

2021-07-01

Tourist security, terrorism risk management and tourist safety

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<http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/17051>

10.1016/j.annals.2021.103207

Annals of Tourism Research

Elsevier Masson

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Annals of Tourism Research

TOURIST SECURITY, TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT & SAFETY

--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:	ATR-D-20-00859R2
Article Type:	Full Length Article
Section/Category:	Qualitative
Keywords:	Terrorism; tourist security; due care; terrorism risk assessment, management and communication; narrative analysis
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Abstract:	Tourists are easy targets for terrorists. Drawing on the example of the 2015 Sousse(Tunisia) shootings, and using a conceptual framework informed by tourist security, terrorism risk management including terrorism risk assessment, communication and due care, we analyse the management of the terror induced security risks, and the factors influencing this process. This is achieved through a first-in-the field tourism study that applies narrative analysis to legal discourse. We show tourist security was compromised by a lack of terrorism risk communication, poor policing, and limited integration of counter-terrorism strategies (e.g.inadequate implementation of environmental mitigation). Implications for terrorism risk assessment, management and communication are discussed and key propositions around tourist security responsibilities (e.g. due care) are examined alongside future research opportunities.

Dear Brent

The changes requested are highlighted in red to enable you to check all the points raised that were required to be changed as the basis for acceptance.

In addition, a definition of 'lone wolf' has been included as not all readers will be familiar with this term.

Stephen

TOURIST SECURITY, TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT AND TOURIST SAFETY

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RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

- Examines the relationships between terrorism risk management, tourist security and due care
- Explore the management of terror-induced security risks
- Applies a novel and under-utilised approach to narrative analysis
- Reveals several failings relating to terrorism risk assessment, management and communication
- Contribute to a research gap on terrorism risk management, tourist security and due care in the context of lone wolf attacks

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TOURIST SECURITY, TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT AND TOURIST SAFETY

1
2 Abstract
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5 Tourists are easy targets for terrorist activities, especially with the rise of lone wolf
6 attacks. Drawing on the example of the 2015 Sousse (Tunisia) shootings, and using
7 a conceptual framework informed by tourist security, terrorism risk management
8 including terrorism risk assessment, communication and due care, we analyse the
9 management of the terror induced security risks, and the factors influencing this
10 process. This is achieved through a first-in-the field tourism study that applies
11 narrative analysis to legal discourse. The study reveals that tourist security was
12 compromised by a lack of terrorism risk communication, poor policing, and by limited
13 integration of counter-terrorism strategies, particularly the inadequate
14 implementation of environmental mitigation. We discuss the implications for
15 terrorism risk assessment, management and communication and consider key
16 propositions around tourist security responsibilities (e.g. due care). Future avenues
17 for research are highlighted.
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23 Keywords: terrorism; tourist security; due care; terrorism risk assessment,
24 management and communication; narrative analysis
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INTRODUCTION

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Creating conditions for tourists to feel secure and safe from harm before and during a trip is critical to the success of many destinations (Araña and León, 2008). This is not an easy task as globalisation has exposed the tourism industry to a wide set of risks, one of which is terrorism. Widely understood as the ‘pre-meditated use or threat of use of extra normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain political, religious or ideological objectives (Somnez, 1998; pg. 417), terrorism can induce fear amongst prospective tourists causing them to avoid destinations they believe to be associated with such threats (Araña and León, 2008). According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2019), although the intensity of terrorism declined between 2004-2018, it has become more geographically dispersed due to ‘lone wolf’ attacks. The uncontrollable, involuntary and random nature of these incidents makes managing these risks and ensuring tourist security, extremely challenging for the tourism industry.

Extensive tourism research has been undertaken on the influence of security risks and safety concerns on perceptions of destination image, on tourist decision-making, and on patterns of international travel (e.g. Fourie et al., 2020; Hall et al., 2003; Mansfeld and Pizam, 2006). Terrorism has attracted the most scrutiny, focused on its impact on tourism demand and on destinations (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Baker, 2014; Bassil et al., 2017; Enders et al., 2014; Liu and Pratt, 2017), on tourist decision-making, destination choice and behaviour (e.g. Seabra et al., 2020; Walters et al., 2019), and on tourists’ perceptions of risk, security and safety (e.g. Bowen et al., 2014; Coca-Stefaniak and Morrison, 2018; Fourie et al., 2020; Fuchs and Reichel, 2011; Malečková and Stanišić, 2014; Mansfeld and Pizam, 2006; Seabra et al., 2013; Seabra et al., 2014).

A lacuna of knowledge exists on how terror-related risks are managed by tour operators and third party sellers, specifically in relation to the legal and ethical obligations imposed by their duty of care (also called due care). Moreover, to date no studies exist within tourism on terrorism risk management in relation to a lone wolf attack. For the purposes of this paper, a lone wolf is defined as ‘individuals motivated by ideological concerns and engaged in political violence “...whose modi operandi are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy (Spaaij 2010, pg857).” The key element distinguishing lone-actor terrorism from other forms of terrorism is that lone actors operate without organizational support and are not influenced by organizational dynamics’ Deloughberg et al., 2013, pg 3).

This paper addresses this knowledge gap by examining the management of terror-induced risks, the factors influencing this process and the implications for tour operators regarding due care. This is achieved through the novel application of narrative analysis to legal discourse disclosed during an inquisitional trial. The latter sought to explain the deaths of thirty UK citizens who were killed in and around the Rui Imperial Marhaba hotel, a five star complex 10km north of Sousse, Tunisia on 26th June 2015 as a result of a lone wolf terrorist attack. It was not the first time that Tunisia had experienced an attack of this nature, and a subsequent series of inquests in London raised concerns about the security and safety of holidaymakers when traveling to countries where the potential for terrorist attacks was high.

