, which in turn brings about happiness (Kraut, 2014).

Aristotle describes happiness as a good life that includes living virtuously (Aristotle, 350 BC; Kraut, 2014). Virtues are "states of character" that both makes a person good and makes that person do their work well (Aristotle, 350 BC, p.2, 6). Aristotle compares

this to men being bad or good at their craft. For example, “men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly” (Aristotle, 350 BC, p. Book 2, 2).

According to Aristotle, all people, by nature, have the potential to exhibit virtue through actions. Through these actions, states of character arise, and one’s virtue either grows or is destroyed.

Aristotle emphasises the importance of exhibiting virtues regularly. The moral virtues include temperance, justice, courage, prudence, generosity, magnanimity, wit, right ambition, good temper, magnificence, pride, truthfulness, friendliness (Aristotle, 350 BC). These virtues fall on the middle of a continuum where one end involves excess and the other deficiency, so that having too much or too little of the virtue results in non-virtuous living. For example, courage is in the middle of the continuum as a virtue, and at either end of the continuum are rashness and cowardice. Aristotle calls mankind to exercise virtues so that men can become just by doing just acts, brave by doing brave acts, courageous by doing courageous acts, and so on.

Demonstrating virtues in one’s behaviour results in a fulfilling and meaningful life, which is Aristotle’s definition of happiness. Through repetition, one exercises the capacity to behave in a virtuous way and such behaviour becomes habit (Aristotle, 350 BC). Aristotle also proposed that it is possible for someone to be virtuous naturally, saying “nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature” (350 BC, p. Book 2, 1). The summary of virtue ethics is that through practice, exhibiting virtues through actions becomes habitual, resulting in happiness or the good life.

### *Psychological Views*

Aristotle's theory has been the foundation for the academic study of happiness in more recent years (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Waterman, 1993). Happiness has been studied as two separate concepts: hedonia and eudaimonia. Hedonia is the momentary pleasant feelings that accompany one's belief that one is getting the important things one wants, regardless of the cause (Waterman, 1993). Eudaimonia has been defined as a "process of fulfilling or realizing one's daimon or true nature – that is, of fulfilling one's virtuous potentials and living as one was inherently intended to live" (Deci & Ryan, 2008, p.2). It is about embarking on a journey of self-realisation through actively expressing virtue, which will result in continuous pleasure (Waterman, 1993). Eudaimonia, as studied in moral psychology, often refers to the chief human good in Aristotle's virtue ethics (Carr, 2003; Ryan, Huta & Deci, 2008; Weaver, 2006).

Additionally, Aristotle's theory of ethics has been incorporated into the study of moral psychology as the theory that underpins innate moral intuitions (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Moral psychology academics have proposed a link between virtues and intuitions that underscores moral systems across cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). This link is included as part of the explanation of moral intuition and as part of MFT. This research will be reviewed in detail in section 2.4.1, 2.4.3 and 2.4.3.

The following paragraph outlines reasons against and for using virtue ethics as a foundation for the study of moral psychology. A reason against using virtue ethics involves the difficulty of measurement (Bialek & De Neys, 2017; Cornelissen *et al.*, 2013). Creating clear and universal definitions for virtues to use within assessment measures is difficult, which muddles the ability to examine exact constructs and synthesise results from various studies. In support of using virtue ethics, this theory emphasises the responsibility of the acting agent to practice virtuous behaviour (Carr,

2003). Furthermore, in the specific examination of moral intuition, it is the theory that has been used to define and explain innate tendencies of moral judgment across cultures worldwide (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).

#### *Application of Virtue Ethics to Fundraising*

Support for using Virtue ethics is in one of its strengths. It is the only theory of ethics that reflects the character of the judging agent while simultaneously promoting the interests of others. Through incorporating individual character in his theory, Aristotle sets an expectation for virtuous agents to exhibit practical discernment throughout their daily living. This discernment allows the agent to respond “at the right time, to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive and in the right way” (Carr, 2003, p.219). This ability to respond virtuously across multiple situations also provides an internal resource that can be used intuitively in scenarios where a quick reaction is required.

This level of discernment would benefit professional fundraisers. First, fundraisers are held to high moral standards (Anderson, 1996). Moral virtues guide their daily practices. They practice these moral virtues as they work for non-profit organisations that seek to provide programmes and services to benefit others. Moral virtues can be demonstrated through interactions with colleagues, Board of Trustee members, and donors to the organisation, for example.

When done well, fundraisers have the opportunity to practice moral virtues by intentionally reflecting on how to best exhibit the right moral virtues at the right time towards the right people and with the right motive. As this intentional practice becomes habit, they become virtuous fundraisers. Virtue ethics, as studied in moral psychology,

offers a foundation to explore how to best transform professional fundraisers into virtuous fundraisers as well as how innate tendencies and virtues can help fundraisers. The current project is interested in how fundraisers make automatic, or intuitive, moral judgments, deeming the use of virtue ethics as the most appropriate foundation.

## **Deontological ethics**

### *Philosophical Views*

Immanuel Kant's *deontological ethics*, or duty-based ethics, was published in 1785 (Kant, Abbott & Denis, 2005). Kant's theory proposes that moral acts should be determined by an individual's duty to follow universal laws, or rules of morals that apply to all people all of the time. Examples of Kant's universal laws include truthfulness, honesty, and integrity to keep promises. Deontology is based on categorical imperatives, which are unconditional, are true at all times and in all situations (Kant, 1785). They take the form 'you must do x,' such as 'you must tell the truth no matter what'. Dishonesty is always an immoral action, even if lying in some way protects the wellbeing or safety of others (Frimer *et al.*, 2011; Kant, 1785).

According to Kant, one is obliged to act according to these rules regardless of the consequences to the actor or others (Kant, 1785). Since consequences are beyond the control of acting agents, the determination of whether or not an act is ethical cannot be dependent on the outcome. In order for an action to be a moral action, it must be determined by individual reasoning in relation to universal rules.

Deontological ethics differs from virtue ethics in several ways. Deontology emphasises duty in exercising moral behaviour, whereas virtue ethics emphasises the importance of

character and virtue. Deontology is grounded in categorical imperatives, like ‘you must do x’ and virtue ethics is grounded in hypothetical imperatives, such as ‘if you want to achieve x, you should do y’. And lastly, duty ethics are universal in that they are applicable to all people at all times in all situations. Virtue ethics, however, does not consist of such inflexible rules.

### *Psychological Views*

Kant’s theory of ethics has influenced the systematic examination of moral psychology more than any other theory. Deontological ethics was used as a foundation for Lawrence Kohlberg’s ground-breaking research into moral development (Colby *et al.*, 1983b; Frimer *et al.*, 2011; Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977; Turiel, Edwards & Kohlberg, 1978). Moral development was the first construct to be examined within moral psychology and will be described and critiqued in section 2.2.1. Duty ethics is also used as a foundation for studying moral intuition (Baron *et al.*, 2012; Bialek & De Neys, 2017; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Cummins & Cummins, 2012; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Kahane *et al.*, 2015; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). This research will be reviewed in detail in section 2.3.1.

Despite the historical influence of duty ethics on moral development, there are arguments both for and against using this theory as a foundation for studying moral psychology. One reason for using duty ethics is that the use of universal laws allows researchers to set clear definitions for observation and assessment (Bialek & De Neys, 2017; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Cornelissen *et al.*, 2013; Greene *et al.*, 2008). The universal laws define what is moral and immoral when conducting research. This clarity of right and wrong provides concise definitions for researchers and observers to use

when assessing moral behaviour. Researchers could easily categorise behaviour as moral or immoral using the laws.

The reason against using duty ethics is that the use of universal laws removes the responsibility of judgment and reason from the acting agent and removes the ability to respond to circumstances and context. Researchers have argued this theory of ethics is a “disinterested imposition of generalities” and an external focus on moral behaviour, which removes individual responsibility (Carr, 2003, p.219). By focusing only on behaviour, research refrains from understanding participants’ characteristics, thoughts, judgments, and reasons for their behaviour (Fischer, 2007). Removing this information diminishes the examination of moral psychology to the study of cold and impersonal rules.

#### *Application of Deontological Ethics to Fundraising*

In fundraising, one tool that is provided that helps fundraisers act morally is ethical codes. Fundraisers are expected to follow the codes, which provide a set of ethical rules. This will be explained in-depth in Section 2.2.3. In following the codes, fundraisers enact deontological ethics in their professional work, ensuring they are abiding by universal rules across diverse situations. This further influences the work they do to help provide services to charity beneficiaries.

However, the emphasis on fairness and justice in duty ethics ignores the importance of other moral characteristics necessary for successful fundraising, such as compassion, kindness, and being hard-working. These characteristics are necessary to build relationships with donors, to care about non-profit service beneficiaries, and to work well with fellow team members.

Additionally, duty ethics does not emphasise an individual's obligation to express moral characteristics such as compassion and kindness as a universal law. This gap causes a problem for fundraisers. In expressing compassion for beneficiaries through raising funds for services, one may have to choose demonstrating this moral characteristic over one of Kant's universal laws.

## **Utilitarian ethics**

### *Philosophical Views*

Mill's *utilitarian ethics* emphasises the importance of the outcome in making moral judgments (1863). This theory proposes that the foundation of morals is based on utility or the greatest happiness principle (Mill, 1863). Actions are right (moral) in proportion as they tend to promote happiness or wrong (immoral) as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. Happiness is that of all mankind and consists of various higher moral pleasures and the absence of pain (Mill, 1863). Higher pleasures are intellectual and moral such as reading philosophy, educating children, and engaging in a political discussion. Happiness as a higher pleasure could also include the achievement of goals and ends, such as virtuous living (Mill, 1863).

According to Mill, the principle of utility has external and internal sanctions. The external sanctions include four factors: the desire for approval from fellow men or the Creator; compassion and fondness for man; love and awe of the Creator; one's inclination to do the Creator's will unselfishly (Mill, 1863). The internal sanctions are an individual's conscience, which consists of a sense of unique duty (Mill, 1863). Individuals feel pain if they violate their own standard of duty and affirmation when

they abide by this duty. When put into practice, moral actions are those that ultimately consider the greatest good for others in society, not just individual happiness.

There are some key similarities and differences between the ethical theories of Mill, Aristotle and Kant. When compared to virtue ethics, there is one fundamental similarity and two differences. The similarity is that both virtue ethics and utilitarian ethics emphasise the importance of happiness in regulating moral choices. However, one difference is that utilitarian ethics emphasises the happiness of mankind and virtue ethics emphasise the happiness of the acting agent. The other difference lies in the theory's definitions of happiness. Virtue ethics defines happiness as virtuous living that one should continuously strive for until it becomes habit, and utilitarian ethics defines happiness both as simple and higher forms of pleasure. Utilitarianism's happiness includes basic pleasures such as eating and sleeping, in addition to virtuous living, debating, and learning. So, though both Mill and Aristotle base their theories on happiness, Mill's definition is broader.

When contrasted to duty ethics, there is one key difference: the reason for behaving morally. Utilitarian ethics emphasises that one should make moral decisions based on the consequences of the behaviour. Duty-based ethics emphasises universal laws that people are obliged to follow regardless of consequences; however, utilitarianism emphasises moral standards of living should be made by considering the consequences and what will produce the greatest happiness.

### *Psychological Views*

Utilitarian ethics has also been used as a foundation for understanding why people use reason or intuition to make moral judgments (Baron *et al.*, 2012; Bialek & De Neys,

2017; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Cummins & Cummins, 2012; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Kahane *et al.*, 2015; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). Academics argue that when making a utilitarian moral decision, individuals use reasoning because they have to consider the outcomes of choices. As stated previously, moral intuition research will be reviewed in detail in section 2.4.1.

### *Application of Utilitarian Ethics to Fundraising*

In the non-profit sector, decisions are often made in consideration of promoting happiness for as many others as possible. As will be discussed in section 2.2.2, the work of charities is based on providing good outcomes for others. By practising utilitarian ethics, fundraisers would support services and programmes that would benefit the greatest number of people. However, it is difficult to predict all possible outcomes of moral situations (Rambo, 1995), even if one's intentions are to help the most beneficiaries.

Although this theory somewhat parallels the work of the non-profit sector in providing the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people, it is difficult for fundraisers to predict outcomes. Additionally, grounding moral decisions in utilitarianism would most likely result in fundraisers using cognition to solve moral dilemmas. Contrary to this, the current project is interested in how fundraisers make automatic, intuitive moral decisions.

Table 2.1: Ethical theories, applications, and critical analysis in the context of fundraising.

<b>Ethical Theory</b>	<b>Philosophical Views</b>	<b>Psychological Application</b>	<b>Application to Fundraising</b>	<b>Benefits to Fundraising</b>	<b>Disadvantages to Fundraising</b>
<b>Virtue Ethics</b>	Man acts virtuously until it becomes habit, creating the greatest happiness	Happiness – Eudaimonia  Virtues underpin moral intuition	Fundraisers who practice virtue will conduct themselves morally	Seeks to make virtuous behaviour habit, thereby creating a virtuous person who will act morally	Emphasis on virtuous conduct provides little guidance for situations where virtues conflict with one another in a dilemma
<b>Deontology</b>	Rule-based ethics that are based on universal law. Everyone must obey the laws at all times out of obligation	Stage Theory of moral development based in deontology  Moral intuition linked to this ethical theory	Fundraisers are obligated to follow universal laws that apply to work situations	Provides guidelines for rule-based behaviour that fundraisers can follow when in dilemma	Focus on rules and obligation, and does not allow for individual accountability
<b>Utilitarian Ethics</b>	Ethical behaviour is determined by whatever act would provide the best outcome for the greater good	Moral cognition linked to this ethical theory	Fundraisers should make ethical decisions based on what would bring about the greatest good	Provides guidance to help fundraisers decide what would bring about the best outcome for the most people – beneficiaries of their organisation	Difficult to actually predict an outcome, so fundraisers couldn't know for sure what would be the best for the most people

Source: Author's own work

### *Section summary*

The three main ethical theories, virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics all explain moral behaviour in a different way. Each can be applied to many areas of life – relationships, marriage, leisure activities, and formal occupations. When applied to fundraising, each ethical theory presents benefits and disadvantages; however, one theory is best placed to use as a foundation for the current research.

Deontological ethics provides clear rules for behaviour that are applicable in any situation. This theory enables fundraisers to use rule-based decision making in their actions by following universal rules, but critiques of this theory have warned that by emphasising universal rules, individual characteristics and values are lost (Fischer, 2007).

Utilitarian ethics encourages individuals to act in a way that would promote the greatest happiness and provide the most good. This theory emphasises fundraisers should consider the outcome of their behaviour when making moral decisions so that they can do good for the largest number of people. However, critics of this theory have warned that even with the best intentions, individuals cannot fully predict an outcome (Rambo, 1995).

Virtue Ethics encourages individuals to practise virtues such as good temper, generosity, truthfulness and friendliness. In practising these virtues, fundraisers will experience fulfilment and the highest happiness. Over time, demonstrating the virtues in one's choices and behaviour become habit, such that these virtues will influence how fundraisers' act. In demonstrating such good character through virtue, the fundraiser does not need to memorise rules or consider the possible best outcome for the most

people. The fundraiser will just be doing what is the virtuous thing at that moment. Additionally, current moral psychology theories support the use of virtue ethics to underpin the examination of moral intuition. As such, virtue ethics is the best-suited ethical theory to use as a foundation for moral fundraising.

### **2.2.2 Philanthropy, Charity and Fundraising**

An influential writer on the topic of ethics has explained that “Tough choices, typically, are those that pit one “right” value against another. That’s true in every walk of life—corporate, professional, personal, civic, international, educational, religious, and the rest” (Kidder, 1995, p.4). In context, tough choices are those that involve an individual’s practice of ethics, which can be grounded in any of the theories presented in section 2.2.1. As this research is concerned with ethics in relation to individuals in non-profit fundraising, it’s important to understand this context. To provide clarity, this section will define and explain philanthropy, charity and fundraising.

Philanthropy originates from the Greek word *filanthropía*, which is a combination of the words “loving” (*philia*) and “human being” (*anthropos*) (Dobrof, 1997). In Greek, philanthropy is defined as the love of humanity as shown by caring, nourishing and enhancing the human experience. In the non-profit sector, Robert L Payton’s definition of philanthropy is commonly used (Gurin & Van Til, 1990; Sargeant & Jay, 2014). This definition is:

“Voluntary giving, voluntary service and voluntary association, primarily for the benefit of others; it is also the ‘prudent sister’ of charity since the two have been intertwined throughout most of the past 3500 years of western civilization” (Payton, p. 2984 cited in Sargeant & Jay, 2014, p.2).

This definition incorporates monetary contributions (voluntary giving) and time or skill-based contributions (voluntary service) for the benefit of others. Due to its completeness, Payton's definition of philanthropy is how the term is used in the current work. Charities are able to provide services that benefit others because of the philanthropy of supporters.

The definition of charity has changed over the years. Historically, charity has been more concerned with giving to the poor and needy on a one-to-one basis (Gurin & Van Til, 1990). More recently, charity has referred to altruism based in religious traditions and focused on factors such as empathy and compassion (Gurin & Van Til, 1990). Altruism, as it relates to giving to charity, is explained as people who recognise a need and offer a donation "even in circumstances where they themselves will derive no benefit" (Sargeant & Jay, 2014, p.71). These previous definitions of charity describe the word when it is used as a verb. Today, the word charity is also used in the form of a noun, and the definition includes legal forms of all organisations that provide services and programmes that are not found in the government or corporate sectors (Sargeant & Jay, 2014).

By law, a charity is an institution, which is established for charitable purposes only and is for the public benefit (Gov.uk, 2013). There are 13 charitable purposes listed in the Charities Act, such as the prevention or relief of poverty, the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science, and the advancement of environmental protection or improvement (Gov.uk, 2013). Public benefit is defined as beneficial to the public in general or a sufficient section, where any detriment or harm does not outweigh the benefit (Gov.uk, 2013). As long as institutions meet these two criteria, they are legally defined as charities.

In order for charities to implement their programmes and services, they must obtain appropriate financial support. A group of professionals called fundraisers are employed by the sector to obtain this financial support. The regulating body of fundraisers for England and Wales defines fundraisers as: “i) any person who carries on a business for gain which is wholly or primarily engaged in soliciting or otherwise procuring money or other property for charitable, philanthropic or benevolent purposes (but charities themselves and their trading subsidiaries are excluded) ii) any other person who solicits money or other property “for reward” (but again charities themselves, their employees and trustees and charity trading subsidiaries are excluded)” (Fundraising Regulator, 2018b, p.29).

In addition to the formal definition, fundraisers have been described as decent, honest and compassionate people who value the way philanthropy creates and enriches community life (Fischer, 2000). They are seen to treat others with respect and act with integrity in their work within philanthropic organisations (Fischer, 2000). The combination of the Fundraising Regulator’s formal definition and Fischer’s description is the definition of the population of interest for the current study.

Fundraisers have both a responsibility to ensure they raise the necessary funds as part of their professional role, and a responsibility to promote the basic tenants of philanthropy. These responsibilities can sometimes put fundraisers in challenging situations that force them to solve moral dilemmas. It is these situations that have inspired this particular research project. The following section will further explore such difficult situations.

### **2.2.3 How Fundraisers use Laws and Ethical Codes to Solve Moral Dilemmas**

This section will explain how the guidance of both the law and ethical codes can help fundraisers when facing moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas will be defined and further explained using examples applicable to fundraisers. In some circumstances, there are laws that instruct fundraisers on how to solve moral dilemmas. In other circumstances, there are ethical codes that should be applied. The section below will explain such circumstances and provide examples of each for context.

#### *Law-based Decision Making vs Ethics-Based Decision Making*

In all situations, fundraisers are expected to obey the law and act ethically (Anderson, 1996). Laws are defined as a system of rules that are created to regulate behaviour and enforced through social or governmental institutions (Robertson, 2006). Laws and rules provide easily understood boundaries and set lines within which people know the right thing to do (Anderson, 1996). Laws include requirements for the most minuscule standards of behaviour, which are of broad interest and concern for a society of people (Sargeant & Jay, 2014). Laws also reflect the prevailing view of the government. Law enforcement includes systems such as the police and the justice system. Individuals within society are taught to abide by the laws because it is the right thing to do, and there are consequences when laws are broken.

Ethics, as previously defined, are principles and values that inform right and wrong behaviour (Billington, 2003). Ethics operate at a higher level and are driven by individual beliefs and values which determine right from wrong (Sargeant & Jay, 2014). They are not a reflection of political views. Unlike for the law, there are not ethics

enforcement systems like an ethical police force. Instead, people are expected to act morally in order to demonstrate ethics.

Because the standards of laws and ethics are so different, a person's actions can be lawful but 'wrong' as they are immoral. For example, in the charity sector it is against the law to hide financial transactions from an organisation's books and steal the funds. This is punishable as fraud in the judicial system. However, a fundraiser could legally accept a small personal gift from a supporter, even though this could be considered unethical. In summary, the difference between law and ethics is the standard of expectations for the conduct of society. Laws define the bare minimum that individuals must do to maintain order, and ethics are value-based principles that hold individuals to a higher standard.

### *Clarifying Moral Dilemmas*

Moral dilemmas are scenarios when an individual must choose between two 'right' actions or two 'wrong' actions (Kidder, 1995). These dilemmas consist of a "tension between two powerful values" and occur in many different walks of life such as professional, personal, educational and others (Kidder, 2004, p.78). Kidder provides the example that "It is right to protect the endangered spotted owl in the old-growth forests of the American Northwest – and right to provide jobs for loggers" (Kidder, 2004). Both protecting the animals and providing jobs for people are right actions, but how does one choose one over the other?

In the charity sector, fundraisers will find themselves in situations where they must also choose between two 'right' or two 'wrong' alternatives. The most common categories of ethical dilemmas faced by fundraisers in the UK include remuneration, donor

information and privacy, acceptance of gifts, efficiency, appropriate corporate support and distortion of mission (Sargeant & Jay, 2014; Sargeant, Shang & Associates, 2017). Examples of moral dilemmas in fundraising include the following: It is right to punish employees who have behaved in a way that damages the reputation of the charity, and it is also right to demonstrate compassion and give the employee a second chance. It is right to respect the individual opinions of charity supporters, and it is also right to stand up against prejudice, discriminatory or hateful speech.

### *Ethical Codes*

There is an International Statement of Ethical Principles in Fundraising, which gives fundraisers guidance regarding aspirational values (National Fundraising Representatives, 2018). The Statement outlines shared principles for fundraising across the global community, which consists of values such as honesty, respect, integrity, transparency, and responsibility. The Statement demonstrates global commitment amongst fundraisers to work to a high standard and follow an ethical approach.

In addition to The Statement, codes of ethics provide instructions and guidelines for fundraisers to help them make decisions during moral dilemmas. Examples of such codes are the Code of Fundraising Practice (the Code) for the United Kingdom (Fundraising Regulator, 2018b), and the AFP Code of Fundraising Ethics for the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, and Mexico (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2014). These codes are regularly maintained and updated by professional organisations. Fundraisers in all countries are expected to abide by the guidelines outlined within their respective codes.

The Code of Fundraising Practice in the UK provides a guide to both the legal and ethical expectations of fundraisers. It is broken down into 20 topical sections, including Key Principles and Behaviours (1.0), Raffles and Lotteries (13.0), and Payment of Fundraisers (19.0). In addition to abiding by the Code, organisations that are members of the Fundraising Regulator agree to the Fundraising Promise which states that their fundraising will be legal, open, honest and respectful (Fundraising Regulator, 2018a). To clarify between legal and ethical expectations, the Code of Fundraising Practice uses “Must\* and Must Not\*” to state legal requirements and “Must and Must Not” (without an asterisk) to state ethical requirements.

The Code of Fundraising Ethics in the US, Canada, Puerto Rico, and Mexico is comprised of four sections and 25 ethical statements. The four sections are titled Public Trust, Transparency & Conflicts of Interest; Solicitation & Stewardship of Philanthropic Funds; Treatment of Confidential & Proprietary Information; and Compensation, Bonuses & Finder’s Fees. Rather than distinguish between ethical and legal expectations of fundraisers like the Code of Fundraising Practice, the Code of Fundraising Ethics makes a blanket statement that AFP members should “comply with all applicable local, state, provincial and federal civil and criminal laws” (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2014). Again, all fundraisers practising in the respective countries are expected to follow the Code of Fundraising Ethics whether or not they are members of the AFP.

#### *How do Fundraisers Solve Moral Dilemmas?*

Fundraisers have many tools they can use to solve moral dilemmas. They can use ethical theories, the International Statement of Fundraising Principles, the law, or

ethical codes for fundraising. Using these tools provides a wide breadth of guidance when defining what is right vs what is wrong.

The ethical theories provide different reasons for moral decisions. These differences can best be explained using an example. Previously, an example of a moral dilemma was that it is right to punish employees who have behaved in a way that damages the reputation of the charity, and it is also right to have compassion and give the employee another chance. Virtue ethics would encourage practising the virtue of being compassionate, thereby softening the consequences towards the employee. Duty-based ethics would emphasise the obligation to follow the rules and punish the employee in order to be fair and just. Utilitarian ethics would look at these two alternatives and emphasise choosing whichever outcome would provide the most happiness for the entirety of the charity team. The fundraiser could make a decision based on his or her chosen ethical theory.

In utilising the International Statement of Ethical Principles, fundraisers would need to align their actions with the outlined ethical approach. The Statement has been praised in its purpose for setting ethical and value-based aspirations for fundraisers to achieve. The Statement isn't a prescription telling fundraisers what to do, but rather a guide that inspires and gives fundraisers the liberty they need to achieve the aspirational values they seek to embrace (Cooney, 2018).

Additionally, following the laws and ethical codes helps fundraisers solve moral dilemmas. Like all responsible citizens, fundraisers are obliged to abide by the law. In moral dilemmas where the law is involved, fundraisers would use duty-based decision-

making and follow the law. When the law is involved, the difficulty of making a choice between two right alternatives of a moral dilemma is removed.

An example of a law-based situation would be a fundraiser being approached by a colleague whose 15-year-old daughter wanted to volunteer for the organisation's House-to-House collections fundraising activity. The fundraiser has just had a volunteer for the collections drop out at the last minute, so the daughter's help is much needed. However, the Code of Fundraising Practice clearly states that the law requires House-to-House collectors be a minimum of 16 years of age (House to House Collections Act 1939). In this instance, the fundraiser must apply this legal rule to the situation and explain to the colleague that legally, the daughter is not old enough to collect for the organisation, unfortunately. As this choice is clear, the fundraiser can easily follow the law and solve the dilemma.

In situations where there are no legal obligations, fundraisers can use the ethical codes provided within their country to help solve the moral dilemma. Some sections of the codes address the most common dilemmas such as remuneration (see 4<sup>th</sup> Section of the Code of Ethical Standards and section 10 of the Code of Fundraising Practice) (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2014; Fundraising Regulator, 2018c). The codes offer provide guidance, but it is up to the fundraisers to process and apply the relevant suggestions.

For example, when raising money from businesses, Section 12.3 of the Code of Fundraising Practice states:

- b) Organisations **MUST** ensure there are no conflicts of interest or potential conflicts of interest relating to the partnership. (Fundraising Regulator, 2018c)

Potential conflicts of interest will be unique for each proposed partnership. Staff and trustees of organisations should discuss and define potential conflicts of interest to guide decisions regarding prospective donations. Also, the fundraiser must use his/her individual judgment when making decisions regarding each potential corporate partner. This demonstrates the importance of having ethical codes as a starting point, but that final moral decisions can be based on the judgments and beliefs of fundraisers as a representative of his or her organisation.

### *Section summary*

The ethical codes have been written to provide guidance for fundraisers in as many situations as possible; however, some have commented, “while immensely valuable, this Code supplies only half of the professional equation” (Sargeant & Jay, 2014, p.421). In some situations, fundraisers will need to use their own interpretations and morals. For example, at times fundraisers have to solve a moral dilemma quickly and are unable to reference or use clear rules within the ethical codes. These scenarios require intuition to determine the most right alternative. Moral intuition as a concept will be discussed in section 2.4.1. Intuitive responses reflect the fundraiser’s moral character, much like in virtue ethics. If fundraisers make decisions and behave in a way that demonstrates virtue instinctively, this would help them to quickly solve moral dilemmas when they are put on the spot.

Table 2.2 below provides an overview of the benefits and disadvantages of the tools available that fundraisers can use to solve moral dilemmas.

Table 2.2: Benefits and disadvantages of resources available for fundraisers to use in solving moral dilemmas.

	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Disadvantage</b>
<b>Law</b>	A system of rules that are created to regulate behaviour and enforced through social or governmental institutions	Created and enforced to achieve order and protection	Only provides requirements for the basic legal standards of behaviour – doesn't hold people accountable to higher standards
<b>Ethical Theories</b>	Principles and values that inform right and wrong behaviour	Provide ways to demonstrate one's values through aligned behaviour	- Provides high standards for moral behaviour but cannot be enforced - Relies on individual motivation and desire to act morally
<b>International Statement of Fundraising Principles</b>	Values, beliefs, and principles that govern professional fundraisers across the world	Sets out aspirations and ethical behaviour	- Does not provide instruction on how to operationalise the principles
<b>Code of Fundraising Practice (the Code)</b>	Code of ethical fundraising for the United Kingdom	Provides guidance for legal and ethical expectations	- Does not provide guidance for every situation imaginable - Requires knowledge of code to be used in situations where a quick decision needs to be made
<b>Code of Fundraising Ethics</b>	Code of ethical fundraising for United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, and Mexico	Provides guidance for ethical expectations	- Does not provide guidance for every situation imaginable - Requires knowledge of code to be used in situations where a quick decision needs to be made

Source: Author's own work

#### 2.2.4 Decision-making processes available to help solve moral dilemmas

Fundraisers have been said to mostly behave ethically, even whilst facing extreme challenges such as pressures to meet targets, superiors who do not understand fundraising, and a lack of experience in solving moral dilemmas (Rosen, 2005). Limited

guidance, beyond the law and ethical codes, exists to assist fundraisers with moral decision-making. Fundraisers have been challenged to embrace two professional responsibilities: to create an ethical foundation for the work, and create a moral community by promoting ethical behaviour both among colleagues and within non-profit organisations (Sargeant, Shang & Associates, 2017).

In an attempt to assist fundraisers in their moral decision-making, four published texts exist that outline decision-making processes (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Rosen, 2005). Such references support the notion that ultimately, the responsibility for moral decisions lies within individual judgment, beliefs and actions. Unfortunately, there isn't any academic research examining the usefulness and appropriateness of such proposed decision-making processes in applied settings (Petty, 2013; Sargeant & Jay, 2014; Sargeant, Shang & Associates, 2017). Without empirical support, fundraisers use the processes under the assumption that they are helpful when they encounter moral dilemmas.

These processes incorporate different ethical theories as a foundation for decision-making. The first process is a tool that can be applied to moral dilemmas across all situations, regardless of occupation or profession (Kidder, 1995). The other three processes were developed specifically to help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Marion, 1994).

### *Kidder's principles*

Rushworth Kidder introduced one of the first processes to help individuals solve moral dilemmas (Kidder, 1995). This model incorporates all three ethical theories and is a guide for all people, not just fundraisers. Kidder, the founder of the Institute for Global

Ethics, breaks down moral dilemmas into a process of nine checkpoints (Kidder, 1995). The checkpoints include recognising the dilemma and who the actor is, gathering facts, identifying and examining alternatives, and taking action using moral courage.

Kidder uses four paradigms, which represent how the dilemma forces core values to be pitted against one another. The paradigms are truth vs loyalty, individual vs community, short-term vs long-term, and justice vs mercy. Determining the paradigm that forms the base of the dilemma helps in solving the dilemma because it simplifies the situation down to the core issue.

The checkpoints also call for using three resolution principles to reason and exercise moral rationality. The principles are Ends-based thinking (aligned with utilitarian ethics), Rule-based thinking (aligned with duty-based ethics), and Care-based thinking (aligned with virtue ethics). Reasoning in this part of the process should resolve the dilemma; however, if this is not the case, then there may be an additional alternative option called the “trilemma” option (Kidder, 1995, p.184). The trilemma is an alternative option that might not have been considered initially but has come to mind during the reasoning in previous checkpoints. The actor is encouraged to consider all of the options, including the trilemma, select one and move to the next checkpoint.

Once the individual makes a decision and takes action (checkpoint eight), Kidder encourages the use of moral courage. Moral courage is defined as the willing endurance of significant danger for the sake of principle (Kidder, 2005). In this process, individuals’ demonstrate moral courage when they have the conviction and bravery to stick their necks out for what they have determined as the right thing to do, even when facing possible negative consequences.

In a fundraising setting, one could use Kidder's process while facing the following dilemma:

A fundraising director of a non-profit that supports individuals dealing with substance abuse is responsible for a large year-end annual appeal mailing to supporters. The mailing typically generates approximately 10% of the charity's annual income. Over the last six months, the director's charity has helped over 200 individuals become clean and sober. One individual has benefited from the organisation's services and became sober so has featured in the mailing, including a personal quote and photograph. One week before the appeal letter will be printed, the director learns that this individual has suffered a severe relapse and is back in treatment. Should the director keep the photo and quote in the mailing or remove them?

Table 2.3: Kidder’s process applied in a practical setting.

Checkpoint	Dilemma Response
1. Recognise there is a moral dilemma.	The director recognises the dilemma
2. Determine who the actor is, and whose dilemma it is.	The director, as the decision-maker regarding the mailing
3. Gather relevant facts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Current progress of mailing. Has the letter been printed? Sent to the mail house?</li> <li>- Cost of delaying the mailing date</li> <li>- Review the information received about the relapse</li> <li>- Consider income implications of sending mailing late</li> </ul>
4. Examine the dilemma for right vs wrong alternatives.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. send the letter as it is since the director is under deadline pressure and the person gave the quote during sobriety</li> <li>2. postpone and edit the letter to incorporate another success story to demonstrate honesty and integrity</li> </ol>
5. Identify which of the right vs right paradigms best defines the dilemma.	n/a
6. Consider the dilemma using three resolution principles that align with the three ethical theories.	n/a
7. Determine if there is a third option that solves the dilemma.	n/a
8. Take action.	edit the letter to incorporate another success story
9. Revisit and reflect on the action.	Hold time in diary to review the scenario, the options available, and the decision made

During checkpoint four, the director needed to determine if the alternatives are right vs wrong or right vs right. The director decided that although there weren’t any laws or ethical code guidance regarding what decision to make, to choose the first option would be wrong and make him feel uneasy. In this case, the process instructs the director to stop at this checkpoint because the decision has been made. Although the director did not need to use all nine steps in this process, it was necessary for the director to have the time to implement the process and contemplate each step up until making a decision.

However, other circumstances exist when one doesn't have the time for reflection, analysis and contemplation as in the previous scenario. A fundraising example of this would be: A Major Gift Fundraiser has developed a relationship with a major donor over the past four years. During a regular quarterly lunch meeting to review the charity's impact, this donor suddenly insists on paying for the fundraiser's meal. The donor states paying for lunch is a way to show her appreciation for the fundraiser's thorough reports of how her gifts make a measurable impact. The Major Gift Fundraiser's organisation has a gift-acceptance policy of up to £100 (which would easily pay for lunch) but strongly disapproves of any gift-acceptance. Should the Major Gift Fundraiser allow the donor to pay for lunch?

In this instance, the fundraiser must make a decision and immediately reply to the donor. The fundraiser must choose between the option of showing gratitude and accepting the donor's offer to purchase lunch or respecting an organisational expectation to refuse gifts. These options represent a right vs right moral dilemma. In order to use Kidder's principles, the fundraiser would need time to work through the checkpoints. As this is not possible, the fundraiser will need other tools to solve the dilemma.

#### *Barbara Marion's roadmap*

Barbara Marion's roadmap consists of a series of 12 statements that guide fundraisers from the dilemma to the solution, like using a road map to get from point A to point B (Marion, 1994). The process is underlined with ethical values but is not aligned with any of the aforementioned ethical theories. Once a fundraiser decides on a course of action, the process recommends they share their conclusions with other professionals to test it through receiving feedback. After this further evaluation, the process instructs

fundraisers to evaluate the outcomes and use the knowledge gained to influence policies and procedures.

Fundraisers are encouraged to be grounded in the core ethical values of honesty, integrity, promise-keeping, loyalty, fairness, caring for others, respect for others, responsible citizenship, pursuit of excellence, accountability, safeguarding the public trust and duty (Kelly, 1998; Marion, 1994). They then follow a road map of standardised statements to sift through the details of a moral dilemma and determine the best alternative to choose. The statements include clarifying the problem, identifying the values, actors, and alternatives, then imagining and evaluating potential outcomes before making a decision (Marion, 1994). The roadmap also instructs fundraisers to share their decision with someone else and assess the possible consequences, similar to Kidder's checkpoint of revisiting and reflecting. This step provides feedback and can influence policies and procedures for fundraisers and their organisations.

Marion's roadmap is comprehensive and clear; however, similar to Kidder's principles, implementing the roadmap requires time for concentration, reasoning and reflection. This would not be possible in scenarios like the Major Gift Fundraiser lunch dilemma, as a quick reply is necessary. This context of needing to make a speedy decision removes Marion's model from use in dilemma situations where the alternative choice must be selected without the luxury of time, conversation or lengthy evaluations.

#### *Albert Anderson's principles*

Anderson's principles are an example of applied ethics that emphasise the need for patient clarification in order to determine the tension in the dilemma one is facing (Anderson, 1996). The principles are first grounded in Aristotle's emphasis on virtuous

character. Aristotle's ethical theory is applied to how fundraisers should be responsible for matters of philanthropy, where philanthropy is more narrowly defined than previously stated in page 39, section 2.2.2 (Payton, p. 2984 cited in Sargeant & Jay, 2014, p.2). Philanthropy, according to Anderson, is the role professionals play by "raising and distributing private gifts and grants" to support causes they care about (1996, p.ix).

Once a fundraiser recognises they are in a moral dilemma, the process lists a set of three questions to be used, which are:

1. What seem(s) to be the ethical issue(s); that is, what does one judge to be right or wrong in this situation?
2. What action(s) would seem to make the situation right; that is, what ought one to do?
3. What ethical principle(s) and ultimate governing framework would justify the action(s)? (Anderson, 1996, p.49)

Following Anderson's process requires thoughtful contemplation, reasoning and reflection, similar to the previous processes. When answered, deliberation on the questions above provides a formula to identify the problem, propose possible solutions, compare and contrast the potential solutions, and then use legal and ethical guidance to help direct decision-making.

Again, this process would be applicable during the dilemma where the fundraising director has to make a decision around sending the year-end mailing. However, the dilemma involving the Major Gift Fundraiser making a decision about whether to accept a major donor's offer to pay for lunch does not allow for the use of this process.

The fundraiser again will need to use another tool that helps to make a quick, immediate decision and does not require access to sets of questions or time for reasoning.

*Marilyn Fischer's chart*

The final moral decision-making process explicitly developed for fundraisers is that of Marilyn Fischer (2000). Fischer describes fundraisers as people who serve the ideal of philanthropy, where philanthropy is defined as creating and sustaining communities (2000, p.10). The process is based on the premise that fundraisers have three basic value commitments that sometimes come into conflict. Using an ethical decision-making chart, fundraisers walk through a matrix that can be used to clarify the dilemma and identify the best solution.

Fundraisers are encouraged to use storytelling as a way to process the dilemma as this will help them realise the shared ethical commitments of individuals and organisations alike, thereby minimising polarisation. According to this process, fundraisers are committed to three basic values in their professional work:

1. The organisational mission that directs the work
2. Our relationships with the people with whom we interact
3. Our own sense of personal integrity

(Fischer, 2000, p.21)

Organisational mission is the social need an organisation is trying to meet, or a human good an organisation is trying to achieve. Relationships of fundraisers include those with colleagues, donors, volunteers, and other community members. Integrity is defined as expressing “basic values in everyday actions with courage and compassion” (Fischer, 2000, p.23). These values all work inter-connectedly and guide professional behaviours

and decision-making; however, ethical dilemmas occur when they conflict. To work through the dilemma, fundraisers should discuss the scenario with others to gain various perspectives and write suggested alternatives on the chart below. Fundraisers then use the chart to evaluate the dilemma and come to a conclusion.

Figure 2.2: Fischer’s Chart for ethical decision-making.

<b>Value</b>	<b>Alternative 1</b>	<b>Alternative 2</b>	<b>Alternative 3</b>
Organisational mission			
Relationships			
Personal Integrity			

(Fischer, 2000, p.25).

Similar to Marion, Fischer does not link her moral decision-making process to any particular ethical theory. As with all of the previous three processes, Fischer emphasises that solving moral dilemmas is a process that involves reasoning, reflection and discussion. Using her process again requires fundraisers to speak with others and take time to analyse the situation before coming to a conclusion, so could not be used in a situation where a quick decision was necessary.

Again, the Major Gift Fundraiser in the lunch moral dilemma would not be able to use this process to make a decision. Because a quick decision is required, the fundraiser would not have the time or resources to reach out to others, discuss the three questions, and evaluate possible alternatives before responding to the donor.

### *Section Summary*

There are four decision-making processes available to help assist fundraisers solve moral dilemmas. Each process has guidance that encourages reasoning, reflection and consideration. The table below shows an analysis of these processes, including

requirements for use, and strengths and weaknesses based on the practical application of the processes.

Table 2.4: Analysis of decision-making processes available to fundraisers

Process	Summary	Ethical Theory	Requirements	Strengths	Weaknesses
Kidder's Principles	Guide for everyone, not fundraising specific. Consists of 9 checkpoints.	Virtue Ethics Deontology Utilitarianism	Contemplation Following steps Time	Applicable across any moral dilemma scenario	Requires time for cognitive processing
Marion's Roadmap	Guide specific to fundraising. Consists of 12 statements, ten core ethical values, 12 ethical guidelines	Individual preference.	Contemplation Following steps Time Sharing decision with someone else	Clear, detailed formula to follow	Requires time for cognitive processing and conversations with others
Anderson's Principles	Guide specific to fundraising. Consists of 3 questions and is underlined by 3 principles.	Virtue Ethics underlines process. Individual must choose between duty-based ethics or utilitarian ethics	Contemplation Following steps Time Virtuous character as base Review of 3 underlining principles	Questions to guide thinking, but flexible and not so scripted	Requires time for cognitive processing and reflection
Fischer's Matrix	Guide specific to fundraising. Conflict between 3 values. Use storytelling to talk about situation and come to solution.	No theory	Contemplation Time Individuals to speak with. Awareness of three value commitments	Provides guidance for thinking but is most flexible Least scripted process	Requires time for cognitive processing and conversation with others

Source: Author's own work

In summary, there are strengths and weaknesses for using the ethical decision-making processes. In terms of strengths, the processes are helpful for solving moral dilemmas because they provide clear steps to follow. The processes are also explained and documented in an easy to follow format, and encourage fundraisers to base their decisions in values and virtues. This alone helps instil morals and values, thereby creating a group of professionals working toward being better people. Lastly, working through the processes as recommended could give fundraisers assurance that they have

worked through all aspects of the dilemma, providing additional confidence in their decision-making.

In terms of weaknesses, the processes' standardised questions require referencing them or having them memorised. Additionally, each process involves a conversation with others to discuss the dilemma and reflect on the potential decision. In some cases, finding an appropriate individual to have such a serious conversation with might be difficult. Also, the thoroughness of the processes requires fundraisers to have dedicated time and cognitive space to work through the steps. As demonstrated in the example of the Major Gift Fundraiser, time and thought are a luxury that fundraisers sometimes do not have. In instances where a fundraiser must choose a moral dilemma alternative very quickly, working through any of the above processes would be impossible. Most importantly, the review of the literature found no empirical evidence investigating the effectiveness or benefits of any of the decision-making processes (Petthey, 2013; Sargeant & Jay, 2014; Sargeant, Shang & Associates, 2017).

## **Section 2.2 Conclusion**

Section 2.2 reviews and describes three well-known ethical theories, virtue ethics, duty-based ethics and utilitarian ethics. Examples of how ethical theories can be applied within fundraising were used to demonstrate the connection between ethics and philanthropy as broader concepts. Definitions of philanthropy, charity and fundraising were provided to clarify the terms as they are used in the current research. Further explanation of the importance of ethics within fundraising was demonstrated through the description of ethical codes that are utilised by fundraisers globally. The ethical codes provide guidelines to help fundraisers when they encounter moral dilemma situations in their work; however, the ethical codes do not provide guidelines for every

possible moral dilemma nor do they recommend a particular process fundraisers could use to solve moral dilemmas.

Since the moral roles fundraisers play in their work are so important, ethical decision-making processes have been published specifically for fundraisers (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Kidder, 1995; Marion, 1994). The suggested processes are helpful in addressing the complexity involved in moral decision-making, such as obligation, duty, individual values and organisational missions. The four processes were compared and contrasted, revealing weaknesses that could interfere with their effectiveness in particular moral dilemma scenarios. It was also noted that no empirical evidence exists that investigates the use of the processes in practical settings.

The main challenge of using the processes is that they all require fundraisers to complete a lengthy evaluation and reflection, which take time to complete before deciding on the most appropriate action. This research is concerned with scenarios where fundraisers must make a decision instantaneously, rendering the processes irrelevant. In order to help fundraisers in these scenarios, it is important to understand more about what can help them make quick, automatic decisions. The next sections will explore other factors that are involved in making quick, innate decisions.

## **2.3 Moral Development, Moral Judgment and the introduction of Moral Intuition**

The previous section reviewed the practical tools available to help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas. Unfortunately, there is a lack of empirical research evaluating the processes that have been developed to help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas (Petty, 2013; Sargeant & Jay, 2014; Sargeant, Shang & Associates, 2017). Without supporting research, professionals are unable to determine which, if any, of the processes will successfully help them solve moral dilemmas (Clohesy, 2003; Kidder, 2004; Petty, 2013; Rosen, 2005; Shumate & O'Connor, 2010).

In order to provide a robust review of the topic, it is important to also review the academic research that has explained how people solve moral dilemmas. This section will explain how empirically supported theories in moral psychology can be applied to help fundraisers in such situations. Moral psychology is the investigation of human functioning – thoughts, reasoning, behaviour – within the context of morality (Doris & Stich, 2014).

Research into moral psychology initially began by exploring the construct of moral development (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Moral development is defined as increased knowledge of cultural values leading to ethical relativity which is expressed as transformations within an individual's form or structure of thought (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). This research resulted in the development of Stage Theory and was based in cognitive-developmental theories, which emphasise the influence of cognition (thinking, reasoning, etc.) as key to individual development (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977).

As individual cognitive structures grow and become more advanced, so too does moral thinking.

Challenges and critiques of Stage Theory inspired further research to examine moral development from different perspectives, resulting in the proposal of alternative theories. These alternatives are Neo-Kohlbergian Theory, Domain Theory, and the Social-Intuitionist Model. In order to provide historical context for the current research project, as well as explain the influence that this initial research had on the empirical investigation of moral psychology, this section will provide a review of each of the theories. It will also introduce a theory that challenged the standard cognitive-developmental examination of moral decision-making.

### **2.3.1 Stage Theory**

The first and most influential theory of moral development, Stage Theory, was introduced by Lawrence Kohlberg as a progression through stages of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 2008). This theory is rooted in Piaget's cognitive developmental theory and supported by empirical evidence (Kohlberg, 2008; Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Piaget, 1977). Moral reasoning, according to Kohlberg, is defined as "the capacity to make judgments about whether certain actions are right or wrong" (Hardy & Carlo, 2011b, p.495). Kohlberg's research was ground-breaking in the field of moral psychology and provided the first explanation for how cognitive development was associated with moral development.

According to Stage Theory, individuals' progress through six stages of moral development. The stages are paired into three levels. The preconventional level includes

stages 1 and 2 and emphasises cultural rules, good vs bad and right vs wrong.

Individuals in this stage obey a fixed set of rules as they relate to punishment, reward and authority. Stages 3 and 4 comprise the conventional level and focus on conformity and loyalty to the point of maintaining, supporting and justifying social order. Finally, stages 5 and 6 make up the highest level of moral development called the postconventional level. At this level, individuals move past the other stages and view moral values and principles as necessary to improve society in terms of fairness and justice.

Kohlberg's research and theory of moral development catapulted the investigation of moral psychology to new heights and has been a "towering figure" in the field (Haidt, 2008). Its strength is that it formed a classification system to begin the academic study of moral development; however, four main criticisms of the theory have emerged.

Criticisms of Kohlberg's work include a lack of reliability and validity based on the subjective scoring used for the Moral Judgment Scale to rate and rank an individual's moral development as well as the difficulty of applying Stage Theory across non-Western cultures (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). Another critique highlighted the fact that since the theory was developed through the examination of moral development in males, it was inapplicable to females (Gilligan, 1982b). The argument was that Stage Theory did not take into account the importance of interpersonal relationships amongst women, which in turn influences the centre of their morality, and as a result, females scored lower on average than males (around Stage 3) (Gilligan, 1982b).

Responses to these criticisms of Stage Theory have included multiple research projects by Kohlberg and others (Candee & Kohlberg, 1987; Colby *et al.*, 1983a; Colby *et al.*,

1983b; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg, Levine & Hower, 1983; Snarey, Reimer & Kohlberg, 1985). These research projects have improved and supported the theory over time, and it is still used in research today.

However, two further criticisms of Stage Theory are also reasons why the theory will not be incorporated into the framework for the current study. Firstly, Stage Theory was grounded in duty-based ethics, thereby limiting the scope of inquiry into moral psychology (Blasi, 1990). In using the duty-ethics of Kant, Kohlberg's findings were limited by this theory's belief that human nature is dualistic in terms of passion vs reason (Walker, 2004b). In the current project, the ethical theory that serves as a foundation for solving moral dilemmas is virtue ethics.

Secondly, it has been argued that Kohlberg's emphasis on using cognitive development theory to explain moral development is limiting and inappropriate (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). This use has been inappropriate because moral development doesn't integrate with other areas of development. It is also inappropriate because Stage Theory doesn't explain how moral reasoning relates to other psychological processes and constructs, such as memory, identity and motivation. One further limitation is that Stage Theory doesn't explain moral functioning or show any relevance for the teaching of moral character development. The current research examines how moral psychology constructs such as moral intuition and moral identity (which will be explained in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.3, respectively) help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas. These constructs are not grounded in cognitive-developmental theory, so Stage Theory would not assist in understanding the relationships of interest. To understand how other theories were introduced as underpinning moral constructs, the following section explains how Domain Theory proposed a different explanation for moral development.

### **2.3.2 Domain Theory**

Diverting from Kohlberg's stage theory, Elliot Turiel introduced the next theory, Domain Theory, to explain moral development using a social constructionist perspective (Haidt, 2001; 1983). The social constructionist perspective explains moral development as occurring within a social context through interactions with the physical and social environment, such as playing with other children. Domain theory emphasises the construction of moral judgments as based on experiences involving social actions. This conceptual change moved the definition of moral development beyond Kohlberg's focus on fairness and justness and included concepts such as psychological and physical harm and distribution of freedom.

The most significant difference between Domain Theory and Stage Theory is in its explanation of how moral development occurs. Rather than describing moral development as the progression through hard stages, Turiel proposed that moral development occurs in one of three domains. The theory suggests that throughout life, individuals grow and develop across three domains separately: moral, societal and psychological domains (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). According to Domain Theory, development within the domains is independent of the others, and progression within one domain does not represent a progression in other domains (Lourenço, 2014).

The moral domain refers to justice, rights and the welfare of others, and focuses on universal and rigid moral rules. This domain encompasses how we treat one another, an example being that one should not trip another person trying to cross the road. The societal domain refers to arbitrary and flexible communal guidelines and agreements

that regulate the behaviour of community members. This domain has to do with regulations that support the smooth functioning of institutions and communities, and includes customs, traditions, etiquette and politeness. An example of this is the knowledge that one should remain quiet while on an early train to respect others who are commuting. Lastly, the psychological domain consists of issues that only apply to the self and that preclude the need to be socially regulated. This domain incorporates an understanding of the self, autonomy, personal choice and individual discretion. An example of this would be an individual ordering their hot drink of choice whilst waiting for their morning train. Individuals use a combination of these domains when solving moral dilemmas.

One strength of Domain Theory is it was the first moral development theory to include a social aspect. This inclusion progressed moral development research beyond cognitive development's emphasis on individual cognition. By recognising that individuals are influenced by social interactions, Domain Theory proposed a public and community element to moral development.

There are two main critiques of Domain Theory, which justify why it was introduced to provide historical context but will not be used to formulate the framework of the current research. The first critique is that the theory defines morality too narrowly (Narvaez, 2005; Walker, 2004b). Like in Kohlberg's theory, the definition of morality in Domain Theory is also based in Kant's duty-based ethics of universal rules. Since this definition is based on a set of rules, the critique is that it does not allow for the intra-psychic aspects of morality, which are aspects of morality that uniquely occur within the psyche, mind or personality (Walker, 2004b). The current research bases its definition of morality on virtue ethics and incorporates the psyche component of the construct.

The other critique is that Domain Theory has almost no empirical support (Lourenço, 2014; Narvaez, 2005). Only one study exists that examined the development of Turiel's moral domain, and results were only somewhat significant (Davidson, Turiel & Black, 1983). The current research is not based on moral development theories, and would not incorporate a theory with no empirical support.

For the current research, Domain Theory was reviewed to provide historical context. Its addition to the examination of moral development by explaining it as part of an interrelated system consisting of social concepts demonstrates a shift research to incorporate social cognitive theory. This theory emphasises how interactions with the physical and social environment influence moral development, which is particularly relevant as there is a social element to the moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter. Additionally, this shift resulted in the introduction of new theories relevant for the current research, which will be reviewed in Section 2.2.4. Domain Theory doesn't formulate the framework of the current research; however, understanding it is essential as it helped explain and examine the social aspect of moral development.

### **2.3.3 The Neo-Kohlbergian Approach**

Using critiques of Stage Theory as a catalyst, and incorporating the socio-cognitive theory like Turiel, Rest et al. developed the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to moral development (Rest *et al.*, 1999b). They addressed the subjective measurement problems of the Moral Judgment Scale, abandoned the hard-stage model and adopted a gradual shifting of reasoning (Rest *et al.*, 1999b; Walker, 2004b). This approach uses cognition as a starting point for moral development analysis, similar to Kohlberg. It also utilises

categories of developmental stages, suggests that moral development occurs in these stages over time (i.e. from childhood to adolescence), and agrees with Kohlberg's theory in that an individual's progression from the conventional to postconventional stage of moral thinking occurs from adolescence to adulthood.

The major differences between Kohlberg's theory and the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach can be found in assessment methods and psychological explanations for moral development (Rest *et al.*, 1999a). In terms of assessment methods, rather than the subjective measures used by Stage Theory, the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach measures moral development objectively using the Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT is a multiple-choice test that consists of a standardised rating and ranking system.

Responses to the DIT provide quantitative scores, which align with particular moral development stages. The use of a standardised rating system supports construct validity unlike Stage Theory (Rest *et al.*, 1999a).

The more significant difference between the two approaches is the psychological explanation for moral development. Rather than explaining moral development as a journey that occurs solely within cognitive development theory, Rest *et al.* propose that moral development is grounded in moral schemas. Schemas are "general knowledge structures that reside in long-term memory" and are used as a guide when individuals are exposed to new knowledge (Rest *et al.*, 1999a, p.297). Examples of schemas used in social cognition research include person schemas (e.g. this person is compassionate or cruel, truthful or dishonest) and role schemas (e.g. teachers, police officers, fundraisers). When faced with new information, individuals call upon prior knowledge and understanding held within schemas to fill in the information and provide guidance for

problem-solving. The schemas give meaning to, and assist in processing, the new information.

Rest et al. created a new category of schemas called moral schemas to help explain how social experiences influenced moral development (Rest *et al.*, 1999a; Rest *et al.*, 1999b). The three created moral schemas are ordered developmentally and include the Personal Interests Schema, Maintaining Norms Schema, and Postconventional Thinking Schema (Rest *et al.*, 1999a).

Academics have noted three strengths of the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach. First, it improved upon Stage Theory by creating objective assessment measures, which provided vast examples of reliability and validity in its use in research (Narvaez, 2005). Second, it broadened research by proposing four psychological processes that comprise the moral domain and motivate moral behaviour (Narvaez, 2005). These four processes include moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral action. Moral sensitivity is defined as “noticing and interpreting events” (Narvaez, 2005, p.20). Moral motivation is “maintaining an ethical identity,” and moral action is “striving to follow through and implement an action” (Narvaez, 2005, p.20). Moral judgment is determining whether certain actions are right or wrong has already been defined (see page 63). The introduction of these additional processes involved in moral psychology is relevant for the current research as it expanded knowledge to understand complex relationships between moral constructs that influence moral action.

The third strength is that it provided an alternative theory that underpins moral development (Narvaez, 2005). Through the introduction of schemas, the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach expanded the frameworks used to explore moral psychology and

shifted research toward a social-cognitive view. This shift introduced the influence of social interactions on moral psychology and led to the examination of other moral constructs, such as moral personality, moral exemplars, and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Colby & Damon, 1992; Narvaez, 2005). This is relevant for the current research in that one of the main theories, Social Intuitionist Model, used to create this research's framework is based on social-cognitive theory and will be addressed in section 2.2.4. It is also relevant because one of the main constructs of interest, moral identity, is explained through schemas, which will be explained in detail in section 2.3.2.

However, Like Stage Theory and Domain Theory, the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach has also been critiqued. Some suggest that individual results of the DIT are connected to verbal ability since moral judgment progresses over time and can be viewed as merely the result of general cognitive development (Sanders, Lubinski & Benbow, 1995). Another critique of this approach is that it is biased to favour individuals with liberal political views because those who are liberal score as more morally mature than their conservative counterparts (Emler, Renwick & Malone, 1983). Rest et al. have countered this critique by stating that the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach does not join in a political debate or choose a moral philosophy (1999a). Finally, one last critique is that the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach purposely doesn't emphasise virtues or personality traits, which excludes consistent influences across situations (Narvaez, 2005). As the current research is grounded in virtue ethics, the lack of emphasis on virtues leaves a gap.

The strengths of the *neo*-Kohlbergian approach to explaining the relationship between moral development and moral behaviour, as well as introducing the role of schemas in moral psychology research influenced research into other moral constructs and theories

that are pertinent for the current research. It also embraced the socio-cognitive understanding of personality that traits fluctuate and shift in correspondence to context. The theory was important to cover for its role in the historical examination of moral psychology; however, its focus on moral development and lack of emphasis on the role of virtues conflict with the intention of the current work.

#### **2.3.4 Social Intuitionist Model**

The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM – Figure 2.3) was proposed to explain participant responses during a research project (Haidt, 2001). SIM incorporates cognitive and social literature whilst simultaneously questioning the rationalist approaches to moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). The central tenant of the Social Intuitionist Model is that “moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning” (Haidt, 2001, p.817). Haidt’s theory merged the rationalist approach of Kohlberg and the social interactionist perspective of Turiel. This model presented the first challenge to the role of moral reasoning in making moral judgments and proposed that actually, moral judgments are initially made using intuition.