1 In the first part of the paper, tourist security and its relationship with tourist
2 safety is discussed, followed by consideration of travel risks and perceptions of
3 tourist security risks. Next, terrorism and tourism is detailed and the terrorism risk
4 management framework is documented, alongside its related components including
5 risk assessment, risk communication and mitigation measures such as counter-
6 terrorism. In the second part of the paper, using the example of the 2015 shootings
7 that occurred in Sousse, Tunisia, the management of the terror-induced risks are
8 analysed. Following this, the implications for terrorism risk management, tourist
9 security and tourist safety are highlighted.
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12 TOURIST SECURITY AND TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT 13 14

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16 Tourist security is acknowledged as focusing on the protection of tourists against the
17 possibility of global, international or local situations or events whereby harm is
18 intended and deliberate (Tarlow, 2014; Hall et al., 2003), comprising incidents such
19 as arson, assault, crime and terrorism (Korstanje, 2017). Where protection extends
20 beyond the personal safety of tourists to encompass destinations and the tourism
21 economy, the term ‘tourism security’ is often used (Tarlow, 2014). This involves the
22 imposition of a system that seeks to eradicate or mitigate risk in order to protect
23 tourists from harm or other undesirable consequences. Implicit within tourist security
24 is the inter-connected concept of tourist safety.
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28 While both involve tourist protection, the principal distinction between tourist
29 security and tourist safety is that the latter relates to unintended consequences of an
30 involuntary nature (e.g. fire or traffic accident), as opposed to deliberate intentions in
31 the case of the former. As modern conceptions of security have evolved beyond the
32 defense of nation-states, to encompass a variety of global to individual issues
33 ranging from threats from military actions, climate change, resource scarcity,
34 international crime, health, and biosecurity (Hall et al., 2003), the distinction between
35 both concepts has become less clear. Blurred boundaries exist, as implied within
36 Cohen (1972) and Plog’s (1974) tourist ‘drifter’, ‘explorer’ and ‘allocentric’ typologies,
37 all of whom are motivated by novelty and are risk averse (Seabra et al., 2014).
38 Moreover, in some tourism forms (e.g. backpacking and adventure tourism), thrill
39 and sensation-seeking, and possible physical harm are core to the tourism
40 experience (Adam, 2015; Holm et al., 2017). Despite the issue of semantics around
41 security and safety as terms, they conjointly influence intentions to travel
42 internationally (e.g. Sonmez and Graefe, 1998), with tourists’ risk perceptions about
43 personal safety and destination security impacting such decisions (Seabra et al.,
44 2014).
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49 *Travel risks and tourist security risk perceptions* 50

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52 Risk is embedded in everyday life and perceptions vary depending on the individual.
53 Mansfeld (2006; pg. 272) refers to tourist risk as ‘a wide range of uncertainties
54 regarding tourists’ ability to fulfil their travel motivations without being exposed to
55 unfortunate situations’. Although a variety of travel risks have been identified ranging
56 from financial, psychological, time, physical and social (Seabra et al., 2014), many
57 do not cause actual bodily harm to tourists; those that do, irrespective of being
58 unintended or deliberate, may directly and indirectly do so, through their potential to
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1 damage infrastructure, disrupt supply chains, challenge law and order, and/or create
2 chaotic and spin-off crisis situations. Examples include extreme weather, natural
3 disasters, pandemics (e.g. Page et al 2006), political instability, crime, and terrorism
4 which pose travel risks to tourist security and safety (e.g. Hall et al., 2003; Fuchs and
5 Reichel, 2011; Sonmez, 1998) (see Figure 1).
6

7 [Figure 1]

8 Perceptions or feelings of being protected from factors that cause harm are
9 integral to tourist security and safety. Researchers posit that perceived risk as
10 opposed to actual risk has received the greatest attention as the latter determines
11 behaviours (e.g. Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992). Risk is multidimensional and its
12 complexity affects tourist decision-making where risk perceptions may be situation
13 specific (Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992), and judgements are highly individual, based
14 upon personal factors including personality traits (Reisinger and Mavondo, 2005),
15 culture and nationality (Kozak et al., 2007), past travel experience and demographics
16 (Seabra et al., 2013), income and education (Floyd and Pennington-Gray, 2004),
17 everyday contact with crime and violence (Brunt et al., 2000) and sought benefits.
18 Situation-specific risks may outweigh perceived risks when taking the final decision
19 (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998). The most frequently examined safety concerns within
20 tourists' risk perceptions are political instability and unrest, health (e.g. Clift and Page
21 1996) and terrorism and the relationship to destination choice and intentions to visit
22 (Araña and Leon, 2008; Sönmez and Graefe, 1998).
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27 *Terrorism and due care*

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30 Terrorism and political instability create fear amongst tourists (Sönmez and Graefe,
31 1998), with younger generations ranking war, terrorism and political tension as their
32 top concerns (Deloitte, 2017). Whilst terrorist-induced deaths have declined in the
33 last three years, political conflict is a key driver of instability globally (Institute for
34 Economics and Peace, 2019), and a significant number of terrorist incidents have
35 occurred at tourist destinations (Korstanje, 2017). Terrorist attacks have targeted/
36 involved tourism infrastructure and destinations (e.g. Fourie et al., 2020). Global
37 cities have become particular targets given the media attention they attract
38 exemplified by recent terror attacks on Sydney and Melbourne (Australia), Paris
39 (France), Brussels (Belgium), and Manchester and London (UK). Each incident was
40 high impact but low in frequency. Running parallel to this, is a randomness in the
41 spatial and temporal occurrence of terrorist incidents (Walters et al., 2018).
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46 A perennial challenge which these risks pose is the thorny issue of the
47 tourism industry's responsibility for safeguarding tourists. A limited range of studies
48 address 'who is responsible for tourist safety?' (Cavlec, 2002; Lovelock, 2003;
49 Mansfeld, 2006; Pizam et al., 1997; Walker and Page 2003). This is often a
50 tautological discussion where some positions highlight the tourism sector's
51 responsibility for tourist security and safety (e.g. Cavlec, 2002; Mansfeld, 2006;
52 Pizam et al., 1997). Cavlec (2002) in particular, emphasized the legal requirement of
53 due care to avoid or minimize risks to an acceptable level. Its legal definition is the
54 dispensation of reasonable care to manage risk and encompasses activities such as
55 policy enforcement, implementing counter measures, and encrypting data. The
56 fulfilment of due care involves practicing due diligence that involves developing
57 security structures, formulating security policies, standards, guidelines and
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1 procedures. Implicit within due diligence is monitoring, auditing and providing
2 verification that due care actions have been carried out and are being followed
3 (Barner, 2019).
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5 For tour operators, travel agents and third party sellers of tourism products in
6 many EU countries, due care results in inevitable tensions between moral
7 responsibility, legal requirements and profitability. Lovelock (2003; pg. 277) claimed
8 that travel agents are often caught between two sets of ethics: 'the humanitarian one
9 that advocates not sending tourists to dangerous places and the business ethic,
10 which calls for a hard sell regardless of the risk involved'. Mansfeld (2006) expected
11 that tour operators avoided selling high security risk destinations, providing security-
12 oriented information to make customers aware of the potential risks (Lovelock,
13 2003). Thus, the need to manage the risks posed by terrorism is vital if both the
14 industry and tourists are to be safeguarded.
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17 *Terrorism risk management*

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19 Rooted within the broader framework of security risk management, terrorism
20 risk management has emerged as a specialised branch of expertise. It focuses on
21 terror-induced incidents and minimising the deliberate actions geared towards
22 inflicting harm to an individual, organization, business and destination. It is derived
23 from generic risk and security risk management processes, involving the
24 identification and evaluation of risks (e.g. the frequency and severity of attack at
25 strategic and operational levels) to inform the design of terror risk communication,
26 management and mitigation (Smith and Brooks, 2013). When applied to terrorism, it
27 evaluates the threat (high versus low), criticality (urgent versus non-urgent),
28 vulnerability (high versus low), probability (likely versus unlikely) and impact (high
29 versus low) of the risks posed. Although vital, knowledge of the nature of terrorist
30 threats alone is insufficient. Consequently, unless there is awareness and
31 understanding among business, industry bodies, leadership teams and the public, of
32 terrorism risks and how these are to be mitigated including roles and responsibilities,
33 terrorism risk management is likely to be ineffective. Thus, a key element of
34 terrorism risk management also involves communication.
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41 Terrorism risk communication entails the application of risk communication
42 principles, but focuses solely on the provision of information to the public regarding
43 possible terrorist attacks and level of risk (Freedman, 2006). For tourism, it primarily
44 concerns the probable occurrence and likely risk of a terror-related event affecting a
45 travel decision, and is targeted at tourists and the tourism sector (Mansfeld, 2006).
46 Implementing this involves the dissemination of real-time intelligence and threat
47 estimates, with the purpose of offering guidance on future intentions and behaviours
48 of known terrorist cells and individuals, and conveying a range of possibilities that
49 might occur as a result (Freedman, 2006). It tends to be preventative in nature
50 highlighting terror risks that would otherwise not be taken into consideration, and like
51 risk communication, it builds understanding amongst stakeholders so that informed
52 decision-making and behavior change can mitigate exposure and impact (Freedman,
53 2006; Wang and Lopez, 2020).
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58 All forms of risk communication are increasingly undertaken utilizing
59 computer-mediated communication in conjunction with mass media outlets and
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1 terrorism risk communication is no different. Social media enables information
2 dissemination to the public directly and the collection of valuable real-time
3 information using the public as eye witnesses (Latonero and Shklovski, 2011). The
4 minimisation of terror-related risk and/or threats however are informed not only by
5 the availability of security information, their level of exposure to it, its nature, quality
6 and credibility (Mansfeld, 2006), but also by decision and buying behaviours and
7 perceptions of risk, fear and safety. Consumer behaviour theories (e.g.
8 Psychoanalytical, Veblenian Social-Psychological, Reasoned Action, Motivation-
9 Need, and Hawkins Stern Impulse Buying), provide insights into the former, whilst
10 regarding the latter, several studies (e.g. Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992; Seabra et al.,
11 2013) demonstrate heterogeneity in risk perceptions. Seabra et al. (2013) for
12 example revealed the carefree nature of many international travellers who feel no
13 significant risk in any dimension, pointing to the need for tailoring terrorism risk
14 communication to different market segments. This contention is reinforced by Wang
15 and Lopez (2020), who found that safety messages positively impact visit intentions,
16 particularly amongst low risk, high self-efficacy tourists.
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21 There are also limits to what tourists can do to protect themselves when the
22 degree of personal risk and danger is difficult to calculate (Freedman, 2006).
23 Information about potential terrorist activity is poor, particularly concerning sub-state
24 groups and individuals operating covertly as they are harder to track and their attack
25 options are numerous (Freedman, 2006). Moreover, any threat assessment is likely
26 to be reflexive since terrorists are able to change their plans in light of the knowledge
27 they gain from any terror risk communications (Freedman, 2006). Despite these
28 complexities, communication is an important component of terrorism risk
29 management because in the absence of doing nothing, governments and industry
30 sectors stand accused of failing in their duty to protect their citizens.
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34 *Barriers to terrorism risk management*