Haidt defines intuition as a process “that occurs quickly, effortlessly and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness,” and defines moral intuition as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment...without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 2001, p.818). Haidt explains that after making an intuitive moral judgment, individuals engage in intentional, effortful and controllable conscious moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001). Like Kohlberg, Haidt’s

definition of reasoning involves making moral judgments; however, Haidt's definition expands the construct to explain the process.

SIM was developed because Haidt observed participants exhibiting strong moral judgments straight away when told different scenarios (Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2000). For example, one scenario is of a brother and sister travelling together on summer vacation from university, who, one night, decide it would be "interesting" and "fun" to make love. The couple used appropriate contraception and enjoyed the act, but decided not to make love again and kept it a secret. After sharing the story with research participants, an interviewer then asked, "What do you think about that?" "Was it OK for them to make love?" (Haidt, 2001, p.814).

Most people who heard the scenario immediately said it was wrong for the siblings to make love, but when asked why they felt this way, participants were unable to provide any rational explanation for their reaction. This phenomenon is now termed "moral dumbfounding" and serves as evidence for the automaticity of moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2000). Based on these observed reactions, Haidt created a sequential explanation of how people make moral judgments, called the Social Intuitionist Model (see Figure 2.3).

The model is composed of four main links that generally lead to moral judgments.


Then, two additional links explain how a person might change their mind after making the initial moral judgment. The four main links are:

1. *Intuitive judgment link* - effortless instinct and automatic processes explain how moral judgments initially occur. Individuals first have a rapid response

to a situation determining its moral value enabling them to make a moral judgment of right or wrong.

2. *Post hoc reasoning link* - individuals make an effort to find reasons, arguments and evidence to support the previously made moral judgment.
3. *Reasoned persuasion link* - individuals attempt to justify their pre-made moral judgments to others by verbally sharing their moral reasoning from link 2.
4. *Social persuasion link* - the contribution of the influence of moral judgments of friends, family and others in one's social network is introduced. This influence is attributed to the strong effect of group norms within communities.

Figure 2.3: “The social intuitionist model of moral judgment. The numbered links, drawn for Person A only, are (1) the intuitive judgment link, (2) the post hoc reasoning link, (3) the reasoned persuasion link, and (4) the social persuasion link. Two additional links are: (5) the reasoned judgment link and (6) the private reflection link.”



Source: (Haidt, 2001, p.815).

Although it rarely happens according to SIM, in order to include the possibility that that people can change their minds after making a moral judgment, two further links are included. The fifth link, *the reasoned judgment link*, allows for individuals to have the potential to override their instinctual judgments through logic. And lastly, in *the private reflection link*, it is possible that people could change their own judgment by thinking about a situation from a different perspective through role-taking and attempting to empathise with others (Selman, 1971).

The developers of SIM have highlighted two strengths of the theory, which are expanding the examination of morality beyond WEIRD populations and not limiting the theory to being grounded in any of the broader ethical theories (Haidt, 2013; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). The first strength of SIM is that it is not grounded in any particular ethical theory. As a result of wanting to expand moral psychology research beyond the influence of duty-based ethics, theory developers do not reference any of the three theories in their explanation of the model. This allows individuals to ascribe to whichever ethical theory they choose.

The other strength is the result of questioning whether or not studies of moral judgment were biased as a result of the influence of liberal-leaning researchers that mainly examined WEIRD populations (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) (Haidt, 2013). By introducing intuition into the study of moral psychology, SIM incorporates innate tendencies that can be applied to all cultures globally. Haidt defines innate as “structured in advance of experience” where “experience can suppress, alter or magnify the importance of it” (Haidt, 2013, p.290; Marcus, 2004). These innate tendencies can be applied to international cultures and include examples like group loyalty, purity, sanctity, sympathy, and communal sharing. Introducing these tendencies

as part of the explanation of moral intuitions expanded the definition of morality beyond the harm and fairness base that was created by the historical emphasis on duty-based ethics.

Like all theories, SIM is not without its critiques, two of which are relevant to the current research. The first critique is that the theory's definition of moral reasoning as a "conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about people in order to reach a moral judgment" is too broad (Haidt, 2001, p.818). Challengers claim this definition allows for any thought process that involves people and affects moral judgment to be called moral reasoning (Paxton & Greene, 2010). The broad definition then incorrectly classifies conversations and discussions about moral topics as moral reasoning (Paxton & Greene, 2010).

Contradicting a strength proposed by theory developers, another critique of SIM is that it doesn't consider the influence of ethical theories on moral judgments (Paxton & Greene, 2010). The argument is that when individuals make a deontological moral judgment based in universal law, they use intuition because these judgments are simply following universal rules. The moral rules of deontology allow for quick, automatic moral judgments (Paxton & Greene, 2010). However, when one makes a utilitarian judgment, cognitive reasoning must be used to determine which result will bring about the greatest good (Paxton & Greene, 2010). According to this challenge, the use of intuition or reasoning is solely the result of the type of judgment that needs to be made, not the inherent tendencies of an individual.

Despite the challenges of the theory, the strengths of the Social Intuitionist Model play a key role in underpinning the current research. Particularly, the incorporation of intuition

and the inclusion of innate tendencies are important because fundraisers encounter moral dilemma situations where they must give an almost immediate response. The need for the immediate response means the fundraiser does not have time to engage in reasoning and must follow their instincts. An example already shared is that of the Major Gift Fundraiser that faces the dilemma of whether or not to accept a gift of a major donor paying for lunch. According to SIM, the fundraiser would immediately make an intuitive judgment based on his/her innate tendencies.

Furthermore, as SIM is not grounded in one particular ethical theory, it can be incorporated into the current research. Virtue-based ethics is the primary theory used for the current research, and SIM demonstrates how habitual virtues influence intuitive moral judgments. Virtue ethics describes a morality where innate tendencies present as virtues like truthfulness, friendliness and generosity. Through practice, individuals will demonstrate habitual, virtuous behaviour, which will present in the intuition used to solve moral dilemmas. For example, if the Major Gift Fundraiser practices the virtue of being caring so that it has become a habit, then the fundraiser will likely intuitively choose to accept the offer of lunch. This choice demonstrates the fundraiser's feelings of caring about the relationship with the donor.

### *Section Summary*

Research in moral psychology began with understanding moral development. Three theories were introduced to explain how morality advanced within individuals from childhood through adolescence to adulthood (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Rest *et al.*, 1999a; Turiel, 1983). These three theories were Stage Theory, neo-Kohlbergian approach, and Domain Theory (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Rest *et al.*, 1999a; Turiel, 1983). Stage theory was the first theory to explain moral development (Kohlberg &

Kramer, 1969). It did so through the lens of cognitive-developmental theory and involved six stages that people progressed through. Stage Theory measures moral development by assessing how people explain the reasons they have for making a moral judgment. This theory was the springboard for moral psychology research.

To improve upon Stage Theory, theorists responded to critiques and created the neo-Kohlbergian approach (Rest *et al.*, 1999a). This approach explained moral development as a progression of moral development through the use of three different schemas and provided an objective assessment method with standardised scoring to measure moral development. Introducing the role of schemas into moral psychology research was a key strength of this approach, as schemas would form the explanation for other moral psychology constructs, such as moral identity.

Another theory that was introduced to explain moral development was Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983). This theory introduced the social aspect of development, emphasising the influence of interactions and relationships on how morality is established within children. The emphasis on social relationships was unique to this theory.

Broadening explanations of moral development, research progressed to explain how people made moral judgments. The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) was introduced for this very reason (Haidt, 2001). Based on research findings, the SIM proposed that moral judgments are initially the result of intuition, not moral reasoning. This was specifically contrary to Stage Theory. SIM incorporates the use of moral reasoning, but only as potentially occurring after making a moral judgment and then reflecting on the judgment. The key strength of SIM was the introduction of intuition as a way of making moral judgments.

A review of all of the theories from this section can be found in Table 2.5. Through the SIM's introduction of intuition, moral psychology research has continued to grow and study how this cognitive process influences moral judgment. Further explanation of this construct and the importance of intuition for the current research are included in the next section.

Table 2.5: Evaluation of moral psychology theories.

Theory	Ethical Theory	Moral Construct	Approach	Explanation	Relevance for current study	Evaluation in Fundraising Context
Stage Theory	Deontological	Moral Development Moral Judgment Moral Reasoning	Cognitive Developmental	Moral Development occurs in stages as a result of moral reasoning	Historical introduction of the study of moral psychology	Fundraisers expectation to follow ethics codes might register them as morally immature in Stage 1 or 2
Domain Theory	Though not explicitly linked to an ethical theory, the emphasis on universal and rigid rules aligns with Deontological	Moral Development Moral Judgment	Social-Interactionist	Moral Development occurs through social interactions with others	Demonstrates shift in moral psychology research through inclusion of social aspect of moral development	Fundraisers would register as morally mature the more they followed universal rules
Neo-Kohlbergian Approach	Deontological	Moral Development Moral Judgment	Cognitive Developmental	Moral Development is the result of moral reasoning that advances through the development of schemas	Demonstrates stronghold of Deontological ethics on defining and measuring morality	Fundraisers who make moral judgments based on shared community ideals would register as morally mature
Social Intuitionist Theory	Virtue Deontological, Consequentialist,	Moral Judgment, Moral Intuition, Moral Reasoning	Social Intuitionist	Moral judgment occurs via intuition, and is the result of interpersonal processes. Reasoning is only used after judgments are made to explain or influence the intuitions of other people.	Demonstrates shift in field through inclusion of intuition when examining moral judgments and expansion of moral psychology research to include other moral constructs	Fundraisers have an instinctual reaction to moral dilemmas and then use reasoning to justify it when necessary

Source: Author's own work

## **2.4 Moral Intuition, Moral Foundations Theory & Moral Emotions**

### *Introduction*

Theories describing moral development as a result of making moral judgments inspired further research in moral psychology. The introduction of intuition as the cognitive process used for making moral judgments shifted moral psychology away from moral reasoning and the cognitive-developmental way of thinking (Haidt, 2001). This shift caused a ripple effect and stimulated moral psychology research to further explore intuition in a deeper way.

Initially, research defined intuition and moral intuition as provided by the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) (Haidt, 2001). The SIM provided a theoretical base to examine how intuition effected moral judgments. Initial experiments demonstrated this effect, providing justification to further explore the contexts when intuition occurs. This exploration led to researchers to make a conscious effort to include many different cultures in identifying key categories of intuitions. Once the categories were identified, theorists labelled them moral foundations.

Moral foundations provide the base for a theory that was introduced to explain how moral intuition linked to particular moral judgments. This theory, called the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), has provided a platform for understanding the complexity of moral intuition (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). It specifically links moral foundations to environmental triggers, explaining why people make intuitive moral judgments in certain situations. In addition to the environmental triggers, MFT proposes that moral intuitions are the result of experiencing intense emotions. Particular emotions are associated with each of the five moral foundations. According to MFT, when people

experience these intense emotions, they intuitively respond to scenarios and make immediate moral judgments (Haidt & Joseph, 2008).

As previously stated, fundraisers encounter situations when it is necessary to make immediate moral decisions. Examples of such situations have been described earlier. According to MFT, when situations align with a moral foundation, fundraisers will experience associated moral emotions, which will influence their intuitive response. In order to better equip fundraisers for such situations, a complete understanding of how this occurs will be beneficial.

#### **2.4.1 Moral Intuition**

The Social Intuitionist Model introduced moral intuition as an explanation for immediate moral judgments (see Section 2.2.1 to review) (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2000). The central theory of the SIM is that moral judgment is initially caused by rapid moral intuitions and is followed by slow moral reasoning only when needed (Haidt, 2001).

Moral intuition is defined as “the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about a moral situation, without any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p.188). Moral intuition is viewed as automatic, quick, and accompanied by emotional reactions such as anger or disgust (Weaver, Reynolds & Brown, 2013). An example of when a fundraiser would need moral intuition has been described previously involving a Major Gift Fundraiser at a lunch meeting.

To again revisit, the example was that a Major Gift Fundraiser had developed a relationship with a major donor over the past four years. During a regular quarterly lunch meeting to review the charity's impact, this donor suddenly insists on paying for the fundraiser's meal. The donor states paying for lunch is a way to show her appreciation for the fundraiser's thorough reports of how her gifts make a measurable impact. The fundraiser's organisation has a gift-acceptance policy of up to £100 (which would easily pay for lunch) but strongly disapproves of any gift-acceptance. What should the Major Gift Fundraiser do?

The fundraiser must quickly choose between two right options: whether to accept or decline the offer to buy lunch. The fundraiser must judge what option is the 'most right'. According to SIM, the fundraiser will instantly make a judgment based on instinct, which is moral intuition.

Moral intuition is explained in research as functioning within individuals as an operation of schemas (Narvaez *et al.*, 2006; Weaver, Reynolds & Brown, 2013).

Schemas were previously defined in section 2.3.3, page 87 (Rest *et al.*, 1999a). Schemas are general knowledge structures that are used both to understand and to respond to situations (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Since schemas are easily accessible, they are used as shortcuts to make future encounters with similar situations easier to navigate (Smith & Conrey, 2010).

In this example, moral intuition would function through the fundraiser's person schema that includes moral traits, such as being loyal or compassionate. In the lunch scenario, if the fundraiser's loyal person schema is activated, they would make moral judgments

based on faithfulness and betrayal. The fundraiser would choose to refuse lunch payment out of loyalty to their organisation's expectations. As the fundraiser uses the loyal person schema more and more frequently, responses to situations processed through this schema would become more and more automatic or intuitive (Weaver, Reynolds & Brown, 2013).

Research exploring the relationship between moral intuition and moral judgment is in its infancy with limited published studies available for examination (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). Research into moral intuition initially began to examine a proposition that utilitarian moral judgments would positively correlate with cognition, and deontological moral judgments would positively correlate with intuition (Greene *et al.*, 2008). The theory emphasised that because deontological moral judgments were rule-based, individuals could quickly make these judgments based on the applicable rule. Studies to date have reported contradictory findings, with some results supporting this theory (Greene *et al.*, 2008), some challenging it (Tinghog *et al.*, 2016), and others being mixed (Suter & Hertwig, 2011).

In the limited studies available, researchers tend to manipulate cognitive load (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016) and time pressure (Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016), and then measure moral intuition based on the impact this effect has on participant response time (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Suter & Hertwig, 2011) and/or participant response type (deontological vs utilitarian judgments) (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). Table 2.6 below provides an analysis of the studies available, highlighting the different measures used to test moral intuition, participant samples,

ethical theories that influence the studies, conflicting findings, and critiques of each study.

Table 2.6: Comparison and Critique of Moral Intuition Studies

Study	MI measure	Participant Sample	Ethics Philosophy	Findings	Critique/Observations
Greene et al. 2008	Group 1 – Read dilemma and make a judgment Group 2 - Cognitive load with numbers scrolling, perform other task whilst reading dilemmas and making judgments	82 undergraduates at Princeton University	Utilitarian = should take longer to make judgments Deontological judgments = shorter  Cog load would decrease the number of utilitarian judgments	Utilitarian judgments = longer response time for cog load Deontology judgments = no response time difference for cog load or NO cog load	Response time difference is the result of difficulty of dilemmas (easy to difficult rating) OR people having difficulty making decisions (Baron <i>et al.</i> , 2012)  Results could be because cognitive load generally changes the type of decision that would be made (Tinghog <i>et al.</i> , 2016)  Unrealistic, “high-conflict” dilemmas were used – forcing participants to choose to kill another person to save several others  Did not measure moral intuition per se, equated response type with intuition/deliberation  Sample was not reflective of population for current study
Conway & Gawronski, 2013  Study 1	Response time  Empathic concern, REI – Faith in Intuition, and perspective-taking  Emotional vs cognitive processing	112 undergraduates, mean age 19.23 ½ Caucasian, 1/5 east Asian, rest = other non-white	Utilitarian – need for cognition, longer rt  Deontological – faith in intuition, empathic concern, perspective-taking, religiosity, internalised moral identity, shorter rt	Shorter rt for congruent dilemmas, longer rt for incongruent  Traditional analysis showed correlations: Deontology – empathic concern, perspective-taking, religiosity, (-) need for cognition. NOT faith in intuition.  Process Dissociation analysis correlations: Deontology – empathic concern, perspective-taking, not need for	Did not demonstrate expected result that faith in intuition would be correlated with deontological responses  Results do not strongly support using Process Dissociation Analysis instead of Traditional Analysis  Sample was not reflective of population for current study

				<p>cognition.</p> <p>Utilitarian – need for cognition, NOT empathic concern or perspective taking</p> <p>Faith in intuition = NEITHER</p>	
<p>Conway &amp; Gawronski, 2013</p> <p>Study 2</p>	Cognitive load	<p>57 undergraduate students, ave age 18.37, ½ Caucasian, ½ non-white</p>	<p>Utilitarian – less likely with cog load</p> <p>Deontological – more likely with cog load</p>	<p>Traditional – Cog load – preference for deontology over utilitarian judgments</p> <p>Process Dissociation analysis: utilitarian inclinations were significantly lower under cognitive load compared to control conditions, deontological inclinations were unaffected by cognitive load,</p>	<p>Sample was not reflective of population for current study</p>
<p>Conway &amp; Gawronski, 2013</p> <p>Study 3</p>	Emotional impact – enhanced empathic concern (thinking increase deontological inclinations)	<p>275 American participants from M Turk, 156 f, 118, m</p> <p>Ave age 34.08, 227 – Caucasian, rest non-white</p>	<p>Deontological – increased with photo of victim</p> <p>Utilitarian – no change with photo</p>	<p>Traditional analysis: Empathic concern – preference for deontological over utilitarian judgments</p> <p>Process dissociation analysis: Photo group – deontological inclinations higher</p> <p>Utilitarian inclinations – unaffected</p>	<p>Results do not strongly support using Process Dissociation Analysis instead of Traditional Analysis</p> <p>Sample was somewhat reflective of population for current study based on mean age and gender</p>
<p>Tinghog, 2016</p> <p>Experiment 1</p>	<p>Time pressure vs Time delay</p> <p>Time pressure had to respond within 7 seconds.</p> <p>Time delay had to</p>	<p>1,102 – Sweden n-199, Austria n-320, USA n-583, age range 18-81 yrs.</p> <p>Sweden and Austria – lab with</p>	<p>Utilitarian judgments – should decrease as a result of time pressure</p> <p>Deontological judgments should increase with time</p>	<p>Neither time pressure nor cog load led to more deontological moral judgments</p> <p>Time pressure group make utilitarian judgments ½ the time</p> <p>Males more likely to make</p>	<p>Results could demonstrate the value participants place on the greater good as being more instinctual than knowing rules, or that universal rules are not always memorised and quick to make</p> <p>Sample from USA was broad and reflective of population for current study</p>

	wait 20 seconds before responding	student samples (undergraduates) USA – web survey through Decision Research	pressure	utilitarian judgments than females	based on age range
Tinghog, 2016 Experiment 2	Cognitive load	311 students at Linköping University in Sweden	Utilitarian judgments – should decrease as a result of cog load  Deontological judgments should increase with cog load	Cog load did not lead to more deontological moral judgments  Males more likely to make utilitarian judgments than females	Same critique as Experiment 1  Sample was not reflective of population for current study
Suter & Hertwig, 2011 Experiment 1	Time pressure - respond within 8 seconds (showed countdown timer) or allowed 3 minutes to deliberate before answering	67 psychology students at University of Basel. Age range 17-46, mean 24.7	Dual-process yes = utilitarian, no= deontological  Time pressure should	Time pressure lead to more deontological moral judgments compared to no-time pressure group – but only for high-conflict dilemmas  The proportion of deontological responses did not differ for low-conflict or impersonal moral dilemmas	First demonstration of impact of time on moral judgment  Used 10 standardised dilemmas that are not reflective of real-life scenarios  Expected results only occurred in high-conflict dilemmas, which isn't reflective of real-life dilemmas  Dilemmas were in the 3 <sup>rd</sup> person, participants did not need to answer the dilemma as if they were the actor performing the action  Sample was not reflective of population for current study
Suter & Hertwig, 2011 Experiment 2	Told to answer as quickly as possible or to deliberate thoroughly	80 psychology students from University of Basel, 18-49 years, M=23.3	Self-paced-intuition condition (answer as quickly as possible) should respond quicker and with more deontological responses  Self-paced-	Self-paced intuition group responded 3 times more quickly than self-paced-deliberation group.  Faster responses were more likely to be deontological but only in high-conflict dilemmas	First demonstration of impact of time on moral judgment  Expected results only occurred in high-conflict dilemmas, which isn't reflective of real-life dilemmas  Sample was not reflective of population for current study

			deliberation should take longer and have more utilitarian responses	The proportion of deontological responses did not differ between groups for low-conflict or impersonal dilemmas	
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Source: Author's own work

In summary, there are very few studies at present that have begun to explore moral intuition. Of those that have been conducted, conflicting results make it difficult to understand a consistent, predictable relationship between moral intuition and moral judgment. Beyond this, there are gaps in recent research that might help explain the relationship more fully.

One of the gaps is that the studies exclude virtue ethics from the equation and merely examine deontological vs utilitarian moral judgments. If an individual is practising virtue, then these virtuous characteristics would be influencing their moral judgments, rather than the other ethical theories. Another gap is that the studies have not explored emotional responses, which are often associated with intuitive responses (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Including emotion in research could help understand how emotional impulses affect moral judgments.

The last gap is that the moral dilemmas that have been used are unrealistic but typical of research in moral psychology. One example of a dilemma is the footbridge dilemma, where a runaway trolley is heading down train tracks toward five men who will be killed if it hits them. The research participant is meant to imagine they are standing on a bridge witnessing this next to a large stranger. The participant must then decide whether to push the stranger onto the tracks and save the workmen or continue observing and watch the workmen die. This dilemma is very unrealistic and impractical.

Fundraisers find themselves in moral dilemmas where a decision must be made quickly, requiring the use of moral intuition, such as the Major Gift Fundraiser example at the beginning of this section. However, the two options for the fundraiser to choose are not deontological vs utilitarian in the sense that moral intuition research has presented

moral dilemmas to date. There is not a universal rule that can inform the fundraiser's judgment. Neither is there a clear consequence that would produce the most good for the most people. Instead, to make a moral judgment, the fundraiser must choose between caring for the major donor and remaining loyal to their organisation, which are both good virtues.

The contradictory results of the aforementioned studies suggest that there may be gaps in the understanding of moral intuition. These gaps exclude virtue ethics as a theory used to create moral judgment responses in questionnaires. This limits the understanding of how other constructs might influence intuitive responses.

#### **2.4.2 Moral Foundations Theory**

After the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) introduced the construct of moral intuition into moral psychology research, academics sought a way to further explain the concept and created the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Graham *et al.*, 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). The MFT advanced the SIM by defining and describing the categories of moral intuitions that are used to make intuitive moral judgments. The MFT provided a new approach to moral judgment that explained human morality more thoroughly, through the use of innate mental systems. Within MFT, innate is defined as "organized in advance of experience" (Haidt & Joseph, 2007, p.8; Marcus, 2004). The theory consists of four claims which explain morality: nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism, pluralism (Graham *et al.*, 2013).

The nativism claim of the theory is that morality is innate and organised in advance of experience (Graham *et al.*, 2013). Genes create the first draft of morality within people,

and experiences revise the draft throughout childhood and even into adulthood. The first draft prepares individuals to learn moral values, norms and behaviour through exposure. However, some moral values and norms are easier to learn than others. Theorists have found that children are easily taught to want revenge by exposing them to angry and vengeful role models who are treated unfairly (Graham *et al.*, 2013). Contrastingly, it is more difficult to teach children to love their enemies; even by repeatedly exposing them to stories of role models who turned the other cheek to those who do them harm. This claim demonstrates that the first draft may be more receptive to learning certain moral values, norms and behaviour.

The cultural learning claim is that the first draft of morality is edited during development (Graham *et al.*, 2013). Revision and emphasis of particular morals occur during different experiences so that children can successfully navigate moral scenarios in their culture. An example of cultural learning is demonstrated in the differences in respecting authority within Hindu households and American households (Graham *et al.*, 2013). The difference is that traditional Hindu culture teaches children to bow for revered elders and guests; however, this is not taught in America. The Hindu actions emphasise the innate moral of respecting authority within hierarchies. The lack of such actions in American households leaves the teaching of respect of authority to other experiences.

The intuitionism claim states that moral judgments are the result of initial intuition and are followed by strategic reasoning. This claim was discussed in detail in section 2.2.4 that described the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001).

The pluralism claim is that there are five moral foundations that prepare individuals for multiple social challenges. Each moral foundation aligns directly with adaptive challenges that human ancestors encountered. The ancestors that could intuitively solve the most challenges were favoured in terms of reproduction and survival, such that developing all of the moral foundations was a benefit.

The moral foundations were created through a wide review of moral values and social practices across diverse cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Once clustered together, theorists' determined there were five moral foundations that make up the first draft of morality (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). The five foundations are detailed in Table 2.7 and include harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity.

Table 2.7: Moral Foundations Theory: the five moral foundations

	<b>Harm/Care</b>	<b>Fairness/ Reciprocity</b>	<b>Ingroup/ Loyalty</b>	<b>Authority/ Respect</b>	<b>Purity/ Sanctity</b>
Adaptive Challenge	Protect and care for young, vulnerable or injured kin	Reap benefits of dyadic cooperation with non-kin	Reap benefits of group cooperation	Negotiate hierarchy, defer selectively	Avoid microbes and parasites
Proper domain (adaptive triggers)	Suffering, distress, or threat to one's kin	Cheating, cooperation, deception	Threat or challenge to group	Signs of dominance and submission	Waste products, diseased people
Actual domain (the set of all triggers)	Baby seals, cartoon characters	Marital fidelity, broken vending machines	Sports teams one roots for	Bosses, respected professionals	Taboo ideas, (communism, racism)
Characteristic emotions	Compassion	Anger, gratitude, guilt	Group pride, belongingness, rage at traitors	Respect, fear	Disgust
Relevant virtues	Caring, kindness, [cruelty]	Fairness, justice, honesty, trustworthiness [dishonesty]	Loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice [cowardice, treason]	Obedience, deference [disobedience, uppitiness]	Temperance, chastity, piety, cleanliness [lust, intemperance]
Example in Fundraising Domain*	Concern for a Major Donor who is upset	Charities claim their 'cost of fundraising' differently because there is no standard definition	Stay true to organisational mission and programmes when challenged	Reverence for a charity Trustee	Refusing donations from unethical people or businesses
Overall Application and Evaluation*	Applicable to multiple relationships that fundraisers hold as part of work Subjective	Embedded in Fundraising Code of Ethics in that all charities are expected to fairly follow the guidance Objective and Rule-Based	Applicable when fundraisers feel attached and belonging to their charity Subjective	Reflects the power dynamics of Trustees (mostly male) to fundraisers (mostly female) Objective, based on title	Very public-focused in that media publicise stories about charities accepting 'dirty money' Subjective

Source: (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). \*Row added by author.

The first row of Table 2 explains the adaptive challenge that had to be solved to increase the probability of survival. The second row lists the matters that the moral foundation was designed to detect. The third row represents the matters that typically trigger the moral foundation in today's world. The fourth row lists the emotions that are characteristically aligned with the moral foundation. The fifth row demonstrates how developing relevant moral virtues will assist in strengthening each moral foundation.

The sixth and seventh rows have been added to demonstrate how this theory can be applied to the current research.

To further understand how this theory applies to fundraising, the following paragraphs explain each of the five foundations and then apply them to fundraising. MFT doesn't specifically define the foundations but rather describes how they function through examples (Haidt & Joseph, 2007).

The harm/care moral foundation is described as an expansion of mammalian parents caring for their offspring. Initially, caring for offspring would increase their chances of survival and therefore benefit the survival of the species. MFT doesn't specifically define care as part of the theory, but later writings explain care as, "concerns about obligations to care for, protect and nurture those to whom they are connected, particularly those who are vulnerable," (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p.3). In today's world, the care moral foundation is triggered as a response to witnessing other people suffer or be in distress, especially those that are vulnerable.

In relation to fundraising, the harm/care foundation would apply to the relationships that fundraisers hold with other colleagues, Trustees, donors, or even beneficiaries. These close relationships lead to fundraisers caring for the wellbeing of these particular individuals. When facing moral dilemmas, caring for the Trustee or donor would influence the moral judgment of the fundraiser.

The fairness/reciprocity foundation represents the reactions people have to acts of cheating or cooperation by others (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Historically, individuals who

were highly sensitive to evidence of cheating and cooperation had an advantage over others who were not. This led to even exchanges between individuals.

In fundraising, this foundation would apply as fundraisers are expected to follow ethical codes, which are fairly and equally created. The rules in the codes fairly apply to all fundraisers across all scenarios. There are consequences if fundraisers choose to disobey the codes.

The ingroup/loyalty moral foundation is described as an expansion of the long history of primate species (including humans) living in kin-based groups (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Individuals that showed cohesion and allegiance to their group helped protect the group and were, therefore, more likely to survive. Today, the definition of an ingroup has expanded beyond kin to other groups with members demonstrating trust and cooperation (Haidt & Graham, 2007). This explanation applies to a much wider range of individuals in groups. In fact, Haidt and Joseph introduce this concept by stating that an ingroup's "actual domain now includes all the ethnic groups, team, and hobbyist gatherings that contribute to modern identities" (2004, p.63). The theory doesn't provide a specific definition of loyalty (Haidt & Joseph, 2007).

As it applies to fundraising, fundraisers belong to the group or community of the organisations they work for. This belongingness would initiate the desire to act in a way that demonstrates a fundraiser's allegiance to the organisation. When facing moral dilemmas involving the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation, demonstrating one's commitment to the organisation would influence the moral judgment of the fundraiser.

The authority/respect foundation is an expansion of primates' living in dominance hierarchies (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Today, those who can navigate hierarchies to build beneficial relationships upwards and downwards have an advantage over those who do not. Examples include interacting with law enforcement, line managers at work, or the courts.

Within fundraising, this foundation applies to the hierarchical construction of charities. Charities are often run by executive directors and are constructed of various teams. Larger charities have fundraising teams, which are led by a fundraising director and then layered with managers, officers, and administrators. Fundraisers would benefit from building relationships both with those higher and lower than them within organisational hierarchies.

The purity/sanctity foundation is an expansion of ancestors identifying risks from pathogens and parasites in the environment, and then making adaptations that increased their immunity (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). An example of this was shifting to a more omnivorous diet, which was carefully scavenged. Today, this foundation is applied to situations that involve sexual deviance or eating organic, free-range food.

Within fundraising, the purity/sanctity foundation is mainly related to ethical gift acceptance. For example, healthcare charities typically have an ethical policy that refuses donations from tobacco or alcohol companies.

As has been the case with previously reviewed theories, MFT has been criticised, in three areas: the nativism claim, the pluralism claim and regarding general criteria (Graham *et al.*, 2013). Those that criticise the nativism claim question its validity as

there has yet to be any physiological evidence that demonstrates which parts of the brain are involved in the innateness of morality (Narvaez, 2008). Without this, it's unclear how moral foundations function as the first draft of morality (Narvaez, 2008).

There are two criticisms against the pluralism claim: one from monists who simply reject pluralism generally (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012), and one from those who think there is a different set of foundations than the five that have been listed. The first monist critique states that actually, all of morality is a result of harmful agents and the suffering of others so that only the Care/harm foundation is required to explain morality (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012). The other critique agrees that plural foundations are possible; however, there may be alternative possibilities to the five moral foundations that comprise the MFT (Graham *et al.*, 2013).

The last area of critique is that there is no explicit list of criteria provided that underlies all of the moral foundations (Graham *et al.*, 2013). Critics claim that in having a list, researchers could decide what counts as a foundation. This list could then be used in research to progress moral psychology and further examine the theory.

MFT Theorists have responded to most of these critiques (Graham *et al.*, 2013). To counter the pluralism challenge, theorists explain that there are situations where reducing morality to harm/care would not fully explain how morality works (Graham *et al.*, 2013). One situation is why feelings of disgust during an incident harshens moral judgments (Schnall *et al.*, 2008). In response to the pluralism critique regarding the validity of the five foundations, theorists hosted the “moral foundation challenge” which offered a cash prize for anyone who could justify the addition of another moral foundation (Graham *et al.*, 2013). The challenge resulted in the proposal of a sixth

moral foundation, titled Liberty/oppression. Empirical testing has ensued to verify this addition. And finally, in response to the critique about the criteria, theorists listed the following five criteria that underlie all of the moral foundations (Graham *et al.*, 2013):

1. A common concern in third-party normative judgments
2. Automatic affective evaluations
3. Culturally widespread
4. Evidence of innate preparedness
5. Evolutionary model demonstrates adaptive advantage

For the current research, it is only necessary to mention the creation of this list of criteria rather than carry on with further explanation.

In contrast, the strengths of MFT warrant the use of this theory in the development of the current research project. Strengths of MFT include the explanation of the role of intuition in moral judgment, the explanation of the role of moral emotions, and the linkage of moral innateness to virtue ethics.

The intuitionism claim is a strength of the MFT because it clearly explains how intuitive moral judgments are made in alignment with the five foundations. This breakdown of intuition into five distinct categories allows researchers to systematically explore moral intuition. As was described in section 2.2.4, fundraisers are involved in scenarios that require quick, automatic moral judgments. Exploring how these scenarios align with the moral foundations will enhance understanding and support for fundraisers.

By introducing the role of emotions in moral judgment, MFT expanded the study of moral psychology beyond the traditional foundation of cognitive development theory

and rational explanations. The introduction of emotions has led to further research supporting the experience of emotions of disgust (Inbar *et al.*, 2011; Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 2008), and anger and contempt (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011) while making moral judgments. Further research to explore other related moral emotions is needed to help support MFT.

Lastly, a further strength of the MFT is how it links the intrinsic innateness of morality to the virtue ethics theory. According to MFT, virtue is defined as “characteristics of a person that are morally praiseworthy” (Haidt & Joseph, 2008, p.20). Virtues are traits when traits are defined as “dynamic patternings of perception, emotion, judgment, and action” (Dewey, 1922; Haidt & Joseph, 2008, p.20). MFT states that individuals that possess virtues are the result of their ability to refine their perception and response to morally-relevant information within a social context (Haidt & Joseph, 2008).

As virtue ethics states, virtues should be practised by individuals so they become habit. Once this happens, the virtuous characteristic functions within an individual’s life as a response to adaptive challenges. As it relates to fundraising and the moral foundations that are most applicable to the current project, the more an individual possesses the virtues of care, kindness, loyalty, and self-sacrifice, the better equipped that fundraiser will be to cope with the moral dilemmas that are associated with the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty moral foundations.

### **2.4.3 Moral Emotions & Positive Emotions**

The SIM states that moral intuitions include moral emotions and that these emotions cause moral judgments (Haidt, 2001). Additionally, MFT often uses the terms of moral

intuition and moral emotions in combination when explaining the theory. For example, “moral education is accomplished by shaping emotions and intuitions...” (Haidt & Joseph, 2008, p.368). Also, when comparing utilitarianism and deontological ethics to virtue ethics, MFT states, “both insist that moral decisions should be governed by reason and logic, not emotion and intuition” (Haidt & Joseph, 2008, p.370). By using the terms in combination, the theory emphasises the importance of emotions as part of moral intuition, so much so that specific emotions are linked to particular moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2008).

According to the theory, when individuals encounter a moral dilemma, they experience unique sets of automatic emotions (Haidt, 2001; Rozin *et al.*, 1999). These moral emotions are defined as “the emotions that respond to moral violations or that motivate moral behaviour” (Haidt, 2003, p.853). They are further defined as “those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent,” (Haidt, 2003, p.853). Experiencing the moral emotions influences an individual’s intuitive moral judgments according to the relevant moral foundation.

The table below demonstrates how MFT aligns emotions to moral foundations.

Table 2.8. Moral Foundations mapped to emotions and virtues.

	<b>Harm/Care</b>	<b>Fairness/ Reciprocity</b>	<b>Ingroup/ Loyalty</b>	<b>Authority/ Respect</b>	<b>Purity/ Sanctity</b>
Characteristic emotions	Compassion	Anger, gratitude, guilt	Group pride, belongingness, rage at traitors	Respect, fear	Disgust
Relevant virtues	Caring, kindness, [cruelty]	Fairness, justice, honesty, trustworthines s [dishonesty]	Loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice [cowardice, treason]	Obedience, deference [disobedie nce, uppitiness]	Temperance, chastity, piety, cleanliness [lust, intemperance]

Source: (Haidt & Joseph, 2008).

For example, MFT links the emotion of compassion to the harm/care moral foundation. This link is a result of an expansion of an evolutionary need to care for vulnerable offspring (proper domain) to now include the need to care for anyone suffering or experiencing harm, especially those that are vulnerable (actual domain) (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Relating to the proper domain, the more an individual felt compassion that motivated moral action to care for one's offspring, the more likely their offspring would survive. In the actual domain, individuals experience the moral emotion of compassion when they witness a scenario of anyone suffering, which motivates moral action that relieves the suffering or protects the individual.

Research to date providing empirical support for the role of moral emotions in moral intuition is limited and has mostly focused on the moral emotion of disgust (Graham *et al.*, 2013; Horberg *et al.*, 2009; Oveis, Horberg & Keltner, 2010; Rozin *et al.*, 1999). One study demonstrated participants from both the US and Japan accurately mapped moral emotions of contempt, anger and disgust to situations (Rozin *et al.*, 1999). Moral emotions were mapped through emotion words and facial expressions of emotions. Another study found that feelings of disgust aligned with the purity moral foundation more than other foundations, and predicted stronger moral judgments against violations of this moral foundation (Horberg *et al.*, 2009). These studies provide support for the association of disgust with the purity moral foundation and research would benefit from examining other correlations between emotions and moral foundations.

For example, to date, there is a lack of empirical evidence supporting the relationship between positive moral emotions and moral intuition. In order to understand how positive moral emotions influence intuitive judgments, the only two positive emotions

listed (pride and compassion) should be explored (Graham *et al.*, 2013). This investigation will also help understand how moral emotions function within moral foundations beyond purity/sanctity. The current research aims to verify that only moral emotions, not positive emotions generally, influence intuitive moral judgments; therefore, the influence of happiness and hope will also be explored. A review and research expectations related to each emotion is described below.

### *Pride*

MFT does not provide a clear definition of the moral emotion of pride (Graham *et al.*, 2013; Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). A review of published literature showed that the emotion of pride is often measured in two ways, as hubristic pride or authentic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Authentic (beta) pride is defined as state-based and is displayed by statements such as, 'I'm proud of what I did' (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Hubristic (alpha) pride is defined as trait-based and is displayed by statements such as, 'I'm proud of who I am' (Tracy & Robins, 2007). These definitions explain pride of individual actions or traits but do not demonstrate how one could feel group pride.

Other research has proposed another definition of pride that incorporates this group aspect (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006). Shiota, Keltner & John defined pride as "when one succeeds in a socially valued endeavor, enhancing social status within the group and rights to claim group resources" (2006, p.64). This definition is both state-based, demonstrating the quick temporal aspect of moral emotions as related to intuition, and is also group-focused, which links the emotion to the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation. As this definition demonstrates the state-based nature of the construct and the situational factors that affect the emotion, it is the most applicable definition to use as it relates to MFT.

Fundraisers are expected to experience pride as success in an endeavour that improves their status within their organisation. In response to feeling pride about the valued work they have done for their organisations, it is expected that this moral emotion will trigger fundraisers to make intuitive moral judgments in alignment with the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation.

Research examining the experience of pride has included gender differences (Brody & Hall, 2008; Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012; Tracy & Robins, 2007). Men are stereotyped as expressing and experiencing anger, contempt and pride more often than women (Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012). Research examining the experience of pride has demonstrated conflicting results. When studies examining gender differences within the experience of hubristic and authentic pride were conducted, findings revealed that in general, men scored higher than women on hubristic pride; however, there were no gender differences in authentic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Furthermore, results from a meta-analysis revealed negligible or no gender difference in the experience of pride (Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012).

Although there are gender stereotypes about the expression of emotions (Brody & Hall, 2008), MFT does not differentiate how gender might affect the experience of moral emotions, or how gender might modify the influence of moral emotions on moral intuition.

Based on research to date, the assumed gender stereotypes about the experience of pride cannot be unequivocally supported with empirical evidence. Additionally, pride has been measured as a general feeling, rather than a momentary experience aligning with

moral intuition (Tracy & Robins, 2007). The experience of pride as a precursor to an intuitive moral judgment might be different for women and men; however, research has yet to examine this. As such, the current research will examine if there are gender differences in experiencing the moral emotion of pride, and if experiencing pride influences relationships effecting moral intuition.

### *Compassion*

Again, MFT does not provide a definition of compassion in the literature (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). However, previous literature describing moral emotions explained how compassion motivates people to act such that it “makes people want to help, comfort or otherwise alleviate the suffering of the other” (Haidt, 2003, p.862). This explanation is based on the definition that compassion is ‘being moved by another's suffering and wanting to help’ (Lazarus, 1991, p.289). A similar definition of compassion used in empirical research is “feelings of concern for another’s wellbeing which stimulates nurturant behavior toward offspring and significant others in need, and is elicited by cues of vulnerability, helplessness, cuteness, and distress” (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006, p.64). These definitions all state the feeling of compassion stimulates action to relieve suffering or distress and explain how compassion is linked to the harm/care moral foundation.

Fundraisers are expected to experience compassion as concern for the wellbeing of those they are in relationships with, such as colleagues, major donors or Trustees. In response to feeling compassion towards others in their professional roles, it is expected that the stronger fundraisers feel compassion, the more likely this moral emotion will trigger an intuitive response aligning with the harm/care foundation.

Research exploring how feelings of compassion influence intuitive moral judgments aligning with the harm/care moral foundation has not been published to date. Empirical research exploring compassion has examined how it influences the intention to engage in prosocial behaviour (Septianto & Soegianto, 2017), and gender differences in the experience of the emotion (López *et al.*, 2018; Pommier, 2010; Sousa *et al.*, 2017; Strauss *et al.*, 2016).

Feelings of compassion have been positively correlated with the intent to engage in prosocial behaviour (Septianto & Soegianto, 2017). Those who expressed stronger feelings of compassion were more likely to engage in the acts of donating or volunteering. Although the study did not examine how compassion influences moral intuition, it does demonstrate that compassion is correlated to the intent to act morally.

Gender differences within feelings of compassion have been demonstrated time and time again (López *et al.*, 2018; Pommier, 2010; Sousa *et al.*, 2017; Strauss *et al.*, 2016). In a meta-analysis of the measurement and definition of compassion, all scales measuring compassion for others demonstrated results where women scored significantly higher than men (Strauss *et al.*, 2016). Specifically, the Compassion Scale has revealed significant gender differences, with women scoring significantly higher than men in a variety of samples of participants, including Portuguese adults and American undergraduate students (Pommier, 2010; Sousa *et al.*, 2017). Similar results were also reported using the Compassion subscale of the Dispositional Positive Emotions Scale (DPES-comp) with a community sample of adults in the Netherlands (López *et al.*, 2018).

The MFT does not propose gender differences in the experience of compassion and its influence on dilemmas involving the harm/care moral foundation. However, due to consistent findings that women are more likely to experience compassion than men, gender differences in the experience of compassion are expected to influence responses to moral dilemmas within the harm/care moral foundation.

#### *Other positive emotions*

To ensure thorough examination of emotions, the influence of other positive emotions on moral intuition should be included in research. It is suggested that the emotions of happiness and hope be included. These positive emotions were selected as they can be measured as state-based traits, which is necessary for examining intuition.

#### *Happiness*

The emotion of happiness was selected for the current research because it is a key aspect of virtue ethics. As the term is used in virtue ethics, feelings of happiness underscore realising one's purpose in life and the fulfilment one gets from living (Carr, 2003). In order to ensure the measurement of happiness for the current research aligned both with virtue ethics theory and MFT, the term was defined as a "high-arousal emotion felt when the environment signals an imminent improvement in resources, and one must expend energy to acquire that reward" (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006).

In this research, it is expected that if fundraisers might feel happiness that improved resources are forthcoming. Using the dilemma where a Major Donor has offered to buy lunch, the fundraiser has two options: abiding by organisational expectations about gift acceptance but hurting the donor's feelings, or accepting the lunch payment to make the donor happy (which could result in further large donations based on a positive relationship with staff) but being disobedient to the organisation's expectations. The

choice to accept the lunch payment aligns with both the feelings of compassion and happiness. However, MFT does not align happiness with any of the moral foundations. Given this, experiencing happiness should not influence moral intuition.

### *Hope*

The emotion of hope was selected because it can be measured as a state-based trait and can be experienced across a wide range of situations (Cavanaugh, Bettman & Luce, 2015; Snyder *et al.*, 1996). The definition of hope used for the current study is “a cognitive set that is based on a reciprocally-derived sense of successful agency and pathways” (Snyder *et al.*, 1991, p.571). This definition of hope is based on an individual’s perception that the goals she has set can be achieved through determination, the ability to plan routes, and performing actions.

In this research, it is expected that fundraisers will experience feelings of hope as an intuitive reaction if one of the dilemma options aligns with a goal. Using the previous example again, if the fundraiser has a goal that includes stewarding a larger donation to the organisation (such as £100,000) and this donor has the means to provide such a gift, then the option to accept the offer for lunch may be a part of the pathway to achieving this goal. Recognising this choice as a pathway to achieving the fundraiser’s financial goal could immediately result in feelings of hope.

Extensive searches of the literature have resulted in no findings of empirical work that links experiencing the emotion of hope to intuitive moral judgments. In line with MFT, feelings of hope are not expected to influence intuitive moral judgments.

### *Section summary*

The introduction of intuition within the examination of moral psychology led to the development of the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) and inspired research into moral intuition and moral emotions. Through creating the five moral foundations, theorists have provided clearer explanations of the role of moral intuition in making moral judgments (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Additionally, MFT theorists have aligned particular moral emotions with each of the five moral foundations. In order to provide empirical support for the role of moral emotion in intuitive moral judgments, studies have commenced primarily examining the emotion of disgust (Graham *et al.*, 2013; Horberg *et al.*, 2009; Oveis, Horberg & Keltner, 2010; Rozin *et al.*, 1999). These studies have supported the claims of MFT for this particular emotion; however, more research is still needed to support the linkage of the other moral emotions with their associated moral foundation.

In addition to the current lack of empirical support for the MFT, the theory's emphasis is still on moral judgment alone. Proposals have been made that encourage moral psychology research to expand beyond judgment and begin understanding what motivates people to perform moral actions (Blasi, 1980). In reality, making a moral judgment doesn't really matter if in the end, people don't act morally. Specifically, the question remains that if an individual uses intuition to make an automatic moral judgment, will that individual act in alignment with their judgment? The following section introduces additional theories and empirical evidence that could help formulate the answer.

## **2.5 Self Model, Identity Theory & Moral Identity**

As described section 2.2, work in the field of moral development revealed the complexities of moral psychology. Though the theories in that section were established to explain moral development (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1998) and the process of making moral judgments (Haidt, 2001), the problem still remained to understand if these constructs influenced individual moral action (Blasi, 1980). After all, researchers proposed that the true evidence of an individual's morality was evidenced in their actions (Blasi, 1980). This definition of moral action includes behaviour, "feelings, questions, doubts, judgments and decisions" (Blasi, 1980).

To examine this relationship, a critical review of moral psychology research up until the late 1970s provided an overview and summary of empirical knowledge to date (Blasi, 1980). The review used the terms moral reasoning and moral judgment interchangeably. The review provided two contributions. The first contribution was to reveal that two contrasting assumptions were being used to study moral action: it was the immediate result of action tendencies and/or habits via the social science perspective (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Turiel, 1983), or it was the product of cognitive processes via the cognitive-developmental perspective (Jennings, Mitchell & Hannah, 2015; Piaget, 1977; Rest *et al.*, 1999a). The second contribution was that it revealed that regardless of the perspective used, there were inconsistencies in how findings supported whether or not moral action was determined by moral reasoning (Blasi, 1980).

The review stated contrasting assumptions were used to define the term 'moral action,' which created a divide in the literature. One assumption was based in social scientific theory and suggested that habits incorporating attitudes, traits and genetics, and action tendencies determined individual moral actions (Blasi, 1980). These moral actions would be automatic and influenced by cultural norms (Blasi, 1980). The other

assumption was based in cognitive-developmental theory and proposed that moral cognition, such as observation, memory, retrieval, labelling and the creation of meaning, played a central role in moral action (Blasi, 1980).

According to this perspective, action is entirely determined as a reaction to a situation based on moral rules and principles. Given the influence of Kohlberg's research of moral development, the cognitive-developmental theory was most commonly used to underpin studies of moral action (Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kurtines & Greif, 1974; Turiel, Edwards & Kohlberg, 1978).

However, the emphasis on the cognitive-developmental approach resulted in a bias in the literature towards a particular perspective, which limited research up (Blasi, 1980).

The second contribution the review gave was that it revealed that regardless of the assumptions used, there were inconsistencies in how findings supported whether or not moral action, such as honesty, delinquency and altruistic behaviour, was related to moral reasoning (Blasi, 1980). For example, there were 17 studies developed to understand the relationship between moral reasoning and moral action. Each study used different behaviours to measure moral action, and each study used different units of analysis to measure the relationship between moral reasoning and moral action. As such, the hypothesis that there was a relationship between moral reasoning and moral action was supported in seven studies, rejected in seven studies, and three gave mixed results (Blasi, 1980).

In an attempt to reconcile such inconsistencies, Blasi suggested: "the relations between thinking and action in the moral sphere are less direct and more complex than psychologists expect" (Blasi, 1980, p.9). The conclusion was drawn that, overall,

research supported the hypothesis that moral reasoning and moral action are statistically related; however, inconsistent definitions, influences and findings interfered with explaining the relationship succinctly. The inability to explain the relationship between moral judgment and moral behaviour is now commonly known as the “judgment-action gap” (Walker, 2004a).

Two ideas have been used to bridge the judgment-action gap in morality: self model theory and moral identity construct. Each idea will be described in detail in the following sections.

### **2.5.1 The Self Model**

To explain the “judgment-action gap,” Augusto Blasi introduced the Self Model (1983). The Self Model made seven propositions that explained consistency between moral judgment and moral action (Blasi, 1983). The Self Model is cognitive-developmental and centred on the self. The self is defined as more than a collection of traits, attitudes and percepts, but also the way these characteristics are ordered and organised as an essential part of one’s functioning (Blasi, 1983). The self is unique to each individual and can grow developmentally over time. To indicate the individual differences of how relevant the self is to morality, Blasi coined the term ‘moral identity’ (Blasi, 1981; Blasi, 1980). Although other definitions of self have been proposed (Callero, 1985; Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1968), this definition was the one used as the base for the Self Model and will be used for the current research.

A description of each of the propositions and how they apply to fundraising is outlined in the table below.

Table 2.9. Self Model propositions and application to fundraising.

Proposition	Description	Application to Fundraising *
1	Moral actions fulfil certain criteria and are responses to situations	Refusing to accept a donation that causes a conflict of interest, such as a donation from a tobacco company to the British Heart Association, is a moral action because it is a good action; whereas accepting a donation is a morally neutral action
2	One's moral judgment results in a moral choice which dictates one's moral actions	The fundraiser choosing to refuse an unethical donation is a moral action
3	Before becoming moral action, moral judgment choices are further examined to see if one is responsible for performing the action	The fundraiser makes a judgment that accepting the tobacco company's donation is unethical. The fundraiser, before taking moral action (refusing the donation), must determine if he/she is responsible for the action.
4	Determining responsibility is personal and customised for each individual based on their self-definition	The fundraiser will have his/her own self-definition which will determine whether or not he/she feels responsible to make the action
5	Maintaining self-consistency is what supports an individual moving from a moral judgment of responsibility to moral action	If the fundraiser judges that refusing the donation is a moral action and feels responsible to do the action based on his/her self, he/she must perform the moral act to support consistency within the self
6	Individuals with coping strategies for conflicting needs have higher consistency between moral judgment and moral action	The fundraiser will demonstrate increased consistency between moral judgment and moral action if the fundraiser has ways to cope with conflicting needs. For example, the fundraiser probably has a monetary target to meet to support the charity's services. If the fundraiser can resist the temptation to take unethical donations, then he/she is more likely to refuse the gift (take moral action).
7	If one performs an action inconsistent with a judgment of responsibility, they will feel guilt	If the fundraiser cannot resist temptation and accepts the donation from the tobacco company, he/she will feel guilty for doing so because he/she was responsible for performing the moral action. The feelings of guilt reconnect the unity of the self.

Source (Blasi, 1983) \*column added by researcher

Strengths of the Self Model are that it made an initial attempt to explain additional factors that must be present in order to link moral judgment to moral action. The Self Model filled a hole in moral psychology research, progressing research beyond moral development and moral judgment. The Self Model also introduced concepts of responsibility, integrity and personal consistency into the discussion of moral action (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Lastly, the Self Model is based on agentic views, such that individual differences in moral judgments are the root of moral action, rather than differences in knowledge of moral rules (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Through its explanation of the self and moral identity, the Self Model has been a useful contribution to moral psychology.

The Self Model is not without its critiques. One critique is that the Self Model cannot be applied to automatic moral actions. Another is that the model doesn't include developmental processes and antecedents, so it is unclear how self, identity and morality are eventually integrated (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Additionally, there is not much empirical evidence supporting the Self Model in practice. In modern-day literature searches within highly regarded databases such as WebEx, PsycArticles and PsycINFO, Blasi's 1983 article was referenced in hundreds of publications; however, none of the research tested the soundness of this model.

For decades, academics have used the Self Model within the literature review to demonstrate how it has furthered moral psychology research in relation to other constructs (Broderick, 2010; Damon & Hart, 1992; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Jennings, Mitchell & Hannah, 2015; Matsuba & Walker, 2005). By challenging moral psychology research to move beyond development and judgment, the Self Model stimulated academics to examine the influences of moral behaviour. However, there is a lack of

evidence verifying the theoretical implications of how the Self Model explains moral behaviour. As such, this theory wasn't used to create the framework for the current study but was introduced to provide context and understand the historical importance of the Self Model.

### **2.5.2 Identity Theory**

The constructs of self and identity have been intertwined for decades. The two terms can be furthest traced back to the work of Mead (1934). Mead created an initial framework used to analyse sociological and social psychological issues. According to Mead, phenomena could be explained by using the formula "society shapes self shapes social behavior" (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p.285). Researchers took this formula and defined the self as being constructed by discrete identities (Stryker, 1968). Given the importance of identities within the self, academics have suggested various definitions of the construct over time (Burke & Stets, 2009; Fearon, 1999; Stone, 1962; Stryker, 1968).

The most recent definition of identity is that it relates to three areas: roles individuals play in society (fundraiser, teacher, student, etc.); person characteristics one assigns to themselves (caring, moral, etc.); or social group membership (political party member, sorority/fraternity member, etc.) (Burke & Stets, 2009). This definition includes the importance of roles and social groups while also allowing for characteristics and traits. This broad view of identity is the best definition for the current research as participants will be identifying as fundraisers (role in society), and as having particular characteristics that align with morality, such as being compassionate, truthful, etc. It is also the definition used in Identity Theory at present (Burke & Stets, 2009).

### *How identity influences behaviour*

Identity Theory explains how identity motivates behaviour through two main ways: identity salience hierarchy and identity verification (Carter, 2013). Identity salience is defined as the “probability that an identity will be invoked in response to different situations or across persons in a shared situation” (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p.286). Identity verification is when an individual seeks situations where they can actively demonstrate what one believes to be one’s identity (Carter, 2013). Both identity salience and identity verification will be further described in the following paragraphs.

Identity salience hierarchy explains behaviour as aligning within a hierarchy of identities. So the higher an identity sits within the self, the more likely one’s behavioural choices will align with that identity (Stryker & Burke, 2000). One factor influencing identity salience is how committed an individual is to the role relationships they have. The more committed an individual is to role relationships that require an identity results in that identity’s increased salience. Using this premise, the identity at the top of the hierarchy will be the identity that most frequently influences the behaviours of individuals.

Examples of this influence can be found in studies of religious identity and donor identity. The more committed participants were to religious-based role relationships, the more salient their religious identity was, and the more time they spent in religious activities (Stryker & Serpe, 1982). Another study examining blood donor identity found that the salience of donor identity predicted the frequency of blood donations, such that those who held the donor identity higher in their identity hierarchy than those who did not were more likely to donate blood (Callero, 1985).

The second way Identity Theory explains identity motivating behaviour is based on identity verification. Individuals seek and create situations which confirm their self-proclaimed identities through developing opportunity structures (Carter, 2013). There are three ways that people create their own opportunity structures.

The first way is through displaying signs and symbols that represent who a person is. The signs and symbols include language, clothing, hairstyle, and possessions such as a car or house. The second way is through selective affiliation. This is when an individual chooses people to interact with because they treat them in a way that is consistent with one of their identities. For example, someone who holds a doctor identity might choose to spend time with other medical professionals as their interactions and conversations confirm the doctor role identity. The third way people create an opportunity structure is through interpersonal prompts. This is when people behave such that others treat them in alignment with an identity. For example, a person who identifies as dominant might be keen to make decisions and be direct in interactions with others. The result of the three ways that people create opportunity structures is that they verify a particular identity within the individual and the social structure.

Identity verification has been supported in the literature examining gender, spousal roles, leadership, sociability and friendliness (Stets & Burke, 2014; Stets & Burke, 1996). In one study, when spousal identities weren't verified in marital interactions, participants level of efficacy decreased and control over the spouse increased to recover the verification that was missing (Stets & Burke, 2005). Another study examining leadership identities found that participants adjusted their leadership behaviour in small task-oriented groups to verify what would be expected of their leadership level, such

that if someone identified as a strong leader but behaved in a way that did not match that identity, they would change how they acted during the next task to match a strong leader (Burke, 2006). Lastly, another study demonstrated that person identities of sociability and friendliness as well as the role identity of spouse were verified by personal, interpersonal and structural resources (Stets & Cast, 2007). Personal resources are beliefs about one's self, including worth and efficacy. Interpersonal resources are those in relationships such as trust and role-taking. Structural resources include income, education and occupation.

There are several strengths of Identity Theory. Firstly, even from its early days, it helped explain how identities operate and produce behaviours (Stets & Burke, 2014). Over time, the theory has expanded and extended to include other concepts that help further understand the relationship between identity and behaviour. One such example was the addition of identity verification through the incorporation of the perceptual control system. This addition explained that feedback from others and the self provided meanings to behaviours (Stets & Burke, 2014). Another big extension has been the inclusion of resources, as explained in the previous paragraph (Stets & Burke, 2014). Through including resources in the theory, researchers have been able to show how acquiring and losing resources affects identities, which also affects the verifying behaviours.