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36 The application of terrorism risk management is a complex task primarily because
37 destinations are rarely managed by a single actor, but instead by a diversity of
38 organizations, interacting within complex networks. Tourist destinations must
39 contend with the added challenge of managing a large transient tourist population
40 whose knowledge of actual risk is generally low (Morakabati et al., 2017). Managing
41 terror-related risks and ensuring tourist safety in crowded public spaces such as
42 beaches, parks and shopping malls is particularly problematic. These spaces are
43 easily accessible, are widely available, they may have little or no protective security,
44 and are densely packed at certain times of day. Moreover, they often lie at the heart
45 of the tourist experience, and so as not to heighten perceptions of fear, terror risk
46 management must be finely balanced with tourists' desire for fun, entertainment and
47 relaxation.
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51 Consequently, terrorism risk management involves multiple actors operating
52 at a variety of levels, including: the macro (e.g. which countries are safe to visit);
53 meso (e.g. which resorts within the country are safe); and, the micro (e.g. which
54 areas/hotels within a resort are safe). Mitigation might also focus on tourists, through
55 the provision of specific advice on precautionary action and risk minimization. With
56 reference to all levels, terrorist-related risks are assessed and communicated
57 through formal, informal, and experiential travel information (Walter et al., 2019).
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1 One important formal mechanism are travel warnings, issued by governments as
2 part of an extra-territorial policy to protect their citizens, and to mitigate exposure to
3 risk during international travel. In determining the safety of destinations, tour
4 operators and travel agencies usually follow advice from government issued travel
5 advisories and from established, credible industry bodies. In the UK for example, all
6 tour operators seek additional assurance from the Association of British Travel
7 Agents (ABTA).
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10 At the macro-, meso- and micro-levels, the police and security services play a
11 fundamental role in ensuring that tourists and destinations are secure from terrorist
12 attacks (and conventional crime). As public spaces have been the targets of terrorist
13 attacks globally, recent activity is focused on assessing, managing and mitigating the
14 terror-related risks at crowded public spaces and/or at components of the tourist
15 infrastructure such as sporting venues, commercial centres, transport, and hotels,
16 bars, night clubs and restaurants. Action primarily involves counter-terrorism, notably
17 crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). This refers to the ways in
18 which environments are security proofed through the design of buildings and public
19 spaces, encompassing also security hardware (e.g. CCTV and lighting), thereby
20 making targets less accessible to perpetrators and more visible to potential
21 witnesses.
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25 At the meso- and micro-levels, national, regional and/or local government
26 bodies produce security and terrorism risk management plans, while each individual
27 component of the tourism industry, engages in risk assessment, management and
28 mitigation. Multiple actors operating at various levels are involved in terrorism risk
29 management with much of this activity undertaken in a siloed, non-collaborative
30 manner (Morakabati et al., 2017). Consequently, the question of who is responsible
31 for tourist security has created controversy. Mair et al. (2016) argue that it rests with
32 destination management organisations and/or managers; conversely, Varghese and
33 Paul (2014) suggest it lies with individual tourism stakeholders. In terms fulfilling due
34 care for tourist security and demonstrating due diligence, the processes entailed
35 within terrorism risk management must be undertaken (see Figure 2).
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40 [Figure 2 here]
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42 Tourist security and safety is a complex issue that fundamentally involves the
43 application of terrorism risk management. For these reasons, we seek to analyse,
44 through a case study of the 2015 Sousse shootings, the management of security
45 risks posed by terrorism and the factors influencing management effectiveness.
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48 METHODOLOGY 49

50 ***Research setting: Terrorist attack at Port El Kantaoui, Sousse in 2015***

51 On 26 June 2015, thirty-eight tourists, 30 of which were Britons, were killed by a lone
52 gunman disguised as a tourist, in a terrorist attack in and around the Riu Imperial
53 Marhaba hotel, a five star tourist complex accommodating 565 guests, located at the
54 coastal town of Port El Kantaoui, 10km north of Sousse, Tunisia. The gunman fired
55 at each person he encountered until he was eventually killed by Tunisian security
56 forces. Tunisia is no stranger to the disruptive effects of political events on its tourism
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1 sector. Lanouar and Goaled (2019) outline the long-run effects of politically-inspired
2 instability namely Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, and it was not the first time in 2015
3 that Tunisia had experienced a similar incident of this nature. In March 2015, three
4 Jihadists launched an attack at the Bardo National Museum in Tunis, killing twenty-
5 two people, mostly European tourists and injuring around fifty. The tourism sector in
6 Tunisia in 2014 (African Manager, 2015), accounted for 14 per cent of GDP based
7 on 6 million international visitors, many from Western Europe, and employed nearly
8 12% of the working population (Solomon, 2015). Following the attack, the
9 governments of Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden
10 banned travel to Tunisia. The consequences for Tunisian tourism and the economy
11 were stark, with tourism decimated and, until recently, no evidence of any upturn
12 (Sengupta, 2017). Subsequent inquests into the death of the 30 Britons began in
13 January 2017 at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, and a Coroner ruled the
14 victims of the attacks were "unlawfully killed". A separate and independent Tunisian
15 investigation of the Sousse shootings was undertaken by Judge Akremi.
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19 ***Research approach employed***

21 This study employs an interpretive research paradigm and case study approach to
22 analyse the process and outcome of the phenomenon under investigation. Two
23 reasons informed case study selection. First, it provides an example of a lone wolf
24 terrorist attack that specifically targeted tourists at a well-known tourist destination.
25 Second, Tunisia has been a notable absentee from academic discussions of terrorist
26 attacks on tourists. Although a case study approach may be criticised for lack of
27 validity and generalisability, the advantages of its application to this study outweigh
28 criticisms. This is because this terrorist incident raises broader questions concerning
29 terrorism risk management and tourist security, which are of relevance to all
30 overseas destinations, and are only evident from an in-depth single case study
31 analysis.
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36 ***Analytical method: Narrative analysis***

38 Narrative inquiry was selected as a technique to evaluate the terror risks and
39 their management as it is a powerful tool to explore the complexities of social
40 realities and social agents (Mura and Sharif, 2017). It is an under-used method
41 within tourism analysis as traditionally, it has been employed to analyse stories
42 elicited from tourist experiences. The approach adopted in this particular study
43 therefore is very different to that employed in the extant literature, utilised to analyse
44 the evidence provided by those who were present in all or part of the terrorist
45 incident and from those key agencies responsible for the safety of UK tourists.
46 Narration plays a central role in legal discourse as it involves the reconstruction of
47 multiple stories divulged within a court-room; witness cross-examinations, and
48 opening and closing statements all contain narrative elements. Given that
49 investigations and inquests are essentially fact-finding exercises, conducted when an
50 individual has died in certain circumstances, a narrative approach was preferred over
51 content analysis as the focus was problem-centred, extending beyond textual
52 considerations (Mishler, 1995). It is concerned with the sequence and consequences
53 of the stories presented, thereby enabling the events relating to the attack to be
54 identified, organised, connected and evaluated (Reismann, 2008). A narrative
55 approach enables these stories or as Reismann (2008; pg. 32) terms
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1 'representations of realities' to be less concerned with finding one grand truth, and to
2 reveal instead several macro- and micro-narratives.