Critiques of Identity Theory are that it lacks an explanation for how resources influence the identity process, that it only examines positive or common identities, and that linkages to other theories are not fully understood – especially the overlap between identity theory and social identity theory (Stets & Burke, 2014). Critics propose future research should aim to better understand the role of actual resources (existing) and

potential (existing but unused) resources in the identity process (Stets & Burke, 2014). Additionally, research would benefit from understanding the outcomes of verifying negative or stigmatised identities, and how this verification might fluctuate based on whether or not the individual holds the stigmatised identity as positive or negative (Stets & Burke, 2014). Lastly, understanding how identity theory is linked to other theories such as social identity theory, affect control theory, expectation states theory, network exchange theory, justice theory, social comparison theory and social movements theory has been suggested (Stets & Burke, 2014).

In summary, Identity Theory provides a robust and empirically supported theory that explains why human behaviour occurs. Academics in the field have extended the theory based on previously identified gaps, and are looking to address the critiques listed to provide further areas of growth. The definition of identity in the theory incorporates all aspects of the constructs of interest for the current research. The role identity for the current research is that of a fundraiser, and the person identity for the current research is that of morals. The theory itself doesn't explicitly link to any ethical theories; however, the virtues that an individual strives to display in his/her behaviour would align with person characteristics identity in the theory, such that demonstrating moral virtues would be labelled a moral person identity, or even more specifically as a caring person identity. This aligns with Virtue Ethics in that the practice of virtues that are held in schemas would make them more salient. It also aligns because if an individual identifies as a moral person or virtuous person, that individual will seek situations and behave in ways that verify such identities. For these reasons, identity theory has been incorporated into the framework for the current research.

The following table provides an overview and analysis of Self Model and Identity Theory.

Table 2.10: Analysis of the Self Model and Identity Theory

<b>Theory</b>	<b>Approach</b>	<b>Explanation</b>	<b>Analysis</b>
Self Model	Cognitive Developmental	Moral behaviour is the result of three things: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Self</li> <li>2. Personal responsibility</li> <li>3. Integrity</li> </ol>	Application of theory not supported in the literature  Was introduced in the early 1980s and has made little progress in identifying critiques or strengths.
Identity Theory	Social Cognitive	Moral behaviour is the result of interactions between identities (private) and social roles (public).	Strong support exists for theory in a range of areas, from gender, to education, to moral psychology  Incorporates roles and person characteristics as identities  Has expanded to fill gaps and has identified areas for future growth

Source: Author's own work

### 2.5.3 Moral Identity

Stemming from identity theory research, moral identity is one particular identity that has demonstrated influence on moral action (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1983).

Historically, two separate approaches have been used to define and study moral identity.

The first was the character or trait approach, which has stemmed from Blasi's work with the Self Model, and the second was the social cognitive approach (Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). In research today, the construct of moral identity is measured as a combination of these two approaches.

The combined approach unites the importance of the self's characteristics and activated schemas and defines moral identity as "a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits" (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p.1424). It is further grounded in recent social-cognition-oriented definitions of the self (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This approach is strongly supported in the academic literature as most appropriate for understanding the complexity of moral identity and has been used in approximately 70 per cent of moral identity literature (Aquino *et al.*, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bandura, 1986; Bandura, 1991; Jennings, Mitchell & Hannah, 2015; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009; Reed, 2002).

This approach states that people can internally use moral identity as part of one's self-definition, and socially identify to others as having a moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The definition draws on the personological approach in its emphasis on the importance of specific moral traits as they relate to an individual's self definition. It also draws from the social cognitive approach by presuming that a person's moral identity is socially influenced through membership groups (e.g. professional associations), unknown individuals (e.g. Mahatma Gandhi) or any other social construction (e.g. expats living abroad, mothers, etc.) (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

This definition of moral identity was most appropriate for the present research for the following reasons. Firstly, by incorporating both the personological and social-cognitive approaches, this definition of moral identity thoroughly explains the construct as a part of the self and as influenced by the social environment. Secondly, research that has used this definition has repeatedly demonstrated the relationship between moral identity and moral action (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Winterich, Mittal & Aquino, 2013).

### *The two aspects of Moral Identity: Internalisation and Symbolisation*

In order to measure both the social cognitive and character side of moral identity, academics have segmented the construct into a private and public aspect (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The private aspect, moral identity internalisation, is consistent with Erickson's definition of identity as internally defined (Erickson, 1964), and the public aspect, moral identity symbolisation, is consistent with social psychology's proposition that individuals possess a public and private self (James, 1950). In combination, moral identity internalisation and symbolisation represent both an individual's desire to be a moral person and external evidence that one is a moral person.

Moral identity internalisation is the importance within one's self to have the characteristics of a moral person (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The more one wishes to be a moral person, the higher they would score on moral identity internalisation measures.

Moral identity symbolisation is one's desire and commitment to demonstrate moral traits through moral action (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This could be done through volunteering or being a member of an organisation revered as having high moral standards (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Evidence supporting the influence of moral identity and moral action has been demonstrated in multiple studies (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Winterich, Mittal & Aquino, 2013). In one study, moral identity internalisation and symbolisation predicted participants' self-reporting of doing good deeds to benefit human welfare, such as volunteering at a homeless shelter, helping feed the hungry, and visiting patients at a nursing home (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Another study reported participants with high internalised moral identity scores were more likely to give canned

goods to help the local food bank than those who did not (Aquino & Reed, 2002). One further study examining the relationship between moral identity, charitable giving, and cheating, revealed that moral identity symbolisation positively influenced charitable giving and moral identity internalisation was negatively related to cheating behaviour (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). And lastly, when moral identity was activated, participants were more likely to tell the truth than those whose moral identity was not activated (Carter, 2013).

The aforementioned studies were performed with undergraduate university students or adolescents, which limited the applicability of findings to other populations such as fundraisers. However, further support for the relationship has been established in studies examining a broader adult population. One study of professional managers from a variety of organisations discovered that high moral identity internalisation and symbolisation significantly influenced moral action (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Another study examining adult participants provided evidence of a relationship between moral identity and prosocial behaviour (i.e. donating money and donating time) (Winterich, Mittal & Aquino, 2013). The above studies repeatedly demonstrate the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour.

#### *Implicit measurement and intuition*

To date, a positive relationship between moral identity and moral action has been mainly measured explicitly. Moral identity is measured through the Self Importance of Moral Identity Questionnaire (SMI-Q) and moral action is measured through self-reporting of moral behaviours, such as volunteering or donating to charity or responses to moral dilemmas (Aquino *et al.*, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic,

2007; Winterich, Mittal & Aquino, 2013). Explicit cognitive processes are the result of reflection, deliberation and conscious thought (Carlston, 2010). In a meta-analysis of such studies, results revealed a small effect size when examining whether explicit moral identity predicted moral behaviour (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016).

Though explicit moral identity has been shown to influence moral behaviour, the current research isn't interested in scenarios where individuals are able to participate in reflection, deliberation or conscious thought. This research is interested in measuring constructs as they occur in scenarios that require the use of moral intuition. To appropriately measure moral identity as it functions within the subconscious, implicit measures should be used. These measures examine implicit cognitive processes, which function in the subconscious and are expressed through reactions, instincts and immediate responses (Carlston, 2010). They influence spontaneous and reflexive behaviours, such as on-the-spot decisions, impulsive urges and physiological reactions, so can be predicted through indirect measures (Perugini & Leone, 2009).

Implicit measures assess a construct of interest through automatic activations (Goodall, 2011). Through activating the construct inadvertently, research examines whether or not the construct influences spontaneous decision-making, functioning below an individual's consciousness (Goodall, 2011). Measuring moral identity, a meta-analysis of studies reported that most of the studies used priming techniques to elicit implicit moral identity (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Although manipulation checks verified the effectiveness of the primes, implicit moral identity actually had a weak effect on moral behaviour.

Another tool used to assess moral identity implicitly was the Implicit Association Test, (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998; Perugini & Leone, 2009). The measure asks participants to associate the words “me” and “others” with moral words (e.g. caring) and immoral words (e.g. deceptive) as fast as they can through selecting particular keys on a computer keyboard. Using reaction times, the measure assesses the strength of the participants’ association between their self-identity and moral traits. The faster an individual associates “me” with moral traits, the higher the individual’s implicit moral identity.

The meta-analysis only reported overall results of all implicit moral identity measures and did not separate results from priming techniques vs results from using the IAT. However, results from one study that used the IAT measure reported that implicit moral identity predicted observable moral behaviour (e.g. honesty when faced with moral temptation) (Perugini & Leone, 2009). Though limited to a single story, the results demonstrate a relationship between implicit moral identity and automatic moral behaviours that must be performed spontaneously (Johnston, Sherman & Grusec, 2013; Perugini & Leone, 2009).

The current research is interested in understanding the relationship between moral identity and moral decisions that are instinctual responses to a situation. As has been demonstrated in the Major Gift Fundraiser example, the fundraiser must respond to the situation of receiving the gift of lunch in a public setting, in front of the major donor, and rather quickly. This scenario does not leave the fundraiser with time for extensive deliberation and reasoning. Instead, the fundraiser must depend on instincts. In order to most accurately measure moral identity as functioning within instinctual processes, implicit cognitive process of moral identity were measured for the current study.

### *Section Summary*

Moral psychology research has expanded beyond understanding moral judgment and has begun to examine what influences moral action. Two explanations have been proposed that explain influences of moral action: Self Model and Identity Theory.

The Self Model was the first theory to introduce the construct of moral identity into the realm of moral psychology research (Blasi, 1983), but little has been done to provide support for this theory in practical settings. Identity Theory explains moral action as the result of identity salience and identity verification (Stryker & Burke, 2000). Literature supports the influence of identity theory on behaviour in several areas (Stets & Burke, 2014). Research evaluating this theory has supported the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Winterich, Mittal & Aquino, 2013).

If moral identity is the identity that influences moral action, and moral action is needed to make the world a better place, than the more salient moral identity can become in people, the more this identity will be activated in response to social situations. This increased salience would then result in an individual having automatic responses, such that moral identity establishes a role within moral intuition.

If this is the case, then the more fundraisers can verify or activate their moral identities, the better equipped they'll be at making instinctual moral judgments and using moral intuition in their roles. For example, if the Major Gift Fundraiser has a highly salient moral identity, then this identity will be more likely to be activated in response to the situation where they must make a judgment about whether or not it is OK for the major

donor to pay for lunch. Both responses are right in that one expresses compassion for the donor, and one expresses loyalty to the organisation.

According to the theory, an activated moral identity will help the fundraiser make the moral judgment and then take moral action to either accept or refuse the offer. The relationship between moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition is currently unknown. However, through integrating SIM, MFT, and Identity Theory, these constructs may all play a role in influencing moral action.

## **2.6 Summary & Proposed Model for Moral Intuition**

Historically, philosophers have proposed ethical theories that explain moral judgments and behaviour in different ways. The three theories of interest for the current study are virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics. Each theory emphasises different reasons that influence ethical judgments and actions. Although virtue ethics is referenced as underlying the Moral Foundations Theory, research of moral intuition only uses the ethical theories of deontology and utilitarianism to test the construct (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). This work has focused on the use of cognition or intuition in making moral choices.

Moral psychology research began with the purpose to understand moral development through cognitive-developmental theories (Jennings, Mitchell & Hannah, 2015). It then progressed to incorporate social influences on moral development and understand other constructs such as moral judgment, moral intuition, moral emotions and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Graham *et al.*, 2013; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Turiel,

1983). The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) first introduced the use of intuition in moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). SIM challenged the commonly used rational explanation of moral judgment and proposed that judgments were made initially by moral intuitions and that reasoning only followed when needed (Haidt, 2001).

Research supported this theory (Haidt, 2001), opening moral psychology to further understand moral intuition, which was defined as the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about a moral situation, without any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008).

Additional research has supported SIM as studies have shown the intuitive system is always at work, and the reasoning system becomes active only when an individual has the time, resources and desire to “consider carefully” (Oyserman, Elmore & Smith, 2012).


Further understanding of how moral intuition functions within individuals can be explained by two separate theories: Moral Foundations Theory and Identity Theory.

### **2.6.1 Conceptual Framework**

This section presents this study’s conceptual framework derived from a review of the literature presented in Chapter 2. The section begins with a figure that outlines the conceptual framework, which includes the independent, mediating, moderating and dependent variables and their relationships. This diagram is followed by the rationale that explains the theoretical justifications and assumptions used to propose the

relationships between variables. The section ends with the hypotheses used for the current work.

Figure 2.4: Conceptual Framework of the study



The conceptual framework integrates theories from moral psychology, specifically MFT and Identity Theory. The independent variable (X) in the framework is moral identity measured implicitly and the dependent variable (Y) is moral intuition. Mediators (M1-M4) are moral emotions (M1-M2) and other emotions (M3-M4) identified through the literature review and include compassion, pride, happiness and hope. Figure 2.5 suggests that the relationship between moral identity and moral intuition is mediated by the experience of moral emotions. The linear sequence is

moderated by gender (W). The influence of the moderating effect of gender is further moderated by the priming group of moral foundations harm/care or ingroup/loyalty (Z).

This conceptual framework will be the basis for designing the research methodology discussed in Chapter 4. Further description of the variables, including variable name, definitions and the scale used to measure the construct can be found in Table 3.11. Further explanation of the construct, variable role, variable type, scoring and measure used can be found in Table 3.12.

### *Moral Intuition explained through Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) & Moral Emotions*

Moral intuitions are explained in the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Graham *et al.*, 2011). MFT explains the innateness of morality such that an individual's morals are initially genetically organised, and then culture and personal experience influence and alter them (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MFT explains moral intuitions occur in five foundations: harm vs care, fairness/justice vs cheating, ingroup/loyalty vs betrayal, authority/respect vs subversion, and purity/sanctity vs degradation (Graham *et al.*, 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2008).

When encountering a moral dilemma that aligns with one of the five foundations, individuals experience unique sets of automatic emotions that correspond to one of the MFT foundations (Haidt, 2001; Rozin *et al.*, 1999). Once experienced, moral emotions trigger intuitive responses to the situation.

Research has examined moral intuition as a function of the ethical theories of deontology and utilitarianism. Incorporating these theories, researchers predicted that utilitarian moral judgments would positively correlate with cognition and non-

utilitarian, or deontological moral judgments, would positively correlate with intuition (Greene *et al.*, 2008). Limited studies with conflicting results have been conducted to examine this prediction (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). To date, although virtue ethics provides the foundation for MFT, it hasn't been incorporated into studies of moral intuition. This is a gap in the research, as individuals practising virtue should be incorporating these values into their schema, which would result in expression through intuitions.

The relationship between moral emotions and moral intuition has been evidenced in empirical studies examining guilt (Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2000), and contempt, anger and disgust (Rozin *et al.*, 1999). The research has demonstrated a relationship between the two constructs across cultures but has only looked at negative emotions, not positive emotions. The current work looks to explore how positive moral emotions influence moral intuition.

Lastly, studies have begun to examine gender differences in experiencing moral emotions (Brody & Hall, 2008; Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012; Tracy & Robins, 2007). In general, women are seen as stereotypically more emotional than men in North American culture (Brody & Hall, 2008). However, in relation to specific moral emotions, qualitative studies have described gender differences amongst the experience and expression of the emotions of guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride (Brody & Hall, 2008; Ferguson, Eyre & Ashbaker, 2000; Roberts & Goldenberg, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2007). A meta-analysis has also reported that women are more likely to experience guilt and shame, but no gender difference exists in the experience of embarrassment or pride (Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012). According to Else-Quest *et al.*, mixed results of gender differences in emotion research were the result of the type of measure

used and whether or not the emotions were measured as state (temporary, immediate experience of emotions) vs trait (characteristic, generalised experience of emotions) (2012). Without definitive evidence, the current work will also explore the moderating effect of gender differences on experiencing moral emotions amongst fundraisers.

#### *Moral Intuition explained through Identity Theory & Implicit Moral Identity*

The other explanation of how moral intuition functions within individuals is through Identity Theory. Identity theory proposes that identities reside within schemas and are used to understand and respond to situations (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). The identity suggested to influence moral intuition is moral identity, which is an individual's attributes, beliefs, desires, or principles of action that relate to morality (Aquino & Reed, 2002). When an individual activates their moral identity across many situations, they will have multiple moral associations within their schemata. As intuitive responses result from activated schemas, and as implicit moral identity resides in the schemas, the associations, beliefs and memories linked to moral identity should formulate one's automatic and intuitive responses to moral situations.

#### *Application of Moral Foundations Theory and Identity Theory to fundraising*

The concepts within virtue ethics, MFT and Identity Theory, when combined, should help explain how fundraisers use moral intuition to solve moral dilemmas in practical settings. Throughout their careers, fundraisers encounter moral dilemmas that require an immediate response as part of their working responsibilities.


To help fundraisers make such choices, decision-making processes have been introduced (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Kidder, 1995; Marion, 1994). These processes provide thorough guidelines and recommendations that fundraisers can use

when facing moral dilemmas; however, all processes require time, reflection, and conscious processing. The situations this research is interested in are when a quick, immediate response is required, rendering the processes irrelevant.

Through the incorporation of MFT and Identity Theory, fundraisers encountering moral dilemmas that require an instinctual response should be helped by having a strong implicit moral identity functioning through schemas. They should also be helped by experiencing particular moral emotions when solving a dilemma that aligns with one of the moral foundations. Depending on how strongly a fundraiser experiences a particular moral emotion, the emotion should trigger a response that aligns more with one alternative over another. It is proposed that fundraisers with high implicit moral identity will be more likely to experience moral emotions that influence intuitive moral choices.

To show how the theories are incorporated in the current work, the proposed relationships can be found in the research model framework below:

Figure 2.5: Moderated Moderated Mediation Research Model for the current research.



Key:

 = moderating effect

 = mediating effect

The research model above will be tested using the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The influence of implicit moral identity on moral intuition aligned with the moral foundations of harm/care or ingroup/loyalty is mediated by the experience of compassion and pride, respectively.

Hypothesis 2: Compassion, not pride or other positive emotions, will mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition for dilemmas within the harm/care moral foundation.

Hypothesis 3: Pride, not compassion or other positive emotions, will mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition for dilemmas within the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation.

Hypothesis 4: The effect of compassion and pride will be stronger for individuals with low implicit moral identity than for individuals with high implicit moral identity.

Hypothesis 5: The effect of compassion will be stronger for men, and the effect of pride will be stronger for women.

However, prior to testing the model, the types of dilemmas fundraisers encounter must be explored. Dilemmas requiring the use of moral intuition are currently unknown in the academic literature. Therefore, the researcher must first investigate the types of moral dilemmas that fundraisers encounter, identify how these dilemmas align with moral foundations, and determine if they require intuitive responses. Once this information is acquired, the researcher will be able to test the relationships proposed by the Moral Foundations Theory and Identity Theory on moral intuition.

## Chapter Three: Methodology

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed description, evaluation and justification of the components of the methodology used in the research (Howell, 2013; Sampson, 2012). Methodology is the process an investigator uses to discover what he/she believes can be ascertained (Howell, 2013). The chapter first details the research question and aims. Next, justification for the hypotheses for Phase 2 is provided. The research design, participants, and methods are explained for each phase. As part of the methods, the procedures that occurred prior to, during, and after data collection are extensively explained.

In between Phase 1 and Phase 2, scale development ensued. This part of the research incorporated findings from Phase 1 and the Moral Foundations Theory to create a scale (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Similar to Phase 1 and Phase 2, the research design, participants and methods are explained for this part of the research.

Following the information about the research process, the chapter then clarifies definitions of key terms used to explain the investigator's research philosophy, including 'paradigm', 'quantitative research', 'qualitative research' and 'mixed methods research'. The combination of how research philosophy and term definitions influenced the development of the research project is then explained. In summary, the current researcher explains and justifies that in order to most appropriately answer the research question and test the hypotheses that were created, it was necessary to use mixed

methods influenced by the postpositivist paradigm philosophy of research for this project.

### **3.1.1 Research Aims and Objectives**

As outlined in the literature review, fundraisers encounter work-related moral dilemmas throughout their careers. Frameworks exist to help fundraisers solve the moral dilemmas; however, these frameworks are limited in their capacity to help when fundraisers are under pressure to make a quick, intuitive decision. In order to help fundraisers in these situations, theories and previous findings were used to inform the current research project regarding the relationship between moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition. In order to examine these relationships, the researcher had to first understand examples of real-life moral dilemma scenarios requiring the use of moral intuition. Using semi-structured interviews in Phase 1, the researcher obtained realistic examples of moral dilemma scenarios that fundraisers encounter in the workplace. This information was then used to create a measure to be used as part of a large-scale survey for hypothesis testing. Based on theories, previous findings, and curiosity, the following research aims and objectives were formed for the current study.

The overall research question for the current study was “What kind of moral dilemmas do fundraisers encounter that require intuitive responses, and how are they solved?”

The research aims included:

1. To explore the role of moral intuition amongst fundraisers facing moral dilemmas in the workplace
2. To determine the role of moral foundations and moral intuition within moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter

3. To investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition in the context of solving moral dilemmas.

Table 3.1 Aligning research aims and objectives with research methods.

	Phase 1	Phase 2
Research Aims:	1, 2	1, 2, 3
Research Objectives:	<p>To obtain tangible, realistic example moral dilemma scenarios fundraisers encounter in the workplace</p> <p>To create a measure that uses practical, applicable moral dilemmas to measure moral intuition amongst fundraisers.</p> <p>To develop hypotheses that test what mechanisms help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas</p>	<p>To establish the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.</p> <p>To determine how this relationship varies based on the experience of moral emotions.</p> <p>To determine whether the effect of moral emotions varies based on gender.</p> <p>To establish whether the effect of moral emotions aligns with moral foundations.</p>
Research Method:	Semi-structured interviews	Large scale survey
Analysis Chapter:	4	5

Source: Author's own work

Integration of the theories and research findings presented in the literature review were used to develop hypotheses for the current research. Identity Theory and Moral Foundations Theory were integrated since implicit moral identity should have a relationship with moral intuition when an individual is faced with a moral dilemma aligned with a moral foundation. The stronger one's implicit moral identity, the more likely this identity would subconsciously activate and intuitively formulate the response to dilemma situations. Additionally, the higher an individual's implicit moral identity, the more likely they would be to experience moral emotions. Furthermore, the stronger moral emotions are experienced when encountering a moral dilemma that aligns with

the moral foundations, the more likely those emotions will affect the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

From the synthesis of theories and literature explained, the following hypotheses were generated:

Hypothesis 1: The influence of implicit moral identity on moral intuition aligned with the moral foundations of harm/care or ingroup/loyalty is mediated by the experience of compassion and pride, respectively.

Hypothesis 2: Compassion, not pride or other positive emotions, will mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition for dilemmas within the harm/care moral foundation.

Hypothesis 3: Pride, not compassion or other positive emotions, will mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition for dilemmas within the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation.

Hypothesis 4: The effect of compassion and pride will be stronger for individuals with low implicit moral identity than for individuals with high implicit moral identity.

Hypothesis 5: The effect of compassion will be stronger for men, and the effect of pride will be stronger for women.

## **3.2 Research Strategy**

### *Introduction*

To answer the research questions and test the hypotheses, mixed methods were used sequentially, with Phase 1 including qualitative methods followed by quantitative

methods in Phase 2. Methods were combined for scale development. In the literature, development is defined as “seeks to use the results from one method to help develop or inform the other method, where development is broadly construed to include sampling and implementation, as well as measurement decisions” (Bryman, 2006; Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989, p.259). The results of the qualitative methods were employed to develop a scale used in Phase 2, where quantitative methods examined validity and the factor structure of the scale. Phase 2 also included other scales that measured the relationships between the constructs of interest: implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition. The bulkier phase of the research was Phase 2, giving quantitative methods priority for this particular study. Details of each phase’s research design, sampling, population and methods follow. The in-depth justification of the research methods will be detailed in section 3.4 when the research methods employed are considered.

### **3.3 Research Philosophy**

#### **3.3.1 Evaluation and role of research philosophy**

Firstly, it is important to understand what philosophy and assumptions influence the way the current investigator conducts research. Initially, the contradictions regarding the definition of the term ‘paradigm’ will be reviewed. This review will result in the definition used by the current investigator. Next, there is a review of the definitions of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research for the current research.

Following this, different viewpoints of the use of paradigms in mixed methods research are explained. Finally, four alternative perspectives of how to conduct research projects and what influences research design are described. The purpose of explaining the

concepts in this section is to set a foundation for section 3.3.2, which will discuss the current investigator's justification for her research approach and design.

### *Definition of Paradigm*

The definition of the term paradigm is not consistent in the research community (Biesta, 2010; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007; Morgan, 2007). Although many current academic articles reference Thomas Kuhn's book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), as responsible for researchers' describing their beliefs about how they intend to create knowledge through paradigms (Creswell, 2011; Morgan, 2007; Teddlie, 2009), the definition of paradigm is not consistent within the literature. Some scholars argue that paradigms are not exclusionary and can be used as tools during the research process (Biesta, 2010). Others profess that paradigms should be replaced by phrases such as "stances" or "mental models" (Greene & Hall, 2010). Still, others claim that paradigms "deal with first principles or ultimates and are human constructions" (Denzin, 2011, p.91). In order to clarify a working definition for the word paradigm, Morgan identified and explained four versions of the term 'paradigm' that is used in research today (Morgan, 2007).

One version is that paradigms are worldviews. This version defines paradigm as an "all-encompassing perspective one has on the world" (Morgan, 2007, p.51). Another version is paradigms as epistemological stances, which is the dominant version used in the social sciences currently. This version defines paradigms through the philosophy of knowledge of ontology, epistemology and methodology. The third version is paradigms as shared beliefs in a research field. This version defines paradigms as being "shared beliefs about the nature of questions and answers in a research field" (Morgan, 2007,

p.51). The last version is paradigms as model examples. This version is largely absent in social science literature and defines paradigms as relying on “specific exemplars of best or typical solutions or problems” (Morgan, 2007, p.51).

Morgan discusses each version of paradigm independently but explains they are nested within each other and therefore, are not mutually exclusive. Morgan then goes on to define the term as “systems of beliefs and practices that influence how researchers select both the questions they study and methods that they use to study them” (Morgan, 2007, p.49). This definition incorporates and summarises all of the four versions of the term, emphasising the importance of each version. As such, this is the definition of paradigm used for the current project, with the condition that the word ‘beliefs’ includes philosophies. Academic literature typically considers differences within paradigm epistemological stances as philosophical issues (Teddlie, 2009). This definition will be used for the current research so that paradigms can be guides and frameworks for developing the research project (Shannon-Baker, 2016).

Although there are conflicting definitions of the term paradigm, the most commonly agreed paradigms currently used in research include Positivism, Postpositivism, Critical Theory (+Feminism Theory, +Race Theory), Constructivism (or Interpretivist), and Participatory (+ Postmodern) (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011). Table 3.1 lists the basic axiomatic nature of the paradigms (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011). The axioms consist of ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Ontology is the nature of reality for a researcher (Howell, 2013). Epistemology is the relationship between the investigator and what can be discovered (Howell, 2013). Methodology consists of the theoretical assumptions and principles that underpin a research approach (Denzin, 2011; Giddings, 2006).

This table strictly aligns with the version of Kuhn’s paradigms as epistemological stances (1962); however, one can see that if a group of researchers share the epistemological version of a paradigm, such as postpositivism, then this table also represents paradigms as shared beliefs. And if each column is wholly considered, the combination of each issue creates a researcher’s worldview, such that the table can also represent paradigms as worldviews.

Table 3.2: Basic Beliefs of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Positivism</i>	<i>Postpositivism</i>	<i>Critical Theory et al.</i>	<i>Constructivism</i>	<i>Participatory*</i>
Ontology	Naïve realism – “real” reality but apprehensible	Critical realism – “real” reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible	Historical realism – virtual reality shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values: crystallised over time	Relativism – local and specific co-constructed realities	Participative reality – subjective-objective reality, co-created by mind and given cosmos
Epistemology	Dualist/objectivist: findings true	Modified dualist/objectivist; critical tradition/community; findings probably true	Transactional/subjectivist; value-mediated findings	Transactional/subjectivist; co-created findings	Critical subjectivity in participatory transaction with cosmos; extended epistemology of experiential, propositional, and practical knowing; co-created findings
Methodology	Experimental/manipulative; verification of hypotheses; chiefly quantitative methods	Modified experimental/manipulative; critical multiplicity; falsification of hypotheses; may include qualitative methods	Dialogic/dialectical	Hermeneutical/dialectical	Political participation in collaborative action inquiry; primacy of the practical; use of language grounded in shared experiential context

SOURCE: Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba (2011). \*Entries in this column are based on Heron and Reason (1997).

To summarise, the definition of paradigm has been argued over many years in the research community. Ensuring research audiences understand the definitions used in

research projects provide clarity and consistency in the research community. The current research defines paradigms as “systems of beliefs and practices that influence how researchers select both the questions they study and methods that they use to study them” (Morgan, 2007, p.49), as long as systems of beliefs include philosophical underpinnings and epidemiological stances. Using this definition, the main paradigms in the research community include positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, constructivism, and participatory. Researchers should clarify which paradigm they are using as a foundation and framework when developing their research projects.

### *Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Methods Research*

Some researchers consider Quantitative Research, Qualitative Research and Mixed Methods Research paradigms in and of themselves (Burke Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007; Denscombe, 2008). However, these categories of research do not incorporate any of the four versions of the term paradigm as identified through Kuhn’s past work (1962). Instead, quantitative and qualitative methods have been historically linked with the paradigms associated with them, such that quantitative methods are associated with the positivist paradigm, and qualitative methods are associated with the constructivist paradigm (Giddings & Grant, 2006). According to well-respected paradigm contrast tables, Quantitative Research, Qualitative Research and Mixed Methods Research are not included as paradigms, representing this as the most prevalent view of the academic community (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011; Teddlie, 2009).

In addition to being defined as paradigms, the terms ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ have also been defined as both methodologies and methods within research (Giddings &

Grant, 2006), and also as only classifications of data collected relating to quantities (numbers) or qualities (usually via text), respectively (Biesta, 2010). As a reminder, for the current research, methodology is defined as formulating part of a research paradigm that guides how researchers frame the research question using theoretical assumptions and principles (Giddings, 2006; Giddings & Grant, 2006; Giddings & Grant, 2007). Methodology informs a researchers use of quantitative or qualitative viewpoints, types of data collection, analysis and inference techniques (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). Methods are then defined as “concrete and practical. They are the *doing tools* for collecting and analysing data” (Giddings & Grant, 2006, p.5). The most useful description of the terms qualitative and quantitative are as different types of “methods that may be used for data collection and analysis” (Giddings & Grant, 2006, p.5; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

Not only are different definitions used for quantitative and qualitative research, the research community conflicts in their definition of the term ‘mixed methods.’ An early definition of mixed methods emphasised the mixing of *methods* only, stating “we defined mixed-method designs as those that include at least one quantitative method (designed to collect numbers) and one qualitative method (designed to collect words), where neither type of method is inherently linked to any particular inquiry paradigm” (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989, p.256). Over time, however, the research community began using different definitions. To obtain a complete picture of how ‘mixed methods’ was being used, a group of academics asked leading mixed methods researchers to share their definition of the term and received 19 different responses (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). Differences within the definitions were found within five themes and had varying levels of specificity (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie &

Turner, 2007). Most of the definitions described the term as using either different *methods* (12) or *methodologies* (7) in research.

Despite the result of this research demonstrating the research community's emphasis on mixed methods research being solely the use of different *methods*, the summarised version of all definitions is "the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration" (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p.123). Using this definition, the authors argued that mixed methods research was "the third methodological or research paradigm (along with quantitative and qualitative research (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p.129). This definition not only contradicts the majority of definitions received from the mixed methods research community (mixed methods are, in fact, *methods*); it uses the terms methodology and paradigm interchangeably.

As stated previously, the current investigator agrees with previous academics that qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research are not paradigms but fall within the category of methods (Giddings & Grant, 2006, p.5; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Given this categorisation, and the disagreement and incongruence within the research community, the most appropriate definition for mixed methods in the current study is "the collection or analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research" (Creswell *et al.*, 2003, p.212).

This definition is supported by other mixed methods researchers who define the term as “research that involves the sequential or simultaneous use of both qualitative and quantitative data collection and/or data analysis techniques” - Steve Currall, “the utilization of two or more different methods to meet the aims of a research project as best one can” - Marvin Formosa; and “combining qualitative and quantitative research methods in the same research project - Al Hunter (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p.119).

### *How Paradigms are used in Mixed Methods Research*

Although there is relative agreement on the most commonly used paradigms in research, there are conflicting stances on how paradigms should influence the development of research (Greene & Hall, 2010). Table 3.2 lists five different stances on the importance of the role paradigms play in research, and whether or not paradigms can be mixed meaningfully in the same study (Greene & Hall, 2010, p.123). As seen here, researchers’ beliefs range from high importance and role of paradigms (Purist) to low importance (Aparadigmatic), which emphasises the role of theory, context and ideology as stronger than that of paradigms. Depending on the stance of the researcher, beliefs about integrating different paradigms in the same study range from a ‘No, they are incompatible’ to ‘Yes, but they should remain separate’ or ‘Yes, but they can speak to each other in a dialogue to create a new understanding’.

Table 3.3: Stances on Mixing Paradigms While Mixing Methods

<i>Stance</i>	<b>What is the importance and role of philosophical assumptions in inquiry practice?</b>	<b>Can assumptions from different philosophical traditions usefully and meaningfully inform the same study?</b>
<i>Purist</i>	High: Assumptions importantly guide and direct inquiry decisions.	No, because assumptions from different traditions are incompatible.
<i>Complementary strengths</i>	High: Assumptions, along with context and theory, importantly guide and direct inquiry decisions.	Yes, but they must remain separate so that paradigmatic and methodological integrity can be maintained.
<i>Dialectic</i>	High: Assumptions, along with context and theory, importantly guide and direct inquiry decisions.	Yes, assumptions from different traditions can be respectfully and dialectically engaged in dialogue toward enhanced, reframed, or new understandings.
<i>Aparadigmatic</i>	Low: Assumptions importantly inform our understanding of methodology, but inquiry practice is more directly informed by theory, context, and/or ideology	One can mix and match assumptions from different traditions as required by the inquiry context and theory, but they exert little influence on inquiry decisions.
<i>Alternative paradigm: pragmatism</i>	Mixed: This can range from “high” where transactional assumptions about human action can importantly guide human action to “low” where the focus is reoriented instrumentally to developing workable solutions to ongoing social problems	Because pragmatism, even in its various forms, presents a coherent system of thought, there is no mixing of assumptions from different traditions

Source: Greene & Hall (2010).

As seen in this table, the range of stances provides such a variety of categories that most researchers should be able to align their beliefs accordingly.

Another view of how paradigms are used in research includes viewing the paradigm table as a continuum rather than as polarised philosophies ranging from positivist to participatory (Teddlie, 2009). Researchers have proposed that rather than aligning one’s research strictly within a singular research paradigm, every component of a research

project can be placed on a continuum (see Figure 3.1). Within this continuum, the authors state that most qualitative research falls within the right side of the continuum and quantitative research falls within the left side of the continuum (Teddlie, 2009). Teddlie defines qualitative and quantitative research as paradigms (2009), so the positivist tradition aligns with the left side of the continuum, and the constructivist tradition aligns with the right side.

Figure 3.1: Multidimensional Continuum of Research Projects

Sphere of Concepts: Purposes, Questions, Objectives		
Deductive questions	←-----→	Inductive questions
Objective purpose	←-----→	Subjective purpose
Value neutral	←-----→	Value involved
Confirmation	←-----→	Understanding
Explanatory	←-----→	Exploratory
Sphere of Concrete Processes (Experiential Sphere)		
Numeric data	←-----→	Narrative data
Structured/close-ended	←-----→	Open-ended
Pre-planned design	←-----→	Emergent design
Statistical analysis	←-----→	Thematic analysis
Probability sample	←-----→	Purposive sample
Sphere of Inferences and Explanations		
Deductive inference	←-----→	Inductive inference
Objective inferences	←-----→	Subjective inferences
Value neutral	←-----→	Value rich
Politically noncommittal	←-----→	Transformative
Etic representation	←-----→	Emic representation
Nomothetic	←-----→	Ideographic

Note: Most QUAN research is closer to the left side of this table, whereas most QUAL research is closer to the right side.

Source: (Teddlie, 2009)

This distinction aside, the point of the continuum is to open up researchers to the idea that research within one research paradigm can have components that might tend to align with another research paradigm. For example, a postpositivist research project “could be exploratory, collect data via open-ended procedures, and develop transformative inferences or explanations” (Teddlie, 2009, p.94). In using this logic, Teddlie purports that it is impossible to strictly align all components of a research project within one paradigm on either end of the continuum (2009). For example, completely value-free investigators cannot exist, which is a strong component of

positivist research. Researchers must fall somewhere along the continuum ranging from being value neutral to value rich. The continuum is an example of a viewpoint against the purist stance in regards to the use of paradigms in research (Teddlie, 2009).

### *Alternative Perspectives for conducting research*

Similar to the stances on whether or not paradigms can be mixed, researchers have offered various paradigms, perspectives, stances and approaches that are used as frameworks for mixed methods research (Greene & Hall, 2010; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Shannon-Baker, 2016; Teddlie, 2009). These include postpositivism, pragmatism, transformative-emancipation, dialectics, and critical realism (Shannon-Baker, 2016). As will be explained in the following paragraphs, postpositivism is a paradigm, pragmatism is an approach, transformative-emancipation is a perspective, and dialectics and critical realism are approaches (Shannon-Baker, 2016). Each provides different purposes for research, approaches to connecting theory to data, and relationships of the researcher to the researched.

For ease, researchers have categorised pragmatism, transformative-emancipation, dialectics and critical realism as perspectives (Shannon-Baker, 2016). Perspectives are not further defined within the article; however, according to the Oxford Dictionary, perspective is defined as “a particular attitude toward something; a way of thinking about something” (Dictionary, 2016). This definition seems appropriate given the summary and purpose of Shannon-Baker’s work, so will be the definition assumed for how the term ‘perspective’ is used for the remainder of the current work. As stated previously, postpositivism is defined as a paradigm in research.

An overview of the four perspectives can be found in Table 3.4 below. Even though postpositivism is one of the most prevalent paradigms used as a framework for mixed methods research, it doesn't appear in this table as the author wanted to give attention to the other less-known perspectives (Shannon-Baker, 2016). Although postpositivism doesn't hold a place on the table, it should be noted that critical realism formulates the ontology of Postpositivism (see Table 3.1). Though not explicit, there is some overlap between using the stance of critical realism and the paradigm of postpositivism when formulating research. As critical realism is used in Table 3.4, it represents the research philosophy and perspective drawn from realism. Postpositivism will be discussed separately at the end of this section because it formulates mixed methods research.

Table 3.4: Four Perspectives for Mixed Methods Research.

<b>Perspective (primary source)</b>	<b>Pragmatism (Morgan, 2007)</b>	<b>Transformative-emancipations (Mertens, 2003)</b>	<b>Dialectics (Greene &amp; Hall, 2010)</b>	<b>Critical realism (Maxwell &amp; Mittapalli, 2010)</b>
Context	Alternative to renewed interest in metaphysics among qualitative researchers	Response to the need for a framework that embodied researcher's work toward social justice with marginalised groups	Response to the paradigm wars	Response to polarisation of positivism and constructivism
Identified as a/an	Approach (Morgan, 2007)	Perspective and/or paradigm (Mertens, 2003); Purpose (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003)	Stance (Greene & Hall, 2010)	Stance (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010)
Purpose for using	Determine practical solutions and meanings; useful for programmatic or invention-based studies	Address social inequities; useful for enacting positive social and/or individual changes for marginalised groups	Address convergent and divergent ideas; useful for studies with conflicting data sets/theoretical stances	Facilitate dialogue and compatibility between quantitative and qualitative approaches; useful for evaluation-based studies
Characterised by	Emphasis on communication; shared meaning making	Working with minority groups or typically excluded groups; attention to power, privilege and voice	Working across and highlighting differences	Emphasis on context; acceptance of alternative viewpoints
Approach to connecting theory to data	Connect theory before and after data collection	Must use a theoretical framework from community's perspective	Emphasise the connections and divergence of theory and data/data sets	Recognise the partial and incomplete nature of theory to explain/capture data
Researcher's relationship to the research	Can follow tenets of objectivity and/or subjectivity depending on research/researcher (referred to as intersubjectivity)	Have a strong relation to the community involves; maintain some level of objectivity to address potential bias	Remain reflective throughout inquiry; promote dialogue among theories, data and results	Emphasise relationships throughout; believe that complete objectivity is not possible
Methods	Emphasises identifying practical solutions	Involves community in design and implementation	Emphasises ability to make comparisons across data	Emphasises perspectives and perspective taking; process-oriented
Inferences from data	Discuss transferability of results by determining level of context-specificity and study's generalizability	Discuss within relevant community socio-historical contexts and power dynamics	Generate via integrations of diverse viewpoints/data sets, particularly from tensions within data strands and integrations results	Can make causal inferences when emphasising the context
Implications for mixed methods research	Mixes characteristics of quantitative and qualitative approaches; identifies practical solutions	Provides overarching social justice related goals and issues to guide research process	Addresses divergent results directly and emphasises both convergence and divergence in data	Provides potential for causal inferences, and an approach to establishing context-based validity; emphasises importance of mental aspects and perception
Why inappropriate for current research*	Identified as an approach, not paradigm	Incompatible context	Incompatible purpose	Identified as a stance, not paradigm

Source: (Shannon-Baker, 2016) \*row added by researcher.

## Pragmatism

The pragmatism perspective focuses on the outcome and product of research (Biesta, 2010). With emphasis placed on the research question, pragmatists design their research projects using whatever inferences and methods are necessary to discover an answer (Teddlie, 2009). Pragmatism provides a basis for using mixed methods in research because it purports that researchers can simultaneously maintain subjectivity in their reflections and objectivity in data collection and analysis (Shannon-Baker, 2016; Teddlie, 2009). It “emphasises the importance of the research questions, the value of experiences and practical consequences, action and understanding of real world phenomena” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p.16). Pragmatism does not concern itself with the conflicting philosophical foundations of paradigms.

Although pragmatism is a term commonly used as a framework for mixed methods research, there is a lack of clarity within the research community as to how it’s defined. In Table 3.4 above, pragmatism was both a ‘paradigm’ and a ‘stance’ (Greene & Hall, 2010). In one instance, academics have listed pragmatism in the middle of the paradigm contrast table between positivism and constructivism (Teddlie, 2009); however, there are various other uses of the term in the literature. Pragmatism has been labelled a “paradigmatic perspective” (Shannon-Baker, 2016), an “ideological position available within any paradigm rather than a paradigm in its own right” (Giddings & Grant, 2007), and an “approach” rather than a paradigm (Morgan, 2007).

The distinction of pragmatism as an approach rather than a paradigm is “important because it’s been described as offering specific ideas as to what constitutes knowledge, but does not purport to present an entirely encompassing worldview” (Biesta, 2010;

Shannon-Baker, 2016, p.325). As shown in Table 3.2, pragmatism does not appear as a paradigm with an epistemological stance in the research community (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011). Neither do the descriptions of pragmatism fulfil the four versions of paradigm used as a definition for the term (Morgan, 2007). Given this, it is more appropriate to use the term pragmatism as an approach to research, rather than a paradigm explaining a researcher's philosophical beliefs and epistemological stance that underpins research.

### *Transformative-emancipation*

The transformative-emancipation perspective is “characterized by the intentional collaboration with minority and marginalized groups or those whose voice is not typically heard on particular issues” (Shannon-Baker, 2016, p.326). The perspective was developed within the United States in response to the increased awareness of issues regarding disabilities, genders, class, and race. Using this perspective, researchers must have an understanding of a community's history and challenges (Shannon-Baker, 2016). Researchers must also develop or have a strong relationship with a community either as being well-connected or integrating. Through these relationships, transformative researchers involve community members in the research in various ways, such as developing questions or helping with recruitment (Shannon-Baker, 2016).

Like pragmatism, transformative-emancipation has been used in various ways in the literature. The term transformative-emancipation has been categorised as a perspective and/or paradigm, as well as a purpose (Mertens, 2003; Shannon-Baker, 2016).

However, unlike pragmatism, there doesn't appear to be much discussion regarding the conflicting uses of the term. Although it's been listed as a paradigm, transformative-

emancipation does not appear on the standard paradigm comparison table (see Table 3.2). As a purpose, transformative-emancipation addresses social inequalities and aims to enact positive changes for individuals or entire communities that are generally marginalised (Shannon-Baker, 2016). Given the use of the term and explanation provided by Shannon-Baker, using transformative-emancipation as a perspective, or way of thinking about something seems the best category to apply.

### *Dialectics*

Dialectics is a stance that argues using two or more paradigms in a dialogue such that using multiple paradigms adds value to research (Greene & Hall, 2010). Dialectics poses that using different paradigms allows researchers to better understand the complexity of human phenomena (Greene & Hall, 2010). Rather than arguing that researchers should be limited to only one paradigm, or that paradigms are incompatible, dialectics emphasises the new understanding that can arise from the tensions that exist between paradigmatic philosophical assumptions in research (Shannon-Baker, 2016).

Proponents of dialectics encourage researchers to remain reflective throughout their studies so that they remain aware of potential biases (Greene & Hall, 2010). The reflections should also be used to generate complex and rich insights from the data (Shannon-Baker, 2016). In conducting research, dialectics believe that the study should dictate using methods in a way that encourages dialogue, particularly between qualitative and quantitative data (Shannon-Baker, 2016).

### *Critical Realism*

Critical Realism posits that using quantitative and qualitative research methods should be used together because they address one another's limitations (Shannon-Baker, 2016). Critical realism is based on the philosophy that there is a reality that exists independently of theories or perception (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010). It denies the ability of researchers to be objective or have certainty of knowledge about the world and maintains that knowledge is partial, incomplete and fallible (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010). Critical Realist researchers, therefore, use theories to guide the research process but understand that theories are incomplete views of reality. As theories are incomplete, causality is possible only in particular situations or contexts, rather than in generalisations (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010; Shannon-Baker, 2016). When applied to research, critical realism emphasises relationships, situational causality, and perspective-taking (Shannon-Baker, 2016).

There isn't an argument in current literature regarding how critical realism should be used in mixed methods research. Researchers currently agree that critical realism should be applied as a stance and have no interest in introducing critical realism as a new paradigm (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010). Interestingly, however, critical realism is listed as the ontology of postpositivism, a paradigm that has dominated mixed methods research thus far (Shannon-Baker, 2016). As such, the overlap between Critical Realism as a perspective and Postpositivism as a paradigm will be apparent in reading the next section.

### *Postpositivism*

Postpositivism is the most well-known and dominant paradigm used in mixed methods research (Giddings & Grant, 2007; Shannon-Baker, 2016). Postpositivism is defined by

a Critical Realist ontology which states that there is a 'real' reality, but it can never fully be known, only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehended (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011). The researcher and that which is researched are independent of each other. Experience in this reality can be tested and conceptually described, but postpositivists appreciate that the contradictory and unpredictability of human experience needs to be factored into research (Giddings & Grant, 2007). While observing and measuring reality, postpositivists recognise that reality is socially and culturally constructed. Researchers strive to remain objective and neutral but recognise the potential effect of biases in research. "Researcher objectivity is impossible" (Giddings & Grant, 2007, p.54). In conducting research, postpositivists have the flexibility of choosing either qualitative or quantitative methods, depending on the research question (Giddings & Grant, 2007).

Again, there is no argument in the research community regarding whether or not Postpositivism is a paradigm. Postpositivism was developed in response to criticisms of positivism's philosophical assumptions such as determinism (cause and effect) and reductionism (experience can be tested and described as a discrete set of ideas or concepts) (Giddings & Grant, 2007). It continues to have a strong foothold on the philosophical assumptions researchers ascribe to when conducting research (Giddings & Grant, 2006; Giddings & Grant, 2007).

### *Section Summary*

In formulating research projects that use mixed methods, researchers tend to align with one of five perspectives. These include pragmatism, dialectics, transformative-emancipation, critical realism and postpositivism. Each of these perspectives offers a

different approach in regards to using paradigms (or not), the connection between theory and data, inferences that are made, and the researcher's relationship to the researched. The perspective used when conducting mixed methods research "should be at the discretion of the researcher(s)" (Shannon-Baker, 2016, p.332).

### **3.3.2 Locating the research and the researched – justification for the approach**

The current research project consists of mixed methods influenced by the postpositivist paradigmatic philosophies and assumptions. The current investigator believes that declaring and using paradigms as a foundation for research is critically important as doing so gives readers a better understanding of possible influences on the research (Shannon-Baker, 2016). Clarifying one's paradigm also helps inform one's research by creating a foundation from which a researcher can make decisions about conducting research. Additionally, "ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions have a real influence on the perspectives and behaviour of human beings, and inevitably influence their actions to some degree. These assumptions are often unconscious and implicit and are not easily abandoned or changed" (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010, p.147).

Specifically, when describing the methodological assumptions for mixed method research, Mertens states, "mixed methods designs that use both quantitative and qualitative methods can be used in any paradigm; however the underlying assumptions determine which paradigm is operationalized" (2003, p.141-142). As the postpositivist paradigm most closely aligns with the current investigator's philosophical worldview and this methodology allows for the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011), this paradigm was the best fit to use for this research.

The arguments about whether mixed methods can be used in the same study have primarily centred around the disagreement of whether or not quantitative methods, historically linked with positivism, and qualitative methods, historically aligned with constructivism, could be used in the same study (Baskarada & Koronios, 2018; Morgan, 2007; Teddlie, 2009). The research community agrees that these paradigms are significantly different from one another, but they disagree regarding how the paradigms can (or cannot) be used within the same study.

How paradigms can or cannot be used within research have been explained through various perspectives, which include pragmatism, dialectics, critical realism, and transformative emancipatory perspectives. These perspectives often use the argument that the philosophical underpinnings of positivism simply do not align with qualitative methods and so quantitative and qualitative methods cannot be mixed within this research philosophy; however, the use of positivism in social science research was replaced by postpositivism in the 1980s (Giddings & Grant, 2007). Since positivism was replaced by postpositivism several decades ago, arguments against using the positivist paradigm are not applicable for the current research.

Postpositivism addresses the criticisms and rigidity of positivism, providing an ontology, epidemiology and methodology that is more applicable within the study of social sciences (Giddings & Grant, 2007). The paradigm shift from the hard lines of positivism in terms of causality, methodology and research design allowed research based in postpositivism to discover probabilistic correlational relationships through the use of statistics and interpretations that aim to discover and create new knowledge (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011). Rather than the determinism of positivism which aimed to identify strict cause and effect relationships, “postpositivist determinism is that

effects and outcomes are the result of a complex array of interactive causative and outcome factors” (Giddings & Grant, 2007, p.54). This line of thinking is much more open and encompassing of the world of social influences.

Additionally, as postpositivism’s ontology is critical realism, the relationship between postpositivist researchers and the researched is one of approximation, with minimal interaction between researchers and subjects, and an attempt to stay as objective as possible with the realisation that complete “objectivity is impossible” (Giddings & Grant, 2007, p.54; Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011). Though some researchers claim that the difference between postpositivism and positivism is not significant enough (Giddings, 2006; Giddings & Grant, 2007), it is widely accepted that postpositivism is an appropriate and commonly used paradigm for mixed methods research (Shannon-Baker, 2016).

This research is not concerned with the argument about whether or not mixed methods favour postpositivism (Creswell, 2011; Giddings, 2006; Giddings & Grant, 2007).

Mixed methods research can be conducted using various perspectives, paradigms or approaches, and favours either quantitative or qualitative methods depending on the researcher (Creswell, 2011). The current investigator does not align with the purist perspective and believes that in the right circumstances it may be more appropriate to use multiple paradigms in a research project to produce the best outcome (Greene & Hall, 2010). The investigator also does not discriminate against qualitative research in its own right or the use of other paradigms. This investigator aligns with the postpositivist worldview and epistemology, and this paradigm is also appropriate to use for the entirety of the current research.

In particular, the current researcher might be questioned for not using the pragmatic approach to guide the current project. As stated previously, the investigator believes in the importance and clarification provided by declaring one’s paradigmatic views when conducting research. Pragmatism is currently defined in the research community as an approach, and until there is agreement regarding the use of this term and its definition as a paradigm, it currently doesn’t explain enough of the worldview and philosophy of research to be considered. Additionally, as it applies to mixed methods research in particular, pragmatism “understates the actual *influence* of philosophical assumptions on research methods, an influence that is particularly significant for combining qualitative and quantitative approaches” (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010, p.146). For the reasons listed above, the current investigator did not find it appropriate to use a pragmatic approach for the research.

Table 3.5: A summary of the position taken for current research.

<b>Postpositivism (Lincoln, Lynham &amp; Guba, 2011)</b>		<b>Position for current research</b>
Ontology	Critical realism – “real” reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible	This research critically examines the application of moral identity and moral emotions to moral intuition. The literature in this area is extremely limited. The literature also doesn’t explore these relationships within fundraisers.
Epistemology	Modified dualist/objectivist; critical tradition/community; findings probably true	This research further develops existing epistemological work to understand moral intuition while introducing new relationships with moral identity.
Methodology	Modified experimental/manipulative; critical multiplism; falsification of hypotheses; may include qualitative methods	Semi-structured interviews investigate moral dilemmas requiring moral intuition amongst fundraisers as well as confirm the application of Moral Foundations Theory to such dilemmas. This phase provides in-depth information required before testing the hypotheses, which was completed by the large-scale quantitative survey.

Source: Author’s own work

## **3.4 Research Methods Employed**

### **3.4.1 Phase 1 - Research Design**

#### Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews of professionals in fundraising were used to understand commonly encountered moral dilemmas. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the best method to use to answer the research question for several reasons.

Firstly, semi-structured interviews are well suited for discussing sensitive topics (Barriball & While, 1994; Fylan, 2005; Kallio *et al.*, 2016). The British Psychological Society Codes of Conduct for Psychologists requires, 'When research may involve behaviour or experiences that participants may regard as personal and private the participants must be protected from stress by all appropriate measures, including the assurance that answers to personal questions need not be given' (The British Psychological Society, 2018, p.12). The purpose of this phase of the research was to understand what types of moral dilemmas professional fundraisers encounter and how they solved them. The interview questions required participants to be vulnerable in their sharing of difficult scenarios and their decision-making choices. This line of questioning was equivalent to inquiring about personal, sensitive topics.

Other means of data collection, such as postal questionnaires, could have been used for the study. However, using such questionnaires would not provide adequate assurance that participants were protected as they may not realise they would not be required to answer all of the questions, or that by merely reading the questions, participants might

become unhappy (Fylan, 2005). As part of the semi-structured interview, rapport is built between the interviewer and interviewees. Interviewees participate voluntarily, can choose to quit the interview at any time, and can ask questions about why the research is being conducted (Fylan, 2005). These characteristics of the interview provide confidence that interviewees are emotionally supported and protected while taking part in the research.

Secondly, semi-structured interviews enabled probing that allowed for further clarification and requests for more information related to participant answers (Barriball & While, 1994). Although participants were all asked the same list of main questions, follow-up questions allowed the investigator to help ensure the reliability of the data. Probing enabled exploration and clarification of inconsistencies with interviewee answers, elicited valuable information, helped prompt interviewees to recall information for questions involving remembering, and clarified thought-provoking and pertinent issues raised by interviewees (Barriball & While, 1994).

Thirdly, semi-structured interviews are useful for developing a deeper understanding of research questions through exploring variations in participant answers (Kallio *et al.*, 2016). As interviews were conducted, the researcher would be able to identify differences and contradictions in the responses received by participants. These contradictions could be the result of participants defining words used in the interview questions differently. Researchers can use these differences to modify words or phrases or clarify definitions to ensure the interviews are providing answers to the research question.

Other methods that could have been used include structured interviews, unstructured interviews, focus groups, and open-ended questionnaires. These other methods were not selected for the current research because they would not have appropriately answered the research question. Structured interviews would have used fixed questions that are more standardised than semi-structured interviews; however, the constraints on the interview would have restricted the ability to prompt interviewees in order to understand the cognitive strategies used to solve moral dilemmas (Fylan, 2005; Howell, 2013). Unstructured interviews would have allowed for an open conversation, however conducting these interviews requires specialised training, standardisation is difficult to achieve, and it would have been challenging to collect ample data without some structure (Howell, 2013). A focus group could have been used to explore the research questions with a group of individuals; however, the method is difficult to standardise and coordinating a session with participants located internationally would have been trying (Howell, 2013). Lastly, an open-ended questionnaire could have been sent for participants to complete and return; however, this method would constrain the ability of the researcher to ask follow-up questions necessary to answer the research question and understand cognitive strategies used when facing moral dilemma scenarios (Howell, 2013).

Once the interviews were scheduled, the researcher followed guidance suggested from psychology literature to conduct the interviews (Fylan, 2005). This guidance included the following:

1. Tell the participant the purpose of the interview.
2. Know the interview schedule.
3. Keep the questions simple.
4. Steer the interview subtly.

5. Don't ask leading questions (but have prompts ready).
6. Silences aren't scary.
7. Ask if the interviewees have anything else to talk about.

Experts were sent an overview describing the purpose of the interview and the semi-structured questions they would be asked. They were asked to prepare for the interview and consider their answers beforehand. The preparation ensured the most efficient use of interview time, such that interviewees gave appropriate examples and ample prompting could occur if necessary. The researcher prepared and memorised the interview schedule, which included questions, prompts and keywords in participant responses. Questions were kept simple, and prompts were given when necessary. Given the complex nature of the questions, silence was allowed so interviewees could contemplate and respond in their own time.

The semi-structured interview questions were created to discover the knowledge of the experts interviewed. This information would then be used to create a scale of scenarios and possible dilemma responses for use in future studies. The interview responses could also be used to understand the intuitive strategies used to solve moral dilemmas. This information is shared in Chapter 4, which discusses findings of potential strategies for resolving moral dilemmas.

When interviewees responded to the first interview question, prompting questions were asked to help identify what cognitive strategies the interviewees used to solve the moral dilemma. The data collected from these steps were analysed to identify themes and patterns. These themes can be found in Chapter 4. Findings were also used to develop a

scale used in Phase 2 of the current research. Future work could utilise the information obtained in Phase 1 within future research or educational programmes for fundraisers.

The purpose of the interviews was to provide detailed descriptions of moral dilemma situations that require intuitive responses. Interviewees were asked the following questions:

1. Please describe difficult moral dilemma[s] you have had to resolve almost instantly. Were you under intense time pressure? How did you know what decision to make? The situation could have occurred at any moment in your career. I am going to ask you to describe the dilemma and explain how you coped with it. I am interested both in the dilemma situation and in your reflections about the dilemma. [40 minutes]
2. Secondly, what are the most common dilemmas you think fundraisers face in their first year in the profession, as an administrator let's say? [15 minutes]  
... as a Fundraising Director?  
... as the CEO of a Charity?
3. If different than the examples provided above, what are the three most frequent moral dilemmas you encounter?
  - a. Please give examples of each

Do you have any other thoughts or suggestions that you feel will be helpful or relevant to this project?

The interview one-pager that was sent to interviewees can be found in Appendix 1.