3 **Data sources**

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6 The study data were produced from two independent sources. Firstly, from
7 the UK Inquests during which oral and written evidence regarding the terrorist
8 incident was presented by 81 people, some of whom were eyewitnesses, police
9 officers, and employees of the tour operator TUI UK Ltd, and one was a senior
10 manager at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (Opus 2 International,
11 2017). The trial commenced on Monday 16 January 2017, and ended on 28
12 February 2017. Secondly, the outcome of a separate and independent Tunisian
13 investigation of the Sousse shootings undertaken by Judge Akremi was used. This
14 consists of 72 witness accounts from a range of individuals employed at the Imperial
15 Marhaba Hotel, were members of the public, or were attached to the police, and
16 other local, regional and national governmental security providers. The findings of
17 this investigation were subsequently provided to the UK Inquests as evidence (Leek
18 et al., 2017).
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23 Within the UK, inquests are presided by a Coroner, whilst in this particular
24 case, a judge led the Tunisian investigation of the Sousse shootings. The Coroner
25 and the Judge play key roles in determining the proceedings, examining the
26 witnesses and reaching an impartial verdict. The purpose or macro-narrative of the
27 UK Tunisia Inquests was to consider how the 30 British victims died on 26th June
28 2015, whilst the focus of the Tunisian investigation was to examine the security
29 response to the shootings. Data with direct relevance to the management of the
30 terror risks were considered. Therefore, 35 out of the 81 persons involved in the UK
31 Inquests, and 23 of the 72 persons included in the Judge Akremi investigation
32 provided relevant evidence, with some providing insights into more than one aspect
33 (see Table 2).
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37 [Table 2]
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40 **Data analysis**

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42 Given this factual focus, initially, a structural as opposed to an interactional
43 approach to narrative inquiry was deemed the most appropriate analytical practice,
44 because it enables comparisons to be drawn between multiple narrative accounts
45 thereby facilitating a critical evaluation of terrorism risk management. Since the story
46 is the object of the study, Mishler's narrative analysis typology (1995), specifically
47 category one – reference and temporal order: the "telling" and the "told", enabled
48 individual stories to be drawn out inductively. A comparative analysis was then
49 undertaken of these micro-narratives in relation to the teller (witness) and to the
50 sequence and critical moments of the telling (the incident). Several micro-narratives
51 were revealed. These included: the security response; the terrorism-related travel
52 advice offered to tourists; and, the security in place at Sousse beach and the hotel
53 on the day of the attack and preceding it. Given that the meanings attached to these
54 micro-narratives are less important as opposed to their explanatory power in
55 shedding light on the management of terror-induced risks, the data then underwent a
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1 second level of deductive thematic analysis, facilitated through the employment of
2 NVivo 12.

3 RESULTS

4 *The terrorist security response*

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8 In order to establish the cause of death of 30 Britons in Sousse on 25th June 2015,
9 the Inquests focused on the security response. Overall, 20 police witnesses, two
10 local workers, one holiday-maker and one eye-witness to the event, suggested that
11 the security response was ineffective. One witness for instance, the Director of the
12 National Security Police stated that,
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16 'he discovered that the Station Head for National Security did not intervene to
17 stop the attack, remaining outside the Hotel.....none of the coastal, quad-bike,
18 mounted or coastguard patrols intervened at the Hotel.....(Akremi, 2017,
19 cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg.14).
20

21 He also stated that,

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23
24 '...two guards came down to the beach after the attacker, heading toward the
25 swimming pool.....the second guard started to get rid of his uniform and
26 mingled with the crowd of onlookers' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017;
27 pg.14).
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30 This account was confirmed by another police witness, the Commander of the
31 Coastguard Headquarters in El-Kantaoui. He stated that,

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34 'He was overcome with terror, slipped and fell onto the floor and dropped his
35 weapon.....He hid behind a parasol until he saw the offender leaving the
36 scene.....' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg. 23).
37
38

39 Further investigation of the security response revealed a variety of explanations as to
40 why it was ineffective. These include a reluctance to engage with the perpetrator,
41 poor leadership, and a lack of fire arms and situation awareness training (Table 3).
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44 [Table 3]

45
46 Based on this evidence, it not surprising that the terrorist security response was
47 criticised by the Coroner, who described it as: '.... at best shambolic, at worst
48 cowardly' (Opus 2 International, Day 17; pg. 16). One possible explanation for this
49 failing is because the security services in Tunisia are managed in a top-down, state-
50 centred, hierarchical and militaristic manner, the antithesis of a transnational
51 collaborative approach to terrorism risk management (e.g. Morakabati et al., 2017),
52 involving key stakeholders (e.g. the local community). This lack of collaboration
53 proved to limit the terrorism security response further since the community's use of
54 social media might have provided information about the whereabouts and movement
55 of the terrorist (Latonero and Shklovski, 2011), critical knowledge that was not
56 otherwise available (Akremi, 2017, cited in Opus 2 International, Day 5, 2017).
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Terrorism risk communication