### *Section Summary*

This section explains and justifies the use of semi-structured interviews as the method used for this phase of the research. Other qualitative methods include structured

interviews, unstructured interviews, focus groups, and open-ended questionnaires; however, these methods would not have been able to provide the data necessary to answer the research question. As such, semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate method for answering the research question and for respecting the sensitive nature of the research topics (Fylan, 2005). Guidelines for preparing for and conducting the semi-structured interviews were implemented from the psychology literature (Fylan, 2005). By preparing, sticking to the interview schedule, and using probing questions, the researcher was able to answer the research question and collect appropriate data for analysis.

### **3.4.2 Phase 1 - Participants**

#### *Sampling*

A nonprobabilistic, purposive sample defined as “selected according to predetermined criteria relevant to a particular research objective” was used for this phase of the research (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006, p.61). Criteria included:

- 1) Board Member or known to Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy
- 2) Active within the fundraising community
- 3) More than ten years’ experience in fundraising as a consultant or within the charity sector

The initial sample size was set at ten interviews. This was based on the prediction that ten interviews would answer the research question by producing adequate data to analyse for variety and themes (Francis *et al.*, 2010). Logistical factors also informed this decision including the number of researchers (one) (Ryan & Bernard, 2003) and the interviews being semi-structured which should have limited the variety of data that would be collected (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006).

Expert professionals were recruited through the leadership team at the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy. Ten interviews ensued with professionals working in various positions and types of organisations. Sampling ceased after ten participants for multiple reasons. Primarily, sampling ceased because the data collected had met the criteria for discovering an ample number of real-life fundraising moral dilemmas requiring moral intuition as outlined in the research proposal (Mason, 2010). This research aim was to discover themes but maintain some variety in order to create multiple examples of moral dilemmas rather than analyse repetitive examples.

Additionally, analysis of the interview responses demonstrated adequate data saturation, in that themes related to moral foundations theory were identified and confirmed.

Though there are inadequate descriptions of how saturation is determined in the academic literature (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006), guidance available suggests that data saturation occurs when no new themes occur (Francis *et al.*, 2010). Saturation occurred in the current research as similar themes were observed during data analysis for the ten interviews (details in Chapter 4).

There are conflicting recommendations regarding the number of interviews necessary to reach saturation (Creswell, 1998; Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006; Kuzel, 1992; Morse, 1994). Several guidelines for saturation support the current research stopping at ten interviews. Morse recommends stopping semi-structured interviews at six participants for phenomenological studies (1994). In a study conducted by Guest, Bunce and Johnson, they discovered “basic elements for metathemes were present as early as six interviews” (2006, p.59). Creswell recommends 5-25 interviews for phenomenological studies and 20-30 interviews for grounded theory (1998). Lastly, Kuzel recommends 6-

8 interviews when interviewing a homogeneous sample and 12-20 “when looking for disconfirming evidence or trying to achieve maximum variation” (1992, p.41).

The interviews were arranged over Skype due to the international location of participants. Skype was the chosen medium for communication based on the availability of technology, user-friendliness, and budgetary restrictions. Had problems arose with this medium, alternative means of communication would have been arranged, such as phone calls or WhatsApp calls. The key criteria needed for conducting the interviews was to have access to the interviewees’ voices.

### *Population*

The population of interest is a range of fundraising professionals, from various organisations and holding a variety of roles. Interviewees were a sample of ten fundraising professionals, selected via the criteria listed above. Roles of interviewees ranged from fundraising consultant to voluntary Trustee members to Chief Executive Officer. The experience and understanding of the dilemmas fundraisers encounter at various levels throughout their careers was representative of the population of which this research applies.

### **3.4.3 Phase 1 – Procedures**

#### *Prior to Data Collection*

Prior to data collection, requests were sent to the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy Board of Trustees to participate in the semi-structured interviews or provide recommendations. Based on their experience, activity within fundraising, and

relationship with Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy, Board of Trustee members and other experts were interviewed.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted via phone or Skype in private locations where only the interviewer and interviewee could hear the conversation. Interviews were recorded and kept in a secure location. Written notes from interviews were kept with the recorder in a secure location. The researcher and Rev.com then transcribed interviews. Files were securely stored and transmitted using 128-bit SSL encryption. Rev.com does not share files or personal information outside of the company and professionals working with the company sign strict confidentiality agreements. Details of Rev.com information and procedures can be found here:

<https://www.rev.com/transcription/how-it-works>. Returned transcripts of the files have been stored on a securely encrypted jump drive and in a password-protected Dropbox account.

No demographic information was collected for interviewees. As was written in the approved ethics form, there was not a consent form used during interviews. Participants agreed to interviews via emails. Consent was included in the script that was read, which can be found in Appendix 2. Once participants agreed to be interviewed, they were sent an overview of the interview that included the main themed questions so they could prepare responses accordingly. The overview was sent as early as possible so that participants had ample time to review and consider their responses.

During the interview, the investigator used a schedule that included a script of introduction, gratitude to the interviewee for participating, and affirmations of confidentiality and anonymity. Participants were asked to verbally provide their

approval for recording the interviews. Interviews were transcribed by the researcher and professionals at Rev.com. The researcher reviewed qualitative data analysis procedures using thematic analysis, which will be described in further detail below.

#### *During Data Collection*

During data collection, the instructions were read to the participants, and consent to be recorded was sought. The fixed questions of the semi-structured interview were asked of the participants. Data was collected through recordings of responses by the participants. Additional notes were taken by the researcher and used to construct follow-up questions to further answer the research questions. When interviews were completed, contact information was provided to the participants so they could request further information or support resulting from completing the interview.

#### *After Data Collection*

A nomothetic approach was used to understand what participant answers shared with each other. This approach is typically used with quantitative data; however, the purpose of this phase of the research was to identify moral dilemmas that could be encountered by a large number of fundraisers. The research goal was to be able to generalise the information received to a larger population.

### **Thematic Analysis**

Thematic Analysis was used as the primary data analysis method for Phase 1. Thematic analysis is a flexible and foundational method for qualitative analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is defined as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.79). Within the current method, the

term ‘themes’ was defined as “something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.82). Although it is embraced for its flexibility, academics have introduced a set of guidelines that help to balance explaining what thematic analysis is and how to do it, yet maintain the lack of limits and constraints that are associated with the method. These guidelines consist of six phases that were used as a tool to conduct this analysis.

Before implementing the six phases, it is recommended to identify whether or not a researcher will use inductive or theoretical thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In the current study, both inductive and theoretical thematic analyses were used. The inductive analysis identified practical themes that were strongly linked to the data themselves (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This type of analysis was performed to allow for data-driven analysis, thereby minimising researcher subjectivity and allowing the data to speak for itself. The theoretical thematic analysis was driven by the researcher’s analytic and theoretical interests (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This type of analysis was performed to link the data specifically to the Moral Foundations Theory and intuition. Although using both analyses was complicated, it was important to the researcher to ensure that the prevalence of themes, whether related to theory or not, were represented in Chapter 4.

The six phases of thematic analysis used for the current study are 1.) familiarising yourself with your data, 2.) generating initial codes, 3.) searching for themes, 4.) reviewing themes, 5.) defining and naming themes, and 6.) producing the report. Descriptions of the phases and how they were deployed in the current study are displayed in the table below.

Table 3.6: Phases of thematic analysis

Phase	Description of the process	How deployed in current study*
1. Familiarising yourself with your data:	Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Researcher conducted and recorded interviews</li> <li>• Interviews were transcribed verbatim into text-based word documents</li> <li>• Interviews 1-3 were transcribed by researcher through listening to recording and typing text</li> <li>• Interviews 4-10 were transcribed by Rev.com</li> <li>• Transcripts from Rev.com were spot checked against audio recordings by researcher</li> <li>• Transcripts read several times before coding began</li> </ul>
2. Generating initial codes:	Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Researcher worked systematically through data set and identified interesting ideas and concepts that were repeated in different interviews</li> <li>• Analysis performed in 3 areas: question order, moral dilemma scenarios, moral dilemma response options</li> <li>• Example moral dilemmas were entered into a table containing dilemma text and a second column for codes</li> <li>• Similar procedure was conducted for moral dilemma response options</li> </ul>
3. Searching for themes:	Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Researcher reviewed codes from phase 2</li> <li>• Codes were collated and combined to form higher-level themes</li> </ul>
4. Reviewing themes:	Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Researcher combed through themes from phase 3 to see which were most substantial</li> <li>• Some themes were combined and some themes removed resulting in strongly represented themes</li> <li>• Themes considered in relation to codes created in phase 2 and entire data set</li> <li>• Ensured themes were valid in relation to data set and codes</li> </ul>
5. Defining and naming themes:	Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Themes were named and defined on two overarching categories: practical themes and theory-based themes</li> <li>• Themes were then described by what was interesting about them</li> <li>• Helped to organise the themes so that each could tell unique story about data</li> </ul>

6. Producing the report:	The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report is written in detail in Chapter 4</li> <li>• Report includes quantitative evidence of theoretical themes and uses tables to demonstrate frequency of themes</li> <li>• Report also includes vivid examples that demonstrate the themes</li> <li>• Individual examples and overarching numeric evidence demonstrates thorough analysis that illustrates the information provided in the data yet maintain the desire for researcher objectivity</li> </ul>
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Source: (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.87) \*Column added by researcher.

### Section Summary

The researcher used the guidance of Braun and Clarke (2006) to conduct qualitative data analysis methods. This guidance included 6 phases, funnelling the data from an entire data set to overarching themes to tell a compelling story about the data collected. To ensure the thematic analysis was conducted appropriately, the researcher also followed the 15-point checklist of criteria from Braun & Clarke (see Table 3.7) (2006). The table lists several criteria that ensure thorough methods were performed in the procedures following data collection.

Results of these procedures are reported in Chapter 4, Data Analysis.

Table 3.7 Qualitative Data Analysis Procedures.

Process	No.	Criteria
Transcription	1	The data have been transcribed to an appropriate level of detail, and the transcripts have been checked against the tapes for 'accuracy'
Coding	2	Each data item has been given equal attention in the coding process
	3	Themes have not been generated from a few vivid examples (an anecdotal approach), but instead the coding process has been thorough, inclusive and comprehensive
	4	All relevant extracts for each theme have been collated
	5	Themes have been checked against each other and back to the original data set
Analysis	6	Themes are internally coherent, consistent and distinctive
	7	Data have been analysed – interpreted, made sense of – rather than just paraphrased or described
	8	Analysis and data match each other – the extracts illustrate the analytic claims
Overall	9	Analysis tells a convincing and well-organised story about the data and topic
	10	A good balance between analytic narrative and illustrative extracts is provided
	11	Enough time has been allocated to complete all phases of the analysis adequately, without rushing a phase or giving it a once-over-lightly
Written report	12	The assumption about, and specific approach to, thematic analysis are clearly explicated
	13	There is a good fit between what you claim you do, and what you show you have done – i.e., described method and reported analysis are consistent
	14	The language and concepts used in the report are consistent with the epistemological position of the analysis
	15	The researcher is positioned as <i>active</i> in the research process; themes do not just 'emerge'

SOURCE: Braun & Clarke (2006, p.96).

### 3.4.4 Quality of the qualitative research

In order to assure the quality of the qualitative methods used for the current research, several criteria were met. Some critics oppose using criteria, seeing them as strict standards that are unhelpful (Guba & Lincoln, 2005); however, the current investigator agrees with Tracy that criteria are useful and provide guidelines that help us learn, practice and perfect (2010). The criteria Tracy proposes are not tied to specific theories or paradigms, but offer universal rules that can be applied to various qualitative research projects. The criteria also align with other quality criteria proposed by other researchers (Sampson, 2012).

Tracy confirms that the eight criteria recommended can be achieved through flexible skills that are dependent on the goals of the study (2010). The criteria provide instructions to ensure new and advanced researchers have a platform with a unified voice for discussion (Tracy, 2010). The concept was also introduced to the research community in order to “promote respect” amongst individuals who hold power, yet misunderstand and misevaluate qualitative research (Tracy, 2010, p.839). The eight criteria include 1.) worthy topic, 2.) rich rigour, 3.) sincerity, 4.) credibility, 5.) resonance, 6.) significant contribution, 7.) ethics, and 8.) meaningful contribution. Further details for how each criterion can be achieved and how this was demonstrated in the current research may be found in table 3.8.

Table 3.8 Eight “Big-Tent” Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research

Criteria for quality (end goal)	Various means, practices, and methods through which to achieve	Demonstration of criteria in current research*
Worthy topic	<p>The topic of the research is</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevant</li> <li>• Timely</li> <li>• Significant</li> <li>• Interesting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevant: Ethics in fundraising has been a topic of increased attention in recent years (MacQuillin, 2016a; MacQuillin, 2016b; Roddy, 2016)</li> <li>• Relevant: Little guidance exists to help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas when they are on the spot (Fundraising Regulator, 2018c)</li> <li>• Relevant: First-hand experiences described by interviewees provided valid moral dilemma scenarios</li> <li>• Significant: This was the first study implemented with the aim to understand moral dilemmas that occur in fundraising and how professionals use intuition to respond to such situations.</li> <li>• Interesting: the purpose of the current study was to also understand the possible choices fundraisers could make in response to moral dilemma scenarios</li> </ul>
Rich rigour	<p>The study was sufficient, abundant, appropriate, and complex</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theoretical constructs</li> <li>• Data and time in the field</li> <li>• Sample(s)</li> <li>• Context(s)</li> <li>• Data collection and analysis processes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due diligence was executed ensuring the sampling, researcher training, data collection and data analysis were adequate</li> <li>• The procedures explaining sampling, data collection and data analysis were also explained in section 3.4.3.</li> <li>• Researcher competence: experience and professionalism needed to formulate standard questions, ask pertinent follow-up questions, and conduct interview conversations with such high-calibre participants</li> <li>• Researcher competence: reviewed and independently studied best practices and guidelines for conducting semi-structured interviews ensuring adequate data collection during interviews whilst maintaining good rapport and allowing for probing to take place (Fylan, 2005).</li> <li>• Researcher competence: used interpersonal communication to develop good rapport, and empathic and non-judgmental relationships, which ensured truthful self-disclosure from participants</li> <li>• Plausibility: demonstrated in the detail and connection between procedures during the study</li> </ul>

Sincerity	<p>The study is characterised by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Self-reflexivity about subjective values, biases, and inclinations of the researcher(s)</li> <li>• Transparency about the methods and challenges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Self-reflexivity: awareness of biases and potential influences include researcher is a fundraiser</li> <li>• Self-reflexivity: interview questions designed to focus on participants' experiences without specific reference to personal characteristics or job titles</li> <li>• Transparency: methods utilised for data analysis helped maintain as much objectivity as possible</li> <li>• Transparency: documentation of procedures explained in section 3.4.3</li> </ul>
Credibility	<p>The research is marked by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thick description, concrete detail, explication of tacit (nontextual) knowledge, and showing rather than telling</li> <li>• Triangulation or crystallisation</li> <li>• Multivocality</li> <li>• Member reflections</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thick description: participants were asked to explain a moral dilemma they had experienced under time pressure in detail, using 20-30 minutes</li> <li>• Thick description: probing questions in semi-structured interviews ensured data collected was thorough and organised, providing meaningful, credible information to analyse for the findings</li> <li>• Multivocality: research included "multiple and varied voices in the qualitative report and analysis" (Tracy, 2010, p.844)</li> </ul>
Resonance	<p>The research influences, affects or moves particular readers or a variety of audiences through</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aesthetic, evocative representation</li> <li>• Naturalistic generalisations</li> <li>• Transferable findings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aesthetic representation: findings presented with clarity, demonstrating vivid examples of themes and intertwined with quotes from participants (see Chapter 4)</li> <li>• Transferable findings: readers are able to empathise with scenarios and quotes presented in Chapter 4</li> <li>• Transferable findings: thematic analysis revealed scenarios related to management decisions which could resonate with professionals more generally, not solely within the field of fundraising</li> </ul>
Significant contribution	<p>The research provides a significant contribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conceptually/theoretically</li> <li>• Practically</li> <li>• Morally</li> <li>• Methodologically</li> <li>• Heuristically</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theoretically: Moral dilemma scenarios were aligned with the Moral Foundation Theory (MFT) (Graham <i>et al.</i>, 2011)</li> <li>• Practically: highlighted a contemporary problem occurring in fundraising</li> <li>• Practically: understanding potential moral scenarios can help with staff team-building activities and training for junior fundraisers</li> </ul>
Ethical	<p>The researcher considers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Procedural ethics (such as human subjects)</li> <li>• Situational and culturally specific ethics</li> <li>• Relational ethics</li> <li>• Exiting ethics (leaving the scene and sharing the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Procedural ethics: ethics approval by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Plymouth University</li> <li>• Relational ethics: researcher remained conscious of her how her actions and questions had consequences on the interviewees, also remained sensitive to tone of voice and vulnerability of participants</li> </ul>

	research)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exiting ethics: removed identifying information from data to ensure confidentiality</li> </ul>
Meaningful coherence	<p>The study</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Achieves what it purports to be about</li> <li>• Uses methods and procedures that fit its stated goals</li> <li>• Meaningfully interconnects literature, research questions/foci, findings and interpretations with each other</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conclusions are meaningful both practically and theoretically</li> <li>• Methods and procedures that fit: Semi-structured interviews best method for answering research questions within philosophy of postpositivist paradigm</li> <li>• Meaningfully interconnects: interview question creation linked to literature review, findings linked to research questions</li> </ul>

Source: Tracy (2010, p.840), \*column added by researcher.

### *Section Summary*

In meeting certain criteria, researchers can demonstrate the quality of their qualitative research. The methods, sampling, and procedures described in this chapter demonstrate that the current research project has met a set of eight guidelines that demonstrate this was high quality. The eight criteria include 1.) worthy topic, 2.) rich rigour, 3.) sincerity, 4.) credibility, 5.) resonance, 6.) significant contribution, 7.) ethics, and 8.) meaningful contribution. In meeting these criteria, the researcher aims to assure readers and other researchers to trust and respect the research presented in this study.

#### **3.4.5 Moral Dilemma Scale Development - Research Design**

An inductive approach was used to create the moral dilemma scale. This approach was used because there was uncertainty of what types of dilemmas fundraisers experienced and the types of potential responses they could have (Tay & Jebb, 2017). As mentioned in section 3.2.1, semi-structured interviews were used to provide sample descriptions of the concept. Further steps used to guide scale development were construct definition, purpose, principles of writing the items, scale validation, and scale revision (Tay & Jebb, 2017).

In order to provide a clear definition of the construct, the researcher used induction to identify the choices fundraisers believed they had when encountering moral dilemmas that required moral intuition. This involved analysing the data collected in Phase 1 and relating it to concepts in the literature review related to moral intuition. Analysis of the interviews revealed that many of the moral dilemmas the experts described involved situations that forced them to choose between their responsibilities to the organisation

they worked for and a relationship with an individual. The individuals described were colleagues, bosses, donors, or peers.

These results revealed that there were actually two components involved in moral dilemma responses that were related to the Moral Foundations Theory. Results revealed that organically occurring dilemmas for professional fundraisers were often decisions involving the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty foundations. In many cases, fundraisers were choosing between caring for an individual OR being loyal to their organisation. Based on this knowledge, the dilemmas used in this study reflected situations involving making a choice between these two foundations.

A formula table was created to compare and select the most appropriate moral dilemma responses (Table 3.9 below).

Table 3.9 Moral Dilemma Response Formula Table

<b>Object</b>	<b>Loyalty</b>	<b>Care</b>
Group	1. Stronger loyalty over care	1. Stronger care over loyalty
	2. Stronger loyalty over weaker loyalty	2. Stronger care over weaker care
	3. Stronger loyalty over care and weaker loyalty	3. Stronger care over loyalty and weaker care
Individual (a member of the group)	1. Stronger loyalty over care	1. Stronger care over loyalty
	2. Stronger loyalty over weaker loyalty	2. Stronger care over weaker care
	3. Stronger loyalty over care and weaker loyalty	3. Stronger care over loyalty and weaker care
Individual (a non-group member)	1. Stronger loyalty over care	1. Stronger care over loyalty
	2. Stronger loyalty over weaker loyalty	2. Stronger care over weaker care
	3. Stronger loyalty over care and weaker loyalty	3. Stronger care over loyalty and weaker care

Source: Author's own work

To properly reflect the decisions fundraisers must make, responses to the dilemmas were two choices:

1. Loyalty to the organisation over loyalty to the individual (where the individual is not seen as a member of the organisation or group) and care for the individual.
2. Care for the individual over care for the organisation and loyalty to the organisation.

This prescription for responses was contrived as the clearest way to measure the constructs of interest: Loyalty and Care.

In writing the items and validating the scale, the researcher emphasised that these two components, or dimensions, were clearly articulated (Tay & Jebb, 2017). The final measure included eight moral dilemma scenarios, each with a loyalty-based and care-based choice. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two blocks of scenarios that presented four care and four loyalty options.

Participants were asked to rank the likeliness of them performing the behavioural option by ranking from 1 (very unlikely) – 7 (very likely). In current practice, most Likert-type scales and other rating scales measuring attitudes and opinions use either a five or seven response category (Preston & Colman, 2000). In electronic surveys, 5-point scales have been associated with more interpolations, which cannot be mitigated within an electronic survey (Finstad, 2010). As the current survey will be disseminated electronically, the problem with interpolation thus presents further issues with sensitivity and accuracy of construct measurement (Finstad, 2010). Comparatively, seven-point Likert scales have demonstrated higher sensitivity and accuracy while maintaining a compact response scale, and are therefore supported as more suited to

electronic survey distribution (Finstad, 2010). Using a seven-point Likert scale response style was chosen for this study for two reasons.

Firstly, as the moral scenarios were based on day-to-day situations, they were not as extreme as previously used scenarios in moral intuition studies. Due to the more mild nature of the scenarios, there may be a milder response, which isn't strong enough to trigger a dichotomous response quickly. The milder response could also potentially cause a delay in responding that would risk the ability of the scale to measure moral intuition as a result of response time. The potential delay in response time introduces the risk that participants take the time necessary to engage in cognitive reasoning, rather than intuition. By allowing individuals to rank the likelihood of performing the response, they should feel less pressure to fully commit to a dichotomous answer, encouraging a quicker response. Meanwhile, the data received will be able to inform analysis as to which side of the Care vs Loyalty continuum participants choose.

Secondly, there is a risk that participants would select any response over harming others, as this is a very motivating influence on behaviour (Gamez-Djokic & Molden, 2016). Although recent research has demonstrated that it is not always the case that harm prevails over other moral foundations (Gamez-Djokic & Molden, 2016), this may not be the case in day-to-day moral scenarios. It may be that even if primed towards loyalty, participants would choose to care for the individual over being loyal to the organisation (though we hope this not to be the case). Until more is known about how moral foundations are prioritised within individuals, utilising a Likert scale response enables data analysis to explore participant preferences for loyalty-based and care-based responses.

In order to balance the types of responses participants were exposed to, eight moral scenarios were randomly presented. Four dilemmas asked them to rank how likely they would be to perform an act of loyalty, and four asked them to rank how likely they would be to perform an act of care. The eight scenarios and their 16 potential options can be found in Appendix 4.

On the screen presenting the response option and Likert-scale ranking to participants, a countdown clock appeared in the top corner and counted from 18 seconds to ensure that individuals solved the dilemmas quickly. Measuring participants' response time to moral dilemmas has been successfully used in the literature to measure moral intuition (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). In previous studies, visible countdown clocks have been used to instill time pressure and encourage the use of moral intuition (Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016).

One study allowed 8 seconds for participants to respond with a "yes" (i.e., the consequentialist response) or "no" (i.e., the deontological response) to moral dilemmas (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Another study gave participants 35 seconds to read a dilemma and respond again with a yes or no response (Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). Further explanation of how the amount of time pressure (8 seconds and 35 seconds) was calculated is not available in the literature (Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). These experiments then use participants' response times as a continuum to measure intuition, with a smaller response time equating to intuition and longer response time equating to contemplation.

For the newly developed measure, word count and average reading time were used to calculate the amount of time participants should need to read the moral dilemma response options. Response options were within 2-3 words of the same length, averaging 28 words in total, taking between 6.71 – 8.40 seconds to read, where average reading time is 200 - 250 words per minute for adults (Nowak, 2018). Response options asked participants to rank “How likely would you be to...” perform an action, using a Likert-scale from 1-7. As this type of response was more complicated than a simple yes/no response, it was decided that allowing for a further 11-12 seconds for participants to select their ranking would provide the time pressure needed to encourage a speedy response, yet ensure that participants had enough time to respond.

A detailed discussion of the results and how these results defined the concepts used for the scale can be found in chapter 4.

The purpose of creating the moral dilemma measure was to examine moral intuition and strength of intuitive moral decisions as part of Phase 2 of the current research. The scale was intended for use within the population of fundraisers. Understanding and clarifying the purpose of the scale guided how general or specific items needed to be, how the items might be interpreted, and what the appropriate response format should be. The items were both specific and general. Items were specific in that they were unique to fundraising situations, and they were general in that they could be applied to fundraising situations across organisations and speciality areas.

Consideration was made that respondents might interpret responses differently, and this was tested as part of scale validation. Lastly, it was determined that to most appropriately record responses a seven-point Likert scale was implemented rather than a

dichotomous scale so that continuous data could be collected and used for hypothesis analysis (Purgato & Barbui, 2013). Research has shown that seven-point Likert scales are rated as easier to use, better for expression of participant feelings, and almost as quick to use as dichotomous scales (Preston & Colman, 2000). The Likert scale allowed respondents to reply quickly using intuition without strict commitment to a yes/no or true/false response format.

As recommended, the initial pool of items contained more items than were present in the final scale (Tay & Jebb, 2017). The results of Phase 1 provided a plethora of moral dilemma scenarios and response options. As explained in Chapter 4, the researcher used a formula to create standardised response options that linked items to those constructs that were defined by the Moral Foundations Theory (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Final items used were straightforward, did not use slang, jargon, or ambiguous words, were not leading, and were not identical (Tay & Jebb, 2017). To further help with item writing, when validating the scale, definitions of the constructs were given to evaluators (Tay & Jebb, 2017).

A detailed outline of scale validation can be found in section 3.2.7. The researcher understood the importance of initial scale validation. Initial scale validation took place in this phase of the research; however, to respect guidelines of sampling recommendations for scale development, further validation tests were implemented as part of Phase 2. The initial validation was completed using a sample of five individuals from the Hartsook Team; however, recommendations are to use samples between 100-200 participants. This larger sample size was obtained in Phase 2, and results from this part of the research are explained in chapter 4.

Lastly, it is recommended to revise the scale as necessary to increase reliability and improve construct representation (Tay & Jebb, 2017). Results from this part of the research did not present findings that required scale revision. However, as a result of Phase 2 of the research, further revision might occur to help develop a scale with higher item-total correlations and factor loadings on the two-scale dimensions. Development of this scale was a study within a study.

### **3.4.6 Moral Dilemma Scale Development - Sampling**

The survey was sent to students and staff of Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy to validate response options and check choice difficulty. Sample size was not set prior to sending the survey link. Five individuals from the Hartsook team responded to the survey. Given this group's experience and knowledge of scale development and validation, their scores and feedback were deemed appropriate to use to evaluate the scale. Sampling ceased after receiving the five responses because the data collected met the criteria for this sub-phase of the research project (Mason, 2010).

### **3.4.7 Moral Dilemma Scale Development - Procedures**

#### *Prior to Data Collection*

Following the thematic analysis of Phase 1, results-based moral dilemma scenarios and response options were created. These scenarios were constructed based on example moral dilemmas provided through the interviews from Phase 2. The response options were created based on strict criteria regarding the object of option and the contrasting moral foundations (see Table 3.10 below). The final contrasting options for each moral dilemma reflected the options 1.) stronger loyalty over care and weaker loyalty and 2.)

stronger care over loyalty and weaker care. Overall, response options were created for nine moral dilemma scenarios reflective of this formula.

Table 3.10: Criteria for developing contrasting moral dilemma response options.

Object	Loyalty	Care
Group	1. Stronger loyalty over care	1. Stronger care over loyalty
	2. Stronger loyalty over weaker loyalty	2. Stronger care over weaker care
	3. Stronger loyalty over care and weaker loyalty	3. Stronger care over weaker care and loyalty
Individual (a member of the group)	1. Stronger loyalty over weaker loyalty	1. Stronger care over weaker care
	2. Stronger loyalty over care	2. Stronger care over loyalty
	3. Stronger loyalty over care and weaker loyalty	3. Stronger care over weaker care and loyalty

Source: Author's own work

Once the dilemmas and response options were created, they were pilot tested for difficulty and meaning. The pilot study was used to specifically evaluate and test the definitions used for the moral dilemmas and moral dilemma choices. The responses were evaluated in three ways:

1. Examine the difficulty level of the options.
2. Examine the accuracy of choice definitions.
3. Identify applicable recommendations to improve the clarity of scenarios and choices through text comments.

*Examine the difficulty level of the options.*

Participants were asked to rate the difficulty level of both care and loyalty responses on a scale from 1 (Extremely easy) to 7 (Extremely difficult). This was to ensure that participants did not select an option simply because it was an easier choice to make. The aim was that both loyalty/ingroup and care response options would be equally difficult to choose. The survey, in its entirety, can be found in Appendix 4.

Specifically, participants were asked, “Please rate how easy or difficult it is to understand the statement below from 'extremely difficult to understand' to 'extremely easy to understand.’”

*Examine the accuracy of choice definitions.*

Following the difficulty questions, participants were then presented with the researcher’s definitions of loyalty and care. After reading the definitions, participants were asked, “Using the definitions of care and loyalty above, what choice do you think this response is asking you to make?” Participants were then presented with the two response options from the formula with one response reflecting stronger loyalty over care and weaker loyalty and another reflecting stronger care over loyalty and weaker care. The choices reflected each of the six response options in the criteria table.

*Identify applicable recommendations to improve the clarity of scenarios and choices through text comments.*

Finally, participants were given a text box to offer further feedback about the survey. For each scenario and response options, participants were asked, “Please use the space below to provide any additional comments.” Further prompts included questions about legibility, understanding and improvements.

The results and suggestions from this survey were used to alter and verify the moral dilemma scale that was used for the large-scale survey for Phase 2.

*During Data Collection*

During data collection, participants followed a link to take the survey online.

Participants were required to answer all of the questions in order to complete the survey.

### *After Data Collection*

#### Determining Difficulty

Data was exported from Qualtrics as a CSV file. The Difficulty Question Columns were copied into a separate worksheet for analysis. To ensure no data was missing, the researcher confirmed that there were five responses below each column that represented a response for each participant. Additionally, the researcher cross-checked the question numbers from the CSV file with the PDF of the exported survey from Qualtrics.

To calculate the average difficulty rating, the researcher separated responses to reflect loyalty response options and care response options. The difficulty ratings for each participant were summed for loyalty response options and care response options separately. The average difficulty was calculated for each separate category.

Additionally, all scores were tallied, and the average difficulty rating for all response options (both categories combined) was calculated.

#### Moral dilemma response option definitions

Data was exported from Qualtrics as CSV file. The responses were coded to reflect participants selecting the right criteria option. Scoring was 1 = fully correct, 2 = partially correct, 3 = incorrect. Scores were tallied for completely correct answers and partially correct answers for both care response options and loyalty options separately. The tally of scores was divided by the total number of responses to determine the percentage of fully correct and partially correct answers. The percentages were used to determine the reliability that response options were actually asking participants to choose one moral foundation over another.

### **3.4.8 Phase 2 - Research Design**

#### **Experiment**

##### Survey Planning & Creation

Answers from the semi-structured interviews, information from previous research, and construct-relevant measures were used to create a close-ended question quantitative survey. Several standardised surveys were compiled ending in a questionnaire that measured implicit moral identity, types of cognition, emotions and demographic information. Participants were also asked to make instantaneous decisions about eight moral dilemmas.

Aligning with the postpositivist paradigm of inquiry, methods involved collecting quantitative data from a large sample. The hypotheses that were tested were precise and specific, and the results from the sample could be generalised to a broader population. To ensure these criteria were met, the best method to use was an electronic survey for several reasons. In general, questionnaires are less time consuming than interviews, so allow for a large amount of data to be collected without asking too much of a commitment from participants. Questionnaires are a common way to collect data, so people are familiar with the method. Lastly, questionnaires are a cost-effective method, especially when conducted electronically. Neither the investigator nor the participants needed to purchase any special software or electronic equipment to conduct the questionnaire.

Other methods that might have been used include mailed questionnaires and structured interviews. Both of these methods allow for standardisation with fixed questions that require a response. However, it was inappropriate to use these methods for various

reasons. It would have been difficult to obtain addresses of fundraisers as most communication is now online, mailing surveys is expensive, and it would have been extremely difficult to measure intuition from a returned survey (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Additionally, structured interviews would have needed to commence with hundreds of professionals to obtain the large sample size necessary. Analysing the responses of interviews requires some subjectivity which is contradictory to the efforts of postpositivists remaining as objective as possible (Howell, 2013). Based on the need for quantitative data collection, standardisation, and large sample sizes, the methods of semi-structured interviews, unstructured interviews, focus groups, and observation were not appropriate to use for Phase 2.

As it was clear that using an electronic questionnaire was the most appropriate method to use for Phase 2, the following steps were taken. In order to take part in the survey, participants firstly gave consent and agreement to participate in the research. They then verified that they were or had been professional fundraisers. They also verified that they were not using a mobile device, as one section of the survey was incompatible with this method of data collection. Once this information was provided, participants completed scales listed below over the course of approximately 25 minutes and submitted their surveys for analysis.

Participants then completed the scales below in the following order:

1. IAT – Implicit Association Test for moral identity
2. Intervention – Priming using Moral Foundations Questionnaire:  
subscales harm/care or ingroup/loyalty
3. Timed Moral Dilemmas
4. Positive Emotions Scales [randomised]

- a. Discrete Emotions Scale- Happiness
  - b. Dispositional positive emotion scale - Compassion
  - c. Dispositional positive emotion scale – Pride
  - d. State Hope Scale - Hope
5. Rational Experiential Inventory [REI] short-form – Reasoning and Intuition
  6. Self-Importance of Moral Identity [short-form]
  7. Manipulation Check – Moral Foundations Questionnaire (opposite subscale to that which was given during the Prime – harm/care or ingroup/loyalty)
  8. Demographic questions

### Quantitative Data Collection

The following sections outline the variables of interest and scales used to measure them. Each scale was scrutinised in terms of development, representation, reliability and validity. Through this scrutiny, the investigator’s awareness of potential biases and issues were addressed. Details of this scrutiny can be found in Appendix 3. Table 3.11 provides a summary of the functions and measurements of the variables of interest. The table is followed by a statement of purpose and a summary that justifies the appropriateness of the selected measures for the current study.

Section 3.4.10 includes a description of the sample participants in this phase and the target population for which results will be generalised. Lastly, procedures used prior to, during, and after data collection are explained.

### 3.4.9 Variables & Measures

The following table lists the variables of interest, their function within the study, the survey used to measure the variable, and the reference for each measure. After the table, there is a statement of purpose for each measure in order of their appearance in Table 3.11.

Table 3.11: Functions and measurements of variables of interest.

	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Measure (in order of completion)</b>	<b>Reference</b>
1.	IV – Implicit Moral Identity	Implicit attitudes are manifest as actions or judgments that are under the control of automatically activated evaluation, without the performer's awareness of that causation (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p.6-8).	IAT – Implicit Association Test	(Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998)
2.	Prime – Loyalty	An act of showing or giving support of or allegiance to a person or a group of people when one feels a sense of possession of or belonging to the person or group because of bounded moral values.	Moral Foundations Questionnaire – short form	(Graham <i>et al.</i> , 2011)
3.	Prime – Care	To respond to a need when one feels a sense of concern for the wellbeing of the person or group. This includes physical and psychological wellbeing.	Moral Foundations Questionnaire – short form	(Graham <i>et al.</i> , 2011)
4.	DV – Type of cognition	Moral Intuition: process “that occurs quickly, effortlessly and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008) automatic output of an underlying, largely unconscious set of interlinked moral concepts (Haidt, 2001) the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about a moral situation, without any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008)	Timed Moral Dilemmas	Semi-structured interviews
5.	DV – Care and Loyalty Choice strength	Care: to respond to a need when one feels a sense of concern for the wellbeing of the person or group. This includes physical and psychological wellbeing.	Moral Dilemma rated choice	Semi-structured interviews

		Loyalty: an act of showing or giving support of or allegiance to a person or a group of people when one feels a sense of possession of or belonging to the person or group because of bounded moral values.		
6.	Mediator 1 – Compassion	Feelings of concern for another’s wellbeing, facilitates nurturant behaviour toward offspring and significant others in need, and is elicited by cues of vulnerability, helplessness, “cuteness,” and distress (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006).	Dispositional positive emotion scale - Compassion	(Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006)
7.	Mediator 2 – Pride	experienced when one succeeds in a socially valued endeavour, enhancing social status within the group and rights to claim group resources (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006)	Dispositional positive emotion scale – Pride	(Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006)
8.	Other Mediator – Positive Emotions – Hope	Feelings that an expenditure of energy or effort could result in achieving a valued positive change in outcome (Cavanaugh, Bettman & Luce, 2015).	State Hope Scale	(Snyder <i>et al.</i> , 1996)
9.	Other Mediator – Positive Emotions - Happiness	High-arousal emotion felt when the environment signals an imminent improvement in resources, and one must expend energy to acquire that reward (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006)	Discrete Emotions Scale- Happiness	(Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016)
10.	DV – Type of Cognition Experiential/Rational	Rational System: conscious, relatively slow, analytical, relatively affect-free. Experiential System: learning system that is preconscious, rapid, automatic, holistic, primarily nonverbal, intimately associated with affect.	Rational – Experiential Inventory [REI] short-form	(Pacini & Epstein, 1999)
11.	Other – Explicit Moral Identity	A basis for social identification that people use to construct their self definitions. And like other identities, a person’s moral identity may be associated with certain beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours.	Self-Importance of Moral Identity [short-form]	(Aquino & Reed, 2002)
12.	Moderator – greater effect for men than women	compassion and care	Demographics	
13.	Moderator – greater effect for women than men	pride and loyalty	Demographics	
14.	Demographics	Particular characteristics of a population (Salkind, 2010)	Age, primary language spoken, education, years within fundraising, country where practising fundraising, gender	

## **1. Implicit Association Test [IAT]**

The IAT is a test that measures the differential association of target-concept discrimination and an attribute dimension. In this research, the target concept discrimination is *self vs other*, and the attribute dimension is *moral vs immoral*. As an implicit measure, the IAT is used to measure the associations that represent implicit attitudes participants hold in automatic cognition. In this research, the IAT will measure the extent to which people associate themselves with moral characteristics, measuring the construct implicit moral identity.

## **2. & 3. Moral Foundations Questionnaire [MFQ] Harm/Care and Ingroup/Loyalty Scales**

The Moral Foundations Questionnaire was used to prime the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty moral foundations. As an already valid and reliably established measure in the literature, the MFQ was used to enhance participants thinking towards these two moral foundations (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Items from both the moral judgments and moral relevance subscales of the MFQ were used to activate harm/care foundations and ingroup/loyalty foundations. This simulation was also expected to increase the state-based experience of compassion and pride.

Ultimately, the results of the survey responses of the two primed groups [harm/care group vs the ingroup/loyalty group] were used to determine how these moral foundations moderated the mediating effect of compassion and pride on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

#### **4. & 5. Moral Intuition and Moral Decision Strength [Timed Moral Dilemmas]**

Moral dilemma scenarios were used to measure two constructs – moral intuition and the effect of the prime. The dilemmas measured moral intuition based on the amount of time participants took to make a moral decision. The amount of time participants took to make a decision was recorded and used as a measurement of speed. Shorter reaction times reflected more intuitive responses, as individuals did not take the time to begin to engage in thoughtful cognition and reasoning.

Additionally, the strength of the response to the moral dilemma scenario measured the effect of the prime on participants' choices. The choice following the moral dilemma scenarios was based on a 7-point Likert Scale and asked participants how likely they would be to perform an act that was either Care-based or Loyalty-based. This response strength was used to see if the prime (Care or Loyalty MFQ questions) aligned with moral choices.

#### **6. & 7. Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale – Compassion, Pride**

The Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale – Compassion was used in this study to measure the participant's state-based feelings of compassion. The emotion of compassion has been linked to the harm/care moral foundation (Haidt, 2003). To date, there is a lack of empirical evidence supporting the relationship between positive moral emotions and moral intuition. In order to examine how positive moral emotions influence intuitive judgments within these foundations, the emotion of pride was also measured (Graham *et al.*, 2013). The DPES measure will be given to participants to test

whether the moral foundations priming questions have affected emotions of compassion and pride. The experience of these emotions will be evaluated to determine whether or not the constructs mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

### **8. State Hope Scale – Hope**

The State Hope Scale (Snyder *et al.*, 1996) was used to measure the positive emotion, hope, with the hypotheses that hope does not mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. The State Hope Scale measures the construct in a way that matches this research's definition of the construct: feelings that an expenditure of energy or effort could result in achieving a valued positive change in outcome (Cavanaugh, Bettman & Luce, 2015). And lastly, this measure was selected as it measures emotions as they are felt in the "here and now" so original items could be used to measure state-based emotions.

### **9. Discrete Emotions Questionnaire – Happiness Scale**

The Discrete Emotions Questionnaire was used to measure temporal happiness/joy to test whether any positive emotion might mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. The authors defined joy/happiness as a "positive emotion that could be associated with a variety of intensities of approach motivation" (Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016). It was expected that the emotion of happiness would not mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

## **10. Rational Experiential Inventory**

The short form of the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) was used as an explicit measure of the dependent variable, intuition. The measure examined rational-analytic cognitive processing and intuitive-experiential cognitive processing.

## **11. Self-Importance of Moral Identity**

The Self-Importance of Moral Identity measure was used to measure explicit moral identity. Although explicit moral identity was not a construct within the research hypotheses, it was measured to provide data for potential future studies. For future research, the relationship between explicit and implicit moral identity could be explored as it hasn't been reported in published literature (Shang & Kong, 2015). Additionally, the relationship between explicit moral identity and moral emotions has not been explored. In the current study, integrating this measure at the end of the survey ensured that the measurement of this construct would not affect the measurement of constructs of interest, such as implicit moral identity. Future work could include measuring the relationship between implicit and explicit moral identity, as well as examining new relationships in an exploratory way.

## **12. Demographics**

Demographic information was collected to identify characteristics of participants (Salkind, 2010). This information was then used to determine whether or not the individuals in the study were a representative sample of the target population for generalisation (Salkind, 2010). The demographic variables measured in the current

study were selected for several reasons. They were chosen to measure moderator variables, control variables, and descriptive variables. The moderator variable measured was gender. The control variables measured were age, relationship status, education, handedness, and primary language spoken. The descriptive variables measured were years within fundraising and country of practising fundraising.

Demographics were located at the end of the survey so that the explicit questions did not stimulate any identities that might influence responses. For example, although gender was a moderator variable, asking a participant their gender at the beginning of the survey might have triggered this identity, thereby influencing one's reported experience of emotions or response to the moral foundations questionnaire.

Only relevant, useful, and relevant demographic questions were used. This led to the asking of eight questions. In keeping demographic questions to a minimum, the researcher hoped to mitigate attrition and collect necessary information for data analysis and reporting.

### **Summary of evidence of appropriateness of the measures**

Each measure that is used to create the large-scale survey was reviewed and critiqued. Potential biases in the measures were addressed, and the representativeness of normative groups was verified where possible. Generally, the measures used have demonstrated reliability and validity in previous empirical research. Based on the support for the measures presented in the literature, it was determined that they were appropriate to use for the current study.

### **3.4.10 Phase 2 - Participants**

#### *Target Population*

The population of interest is a range of fundraising professionals, from various organisations and holding a variety of roles in English-speaking countries. The exact number of fundraisers within these countries is unknown; however, there are hundreds of thousands of charitable organisations that employ the fundraising staff that comprise the population of interest for the current study. In England and Wales alone, there are 168,000 charitable organisations registered with the Charity Commission (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2018). In the United States, there are over 1.5 million non-profit organisations registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) according to the National Centre for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) (McKeever, 2019).

To get an idea of the total population of fundraisers, data from professional membership organisations is helpful. The Association of Fundraising Professionals reports having over 30,000 individual members worldwide (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2019). The Institute of Fundraising reports having 6,000 individual members within the United Kingdom (Institute of Fundraising, 2018). The Fundraising Institute of Australia webpage doesn't share their membership numbers; however, their Facebook group has 3,029 members (Fundraising Institute of Australia, 2020). If these membership numbers are summed, 39,029 fundraisers subscribe to these professional organisations.

The above is not a complete list of professional fundraising membership associations or institutes in English-speaking countries. It is also not a requirement for fundraisers to belong to professional organisations in order to practice fundraising. As such, there are many more fundraisers employed by charitable organisations that do not necessarily

have active association memberships. Without complete data representing fundraising more completely, a moderate estimation of the population of fundraisers within the United Kingdom, United States and Australia could be in the upwards of over 200,000.

### *Sampling*

Initial estimates of the sample size necessary for Phase 2 of the research was based on recommendations determined by the population size, margin of error, confidence level and amount of variance expected in the data (Smith, 2019). The estimated population size is upwards of 200,000. The standard confidence level of +/- 5% was used for the margin of error. Although the questionnaire was an exploratory project examining relationships between variables that hadn't been studied before, a confidence level of 95% was used. This interval was selected to ensure the investigator would have assurance in the data. For assurance in the expected variance in the responses, recommendations suggest using 0.5 as it is forgiving and ensures the sample will be large enough (Smith, 2019). With these factors considered and defined, the calculated sample size needed was 385 respondents.

A random probability sample was preferred for the current project to ensure representation of the total population (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2017); however, it was too difficult to identify every member of the population pool and ensure they all had an equal chance of being selected as a participant. Unfortunately, there isn't a global list of professional fundraisers that would have provided the contact information necessary in order to invite all fundraisers to participate. In order to obtain relevant data within the population of interest, it was necessary to use convenience sampling. Although using this approach decreases the likelihood of a representative sample, it was the best approach to use in order to obtain the data needed for the project.

As such, as many fundraisers as possible were invited to participate based on reach, accessibility and availability. Given the connections of the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy's board of directors and staff, invitations to participate were sent to as many fundraisers as possible. In order to reach the highest number of fundraisers possible, recruitment focused on invitations to members of professional organisations or associations. Recruitment procedures are explained in full below, and over 15,000 professional fundraisers around the world were invited to take part in the survey. All participants were offered the option to receive their personal scores and/or enter a raffle to win an I-pad mini or £100 gift card.

Although the sampling goal was 385 participants, research ceased after receiving 188 responses. This decision was based on preliminary findings, the investigator's timeline, and the exhaustion of recruitment options. In some cases, researchers are able to use large survey databases such as MTurk in order to reach their sampling requirements. Using such databases was not an option for the current research, however, given the niche requirements of the population of interest. There simply is not a database of professional fundraisers who have signed up in a database to partake in voluntary or paid research surveys.

The investigator realises the actual sample size more closely represents a margin of error of approximately 7% (Raosoft, 2004). It also decreases the overall ability to generalise findings to the population.

### **3.4.11 Phase 2 – Procedures**

### *Prior to Data Collection*

Human subjects review process was completed prior to data collection. The application for ethics approval was submitted on 20th November 2016. The Faculty of Business Research emailed confirmed receipt of application on 22nd November 2016, and approval was granted on 15th December 2016 (letter can be found in Appendix 5).

Data was collected with permission from appropriate organisations including the Hartsook Centre of Sustainable Philanthropy, the Institute of Fundraising, Rogare, the Association of NHS Charities and Fundraising UK professional member group.

Participants agreed voluntarily to provide data to use for the research. A secure virtual location was used to store data. Data was collected using Qualtrics, which is password protected. Once data collection was complete, data was downloaded and kept on a personal jump drive that is encrypted and requires a password to access.

Participant demographic data were included at the end of the survey. Informed consent was asked of participants based on guidance from the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy team and previous research projects. Consent included answers to the following questions:

- What is the purpose of the study?
- Who can take part?
- What do I have to do?
- What will happen to the information that I give?
- Who are the researchers and who is funding the research?
- Can I withdraw from the study?
- Will my taking part be confidential
- Do I have to take part?

- Researchers contact information

A digital consent form was located at the beginning of the survey, and agreement was required prior to any participant proceeding with the research study. The consent form text was approved with ethics approval from Plymouth University. Minor changes were made to add some specification regarding participants who could take part, but all content themes remained the same.

The presentation of measures was strategically constructed to minimise order effect, especially in regards to implicit vs explicit measures. The implicit moral identity measure was listed first in the full survey, and the explicit moral identity measure was ordered last in the full survey. This was because the hypotheses for Phase 2 were not concerned with explicit moral identity; however, the construct was measured for exploratory purposes in the future. In order to reduce any order effects that may have resulted from the implicit measure, seven other scales were given to participants before the explicit moral identity measure. Emotion measures were slightly altered so that items reflected in-the-moment experiences. It was important to understand how participants felt while completing the moral scenario items. The instructions of the emotion measures and the manipulation check consistently asked participants to think about how they felt while completing the moral scenarios and then asked them to rank their responses to various scale items.

To demonstrate the overview of the study, constructs, manipulations, and variables, below is a table outlining constructs, variable roles & types, scoring, measurement, and the variable name used for data analysis.

Table 3.12: Constructs, variables, scoring and variable name.

Construct	Variable Role	Variable Type	Scoring	Measure	Variable Name (SPSS)
Implicit Moral Identity	Predictor	Continuous	D scores IAT	IAT	IAT_MI_D_SCORE
Moral Intuition	Outcome	Continuous	Response time	Moral scenarios	CARE_MI_TOT_SCORE LOY_MI_TOT_SCORE
Moral Intuition	Outcome	Ordinal	7-point Likert scale	Moral scenarios	CARE_STR_TOT_SCORE LOY_STR_TOT_SCORE
Moral Foundation – Ingroup/Loyalty	Prime	Nominal	Loyalty = 1 Care = 0 And Care = 1 Loy = 0	MFQ	LOY_TOT_PRIME_SCORE CARE_TOT_PRIME_SCORE Care1Loyalty0
Moral Emotion – Compassion	Mediator	Ordinal	7-point Likert scale	DPES	COMP_SCORE
Moral Emotion – Pride	Mediator	Ordinal	7-point Likert scale	DPES	PRIDE_SCORE
Positive Emotion – Hope	Control	Ordinal	7-point Likert scale	State Hope Scale	HOPE_SCORE
Positive Emotion – Happiness	Control	Ordinal	7-point Likert scale	Discrete Emotions Scale	HAPPY_SCORE
Gender	Moderator	Nominal	Male = 1, Female = 0	Demographics	Q102_GEN_M1n_F1p
Explicit Moral Identity	Predictor	Ordinal	7-point Likert	Self-Importance modified	EXP_MI_SCORE
Moral Foundation – Ingroup/Loyalty	Manipulation Check	Ordinal	7-point Likert scale	MFQ\$	LOY_CHECK_TOT_SCORE CARE_CHECK_TOT_SCORE

The data collection measure consisted of a survey made up of 8 sections. The section, measure used, construct of interest, and details of how the data collected would be recorded may be found below.

- 1) In the first section, participants completed the IAT that measured implicit moral identity.

- a. IAT D scores were used to identify participants with high vs low implicit moral identity. Large, positive D scores indicated that participants had high implicit moral identity.
- 2) The second section contained the manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. In their group, they completed a measure of either harm/care or ingroup/loyalty (Moral Foundations Questionnaire). This measure was used to prime participants' thinking in alignment with these two moral foundations.
- a. There were two expectations as a result of the manipulation
    - i. Firstly, it was expected that individuals would experience a stronger moral emotion related to their manipulation group than the other moral emotion and positive emotions. For example, ingroup/loyalty is linked to pride, so individuals assigned to complete the ingroup/loyalty questions from the MFQ were expected to score higher on the pride measure than those assigned to the harm/care group, and were expected to score higher on the pride measure than on the other emotional measures (happiness, hope, and compassion).
    - ii. Secondly, it was expected that responses to the moral scenarios would align with manipulation groups. So individuals assigned to the ingroup/Loyalty group in the manipulation would respond with stronger 'Likely to' responses for loyalty-based actions than individuals assigned to the harm/care group, and they would have stronger "likely to" responses for loyalty-based actions than care-based actions.

- 3) In the third section, participants were randomly assigned to one of two blocks of 8 moral scenario questions. Participants' read a fundraising-related moral scenario. They were then presented with an action that aligned with either the harm/care moral foundation or the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation. Participants had 18 seconds to read the option and rate the likelihood that they would perform the action. The rating measured the strength of participants' alignment with moral foundations (CARE\_STR\_SCORE/ LOY\_STR\_SCORE). Response time was recorded as a way to measure moral intuition based on the quickness of decision-making (CARE\_MI\_SCORE / LOY\_MI\_SCORE).
- a. There were three expectations in this section:
    - i. Firstly, the strength of responses to the moral scenarios was expected to correlate with the manipulation group, such that individuals assigned to harm/care group would respond more strongly to perform care-based actions than loyalty-based actions.
    - ii. Secondly, the amount of time taken to respond to moral scenarios was expected to correlate with moral intuition as measured by IAT D scores, such that individuals with high IAT D scores would take less time to make a decision.
    - iii. Thirdly, the amount of time taken to respond to moral scenarios was expected to correlate with intuition as measured by REI-Trust in Intuition scores, such that individuals with high REI-Trust in Intuition scores would take less time to make a decision.
- 4) In the fourth section, participants were then asked to reflect on how they felt while completing the moral scenarios. They then responded to four measures of moral emotions and positive emotions. The four measures appeared in a random order, and the questions within the measure were randomised. Moral emotions

were expected to mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity (IAT D Scores) and moral intuition (moral scenario response time and REI-Faith in Intuition). Emotions that were measured include:

a. Compassion (DPES)

- i. It was expected that individuals primed with harm/care would score higher on this measure than the other three emotion measures.

b. Pride (DPES)

- i. It was expected that individuals primed with ingroup/loyalty would score higher on this measure than the other three emotion measures.

c. Hope (State Hope Scale)

- i. It was expected that neither prime would influence scores on this measure.

d. Happiness (Discrete Emotions Scale)

- i. It was expected that neither prime would influence scores on this measure.

5) In the fifth section, participants were asked to continue to reflect on how they felt while working through the moral scenarios. They then responded to an explicit measure of intuition and reasoning (Rational Experiential Inventory – Short Form). The measure resulted in scores on Faith in Intuition and Cognition.

a. There were three expectations from this section.

- i. Firstly, it was expected that individuals with high implicit moral identity scores would have high scores on the Faith in Intuition scale.

- ii. Secondly, it was expected that individuals with high implicit moral identity scores would have lower scores on the Need for Cognition scale.
  - iii. Lastly, it was expected that a quicker timed response to the moral scenarios would be positively correlated with Faith in Intuition scores.
- 6) In the sixth section, participants responded to questions measuring Explicit Moral Identity (Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale).
  - a. Explicit moral identity was measured to further examine the construct's relationship with implicit moral identity in future research.
  - b. Relationships with moral emotions and moral intuition would be exploratory only.
- 7) In the seventh section, participants responded to the alternate measure used for the manipulation. So if a participant was assigned to the Care group, they would respond to the Loyalty MFQ scale in this section.
  - a. Responses to this section would be used to compare the participant's responses to moral scenarios and moral emotion measures. If an individual's responses to the manipulation check were higher than responses to the prime, than they may have had a stronger disposition toward one moral foundation, thereby influencing their responses to the moral scenarios and emotion measures.
- 8) The eighth section was a set of demographic questions such as age, gender, and employment-related questions.
  - a. It was expected that gender would moderate the relationship between implicit moral identity and the experience of moral emotions. Men were expected to have a stronger experience of pride than compassion, hope or

happiness; and women were expected to have a stronger experience of compassion than pride, hope or happiness.

Pilot testing of data collection measures was conducted to ensure the order was accurate, responses were appropriately recorded, scales were randomised, and data from the scales was uploaded to Qualtrics for downloading and analysis. Adjustments were made when necessary.

Participants were recruited through advertisements in multiple sources including personal newsletters of the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy's Board of Trustees, the Institute of Fundraising, Rogare, the Association of NHS Charities, the UK Fundraising Blog, and within conference presentations. Individuals who were members or known to the groups above were selected as participants for the research. A detailed listing of recruitment procedures can be found below in Table 6. The invitation for research can be found in Appendix 6.

Table 3.13 Recruitment Procedures

Date	Source	Members/Audience	Notes
1-11-2017	IoF –blog	4,000	
2-11-2017	IoF – Newsletter	4,000	Little traction
10-11-2017	SLACK General Post	122	
12-11-2017	SLACK – Research post	122	
17-11-2017	Email from Adrian to Hartsook Board Members	8	
19-11-2017	Personal links and email sent to NHS Charity Fundraisers	99	
20-11-2017	Sent in Joyaux Associates newsletter	??	Emma Forwarded email on 21-11-2017
20-11-2017	Sent in The Agitator by Roger Craver	??	
22-11-2017	Sent to contacts from Jonathan Smith	??	In 10-12-17 email ‘How Ethical Are You?’
26-11-2017	Email sent from American colleagues to contacts	1 (for 10)	Matt Taylor email shows Rachelle’s email 27-11-2017
11-12-2017	Blog posted for UK Fundraising Page	3,986 (FB)	Howard Lake Email (11-12-17)
5-12-2017	Critical Fundraising Forum Post	995	
12-12-2017	Reminder Email from Adrian Sargeant to Hartsook Board Members		
19-12-2017	NHS Charity Fundraisers Group Reminder	75	
11-1-2018	Critical Fundraising Forum Post	995	
11-1-2018	Email sent to Howard Lake re: UK Fundraising plug again		
11-1-2018	Post on IoF FB Page	6,062	

#### *During Data Collection*

During data collection, instructions for participants were included in text format at the beginning of the survey. Participants were required to read the text and then complete the survey.

Once participants completed the survey, data was automatically kept within Qualtrics to be downloaded and used for analysis. The researcher was able to check how many participants had completed the survey. Due to the confidentiality of the survey and the inability to identify participants, the researcher was unable to send reminder emails for participants who may have failed to complete their survey.

At the end of the survey, participants were asked if they would like to receive a summary of the dissertation findings. If they selected yes, they were required to provide an email address to be used for communication only. This data was not used to identify the participant in any way. Participants were also given contact information so they could request further information or support in dealing with any issues or concerns that may have occurred as a result of completing the measures.

#### *After Data Collection*

After data was collected, the data was downloaded and analysed. Recommendations by SAGE were used to direct the six steps for analysing the data (O'Leary, 2016). The six steps are 1.) managing the data, 2.) understanding variable types, 3.) running descriptive statistics, 4.) running appropriate inferential statistics, 5.) selecting the right statistical tests, and finally, 6.) looking for statistical significance.