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2 The Inquests pursued two lines of inquiry to ascertain the cause of deaths of 30
3 Britons in Sousse, and examined (a) the nature and appropriateness of the terrorism
4 travel advice provided by the FCO to tour operators including TUI UK Ltd, and (b) the
5 dissemination of such advice to prospective tourists. The evidence suggests that
6 there were several shortcomings concerning terrorism risk communication provided
7 at the macro- and meso-scales. In the case of the first line of enquiry, a FCO Senior
8 Manager stated that,
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12 'In the case of terrorism, we will only advise against travel in situations of
13 extreme and imminent danger, where the threat is sufficiently specific, large-
14 scale and endemic to affect British nationals severely' (Opus 2 International,
15 Day 1, 2017; pg. 12).
16
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18 Following the receipt of an Islamic State threat in 2014, warning of the possibility of
19 terrorism, and the terrorist attack on the Bardo Museum (Tunis) on 15th March 2015,
20 the FCO reassessed its travel advice (Opus 2 International Day 2, 2017). Given that
21 the threats posed were deemed to not be specific or large enough to adversely affect
22 British nationals, they did not advise against travel; instead strengthened language
23 was inserted, warning of likely further attacks. This judgement is questionable in light
24 of the Sousse shootings on the 25th June 2015. Moreover, their failure to issue an
25 advisory against all travel to Tunisia immediately after the Sousse shootings is
26 perhaps more worrying. Whilst, TUI UK Ltd suspended all outbound travel on
27 Sunday 28th June 2015, the FCO did not change their terrorism travel advice until 9th
28 July 2015, 13 days after the attack.
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33 With respect to the second line of enquiry, the Inquests examined the
34 terrorism risk communication provided to those tourists who booked their trip through
35 a TUI operated or independent high street travel agency selling TUI products. In
36 2015, despite there being a joint venture between the FCO and the travel industry
37 entitled 'Know Before You Go' (KBYG), implemented to better prepare British
38 travellers abroad, the KBYG logo was not displayed in TUIs brochures.
39 Furthermore, the tourism industry was expected to highlight the FCO's travel advice
40 to prospective tourists. However, the Inquests demonstrated that none of the six
41 employees of such retail outlets questioned, stated that they referred to any previous
42 attack and to the advice provided by the FCO during the sale. This finding was
43 confirmed by all of the seven tourists questioned, who had purchased their holidays
44 through a retail outlet. Some even claimed that they were told during the sale that
45 the destination was safe, and that it was only after the point of sale, that information
46 was provided on where to find advice about destination safety (Opus 2 International
47 Day 17, 2017).
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52 TUI UK Limited's website did not also present any of the FCOs travel advice
53 about the increased possibility of terrorist attacks following the Bardo Musuem
54 incident. Prior to the Sousse attack, TUI's websites did not prominently display logos
55 and links to the UK Government's Travel Aware programme, which provided detailed
56 travel advice for every country on the FCO website (Opus 2 International, Day 17,
57 2017). Instead, a crib sheet was issued to online sales staff, which, according to the
58 Coroner, was a flawed approach. This was because:
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1 'Firstly, it does not give any details of the attack and only refers to "the
2 incident that took place there yesterday". Secondly, it does not mention the
3 word "terrorism" or the phrase "risk of terrorism". And thirdly, although it refers
4 to the FCO advice, it does not give any guidance as to where it can be found'
5 (Opus 2 International, Day 17, pp. 41-42).
6
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8 Overall, it therefore appears that terrorism risk communication was not successfully
9 imparted to TUIs customers; many were not alerted to the terrorist risks at the time of
10 booking or directed to the FCO's travel advice either at a retail store or online, and
11 TUIs website did not contain the most recent FCO travel advice. Given that Tunisia
12 had experienced previous terrorist attacks, this is a serious oversight as good
13 security communication enables people to make informed travel decisions
14 (Mansfeld, 2006).
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17 *Security at Sousse beach and Imperial Marhaba Hotel*

18 In addition to the security response, the Inquests also examined security provision at
19 Sousse beach and Imperial Marhaba hotel. Evidence provided by TUIs Director of
20 Risk and Compliance revealed that after an earlier attack occurring in March 2015 at
21 the Bardo museum in Tunis, the management company, Tunisotel, responsible for
22 overseeing the Imperial Marhaba, reviewed its security arrangements and
23 recommended numerous enhanced security measures (Opus 2 International, Day 4
24 and 17, 2017). These included many *CPTED* design principles and strategies such as
25 increasing the number of security guards, increasing the number of CCTV points
26 within all hotels, and strengthening counter-terrorist security measures (Opus 2
27 International, Day 17, 2017).
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33 However, evidence presented by a Detective Superintendent of the
34 Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism Command, who examined the security
35 arrangements around and within the Imperial Marhaba post-attack, revealed some
36 *CPTED* failings. First, the main gate between the beach and the hotel grounds was
37 unmanned and unlocked during the day, and remained so sometimes at night, thus
38 providing the potential for unchallenged access. Second, he highlighted the
39 existence of poor surveillance arrangements stating there were only six cameras
40 covering the beach and hotel, two of which were not working. Those working were
41 on the main gate, the delivery drive, and on the north and south side of the lifts. In
42 contrast, the two located within the hotel (one at the front door and one on the
43 terrace doors) were not and there was no control room (Opus 2 International, Days 1
44 and 17, 2017). When compared to other hotels in Sousse, all had significantly more
45 CCTV cameras and one or more control room (Opus 2 International, Days 1 and 17,
46 2017). The lack of surveillance might also have contributed the ineffective security
47 response to the attack, a reason outlined by a number of Tunisian security personal.
48 According to the Constable who worked in the National Security Police Operations
49 Room, due to limited information, personnel had to draw on their local knowledge; for
50 some units this was impossible since they operated outside of the locality (Akremi,
51 2017 cited in Opus 2 International, Day 5, 2017).
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58 It also emerged from the Inquests that there was inadequate terrorist risk
59 management at the hotel. While there were plans in place for gas, fire and flooding
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1 emergencies, one specifically focused on a terrorist incident, was absent (Opus 2
2 International, Day 17, 2017). Additionally, the hotel staff had received no training to
3 deal with such an incident and there was no procedure in place for an evacuation
4 (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017). Ultimately what these deficiencies resulted in
5 was no delineation of clear roles and responsibilities amongst the hotel's employees
6 generally but specifically amongst the hotel's security staff. Tourists took unaided
7 refuge anywhere they could, assisted by non-security staff. For example, the
8 Excursion Liaison Officer (witness AO) stated that 'He took them [tourists] to the
9 reception and helped them to take refuge in the basement and in the hotel's shops'
10 (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017, pg. 2).
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12
13 The Inquests data revealed that the risk assessment of the Imperial Marhaba
14 neglected to consider potential risks to tourists' security as a result of a terrorist
15 attack. According to TUI's Director of Risk, Compliance, it only focuses on business
16 risk. This is because mitigating actions and controls are different depending on the
17 nature, location and size of the risk (Opus 2 International, Day 4, 2017). More
18 specifically, this witness stated (Opus 2 International, Day 4, 2017; pg.15),
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21 '.....overseas we have to rely on the controls and actions of our suppliers, and
22 therefore, to assure ourselves, as best we can that Federation of Tour
23 Operators (FTO) standards are being met, we commission audits of hotels'.
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26
27 TUI out-sourced risk audits of hotels within their portfolio to independent specialists
28 but at the time of the Sousse attack, such assessments did not include hotel security
29 and thus did not meet FCO guidance (Opus 2 International, Day 4, 2017).
30

31 Overall, the Inquests revealed that terrorism risk assessment and
32 management undertaken by TUI UK Ltd was limited. Responsibility was delegated to
33 accommodation providers. Although assurances were provided to TUI UK Ltd by the
34 Tunisian Consul that security had increased at all hotels within the company's
35 portfolio (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017), TUI UK did not undertake its own
36 checks that adequate steps had taken and implemented. More crucially, there were
37 no security advisors on TUI's board, a concern noted by the Coroner (Opus 2
38 International, Day 17, 2017). The evidence presented demonstrates that security
39 within the hotel and its grounds was poor. Certainly if all the CCTV cameras had
40 been operating and the beach gates locked, access to the hotel would have been
41 much more difficult. Whilst this action would not have stopped this lone terrorist
42 incident, it might have deterred any such attack by reducing points of weakness and
43 vulnerability, or limited its severity.
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48 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 49

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51 This paper provides a critical assessment of the tourist security and safety
52 nexus and contributes to research on terrorism, tourist security and due care. We
53 identify an important research gap – namely that, tourism research has insufficiently
54 considered terror risk assessment, management and communication, particularly in
55 the context of lone wolf attacks and due care. **Lone wolf attacks have more recently
56 been recognised to be hugely challenging to risk assess, manage and mitigate
57 (Hartleb, 2020), prompted by the Norwegian 2011 terrorist attacks in Oslo (a car
58 bomb which killed 8 people) and a mass shooting at a Labour Youth camp on the
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1 Island of Utøya, killing 77 people. Although, this form of terrorism as yet has not
2 commonly targeted destinations, tourists or tourist spaces, this development is
3 worrying, particularly since acts of 'leaderless' resistance have been heralded as the
4 hallmark of the terrorist landscape (Joose, 2017; Michael, 2012), especially the
5 targeting of crowded spaces (Spaaij and Hamm, 2015). Indeed, key bodies like the
6 European Police Chiefs Association and Europol acknowledge that solo actor
7 terrorists are now a key threat, with motivations, capability, behaviours and types,
8 under-examined, under-theorised and contested (e.g. Hartleb, 2020; Miller, 2019).
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11 Our study reveals that the risk assessment undertaken in Sousse was not
12 terrorism specific and only partially undertaken. As well as undertaking threat,
13 vulnerability, criticality, likelihood and impact assessments (Figure 1), our study
14 posits the importance of analytically distinguishing between *generic terror risks* (i.e.
15 those that are commonly identified and associated with general locations, events
16 and/or activities) and *dynamic terror-related risks* (i.e. lone wolf attacks). This
17 requires continued assessment of the changing socio-economic and geopolitical
18 environments, especially the terrorist landscape. Thus, it is imperative that the
19 influence of the operational context is recognised also if terrorism risk assessments
20 are fit for purpose. This is especially true of this particular example, since Tunisia
21 has been the victim of terrorism for decades with attacks occurring in 1995, 2002,
22 2013 and between 2015 and 2020. Additionally, the legacy of a post-colonial past
23 means that it is not uncommon for police forces, despite democratic transitions, to
24 still lack self-efficacy, and be characterised by inner turmoil, poor working conditions
25 and low salaries (Pino and Watrowski, 2016).
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31 Our study highlights the critical need for a portfolio of terrorism specific risk
32 management plans that address the diversity of attack scenarios that a destination
33 may experience. Each should be thoroughly evaluated in order to understand how
34 they perform in different terror situations such as when threats come from
35 unexpected sources, when attackers use varied attack types and when there is a
36 change of strategic and tactical behavior. Preventative and mitigation strategies that
37 perform well across a range of possible futures are by implication more resilient. This
38 activity should also be accompanied by training of all stakeholders and their staff in
39 order to build capacity and knowledge of specific plans and leadership in their
40 implementation. For the police and security services, regular firearms and situation
41 assessment training is required so that key personnel are confident and combat
42 ready.
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47 Our study also revealed clear deficiencies in terrorism risk communication
48 which require the urgent attention of tour operators and third party sellers in order to
49 ensure the implementation of measures to avoid the exposure of clients to terrorism
50 security risks; neglecting this could lead to legal exposure. Although the Inquests did
51 not find any failure in due care by TUI UK Ltd, the Coroner was highly critical of the
52 company's practice of due diligence (Opus International, Day 17, 2017) as more
53 should have been done to highlight the occurrence of previous attacks. Reinforcing
54 Mansfeld's (2006) contentions, decisions around the content of security risk
55 communication should be made alongside but independently of FCO travel advice,
56 and risk assessments of the destination and of hotels and their surroundings, should
57 be publicly available so informed calculated risk travel decisions can be made.
58 However, given the distinctive problems with communicating prospective terror risks
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1 (Freedman, 2006), there needs to be greater understanding of how best to do this.
2 This might be achieved by combining the insights provided by consumer behavior
3 theories (e.g. Psychoanalytical, Veblenian Social-Psychological, Reasoned Action,
4 Motivation-Need, and Hawkins Stern Impulse Buying) with travel risk behaviors (e.g.
5 Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992) and tourist risk perception typologies (e.g. Seabra et
6 al., 2013). This may help identify distinct consumer segments to more effectively
7 target tailored terror risk communications to specific audiences. Such targeting
8 should also be accompanied by the testing of messages, their likely impact and
9 effectiveness.
10