#### **Data Management (Validation /Cleaning Checks)**

Data management involved becoming familiar with the data and analysis software. It also entails screening the data, entering the data into SPSS and 'cleaning' the data (O'Leary, 2016).

The researcher used SPSS because it is a well-known and respected statistical software program used in social science research (Field, 2009). The researcher had previous experience using SPSS from Masters Level postgraduate work; however, in order to ensure the researcher was utilising the most up-to-date software functions, the researcher refamiliarised herself with SPSS through various resources. The researcher read *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS* (Field, 2009), watched SPSS training videos available on Plymouth University's online learning portal, Lynda, and read several of Andrew Hayes work on mediation, moderation and conditional process analysis (Hayes, 2013; Hayes, 2018; Hayes, Montoya & Rockwood, 2017).

Data was downloaded from Qualtrics and imported into SPSS. This ensured the survey questions and responses were directly pulled from the survey that was viewed by participants. Data was then checked for accuracy. The researcher performed a range check such that correct number values for all questions were within the specified range. All survey scales that used Likert-scale responses ranged from 1-7.

Additionally, a presence check was performed, ensuring that there were a total of 188 responses for all questions. In some instances, only 94 responses would be required, for example, in the priming scale responses. Any incomplete data sets were removed from analysis.

### **Understanding variable types**

In order to demonstrate that the researcher understood variable types, the researcher distinguished variables and how they would be measured. Variables were initially

identified as predictor, outcome, mediator, or moderator variables. The responses were then set as a nominal or ordinal scale based on the measurement technique. The researcher then scored individual scale items so that responses matched scale scoring. According to scale development/user guidelines, items that were negatively phrased were reverse-scored (Graham *et al.*, 2011; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Items of scales that comprised variables were then summed. Summed scores were used for variable analysis.

### **Running descriptive statistics**

This step was used to summarise the basic features of the data set using measures of central tendency, and dispersion. Central tendency was summarised through mean, mode, and median scores of variables. Data dispersion was measured through standard deviation. Furthermore, internal consistency was checked for all scales and subscales. Alpha reliabilities were calculated for variable scales.

### **Running inferential statistics**

Inferential statistics were run to help understand how conclusions from the study might be applied beyond the sample. Demographic statistics were run to further understand the sample size and response rate, gender, age, marital status, educational level, and country of employment for the sample.


### **Selecting the appropriate statistical test**

Finally, the researcher selected the appropriate statistical test as a demonstration of knowledge of the nature of the variables, scale of measurement, distribution shape, and types of question asked. The research question asked not just if implicit moral identity and moral intuition are related, but also how implicit moral identity exerts its effect on moral intuition and when implicit moral identity affects moral emotions. These complex questions introduced mediation and moderation to a simple equation of whether or not X effects Y (Hayes, 2013).

Mediation analysis is used to “quantify and examine the direct and indirect pathways through which an antecedent variable X transmits its effect on a consequent variable Y through one or more intermediary or mediator variables” (Hayes, 2013, p.10). The question involving mediation was whether implicit moral identity (X) exerted its effect on moral intuition (Y) through the experience of moral emotions (M). Moderation analysis is used to “examine how the effect of antecedent variable X on a consequent Y depends on a third variable or set of variables” (Hayes, 2013, p.10). The question involving moderation was whether implicit moral identity (X) affects the experience of moral emotions (M) based on moral foundation priming (W) and furthermore, whether the moral foundation priming (W) affected the experience of moral emotions (M) based on gender (Z). Both mediation and moderation were present in each of the four hypotheses.

Sometimes, given the complexity of hypotheses, conceptual diagrams are used to understand how the variables interact with one another in an experiment (Hayes, 2013). The conceptual diagram that was used for the current study can be found in Figure 3.2 below.

Figure 3.2: Moderated Moderated Mediation Research Model for the current research



This diagram depicts moderated moderated mediation. The process linking implicit moral identity to moral intuition through the experience of moral emotions is moderated or conditional. The term used to describe this relationship is called a conditional process model (Hayes, 2013). Examination used conditional process analysis techniques (Hayes, 2013). “Conditional process analysis is used when one’s research goal is to describe the conditional nature of the mechanism or mechanisms by which a variable transmits its effect on another and testing hypotheses about such contingent effects” (Hayes, 2013, p.10).

To run conditional process analysis techniques required complex statistical analysis software. The software selected for the current study was SPSS, which is a well-known statistical software program (Field, 2009). The software is available through The University of Plymouth resources, demonstrating the University’s support of using this software for research analysis. Furthermore, SPSS is very user-friendly, with many analysis tests built-in; however, the software is designed to allow researchers to tailor tests to particular needs (Field, 2009). Additionally, and most importantly, the use of SPSS allowed the researcher to add on PROCESS software. PROCESS is a statistics

software that was specially designed by Andrew Hayes to perform conditional process analysis within SPSS and SAS analysis software program (Hayes, 2013).

PROCESS has multiple models built into its programming that include moderation and mediation in various combinations. Output from PROCESS also estimates conditional and unconditional direct and indirect effects, as well as other information needed to determine inference. The output is displayed in an easy-to-read table that includes standard errors, p-values, and confidence intervals for direct effects. For conditional indirect effects, outputs include bootstrap confidence intervals. Like in SPSS, PROCESS also enables researchers to tailor tests to fit particular needs, such as centring variables or requesting conditional effects for percentiles or specific values of moderators.

The conceptual diagram was then converted into a statistical model. The statistical model included multiple parallel mediators. Multiple parallel mediators are defined as influencing the relationship between X and Y, with the condition that no mediator causally influences another. In the current project, the multiple mediators were the experience of moral emotions, pride and compassion.

The statistical model was then dissected into parameters that were entered into PROCESS. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to analyse the data. OLS regression is a “statistical method of analysis that estimates the relationship between one or more independent variables and a dependent variable” (Poston Jr, 2008). OLS regression method “estimates the relationship by minimising the sum of the squares in the difference between the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable configured as a straight line” (Poston Jr, 2008).

Historically, using OLS regression for simple mediation models is commonplace; however, some have argued that more complex mediation models require a maximum likelihood-based Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) programs (Hayes, 2013). Although there are some advantages for the estimation of parallel multiple mediation models, Hayes counters that it is not necessary or better to use these programs over PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Hayes, Montoya & Rockwood, 2017). One advantage is that SEM programs allow users control over the estimation method and the configuration of variables in the model, whereas PROCESS forces users to estimate a model it is programmed to estimate (Hayes, 2013). This advantage was unnecessary for the current project as the conceptual diagrams used for the current project's hypotheses fit model 12 perfectly. The counterargument involving different outputs from SEM programs and PROCESS's OLS regression outputs was tested by Hayes himself (2013). Results demonstrated that the coefficients in PROCESS were the same as maximum likelihood estimates in SEM programs to three decimal places and only tiny differences existed between standard errors (Hayes, 2013). For these reasons, the researcher determined the use of PROCESS and OLS regression was adequate for quantitative analysis for the current study.

In addition to using OLS regression, analysis included bootstrap confidence intervals in order to make a statistical inference about the indirect effects conditioned on the moderators. The Normal Theory Approach could have been used; however, it was decided not to use this approach for several reasons. Firstly, this approach isn't recommended, "unless one has no other alternative" (Hayes, 2013, p.349), and it is lower in power than bootstrap confidence intervals. More importantly, the moral theory

approach assumes a normal shape of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect (Hayes, 2013).

Instead, bootstrap confidence intervals were used because it is a versatile method that has been around for at least a few decades. Bootstrap confidence intervals do not assume a normal distribution of the sample used in research. Instead, statistical software computes empirically generated representations of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect, which is then used to construct confidence intervals. “Bootstrap confidence intervals better respect the irregularity of the sampling distribution and, as a result, yield inferences that are more likely to be accurate than when the normal theory approach is used” (Hayes, 2013, p.106).

With the confidence that using OLS regression in PROCESS was the most appropriate statistical analysis for the current project, the following paragraphs outline the methods used for each of the four hypotheses for Phase 2. Table 3.14 below provides an overview of variables and constructs measured within each hypothesis.

Table 3.14: Overview of variables and constructs measured for four hypotheses.

	<b>Hypothesis 1</b>	<b>Hypothesis 2</b>	<b>Hypothesis 3</b>	<b>Hypothesis 4</b>
X	Implicit Moral Identity	Implicit Moral Identity	Implicit Moral Identity	Implicit Moral Identity
M1	Feelings of compassion	Feelings of compassion	Feelings of compassion	Feelings of compassion
M2	Feelings of pride	Feelings of pride	Feelings of pride	Feelings of pride
M3		Feelings of happiness	Feelings of happiness	Feelings of happiness
M4		Feelings of hope	Feelings of hope	Feelings of hope
W	Prime Group	Prime Group	Prime Group	Prime Group
Z	Gender	Gender	Gender	Gender
Y1	Faith in Intuition	Care Moral Dilemma Response Time	Mean scores of strength of care moral dilemma responses	Mean scores of factor 3 of loyalty moral dilemma responses
Y2	Response Time	Loyalty Moral Dilemma Response Time		

For the first hypothesis, relevant mean scores and categorical variables were analysed in PROCESS model 12 within SPSS. Results were bootstrapped for 10,000 with 95% confidence intervals. In this model, implicit moral identity was entered as a predictor (X), feelings of compassion (M1) and pride (M2) as mediators, prime group of loyalty or care (W) and gender (Z) as moderators, and faith in intuition scores (Y1) and response time (Y2) as outcome variables. In this and every subsequent analysis, mediators are run parallel to each other. Analyses for each Y variable were performed separately in PROCESS. Covariates held constant were age, dominant hand, relationship status, and education.

For the second hypothesis, relevant mean scores and categorical variables were analysed in PROCESS model 12 within SPSS. Results were bootstrapped for 10,000 with 95% confidence intervals. In this model, implicit moral identity was entered as a predictor (X), feelings of compassion (M1), pride (M2), happiness (M3) and hope (M4) as mediators, prime group of loyalty or care (W) and gender (Z) as moderators, and care

moral dilemma response time (Y1) and loyalty moral dilemma response time (Y2) as outcome variables. As stated in hypothesis 1, mediators in this model are parallel to each other. Analyses for each Y variable were performed separately in SPSS - PROCESS. Covariates held constant were age, dominant hand, relationship status, and education.

To ensure a difference in means based solely on gender does not exist independently of the proposed interactions, independent samples t-tests comparing feelings of compassion, feelings of pride, care dilemma response time and loyalty dilemma response time for men and women were conducted.

For the third hypothesis, relevant mean scores and categorical variables were analysed in PROCESS model 12 within SPSS. Results were bootstrapped for 10,000 with 95% confidence intervals. In this model, implicit moral identity was entered as a predictor (X), feelings of compassion (M1), pride (M2), happiness (M3), and hope (M4) as parallel mediators, prime group of loyalty or care (W) and gender (Z) as moderators, and mean scores of strength of care moral dilemma responses (Y1) as the outcome variable. Analysis was performed in SPSS - PROCESS. Covariates held constant were age, dominant hand, relationship status, and education.

For the fourth hypothesis, relevant mean scores and categorical variables were analysed in PROCESS model 12 within SPSS. Results were bootstrapped for 10,000 with 95% confidence intervals. In this model, implicit moral identity was entered as a predictor (X), feelings of compassion (M1), pride (M2), happiness (M3), and hope (M4) as parallel mediators, prime group of loyalty or care (W) and gender (Z) as moderators, and mean scores of factor 3 of loyalty moral dilemma responses (highest loading factor

for loyalty moral dilemma responses) (Y1) as the outcome variable. Analysis was performed in SPSS - PROCESS. Covariates held constant were age, dominant hand, relationship status, and education.

### **3.5 Summary**

In order to fulfil the research aims, this chapter described the research strategy, methodology and procedures prior to, during, and after data collection. The researcher then evaluated research philosophy and located herself within the research paradigm of postpositivism. To align with postpositivism, mixed methods were used to conduct the research. The qualitative semi-structured interviews created a scale, which was used for the design of the large-scale survey. The quantitative survey explored the mediating influence of moral emotions on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition within fundraisers. It also examined the moderating influence of gender and moral foundations on the effects.

## **Chapter Four: Phase 1 Findings**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The following chapter presents the results of the thematic analysis of the semi-structured interviews. Initially, the aims of the semi-structured interviews are presented again as a reminder to the reader. Next, a composition of the interviewees is presented. As limited demographic information was collected during Phase 1, the composition is quite thin. Following the composition, results from both the theoretical thematic analysis and inductive thematic analysis are described. The inductive analysis results are practical themes, and the theoretical analysis results are themes related to intuition and the Moral Foundations Theory (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Tables and quoted data are used to demonstrate the quality of the qualitative data.

#### **Aims of the Semi-Structured Interviews**

The semi-structured interviews were conducted to answer the following research questions:

- What kind of moral dilemmas do fundraisers encounter that require intuitive responses, and how do they solve them?
- Do the moral dilemmas align with moral foundations?

### **4.2 Composition of Phase 1 Interviewees**

The qualitative research consisted of interviewing ten participants, as previously described in Chapter 3. Due to the referral process used to recruit this small sample,

Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy staff deemed collecting basic demographic information inappropriate and unnecessary.

Table 4.1: Phase 1 participant demographics.

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Location</b>
1	M	Charity Trustee	United States
2	F	Charity Executive Director	United Kingdom
3	F	Fundraising Consultant	United States
4	F	Fundraising Consultant	United States
5	F	Charity Fundraising Director	Italy
6	M	Charity Executive Director	Australia
7	M	Charity Executive Director	United Kingdom
8	F	Director of Development	United Kingdom
9	M	Professor of Philanthropic Studies and Dean	United States
10	M	Vice President	United Kingdom

Interviewees consisted of five males and five females, all residing and working in Westernised societies. Positions held by interviewees over the course of their careers included Development Officer, Development Director, CEO, Head of Marketing, Assistant Director, Dean, and Consultant. Interviewees had experience working in over 31 organisations from 19 different categories (e.g. youth, animal, homeless focused organisations) in the third sector. Many of the interviewees also served in various volunteer roles as board members for organisations.

The sample used was purposely not representative of the population to which data would be applied; however, interviewees still represented a variety of different genders, charity roles, charity categories, and geographic locations. As interviewees were experts in the field and held quite senior roles in fundraising, there was a worry that their interview responses would be rather narrow and senior-focused. In order to ensure dilemma scenarios included situations involved varying levels of seniority, interview questions included specific prompts to describe scenarios that junior fundraisers

experience. Interviewees were also asked to consider what types of moral dilemmas their junior staff members encounter in today's fundraising climate. Additionally, prompts were used when necessary to doubly ensure interviews captured a wide breadth of situations.

### **4.3 Thematic Analysis Findings**

The investigator performed the six phases of thematic analysis on the data collected from semi-structured interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The six phases are:

- 1.) familiarising yourself with your data
- 2.) generating initial codes
- 3.) searching for themes
- 4.) reviewing themes
- 5.) defining and naming themes
- 6.) producing the report

Themes were identified using both theoretical analysis and inductive analysis. In addition to just identifying, defining, and naming themes, themes were also counted and grouped. Through counting and grouping themes, the researcher could confidently report the frequency and importance of themes.

Data collected resulted in descriptions of a total of 61 moral dilemma situations and 96 possible dilemma responses. Dilemma responses mapped to 38 of the 61 moral dilemmas. Some dilemmas were described without the possible responses interviewees could have actioned. Other dilemmas were further explained with three possible

responses. Dilemmas were then coded based on the question asked, with 17 dilemmas coded for question 1, 26 dilemmas coded for question 2, and 17 coded for question 3.

As the emphasis of the current research was on moral intuition, theoretical analysis was conducted initially, resulting in 56 moral dilemma situations mapping to competing moral foundations (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Following this, inductive analysis was performed on the 56 dilemmas to identify practical themes. Lastly, theoretical analysis examined the 97 moral dilemma responses and mapped them to moral foundations (Graham *et al.*, 2011).

#### **4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis – Moral Intuition and Moral Foundations Themes**

##### *Introduction*

During the theoretical thematic analysis, it was discovered that most of the moral dilemma scenarios had two or more responses that could be mapped to the five moral foundations. However, only 56 of the moral dilemma scenarios consisted of responses that represented competing moral foundations (i.e. harm/care vs purity/sanctity). Due to this research's emphasis on moral intuition and the moral foundations theory, it was determined that these 56 moral dilemma scenarios best answered the research questions. Accordingly, these 56 moral dilemmas were used for further analysis.

Analysis of the responses from these 56 dilemmas resulted in a variety of moral foundation combinations. There were a total of 15 possible combinations, as shown in Table 4.2 below. Five moral foundation combinations were not mapped to any dilemmas: fairness/reciprocity and purity/sanctity, fairness/reciprocity and

fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect and authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty and ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity and purity/sanctity. Four combinations were only mapped to one dilemma each: harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, harm/care and purity/sanctity, fairness/reciprocity and authority/respect, purity/sanctity and authority/respect.

Table 4.2. Moral dilemmas categorised according to moral foundation alternative responses combinations.

	Harm/Care	Fairness/Rec	Ingroup/Loy	Authority/Res	Purity/Sanctity
Harm/Care	2	1	21	5	1
Fairness/Rec	1	0	7	1	0
Ingroup/Loy	21	7	0	5	12
Auth/Respect	5	1	5	0	1
Purity/Sanctity	1	0	12	1	0

Of the remaining six possible combinations, moral dilemmas mapped most frequently to ingroup/loyalty and harm/care (21). Moral dilemmas mapped to the other combinations as follows: ingroup/loyalty and purity/sanctity (12), ingroup/loyalty and fairness/reciprocity (7), harm/care and authority/respect (5), ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect (5), and harm/care and harm/care (2).

In addition to moral dilemma analysis, the moral dilemma responses provided by interviewees were mapped to moral foundations. Of the 97 responses provided, almost two-thirds were mapped to two foundations: harm/care (30) and ingroup/loyalty (32). This separate analysis confirmed the results of the findings reported for mapping dilemmas to moral foundation alternatives. The moral dilemma response mappings can be seen in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Moral dilemma responses mapped to moral foundations.

	Harm/ Care	Fairness/ Reciprocity	Ingroup/ Loyalty	Authority/ Respect	Purity/ Sanctity
Q1	13	9	15	6	2
Q2	9	2	10	6	5
Q3	8	4	7	1	0
<b>Total (96)</b>	30	14	32	14	7
<b>Percentage</b>	31%	14%	33%	14%	7%

In addition to the quantified analysis, quality for excellence for the qualitative research was also demonstrated. The following paragraphs demonstrate the rigour, credibility, and meaningful coherence of this phase (Tracy, 2010). Firstly, rigour is demonstrated through examples of appropriate and complex theoretical constructs, such as intuition and the Moral Foundations Theory, in quoted responses (Graham *et al.*, 2011; Tracy, 2010). Secondly, credibility is displayed through the thick description and concrete detail of participant quoted examples. And thirdly, meaningful coherence is exhibited through the way the descriptive paragraphs make a meaningful connection between the literature and findings.

The following sections provide a deeper explanation of the thematic analysis findings. The demonstration includes explanatory paragraphs and quotes from participants. The quotes specifically show how the data collected reflected intuition and linkage to the MFT.

### **Illustrations of Intuition**

Of the interviewee responses, 18 of the 56 moral dilemma situations were described when participants were asked about situations that occurred under the most intense time pressure (question 1). To further explore how fundraisers used intuition to solve moral dilemmas, specific phrases and terms commonly associated with intuition were

identified within participant responses. Interviewees explained whom they made decisions using intuition with phrases like, “not a thought,” “instantaneously,” and “right then and there.” Based on the definition of intuition used for this research, “that occurs quickly, effortlessly and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness,” these phrases demonstrated the use of intuition to solve moral dilemmas (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). Specific examples of the use of intuition can be found in table 4.6.

The examples show interviewee responses supported the research question asking how fundraisers use intuition in solving moral dilemmas in the workplace. Interviewees described several situations they felt occurred while under time pressure and used words and phrases indicating that decisions were made instinctually. The confidence in being able to make decisions based on ‘gut instinct’ may also be the result of interviewees holding senior roles and having a long history of experience in the field. It may also be the result of interviewees trusting in their intuitions, which can vary from person to person regardless of professional experience (Epstein *et al.*, 1996; Wittman *et al.*, 2009). Interestingly, only one of the participants mentioned using “intuitive signals” when making moral decisions. This demonstrated that, although interviewees were using intuition in some cases, they were unaware of such an occurrence. This lack of awareness and understanding of how we make decisions in moral dilemma situations will be further examined in Phase 2 of the current research project.

### **Illustrations of the Five Moral Foundations**

To answer the objective of how fundraisers use moral intuition to solve moral dilemmas, data analysis categorized moral dilemma situations and response options

based on the definitions of the five moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). The five moral foundations include harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). The total 97 response options were categorized to align with individual moral foundations. The 56 moral dilemma scenarios were categorized to align with two moral foundations (each representing one of the two alternative response options available to interviewees). This stage of the analysis connected the current research with existing literature and theories of moral intuition and moral foundations (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008).

As shown in Table 4.4, of the 97 response options described, 32 illustrated ingroup/loyalty (33%), 30 illustrated the foundation of harm/care (31%), 14 illustrated fairness/reciprocity (14%), 14 illustrated authority/respect (14%) and 7 represented purity/sanctity (7%). Further analysis uncovered patterns and themes that are described in the following sections.

Table 4.4: Moral dilemma response options categorized by practical themes and moral foundation themes.

<b>Fundraising Type/ Moral Foundation</b>	<b>Harm/ Care</b>	<b>Fairness/ Reciprocity</b>	<b>Ingroup/ Loyalty</b>	<b>Authority/ Respect</b>	<b>Purity/ Sanctity</b>
Corporate	0	1	2	1	1
Direct Mail	3	2	4	2	0
Individual	5	1	3	0	0
Major Gifts	10	5	12	2	2
Management	6	3	4	3	1
Other – personal gain	4	0	1	0	2
Other – junior fundraising pressure	1	0	0	1	0
Other – pressure from Trustees	1	0	1	3	0
Other – various	2	2	2	2	0
Other – ethical gift acceptance	0	0	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7</b>

### *Ingroup/Loyalty*

The most frequently described type of response option illustrated the moral foundation of ingroup/loyalty (33% of 97 response options). Loyalty is defined in this research as a binding obligation to belong to a group (further explained in section 4.4). Participants described response options that demonstrated their commitment and loyalty to an organisation or team. Since the situations described occurred within occupational settings, it is not surprising that interviewees were thinking of their obligations and responsibilities as they related to their organisations. In turn, these responsibilities transpired as commitment to meeting organisational objectives. The objectives would be met if interviewees demonstrated their support for the organisation through their behaviour. Further, meeting these objectives resulted in interviewees displaying their sense of affinity or belonging to the organisation.

Illustrations of ingroup/loyalty responses are found in Table 4.6.

Overall, interviewees described situations that related to a sense of responsibility and ownership of organisational goals. This sense of ownership developed as a result of personal investment in one's work and feeling as though being a part of this work is important to the organisation. In expressing this investment through accomplishing their responsibilities, interviewees described scenarios that illustrated feeling possession over broader organisational goals.

The response from interviewee 10 most clearly illustrates the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation in that it describes how individuals identify so much with the organisation that they defend the organisation as if they were defending their own self. This type of

identity extends the organisational values and ethos to the individual, as if whatever is true of the organisation is also true of the individuals that make up the organisation (Cohen *et al.*, 2014; Hollingworth & Valentine, 2015; May, Chang & Shao, 2015; Suhonen *et al.*, 2011; Trevino, Weaver & Reynolds, 2006; Weaver, 2006). The establishment of such a connection aligns with the definition of loyalty for this research, that of feeling a sense of belonging to a group or organisation.

### *Harm/Care*

The second most common moral foundation mapped to the response options was harm/care (30% of 97 response options). This foundation is defined as a “sensitivity to or dislike of signs of pain and suffering in others, particularly in the young and vulnerable” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). As it relates to this research, the author’s definition of care is “a response to a need when one feels a sense of concern for the wellbeing of a person”. This expands the definition beyond just those that are young and vulnerable and allows for the care one feels for a broader range of people, such as friends and colleagues.

In the response options described, participants were clearly concerned about the wellbeing of others. This concern was described for many types of “others”, including fellow team members, Board of Trustee members, beneficiaries and major donors. The expressed concern demonstrated the value interviewees placed on the relationships they hold as part of their work. It also showed the personal investment fundraisers make in contributing to the wellbeing of others.

Illustrations of harm/care responses can be found in Table 4.6:

Interviewee responses demonstrated caring for many different categories of individuals. Based on this, it is apparent that the interviewees often make decisions at work that generally attempt to look after the wellbeing of others. Interviewees used words like “validate” and “help” which show they are conscientious that their decisions and actions impact others. This self-awareness may very well inadvertently influence fundraisers’ reliance on the harm/care moral foundation in their daily work.

*Fairness/Reciprocity, Authority/Respect, Purity/Sanctity*

The remaining 35 response options aligned with the three other moral foundations. The least common moral foundation related to the response options was purity/sanctity (7 response choices, 7%). Authority/respect and fairness/reciprocity each mapped to 14 response choices (14%).

The number of responses involving authority/respect was attributed to the level of experience of participants. Since participants were experts in the field and held authoritative roles, they may have had different experiences of tension that exists when dealing with hierarchical decisions. As was mentioned previously, the participants were able to describe dilemmas and choice options that reflected the point of view of junior members of staff. Some of the examples that mapped to this category were those junior-fundraiser situations.

Lastly, though seven response choices mapped to the purity/sanctity foundation, many of these choices described situations involving accepting ‘dirty money’ or unethical gift acceptance. This dilemma was shared by many participants and is currently one of the

dilemmas address by the “Ethical Issues in Fundraising” Module of the Institute of Fundraising (<https://www.institute-of-fundraising.org.uk/guidance/research/ethical-issues-in-fundraising/>). As this is such a common occurrence for fundraisers, this type of dilemma and its relevant response choices were removed for inclusion in the main study. Professional training modules have been developed to educate and support fundraisers in situations involving unethical gift acceptance. Rather than duplicate work, it was more important that this research added to the overall body of knowledge in this area.

### **Combinations of Moral Foundation Alternatives**

After the individual response options were mapped to moral foundations, further analysis was performed to see how the possible response choices were presented in combinations of response alternatives. The analysis looked at what two (or more) moral foundations were in competition in the interviewee’s mind, leaving the interviewee to choose one foundation over the other. So, for example, was it the case of choosing a harm/care response option vs an authority/respect response option, or an ingroup/loyalty response option vs a purity/sanctity response option?

The majority of dilemmas presented with alternative response options from different moral foundations. The most frequent combination of moral foundation alternatives, by far, was response options in ingroup/loyalty vs harm/care (21 of 56 dilemmas, 37.5%). Analysis revealed that in most situations, interviewees felt torn between commitments associated with the organisations they worked for and caring for (or not harming) an individual (either an other or their self).

The second most frequent combination of moral foundation alternatives was ingroup/loyalty vs purity/sanctity (12). Four of these dilemma combinations were descriptions of scenarios involving ethical gift acceptance, which, as was stated previously, is a very common dilemma in fundraising. The next most frequent combination was ingroup/loyalty vs fairness/reciprocity (7). Remaining combinations of alternative moral foundations comprised of 5 or fewer dilemmas. The moral foundation involved in the largest number of moral foundation alternative combinations was ingroup/loyalty (45 of 56 dilemmas, 80%).

Table 4.5 Moral dilemmas categorized according to moral foundation alternative combinations.

	Harm/ Care	Fairness/ Reciprocity	Ingroup/ Loyalty	Authority/ Respect	Purity/ Sanctity
Harm/ Care	2	1	21	5	1
Fairness/ Reciprocity	1	0	7	1	0
Ingroup/ Loyalty	21	7	0	5	12
Authority/ Respect	5	1	5	0	1
Purity/ Sanctity	1	0	12	1	0

### *Interpretation*

Ingroup/loyalty was the most cited moral foundation in interviewees' descriptions of moral dilemmas and response options. As previously stated, the definition for this research states loyalty is only expressed when one feels a sense of possession of or belonging to the group. It may be the case that individuals will only choose loyalty over other moral foundations after they have been an employee of an organisation for long enough to result in connection and belongingness with colleagues. Loyalty could also be the result of individuals feeling personally invested in the cause of the organisation they work for. Alternatively, it may vary for individuals based on longevity of employment with organisations as well as the relationships they develop with other members of staff.

An example of choosing to work for an organisation based on the cause or mission was shared by interviewee 7 and can be found in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Theoretical Analysis Examples from Interviews

	<b>Intuition</b>	<b>Ingroup/loyalty</b>	<b>Harm/care</b>	<b>Combination</b>
Example 1	<p><i>“For me, it’s not even a thought. It’s not even a dilemma for me. I just tell them it’s not what I do. I don’t have a list. I don’t keep a list. I’m not bringing you any donors. Whether or not they don’t hire me is irrelevant. Or whether or not they hire me, I should say...”</i></p> <p>Interviewee 3</p>	<p><i>“I wanted to fact check myself really and sort of say, am I right to be as concerned about this as I am? Or am I just making a mountain out of a mole hill?”</i></p> <p>Interviewee 10</p>	<p><i>“You know, we always say we’re donor sensitive, and the needs of the donor take priority, but what if the donor has a set of assumptions, a set of prejudices about the area in which you work that frankly aren’t brought out by fact? And one of the things that you know is that just giving people alternatives, giving people the truth is unlikely to change people’s minds. I mean there’s all that research now that shows that if you have somebody who’s got a demonstrably false position, when they’re provided with a counter and the actual facts, they don’t change their view. In fact, it tends to reinforce their previous view rather than change it.”</i></p> <p>Interviewee 10</p>	<p><i>“...You have moral dilemmas in terms of your career, and who you’ll work for, and who you won’t work for. So, it might be that you’re motivated by humanitarian or human services issues. But there’s an awesome job opportunity going in the animal welfare charity down the road. Do you take the animal welfare job ‘cause you know it’s gonna be good for you from a career point of view, and what’s that do in terms of your motivation, or your moral focus around human services, or humanitarian issues?”</i></p> <p>Interviewee 7</p>
Example 2	<p><i>“Those things have happened at an event, and they have happened to me, at an event, in a situation, where a gift is offered and you pretty much instantaneously, without recourse to anybody, you need to be able to take that decision ... and move</i></p>	<p><i>“I think because you’re a fundraiser also, if you’ve been working in an institution quite a long time as a fundraiser you probably identify with the institution an awful lot. So anything that somebody says that’s against the institution, you take personally.”</i></p>	<p>Caring about donors...</p> <p><i>“You have to respond in a way that validates them as a person because that is what is the root of their complaint...”</i></p> <p>Interviewee 10</p>	

	<i>forward.”</i> Interviewee 8	Interviewee 10		
Example 3	<i>“Oh yeah, you got to nip that in the bud right then and there. And let them know that in fact there should almost be shock and dismay on your face.”</i> Interviewee 1	<i>“The donor you're talking with may have, say, political views or religious views that are not only slightly askew of what yours might be, but they might be absolutely opposing ideologies... Learning how to be quiet in that situation because your ultimate goal is to generate revenue for the institution, which will help produce another good in society.”</i> Interviewee 9	Caring about colleagues... <i>“Does it help good staff? Does it demoralize other staff?”</i> Interviewee 2	
Example 4	<i>“I think using that default mechanism just to check those intuitive signals; sometimes, I can be wrong. Developing a good gut instinct to things is really important in all matters, in all parts of life. But in the ability then to reference or challenge that to make sure you're not being skewed or swayed to particular views and positions where necessary. Golly, we're never going to be paragons of virtue. We're always going to make wrong calls and be led down different paths, I guess.”</i> Interviewee 6	<i>“Well, our organisation takes care of abused families, and we just had an offer of a gift from the local liquor distributor,” kind of thing. “Should we take that money?” Then there you are risking the integrity of the institution against having resources to actually do some good. You have to try to weigh that dilemma.”</i> Interviewee 9		

### **4.3.2 Inductive Analysis - Practical Themes**

#### *Introduction*

The inductive thematic analysis reviewed the 56 moral dilemmas that mapped to a moral foundation during the theoretical thematic analysis. These dilemmas were examined inductively to discover practical themes within the moral dilemmas. In searching for themes that would emerge from the data itself, the researcher aimed to demonstrate sincerity. By recognizing themes that emerged from the data, researcher biases and inclinations could be mitigated, or at least, kept at bay. The initial themes that emerged involved the context of the moral dilemmas. It was important to understand the context of when interviewees experienced moral dilemmas to verify whether, or not these scenarios could be tested for the broader population.

The review of the context-based themes resulted in categories of fundraising type, employee management situations, association with a financial target, and relationships with individuals and/or the organisation. When counted, 28 of the 56 moral dilemmas mapped to a specific fundraising type, 17 of the dilemmas were related to fundraisers meeting targets, 26 dilemmas involved individual relationships, 24 dilemmas involved organisational relationships, and 11 of the 56 dilemmas involved management-type situations.

These categories were relevant as they encompassed various descriptions of the job responsibilities of fundraisers. For example, in large organisations, fundraising operations can consist of individuals or teams that are responsible for a particular type of fundraising activity such as major gifts, corporate, or individual giving. Also, as fundraisers progress in their work, they are likely to be promoted to senior roles,

requiring them to make management decisions. Additionally, as the goal of fundraising is to raise funds for a charity, many fundraising roles are directly tied to financial targets.

Other themes that emerged occurred in very small quantities. These moral dilemmas were grouped together and categorized as ‘Other’. Within the ‘Other’ category, themes included ethical gift acceptance (4), personal gain (3), junior fundraising pressure (3), pressure from Trustees (2), and various (5).

An overview of the inductive analysis themes can be viewed in table 12 below.

Table 4.7: Moral dilemmas categorized based on practical contexts.

Categories	Dilemmas			
	Count	Target	Ind Rel	Org Rel
Corporate	3	2	1	2
Direct Mail	5	2	3	2
Individual Giving	3	3	3	1
Major Gifts	17	8	8	6
Other	17	1	7	7
Management	11	1	4	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>24</b>

Part of the inductive thematic analysis included demonstrating quality for excellence for the qualitative research, as described in section 3.2.4. The following sections provide evidence of rigour, credibility, and meaningful coherence of Phase 1 (Tracy, 2010).

Firstly, rigour is demonstrated through the establishment of appropriate and complex theoretical constructs of intuition and the Moral Foundations Theory within participant responses (Graham *et al.*, 2011; Tracy, 2010). Secondly, each section exhibits credibility’s thick description and concrete detail through participant quotes and explanations. And thirdly, meaningful coherence is confirmed by meaningfully connecting the literature to the data in the descriptive paragraphs (Tracy, 2010).

The two most prominent contextual themes, type of fundraising activity and management, represented a total of 39 of the 56 moral dilemmas. As these themes emerged so strongly, they were analysed further such that additional sub-themes could be identified and scrutinised. Each of these themes is discussed in detail in the following sections, with examples provided to demonstrate the findings in quoted data.

### **Illustrations of Type of Fundraising Activity**

As participants were asked to describe moral dilemmas that occurred as a part of their occupation, it was expected that the situations described would relate to particular aspects of fundraising. Results revealed that 28 of the 56 dilemma situations involving situations occurring when engaged with a particular type of fundraising, including direct mail, individual giving, corporate, and major gifts. The different fundraising activities require various processes and relationship building, resulting in diverse donation amounts and types. Further analysis of dilemma situations that occur under the most time-pressure resulted in participants describing instances involving a theme of major gift fundraising the most (17 dilemmas out of 56 total, or 17 dilemmas out of 28 related to specific types of fundraising).

Although there are many different types of fundraising activities, major gift fundraising results in individuals making sizable personal contributions which typically have a major impact on charity organisations (Sargeant & Jay, 2014). There is a formula comprised of particular activities that contributes to a successful major gift fundraising programme. The formula includes building a relationship with major donor prospects over a long period of time, asking for the donation in a face-to-face situation,

encouraging the donor to become personally involved in the work and running of the organisation, and determining the reward or acknowledgement that suits the size of the gift (Sargeant & Jay, 2014). When all of these activities are managed and implemented properly, fundraisers have a higher chance of obtaining a successful major gift from a donor. Interviewees described dilemma situations that occurred in various stages of this complex process.

For example, there was a situation that described an interaction between the fundraiser and the major donor:

*“At a charity reception, a major donor prospect suddenly turned to me and said, “so how much are you needing?” It sounds such an innocuous question, but I had 30 seconds; I had about 10 seconds to decide.”*

Interviewee 2

There was also a situation describing interactions between major donor fundraisers and organisational management:

*“Major gift fundraisers...go to another charity in the same city or same region and part of your interview process you make it known that you think you can bring some of the major donors from your last charity (they’ll have never even heard of the new charity) with you.”*

Interviewee 1

And there was a situation described that involved whether it was ethical to accept a major gift:

*“I said that I didn’t want to accept the donation because we had an ethical code, and I thought that we didn’t have to accept all this money.”*

Interviewee 5

In addition to referencing major gifts, in order to align findings from this phase with theories used for Phase 2, the dilemma scenarios were mapped to moral foundation alternative combinations (see Table 10) (Graham *et al.*, 2013). As can be seen, the majority of scenarios involved a conflict between responses between harm/care and ingroup/loyalty, followed by fairness/reciprocity and ingroup/loyalty, followed by purity/sanctity and ingroup/loyalty. These combinations were taken into consideration when creating the final versions of dilemma scenarios for Phase 2 of the research. Further explanation of the interpretations of these results follows in the Discussion chapter.

Table 4.8. Major gift moral dilemmas categorized according to moral foundation alternative combinations.

	<b>Harm/ Care</b>	<b>Fairness/ Reciprocity</b>	<b>Ingroup/ Loyalty</b>	<b>Authority/ Respect</b>	<b>Purity/ Sanctity</b>
<b>Harm/ Care</b>	1	0	8	0	0
<b>Fairness/ Reciprocity</b>	0	0	4	1	0
<b>Ingroup/ Loyalty</b>	8	4	0	0	3
<b>Authority/ Respect</b>	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Purity/ Sanctity</b>	0	0	3	0	0

In summary, since major gift fundraising was the most referenced type of fundraising for dilemma scenarios, it is clear that this type of fundraising must be the focus of at least one of the scenarios used in Phase 2. However, as Phase 2 of the research will involve surveying fundraisers from all different levels and speciality areas, they may have limited experience with this type of fundraising. As such, dilemmas will also include the other types of fundraising mentioned by interviewees in order to provide scenarios that are applicable to as many participants as possible.

## **Illustrations of Management Contexts**

Further analysis revealed that 11 of the 56 dilemma situations described by interviewees could be categorized within a broad theme of management decisions. The examples given were as answers to all three of the main interview questions, displaying the vast implications these types of situations have on professional fundraisers throughout their careers. Question 1, asking for situations occurring under the most time pressure, resulted in two situations. Question 2, asking for situations occurring during various times throughout an individual's career (junior to senior level), resulted in three situations. And Question 3, asking for situations that occur most frequently resulted in six scenarios. Further examination revealed the situations described themes involving management related moral dilemmas that involved decision-making and managing people.

### *Decision-Making*

For example, participants described the dilemmas involved in making decisions about the fundraising activities they would pursue as part of their overall fundraising plan. This type of decision would need to be made by someone with the responsibility of delivering a fundraising plan at a management or director level. Other situations described were relevant for all fundraisers that are currently grappling with the public view of certain types of fundraising, such as face-to-face or telephone fundraising. These situations included making the decision of what type of fundraising to pursue and the public perception of executing such fundraising activities. And lastly, further situations described the dilemma of determining appropriate fundraising activities as it

pertained to particular categories of organisations, such as faith-based charities.

Examples of such situations are as follows:

*“I think the sort of senior dilemma that I have been around or witnessed or been part of ... It is about the organisation having a really clear evidence-based strategy and business plan for itself and about the impact it wants to have and being able to prove that impact and the tension between that and some of the funder agendas.”*

Interviewee 8 (#32)

*“The biggest dilemma you have as a fundraising director is and how far do you push it; and how much do you tell your boss that you’re pushing it to get the money in from blacklisted companies. You are very Target led, and you can be quite blinkered as to how to get that money.”*

Interviewee 2 (34)

*“What kind of fundraising activities you're gonna do. As an illustration, if you're a religiously motivated charity, some organisations would say, okay, well, we're not going to do anything that is like a raffle or lottery for it, because it's promoting gambling. So, are there fundraising activities, and there will be some things that people will say, okay, well there are particular techniques that we would see as unacceptable.”*

Interviewee 7 (39)

### *Managing People*

Participants also described dilemmas involving how to manage people in their organisations. They described situations concerning compensation based on a percentage of funds raised, how to reward staff performance, and time off in lieu when working out of normal business hours. The situations described involved a senior-level employee managing junior-level fundraisers. They also described situations where staff performance plans and rewards must be decided at an organisational level. These situations would typically be experienced by very senior-level staff, such as directors or CEOs.

*“...the discussion and strategies around proper compensation which should be something other than a straight percentage of what is being raised, there are so many other alternatives that can be used in the way of salary and bonus for that.”*

Interviewee 1 #30

*“I think in any size charity, its rewarding staff and performance-related pay. Do you do it? How does it work? Does it help good staff? Does it demoralize other staff?”*

Interviewee 2 #35

*“The other one I find it really prosaic... but I will tell you it's the time off in lieu stuff. ... We do a lot of events in the evenings and some weekends and some stuff almost work to, 'I've done three hours here so I'm going to take three hours off.' And other stuff say 'hey that's part of the job, of course I'll do that.'”*

Interviewee 2 #36

In summary, one of the major themes of dilemma situations described by participants was related to management. The two areas most referenced included management-level decision-making and managing people. Given these responses, these types of situations frequently occur for fundraisers, but they would only apply to those in senior-level positions. In order to be applicable to fundraisers at a variety of levels, management-specific dilemma scenarios were not used in Phase 2 of this research. It was preferable to use other scenarios that could be related to by junior and senior-level fundraisers.

In order to ensure participants were also sharing more junior level dilemmas, Question 2 specifically asked to share dilemmas they may have experienced as administrators or junior level fundraisers. Answers to this question revealed that participants remembered dilemmas they experienced when first starting off in fundraising. Responses also demonstrated participants' ability to sympathize with the perspectives of their current younger members of staff. Evidence of this is shown in the examples below.

Examples

*“I think that first you're in a profession that very much shapes how you might deal with those choices. I know looking back that I would have been a lot more instinctual, in what was a far less formed instinct, and why in many regards in interacting with the world, and a new and very strange environment. I suppose my response to any dilemmas would have been quite unformed and much more simplistic at that stage.”*

Interviewee 6, 59

*“I think the administrator piece... your lens is narrowed a lot more to the environment or the particular responsibilities or the KPIs or outcomes that you need to accomplish. I see that influencing often people's choice sets in all sorts of questions, and that would I think include those moral dilemma questions.”*

Interviewee 6, 60

*“So a lot of these people, in those more younger days of people's fundraising careers, are likely to be the people who are managing activity on a day-to-day basis. And that can be quite time-intensive on a day-to-day basis. And those time pressures, I could imagine kicking in, in terms of... The whole issue that is obviously very live in the sector at the moment, of have we done all of the due diligence that we should possibly do, in terms of this activity? And what if something goes horribly wrong and we end up in the papers, type thing. And that dilemma that people are gonna face is...how do I balance the need to get this activity done, which is what I'm probably being told to do by my direct boss, and how do I make sure that I have enough time and space to actually do what the organisation more broadly would want me to do?”*

Interviewee 7, 58

*“They're turning things in a massive hurry, especially with digital things. You see things and you say, "Whoa. Who signed off on that?" Actually, you find out, with an organisation that I worked for not too long ago, there wasn't really the sort of sign off procedure you'd expect, so nobody effectively.”*

Interviewee 8, 61

As the examples above involve scenarios that both junior and senior-level fundraisers could relate to, dilemmas were created using the conflicts explained for Phase 2 of this research. The dilemmas included conflicts between hierarchical obligations, personal values, and team loyalties. These types of conflicts were also aligned with the definitions of care and loyalty for the current project, and matched with the ingroup/loyalty and harm/care foundations of the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2007).

#### **4.4 Defining Care and Loyalty for the current study**

Results from Phase 1 revealed that the two most common foundations represented in moral dilemmas faced by fundraisers were harm/care and ingroup/loyalty. The harm/care foundation applied to situations that involved the relationships that fundraisers have with others as a result of their work. Likewise, the ingroup/loyalty foundation applied to situations where fundraisers felt as though they belonged to the group or community of the organisations they work for.

Upon reviewing these two foundations, a limitation in the literature was discovered in that Moral Foundations Theory did not explicitly provide definitions for these key terms (Haidt & Graham, 2007). In order to proceed with the current research and create moral dilemma scenarios that aligned with these two foundations, definitions of care and loyalty were required. Definitions of care and loyalty in the literature were reviewed to determine if and how they might align with Moral Foundations Theory. In order to ensure reliable measurement of these constructs within the Moral Dilemma Scale for the current research, previous definitions and theoretical influence were used to create appropriate definitions for the terms care and loyalty.

##### *Care*

The harm/care moral foundation is described as an expansion of mammalian parents caring for their offspring and in today's world, is triggered in response to witnessing other people suffer or be in distress, especially those that are vulnerable. The only research paper examining the Moral Foundations Theory has defined care as "concerns

about obligations to care for, protect and nurture those to whom they are connected, particularly those who are vulnerable,” (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p.3). This definition appropriately aligns with the harm/care moral foundation in that it expands from mammalian parent caring for offspring to any person one is connected to (Haidt & Graham, 2007). It also emphasises obligation, which is defined in the Oxford dictionary as an ‘act or course of action to which a person is morally bound’ (Dictionary, 2016). By including the word obligation, the definition links concern to morals and action. However, there are two gaps in the definition that need to be addressed.

The first gap is that the moral action of caring is specifically narrowed to actions of protecting and nurturing only. There are many other ways to show someone you care about them, such as giving them a compliment or gift, listening to them after a hard day, or offering to do something nice for them, like clean or take them to a show.

Incorporating a broader explanation of moral action would expand the definition beyond kin-based caring to that for any individual. The other gap is that this definition pays special attention to those who are vulnerable, which suggests that individuals would not feel concerned for others who might be seen as strong or even thriving. To address these gaps, the definition of care needed for the current research needs to include a wider breadth of moral actions and a more inclusive description of the people that one cares about.

In ethics literature, care has been defined as “moral reasoning that derives from a concern for others and a desire to maintain thoughtful mutual relationships with those affected by one’s actions” (Derry, 2005, p.65-66). This definition has been used in

research exploring moral courage, leadership and management (Atwijuka & Caldwell, 2017; Caldwell, 2009).

There are some critiques of this definition, which make it inappropriate for the current research. Although the definition also incorporates action, it is only included as a way to explain the relationship one has with 'others'. Also, the description of 'others' as those one has thoughtful mutual relationships with shrinks the definition to a particular type of relationship, rather than the generic non-kin relationships referenced in MFT. Though having these close relationships makes it easier to feel concerned and care for someone else, people can feel concerned for others in a broader sense. Lastly, this definition begins with moral reasoning, which is contradictory Moral Foundations Theory's emphasis on intuition and instinct. In order to meet the needs for the current research, this definition needs to expand its definition of action, expand the 'others' that one feels concerned for, and eliminates the emphasis on moral reasoning.

Contrary to these critiques, one part of each definition is crucial to the explanation of care, and that is the emphasis on concern. This emphasis is important because the research community has accepted it and it incorporates the Moral Foundations Theory's expansion to include care for all individuals, not just kin-based relationships. Anyone can feel concerned for someone else, whether or not that someone is vulnerable and whether or not there is an obligation to nurture or protect that someone. In fact, the feeling of concern for a stranger is evidenced regularly when people respond to charity TV adverts that show the plight of strangers in poverty. As concern can be applied to a wide breadth of individuals, it can be incorporated as part of the definition used for this research.

There are two areas of care which each definition is missing which are the explicit drivers that motivate individuals to action and that care should motivate individuals to action. Just like the expression of care has moved beyond kin-based groups, so has the motivation for caring expanded beyond individuals who are vulnerable or need protection. In modern society, people feel concerned for the general wellbeing of others, where wellbeing is described as being comfortable, healthy or happy. Happiness in this definition aligns with eudaimonia, which was discussed in virtue ethics Section 2.2.1. Using this definition of wellbeing includes physical and psychological wellness. Based on the critiques and justifications above, this definition of care was used for the current research:

Care: to respond to a need when one feels a sense of concern for the wellbeing of the person or group. This includes physical and psychological wellbeing. Care occurs during situations where people are physically or psychologically harmed as well as during situations where people can physically or psychologically thrive.

### *Loyalty*

The ingroup/loyalty moral foundation is described as an expansion of the long history of primate species (including humans) living in kin-based groups (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). An academic paper published before the Moral Foundations Theory stated that an ingroup's "actual domain now includes all the ethnic groups, team, and hobbyist gatherings that contribute to modern identities" (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p.63). This paper investigated moral intuition, but there have been no published documents on Moral Foundations Theory that define loyalty.

Loyalty in psychology research has been defined as “adherence to a social unit to which one belongs, as well as its goals, symbols, and beliefs” (James & Cropanzano, 1994, p.179), “adherence to ingroup norms and trustworthiness in dealings with fellow ingroup members” (Brewer & Brown, 1998, p.560), and “actual or intended pro-group behaviour is more ‘loyal’ when it entails personal loss (or sacrifice) rather than personal gain...greater concern for group welfare than for personal welfare” (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001, p.502). It has also been defined “according to its sustaining principles. Members of a group may behave loyally out of external coercion, conscious recognition of interest in membership, consciously recognized feelings of obligation, and unconsciously binding obligation to belong” (Boszormenyi-Nagi & Spark, 1973, p.39). These definitions have been used to study group behaviour, intergroup relations, family dynamics and group identity.

James and Cropanzano’s (1994) and Brewer and Brown’s (1998) definitions both begin with adherence to the group. According to the Oxford Dictionary, adherence is defined as “attachment or commitment to a person, cause or belief” (Dictionary, 2016). By emphasising adherence, these definitions state that members of the groups are attached to the group’s norms, goals, symbols and beliefs; however, there is no indication of how group members would act according to this adherence.

Zdaniuk and Levine’s definition explains loyalty through pro-group behaviour (2001), which shifts the definition from mere attachment to action. However, this definition focuses on actual or intended behaviour, which would only be possible through the use of thoughtful, planned actions. In order to align with MFT, the behaviour would need to happen instinctually as a reaction.

Boszormenyi-Nagy and Spark's definition explains loyalty as a function of the reasons for which it might be displayed (1973). Two of these reasons, recognition of interest and recognition of feelings, again align with intended, reasoned behaviour, which does not align with MFT. The last reason, however, focuses specifically on unconscious processes, which sit within intuition. This reason, the unconscious binding obligation to belong, encapsulates MFT's focus on instinctual processes (unconscious binding) and their effect (obligation to belong). As within the Care definition, obligation morally binds people to moral action. When individuals are unconsciously bound to a group, they are obligated to moral action, which benefits the group.

Contrary to these critiques, one part of each definition is important for the explanation of loyalty, and that is the emphasis on an individual's loyalty to social units, ingroups or groups. This emphasis is important because it has been accepted by the research community and incorporates MFT's description of the foundation to represent interactions between individuals and groups.

The definitions previously used do not completely align with the theories and constructs of interest for the current research. In order to represent the construct as it is used in MFT literature and within the population of interest, segments of previous definitions were incorporated and key concepts were added. As a result of this work, incorporating the critiques and justifications listed, the definition of loyalty that was used for the current work was:

**Loyalty:** a binding obligation to belong to a group. Obligation, in this sense, is an act or course of action to which a person is morally bound. The action is to give or show firm

and constant support or allegiance to a group in which the individual belongs or is a member.

## **4.5 Summary**

Overall, this chapter presented the thematic analysis of the semi-structured interviews. The theoretical analysis resulted in identifying the use of intuition and demonstrations of the Moral Foundations Theory. The inductive analysis resulted in practical categorisations involving types of fundraising activity and management decisions. Additionally, analysis revealed fundraisers most often encounter moral dilemmas that align with the moral foundations ingroup/loyalty and harm/care.

Upon using this information to prepare for Phase 2 of the research, it was discovered that definitions for the key constructs of loyalty and care were not explicitly listed in the Moral Foundations Theory literature. As a result, definitions of these constructs in the psychological literature were reviewed and critiqued, resulting in the creation of new definitions that were applicable for the current research.

The findings from this phase of the research demonstrated the types of dilemmas fundraisers encounter, the different choices they feel they have to make, and the processes they use to make such difficult decisions. With the definitions of care and loyalty created for this research, and including the findings presented in Phase 1, moral dilemmas and response options were written and further analysed as part of Phase 2 of this research project.

The findings of Phase 1 were also combined with theory and academic literature to create complex versions of hypotheses to test for Phase 2. The hypotheses incorporated Phase 1 findings, Identity Theory, Moral Foundations Theory, and moral intuition, proposing a relationship between constructs that would help understand how fundraisers solve moral dilemmas. These hypotheses were:

- 1) Higher implicit moral identity individuals (IAT) will be more likely to experience compassion (DPES-Compassion) and pride (DPES-Pride) and use intuition to make moral decisions (dilemma reaction time and REI-trust in intuition) than lower implicit moral identity individuals.
  - a. Whether harm/care or ingroup/loyalty is primed.
  - b. This effect is stronger in women than in men.
- 2) Higher implicit moral identity individuals (IAT) will be more likely to experience compassion (DPES-Compassion) and pride (DPES-Pride) and use intuition to make moral decisions (dilemma reaction time, and Trust in Intuition Scale in REI) that are consistent with their gendered preference than lower implicit moral identity individuals.
  - a. Women are more likely to choose a stronger care decision than men.
  - b. Men are more likely to choose a stronger loyalty decision than women.
  - c. Compassion mediates implicit moral identity and harm/care moral decisions more strongly for women than for men. (strength choice of care responses).
  - d. Pride mediates implicit moral identity and loyalty moral decisions more strongly for men than for women. (strength choice of loyalty responses).
- 3) When primed harm/care, people will make more intuition-based decisions (dilemma response time) that are consistent with the harm/care principle (harm/care strength of response) and be more likely to experience compassion (DPES-Compassion) than


pride (DPES-Pride) or other positive emotions of Hope and Happiness (SHS and DES).

- a. This effect is stronger in Low-Implicit Moral Identity than in High-Implicit Moral Identity.
  - b. This effect is stronger in men than in women.
- 4) When primed with ingroup/loyalty, people will make more intuition-based decisions (ingroup/loyalty dilemma response time) that are consistent with the ingroup/loyalty principle (ingroup/loyalty strength of response) and be more likely to experience pride (DPES-Pride) than compassion (DPES-Compassion) or other positive emotions of Hope and Happiness (SHS and DES).
- a. This effect is stronger in Low-Implicit Moral Identity than in High-Implicit Moral Identity. (Rationale - high implicit moral identity individuals will experience moral emotions more strongly than low implicit moral identity individuals, naturally, so the prime will work more for low ImplicitMI individuals than high ImplicitMI individuals.)
  - b. This effect is stronger in women than in men. (Rationale: men are more likely to experience pride naturally than women and so the prime will be more likely to increase natural loyalty responses for women than men.)

To help clarify, the proposed moderated moderated mediation relationship has been developed into a model, which follows.

As explained in Section 3.4.11, implicit measures, Likert-scale measures, and response time are used to measure the constructs of interest. The results of this data analysis are shared in Chapter Five.

Figure 4.1: A model of the proposed moderated moderated mediation relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.



## **Chapter Five: Phase 2 Moderated Moderated Mediation - Hypotheses Findings**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This section reports findings from Moral Dilemma Scale Development and the electronic survey. These findings are grouped into four categories: preliminary findings, descriptive statistics, inferential statistics and hypotheses analysis.

The Moral Dilemma Scale was created based on the findings from the semi-structured interviews conducted in Phase 1 of the research. These dilemmas asked fundraisers to choose response options that forced a choice between the moral foundations of harm/care and ingroup/loyalty. Reported findings of the Moral Dilemma Scale Development include a brief description of the participants and results from the pilot test used to ensure item strength and clarity of constructs. These findings were performed to verify the reliability and level of difficulty of the moral dilemmas.

The descriptive statistics provide an overview that includes a table of constructs with columns aligning with a description of the variable type, definition, mean, standard deviation and measurement of reliability.

The inferential statistics provide an overview of the participants who completed the survey. This information determines how representative the sample was of the population of interest.

The last analysis includes reports of the Moral Dilemma Scale's factor analysis and reliability, and then hypotheses analyses using moderated moderated-mediation in

SPSS-Process. These analyses examine the relationships between moderators, mediators, implicit moral identity, moral decision choice strength and moral intuition. The results helped advance understanding of the constructs that influence how fundraisers make moral choices when using intuition.

### **5.1.2 Aims and Objectives**

The primary aim of this phase of the research is to investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition amongst fundraisers solving moral dilemmas.

The aims for this phase of the research are:

1. To empirically verify the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition amongst fundraisers.
2. To explore the interactions of gender, moral foundations and moral emotions on moral intuition.

The main objectives of this phase are as follows:

1. To establish the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.
2. To determine how this relationship varies based on the experience of moral emotions.
3. To determine whether the effect of moral emotions varies based on gender.
4. To establish whether the effect of moral emotions aligns with moral foundations.

## **5.2 Inferential Statistics Results - Participant Demographics**

Demographic statistics selected for analysis include age, primary language spoken, education, years within fundraising, and the country where participants worked in

fundraising. As the survey link was sent electronically through various media (described in section 3.4.11, procedures prior to data collection), it is impossible to quantify the number of individuals that were invited to participate in the survey. Online and personal invitations to participate resulted in 294 individuals beginning the survey online; however, only 188 completed all questions in the survey. Further analysis was completed for this sample size. Of the 188 completed surveys, the participant profile is examined below in text and visually in Table 5.1.

### *Age*

The range of ages of participants in the current study went from 22 – 76 years. There was almost a perfectly even distribution when ages were grouped together in chronological quartiles. This demonstrated a good balance of responses from young and old participants, representing views of individuals born in different generations.

### *Primary Language*

English was the native language for 182, or 96.8%, of the 188 participants.

### *Education*

There was a wide variety of highest education levels amongst participants, with each category applying to at least one participant. The most commonly selected highest level of education (37.8% of participants) was of obtaining a graduate degree (MA, MD, or PhD). The second most commonly selected highest level of education was some time at university, though not necessarily obtaining a degree (25% of participants with 1-3 years of university).

### *Years in Fundraising*

Answers to this question ranged from 1 to 60 years. Responses were grouped into quartiles to understand how the large range could be broken down into subsets of years. 50% of responses fell within the two groups of 0-5 years and 6-10 years. The largest quartile grouping covered almost a 40-year spread (21 – 60 years).

#### *Country of Fundraising*

The largest numbers of participants were fundraisers in the USA and the United Kingdom. The majority of all participants were fundraisers in Westernised countries.

Table 5.1: Phase 2 participant demographics.

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	50	26.6%
Female	138	73.4%
<b>Age</b>		
22-33 years	47	25%
34-44 years	47	25%
45-56 years	47	25%
57-76 years	47	25%
<b>Education</b>		
Year 10 or less	2	1.1%
A-levels or equivalent	6	3.2%
GSE-level or equivalent	3	1.6%
1-3 years of university	47	25%
4 year university degree	39	10.6%
Some graduate credits/Advanced degree (MA, MD, PhD)	20	10.6%
Graduate degree (MA, MD, PhD)	71	37.8%
<b>English native language</b>		
Yes	182	96.8%
No	6	3.2%
<b>Years in Fundraising</b>		
0-5 years	48	25.5%
6-10 years	41	21.8%
11-20 years	59	31.4%
21-60 years	40	21.3%
<b>Country of Fundraising</b>		
Australia & New Zealand	4	2.13%
Canada	12	6.38%
European Countries	6	3.19%
United Kingdom	72	38.30%
USA	84	44.68%
Other	2	1.06%
Missing	8	4.26%
Total	188	100.00%

### **5.3 Descriptive Statistic Findings - Construct Analysis**

In order to better understand the relationships between the data collected by the survey, it's important to appropriately summarise the properties of the data set's key constructs (Haslam & McGarty, 2003). This analysis provides an overview that includes a table of constructs with columns aligning with a description of the variable type, definition, mean, standard deviation and measurement of reliability. This information informs the observations made of the sample used for this phase of the study.

After examining measures of central tendency and the spread of the data, skewness and kurtosis were noted amongst some constructs (Haslam & McGarty, 2003). Since the current research used regression analysis and bootstrapping, normal distributions were not required (Hayes, 2013), and issues related to skewed data were irrelevant for the current study. The use of PROCESS to test research hypotheses ensured that further statistical tests were meaningful.

Table 5.2: Phase 2 descriptive statistics.

Construct	Variable Type	Definition	Scoring	Measure	Mean	SD	Cronbach's alpha
<b>Predictor variable</b>							
Implicit Moral Identity	Continuous variable	Implicit attitudes are manifest as actions or judgments that are under the control of automatically activated evaluation, without the performer's awareness of that causation	D scores, negative score = low implicit moral identity; positive score = high implicit moral identity	IAT	.639	.379	.843
<b>Outcome variable</b>							
Moral Intuition - Care	Continuous variable	the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good - bad) about a moral situation, without any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008)	Response time in seconds (submit page) low score = high moral intuition (quick decision) high score = low moral intuition (slow decision)	8 moral dilemmas (Group A & B)	10.419	2.459	N/A
Moral Intuition - Loyalty	Continuous variable	the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like - dislike, good - bad) about a moral situation without any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008)	Response time in seconds (submit page) low score = high moral intuition (quick decision) high score = low moral intuition (slow decision)	8 moral dilemmas (Group A & B)	9.358	2.281	N/A
Moral Intuition – Faith in Intuition	Scale variable	the sudden appearance of an evaluative feeling (like - dislike, good - bad) about a moral situation, without	7-point Likert scale 5 items	REI – short form	5.064	.824	.738

		any conscious awareness of having gone through cognitive reasoning such as steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008)					
Moral Decision Strength – Care	Scale variable		7-point Likert scale 5 items	8 moral dilemmas (Group A & B)	3.133	1.02	EFA
Moral Decision Strength – Loyalty	Scale variable		7-point Likert scale 5 items	8 moral dilemmas (Group A & B)	5.012	.905	EFA
<b>Mediator variable</b>							
Moral Emotion – Compassion	Ordinal variable	Being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help	7-point Likert scale 5 items	DPES	4.927	1.065	.886
Moral Emotion – Pride	Ordinal variable	Experienced when one succeeds in a socially valued endeavour, enhancing social status within the group and rights to claim group resources (Hardy & Mawer, 1999)	7-point Likert scale 5 items	DPES	5.193	.922	.854
<b>Moderator variable</b>							
Moral Foundation - Harm/Care	Nominal variable		Groups Loyalty = 1 Care = 0 Relevance – 6 items Agreement – 5 items Total – 11 items	MFQ	N/A	N/A	Relevance - .895 Agreement – .694 Total - .792

Moral Foundation - Ingroup/Loyalty	Nominal variable		Groups Loyalty = 1 Care = 0 Relevance – 6 items Agreement – 5 items Total – 11 items	MFQ	N/A	N/A	Relevance - .809 Agreement - .680 Total - .789
Gender	Nominal variable		Male = 1, Female = 2	Demographics	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Control variable</b>							
Explicit Moral Identity			7-point Likert scale 5 items	Self-Importance of Moral Identity	6.072	.624	.750
Positive Emotion – Hope	Ordinal variable		7-point Likert scale 4 items	State Hope Scale	5.217	1.000	.809
Positive Emotion – Happiness	Ordinal variable		7-point Likert scale 4 items	Discrete Emotions Scale	4.343	1.141	.898
Need for Cognition			7-point Likert Scale 5 items	REI	4.8138	.935	.623
Moral Foundation - Harm/Care Manipulation Check	Nominal variable		Groups Loyalty = 1 Care = 0 Total - 11 items	MFQ	N/A	N/A	Relevance - .833 Agreement – .745 Total - .851
Moral Foundation - Ingroup/Loyalty Manipulation Check	Nominal variable		Groups Loyalty = 1 Care = 0 Rel – 6 items Agree – 5 items Total – 11 items	MFQ	N/A	N/A	Relevance – .781 Agreement – .680 Total - .767

## 5.4 Preliminary Findings – Moral Dilemma Scale Development

Prior to creating the full quantitative survey, a pilot test was conducted solely on the moral dilemma questions and response choices to ensure appropriate item strength and clarity of constructs. Responses from a sample of 5 individuals that formed an expert panel of academics were analysed to report the following findings.

Participants were given definitions of care and loyalty to ensure understanding of the constructs for the current research. Next, prior to each type of response choice, participants were asked: “Using the definitions of care and loyalty above, what choice do you think this response is asking you to make?”

Participants correctly identified a choice option of emphasising loyalty as the construct focus in 97.78% cases. Participants correctly identified a choice option emphasising care as the construct of focus in 95.56% cases. This was encouraging as it verified that the intended meanings were prevalent in the written options.

To test the difficulty of the dilemmas and response choices, participants were asked, “Please rate how easy or difficult it is to make the decision below from 'Extremely easy' to 'Extremely difficult.'” The ranking scale was from 1 (extremely easy) through to 7 (extremely difficult). The average difficulty score for loyalty response options was 4.47 and for care response options was 4.46. This ensured the researcher that options were neither too easy (which may have required little to no cognitive processing, biased results towards intuitive thinking) nor too difficult (which may have required extraneous cognitive processing, biasing results towards reasoning).

With the confidence of these findings, the dilemmas and response choices were considered adequately difficult and reliable for use in the main study.

#### **5.4.1 Moral Dilemma Scale Development Exploratory Factor Analysis**

##### **Findings**

As described in Chapter 3, all of the standardised measures used in Phase 2 demonstrate excellent reliability and validity. Due to this, the researcher had confidence in using the self-reporting measures as methods for examining constructs of interest. However, part of the work of the research project involved using data from the semi-structured interviews in Phase 1 to construct a self-report measure consisting of 8 moral dilemma situations and 16 moral foundation choices. Response choices were written in a way that aligned with either the Care or Loyalty moral foundations. The use of this measure was critical to collecting the data necessary for the moderated moderated mediation regression analysis, which was used to test the research hypotheses. In order to ensure these items aligned with the intended moral foundation constructs, it was important to run exploratory factor analysis.

Factor analysis is a statistical method of data reduction that identifies and combines sets of dependent variables that are measuring similar things (Haslam & McGarty, 2003). The method relies on the assessment of the correlations between all dependent variables and extraction of a small number of underlying factors that can be viewed as independent sources of relationships among those variables. In social sciences, factor analysis is typically used to identify correlations between variables (Kline, 1994). It is an “essential first step in the investigation of complex areas of human psychology” (Kline, 1994, p.9). It reduces large sets of data to identify and combine sets of variables

that are meant to measure similar constructs (Haslam & McGarty, 2003). Once the analysis is run, researchers can better understand how factors relate to one another.

Exploratory factor analysis is typically used for two reasons that are applicable to this research. Firstly, exploratory factor analysis is used when researchers have a specific interest and are looking for correlations that demonstrate that particular variables load on to the construct of interest. Secondly, exploratory factor analysis is also used in the construction of psychological tests. Because of these reasons, it was important to use exploratory factor analysis to better understand how the items loaded onto the two moral foundation constructs.

As a control, the same eight moral dilemmas were used for all participants; however, the response choices were presented to participants in two different blocks. One group of participants were asked to rank the likelihood of performing the Care response choice for dilemmas one through four (Block 1- Care) and the Loyalty response choice for dilemmas five through eight (Block 1 – Loyalty). The other group of participants were asked to rank the likelihood of performing the Loyalty response choice for dilemmas one through four (Block 2 – Loyalty) and the Care response choice for dilemmas five through eight (Block 2 – Care).

Due to this randomisation and block assignments, factor analysis could only be performed within each block as it related to a moral foundation. Results displayed in Table 5.3 show the factor loadings of all of the Care response choices from block 1 and block 2, and factor loadings of all of the Loyalty response choices from block 1 and block 2.

Data from participants was analysed using a Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization, and Principle Components Extraction. This produced a correlation matrix, with an unrotated factor solution based on Eigenvalue  $> 1$ . Based on steps taken to create the measure, the expectation was that the analysis would show two factors, with all eight of the Loyalty response choices loading onto one factor and all eight of the Care response choices loading on the other.

The findings can be found in Table 5.3 below:

Table 5.3: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results.

<b>Dilemma</b>	<b>Care Response Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>	<b>Factor 4</b>
Dilemma 1 – Block 2	I would speak to make the person feel better, even though it means I may not be able to properly defend my university.	0.699			
Dilemma 3 – Block 2	I would accept the gift to make the individual feel good, even if it means I cannot comply with my organisation's rules.		0.775		
Dilemma 4 – Block 2	I would put off challenging his perspective until later so he feels welcomed and accepted, even if it means I cannot immediately uphold the values of the organisation.	0.761			
Dilemma 5 – Block 2	I would shorten the letter out of respect for the Board Chair's perspective, even if it means my commitment to my organisation's targets may be questioned.	0.678			
Dilemma 6 – Block 1	I would accept the position to please my friend even if it means my employer is undermined by an additional demand of my time.		0.788		
Dilemma 7 – Block 1	I would refrain from challenging the Trustee so he is able to feel good, even if my team might feel abandoned at the time	-0.838			
Dilemma 8 – Block 1	I would challenge the mailing content out of concern for the director's wellbeing, even if my team feels I am disloyal and unsupportive.	0.464			
Dilemma 9 – Block 1	I would consider the celebrity's request so that we can achieve the promised goal, even if it means my team feels that I failed to comply with our agreed rules.				0.884
<b>Dilemma</b>	<b>Loyalty Response Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>	<b>Factor 4</b>
Dilemma 1 – Block 1	I would speak loyally in defense of my university, even if the person continues to feel bad.		-0.738		
Dilemma 3 – Block 1	I would refuse the gift to comply with my organisation's requirements, even if it means the individual will feel hurt.			0.636	

Dilemma 4 – Block 1	I would tell the donor what my organisation and I believe, even if there is the potential to displease the donor.	0.693			
Dilemma 5 – Block 1	I would defend the long letter as a committed employee, even if the Board Chair feels unsupported and let down.			0.690	
Dilemma 6 – Block 2	I would refuse the board position out of loyalty to my organisation, even if my refusal upsets my friend.			0.758	
Dilemma 7 – Block 2	I would refute the system out of devotion to my team, even if the Trustee feels upset and let down.			0.505	
Dilemma 8 – Block 2	I would speak in support of sending the mailing to show team unity, even if the appeal could damage the reputation of the director.		0.742		
Dilemma 9 – Block 2	I would refuse the celebrity's request to remain faithful to my team, even if the celebrity feels hurt and misled.			-0.601	

As shown in the table, both the Loyalty and Care response choice options loaded onto three separate factors. Care responses loaded most strongly on Factor 1 and Loyalty Responses loaded most strongly on Factor 3. The results were saved as variables in the main SPSS data file. Mean scores of factor 3 of Loyalty Responses were used to complete analysis of Hypothesis 4.

## **5.5 Hypothesis Testing**

The complex hypotheses required mediation and moderation to determine the effects of the predictor variable (implicit moral identity) on the outcome variable (moral intuition) (Hayes, 2013). Mediation analysis examines the direct and indirect pathways through which the predictor variable conducts its effect on an outcome variable through an intermediary or mediator variable (Hayes, 2013). Moderation analysis examines how the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable depends on a third variable or moderator (Hayes, 2013). Conditional process analysis techniques were used to evaluate the moderated moderated mediation relationship (Hayes, 2013). Conditional process analysis is used to understand the conditional nature of the mechanisms by which a predictor variable conducts its effect on an outcome variable (Hayes, 2013). Conditional process analysis is used in this research to understand the conditional nature of the mechanisms by which implicit moral identity affects moral intuition through moral emotion mediators and as a result of moral foundations or gender.

### **HYPOTHESIS 1**

Hypothesis 1 examined the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition, with moral intuition measured explicitly by the REI-Faith in Intuition scale and implicitly by total dilemma response time.

Hypothesis 1: Higher implicit moral identity individuals will be more likely to experience compassion and pride and use intuition to make moral decisions than lower implicit moral identity individuals.

- a. Whether harm/care or ingroup/loyalty is primed.
- b. This effect is stronger in women than in men.

Figure 5.1: Research Model where Y = Faith in intuition scores





Figure 5.2: Research Model where Y = Moral decision response time



$Y = \text{Moral Intuition (REI - Faith in Intuition mean score)}$

Analysis of the main effects of participants' implicit moral identity, priming group, gender, and compassion with faith in intuition were not significant ( $bs < .087$ ,  $ts < 1.40$ ,  $ps > .163$ ). The only moderator group with the expected relationship of a positive correlation between implicit moral identity and faith in intuition was females primed with care. This meant that when care is primed, females with higher levels of implicit moral identity also had more faith in their intuition, when compared to females primed loyalty and males in either prime group.

The two-way interactions between implicit moral identity and prime group ( $b = -.3020$ ,  $se = .4114$ ,  $t = -.7341$ ,  $p = .46$ ), implicit moral identity and gender ( $b = .1558$ ,  $se = .3079$ ,  $t = .5061$ ,  $p = .61$ ), and gender and prime group ( $b = .2341$ ,  $se = .3055$ ,  $t = .7665$ ,  $p = .44$ ) with faith in intuition were all not significant. Neither was the three-way interaction between implicit moral identity, gender, and prime group with faith in intuition ( $b = -.0406$ ,  $se = .4036$ ,  $t = -.1007$ ,  $p = .92$ ). This was surprising because a significant relationship was expected that individuals with higher implicit moral identity would have higher faith in intuition scores, and the effect would be stronger for women than men, regardless of prime. So it was expected that women primed with loyalty (in addition to women primed with care) with higher levels of implicit moral identity would also have more faith in their intuition than men.

There were no significant mediating effects of the experience of either compassion or pride on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition when measured by faith in intuition (See Tables 5.4 & 5.5). However, when the mediating emotions of

compassion and pride were introduced, the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition changed in some groups. For all moderator groups, higher implicit moral identity had a positive relationship with moral intuition when mediated by pride. This was expected for groups primed with loyalty, but not with groups primed with care.

Unexpectedly, for both gender groups primed with loyalty, expressing feelings of compassion mediated the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition in the expected direction.

Table 5.4: Results for the mediating effect of compassion on the relationship between Implicit Moral Identity and Moral Intuition-Faith in Intuition

<b>Moderator Groups</b>	<b><i>b</i></b>	<b>BootSE</b>	<b>LLCI, ULCI</b>
Male primed Care	-.1350	.1454	-.4760, .1024
Male primed Loyalty	.1006	.1256	-.0845, .4246
Female primed Care	-.0003	.0348	-.0737, .0775
Female primed Loyalty	.0504	.0548	-.0435, .1716

Table 5.5: Results for the mediating effect of pride on the relationship between Implicit Moral Identity and Moral Intuition-Faith in Intuition

<b>Moderator Groups</b>	<b><i>b</i></b>	<b>BootSE</b>	<b>LLCI, ULCI</b>
Male primed Care	.0420	.2157	-.3989, .4716
Male primed Loyalty	.0904	.1401	-.1217, .4386
Female primed Care	.0538	.0783	-.0613, .2530
Female primed Loyalty	.0942	.1098	-.1146, .3330

Additionally, the relationship between feelings of pride with faith in intuition was significant ( $b=.242$ ,  $se = .0700$ ,  $t=3.453$ ,  $p=.0007$ ). So, for every 1-unit increase in participants' feelings of pride, there is a .242 unit increase in faith in intuition, resulting in a

positive relationship. As expected, participants who felt more proud while making moral decisions tended to have more faith in their intuitive responses.

The expectation that experiencing moral emotions would have a stronger mediating effect on faith in intuition for females was not supported. In fact, though not significant, results revealed a smaller effect of feelings of compassion on faith in intuition for females than males.

Based on all results reported above, there is not enough knowledge to currently support Hypothesis 1 where moral intuition is measured by REI-Faith in Intuition scores.

*Y = Moral dilemma choice response time*

Analysis of the main effects of participants' implicit moral identity, priming group, gender, feelings of pride and feelings of compassion with dilemma response times were not significant ( $b < .1530$ ,  $t < .922$ ,  $p > .113$ ). Both gender groups primed with care demonstrated the expected negative relationship between moral identity and moral intuition. As implicit moral identity increased in these participants, they took less time to respond to the moral dilemmas. For both gender groups primed with loyalty, implicit moral identity had a positive relationship with overall response time, so those with higher implicit moral identity actually took longer to respond to the moral dilemmas. This result was unexpected.

The two-way interactions between implicit moral identity and prime group ( $b = 1.76$ ,  $p = .111$ ), implicit moral identity and gender ( $b = .898$ ,  $p = .278$ ), and gender and prime group

( $b = .479$ ,  $p = .559$ ) with dilemma response time were all not significant. Neither was the three-way interaction between implicit moral identity, gender, and prime group with dilemma response time ( $b = -.458$ ,  $p = .672$ ). Unexpectedly, there was no significant difference in participants' response times based on implicit moral identity, priming group, gender, feelings of pride, or feelings of compassion.

Though not significant, the experience of compassion and pride had a mediating effect on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition in some groups (See tables 5.6 & 5.7). In both gender groups primed with care, experiencing compassion actually weakened the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition, which was unexpected. So, introducing feelings of compassion resulted in individuals with high moral identity taking longer to respond to moral dilemmas. For all groups, experiencing pride negatively mediated the relationship so that increased implicit moral identity resulted in decreased dilemma response times. These results were expected for both gender groups primed with loyalty, but not for the gender groups primed with care.

Table 5.6: Results for the mediating effect of feelings of compassion on the relationship between Implicit Moral Identity and Moral Intuition-Response Time

<b>Moderator Groups</b>	<b><i>b</i></b>	<b>BootSE</b>	<b>LLCI, ULCI</b>
Male primed Care	-.2385	.3104	-.9547, .2755
Male primed Loyalty	.1776	.2713	-.2218, .8580
Female primed Care	-.0006	.0739	-.1695, .1499
Female primed Loyalty	.0891	.1141	-.1209, .3458

Table 5.7: Results for the mediating effect of feelings of pride on the relationship between Implicit Moral Identity and Moral Intuition-Response Time.

<b>Moderator Groups</b>	<b><i>b</i></b>	<b>BootSE</b>	<b>LLCI, ULCI</b>
Male primed Care	-.0140	.1875	-.4244, .3800
Male primed Loyalty	-.0302	.1362	-.3664, .2186
Female primed Care	-.0180	.0737	-.1701, .1492
Female primed Loyalty	-.0315	.1245	-.3612, .1613

There were no significant differences in gender in terms of the mediating effect of feelings of moral emotions on the relationship between implicit moral identity and dilemma response time.

In summary, the expectation that the negative relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition, when measured by moral dilemma response time, would be mediated by moral emotions was not supported based on reporting findings. Based on all results reported above, there is not enough knowledge to currently support Hypothesis 1 where moral intuition is measured by moral dilemma response time.

## **HYPOTHESIS 2**

Hypothesis 2 examined the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition with moral intuition measured by response time of care-based dilemmas and loyalty-based dilemmas independently.

Hypothesis 2: Higher implicit moral identity individuals will be more likely to experience compassion and pride and use intuition to make moral decisions that are consistent with their gendered preference than lower implicit moral identity individuals.

- a) Women are more likely to experience stronger feelings of compassion than men.
- b) Men are more likely to experience stronger feelings of pride than women.
- c) Compassion mediates implicit moral identity and harm/care moral intuition decisions more strongly for women than for men.
- d) Pride mediates implicit moral identity and loyalty moral intuition decisions more strongly for men than for women.

Figure 5.3: Research Model where Y= Care dilemma response time





Figure 5.4: Research Model where Y = Loyalty dilemma response time



*Y= Care Moral Dilemma Response Time*

Analyses of the moderated moderated mediated path from implicit moral identity to care moral dilemma response time (moral intuition) revealed the main effects of implicit moral identity, participants' gender, priming group, and feelings of compassion, pride, happiness or hope were not significant ( $bs < 1.128$ ,  $ts < 1.222$ ,  $ps > .0563$ ).

Though not significant, there is some evidence to suggest that males and females primed with care with high implicit moral identity have higher moral intuition than males and females primed loyalty and males and females with low implicit moral identity. Both males and females in the care prime groups with high implicit moral identity responded quicker to care dilemmas than those in the loyalty prime groups. This was the expected relationship.

When compassion was introduced as a mediating variable, the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition remained in the expected negative direction for both males and females primed care; however, expressing feelings of compassion weakened the relationship. Also, unlike what was expected, the relationship was stronger for males primed with care than for females primed with care. Unexpectedly, there were no significant indirect effects of implicit moral identity on moral intuition as mediated by feelings of compassion for any of the moderator groups. See Table 5.8 below for analysis results.

Table 5.8: Indirect effects of implicit moral identity on care moral dilemma response time when feelings of compassion is the mediator and participant's gender and priming groups are the moderators.

<b>Moderator Groups</b>	<b><i>b</i></b>	<b>BootSE</b>	<b>LLCI, ULCI</b>
Male primed Care	-.3790	.3970	-1.2945, .2538
Male primed Loyalty	.2823	.3495	-.2078, 1.1922
Female primed Care	-.0009	.1041	-.2293, .2185
Female primed Loyalty	.1415	.1525	-.1023, .5060

Overall results of the main effect of feelings of compassion, pride, happiness, hope, participants' gender and priming group were also not significant (bs < 1.4275, ts < 1.126, ps > .1415).

The two-way interaction between implicit moral identity and gender was not significant (b = 1.7395, se = .9633, t = 1.8058, p = .0727). The interactions between implicit moral identity and priming group (b = 1.9434, se = 1.2865, t = 1.5107, p = .1327), and gender and priming group (b = .6774, se = .9483, t = .7143, p = .4760) were also not significant. The three-way interaction between implicit moral identity, gender and moral intuition was also not significant (b = -.8134, se = 1.2530, t = -.6492, p = .5171).

*Y= Loyalty Moral Dilemma Response Time*

Analyses of the moderated moderated mediated path from implicit moral identity to loyalty moral dilemma response time (moral intuition) revealed the main effects of implicit moral identity, participants' gender, priming group, or feelings of compassion, pride, happiness, or hope were not significant (bs < .2770, ts < .14429, ps > .1298).

Though not significant, there is some evidence to suggest that unlike what was expected, males and females primed care with high implicit moral identity actually took longer to respond to loyalty-based moral dilemmas than participants with low implicit moral identity. Instead, both gender groups that were primed care with high implicit moral identity took shorter to respond to loyalty-based moral dilemmas.

When pride was introduced as a mediating variable, the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition changed from positive to the expected negative relationship. As implicit moral identity increased, the response time for loyalty-based moral dilemmas decreased, but only when participants expressed pride in their response decisions. Unlike the gender differences expected, the relationship effect size was very similar for males primed loyalty ( $b = -.0553$ ) and females primed loyalty ( $-.0555$ ). Again, none of these results were statistically significant. However, they are interesting as, contrary to the literature, they suggest there are not the expected differences attributed to gender. See Table 5.9 below for analyses results.

Table 5.9: Indirect effects of implicit moral identity on loyalty moral dilemma response time when feelings of pride was the mediator and participant's gender and priming groups are the moderators.

<b>Moderator Groups</b>	<b><i>b</i></b>	<b>BootSE</b>	<b>LLCI, ULCI</b>
Male primed Care	-.0248	.2345	-.6092, .4380
Male primed Loyalty	-.0533	.1647	-.4913, .1949
Female primed Care	-.0317	.0854	-.2365, .1289
Female primed Loyalty	-.0555	.1456	-.4513, .1574

In summary, results supported the hypothesis that individuals with high implicit moral identity would be more likely to use moral intuition, but only for males primed with care

when care dilemma response time was the outcome variable. The hypotheses were not supported for females primed with care when care dilemma response time was the outcome variable nor for females primed loyalty or males primed with loyalty when loyalty response time was the outcome variable. The moderated moderated mediation hypotheses that participants would be more likely to experience compassion and pride and use moral intuition consistent with their gendered preferences was not supported.


### **HYPOTHESIS 3**

Hypothesis 3 examined the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition as measured by the strength of care-based moral dilemma responses.

Hypothesis 3: When primed harm/care, people will make more intuition-based moral decisions that are consistent with the harm/care principle (harm/care strength of response) and be more likely to experience compassion (DPES-Compassion) than pride (DPES-Pride) or other positive emotions of Hope and Happiness (SHS and DES).

- a. This effect is stronger in individuals with Low-Implicit Moral Identity than in individuals with High-Implicit Moral Identity.
- b. This effect is stronger in men than in women.

Figure 5.5: Research Model where Y = Strength of care moral dilemmas response



Considering the main effects of variables on the strength of care moral dilemma responses, analyses revealed priming group, participants' gender, compassion, pride, happiness and hope were not significant ( $b_s < .4121$ ,  $t_s < 1.3263$ ,  $p_s > .1865$ ), whereas the main effect of implicit moral identity was significant ( $b = .8200$ ,  $se = .4058$ ,  $t = 2.0205$ ,  $p = .045$ ). For every 1-unit increase in implicit moral identity, there was a .82 unit increase in the strength of care-based moral dilemma responses. Participants with high levels of implicit moral identity expressed stronger care-based moral decisions than participants with low levels of implicit moral identity.

The two-way interactions between implicit moral identity and priming group with strength of care moral dilemma responses ( $b = -.3297$ ,  $se = .5368$ ,  $t = -.6141$ ,  $p = .5399$ ), between implicit moral identity and participants' gender with strength of care moral dilemma responses ( $b = -.5619$ ,  $se = .4020$ ,  $t = -1.3979$ ,  $p = .1639$ ) and between priming group and participants' gender with strength of care moral dilemma responses ( $b = .0929$ ,  $se = .3957$ ,  $t = .2348$ ,  $p = .8147$ ) were all nonsignificant. Additionally, the three-way interaction between

implicit moral identity, priming group, and participant's gender with strength of care moral dilemma responses was non-significant ( $b = -.2325$ ,  $se = .5229$ ,  $t = -.4446$ ,  $p = .6572$ ).


The conditional direct effects of implicit moral identity were in the expected direction for both males and females primed care, though not significant. However, for males primed with loyalty, the effect was significant ( $p=.0226$ ). For this group, every 1-unit increase in implicit moral identity resulted in a 1.284 increase in the strength of care-based moral dilemma responses. So as implicit moral identity increases in males primed with loyalty, they were more likely to choose a care-based moral dilemma response. This result was unexpected and meant that male participants with high implicit moral identity who were primed with loyalty expressed stronger care-based moral decisions than men primed with care and men with low implicit moral identity (See Table 5.10 and Figure 5.6).

Table 5.10. Direct effects of implicit moral identity on strength of care moral dilemma responses when participant's gender and priming groups are the moderators.

<b>Moderator Groups</b>	<b><i>b</i></b>	<b><i>se</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>	<b>LLCI, ULCI</b>
Male primed Care	1.3819	.7556	.0692	-.1096, 2.8734
Male primed Loyalty	1.2847	.5583	.0226*	.1827, 2.3866
Female primed Care	.2581	.2856	.3674	-.3056, .8218
Female primed Loyalty	-.3040	.3854	.4312	-1.0647, .4566

\*significant at  $p<.05$

Figure 5.6: Plot of direct effects of implicit moral identity on strength of care moral dilemma responses when participant's gender and priming groups are the moderators.



Though non-significant, when feelings of compassion were introduced, the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition changed from positive to negative for males primed both care and loyalty. This is the opposite effect of what was expected. Females primed care continued to demonstrate a positive relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition; however the relationship was reversed from negative to positive for females primed loyalty. So, these results suggest that females with high implicit moral identity were more likely to perform a care-based moral dilemma response in relation to feeling compassion about their choice, regardless of being primed care or loyalty. However, for the moderated moderated mediational hypothesis, there were no significant indirect effects of implicit moral identity on care moral dilemma response strength

mediated by feelings of compassion for any of the moderator groups, rendering this hypothesis rejected.


#### **HYPOTHESIS 4**

Hypothesis 4 examined the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition as measured by the strength of loyalty-based moral dilemma responses.

Hypothesis 4: When primed with ingroup/loyalty, people will make more intuition-based moral decisions that are consistent with the ingroup/loyalty principle (ingroup/loyalty strength of response) and be more likely to experience pride (DPES-Pride) than compassion (DPES-Compassion) or other positive emotions, Hope or Happiness (SHS and DES).

- a. This effect is stronger in individuals with Low-Implicit Moral Identity than in individuals with High-Implicit Moral Identity.
- b. This effect is stronger in women than in men.

Figure 5.7: Research Model where Y = Loyalty moral dilemma response strength



Considering the main effects of variables on strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses, the effects of compassion, pride, happiness, hope and priming group were not significant ( $b_s < .7058$ ,  $t_s < .13229$ ,  $p_s > .1877$ ). There was a significant main effect of implicit moral identity on strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses ( $b = .8180$ ,  $se = .4005$ ,  $t = 2.0423$ ,  $p = .0427$ ). For every 1-unit increase in participants' implicit moral identity, there was a .8180 increase in the strength of loyalty-based moral dilemma responses. So participants with high moral identity were more likely to select stronger loyalty-based decisions than participants with low moral identity.

Two of the two-way and three-way interactions had main effects on strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses that were significant. The table below (Table 5.11) shows that the interactions between implicit moral identity and gender ( $p=.0085$ ), as well as implicit moral identity and priming group ( $p=.0282$ ), had a negative relationship with strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses. The interaction of gender and priming group is not significant ( $p=.0526$ ) but also had a negative relationship with strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses. So any of the previous combinations of constructs resulted in participants with high implicit moral identity stating they are less likely to perform a loyalty-based moral dilemma response. However, the three-way interaction of implicit moral identity, gender and priming group resulted in a significant positive relationship with strength of loyalty moral dilemma response ( $p=.0147$ ), meaning participants were more likely to perform a loyalty-based moral dilemma response. As priming group and gender are binomial constructs, further exploration of these relationships follows in Table 5.11.

Table 5.11. Regressions of implicit moral identity on strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses when pride, compassion, hope, and happiness are the mediators and participants' gender and priming group are the moderators.

<b>Strength of Loyalty Moral Dilemma Responses</b>	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>p</i>
Implicit moral identity and Participants' gender	-1.0559	.3962	.0085*
Implicit moral identity and Priming group	-1.1617	.5246	.0282*
Participants' gender and Priming group	-.7773	.3982	.0526
Implicit moral identity and Participants' gender and Priming group	1.2768	.5180	.0147*

\*significant at  $p < .05$

As noted previously, to further understand the relationships of each moderator group with the strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses, direct effects were explored and can be found in Table 5.12. These results reveal only one group with a significant relationship. The conditional direct effects show that males with high implicit moral identity that were primed with care have a significantly stronger loyalty moral dilemma response than males primed with loyalty or males with low implicit moral identity. This relationship was unexpected and showed that among males primed with care, for every 1-unit increase in implicit moral identity, there was a 1.8738 increase in the strength of choice of loyalty-based moral dilemma response.


The conditional effects for the other moderator groups, males primed with loyalty, females primed with care and females primed with loyalty, were all in a negative direction and not significant. So as implicit moral identity increased, males primed loyalty and females primed care or loyalty reported being less likely to perform loyalty-based moral dilemma responses (see Table 5.12 and Figure 5.8 below).

Table 5.12. Direct effects of implicit moral identity on strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses when participant's gender and priming groups are the moderators.

Moderator Groups	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>p</i>	LLCI, ULCI
Male x Care	1.8738	.7451	.0129*	.4026, 3.3451
Male x Loyalty	-.5647	.5434	.3002	-1.6377, .5082
Female x Care	-.2379	.2820	.4001	-.7948, .3189
Female x Loyalty	-.1228	.3854	.7504	-.8837, .6381

\*significant at the  $p < .05$  level

Figure 5.8: Plot of direct effects of implicit moral identity on strength of loyalty moral dilemma responses when participant's gender and priming groups are the moderators.



When feelings of pride about the moral decisions were introduced as the mediator, all moderator groups demonstrated a positive relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. This result was expected for males and females primed with loyalty, but not those primed with care. The expression of pride changed the relationship between implicit

moral identity and moral intuition from negative to positive for all moderating groups except males primed with care that already expressed a positive relationship. The mediating effect was slightly stronger for females primed loyalty ( $b=.0249$ ) than any other group ( $b's= .0156, .0182, .0106$ ), which was expected. In summary, unexpectedly, for the moderated moderated mediational hypothesis, there were no significant indirect effects of implicit moral identity on loyalty moral dilemma response strength mediated by feelings of pride for any of the moderator groups.

## **5.6 Other Findings**

### **Relationships of Implicit Moral Identity, Priming groups and Moral Emotions & Other Positive Emotions**

When considering the moderated path from implicit moral identity and feelings of moral emotions, analyses revealed several significant main effects on the moral emotion of compassion, some significant main effects on happiness, and no significant main effects on the moral emotion of pride or hope.

#### **Moral Emotions**

##### Compassion

Specifically, on the moderated path from implicit moral identity to feelings of compassion, many of the main effects, two-way interactions, and three-way interactions were significant, as shown below in Table 5.13. The results are the same regardless of whether loyalty dilemma response times or care dilemma response times are the y variable.

Table 5.13. Relationships of implicit moral identity on feelings of compassion when priming group and participants' gender are the moderators. (See moderated pathway in figures 5.3, 5.5, 5.5, and 5.7.)

<b>Feelings of Compassion</b>	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>p</i>
Implicit moral identity	-.7815	.4053	.0555
Participants' gender	-.6265	.3131	.0469*
Priming group	-1.405	.3970	.0005*
Implicit moral identity and Participants' gender	.7778	.4042	.0560
Implicit moral identity and Priming group	1.6532	.5310	.0022*
Participants' gender and Priming group	.8863	.3993	.0277*
Implicit moral identity and Participants' gender and Priming group	-1.067	.5292	.0453*

\*significant at the  $p < .05$  level

Table 5.13 demonstrates that significant relationships exist between gender, priming group, and feelings of compassion. Additionally, the two-way interaction of implicit moral identity and priming group and the three-way interaction of implicit moral identity, gender, and priming group have significant relationships with feelings of compassion. Further analysis and a potential explanation of these findings follow.

The two-way interaction between implicit moral identity and priming group on feelings of compassion is significant ( $p = .0022$ ). So when participant implicit moral identity scores are analysed in combination with priming group, for every 1-unit increase in implicit moral identity, there is a .7778 unit increase in feelings of compassion, resulting in a positive relationship. This interaction is further analysed and explained below.

In order to further explore the effects of the binomial moderators (participant's gender and priming group) and the interactional relationships, the constructs were further analysed in

Model 3, PROCESS – SPSS. Results were bootstrapped for 10,000 with 95% confidence intervals. In this model, implicit moral identity was entered as a predictor (X), prime group of loyalty or care (W) and gender (Z) as moderators, and feelings of compassion (Y) as the outcome variable. This analysis allowed further detailed information about the direction of the relationships represented by moderator groups (see table below).

Figure 5.9: Research Model where Y = Feelings of Compassion.





Table 5.14. Relationships of implicit moral identity on feelings of compassion based on priming group and participants' gender.

Moderator Groups	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>p</i>	LLCI, ULCI
Male primed Care	-1.559	.757	.0408*	-3.053, -.066
Male primed Loyalty	1.161	.564	.0409*	.049, 2.274
Female primed Care	-.004	.2875	.99	-.571, .564
Female primed Loyalty	.5823	.392	.139	-.191, 1.356

\*significant at the  $p < .05$  level

Figure 5.10: Plot of implicit moral identity on feelings of compassion based on priming group and participants' gender.



From this further analysis, significant relationships appear only within male participants.

When men were primed care, for every 1 unit increase in implicit moral identity, there was a 1.559 unit decrease in feelings of compassion, resulting in a negative relationship. So when men were primed with care, as implicit moral identity increases, feelings of compassion decreases. The relationship direction is the same for females, but results were not significant.

When men were primed loyalty, for every 1 unit increase in implicit moral identity, there was a 1.161 unit increase in feelings of compassion, resulting in a positive relationship. So when primed with loyalty, men with high implicit moral identity experienced significantly

stronger feelings of compassion than men with low implicit moral identity. The relationship direction is the same for females, but results were not significant.

### Pride

On the moderated path from implicit moral identity to feelings of pride, none of the main effect, two-way interactions, or three-way interactions were significant ( $b_s < .1982$ ,  $t_s < .5535$ ,  $p_s > .3415$ ). In this manner, there were no significant differences in feelings of pride for either gender or priming group. Due to these results, further analysis did not occur.

### **Other Positive Emotions**

#### Happiness

For the moderated path from implicit moral identity to feelings of happiness, analyses revealed that the main effects of implicit moral identity and participants' gender were not significant ( $b = -.6838$ ,  $t = -1.5555$ ,  $p = .1216$  and  $b = -.6263$ ,  $t = .3395$ ,  $p = .0668$ , respectively), whereas the main effect of priming group was significant ( $b = -.9072$ ,  $se = .4306$ ,  $t = -2.1071$ ,  $p = .0365$ ). The two-way interaction between implicit moral identity and participants' gender was significant ( $b = .9401$ ,  $se = .4383$ ,  $t = -2.1444$ ,  $p = .0334$ ), whereas the interactions between implicit moral identity and priming group ( $b = 1.0682$ ,  $se = .5759$ ,  $t = 1.8547$ ,  $p = .0653$ ) and between participants' gender and priming group ( $b = .3358$ ,  $se = .4331$ ,  $t = .7755$ ,  $p = .4391$ ) were both not significant. And lastly, the three-way interaction between implicit moral identity, participants' gender, and priming group was not significant ( $b = -.6793$ ,  $se = .5740$ ,  $t = -1.1835$ ,  $p = .2382$ ).

## Hope

For the moderated path from implicit moral identity to feelings of hope, analyses revealed no significant main effects, two-way interactions, or three-way interactions ( $\beta > .4217$ ,  $t < 1.0922$ ,  $p > .2764$ ). In this manner, there were no significant differences in feelings of hope for either gender or priming group. Due to these results, further analysis did not occur.

## **5.7 Summary**

Results from Phase 2 challenged theoretical assumptions in various ways. Each hypothesis tested the relationship between Identity Theory, Moral Foundations Theory, and moral emotions in particular ways, to discover how these theories could help fundraisers solve moral dilemmas in situations where intuition is required. Analysis was organised according to the research objectives shared for this phase of the research. The summary that follows addresses each objective.

### **1. To establish the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.**

This objective was addressed using the results of all four hypotheses. Moral intuition was measured in six ways: Faith in Intuition, Total Moral Dilemma Response Time, Care-Based Dilemma Response Time, Loyalty-Based Response Time, Strength of Care-Based Response, and Strength of Loyalty-Based Response. A review of the total conditional direct effects of the PROCESS analysis for each hypothesis is below in Table 5.15.

Table 5.15: All Conditional Direct Effects for x and y separated by moderator groups.

	Hypothesis 1				Hypothesis 2				Hypothesis 3		Hypothesis 4	
	y = REI-F Int		y = Tot RT		y = CareRT		y =LoyRT		y = Care Str		y = Loy Str	
	Effect	P	Effect	p	Effect	p	Effect	p	Effect	P	Effect	p
MC	-.1219	.8334	-2.2216	.1540	-3.480	.0563	-1.496	.3542	1.3819	.0692	1.8738	.0129*
ML	-.3832	.3734	.001	.9993	-.7237	.589	.4554	.7024	1.2847	.0226*	-.5647	.3002
FC	.1897	.3830	-.4250	.4660	-.0017	.998	-.7830	.200	.2581	.3674	-.2379	.4001
FL	-.1529	.6074	.8807	.2706	1.128	.224	.7487	.3632	-.3040	.4312	-.1228	.7504

\*significant result

MC – Males primed Care, ML – Males primed Loyalty, FC- Females primed Care, FL – Females primed Loyalty

A key finding of this analysis was that implicit moral identity does not have a relationship with moral intuition amongst fundraisers, regardless of gender or priming group. No moderator group with high implicit moral identity took less time to respond to moral dilemmas than those with low implicit moral identity.

Another key finding in this analysis was the unexpected relationship of implicit moral identity and strength of care response that was demonstrated by males primed with loyalty. The loyalty foundation should not have influenced care-based responses by either gender, based on the literature.

One last unexpected relationship that appeared in the findings was that between implicit moral identity and strength of loyalty response in males primed with care. Like with the loyalty prime, the care prime should not have influenced loyalty-based responses, according to the Moral Foundations Theory.

**2. To determine how this relationship (between implicit moral identity and moral intuition) varies based on the experience of moral emotions.**

This objective was examined within all four hypotheses through the conditional indirect effects using moral emotions as mediators. Results did not find any significant results, such that in the case of fundraisers primed with care or loyalty, moral emotions did not have an effect on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

**3. To determine whether the effect of moral emotions (on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition) varies based on gender.**

This objective was addressed in each of the four hypotheses through the moderator variables of gender and the conditional indirect effect results. The results of each hypothesis revealed that the effect of compassion and pride were not statistically different for males and females. Experiencing these emotions did not strengthen the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

**4. To establish whether the effect of moral emotions (on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition aligns with moral foundations (pride aligned with ingroup/loyalty and compassion aligned with harm/care)).**

The fourth objective was attended to in the conditional indirect effects of the moderated moderated mediation analysis of hypotheses two, three and four. There were no statistically significant findings to support the function of emotions according to the Moral Foundations Theory. The experience of pride did not affect loyalty dilemma response time or the strength of loyalty-based dilemmas. The experience of compassion did not affect care dilemma response time or the strength of care-based dilemmas.

This chapter has presented the data analysis for the large-scale survey and aligned the findings to the research objectives for clarity. There were only a couple of instances where statistically significant findings were reported. The sixth chapter that follows discusses the findings in the context of the literature and practical settings.

## **Chapter Six: Discussion**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter, framed by the existing literature, provides an overview of the research conducted, a critical discussion of the findings of the exploratory research results, and a review of the hypotheses testing results. The chapter will begin by providing context for the current research then will review each of the two phases, and the overall research aims before critically evaluating the hypothesis findings.

### **6.2 Overview of the Literature Review**

The overall aim of this study was to understand the relationship between implicit moral identity, emotions and moral intuition amongst professional fundraisers. The literature review chapter provided context by reviewing ethical theories and the history of the academic investigation of moral psychology. The chapter also critically evaluated theories that explain the role of moral intuition, identifying gaps in existing knowledge regarding the practical application of these theories and how they might apply to fundraisers. The review of the literature grounds the current research.

The literature review concluded that there is a need to understand the role of implicit moral identity in intuitive moral decision-making. There is also a need to understand how positive moral emotions influence moral intuition, and more specifically, how the Moral Foundations Theory can be applied to practical moral dilemmas in fundraising. The

literature examining moral intuition was very limited and only used the ethical theories of deontology and utilitarianism to underpin their hypotheses and findings, thereby excluding the influence of virtue ethics. To date, no published literature exists that has examined these constructs using fundraisers as the population of interest, even though this group of professionals must use moral intuition as part of their occupational roles. This lack of understanding informed the current research to focus on fundraisers and the various constructs that interplay during moral dilemma scenarios requiring the use of intuition. This research attempts to fill in some of the gaps found during the literature review and makes a distinctive contribution to existing knowledge.

The following section presents a brief overview of academic literature related to moral intuition, moral emotions and implicit moral identity and then considers the experience of fundraisers and tools available to them for moral decision-making.

### **6.2.1 The Context of the Research**

#### **Moral Intuition**

The literature review showed that research in moral psychology expanded with the introduction of intuition in moral judgment research (Haidt, 2001). This expansion led to the development of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) as an understanding of how moral intuition functions within individuals (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). This theory proposes that moral judgments are the result of initial intuitive reactions and that reasoning follows (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Intuitive moral judgments align with one of five foundations and are the result of experiencing moral emotions. Research to date providing empirical support

for the role of moral emotions in moral intuition is limited and has mostly focused on the moral emotions of disgust, contempt and anger (Graham *et al.*, 2013; Horberg *et al.*, 2009; Oveis, Horberg & Keltner, 2010; Rozin *et al.*, 1999). There have not been further investigations into the role of positive moral emotions, of which there are only two: compassion and pride. Furthermore, literature exploring how moral intuition functions within individuals is limited (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Greene *et al.*, 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). The few studies available examine the construct through the lens of deontology vs utilitarianism, use different methods of measurement for moral intuition, and report conflicting findings.

### **Implicit Moral Identity**

Identity theory has also been used in the literature to explain moral action through identity salience and verification within schemas (Stryker & Burke, 2000). The explicit measurement of moral identity has been positively correlated with pro-social behaviour such as volunteering at a homeless shelter, helping feed the hungry, organising a food drive, mentoring troubled youth and visiting patients at a nursing home (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition has not been studied in the literature. The current research suggested the notion that there should be a relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. As a function within the schemas, the relationship should occur automatically, and be strengthened by the experience of moral emotions. Exploring this relationship was identified as an opportunity for research, so this study investigated the mediating effect of positive moral emotions on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

With the identification of the gaps in the knowledge regarding implicit moral identity and moral intuition, it is important to take into account the specific segment of the population of interest for the current research.

### **The Experience of Fundraisers**

This research sought to understand the mediating effect of moral emotions on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition amongst fundraisers.

Fundraisers were chosen primarily due to the researcher's interest, as she was part of this cohort at the time.

The review of the literature revealed that no academic research exists that examines the relationships of the key constructs of interest amongst this population, even though fundraisers encounter moral dilemmas as a result of their occupational responsibilities. There are laws and ethical codes that serve as guidance for fundraisers; however, they do not provide a rule for every scenario possible. In scenarios where a response is not immediately required, there are decision-making processes available to help fundraisers analyse the dilemma. These processes suggest fundraisers consider various alternative responses, reflect on the situation, and come to a rational conclusion about the moral action they will take (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Marion, 1994; Rosen, 2005). The processes cannot be applied in scenarios when fundraisers are under pressure to make an instantaneous decision. There is also no empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of any of these processes.

The current research has explored the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition amongst fundraisers, and the influence of moral emotions on that relationship. This makes a distinct contribution to the existing academic knowledge. To make such a contribution, the research occurred in two phases. Phase 1 consisted of exploratory semi-structured interviews and Phase 2, a large-scale survey. The following section of this chapter presents an overview of each of the two phases.

### **6.3 Overview of the Primary Research**

Composed of two distinct phases, the first phase of the research used semi-structured interviews to explore the moral dilemma scenarios requiring moral intuition that fundraisers experience. The semi-structured interviews were also used to identify which of the moral foundations applied to the scenarios. Results were used to develop a moral dilemma scale that was used in Phase 2 of the research. This phase consisted of a large-scale survey that incorporated all constructs of interest. The following section explains the process of all of the stages of the current research.

#### **6.3.1 Phase 1 – The Semi-Structured Interviews**

The literature review revealed gaps in the understanding of how implicit moral identity and moral intuition function within individuals. Specifically, little research exists examining these constructs amongst fundraisers, so exploratory research was needed. The exploratory research was designed to understand example situations when fundraisers used moral intuition in a professional context. Information obtained from this phase was also aligned

with the Moral Foundations Theory. Finally, the examples and foundations were used to create a moral dilemma scale that could be used during the second phase of the research to quantitatively test the hypotheses.


The informative semi-structured interviews phase of the research addressed the following research objectives:

1. To obtain tangible, realistic example moral dilemma scenarios fundraisers encounter in the workplace.
2. To create a measure that uses practical, applicable moral dilemmas to measure moral intuition amongst fundraisers.
3. Incorporate findings into hypotheses and utilise the moral dilemma measure in the survey to test relationships of implicit moral identity, moral intuition, and moral emotions quantitatively.

The semi-structured interviews asked specific questions and then used probing techniques to facilitate participant's sharing of moral dilemma scenarios they had to solve while under time pressure. Analysis of these responses revealed that the majority of dilemmas fundraisers encountered involved the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty moral foundations.

There was an expectation derived from the literature, that gender and moral foundation priming would influence the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. As such, a further four detailed hypotheses were developed to incorporate these expectations. Due to the complexity of the relationships between variables, a model framework was developed (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: A model framework of the proposed relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition as mediated by moral emotions and modified by gender and moral foundations.



Findings from the interviews produced moral dilemma scenarios aligned with the general themes identified, including practical context and illustrations of moral foundations (Graham *et al.*, 2013). In the practical context, moral dilemma scenarios tended to align with particular types of fundraising situations, decision-making, and managing people. Concerning illustrations of moral foundations, the majority of scenarios aligned with dilemmas involving the ingroup/loyalty and harm/care moral foundations. A moral dilemma scale was created using these scenarios, and Phase 2 examined the relationships in the framework above.

### 6.3.1 Phase 2 – The Large-Scale Survey

The overall aim of this study was to understand the relationship between implicit moral identity, emotions and moral intuition amongst fundraisers. The following three research objectives guided this phase:

1. To explore the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition amongst fundraisers.
2. To explore the mediating role of moral emotions in the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.
3. To determine whether gender and/or moral foundations moderate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.

The electronic survey link was distributed to the sample population via online sources such as email, blog posts, and electronic newsletters. Due to this distribution method, it is unclear how many participants were specifically invited to participate, but an estimate based on distribution lists is around 20,000 fundraisers. Of those, 188 surveys were fully completed, providing a usable response rate of 10.63%. The data analysis consisted of multiple stages: scale development pilot test, descriptive statistics and moderated mediation statistical analysis.

#### *Moral Development Scale Pilot Test*

The pilot test examined the reliability and difficulty of the moral dilemma questions and response choices. Participants were asked to match dilemma choice options to constructs of interest – care or loyalty. They were also asked to rate the difficulty of making the choice. The analysis showed that response options correctly aligned with care and loyalty and that both sets of dilemmas were equally difficult. With the confidence of these findings, the

dilemmas and response choices were considered adequately difficult and reliable for use in the main study.

### *Descriptive Statistics*

The descriptive statistics examined the central tendencies of the data set and verified the reliability of the standardised measures used. Results revealed that Cronbach's alphas for standardised measures verified reliability. Results also showed skewness and kurtosis amongst some constructs; however, the current research used regression analysis and bootstrapping for the moderated mediation statistical analysis, so normal distributions were not required (Hayes, 2013). As such, issues related to skewed data were irrelevant for the current study.

### *Moderated Mediation Statistical Analysis*

The moderated mediation analysis used complex linear regression models to examine how moral emotions mediated the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. The purpose of the analysis was to identify gender differences in the experience and impact of emotions, as well as identify the impact of moral foundations on the innate relationship.

As the process of the research has been described, the original aims and research hypotheses developed from the semi-structured interviews will be considered.

## **6.4 – The Overall Research Aims Revisited**

The overall research question for the current study was “What kind of moral dilemmas do fundraisers encounter that require intuitive responses, and how are they solved?” A further three aims were used to direct the current research. The following section of this chapter is structured using these aims.

**1. To explore the role of moral intuition amongst fundraisers facing moral dilemmas.**

This research aim was addressed using phase one of the empirical research. According to the literature review, fundraisers experience moral dilemmas within their occupational roles (Fundraising Regulator, 2018b; Fundraising Regulator, 2018c); however, guidance does not exist for situations when fundraisers must give an immediate response (Anderson, 1996; Fischer, 2000; Rosen, 2005). This was identified as a gap in the occupational support fundraisers should receive as part of their professional training.

The literature review resulted in a theoretically based proposal of constructs that would help fundraisers solve dilemmas in such situations. However, existing research had not examined moral intuition amongst this particular population. The semi-structured interviews were used to confirm that fundraisers do, in fact, encounter situations where moral intuition is required.

Specific examples of the use of intuition in fundraising situations are:

*“For me it’s not even a thought. It’s not even a dilemma for me. I just tell them it’s not what I do. I don’t have a list. I don’t keep a list. I’m not bringing you any donors. Whether or not they don’t hire me is irrelevant. Or whether or not they hire me, I should say...”*

Interviewee 3

*“Those things have happened at an event, and they have happened to me, at an event, in a situation, where a gift is offered and you pretty much instantaneously, without recourse to anybody, you need to be able to take that decision ... and move forward.”*

Interviewee 8

The results of the semi-structured interviews provided scenarios that could be used as moral dilemmas.

## **2. To determine the role of moral foundations and moral intuition within moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter.**

To address this research aim, both phases of the study were used. The literature review identified five moral foundations that can be used to explain intuitive moral decisions. Results from the semi-structured interviews provided practical moral dilemma scenarios that were aligned with moral foundations. Responses most commonly aligned with ingroup/loyalty and harm/care foundations (see table 4.3).

Illustrations of ingroup/loyalty responses:

*“I think because you're a fundraiser also, if you've been working in an institution quite a long time as a fundraiser you probably identify with the institution an awful lot. So anything that somebody says that's against the institution, you take personally.”*

Interviewee 10

*“The donor you're talking with may have, say, political views or religious views that are not only slightly askew of what yours might be, but they might be absolutely opposing ideologies... Learning how to be quiet in that situation because your ultimate goal is to generate revenue for the institution, which will help produce another good in society.”*

Interviewee 9

Illustrations of harm/care responses:

*“You have to respond in a way that validates them as a person because that is what is the root of their complaint...”*

Interviewee 10

*“Does it help good staff? Does it demoralize other staff?”*

Interviewee 2

These examples demonstrate the role of loyalty and care when fundraisers face moral dilemmas.

However, the results of the large-scale survey were unexpected. Firstly, results indicated that moral foundations did not influence moral intuition for any of the moderator groups. Additionally, the analysis revealed that males primed with care were more likely to perform loyalty-based moral dilemma responses than males primed with loyalty, and males primed with loyalty were more likely to perform care-based moral dilemma responses than males primed with care. These results suggest that the prime had the opposite effect of what was intended for male fundraisers, but not for female fundraisers.

This finding is important within the context of this research as it illuminates that expected gender effects did not occur in this population, and that priming effects did not align with MFT expectations. Further exploration of these results is presented in Section 6.6 of this chapter.

### **3. To investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition in the context of solving moral dilemmas.**

This research aim was addressed through the large-scale survey in Phase 2. The literature review evaluated and amalgamated theories, concluding that implicit moral identity would

influence moral intuition through its function within schemas. Furthermore, moral intuition is the result of the experience of moral emotions. In combination, this suggests that implicit moral identity and moral emotions would increase the use of moral intuition. The results of the survey show that on a broad level, the relationship between these variables does not exist amongst fundraisers. There were no significant findings to support the mediating effect of moral emotions on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. The results highlight a weakness in the existing literature in regards to the influences of moral intuition.

This chapter has reflected on the overall research aims by reviewing the aims and matching them with appropriate research outcomes. Following this, the chapter will revisit the semi-structured interviews and describe the findings of Phase 1.

## **6.5 The Semi-Structured Interviews revisited**

### **Type of fundraising situation**

The majority of moral dilemma scenarios were described in situations involving major gift fundraising, followed by direct mail, corporate fundraising, and individual fundraising (see Table 4.6). There are several interpretations that could be used to explain these findings. The following paragraphs further explain the potential explanations for the occurrence of such a high number of moral dilemmas involving major gift fundraising.

The first possible explanation is the amount of experience interview participants had at a senior level, as reported in Section 4.1. Often times, Chief Executives and Directors are involved in major gift fundraising as part of their role and responsibilities. Considering this, one would expect interviewees to have ample exposure to and involvement with major gift fundraising. Their breadth of experience in this type of fundraising activity might have led to their involvement in related dilemma situations, influencing their interview answers.

Another explanation of the number of dilemmas involving major gift fundraising could be the type of relationship that is involved in this fundraising. In order to run a successful major gift fundraising programme, one must follow a process involving researching, contacting, and spending time with major gift donors (Sargeant & Jay, 2014). In previous studies examining major gift fundraising, major donors describe their relationships with organisations as communal, such that both the donor and the organisation provide benefits to the other due to mutual concern for wellbeing (Waters, 2008). The mutual concern between major gift donors and organisations would be influenced by the work conducted by fundraisers. The amount of time that fundraisers spend building relationships and caring for major donors makes it more likely that they would experience a dilemma in this type of fundraising over other, more impersonal types of fundraising such as direct mail fundraising.

The last possible explanation involves occupational obligations. Major gift fundraisers are responsible for raising large amount of money to deliver the programmes and services of their organisations. They might also feel that because of this responsibility, they belong to the broader organisational team, which aligns with the definition of loyalty for this

research. Fundraisers that feel a sense of loyalty to their organisations might experience a dilemma during situations that involve the potential to deliver their income targets.

Explanation two and three above show how fundraisers could find themselves in moral dilemma situations where one alternative is to meet their responsibilities to the organisation, and another alternative is to express care for a major donor. This type of situation maps to the moral foundations of ingroup/loyalty and harm/care (Haidt & Joseph, 2008), which was the most frequently described alternative combination of dilemmas experienced in major gift fundraising. Given the overlap between scenarios involving major gift fundraising and the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2008), fundraisers working towards obtaining large donations for their organisations should expect to encounter such moral dilemmas in their work.

### **Management - Decision-making and Managing people**

The second practical setting theme of the moral dilemma scenarios was described as management related, either in making high-level organisational decisions or in managing people. Many of the dilemma scenarios were described from the perspective of senior-level fundraisers. One explanation of this was that interviewees either currently held or previously held management-level fundraising positions as managers, directors or CEOs, as described in section 4.1. As such, these senior-level roles would be expressed in activated and salient identities (Stets & Burke, 2000). As the senior-level fundraiser identity was most salient, it influenced the responses of interviewees.

### **Use of Intuition**

The first question of the interviews asked participants to describe situations that occurred under the most time pressure and required immediate responses. Overall, 18 of the dilemma scenarios explained by interviewees were considered to have occurred under intense time pressure. Interviewees used particular phrases that indicated they were using intuition such as “not a thought” and “right then and there;” however, interviewees did not explicitly mention using intuition or their gut instinct when facing such scenarios. The difficulty in explaining how intuition was used to solve the moral dilemmas further supports the decisions were made without conscious awareness of the process (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008).

One explanation for this difficulty in explicitly identifying intuition is that the situations may have also triggered emotions in interviewees that were related to moral intuitions, thereby influencing responses (Cummins & Cummins, 2012; Etxebarria *et al.*, 2015; Haidt, 2003; Skoe, Eisenberg & Cumberland, 2002; Teper, Zhong & Inzlicht, 2015; Zhang, Kong & Li, 2017). In such situations, the experience of particular emotions may relate to specific moral foundations that are then used to formulate a response. This link between intuition, emotion and the moral foundations was further explored in Phase 2 of the research and will be discussed in section 6.6.

The following paragraphs will explain how intuition would be needed in the two categories of dilemmas described by interviewees – major gift fundraising and management decisions.

In relation to the scenarios aligned with the theme of fundraising type, the use of intuition to solve moral dilemmas reflects the interpersonal relationships required in major gift

fundraising. Dilemmas would occur during an in-person meeting requiring an immediate response. In-person meetings force fundraisers to reply quickly, so they do not have the privilege to use rational cognition or engage in dialogue with colleagues about the situation. Instead, they are forced to address major gift donors who are waiting for an immediate response. As they are in their professional roles, one's fundraiser identity would be activated in such situations (Burke & Stets, 2009). Also, as the situations present moral dilemmas, the fundraiser's moral identity would become activated and used to respond quickly to the situation. In this instance, the fundraiser and moral identities should work in collaboration to create a comprehensive response.

In the situations involving management decisions or managing people, the use of instinct and intuition in solving dilemmas was also the result of in-person meetings where a response is needed quickly. In such situations, one's manager identity and moral identity would be activated (Burke & Stets, 2009). Again, these identities would work in collaboration to respond.

### **Illustrations of the Five Moral Foundations**

Response options provided by interviewees were analysed and aligned with the five Moral Foundations. Findings revealed that response options most illustrated the ingroup/Loyalty moral foundation. The next most illustrated foundation was harm/care.

The response options that aligned with the ingroup/loyalty moral foundation described situations that related to obligations and responsibilities in relation to the organisations. As fundraisers faced moral dilemmas in the work setting, their suggested response options

showed examples of support of and allegiance to the group of people comprising their organisations. There are two possible explanations for this finding.

The first explanation of this result would be the amount of time fundraisers worked for a particular organisation. Employment over many years would demonstrate commitment to the organisation. This commitment would then influence employee behaviour to align with organisational goals (Kish-Gephart, Harrison & Trevino, 2010). The second explanation would be alignment with the organisational mission. Even if fundraisers hadn't worked at an organisation for long, believing in the mission and purpose of the group would influence the fundraiser's desire to show their support.

For the response options that aligned with the harm/care foundation, interviewees described actions that responded to a need for someone they cared for. The interviewees felt concerned for the other person's wellbeing and reacted to that. The people described in the situations were donors, colleagues, beneficiaries, and Board of Trustee members. Given the variety of situations shared, caring for others appeared to permeate many areas of work for fundraisers.

There are two possible explanations for so many response options aligning with this moral foundation. The first explanation refers back to the relationships that fundraisers have. As feelings of care can occur for any individual (Haidt & Graham, 2007), it logically follows that fundraisers will care for the many people they have relationships with.

The second possible explanation is that being caring is an inherent characteristic of fundraisers. Fundraisers have been described as compassionate people who treat others with

decency and respect (Fischer, 2000). Furthermore, research has also demonstrated that fundraisers have empathy for others and are natural relationship builders (Breeze, 2017). As compassion is linked to the Moral Foundation of Care, it is argued that these characteristics naturally align with caring for others (Haidt, 2003).

The other moral foundations were not represented enough in the interviewee responses to be further analysed.

This section reviewed the results of Phase 1 of the research. The next section will revisit the research hypotheses that were created using the results of Phase 1 and implications from the literature review.

## **6.6 The Research Hypotheses revisited**

The primary aim was to investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition within fundraisers using the moral dilemmas created through Phase 1 of the research. As such, Phase 2 objectives were broken down into the following:

1. To establish the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.
2. To determine how this relationship varies based on the experience of moral emotions.
3. To determine whether the effect of moral emotions varies based on gender.
4. To establish whether the effect of moral emotions aligns with moral foundations.

To achieve these objectives, theory, academic literature and the findings of Phase 1 were combined to create hypotheses to test for Phase 2. The literature review revealed that moral intuition could be explained through both the Moral Foundations Theory and Identity Theory. The combination of these theories resulted in the proposal that relationships existed between key constructs within the theories, which were implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition. Specifically, it was proposed that there was a relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition, and that the experience of moral emotions mediated that relationship.

In addition to the review of the literature, Phase 1 findings demonstrated the types of dilemmas fundraisers encounter, the different choices they feel they have to make, and the processes they use to make such difficult decisions. The theoretical analysis of this phase resulted in identifying the use of intuition and demonstrations of the moral foundation theory. Additionally, analysis revealed fundraisers most often encounter moral dilemmas that align with the moral foundations ingroup/loyalty and harm/care. These results were used to create real-life examples of moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter, aligned with the Moral Foundation of ingroup/loyalty and harm/care that were used in the large-scale survey to test the hypotheses of Phase 2.

The four hypotheses tested during Phase 2 incorporated learnings from the academic literature and findings from Phase 1 of the research. They propose relationships between constructs that would help understand how fundraisers solve moral dilemmas and examined potentially moderating gender differences. Each of the four hypotheses is reviewed below, along with possible explanations for the findings of the study.

**Hypothesis 1: Higher implicit moral identity individuals will be more likely to experience compassion and pride and use intuition to make moral decisions than lower implicit moral identity individuals.**

- a. Whether harm/care or ingroup/loyalty is primed.**
- b. This effect is stronger in women than in men.**

There is no evidence to support this hypothesis as findings suggest that fundraisers with higher implicit moral identity were no more likely to experience moral emotions, nor use moral intuition any more than fundraisers with low implicit moral identity. This was the case when intuition was explicitly measured by REI-Faith in Intuition scores and when it was implicitly measured by moral dilemma response time.

This finding is important in the context of this research as it was proposed that implicit moral identity would function within an individual's subconscious processes, thereby working intuitively through activated schemas without influence from other constructs. This was supported in the literature because implicit cognitive processes function in the subconscious and are expressed through instincts and immediate responses (Carlston, 2010). If this is the case, then implicit moral identity should correlate with moral intuition as it is described as an automatic reaction (Weaver, Reynolds & Brown, 2013). So fundraisers with higher implicit moral identity should have had higher faith in their intuition and taken less time to respond to moral dilemmas. Additionally, the IAT and REI have repeatedly demonstrated excellent reliability and validity as a measure of implicit attitudes and explicit faith in intuition, respectively (Epstein *et al.*, 1992; Epstein *et al.*, 1996; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Within the context of this research, this hypothesis was grounded in Identity Theory. This theory proposes that identities that

function within schemas would be displayed in aligned intuitive behaviour, so if moral identity exists within an individual's schemas, it would be demonstrated in their intuitive moral behaviour.

There are two possible explanations for this finding. The first explanation may be the measure used for the outcome variable of implicit moral intuition, which was moral dilemma response time. Although this outcome variable has been measured by response time in the literature, only a limited number of studies have been published, and researchers have reported mixed findings using this construct (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Response time as a measurement of moral intuition might need more empirical support to be proven a standard, reliable measure.

The second explanation may be that the relationship only exists when the moderator variables align more specifically with outcome variables. In order to measure the moderators of care and loyalty, participants completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire aligned with these two foundations. To measure moral intuition, participants completed the moral dilemma scale that was developed from Phase 1 findings. Some of the items in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire measuring loyalty include items like: Is it relevant whether or not someone's action shows love for his or her country? And 'Do you agree with the statement, 'I am proud of my country's history.' Although these MFQ items have been tested and proven as reliable measures of loyalty, they may not have reliably correlated with the outcome variable of a fundraiser's loyalty to their organisation. The remaining three hypotheses more specifically investigate the relationships between each of the moderator prime groups (priming with care and priming with loyalty); however, more research should be conducted to understand this finding.

**Hypothesis 2: Higher implicit moral identity individuals will be more likely to experience compassion and pride and use intuition to make moral decisions that are consistent with their gendered preference than lower implicit moral identity individuals.**

- a) Women are more likely to experience stronger feelings of compassion than men.**
- b) Men are more likely to experience stronger feelings of pride than women.**
- c) Compassion mediates implicit moral identity and harm/care moral intuition decisions more strongly for women than for men.**
- d) Pride mediates implicit moral identity and loyalty moral intuition decisions more strongly for men than for women.**

There is no significant evidence to support Hypothesis 2; therefore, this hypothesis is rejected. The expected relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition did not occur in any of the moderator groups. It could be speculated that the groups were unaffected by either prime and so did not respond faster to the aligned care-based or loyalty-based moral dilemmas. It could also be speculated that higher implicit moral identity doesn't decrease the amount of time needed to respond to moral dilemmas.

For the conditional indirect effects, it was hypothesised that men would be more likely to experience pride, which would mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition for loyalty-based moral decisions. This expectation was based on the literature that demonstrated gender differences in the experience of pride (Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012; Tracy & Robins, 2007), and the effect of the moral emotion of pride on the moral

foundation ingroup/loyalty (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). The evidence from the extant literature has also repeatedly concluded that women experience compassion more than men (López *et al.*, 2018; Pommier, 2010; Sousa *et al.*, 2017; Strauss *et al.*, 2016), therefore it was expected that experiencing this emotion would be more likely to mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition for women. However, results showed that the experience of emotions did not affect the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition, regardless of gender or priming group.

One possible explanation for this result may again be the measure used for the outcome variable of implicit moral intuition, which was moral dilemma response time for care-based moral dilemmas or loyalty-based moral dilemmas. More research is needed to explain why the expected effects did not occur for any of the moderator groups.

**Hypothesis 3: When primed harm/care, people will make more intuition-based moral decisions that are consistent with the harm/care principle and be more likely to experience compassion than pride or other positive emotions of Hope and Happiness.**

- a. This effect is stronger in individuals with Low-Implicit Moral Identity than in individuals with High-Implicit Moral Identity.**
- b. This effect is stronger in men than in women.**

Hypothesis 3 may be rejected. Males primed harm/care did not make stronger care-based intuitive moral decisions than women primed harm/care. As the literature has shown that women are more likely to naturally experience compassion (López *et al.*, 2018; Pommier, 2010; Sousa *et al.*, 2017; Strauss *et al.*, 2016), the effect of the prime harm/care and moral emotions was expected to be more impactful on men.

Interestingly, there was a significant effect of implicit moral identity on care-based moral dilemma responses for males primed ingroup/loyalty meaning that for males primed with ingroup/loyalty, those with higher implicit moral identity had stronger care-based moral dilemma responses. This finding is particularly important because it contradicts what one would normally expect to be the predicted effect of a prime on the outcome variable. The harm/care prime was expected to have a significant positive effect on the relationship between implicit moral identity and strength of care-based moral dilemma responses in men. Although this relationship was positive, it was insignificant, and instead, the ingroup/loyalty prime group actually demonstrated the significant effect.

It also suggests there may not be gender differences in the way individuals experience moral emotions or express moral intuitions. Further research is needed to understand why the ingroup/loyalty prime, not the harm/care prime, moderated the relationship between implicit moral identity and strength of care-based moral dilemma response for males. Such research will help understand what influences male fundraisers' intuition during moral decision making.

**Hypothesis 4: When primed with ingroup/loyalty, people will make more intuition-based moral decisions that are consistent with the ingroup/loyalty principle (ingroup/loyalty strength of response) and be more likely to experience pride (DPES-Pride) than compassion (DPES-Compassion) or other positive emotions, Hope or Happiness (SHS and DES).**

- a. This effect is stronger in individuals with Low-Implicit Moral Identity than in individuals with High-Implicit Moral Identity.**

**b. This effect is stronger in women than in men.**

This hypothesis is rejected because the ingroup/loyalty primed does not appear to influence intuitive moral decisions for either gender. It was expected that the ingroup/loyalty prime would have more of an effect on women than men because the moral emotion of pride is linked to loyalty according to the Moral Foundations Theory and the literature has reported that men naturally experience pride more than women (Else-Quest *et al.*, 2012; Tracy & Robins, 2007). Due to this, priming women with ingroup/loyalty should have had a stronger response to loyalty-based moral dilemmas because pride is theorised to influence ingroup/loyalty moral intuitions (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Unexpectedly, males with higher implicit moral identity that were primed with harm/care had significantly stronger loyalty-based moral dilemma responses than males primed with ingroup/loyalty. Based on the Moral Foundations Theory, it was hypothesised that males with higher implicit moral identity that were primed with ingroup/loyalty would have stronger loyalty-based moral dilemma responses as their prime should correlate with their moral dilemma responses (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Additionally, gender differences in the experience of emotions suggested that the moderating effect of the experience of pride on the relationship between implicit moral identity and the strength of loyalty-based moral decisions should have been strongest for females primed with ingroup/loyalty; however, females with high implicit moral identity in the ingroup/loyalty prime group actually had weaker loyalty-based moral decisions than those with low implicit moral identity. Further research should be conducted to understand what might influence female fundraisers to make loyalty-based moral decisions toward their charity organisation. Research could also

aim to explain why the intended effects of the experience of the moral emotion of pride did not result in stronger loyalty-based moral intuitions as proposed by MFT.

### **General observations**

Another possible explanation for hypotheses results involves the measure for implicit moral identity. To create the IAT for implicit moral identity, the nine moral adjectives from the explicit moral identity measure, the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale, were used. However, the researchers who developed the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale, which has been standardised and proven reliable and valid in the academic community, don't actually define morality in their published literature (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

The only reference made in the article describing the scale development is that one characteristic of morality is that "a person shows concern for the needs and welfare of others" which would inadvertently allude to the harm/care moral foundation (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p.1431; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). However, the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale is not intended to align with any specific moral foundation (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). The scale developers also continue the definition in future work stating that the defining feature of morality is demonstrated through moral behaviour that responds to the needs and interests of others (Aquino *et al.*, 2009). This definition also aligns with the harm/care moral foundation. So it may be the case that unknowingly, as it relates to moral intuition and the Moral Foundations Theory, this scale may be biased towards the harm/care foundation, therefore skewing results of the implicit moral identity measure (IAT) to align moral identity with this particular foundation.

## 6.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has described the current research in the context of the literature review and applied theories. It also reviewed the research aims, objectives and hypotheses developed from Phase 1. When findings are synthesised, the most important result is that these findings did not discover a relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition amongst male or female fundraisers. This prediction was theoretically underpinned, and results were surprising.

An interesting result is that moral foundations significantly affected male fundraisers, though not in the expected way. Male fundraisers with high implicit moral identity that were primed with the harm/care moral foundation were expected to have stronger care-based moral dilemma responses; however, results reported they had weaker care-based moral dilemma responses than males with low implicit moral identity. Another unexpected, key finding of this research is that males with high implicit moral identity that were primed ingroup/loyalty actually had a stronger care-based moral dilemma response than males primed with harm/care. This result was unexpected based on the theoretical context and literature. These results have implications related to theory, academics and in practical settings. Males account for approximately twenty-five per cent of professional fundraisers, so it would be beneficial to understand how moral foundations affect their intuitive decision-making.

Since fundraisers encounter moral dilemmas that require the use of moral intuition in practical settings, it would also be beneficial to understand what might help direct their

decision-making in such scenarios, as implicit moral identity doesn't appear to. As stated previously, measurements for moral intuition vary and have reported conflicting results, perhaps suggesting that it is difficult to measure reliably. Future research would benefit from identifying a widely accepted and proven consistently reliable, valid measure for this construct. This issue is currently not addressed in the existing literature concerning moral intuition, moral foundations theory, or implicit moral identity.

This chapter began with aims, objectives and hypotheses that informed the research. Key findings were then described. Following, the conclusions chapter will discuss the contribution to knowledge, and implications for theory development, research, practice, education and training. It will then propose recommendations for future research and will explain the limitations of the current research.

## **Chapter Seven: Conclusions**

### **7.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides a conclusion of this doctoral research. To accomplish this, the contribution to knowledge and implications for practice, education and training of both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the study are shared. Next, opportunities for future research are recommended. The chapter concludes with limitations of the research.

### **7.2 Contribution to Knowledge**

The research has identified five contributions to knowledge, which are summarised in Table 7.1. The first contribution is that moral dilemmas experienced by fundraisers that require moral intuition are mostly categorised as a conflict between the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty moral foundation. This is the first study to explore moral dilemmas requiring moral intuition within this population. As demonstrated in the literature review, there are not practical tools available to fundraisers to help them solve moral dilemmas that require an immediate reaction. This research provides the groundwork for understanding the types of scenarios fundraisers encounter.

The second contribution is the development of a moral dilemma scale that aligned with factors of harm/care and ingroup/loyalty moral foundations. Results of the exploratory factor analysis of the moral dilemma measure confirmed that the majority of dilemmas in the Care category aligned with Factor 1, and the majority of dilemmas in the Loyalty

category aligned with Factor 3. This alignment with particular factors confirms them as independent sources of relationships among the variables of care and loyalty. Results confirm the two sets of variables meant to measure two constructs; however, more work should be done to improve upon and strengthen this measure.

The third contribution is that higher implicit moral identity is not related to moral intuition amongst fundraisers, regardless of gender or moral foundation priming. The literature review demonstrated that moral intuition was the result of innate reactions that aligned with moral foundations. It was expected that individuals that were primed with a particular moral foundation would have intuitive moral reactions that aligned with the same moral foundation. This research showed that this was not true. None of the moderator groups demonstrated the expected relationship of high implicit moral identity relating to a shorter moral dilemma response time. This highlights the need to further understand the application of the Moral Foundations Theory to practical settings.

The fourth contribution is the finding that positive moral emotions were not found to mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. No previous studies have explicitly tested whether positive moral emotions aligned with the Moral Foundations Theory affect moral intuition. This unexpected finding contrasted theoretical implications outlined in the literature review as the Moral Foundations Theory posits that moral emotions are aligned with particular moral foundations. This suggests that the theorised associations between moral emotions and moral intuitions associated with the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty foundations might not exist, which highlights a need to further test this theory.

The fifth contribution to knowledge is the finding that gender did not have a moderating effect on how emotions mediated the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. The literature review indicated that compassion would mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and the speed of care-based moral dilemmas for females, and pride would mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and the speed of loyalty-based moral dilemmas for males. This finding counters the notion that women are more emotional than men and that different emotions are experienced more strongly by males and females. It also suggests that the experience of moral emotions does not mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition differently based on gender.

The sixth contribution to knowledge is that this research largely challenges the claims of the Moral Foundations Theory. Participants were primed with moral foundations, which should have influenced the strength of their response that aligned with the same moral foundation. However, there were no significant effects in either of the female primed groups. Males with higher implicit moral identity that were in the ingroup/loyalty prime group had stronger care-based moral dilemma responses. Additionally, males with higher implicit moral identity that were in the harm/care prime group had stronger loyalty-based moral dilemma responses. These are important findings because as has been mentioned, the practical application of the Moral Foundations Theory has not been examined. This research demonstrates the need to better understand the relationship between moral foundations and present-day moral dilemma scenarios.

The seventh contribution is that dilemmas fundraisers encounter emphasise cooperation, where cooperation is broadly defined as a “process in which individuals, groups, and/or

organizations interact and form relationships for mutual gain or benefit” (Schalk & Curşeu, 2010, p.454). Cooperation can occur in instances where individual actions maximize a collective gain, individuals work together to achieve a common goal, or agents that are goal-interdependent engage in social interactions (Chen, Chen & Meindl, 1998). The emphasis on cooperation and relationships challenges the theory that underlies the construct of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The basis of moral identity is that individual agency motivates autonomous moral action. Findings from the current research showed that rather than make decisions based on moral autonomy, i.e. ‘What’s in it for me?’, fundraisers often consider their dilemmas to be based on relationships, maximising a collective gain, and working together to achieve a common goal. Factor Analysis supported this finding. This suggests that further examination should examine the emphasis fundraisers place on relationships and cooperation as a foundation for making moral decisions.

The eighth contribution is the finding that the trade off of moral dilemmas in this research leans towards relationships, compassion and collective morals. The discovery that most dilemmas fundraisers encounter requiring intuition is a conflict between caring for an individual and demonstrating loyalty to one’s organisation emphasizes the communal aspect of morality and actually provides support for Ethics of Care Theory. Ethics of Care Theory posits that caring is the foundation of morality and that the relationships we have with others defines our identity (Dunn & Burton, 2013; Vosman, 2014). Furthermore, this theory draws from the Aristotelian virtue of caring, ranging along a continuum from codependence to selfishness, which formulates the ethical foundation for the current work. This research demonstrates the need to include Ethics of Care Theory as an explanation for how fundraisers make intuitive moral decisions.

Given the contributions to knowledge of this research, it is imperative to acknowledge the implications for practice, education, and training. The following section outlines how these findings can be of consequence.

### **7.3 Implications for Practice**

These findings are important to charities with employed fundraisers as they demonstrate the need to understand what constructs might help fundraisers make intuitive moral decisions. Fundraising is a vibrant, complex field, especially in contemporary times. While the Covid-19 pandemic recently turned our way of living upside-down, the need for charitable giving and generosity has increased (Charities Aid Foundation, 2020). Communities across the globe have responded to this need, thanks to the dedicated, resilient work of fundraising teams across a variety of charities.

The semi-structured interviews provide evidence that fundraisers encounter moral dilemmas that require an intuitive response. They also showed that the majority of these types of moral dilemmas are a conflict between caring for an individual and demonstrating loyalty to one's organisation. As such, it will be beneficial to charities to support the moral development of their fundraising teams. To improve fundraisers preparedness and confidence when encountering moral dilemma scenarios, it would be beneficial to improve education and training in this area. Courses on ethics and morals would benefit fundraising professionals and should vary according to level of seniority. It will also be important for charities to understand the implications of intuitive moral decisions fundraisers make on

behalf of the organisation. Improving education in this area would be beneficial not only for the individual's sense of moral identity, but for the internal and external brand reputation for charities. Brand includes integrity, ethics and affinity. Research has shown that performance is linked to staff emotional brand attachment and that strategic brand development results in stronger organisational cohesion (Kylander & Stone, 2012; Liu *et al.*, 2014).

The findings also showed that higher implicit moral identity did not result in quicker intuitive moral decisions amongst any of the moderator groups. There is already a gap in training or educating fundraisers about how to manage moral dilemmas when intuition is required. Unfortunately, the findings of this research showed that having underlying moral characteristics such as compassion, generosity, kindness, helpfulness, honesty, or friendliness will not necessarily assist fundraisers make quicker moral decisions. As such, it may benefit organisations if they invested in understanding more about how to help employees during these situations. Moreover, though not significant, it might also benefit organisations to instil a culture based on these moral characteristics into its ethos that could then support individual employees' embracing of the characteristics of a moral person, thereby encouraging the expression of moral identity in the workplace.

The gender of the fundraiser does not appear to be a significant factor in how the experience of emotions might mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. This research shows that females are no more emotional than males, and also that the experience of emotions does not play a part in the intuitive moral decisions fundraisers make. As females represent approximately 75% of professional fundraisers, this finding is important for charities as it helps them to understand that emotions do not appear

to influence the moral decisions for a large cohort of their fundraising employees. This has implications for how charities might develop ethical strategies.

Having outlined the implications, opportunities for further research identified by this research are discussed in the next section.

## **7.4 Future Research**

Findings from this study result in proposals for future research. Table 7.1 shows the opportunities for further research in alignment with the main contributions to knowledge of this research. The primary research question for this study was ‘What kind of moral dilemmas do fundraisers encounter that require intuitive responses, and how are they solved?’ Results from the study have highlighted areas where further research will benefit the existing knowledge.

Table 7.1 Contribution to Knowledge and Potential for Future Research

Contribution to Knowledge	Potential for future research
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moral dilemmas experienced by fundraisers are often categorised as a conflict between the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty moral foundation.</li> <li>• Development of a moral dilemma scale that aligned with factors of harm/care and ingroup/loyalty moral foundations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research is needed to improve upon the reliability and validity of the moral dilemma measure.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher implicit moral identity is not related to moral intuition.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Future research needs to identify a standardised, reliable, valid measure for moral intuition.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Positive moral emotions were not found to mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Additional research is needed to confirm that moral emotions align with moral foundations and their mediating effect on the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition more broadly.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender did not have a moderating effect on how positive moral emotions mediated the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further research should be conducted to understand if there is a gender difference on the experience and effect of negative moral emotions.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The effect of the moral foundation prime and the strength of moral dilemma response did not align with the Moral Foundations Theory for male fundraisers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further research is needed to examine the practical application of the Moral Foundations Theory.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emphasis of cooperation within moral dilemmas experienced by fundraisers, challenging individual agency focus of moral identity theory.</li> <li>• The trade off of moral dilemmas leans towards relationships, compassion and collective morals.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exploratory research may be conducted to incorporate Relationship Regulation Theory (RR) and Ethics of Care as ways to understand moral intuition.</li> </ul>

Further research is needed to improve upon the measure of moral dilemma scenarios created for this research. As the moral dilemma measure was created for this research specifically, future work could be done to improve this measure’s factor loading, reliability and validity. The current measure was created based on semi-structured interview responses that aligned with two moral foundations, harm/care and ingroup/loyalty. However, when

tested, factor analysis results showed that the dilemma examples did not all load on the same factor for care-based or loyalty-based scenarios. In order to provide more confidence in the research community that these dilemmas are, in fact, measuring responses to particular moral foundations, the measure should be re-tested and amended where necessary until all dilemmas intended to measure particular moral foundations demonstrate this in factor analysis testing. This work would ensure strong measurement accuracy for future studies.

Contrary to what was expected based on theory, no evidence was found supporting the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. More research is needed to explain why the expected effect did not occur in any of the moderator groups. As the current study had a small sample size, conducting a study with a larger sample size examining the relationships would be ideal. Gathering data from a larger sample size will provide a more representative picture of the population of interest. Additionally, future research would benefit from identifying a standardised, reliable, valid measure for moral intuition. This lack of consistency is not currently addressed in the existing literature.

The current research findings revealed that positive moral emotions were not found to mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. Further research should examine the relationship between moral emotions and moral foundations more generally, as well as the potential mediating effect. For example, research could study if negative moral emotions mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. This research could also examine if gender differences exist amongst the experience and effect of negative moral emotions.

Further research examining the practical application of the Moral Foundations Theory is needed. In the current study, the foundation primes did not align with the strength of moral dilemma response for male fundraisers as expected. A better understanding is required of the relationship between moral foundations and how ingroup/loyalty might result in stronger care-based moral dilemma responses, and vice versa. This could also be tested in males more broadly to better understand gender differences within the Moral Foundations Theory itself.

Lastly, additional theories could be used as a lens to study the constructs of interest in future research.

For example, Relationship Regulation Theory (RR) has recently been used to explain moral psychology (Dinh & Lord, 2013). This theory explains moral judgments and behaviours as they relate to social relationships required for living in groups. Creators of RR claim to add to the Moral Foundations Theory by “grounding the foundations in a theory of social relationships and thereby predicting when and how people will rely on one foundation over another” (Rai & Fiske, 2011, p.66). Authors have aligned RR with Moral Foundation Theory, but have yet to explore how this theory explains moral emotions (Rai & Fiske, 2011).

Additionally, Ethics of Care theory posits that caring is the foundation of morality, relationships are an ontology basic to humanity, and that the relationships we have with others defines our identity (Dunn & Burton, 2013; Vosman, 2014). This theory also emphasises the universal impulse to care amongst individuals, suggesting that the

Harm/Care Moral Foundation might more strongly influence moral action than other moral foundations.

Since a strong component of fundraising is based on relationships (Sargeant & Jay, 2014), future research might benefit from incorporating RR or Ethics of Care as explanations for moral identity, moral emotions, moral decisions, and moral intuition.

## **7.5 Limitations of the study**

This research sought to investigate the mediating relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions and moral intuition amongst fundraisers solving moral dilemmas. It was designed in two phases, and as with most empirical research, the research methods consisted of some limitations.

The first phase of the research consisted of semi-structured interviews. The researcher conducted the interviews without previous experience and analysed results somewhat subjectively. It would have been preferred to have used an experienced interviewer; however, there were time and financial restraints. Additionally, including multiple researchers to analyse the interviews may have limited subjectivity; however, the postpositivist philosophical paradigm adopted as the philosophy of the current research accepts the subjectivity of this phase. The semi-structured interviews were intended to understand the context of moral dilemma scenarios in order to measure these constructs in the second phase.

The second phase of the research had a problem with the response rate. Projections for survey recruitment had identified suitable methods to obtain the 385 participants needed to report statistically significant findings; however, only 188 participants completed the survey. Also, the survey took an average of 25 minutes to complete, which may have been a deterrent. When surveys were started but left incomplete, due to the confidentiality of participants, there was not a way to contact individuals with reminders to finish the questionnaire. Despite this limitation, the demographics reported by participants matched those reported in a recent study of UK-based fundraisers (Breeze, 2017). Although the sample of the current study included fundraisers from a few other Westernised countries, there is some confidence that the sample was representative of the fundraising population more broadly, at least in the UK.

The measures used in Phase 2 were mostly self-report questionnaires, which may have resulted in socially desirable responses. The moral dilemma scenarios measure was a newly developed questionnaire and though analysed for reliability, may need further testing to establish stronger reliability and validity. Additionally, there is not a preferred type of measurement recommended by researchers for moral intuition. The current research used both explicit and implicit measures to ensure robust measurement.

The fourth area includes data analyses structure for Phase 2. Even though this study was the initial experimentation used to test and prove the relationship between implicit moral identity, moral emotions, and moral intuition, the significance level was kept at  $p=.05$  (Fisher, 1954). This study was also the first to use newly created measures for the fundraising and moral foundation related moral dilemma scenarios. Sometimes, when doing initial testing, a significance level of  $p=.10$  may be used. This  $p$  level would have given

more flexibility in initial testing and would have resulted in more significant results; however, it would also have increased the results occurring by chance. In order to provide robust analysis and demonstrate significance in alignment with accepted tests in the academic literature,  $p=.05$  was selected.

The fifth limitation addresses potential bias. The current research project came about as the result of the researcher's career in fundraising and interest in moral identity and moral intuition. This being true, to mitigate the risk of bias to emphasise the difficulties of moral dilemma scenarios and the importance of providing professional support in this area, the researcher used neutral and relevant research and theories applicable to the topic to formulate the literature review, hypotheses, and inform the discussion. Additionally, as the research was grounded in the postpositivist paradigm, researcher bias is accepted as inherent.

The sixth limitation is that utilising other schools of thought, such as Ethics of Care, as a theoretical basis for the current research might have added a different dimension to the research. Ethics of Care posits that caring is the foundation of morality, relationships are an ontology basic to humanity, and that the relationships we have with others defines our identity (Dunn & Burton, 2013; Vosman, 2014). Aligned with the virtue of caring in Aristotle's virtue ethics, Ethics of Care proposes that the impulse to care is universal yet varies from individual to individual. Applying this theory to the research might have raised the question of whether fundraisers selected a care-based response to moral dilemmas more quickly and more strongly than loyalty-based responses.

Lastly, there are some general observations that should be addressed for future research. The first observation is that there are many different definitions of morality used by a variety of researchers studying the construct. Secondly, there are a variety of ways that researchers measure intuition, and the accuracy of such measures has yet to be confirmed. These two areas should be further addressed so that researchers can build on the body of knowledge in a collaborative and symbiotic way.

## **7.6 Conclusion**

This research has answered the question of what kind of moral dilemmas fundraisers encounter and how are they solved. Advancements to existing knowledge have been reported, theoretical and practical implications have been shared, and suggestions for future research have been made. Stemming from the results and discussion, further research should commence.

First, in order to measure moral intuition using practical scenarios, more work should commence to ensure the reliability and validity of the moral dilemma scale. Factor analysis for the current research revealed that not all dilemma examples loaded on the same factor. In order to provide more confidence in the research community that these dilemmas are, in fact, measuring responses aligning with particular moral foundations, the measure should be amended and re-tested until all dilemmas intended to measure particular foundations demonstrate this in factor analysis testing. This work would ensure strong measurement accuracy for future studies.

Additionally, findings demonstrated that there was not a relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. Research is needed to understand what other constructs might influence moral intuition as this was predicted based on the literature review.

Lastly, positive moral emotions were not found to mediate the relationship between implicit moral identity and moral intuition. This contrasted theoretical implications outlined in the literature review. Although unexpected, this finding contributed to existing knowledge because no other studies have explicitly tested whether positive moral emotions aligned with the Moral Foundations Theory actually effected moral intuition. The effect of moral emotions, their alignment with MFT, and their effect on moral intuition should be established in future research.

The research has shown the need to understand how fundraisers solve moral dilemmas while under time pressure as part of their occupational responsibilities. Further research is needed to understand what innate and automatic tools fundraisers can access that will help them solve moral dilemmas when intuition is required. In obtaining this understanding, education and training could reflect the learnings and better prepare fundraisers for their roles. This is currently not in practice, as discovered by the literature review.

More broadly, this study has demonstrated that further empirical work is required to explicitly examine the Moral Foundations Theory in practice, specifically the role of moral emotions in moral intuition.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1. Interview Guidelines for Interviewee

Thank you for agreeing to serve on the expert panel for the research project examining moral dilemmas in professional fundraising. Your interview answers will be kept anonymous and confidential. Under no circumstances will your name and answers be connected in any publication or writing.

### Overview and Definitions

For the purposes of this research project, a dilemma is defined as a situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two or more alternatives. Moral dilemmas are situations when a difficult choice must be made between two or more appropriate alternatives or two or more inappropriate alternatives.

This research aims to study how fundraisers cope with moral dilemmas **under time pressure**.

### Interview Questions

You will be asked the following questions during our call:

1. Please describe difficult moral dilemma(s) you have had to resolve almost instantly. Were you under intense time pressure? How did you know what decision to make? The situation could have occurred at any moment in your career. I am going to ask you to describe the dilemma and explain how you coped with it. I am interested both in the dilemma situation and in your reflections about the dilemma. (40 minutes)
2. Secondly, what are the most common dilemmas you think fundraisers face in their first year in the profession, as an administrator let's say? (15 minutes)
  - ... as a Fundraising Director?
  - ... as the CEO of a Charity?
3. If different than the examples provided above, what are the three most frequent moral dilemmas you encounter?
  - a. Please give examples of each

Do you have any other thoughts or suggestions that you feel will be helpful or relevant to this project?

Thank you again very much for your time.

## Appendix 2. Interview Instructions for the Interviewer

Script:

“Thank you for agreeing to serve on the expert panel for the research project examining moral dilemmas in professional fundraising. Your interview answers will be kept anonymous and confidential. Under no circumstances will your name and answers be connected in any publication or writing.”

“In order to ensure that your insight and examples can be applied to the project, I would like to record our phone call. The recording will be used for research-purposes only. Information obtained from this call, in particular sample moral dilemmas, will be used to inform the next stages of this research project. Is it ok for me to record for further analysis?”

“Also, if at any time, you would like to end the call, you are free to do so.”

“After reviewing the guidelines that were emailed, do you have any questions about the concept of moral dilemmas or the definitions used for this research? Would you like any further explanation?”

Interview questions

Ask the interviewee the following:

“1. Please describe the most difficult moral dilemma(s) you have had to resolve under the most intense time pressure. This could have occurred at any period in your career. I am going to ask you to describe the dilemma and explain how you coped with it. I am interested both in the dilemma situation and in your reflections about the dilemma.” (40 minutes)

Probing Questions

Describe the dilemma  
What happened?

Who was involved in the situation?  
Who was around when the situation occurred?  
What choice/solution/action did you take?  
When did the situation occur?  
What was your position at the organisation?  
How did you feel about your choice?  
What made you feel pressured for time?

Might not need to ask this question - Going back 30 years, what was the most difficult dilemma; You also want to keep an eye out for whether they have to make the decision in private or public settings.

2. “Secondly, what are the most common dilemmas you think fundraisers face in their first year in the profession, as an administrator let’s say?” (15 minutes)  
... as a Fundraising Director?  
... as the CEO of a Charity?

3. “If different than the examples provided above, what are the three most frequent moral dilemmas you encounter?”

a. Please give examples of each

“Do you have any other thoughts or suggestions that you feel will be helpful or relevant to this project?”

(if the interview goes well). Could I ask for an additional favour? Would it be ok for me to contact your PA for a copy of your CV?

“Thank you again very much for your time, and I hope you have a wonderful holiday season!”

## **Appendix 3 Scrutiny of Scales used for Phase 2**

This appendix describes the following for each measure:

- Development of the measure
- Scales and subscales
- Potential bias
- Standardisation
- Reliability
- Validity

### **1. Implicit Association Test [IAT]**

#### **Development of the measure**

Greenwald et. al created the measure in three experiments using the same association attribute (1998) and several target concepts: positive [flowers and musical instruments] vs negative [insects and weapons], groups of subjects [Korean American and Japanese American] and groups of racial categories [white and black]. The creators developed a five-step process to measure the construct that includes:

- Step 1 – introduction of target-concept discrimination and assigning participant responses to particular keys on the keyboard that align with designated hands. For example, flowers = right-hand responses, insects = left-hand responses.
- Step 2 – introduction of the attribute dimension, also in the form of two-category discrimination, and also aligning responses with particular keys on the keyboard that link with designated hands [right vs left]. For example, pleasant vs unpleasant.
- Step 3 – the target-concept and attribute are superimposed, i.e. Flowers = pleasant, insects = unpleasant.

- Step 4 – participants learn a reversal of response assignments for the target discrimination, so flowers = left hand response and insects = right hand response.
- Step 5 – the target-concept and attribute are again superimposed, but with a reversal of the response assignments. I.e. flowers = unpleasant, insects = pleasant.

### **Scales and subscales**

There are no scales and subscales within the IAT. Rather, there are two groups of words, target-concept and attributes which measure participant's implicit associations.

### **Potential bias in the measures**

The potential bias in the IAT is related to the outcome measurement used to determine effect size. When the IAT was first used, examiners were using whichever variable they chose in order to obtain the largest effect sizes (Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003). However, IAT developers have revised the scoring instructions so that only the *D* measure is used to report results, regardless of what results may have been found using other measures (Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003). The *iatgen* software, which is used in this study to perform the IAT, uses these instructions for scoring and the *D* measure is used in this study (Carpenter *et al.*, 2017). The scoring is now standardised such that the *D* measure is used across studies, ensuring standardised effect sizes for reporting and comparison.

### **Standardization**

*Adequacy of normative groups*

During measure development, three studies were conducted with 90 total participants (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). All three studies used US students in an introductory psychology course at the same Pacific-Northwestern University [University of Washington]; however developers ensured differences across genders and nationality. The age group of the students wasn't disclosed in the academic paper; however, typically students in university are between 18-22 years old (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998).

Use of the measure beyond development has been mostly with university undergraduate students, particularly in the US. This population is somewhat reflective of the population of interest for this study as the age range of fundraisers can be anywhere upwards of 18. Also, as there are no professional trainings or degrees required to obtain fundraising positions, participants for the current study may have some university experience, but may not have obtained a bachelor's degree.

Overall, since the publication and implementation of the measure in academic literature, the IAT has been cited 3,825 times and has been used to test implicit associations in many other participant groups, such as professional fundraisers (Shang & Kong, 2015), US volunteers with average ages of 39.46, 36.97 and 32.30 (Crawford *et al.*, 2017), and an international online pool of 320 participants, (females = 206; Mage = 31.11, SD = 10.88, Range: 18–71 - [73% Caucasian/White; 12% Asian/Pacific Island; 6% Black; 4% Hispanic; 5% others]) (Keatley, Ailom & Mullan, 2017). The use of the scale with a broader scope of participants increases confidence that it will be an effective measure of implicit moral identity within this research's desired population.

*Representativeness of normative groups*

There is one study that has used a sample of survey takers who also identified as fundraisers attending a professional conference (Shang & Kong, 2015). This group of participants are the closest representation of the population of interest for the current study.

### **Reliability**

IAT reliabilities tend to fall between .70 and .90 (Hofmann *et al.*, 2005). Within parallel IAT measures of various attitudes, correlations between the IAT and other measures were reported at  $r = .85$  and  $r = .46$  (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Further test-retest reliabilities have been reported at  $r = .65$  and  $r = .69$  (Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000; Dasgupta *et al.*, 2000) indicating moderately good stability over time.

When directly compared with the Extrinsic Affective Simon Test [EAST], another implicit measure, results revealed that the IAT split-half reliability was satisfactory and EAST split-half reliability was low (Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000). Additionally, when the IAT was compared with other implicit measures of self-esteem, it was found that the IAT had the highest test-retest reliability (Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000).

### **Validity**

#### *Construct validity*

Construct validity is difficult to demonstrate as there was only one study found that compared implicit measures. Unfortunately, in this study, measuring implicit self-esteem, none of the implicit measures were positively correlated with one another, (Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000). With such limited information, it is difficult to demonstrate construct or convergent validity.

#### *Convergent validity*

When measuring correlations between implicit and explicit measures, a low correlation is expected based on theorization (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) due to systematic method variance for both types of measures. During scale development, weak correlations were observed for the two studies [flower-insect and instrument-weapon contrasts] between scores on the explicit measure and implicit measure (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Additionally, further results from the follow-up study during scale development confirmed no correlation between a semantic differential measure [explicit rating of polar-opposite adjective pairs ranging from [-3] negative to [3] positive] and implicit attitudes toward ethnicity discrimination (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Low correlations have also been demonstrated in research measuring implicit and explicit self-esteem (Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000) and implicit and explicit moral identity (Shang & Kong, 2015).

#### *Discriminant validity*

During scale development, the IAT showed discriminant validity in that two explicit measures were more strongly correlated with each other than with the IAT measure of the same attitudes. The scale developers then stated that this showed “evidence for the divergence of the constructs represented by implicit versus explicit attitude measures” (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998, p.1477).

## **2. & 3. Moral Foundations Questionnaire [MFQ] Harm/Care and Ingroup/Loyalty Scales**

### **Development of the measure**

The authors created the MFQ as a way to systematically examine individual differences in the range of concerns that people consider morally relevant, in alignment with the Moral Foundations Theory (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Initially, participants were asked to evaluate the moral relevance of several vignettes that were related to each of the five foundations.

After multiple evaluations, the fourth and final version involved selecting a combination of scale items that retained the greatest internal and external validity. Authors used internal correlations between every combination of items and three relevant criterion scales (external scales related to the factors of interest) to determine factor-loadings and confirm representation of the five foundations. The final version retained the best three items from each subscale, and the authors identified items that could be used for a shorter 20-item short-form of the MFQ.

### **Scales and subscales**

There are two subscales of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire: moral relevance and moral judgment. The moral relevance subscale assesses explicit theories about what is morally relevant when determining if something is right or wrong. The moral judgment subscale assesses the use of moral foundations when making moral judgments about what is right and wrong (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Each subscale consists of five further sections that align directly with the five moral foundations.

For this research, the items within the Harm/Care and Ingroup/Loyalty scales for both moral judgment and moral relevance subscales were used as a priming measure. The items can be found within the full survey as Appendix 3.

### **Potential bias in the measures**

Some research has revealed that reliance on particular moral foundations can be related to political affiliation (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Individuals with stronger liberal views score higher on harm/care and fairness moral foundation subscales, and those with stronger conservative views have higher scores on authority and purity subscales. Although the differences exist, Graham, Haidt and Nosek comment that the differences between liberals and conservatives were “neither binary nor absolute” (2009, p.1033). In regards to the current research project, political beliefs are not a demographic of interest, and though participants may have a stronger bias toward particular moral foundations, the aim of the current research is not to compare scores on foundations subscales, but to identify the relationships between the subscales, emotions, and particular moral decisions. Given this, the potential bias of the influence of political affiliation on participant scores of the MFQ should not skew results.

### **Standardization**

#### *Adequacy of normative groups*

The first two versions of the MFQ were tested using ProjectImplicit.org, which included heterogeneous populations with large sample sizes [N = 3,285]. No further description of the demographics of these groups was provided in the literature (Graham *et al.*, 2011).

Testing of the third version of the MFQ was quite extensive, involving over 28,000 participants that were recruited through YourMorals.org. Again, the participants were described as heterogeneous without further descriptions of the group’s demographics (Graham *et al.*, 2011). The fourth and final version was tested with 34,476 adults [37% women; mean age = 36.2 years] registered with YourMorals.org. And again, though some demographics were shared for this sample, further descriptive statistics around socio-economic status, education or employment are unknown. Without further information, it is

difficult to come to a conclusion about whether or not the samples used were adequate representations for the population of interest for the current study.

*Representativeness of normative groups*

Although limited demographic information was available for the groups used for standardization, as the studies conducted used such large sample numbers, it has been assumed that there was at least some overlap between these individuals and the sample used for this study.

**Reliability**

The scale developers expected moderate correlations between scales because they specifically created dissimilar items to capture different facets of each foundation (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Contrary to typical scale development, the developers were not attempting to demonstrate high internal consistency within the subscales of each foundation. They argued that having a modest correlation between scale items would be better than having highly correlated items that only capture a small part of the foundations.

Cronbach alphas reported are listed in the following table.

Table 3.12 Cronbach alphas for moral foundations questionnaire.

<b>Foundation</b>	<b>Subscale</b>	<b>Alpha</b>
Harm/Care	Relevance	.70
	Judgments	.51
	Total	.69
Ingroup/Loyalty	Relevance	.71
	Judgments	.46
	Total	.71

Though the internal consistency is not high, it is sufficient enough to demonstrate a common core (Cortina, 1993).

*Test-retest reliability*

The MFQ was first given to 123 college students at an American university [mean age = 20.1 years; 69.9% female] and again after an average interval of 37.4 days [range = 28 – 43 days]. The question order was randomised in both sittings. Consistent with the internal consistencies from the development study, the test-retest Pearson correlations for each foundation score were .71 (Harm/Care), .69 – (Ingroup/Loyalty) [all ps < .001] (Graham *et al.*, 2011). This study demonstrates that responses are stable over time.

## **Validity**

### *Construct validity*

Zero-order correlations between the relevance and judgments subscales for each of the foundations demonstrated two types of validity: convergent validity and discriminant validity (Graham *et al.*, 2011). The correlations revealed that each foundation was measured by different subscales, and subscale relationships were strongest for each foundation. Exploratory factor analysis using Kaiser Normalisation supported the prediction that the strongest loadings for items would correspond clearly to the two groups of moral foundations: individualizing and binding. Confirmatory factor analysis examining the fit and parsimony of five factors, compared with a single factor model, two-factor model [individualising and binding], and three-factor model [autonomy, community and divinity] demonstrated that the five-factor model was the best model.

### *Convergent validity*

To demonstrate convergent validity, data from each of the five foundation scales were compared with data of related scales (Graham *et al.*, 2011). The scales were grouped together to align with the two foundations of interest as follows:

- Harm/Care – empathy subscale of the IRI, Psychopathy Scale (reversed-scored), Benevolence subscale and three items from the Adapted Good-Self Assessment

- Ingroup/Loyalty – importance of being loyal/faithful on Good-Self Scale, endorsement of loyalty, national security, and family security items on SVS

Calculations revealed that the strongest correlations were between foundations and the external criterion scales in the foundation-related groups, confirming convergent validity (Graham *et al.*, 2011).

#### *Predictive validity*

To establish predictive validity, the creators of the MFQ also developed a survey asking participants to report their “gut reactions” to various social groups (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Each social group was paired as either a vice or a virtue for each of the five foundations. The survey included 4-8 items representing the social groups. After controlling for political ideology, which has also related to attitudes and moral foundations (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009), partial correlations between foundations and all social groups were averaged. The results revealed that attitudes toward the related social groups were most strongly predicted by the related moral foundation, not political affiliation (Graham *et al.*, 2011).

#### *Incremental predictive validity*

The measure developers compared the MFQ with the Schwarts Values Scale (SVS), which measures 10 broad classes of values (Graham *et al.*, 2011). Some of the classes overlap with moral foundations, and some are outside of the moral domain. Analysis was performed on data collected from 10,652 visitors to the YourMorals.org website. Participants took the MFQ and SVS, and 92% of them took additional scales or measures. The additional scales included

- Harm/Care – Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Empathy), psychopathy, Good-Self Scale (kind/caring, sympathetic/compassionate, generous/giving)
- Fairness/Justice – Social Dominance Orientation scale, Good-Self Scale (fair/just)

- Ingroup/Loyalty – Good-Self Scale (loyal/faithful)
- Authority – Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, Question about justice scale (traditional justice)
- Purity/Sanctity – disgust scale, religious attendance
- Social groups survey (for each moral foundation)
- Issue positions (i.e. Global warming, gun control, flag-burning, torture, abortion, gay marriage, etc.)

Results revealed that the MFQ made a significant improvement to prediction when added to the SVS (average  $\Delta R^2 = 8\%$ ; all significant at  $p < .001$ ). Additional evidence for incremental predictive validity was discovered when authors added the Big Five Personality Inventory to the SVS. The addition of the Big Five Personality Inventory provided far less of an improvement, with the addition of only  $\Delta R^2 = 2\%$ . This further supports the predictive validity of the MFQ.

#### **4. & 5. Moral Intuition and Moral Decision Strength [Timed Moral Dilemmas]**

##### **Development of the measure**

The measure was developed combining real-life examples provided by the expert panel and the format of dilemmas used in other moral intuition studies (Clifford *et al.*, 2015; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Tinghog *et al.*, 2016). Details of the scale development has been described in detail in section 3.4.5.

##### **Scales and subscales**

There are two subscales, with responses aligned with either Loyalty or Care.

### **Potential bias in the measures**

The expert panel of interviewees were very achieved members of the fundraising community, so many of the examples they provided reflected situations that would be experienced by managers and directors. Though every attempt has been made to edit these situations so that they reflect events that would be experienced by fundraisers from junior employees to more senior employees, the scenarios may not fully represent situations that all fundraisers would experience.

Additionally, there may be a bias towards the fundraising setting in the dilemmas and choices rather than an equal emphasis on fundraising and the demonstration of moral intuition. Since the dilemmas and choices were created as a result of the responses given during the semi-structured interviews and the definitions of moral foundations, they may not encourage the use of moral intuition as much as the scenarios that are typically used to examine this construct. In order to correct for any potential bias, the scenarios and choice options were analysed for face validity by professionals from the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy. The results of this analysis are reported in section 5.4.

### **Standardization**

#### **Adequacy and representativeness of normative groups**

In order to obtain enough information to have a robust, yet manageable, amount of data, it was appropriate to conduct ten interviews. The interviewees involved were invited to participate based on their experience and expertise in the field of fundraising. Questions asked were open ended, and interviewees were asked to think of moral scenarios experienced by fundraisers at many different experience levels. This ensured that the

sample used provided a good representation of the population for which the study is meant to represent.

### **Reliability and Validity**

As development of this measure used within the research is the result of Phase 1, analysis of reliability and validity will be reported in depth in section 5.4

## **6. & 7. Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale – Compassion, Pride**

### **Development of the measure**

In a successful effort to differentially assess the dispositional experience of seven kinds of positive emotion, Shiota et al. (2006) created the Dispositional Positive Emotion Scales [DPES]. The creators identified positive emotion constructs based on a literature review of research into positive emotion states (Shiota & Keltner, 2005).

### **Scales and subscales**

The Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale consists of seven scales, measuring distinct positive emotions: joy/happiness, contentment, pride, compassion, amusement, awe and love. Each scale consists of five or six items. For the current study, the compassion and pride subscales were used.

### **Potential bias in the measures**

The potential biases in the measure involve definitions and cultural emphasis. The measure was created using particular definitions of constructs in a Westernized culture.

Additionally, the participants used for scale development were students at a prestigious American university. To address the potential cultural bias, the scale developers

acknowledged that collectivist cultures emphasised role fulfilment and social rewards over individual performance and the accumulation of rewards. This might lead to different emotion definitions and relationships between positive emotions. For example, the positive self-regard aspect of pride might be more linked to hierarchical cultures rather than collectivist cultures. However, these potential biases did not harm the results of this study as the participants and the population of interest were from Westernized cultures. Recruitment efforts and demographic data supported this intent.

### **Standardization**

#### **Adequacy and representativeness of normative groups**

Initial testing of this measure was conducted using university students in an introductory psychology class in the US (Shiota, 2003; Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006). Additional use of the measure has also been used with other US university students (Cavanaugh, Bettman & Luce, 2015), customers and patients in an Indonesian hospital [Compassion-only scale] (Septianto & Soegiarto, 2017), bi-polar patients and nonclinical control group adults in the US [ages 18-69] (Gruber *et al.*, 2009), and German-speaking adults [aged 18-86, 345 women, 229 men] (Güsewell & Ruch, 2012). Results from each study support adequate levels of reliability and validity.

Over time, the measure has been used with various samples, increasing the ability to generalise results to various populations. The previous research conducted with adults provides reassurance that the measure is appropriate to use with the sample and population of interest for this study.

### **Reliability**

The measure has good internal reliability. During scale development, Cronbach's alphas for the scales of interest in Sample 1 were Joy/Happiness, .79, and Pride, .75 (Shiota, 2003). Cronbach's alphas for the DPES scales in Sample 2 were Joy/Happiness, .79, and Pride, .72 (Shiota, 2003). Additionally, the developers performed confirmatory factor analysis, which supported items loading onto intended constructs.

## **Validity**

### *Face validity*

Face validity was verified in the process the authors outlined during scale development. They began with a literature review of positive emotion states from which seven positive emotion constructs emerged (Shiota & Keltner, 2005). From this literature review, definitions of each of the seven positive emotions were clearly and logically defined in the paper (Shiota, 2003; Shiota & Keltner, 2005). Based on the definitions, items were drafted to assess the frequency and intensity of experiencing the emotions, and the instrument was refined over several iterations of testing. This process resulted in the 38-item DPES.

### *Construct validity*

The authors used the findings of both the confirmatory factor analysis and the Cronbach's alpha levels as part of the evidence for construct validity, stating that "the DPES measures multiple, distinguishable positive emotionality constructs, rather than a single unidimensional construct" (Shiota, 2003, p.9).

The developers also performed a Principle Components Analysis that demonstrated the items loaded onto six factors. Initially Contentment and Joy loaded onto the same factor and appeared indistinguishable; however, the remaining five factors [Pride, Love,

Compassion, Amusement, and Awe] differentiated onto separate factors (Shiota, Keltner & John, no date). To ensure all seven constructs were, in fact, distinct, the authors performed further tests to assess correlations between the seven DPES scales and the Positive and Negative Affect scales of the PANAS. This assessment provided evidence for the seven factors with varying correlations.

#### *Convergent and discriminant validity*

Convergent and discriminant validity were established using the two scales of the PANAS – Positive Affect and Negative Affect (Shiota, Keltner & John, no date). The results of a third study showed that all seven DPES scales correlated positively and significantly with PANAS-PA. Three of the seven scales negatively correlated with PANAS-NA, two significantly; and the other four scales did not correlate with the item at all.

#### *Criterion-related validity*

Criterion-related validity has been reported using the Big Five personality measure (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006). All of the DPES scales correlated significantly with Extraversion; however, other correlations were discovered between specific scales and the other four Big Five factors: Conscientiousness strongly correlated with Joy, Contentment and Pride; Agreeableness strongly correlated with Love and Compassion; Openness to Experience strongly correlated with Joy, Love, Compassion, Amusement and Awe; and Neuroticism strongly correlated with Joy, Contentment, Pride and Love (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006).

Criterion-related validity has also been confirmed through correlations between different scales of DPES and attachment measures (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006). These scores support attachment theory, which states that attachment functions as a secure base for

exploration & achievement. This was reinforced with the additional finding that attachment security was correlated with DPES scales that represent intimate social bonds & resource acquisition: joy, pride, contentment, love and compassion. Additional results revealed negative correlations between anxiety and joy, contentment/pride/love, and negative correlations between avoidance and love/compassion, which would be expected. These results supported previous findings that insecure attachment correlates with high levels of negative affect. The findings also contribute to the understanding of the relationship between affect and positive emotions.

## **8. State Hope Scale – Hope**

### **Development of the measure**

The development was based on the dispositional approach to measurement. The developers' expectation was for the state-based measurement to "provide a snapshot of a person's current goal-directed thinking," (Snyder *et al.*, 1996, p.321). The scale was derived by adjusting the wording of the items in the dispositional hope scale to focus on the present (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). Participants were instructed to rate how each items described their thinking at the moment on an 8-point scale [1 = definitely false, to 8 = definitely true].

The initial measure consisted of two scales each consisting of four items; however, the results of factor analyses showed that one item loaded more strongly onto the unintended scale. As a result, this item was omitted from the final scale and the item with the lowest average factor loading onto the other scale was also removed. This left a six-item version of the scale for research use (Snyder *et al.*, 1996).

### **Potential bias in the measures**

As is common in many self-report measures, there is a risk of potential bias such as social desirability. There is also potential for bias in that the measure and standardisation was developed within a Westernised culture; however, as stated in the analysis of DPES, these potential biases did not harm the results of this study as the participants and the population of interest were also from Westernized cultures. Recruitment efforts and demographic data support this intent.

### **Scales and subscales**

The measure consists of two subscales, three items to measure agency, and three items to measure pathways. Snyder et al. define agency as the “perceived capacity for initiating and maintaining actions necessary to reach a goal,” and pathways as the “perceived ability to generate routes to one’s goals.” (1991, p.571). In combination, agency and pathways comprise the definition of hope used for this measure. For the current study, the combination of both scales was used as a complete measure of hope.

During standardization, each subscale consisted of four items; however, based on statistical findings [explained below in the construct validity and predictive validity sections] one item from each subscale was removed, leaving a 6-item measure with three items on each subscale. This final measure is what was used in the current study.

### **Standardization**

Initial standardization of the measure was conducted with 444 students from the University of Kansas [211 men, 233 women] (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). Participants were instructed that researchers wanted to understand the reactions of college students living a month of their lives, and were given envelopes marked Week 1, Week 2, etc. Participants were asked to

complete daily versions of a variety of measures. After the initial month, participants were asked to complete other measures in a separate setting [n=168] to test the validity of the State Hope Scale.

### **Adequacy & Representativeness of normative groups**

The scale was developed using students enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The sample was 211 men and 233 women, and 240 participants were recruited to complete a follow-up study. Only 168 completed the follow-up study.

Since its development, the State Hope Scale has been used within other studies, demonstrating a variety of appropriate samples within which the scale can be used (Clauss *et al.*, 2018; Ong, Edwards & Bergeman, 2006; Yang, Zhang & Kou, 2016). One of the other samples used in research included a group of forty-five participants, age 62-80 who were predominantly European-American [95.7%] and educated through high school [or GCSE level] [52%] (Ong, Edwards & Bergeman, 2006). Another sample involved 320 Chinese adults with 146 men, 174 women, total mean age = 24.45 years with a range of 18-48 years, and 46 participants were married (Yang, Zhang & Kou, 2016). And lastly, another measure was used amongst a group of forty-four caregivers in Germany with an age range of 23-61 years [average age of 42.3], most living with a partner [65.6%], and most had completed their vocational training as a nurse, working at least 35 hours a week (Clauss *et al.*, 2018). The other studies demonstrated satisfactory reliability and confirmatory factor analyses, which supports the findings from the original scale development.

As is commonly referenced, though the measure hasn't been used with the exact population of interest, other studies using the State Hope Scale have used the measure with other samples that show some overlap with the current study's population of interest in relation to age, marital status, employment status, and other demographic information. This provided assurance that the scale would be appropriate to use within the current study's sample.

### **Reliability**

Reliability and internal construct validity were determined from the development study by calculating Cronbach alphas for each of the 30 days (mass testing and 29 subsequent days) that participants rated their emotion. The alphas ranged from a low of .82 to a high of .95, median alpha .93, demonstrating satisfactory results (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). Nunnally's (1978) recommendation is that self-report indices with internal reliabilities in the .70 to .80 range are acceptable for research purposes. Using these criteria, the State Hope Scale is very acceptable.

Amongst each sub-scale, Cronbach alphas for the three agency items ranged from .83-.95 (for each of the 30 days), and from .74-.93 for the three pathways items. Additionally, the correlations between the agency and pathways scales were moderately and positively correlated, as expected,  $r(442) = .50$ . This demonstrated that the scales measured separate, yet moderately related, constructs.

### **Validity**

*Face validity* was determined by amending the wording of the original Dispositional Hope Scale, which had already been proven reliable and valid, to reflect present-focused

responses (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). As in the Dispositional Hope Scale, the wording of the items was based on the definitions of agency and pathways of hope as previously stated in the subscale section above.

### *Construct validity*

Construct validity of the initially used eight-item scale was determined using a principal-components factor analysis, which forced the extraction of two factors (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). This resulted in eigenvalues of 4.22 and 1.15, accounting for 67.2% of the variance.

After further factor analysis (see predictive validity section below), the revised six-item scale loaded on two factors: the three agency items loaded onto one factor, with an eigenvalue of 3.20, accounting for 53.4% of variance, and the three pathways items loaded onto a separate factor with an eigenvalue of 1.08, accounting for 18.0% (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). The cumulative variance accounted for was 71.4%. Gorsuch (1983) notes that extracted variances of 40-50% reflect a factor structure of substantial impact for self-report scales, supporting the State Hope Scale's construct validity.

Being a state-based measure, the developers' expected a varied response from participants. The scale did, in fact, vary temporally, with correlations ranging from .48 - .93 across any 2 days in the 4-week period of the study (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). No significant differences were found in mean scores based on gender.

### *Convergent validity*

Snyder *et al.* (1996) examined correlations between the State Hope Scale and the dispositional Hope Scale to demonstrate convergent validity. Correlations at Day 1 was *rs*

= .79 and Day 29 was  $r_s = .78$ . These results, as expected, demonstrated that the two scales were related.

#### *Discriminant validity*

To test discriminant validity, the developers compared scores on the State Hope Scale with the State Negative Affect Scale (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). As predicted, there was a negative relationship between the measures, with correlations at day 1 being  $r_s = -.47$  and Day 29 being  $r_s = -.50$ .

#### *Concurrent validity*

The State Hope Scale was compared with the State Self-Esteem scale and the State Positive Affect scale to demonstrate concurrent validity (Snyder *et al.*, 1996). True to the developers' prediction, the State Hope Scale correlated positively with the State Self-Esteem scale on Day 1 ( $r_s = .68$ ) and Day 20 ( $r_s = .75$ ). A positive relationship was also demonstrated between the scale and the Positive Affect Scale with correlations on Day 1 at  $r_s = .65$  and Day 29 at  $r_s = .55$ .

#### *Predictive validity*

Factor analyses were then run on the measure for each of the 29 days of the repeated tests. The original factor structure was replicated in half of the factor analyses. As mentioned in the scale development section, items that loaded to the incorrect factor or had a weak loading were removed, leaving a six-item scale (Snyder *et al.*, 1996).

## **9. Discrete Emotions Questionnaire – Happiness Scale**

### **Development of the measure**

The scale was developed over the course of four studies. The first study used six steps, which are summarised below, to measure seven emotions, ranging from negative to positive emotions (Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016).

1. Participants [n=337, aged 18-73 years, M = 34.28, SD = 12.78] were first asked to read story prompts asking them to remember a specific time when they experienced an event that evoked a particular emotion. The story prompts were based on emotion themes from previously published literature [guilt, sadness, fear/anxiety, fear, anger, joy, love].
2. The participants were then asked to re-experience the emotions they felt at the time of the remembered experience.
3. After remembering the experience, participants were asked to write down the events they remembered.
4. They were then asked to write one word that best described the emotion they experienced during the event.
5. Next, participants were asked to list four further words that they would use to describe the emotion they experienced during the event.
6. Lastly, participants were asked to write the one word they would use to tell a friend how they felt during the event. "I am so \_\_\_\_\_!"

Responses from this first study provided the researchers with a word list that was used to develop a preliminary emotion instrument. Analysis of the list resulted in six items for each of the seven emotion categories.

In Study 2, the authors again recruited adult participants, asked them to read a story prompt based on particular emotion themes, and then write the event the participants were

remembering. After writing about the experience, participants were given a list of emotions (created from the preliminary emotion instrument created from Study 1) and were asked to rate the extent to which they experienced them on a 7-point scale from 1 = Not at all to 7 = An extreme amount.

In Study 3, researchers used guided imagery to elicit a specific emotional response from 439 adult participants (aged 18 – 68 years,  $M = 32.21$ ;  $SD = 10.57$ ). Participants were given an adapted list of emotions, based on findings from Study 2. They were then asked to rate the emotions they experienced while imagining the story on a 7-point scale. Lastly, they were asked to answer a multiple-choice question that assessed which story they read. Results from this study were used to create the final set of subscales.

Study 4 tested the sensitivity of the emotion instrument used in Study 3 when using a different manipulation. A sample of 491 adults (aged 18-79,  $M = 32.19$ ;  $SD = 11.02$ ) were shown sets of five photographs intended to evoke the sets of emotions from the seven instrument subscales. In the instructions given, participants were asked to imagine the scenes from the photos were occurring to them at the present moment, and to think of how the pictures made them feel when looking at them. Participants were only shown one set (of the seven target emotions) and were then given the list of emotions, now titled the Discrete Emotions Questionnaire. They were asked again to rate how strongly they experienced the emotions on a 7-point scale.

### **Scales and subscales**

There are seven subscales within the full measure: Anger, Disgust, Fear/Anxiety, Sadness, Desire, Relaxation, and Happiness. For this study, only the Happiness subscale was used which consists of four items.

### **Potential bias in the measures**

The measure was developed to be clearly understood by lay English speakers, so if English is not the first language of any participants, it may affect responses. To mitigate this bias, participants were asked for their first language in the demographics questions for the current study. Results demonstrate this bias would not have an impact on results.

Additionally, as the measure was created as a list of several subscales ranging from positive to negative, there may be a difference in how participants respond. In the current study, rather than responding to a variety of positive and negative emotional states such as nausea, anxiety, dread, contentedness or panic, participants only ranked their feelings of happiness alongside other positive emotions. This lack of contrast between positive and negative emotions may have affected how strongly participants reported experiencing happiness whilst completing the questionnaire.

Although this is a potential concern, the measure developers recommend using the DEQ in full, with only a few subscales, or with a single subscale – based on the emotion theory and the purposes of the study being undergone (Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016). They have not reported any concern with using single subscales within studies. With the recommendation of the developers to use individual scales, the single subscale was confidently used to measure happiness as required.

### **Standardization**

### **Adequacy & Representativeness of normative groups**

The scale was standardised within four studies using large adult participant pools [ $n=337$ , 244, 439, 491] that were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk software program [MTurk] (Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016). The authors reported participant age and ethnicity, but no other demographic information. The average age of participants for the four studies was 34.28, 32.91, 32.21, and 32.19, with the largest range going from aged 18 – 79.

Based on the expected age range of the sample for the current study, the normative group used for standardization should align. Participants of the current study were working professionals, ranging in age. Because such limited information was given about the other demographics and characteristics of the normative groups used to standardise the Discrete Emotions Questionnaire, it is difficult to make any further conclusions.

### **Reliability**

Internal consistency was calculated for Studies 2 [5 subscales], 3 [all subscales], and 4 [all subscales]. For each study, Cronbach's alpha for all subscales was greater than .80 (Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016), demonstrating excellent reliability.

### **Validity**

#### *Face validity*

Face validity was established in the method used to create the initial list of emotions, which were analysed and edited to form the complete survey. Participants were asked to remember emotional events from their lives, to list words they used to describe their emotions, and then to describe the emotions they felt during the events. In doing this, the

developers have argued that the preliminary instrument was created with words that people actually use to describe their emotional states (Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016). This created definitions and terms that were accessible for the general public for future use in academic research.

### *Construct validity*

Authors determined the emotions of interest as those that were considered “basic” by prominent emotion theories (Harmon-Jones, Bastian & Harmon-Jones, 2016). These emotions were anger, disgust, fear, anxiety, sadness, joy/happiness, desire and satisfaction.

Over the four studies used to develop the measure, researchers examined confirmatory factor analyses from the results of each participant group and adjusted the instrument so that the strongest items were maintained for further exploration. Specifically, the analysis of factor loadings in Study 3 resulted in developers creating the seven subscales by keeping the four highest loading items for each subscale. Furthermore, one-way ANOVAs were conducted. These tests demonstrated that the average rating on the individual subscales were elevated when participants were assigned to matching emotional manipulation prompts or stories.

## **10. Rational Experiential Inventory**

### **Development of the measure**

The measure was developed to fill a gap in the measurements of thinking styles (Epstein *et al.*, 1996). At the time of the measure’s development, there was not a measure that that examined the unipolarity of rational thought and intuition. In order to look at both constructs in the same measure, the authors adopted the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale

(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) to measure analytic-rational processing and created their own measure to examine intuitive-experiential thought. The development of the scale took place “informally over several years”, but resulted with a scale that has face validity and adequate reliability (Epstein *et al.*, 1996, p.392).

### **Scales and subscales**

There are two scales within the REI, Faith in Intuition (FI) and Need for Cognition (NFC). Each scale consists of five items and uses a 7-point Likert Scale rating system.

### **Potential bias in the measures**

Though results from standardisation do not support gender differences in results (Epstein *et al.*, 1996), there is potential bias reflected in the widely held gender stereotypes about how people think (Gilligan, 1982a; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Generally speaking, masculinity is associated with rational thinking and femininity is associated with emotion-based thinking. It may be the case that women score higher on the Faith in Intuition subscale and men score higher Need for Cognition subscale; however, this has not been demonstrated in research with this scale to date.

### **Standardization**

#### **Adequacy of normative groups**

The original Need For Cognition scale was developed and tested using faculty at a mid-western university in the USA [ $n=43$ ], factory workers from the same city [ $n=53$ ], introductory psychology students [ $n=419$ ], another group of introductory psychology students [ $n=104$ ], and another group of introductory psychology students [ $n=97$ ] (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).

The Rational Experiential Inventory, which was adapted from the Need for Cognition scale, was created and tested using two groups of undergraduate students at a large northeastern state university [ $n=83$ ,  $n=115$ ] (Epstein *et al.*, 1996).

Additionally, the shortened version, which was used for this study was standardised using 973 undergraduate psychology students [402 men and 571 women] (Epstein *et al.*, 1996).

There were no significant gender differences in NFC or FI scores in this sample.

### **Representativeness of normative groups**

Although many different samples were used to standardise the measure, most of the samples were undergraduate students, which doesn't reflect the population of interest for the current study.

However, since its publication, Epstein's article has been cited almost 600 times and the Rational Experiential Inventory has been used to measure rational and intuitive thinking in studies using a wider age range of sample groups. For example, Sladek, Bond & Phillips (2010) use the REI to measure preference for styles of thinking in a sample of 520 participants with an age ranging from 20-74 years (average of 41.45). Participants included medical students, medical consultants, senior registered nurses and health managers – which are all educated and professional roles. Another study recruited adult participants that gamble twice a month through local classified advertisements website (MacLaren *et al.*, 2012). In this study, the participant age ranged from 19-82 years (mean of 38.7). No other participant demographic information was disclosed about this group so only age could be compared.

Although the REI hasn't been used with the exact population of interest for the current study, other studies using the REI have used the measure with other samples that demonstrate its versatility in regards to age and employment (MacLaren *et al.*, 2012; Sladek, Bond & Phillips, 2010). The reliability of using the measure in these other studies offered confidence that the measure was adequate for the current research.

### **Reliability**

To demonstrate reliability, the developers tested important correlations and internal consistencies. The shortened, 10-item REI correlated strongly with original item NFC  $r=.90$ , FI  $r = .85$  (Epstein *et al.*, 1996). The internal consistency of each scale was .73 (NFC) and .72 (FI), which was considered adequate within scale development literature (Nunnally, 1978). Lastly, demonstrating that the two subscales were largely independent, the correlation between NFC and FI was only .08.

### **Validity**

#### *Face validity*

#### Need for Cognition scale

Using the definitions of cognition from Cohen *et al.* (1955), scale developers created an initial item pool to test. They then combined these items with adaptations of another questionnaire to create a final set of items with adequate face validity. The 45 items were informally pilot tested as the final edition of the NFC scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).

#### Rational Experiential Inventory - Need for Cognition scale

Based on variations in content and item-total correlations, 19 items from the original Need for Cognition scale were selected for the REI (Epstein *et al.*, 1996). The items describe how much individual's report that they enjoy or dislike, or engage in or avoid, active cognition.

### Rational Experiential Inventory - Faith in Intuition scale

The Faith in Intuition scale items were developed informally over several years, and the process has not been clearly explained in the literature (Epstein *et al.*, 1992; Epstein *et al.*, 1996). The items were created with the intent to measure confidence and engagement in intuitive abilities.

#### *Construct validity*

The developers performed confirmatory factor analysis to demonstrate construct validity. The REI, full length scale loads onto two factors consistently (Epstein *et al.*, 1996). Factor analysis for the shortened REI (used in the current study) also resulted in two factors, with all NFC items loading onto one factor and all FI items loading onto the other (Epstein *et al.*, 1996)(Epstein *et al.*, 1996).

#### *Convergent validity*

To demonstrate convergent validity, the creators of the original Need for Cognition scale tested the relationship between their scale and intelligence measures. Findings revealed a significant correlation between the Need for Cognition and intelligence, measured by reported ACT performance [ $r = .39$ ] (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). This result was expected based on the type of cognition being measured.

Convergent validity of entire REI scale was demonstrated with correlations amongst scales on the CTI [Constructive Thinking Inventory] (Epstein *et al.*, 1996). As expected, Need for Cognition scores correlated significantly with the CTI subscales of Emotional Coping, and those with high Faith in Intuition scores also scored high on Esoteric Thinking and Naïve Optimism.

### *Discriminant validity*

In the original Need for Cognition scale development, scores accurately discriminated between groups expected to differ in their scores based on their occupation (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The developers also stated discriminant validity was demonstrated by the lack of correlation between Need for Cognition scores and the level of test anxiety reported by participants (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).

The two full REI scales appropriately discriminate between the two constructs as scores on the scales do not correlate with one another (Epstein *et al.*, 1996). Additionally, both subscales correlated negatively with scales meant to measure opposite types of thinking. For example, Need for Cognition scores were negatively, but not significantly, correlated with Personal Superstitious Thinking or Esoteric Thinking scores (CTI scale); and Faith in Intuition scores were negatively, but not significantly, correlated with Emotional Coping and Categorical Thinking (CTI scales).

## **11. Self-Importance of Moral Identity**

### **Development of the measure**

The measure was developed, refined and standardised using six studies (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

The first pilot study asked participants to think of personal traits, qualities or characteristics that a moral person would possess. They were asked to list as many as they could in an open-ended response format. After analysis of synonyms, the list of 376 nonoverlapping moral traits was reduced to 19 distinct traits. Further analysis selected traits that were listed

by at least 305 of participants, which resulted in nine traits: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind.

Pilot Study two aimed to validate the initial nine items. Participants were given the list of the nine traits and asked to rate the items from 1 (absolutely unnecessary) to 5 (absolutely necessary) in regards to how necessary it was to possess the traits to be considered moral.

The remaining studies confirmed the reliability and validity of the measure, and are described in further detail in the sections that follow.

### **Scales and subscales**

The measure lists nine traits that describe a moral person. The traits fall within two subscales, Symbolization, defined as “traits that are reflected in the respondent’s actions in the world” and Internalization, defined as “traits that are central to the self-concept,” (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p.1427).

### **Potential bias in the measures**

There is the potential for participants to respond in a way that shows them in a more positive or moral light, as is the risk with all self-report measures. There is also potential bias toward Westernised cultures, but as previously explained, this is the population of interest for the current work so should not be of concern.

### **Standardization and the Adequacy of normative groups**

Pilot Study 1 tested the measure on undergraduate students in the US (average age 20.4 years with ethnicities of – 10 African American, 4 Asian/Pacific Islander, 202 Caucasian, 1 Hispanic, 11 other). Of the sample, there were 112 female and 116 male participants.

Pilot Study 2 again used a variety of samples. There was a sample of undergraduate students at University of Delaware (n = 34, 7 female, 28 male, average age 20.1, race majority Caucasian). Another sample of 57 MBA students at the University of Chicago had demographics including 21 females, 28 males, and a mean age of 30.0. And lastly, one sample was a group of 46 high school students which had demographics of 28 – female and 19 – male, and an average age of 17.7.

Study 1 tested the measure on a sample of 363 undergraduates from three universities. Of those reporting gender, 200 reported being male and 161 female. The average age was 19.70. It also performed confirmatory factor analysis with a sample comprised of 347 adult community residents throughout the US. Analysis of the demographics report that of the sample, 70% were female, 30% were male. The average age of participants was 42.1 years. And the average number of years of work experience was 19.9. The participants ranged in their level within their organisations including, 29% at the executive level, 17% at upper level management, 28% at midlevel management, 4% first level supervision, and 22% nonmanagerial.

Study 2 included 5 separate samples. Four samples consisted of groups of undergraduate students from various universities across the US, including University of Pennsylvania [n=44, female 29, male 15, mean age 20.1], University of Washington [n=53, female 30, male 23, mean age 20.9], Georgia State University [n=51, female 29, male 22, mean age,

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26.5], and University of Pennsylvania [n=124, female 71, male 66, mean age 19.4].

Another sample of master's level students from the University of Delaware also completed questionnaires [n=52, female 16, male 39, mean age 29.1].

### **Representativeness of normative groups**

Though scale development was mainly performed with samples of undergraduate students, the Self-Importance of Moral Identity scale has been used with several other adult groups since its development (Aquino, McFerran & Laven, 2011; Winterich, Zhang & Mittal, 2012). Additionally, this measure was recently used in a study amongst a similar sample to the population of interest for the current study (Shang & Kong, 2015). With such expanded use amongst professional adults in different countries, the measure was used with confidence in the current sample.

### **Reliability**

In two of the studies conducted during development, the internal consistency of the two subscales was acceptable with Cronbach's  $\alpha = .83$  for Internalization and Cronbach's  $\alpha = .82$  for Symbolization.

### **Validity**

#### *Face validity*

Participants were asked to list moral traits, characteristics and qualities as the very first step of scale development. This ensured the measure would consist of items that appeared to measure the construct of interest to lay people.

#### *Construct validity*

In Study 1, participants were given the list of the nine moral traits and then asked to rate their agreement with 13 items adapted from previous instruments to measure how these traits might activate a person's identity. An exploratory factor analysis revealed that the items loaded onto two factors: Symbolization and Internalization (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

To confirm these findings and cross-validate the two-factor model, a further confirmatory factor analysis was performed using a different sample. Results from the confirmatory factor analysis supported the model revealed by the exploratory factor analysis (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

#### *Convergent validity*

As no other measures existed to use as a comparison for convergent validity, the scale developers created another instrument that measures the automaticity of moral associations within the concept of self. When compared with a measure of implicit moral identity, results indicated a positive correlation with Internalization [ $r=.33$ ,  $p<.001$ ] but not with Symbolization [ $r=.11$ ,  $p>.20$ ]. Though not large correlations, these are consistent with other comparisons of explicit and implicit measures (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). This provides some evidence for convergent validity.

#### *Discriminant validity*

Based on theory, it was expected that discriminant validity could be assessed by examining the relationship between explicit moral identity and self-esteem, locus of control and social anxiety. Results from three separate studies were combined for a total  $n=210$  were analysed. The correlations between measures were very low, ranging from  $-.01$  to  $.16$  (for combined Internalization and Symbolization scores), and between  $-.03$ -. $17$  (for separate

scales of Internalization and Symbolization subscales). These results demonstrated that the scale did not hold relationships with unrelated variables.

### *Predictive validity*

During scale development, test-retest reliabilities of the measure were also conducted with a sample of undergraduate students [n=148]. Students took the questionnaire initially and then again in four to six weeks. Results showed reliabilities of .49 for Internalization and .71 for Symbolization (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The modest results demonstrate that the scales are consistent, but that the construct is salient and can change somewhat over time. This supports the developers' definition of explicit moral identity as a nonstable trait.

## **11. Demographics**

### **Moderator variables**

*Gender* – Participant gender information was asked because this construct is a moderator variable for all 4 hypotheses. The information was needed for hypotheses analyses.

### **Control variables**

Certain demographic information could potentially confound the results of analyses. In order to decrease the amount of possible influence of these variables, the information was captured so that the variables could be controlled for during hypotheses analysis. The demographics that were controlled for included age, dominant hand, relationship status, and education.

### *Age*

Age was used as a control variable because people at different life stages may have experienced different moral dilemmas. On the one hand, as people get older, they may have more senior fundraising positions and thorough experience in coping with moral dilemmas. On the other hand, as people age and take on senior roles, they may use different motivations to solve moral dilemmas. Additionally, other studies examining moral identity have held age as a control variable. Since the effect of age on implicit moral identity, experiencing moral emotions, and solving moral dilemmas is unclear, and because this variable is not of direct interest to the study, no predictions are made about it except that it should be used as a control prior to hypotheses analysis.

### *Relationship status*

Relationship status was asked as a demographic question as this variable is commonly used as a variable of interest within studies of broad interests (e.g. health, life satisfaction, wellbeing, etc.). Relationship status was used as a control variable to avoid any potential confounding that might occur. For example, research has examined if the experience of compassion for others and self-compassion differs based on marital status (López *et al.*, 2018). Findings did not reveal a significant difference between groups that were single or married; however, as the current study introduced a prime and was focused on the experience of compassion whilst answering the survey questions, relationship status might have affected the outcome. It was decided that because the effect of relationship status is unknown for the current relationships of interest but has shown to have an effect on previous studies, and because this variable is not of direct interest to the study, it should be used as a control variable prior to hypotheses analysis.

### *Education*

Participants were asked their highest level of education because this question is often part of basic demographics asked. It is often used to help determine the socio-economic status of participants. Education was a control variable in the current study for two reasons. Primarily, the effect of education on the relationships of interest is unknown; however, lower educated individuals have scored higher on scales measuring compassion for others when compared to higher educated individuals (López *et al.*, 2018). To ensure that level of education did not influence feelings of compassion, or any other emotion measures, responses to this question were used as a control variable.

### *Primary language spoken*

This question was asked to ensure participants had a clear understanding of the English language. Since the moral dilemma questions were specifically created to be somewhat difficult, it was important to ensure responses to these questions were not influenced by a lack of understanding of the English language.

## **Descriptive information for participant profile – richness in data collected**

### *Years within fundraising*

In the interest of having richer data to analyse in subsequent research, participants were asked to share how many years they had been fundraising. Answers to this question were used to compile the participant profile and understand whether the results could be applied to the target population.

### *Country where participants worked in fundraising*

As recruitment occurred internationally, another variable of interest was in which country participants were fundraising. Results from this question were used to validate the primary

language spoken question as well as more richly understand the location of participants. Asking about which country participants worked in also helped verify whether or not results could be applied to the target population.

## Appendix 4. Phase 2 Full Survey

### Jess Project-Final-Newsletter

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#### Start of Block: Landing

Q1 Thank you for taking part in this study, which is being conducted by Jessica Burgess, MinsF, at the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy at Plymouth University. We appreciate that your time is important, and we are genuinely grateful for your help in completing our questionnaire. The survey asks you to complete some tasks and includes various questions about how you think and feel. It should take you 25-30 minutes to complete.

Before we begin, please note that the survey contains questions that will only function correctly on a computer with a keyboard. You will not be allowed to continue if you attempt to take the survey from a mobile device. If you are not at a computer with a keyboard (i.e. laptop, desktop), please close the survey and re-open it from a computer with a keyboard. What is the purpose of the study? There are many factors that are known to influence how and why people make decisions. However, there is much that is still unclear about how these different factors influence each other. This research project investigates decision-making amongst fundraisers. Who can take part? We are asking people aged 18+ who are, or who have ever been, fundraisers to take part in the study.

Are you currently engaged in fundraising?

- Yes - I am currently a full-time fundraiser. (1)
- Yes - I am currently a part-time fundraiser. (2)
- Yes - I am currently a volunteer fundraiser. (3)
- No - I was a full-time fundraiser. (4)
- No - I was a part-time fundraiser. (5)
- No - I was a volunteer fundraiser. (6)
- No - I have never been a fundraiser. (7)

*Skip To: End of Survey If Q1 = 7*

---

Q2 What will happen to the information that I give? Completed questionnaires will only be accessible to members of the research team and will be kept securely, in strict accordance with Plymouth University's data protection policy. Information from this research will be aggregated to

form a report on how all our participants responded. The study report may be published and disseminated to all participants upon request. Will my participation be confidential? Yes. Please know that we take the protection of your data very seriously. The information you provide will be held anonymously and your answers will not be shared with anyone. If you wish to receive your individual scores from this study in an email, we will need to link your answers to your email address. You will have the opportunity to request your scores on the last page of the survey. Do I have to take part? Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. Any answers you provided up to the point of withdrawal will be deleted and will not be included in our analysis.

At the end of the study, you will be asked if you would like to be entered into a draw for an iPad Mini or vouchers. You will need to submit your email address or other contact information to be entered into the draw.

I understand and agree to the above terms (1)

---

Q3 Please click the above button to indicate that you have understood and agreed to the above terms.

If you have any concerns, please email the principle investigator of this study Jessica at [Jessica.Silye@plymouth.ac.uk](mailto:Jessica.Silye@plymouth.ac.uk).

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End of Block: Landing

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Start of Block: Incorrect device

Q4 The survey software has detected that you are attempting to take this survey from an incompatible device. The survey contains questions that will only function correctly on a computer with a keyboard. Please open this survey from a computer with a keyboard.

End of Block: Incorrect device

---

Start of Block: Block 40

Q5 On the next page, you will begin your first task. Please read the instructions carefully.

End of Block: Block 40

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Start of Block: IAT 1 - Compatible First Target A on Right with Pos

Q1 IAT Implicit Moral Identity Measure (sample for 1 of 7 tasks)

Other

Self

This should take less than 1 minute

Instructions: Place your left and right index fingers on the E and I keys. At the top of the screen

are 2 categories. In the task, words and/or images appear in the middle of the screen.

When the word/image belongs to the category on the left, press the E key as fast as you can. When it belongs to the category on the right, press the I key as fast as you can. If you make an error, a red X will appear. Correct errors by hitting the other key.

Please try to go as *fast as you can* while making as few errors as possible.

When you are ready, please press the [Space] bar to begin.

Part 1 of 7

x

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End of Block: IAT 4 - Incompatible First Target A on Left with Neg

---

Start of Block: MFT Priming Instructions

Q6 The next section will ask you to share your thoughts about various statements. Please read each statement carefully and indicate your responses according to the rating scales provided.

---

End of Block: MFT Priming Instructions

---

Start of Block: MFT Priming - Harm/Care

Q7 When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale: 1 = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong) 7 = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

	Not at all relevant (1)	Not very relevant (2)	Slightly relevant (3)	Neutral (4)	Moderately relevant (5)	Very relevant (6)	Extremely relevant (7)
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (Q7_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable (Q7_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone suffered physically (Q7_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone cared for someone vulnerable (Q7_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone was cruel (Q7_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone was unkind (Q7_6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q8 Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:

	Strongly disagree (1)	Moderately disagree (2)	Slightly disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Slightly agree (5)	Moderately agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. (Q8_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Looking after those who are vulnerable is the most crucial virtue. (Q8_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. (Q8_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
One of the best things a person could do is help a vulnerable animal. (Q8_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It can never be right to kill a human being. (Q8_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This is an attention filter, so	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

please  
answer  
strongly  
disagree for  
this  
question.  
(Q8\_6)

End of Block: MFT Priming - Harm/Care

---

Start of Block: MFT Priming - InGroup/Loyalty

Q9 When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale: 1 = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong) 6 = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

	Not at all relevant (1)	Not very relevant (2)	Slightly relevant (3)	Neutral (4)	Moderately relevant (5)	Very relevant (6)	Extremely relevant (7)
Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country (Q9_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone's actions showed allegiance to his or her country (Q9_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group (Q9_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone did something to deceive his or her group (Q9_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

showed a  
lack of  
loyalty  
(Q9\_5)

Whether  
or not  
someone  
sacrificed  
something  
for the  
group  
(Q9\_6)



Q10 Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:

	Strongly disagree (1)	Moderately disagree (2)	Slightly disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Slightly agree (5)	Moderately agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I am pleased by my country's history. (Q10_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong. (Q10_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People should not betray their friends, even when they have done something wrong. (Q10_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. (Q10_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is more important to show	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

team support than to achieve individual success. (Q10\_5)

This is an attention filter, so please answer strongly disagree for this question. (Q10\_6)



End of Block: MFT Priming - InGroup/Loyalty

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma Instructions

Q11

### Moral dilemmas

In this part of the survey, **you will read through 8 fundraising scenarios**. They will be written in 2 paragraphs on the page, and you will need to select the 'Next' button to move to the next page and see the question.

Here is an example of a scenario:

You have recently been promoted to Fundraising Manager at the organisation where you have worked for 5 years. The promotion designates you as the lead for Major Gifts fundraising.

You have a standard practice to process and acknowledge all gifts within 48-hours of receipt, especially those over 100. Your administrative staff, who usually handles acknowledgments, is on leave for the week and donations are piling up. A major donor prospect has just called and asked you to meet her for coffee to discuss her potential investment, but she can only meet this afternoon which will leave 20 gifts un-thanked within your target.

You will not be able to go back and revisit the paragraphs after you select the 'next' button, so please take as much time as necessary to read these paragraphs carefully. At the end of these instructions you will be given an example to practice, so don't worry!

After reading the scenario, you will be asked a question about what you would do next. **You will have a maximum of 18** seconds to respond to how likely you would be to perform a particular action. Please answer the questions with your first response as quickly as possible.

Here is an example of a response choice:

How likely would you be to...

...refuse to meet with the prospect in alliance with organisational standards for acknowledgments, even if it means she will feel displeased and deserted.

Rate on a scale of 1-7 where 1 = Extremely unlikely and 7 = Extremely likely.

After a maximum of 18 seconds, if you haven't responded, the next scenario will automatically appear on the screen. So, **please remember to start reading right away and respond as quickly as possible.**

Moral decisions can be difficult to make, and we understand that people sometimes change their minds about moral questions or feel conflicted about the answers they've given. Don't think of your answers as "written in stone." All we want from you is **your first, immediate response**. You may find that in some cases, the right answer seems immediately obvious. If that happens, it's okay to answer quickly. There are no trick questions, and in every case we have done our best to make the relevant information as clear as possible.

Here is the same example as you read above, but in the same format as you will see the scenarios on the screen:

When you are done reading this screen, select Next for the practice trial to appear. Please remember to read the scenarios carefully and **answer the questions as quickly as possible**. Thank you.

End of Block: Moral Dilemma Instructions

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 10b

Q48 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

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Q49 You are the long-time Director of Fundraising for a large charity. The shared vision of the leadership team makes you feel they are like a family. Four years ago, you started a mentorship program for your junior and middle-level staff. They absolutely rave about it.

In a recent directors' meeting, it was decided to cut the size of your team to reduce organisational costs. You have been asked to keep the information confidential for now so the organisation can set up appropriate employee support for the announcement. You know that one of your team members who you have personally mentored will be made redundant and is about to buy a new home for his growing family.

Q50 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q51 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...share the information out of concern for the employee, even if it means I breach the trust of my directors by breaking my promise. (Q51_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 10b

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 10a

Q88 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q89 You are the long-time Director of Fundraising for a large charity. The shared vision of the leadership team makes you feel they are like a family. Four years ago, you started a mentorship program for your junior and middle-level staff. They absolutely rave about it.

In a recent directors' meeting, it was decided to cut the size of your team to reduce organisational costs. You have been asked to keep the information confidential for now so the organisation can set up appropriate employee support for the announcement. You know that one

of your team members who you have personally mentored will be made redundant and is about to buy a new home for his growing family.

---

Page Break

Q90 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q91 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...refrain from telling the employee out of commitment to my Directors' wishes, even if it causes the employee harm and distress. (Q91_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 10a

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma Instructions 2

Q118

Thank you for completing the practice trial. You will now begin the part of the survey where you will read through 8 fundraising scenarios.

Remember, after reading the scenario, you will be asked a question about what you would do next. You will have a **maximum of 18 seconds** to respond to how likely you would be to perform a particular action. Your answers will be recorded. Please answer the questions with your first response as quickly as possible.

End of Block: Moral Dilemma Instructions 2

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 1a

Q12 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q13 You are the long-time individual giving manager for the small university where you obtained your degree. You've recently sent your year-end appeal to alumni.

One morning, you receive a phone call from one of the recipients whom you've met briefly. The person complains, "I received your letter the other day and I don't understand why you even need to fundraise. You have a massive endowment, and besides that, students don't take school seriously anymore...not like when I was in university." The information quoted about your employer is incorrect but you can hear that the person is hurt by your ask.

---

Page Break

Q14 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q15 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...speak loyally in defence of my university, even if the person continues to feel bad. (Q15_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 1a

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 3a

Q20 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q21 You are the Major Gifts Officer for an organisation that has helped your family through a difficult time. Over the past year, you have developed a relationship with a major donor.

During the holiday season, the donor stops by the office on the way to her Christmas holiday and presents you with a token gift of a £10 paperweight engraved with your initials to appreciate your work over the past year. Your organisation has a policy on personal gifts from donors that explicitly forbids acceptance.

---

Page Break

Q22 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q23 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...refuse the gift to comply with my organisation's requirements, even if it means the individual will feel hurt. (Q23_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 3a

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 4a

Q24 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q25 You have been the Major Gifts Fundraising Manager at a local organisation that has been helping many people in your community for 8 years. Currently you have had four meetings cultivating a major donor prospect over the last 6 months.

You know the donor is very passionate about your cause and could give a significant amount of money to your organisation. During a scheduled lunch meeting, the prospect makes a hurtful comment that reinforces negative stereotypes of the target beneficiary group. Their opinion directly conflicts with your organisation's standards and your personal views on how these individuals should be respected. The prospect asks, "Don't you agree?"

---

Page Break

Q26 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q27 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...tell the donor what my organisation and I believe, even if there is the potential to displease the donor or make him feel bad. (Q27_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 4a

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 5a

Q28 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q29 You have finally landed your dream job as Fundraising Manager for a cause you have always wanted to serve. In your new role, you introduce a direct mail appeal that will be sent at the end of the year.

Based on best practice, you have drafted a 4-page letter so that you have the best chance to reach your financial target. You've sent the letter to the Board Chair, as the final signatory, for

input and review. You bump into her in the hallway and she says, "The letter will need to be cut to 1-page if I am to sign it. I feel like 4-pages is too long."

Page Break

Q30 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q31 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...defend the long letter as a committed employee, even if the Board Chair feels unsupported and let down. (Q31_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 5a

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 6b

Q32 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q33 You are a seasoned fundraiser with over 15 years of experience. You have also attended numerous conferences and certificate courses to ensure you implement best practices in your fundraising activities.

You have currently been employed for 10 years for a cause you are passionate about. Your schedule is jam-packed. Recently, one of your close friends who works for another organisation has asked you to serve on their Board of Trustees. You feel equally passionate about the other organisation's work, but it is practically impossible to accommodate the board time commitments without compromising your job.

Page Break

Q34 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q35 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...accept the board position to please my friend even if it means my employer is undermined by an additional demand of my time. (Q35_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 6b

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 7b

Q36 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q37 You have been the Charity Director of your organisation for 5 years and have grown your team from 2 to 10 members. You and your team share the same values, and you feel that all members belong in the group.

A new Trustee has recently joined your board. The trustee swears by the motivation and outcomes that result from a corporate-sector, performance-based incentive program. You believe these incentive programs actually de-motivate weaker members of the team and aren't beneficial for team performance. At a board meeting, the trustee passionately proposes that the organisation begins such a system immediately and asks, "What do you think?"

Page Break

Q38 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q39 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...refrain from challenging the Trustee so he is able to feel good, even if my team might feel abandoned at the time. (Q39_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 7b

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 8b

Q40 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q41 You are a junior member of staff on the fundraising team at an established charity whose mission you've always believed in, and you are responsible for the logistics of sending an appeal mailing.

The current mailing you are responsible for is not entirely transparent as the letter emphasises one particular program, but the income will go to the general fund. This mailing will provide one-quarter of the organisation's annual unrestricted income and needs to be sent within the next week to meet your deadline. You run into the director of fundraising in the hallway one afternoon who asks, "How is the mailing going?"

Page Break

Q42 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q43 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...challenge the mailing content out of concern for the director's wellbeing, even if my team feels I am disloyal and unsupportive. (Q43_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 8b

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 9b

Q44 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q45 You are an active fundraising manager in a small organisation. Your staff are very close and you share similar beliefs.

You have been attempting to get a local celebrity to endorse your charity's work for over a year. Their support could raise an additional million for your organisation, which would achieve your current fundraising goal. During a recent appointment with the prospect, the celebrity says, "I'm very happy to endorse you if I can shoot a video with your beneficiaries that I can use for promotional purposes. If you can't do this, then I will unfortunately need to withdraw my offer for support." The celebrity's request is not aligned with the rules that you have just agreed with your team.

Page Break

Q46 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q47 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
... consider the celebrity's request so that we can achieve the promised goal, even if it means my team feels that I failed to comply with our agreed rules. (Q47_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 9b

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 9a

Q84 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q85 You are an active fundraising manager in a small organisation. Your staff are very close and you share similar beliefs.

You have been attempting to get a local celebrity to endorse your charity’s work for over a year. Their support could raise an additional million for your organisation, which would achieve your current fundraising goal. During a recent appointment with the prospect, the celebrity says, “I’m very happy to endorse you if I can shoot a video with your beneficiaries that I can use for promotional purposes. If you can’t do this, then I will unfortunately need to withdraw my offer for support.” The celebrity’s request is not aligned with the rules that you have just agreed with your team.

Page Break

Q86 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q87 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...refuse the celebrity's request to remain faithful to my team, even if the celebrity feels hurt and misled. (Q87_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 9a

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 8a

Q80 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q81 You are a junior member of staff on the fundraising team at an established charity whose mission you've always believed in, and you are responsible for the logistics of sending an appeal mailing.

The current mailing you are responsible for is not entirely transparent as the letter emphasises one particular program, but the income will go to the general fund. This mailing will provide one-quarter of the organisation's annual unrestricted income and needs to be sent within the next week to meet your deadline. You run into the director of fundraising in the hallway one afternoon who asks, "How is the mailing going?"

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Page Break

Q82 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q83 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...speak in support of sending the mailing to show team unity, even if the appeal could damage the reputation of the director. (Q83_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 8a

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 7a

Q76 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q77 You have been the Charity Director of your organisation for 5 years and have grown your team from 2 to 10 members. You and your team share the same values, and you feel that all members belong in the group.

A new Trustee has recently joined your board. The trustee swears by the motivation and outcomes that result from a corporate-sector, performance-based incentive program. You believe these incentive programs actually de-motivate weaker members of the team and aren't beneficial for team performance. At a board meeting, the trustee passionately proposes that the organisation begins such a system immediately and asks, "What do you think?"

Page Break

Q78 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q79 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...refute the system in devotion to my team, even if the Trustee feels upset and let down. (Q79_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 7a

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 6a

Q72 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q73 You are a seasoned fundraiser with over 15 years of experience. You have also attended numerous conferences and certificate courses to ensure you implement best practices in your fundraising activities.

You have currently been employed for 10 years for a cause you are passionate about. Your schedule is jam-packed. Recently, one of your close friends who works for another organisation has asked you to serve on their Board of Trustees. You feel equally passionate about the other organisation's work, but it is practically impossible to accommodate the board time commitments without compromising your job.

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Page Break

Q74 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q75 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...refuse the board position out of loyalty to my organisation, even if my refusal upsets my friend. (Q75_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 6a

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 1b

Q52 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q53 You are the long-time individual giving manager for the small university where you obtained your degree. You've recently sent your year-end appeal to alumni.

One morning, you receive a phone call from one of the recipients whom you've met briefly. The person complains, "I received your letter the other day and I don't understand why you even need to fundraise. You have a massive endowment, and besides that, students don't take school seriously anymore...not like when I was in university." The information quoted about your employer is incorrect but you can hear that the person is hurt by your ask.

Page Break

Q54 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q55 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...speak to make the person feel better, even though it means I may not be able to properly defend my university. (Q55_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 1b

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 3b

Q60 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q61 You are the Major Gifts Officer for an organisation that has helped your family through a difficult time. Over the past year, you have developed a relationship with a major donor.

During the holiday season, the donor stops by the office on the way to her Christmas holiday and presents you with a token gift of a £10 paperweight engraved with your initials to appreciate your work over the past year. Your organisation has a policy on personal gifts from donors that explicitly forbids acceptance.

Page Break

Q62 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

Q63 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...accept the gift to make the donor feel good, even if it means I cannot comply with my organisation's rules. (Q63_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 3b

Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 4b

Q64 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q65 You have been the Major Gifts Fundraising Manager at a local organisation that has been helping many people in your community for 8 years. Currently you have had four meetings cultivating a major donor prospect over the last 6 months.

You know the donor is very passionate about your cause and could give a significant amount of money to your organisation. During a scheduled lunch meeting, the prospect makes a hurtful comment that reinforces negative stereotypes of the target beneficiary group. Their opinion directly conflicts with your organisation's standards and your personal views on how these individuals should be respected. The prospect asks, "Don't you agree?"

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Page Break

Q66 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q67 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...put off challenging his perspective until later so he feels welcomed and accepted, even if it means I cannot immediately uphold the values of the organisation. (Q67_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 4b

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Start of Block: Moral Dilemma 5b

Q68 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q69 You have finally landed your dream job as Fundraising Manager for a cause you have always wanted to serve. In your new role, you introduce a direct mail appeal that will be sent at the end of the year.

Based on best practice, you have drafted a 4-page letter so that you have the best chance to reach your financial target. You've sent the letter to the Board Chair, as the final signatory, for input and review. You bump into her in the hallway and she says, "The letter will need to be cut to 1-page if I am to sign it. I feel like 4-pages is too long."

Page Break

Q70 Timing  
 First Click (1)  
 Last Click (2)  
 Page Submit (3)  
 Click Count (4)

Q71 How likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely (1)	Moderately unlikely (2)	Slightly unlikely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly likely (5)	Moderately likely (6)	Extremely likely (7)
...shorten the letter out of respect to the Board Chair's perspective, even if it means my commitment to my organisation's targets may be questioned. (Q71_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Dilemma 5b

Start of Block: Emotions Questions Instructions

Q92 Thank you for completing all 8 of the scenarios. Now we would like you to reflect on how you felt while you worked on the moral scenarios. As you worked through the moral scenarios for the

past 10 minutes, please report your level of agreement with each of the following statements.

End of Block: Emotions Questions Instructions

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Start of Block: Moral Emotions – Compassion

Q93 Please reflect on how you felt while you completed the moral scenarios. As you worked through the moral scenarios during this survey, please report your level of agreement with each statement below.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I felt I took care of people who were vulnerable. (Q93_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt a powerful urge to take care of someone hurt or in need. (Q93_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt a warm feeling inside from taking care of others. (Q93_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I noticed when someone needed help. (Q93_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt like a very compassionate person. (Q93_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This is an attention filter, so please answer strongly agree for this question. (Q93_6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Emotions – Compassion

Start of Block: Moral Emotions - Pride DPES Scale

Q94 Please reflect on how you felt while you completed the moral scenarios. As you worked through the moral scenarios during this survey, please report your level of agreement with each statement below.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I felt good about myself. (Q94_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt proud of myself and my accomplishments. (Q94_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt many people respected me. (Q94_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt I stood up for what I believe. (Q94_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt that people would have recognised my authority. (Q94_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Moral Emotions - Pride DPES Scale

Start of Block: Positive Emotions – Happiness

Q95 Please reflect on how you felt while you completed the moral scenarios. As you worked through the moral scenarios during this survey, please report your level of agreement with each statement below.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I felt satisfaction. (Q95_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt happy. (Q95_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt enjoyment. (Q95_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I liked completing the tasks. (Q95_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Positive Emotions – Happiness

Start of Block: Positive Emotions – Hope

Q96 Please reflect on how you felt while you completed the moral scenarios. As you worked through the moral scenarios during this survey, please report your level of agreement with each statement below.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I felt I was energetically pursuing my goals. (Q96_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt there were lots of ways around the problems that I faced. (Q96_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt I could think of many ways to reach my goals. (Q96_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I felt I had met the goals that I had set for myself. (Q96_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Positive Emotions – Hope

Start of Block: REI - Rational Experiential Inventory - Short Form

Q97 Please keep thinking about how you felt while working through the moral scenarios. Please rank the following statements based on how true they were for you while you answered those questions ranging from 'Definitely not true of myself' to 'Definitely true of myself.'

	Definitely not true of myself (1)	Mostly not true of myself (2)	Somewhat not true of myself (3)	Neither true nor not true of myself (4)	Somewhat true of myself (5)	Mostly true of myself (6)	Definitely true of myself (7)
I tried to avoid thinking in depth about the scenarios. (Q97_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I didn't like to have to do a lot of thinking. (Q97_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I preferred complex problems to simple problems. (Q97_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Thinking hard and for a long time about the scenarios gave me little satisfaction. (Q97_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I preferred the scenarios that challenged my thinking abilities rather than the scenarios	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

that  
required  
little  
thought.  
(Q97\_5)

I believed  
in trusting  
my hunches  
when  
making  
these  
decisions.  
(Q97\_6)

I trusted  
my initial  
feelings  
when  
making  
these  
decisions.  
(Q97\_7)

I could rely  
on my gut  
feelings  
when the  
decisions  
involved  
trusting  
people.  
(Q97\_8)

My initial  
impressions  
of people in  
these  
scenarios  
were  
almost  
always  
right.  
(Q97\_9)

I could feel  
if a person  
in the  
scenario  
was right or  
wrong even  
if I couldn't



explain  
how I  
knew.  
(Q97\_10)

End of Block: REI - Rational Experiential Inventory - Short Form

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Start of Block: Explicit moral identity

Page Break

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Q98 We would now like to get some thoughts about how you see yourself.

Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person:

**Caring Compassionate Fair Friendly Generous Helpful Hardworking Honest  
Kind**

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Page Break

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Q99 Read the words carefully again. **Caring Compassionate Fair Friendly Generous Helpful Hardworking Honest Kind**

The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel and act.

Q100 When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, please indicate your agreement with each statement below on a scale ranging from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. (Q100_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. (Q100_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I strongly desire to have these characteristics. (Q100_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People who know me well would identify me as having these characteristics. (Q100_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics. (Q100_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

This is an attention filter, so please answer strongly agree for this question. (Q100\_6)

End of Block: Explicit moral identity

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Start of Block: MFT Manipulation Check - Harm/Care B

Q114 When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale: 1 = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong) 7 = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

	Not at all relevant (1)	Not very relevant (2)	Slightly relevant (3)	Neutral (4)	Moderately relevant (5)	Very relevant (6)	Extremely relevant (7)
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (Q114_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable (Q114_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone suffered physically (Q114_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone cared for someone vulnerable (Q114_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone was cruel (Q114_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone was unkind (Q114_6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q115 Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:

	Strongly disagree (1)	Moderately disagree (2)	Slightly disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Slightly agree (5)	Moderately agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. (Q115_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Looking after those who are vulnerable is the most crucial virtue. (Q115_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. (Q115_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
One of the best things a person could do is help a vulnerable animal. (Q115_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It can never be right to kill a human being. (Q115_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: MFT Manipulation Check - Harm/Care B

Start of Block: MFT Manipulation Check - InGroup/Loyalty B

Q116 When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale: 1 = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong) 7 = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

	Not at all relevant (1)	Not very relevant (2)	Slightly relevant (3)	Neutral (4)	Moderately relevant (5)	Very relevant (6)	Extremely relevant (7)
Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country (Q116_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone's actions showed allegiance to his or her country (Q116_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group (Q116_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone did something to deceive his or her group (Q116_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

showed a lack of loyalty (Q116\_5)

Whether or not someone sacrificed something for the group (Q116\_6)

Q117 Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:

Strongly disagree (1)	Moderately disagree (2)	Slightly disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Slightly agree (5)	Moderately agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
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I am pleased by my country's history. (Q117\_1)

People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong. (Q117\_2)

People should not betray their friends, even when they have done something wrong. (Q117\_3)

It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.  
(Q117\_4)

It is more important to show team support than to achieve individual success.  
(Q117\_5)

End of Block: MFT Manipulation Check - InGroup/Loyalty B

---

Start of Block: Demographics

Q101

What is your age? (number only)

Q102 What is your gender?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other (please specify) (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- Prefer not to say (4)

Q103 Is English your native language?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q140 Which hand would you say is your dominant hand?

- Right (1)
- Left (2)
- Ambidextrous (3)

Q104 Please indicate your relationship status

- Single, never married (1)
- Never married, and not currently in a close relationship (2)
- Never married, but now in a close relationship (3)
- Living with partner (4)
- Married without children (5)
- Married with children (6)
- In a civil partnership (7)
- Separated (8)
- Divorced (9)
- Widowed / widower (10)

Prefer not to say (11)

---

Page Break

Q105 How long have you been a fundraiser?

Year (1) \_\_\_\_\_

Months (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q106 What category best describes your current role/job title?

Head of Fundraising / Director of Development (1)

Head of Fundraising Department (ie. Head of Legacy, Head of Individual Gifts, etc.) (2)

Fundraising Officer / Assistant (3)

CEO (4)

Board Member / Trustee (5)

Fundraising Consultant (6)

Volunteer / Community Fundraiser (7)

Other Consultant (please specify) (8)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Other (please specify) (9) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Page Break

Q107 What specialty area(s) do you work in? Please tick all that apply.

- Direct Marketing (1)
- Individual Giving (2)
- Major Gifts (3)
- Trusts/Foundations (4)
- Legacy Fundraising (5)
- Digital Fundraising (6)
- In Memorial/Tribute Fundraising (7)
- Regular Giving (8)
- Donor Recruitment (9)
- Community/Events Fundraising (10)
- Other (please explain) (11) \_\_\_\_\_

Q145 Please list all of the organisations you have served.

---

---

---

---

Q147 Which category best represents the organization you have most recently served?  
Select a category (1)

▼Animals (0) ... Other (15)

Q142 What country are/were you a fundraiser?  
Select a country (1)

▼Afghanistan (0) ... Zimbabwe (209)

Q108 What professional education/training have you received? Please tick all that apply.

- Trade certificate (1)
  - Two-year degree (2)
  - Undergraduate degree (BA) (3)
  - Graduate (MA) (4)
  - Graduate (PhD) (5)
  - Fundraising Certificate (6)
  - Fundraising Diploma (7)
  - Other (please explain) (8) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q109 What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?

- Year 10 or less (1)
- A-levels (or equivalent) (2)
- GSE-level (or equivalent) (3)
- 1-3 years of University (4)
- 4 year University Degree (5)
- Some graduate credits/Advanced degree (MA, MD, PhD) (6)
- Graduate degree (MA, MD, PhD) (7)

End of Block: Demographics

---

Start of Block: Individual Scores

Q110 Would you like us to email you your personal scores?

- No, thank you. (1)
- Yes, please. Here is my email address: (2)
- 

---

Page Break

*Display This Question:*

*If Q110 = 2*

*And Would you like us to email you your personal scores?&nbsp; Yes, please. Here is my email address: Is Not Empty*

Q111 Please re-enter your email address to confirm.

---

**End of Block: Individual Scores**

---

**Start of Block: Raffle Draw**

Q112 Would you like to be entered into the survey raffle for an iPad mini or voucher?

- No, thank you. (1)
- Yes, please. Here is my email address: (2)
- 

---

Page Break

*Display This Question:*

*If Q112 = 2*

*And Would you like to be entered into the survey raffle for an iPad mini or voucher? Yes, please. Here is my email address: Is Not Empty*

Q113 Please re-enter your email address to confirm.

---

**End of Block: Raffle Draw**

---

## Appendix 5. Ethics Approval Letter



Ref: FREC1617.11  
Date: 15 December, 2016

Dear Jessica,

**Ethical Approval Application No: FREC1617.11**  
**Title: Moral identity and psychology in fundraisers and donors**

The Faculty Research Ethics Committee has considered the ethical approval form and is fully satisfied that the project complies with Plymouth University's ethical standards for research involving human participants.

Approval is for the duration of the project. However, please resubmit your application to the committee if the information provided in the form alters or is likely to alter significantly.

We would like to wish you good luck with your research project.

Yours sincerely

*(Sent as email attachment)*

Dr James Benhin  
**Chair**  
**Faculty Research Ethics Committee**  
**Faculty of Business**

## Appendix 6. Recruitment Blog Post

We've never met, but you might recognise me. In 2015, I had the pleasure of attending the IoF Convention at the Barbican and worked alongside Jen Shang at Plymouth's Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy Charity Lab. It was an amazing few days, and over 220 delegates of the Convention participated in the lab. The research study was designed to test fundraisers' sense of professional self-worth. Were you at this convention? Did you take part in the lab during your break or lunchtime? Are you curious to know what was found?

After the data was analysed, a paper was published called, "The effect of ethical decision making on fundraisers' sense of moral identity," (Shang & Kong, 2015). Results from the study revealed that fundraisers felt worse than non-fundraisers after they were asked to make identical sets of ethical decisions, even though both groups made almost the same decisions. What protected fundraisers? Pride in their identity as a fundraiser.

These results sparked something in me. As a fundraiser, I couldn't believe that so many of my peers were affected so negatively by making ethical decisions, decisions that are regularly faced as part of our work. I felt terrible about it. In my eyes, fundraisers are some of the most virtuous people I know. They have strong morals. They spend their days making sure others benefit from services and programs provided through incredible charities and non-profits.

*The greatest virtues are those which are most useful to other persons. - Aristotle*

If fundraisers are negatively affected by making the ethical decisions that are required of us in our daily work, something must be done to help us! To help give us confidence in our decisions; to strengthen our virtuous characters...

And so, I began my quest, my quest to pursue a PhD in philanthropic psychology at the Hartsook Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy at Plymouth University. For the past three years, I have been a full-time fundraising manager of an NHS Hospital Charity by day, and a budding researcher into morality and fundraisers by night. I have read hundreds of articles, written thousands of words, and interviewed incredible professionals. If I'm honest, working alongside Jen Shang, Adrian Sargeant, Ian MacQuillan, and the many other brilliant people supporting Hartsook has been humbling and inspiring. It is an honour to serve my tribe of fundraisers surrounded by academics who insist on producing only the best, most high-quality work.

All my hours of reading and re-reading and re-writing have led me to this moment. This moment where I ask you, my fellow tribesmen and tribeswomen, to help me help us. The research I am conducting, inspired by the work at the 2015 Convention, has finally reached a place where I have built hypotheses based in sound theories. Where I think I know what influences some of the decisions we make, and where I hope that the results will be used in trainings and conferences to give us courage in our difficult decision-making moments.

*Courage is the first virtue that makes all other virtues possible.*

- Aristotle

Will you help me make sure we are taking care of fundraisers?

If the answer is yes, you only need to give 30 minutes of your time to complete a survey at the comfort of your own keyboard. Your participation in the study will be completely anonymous, and to appreciate your time and effort, you'll have the option to enter a raffle for an i-pad mini or £100 gift voucher. When you have a half hour to dedicate to the survey, please follow this link: \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you for all you already give. Thank you for your courage. Thank you for your virtuous character.

Reference:

Shang, J. and Kong, S. (2015). *The effect of ethical decision making on fundraisers' sense of moral identity*. Plymouth: Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy, Plymouth University



Tags

## WE CARE A LOT ABOUT DONORS, BUT DO WE CARE ENOUGH ABOUT FUNDRAISERS?

Guest Bloggers | 31 October 2017

As a fundraiser, I couldn't believe that so many of my peers were so negatively affected by making ethical decisions, decisions that must be made as part of our work.



We've never met, but you might recognise me. In 2015, I had the pleasure of attending the IoF Fundraising Convention as a fundraiser, and I was also able to work alongside the team at the Centre for Sustainable Philanthropy's Charity Lab. It was an amazing few days, and over 220 delegates participated in the lab. The research study was designed to test fundraisers' sense of professional self-worth. Were you at the Convention? Did you take part in the lab during your break or lunchtime? Are you curious to know the findings?

After the data was analysed, a paper was published called "The effect of ethical decision making on fundraisers' sense of moral identity," (*Shang & Kong, 2015*). Results from the study revealed that fundraisers felt worse than non-fundraisers after they were asked to make identical sets of ethical decisions, even though both groups made almost the same decisions. What protected fundraisers? Pride in their identity as a fundraiser.

These results sparked something in me. As a fundraiser, I couldn't believe that so many of my peers were so negatively affected by making ethical decisions, decisions that must be made as part of our work. In my eyes, fundraisers are some of the most virtuous people I know. They have strong morals. They spend their days making sure others benefit from services and programs provided through incredible charities and non-profits. And as Aristotle said:

## How moral are you as a fundraiser? Take the survey

Home | Blogs | How moral are you as a fundraiser? Take the survey

Posted by Jessica Burgess on 11 December 2017 in [Blogs](#)

0 Comments



All this talk about **ethics** in fundraising over the past few years has really wound me up. Is my practice ethical? Can I justify the decisions I make in work? Am I a moral fundraiser? I need your help to answer these questions...

*If the virtues are neither passions nor facilities, all that remains is that they should be states of character.*  
– Aristotle

Now – I'm on a quest that began in 2015. That year, I had the pleasure of attending the loF

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