11
12 Our study also highlights a methodological gap in terrorism risk management
13 research and showcases the use of a narrative approach to analyse tourist-related
14 inquests, which has not been undertaken before. This is surprising given that the
15 Tunisian Inquests are one of a number of inquisitional trials involving tourist
16 destinations and tourists, with the London Bridge attack in June 2017 and
17 subsequent Inquest being a more recent example. The approach we adopt is novel
18 and innovative for two reasons. First, existing studies employing narrative analysis
19 focus predominantly on positive tourist experiences (e.g. Mura and Shariff, 2017)
20 and the dialogue is flexible, allowing the respondent to develop the topics. In
21 contrast, when using legal discourse, the interviewer, albeit the Judge or Coroner,
22 decides on the sequencing of events, and determines the line of questioning. There
23 are key differences here in the frame of telling, the telling and the told. Second, the
24 frames of reference set this research apart from existing studies; they undertake this
25 post-interview in order to capture the context, the event, the characters, and the
26 feelings experienced. With Inquests, the rules about what is considered relevant are
27 determined by the Coroner, including the degree of detail and presumed objectivity
28 of witness testimonies. Assumptions about what makes a testimony valid influences
29 the telling and re-telling of the events that trials seek to narrate. Thus, the roles
30 played by the Coroner and witnesses are integral to the co-production of knowledge
31 about the circumstances surrounding an inquest. Above all, it is the quest for inter-
32 subjectivity, for the truth, which drives narratives of this nature.
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39 As well as highlighting a research gap, our study compliments existing
40 research on terrorism risk management by re-emphasising the importance of counter
41 terrorism as a core element of terrorism risk management. Greater adoption by all
42 facilities, open spaces and services of crime prevention design-in principles is
43 needed. All infrastructure should be blast resistant, secured against hostile entry,
44 capable of preventing unscreened vehicle access, and have better all-round
45 surveillance. Such action must be sensitively undertaken and not contribute to
46 heightened perceptions of risk. In high risk locales, there should be a greater
47 presence of private security guards within hotels and their surroundings, combined
48 with the establishment of a robust surveillance network that is regularly checked and
49 maintained. Not only will the latter provide valuable information about any terrorist
50 reconnaissance activity, but will also enable the movements of terrorists to be
51 tracked and monitored. In addition, it is important that intelligence is collected from
52 local communities concerning the potential radicalization of individuals (Bakker and
53 de Graaf, 2010).
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58 Moreover, this study compliments existing research and reinforces the notion
59 that a robust framework is required to guide terrorism risk management (Freedman,
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2006), comprising a core set of components – risk assessment, risk management, risk communication and counter-terrorism – that are couched within security governance and accountability including due care (Figure 3). All components are inherently inter-woven, with a successful outcome influenced by the extent to which all are comprehensively undertaken. Omitting to evaluate the range of possibilities and vulnerabilities posed by ‘dynamic’ risks such as those associated with lone wolf attacks is likely to have disastrous knock-on consequences for the preparedness of the police, security services, the hotel and tour operator, and their subsequent ability to effectively manage the incident. Our study also reiterates the importance of a collaborative approach to the planning and management of such emergencies (Morakabati et al., 2017). Given the acknowledged barriers to terrorism risk management, together with the need to ensure that layers of protective strategies are in place and performance tested at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels, it highlights the urgent need for Destination Management Organisations to coordinate and lead in terror-related strategic planning, implementation, management and evaluation.

[Figure 3]

To conclude, using the conceptual underpinnings of terrorism risk management, we used a narrative analysis of Inquest evidence to establish measures needed to enhance tourist security and safety. Our objective was to illustrate how the pitfalls associated with poor terrorism risk assessment, management, and communication, and the limited application of the counter-terrorism principles (i.e. CPtED) could be addressed. Our study contributes to terrorism risk management, emphasising the need for greater scrutiny of the role of tour operators in tourists’ security. **This is particularly pertinent given a recent UK High Court ruling that TUI Ltd will face a trial of liability issues as a result of a civil case instigated by the families of those killed and survivors of the attack, beginning in February 2022. The outcome of such as trial has** global ramifications for every tourist-receiving country, particularly those targeted by terrorism. Although the concept common and collective security already exists (Hall et al., 2003), the responsibility of all external and internal organisations, businesses and agencies for terrorism risk management within a destination has been neglected.

In doing so, this research highlights several avenues for further research. Firstly, greater knowledge is required of the tourist industry’s awareness, understanding and practice of their legal and ethical obligations toward due care. Secondly, more in-depth understanding is necessary of the level of destination security, **especially in the context of lone wolf attacks**, and associated costs and benefits that tourists are prepared to accept. Thirdly, research is needed of indicators of performance monitoring of terrorism risk strategies at micro-, meso- and macro-levels, whilst fourthly, studies are required of the effectiveness and impact of terrorism risk communication to tourists.

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Terrorism risk management	Written evidence, witness role and number of mentions		Oral evidence, witness role and number of mentions	
Safety information available to tourists	TUI employee	5	TUI employee	5
	Tourist/eye-witness	2	Tourist/eye-witness	5
			FCO employee	1
	Total	7	Total	11
Policing	TUI employee			
	Tourist/eye-witness		Tourist /eye-witness	1
	Hotel employee			
	Tunisian security and police	20		
	Local workers – eye-witnesses	2		
	Total	30	Total	1
Crime prevention through environmental design	TUI employee	1	TUI employee	4
	Tourist/eye-witness	2	Tourist/eye-witness	3
	Hotel employee	1	UK Police	1
	Total	4	Total	8

Table 1 Witnesses and their role providing written and oral evidence

Key theme	Associated characteristics	Number of witnesses who mentioned each characteristic
Information available to tourists	Lack of destination risk and safety information provided to tourists prior to booking	7
Poor policing	Reluctance to engage	25
	Lack of leadership	4
	Fire arms training	5
	Situation assessment training	6
Poor implementation of CPtED	Inadequate management of the hotel and its surroundings	6
	Lack of surveillance	7

Table 2 Emergent key failings

Reason	Witness	Statement
Reluctance to engage	Beach worker (El-Kantaoui Maritime Leisure Resort)	'The marine guards were first on the scene but did not immediately confront the gunmen' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg. 2).
	Hotel Excursion Liaison Officer	'The terrorist attack lasted for about 35 minutes, during which time no security agents intervened to stop it' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg. 2).
	Head of Operations Room (Northern Sousse)	'The team leader and the constables with him refused to respond to his instruction to rush to the scene of the incident to halt the terrorist attack.....' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg. 8).
Poor leadership	Head of Operations Room (Northern Sousse)	'The refusal to intervene to stop the terrorist attack was due to simple cowardice' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg. 8).
	Head of the National Security Police (Northern Sousse)	'The operation to eliminate the criminal did not materialise because the tourist security patrol that he had asked to join him, did not do so' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg.10).
Lack of firearms and situation training	Divisional Head of the Tourist Security Police in Sousse	The tourist security police were not equipped and not trained to intervene and counter an attack of this kind (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg. 17)
		'The hotel owners had complained about weapons being on site and so side-arms were not carried' (Opus 2 International Day Eight, 2017; pg. 17).
	Divisional Head of the Tourist Security Police in Sousse	'Constable BY was not trained to assess the security situation and Constable BX was not qualified to assess the readiness of the Division to stop the terrorist attack' (Opus 2 International Day 17, 2017; pg. 17).

Table 3. Selected witness explanations for the security response




Figure 1: Travel risks and implications for tourist security and safety




Figure 2. Terrorism risk management and tourist security process
 Source: Adapted from Smith and Brooks (2013)




Figure 3. Tourist security and terrorism risk management framework

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The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: