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EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN AID:
MANAGING POST-9/11 FRAGILE, CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES

by

JAMES FRANK FLINT

A thesis submitted to the University of Plymouth
in partial fulfilment for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Law, Criminology and Government

1st April 2019
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Doctoral College Quality Sub-Committee.

Work submitted for this research degree at the University of Plymouth has not formed part of any other degree either at the University of Plymouth or at another establishment.

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Brussels European Quarter institutions, think-tanks and third-sector organisations including (but not limited to) agencies of the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, and the Royal Institute for International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

Since the turn of the millennium fragile, conflict-affected states (FCAS) have grown to constitute a significant issue within European discourse. The spill-over of their ‘complex political emergencies’ is destabilising, as epitomised by the 9/11 attacks. Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ speech-act during 9/11’s aftermath signified a juncture, and new historical epoch within International Relations. Within this epoch the EU was confronted by violent extremism/terrorism and irregular-migration flows. Nonetheless, fragile states risked being ‘aid orphans’. They can be unattractive to aid-donors due to the foreign aid dilemma whereby those states and peoples exhibiting the direst need of assistance are frequently the hardest to assist through the complexity of their needs and threats. This thesis takes a critical interest in UK government and EU-level institutional thought pertaining to aid challenges in fragile states. It focusses specifically upon the empirical case of Afghanistan (which was the facilitator of 9/11, and whose ‘complex political emergency’ spanned the epoch). Research is conducted from a critical-interpretivist perspective, qualitatively tracing aid ideas through institutional frame analysis (IFA), with interest in how some ideas came to be prevalent within European discourse while others did not. This entails expanding upon the genesis of ideas, their promulgation, diffusion and salience amidst frame-contestation within interactive discursive-struggle, and their subsequent adoption and adaptation (or resistance thereto). In doing so, the thesis reveals changes within institutional framing of problems and solutions, institutional path-dependency and associated cultural values. Ultimately, the thesis reveals substantive processes of Europeanization concerning transformational soft-content between the UK and EU-level, including notably how UK leadership ambitions ‘uploaded’ pragmatic facets of whole-of-government and stabilisation thinking.
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1HMG</td>
<td>One Her Majesty’s Government Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3BW</td>
<td>Three Block War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3Ds</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Defence, Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Annual Action Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific group of states</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADZ</td>
<td>Afghan Development Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Local Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANATF</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund (US-managed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (World Bank-managed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme (of DFID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPHS</td>
<td>Basic Package of Health Services (DEVCO health initiative in Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEU</td>
<td>Council of the European Union (formerly the Council of the European Communities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Critical Frame Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO/UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (of the CEU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAD</td>
<td>Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (of DFID, latterly CHASE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHB</td>
<td>Clear, Hold, Build (and Exploit; US/UK military concept)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-ordination (EU policy-level interface)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (of the EEAS, planning for CSDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cotonou Partnership Agreement (governing the EDF since 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAA</td>
<td>Concerted Planning and Action (Dane concept, originally targeted at NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (of the EEAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Complex Political Emergency (of a fragile state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPB</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSF</td>
<td>Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (formerly the Conflict Prevention Pools)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism (also Preventing Violent Extremism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>Consent Winning Activity (also termed Quick Impact Projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
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DFID – Department for International Development (formerly the FCO-ODA/MOOD)
DG-DEVCO – Directorate-General for International Development and Cooperation
DG-ECHO – Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Office
DG-RELEX – Directorate-General for European External Relations (Pre-EEAS)
DI – Discursive Institutionalism
DIAG – Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
DPA – Development Partnership Agreement (DFID)
EC – European Commission (formerly the Commission of the European Communities)
EDA – European Defence Agency (of the Council)
EDF – European Development Fund (originally for OCTs)
EEAS – European External Action Service
EEC – European Economic Community
EGF – European Gendarmerie Force (formally non-EU, but supporting CSDP)
EMP – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (rebranded Union for the Mediterranean in 2009)
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
EPA – Economic Partnership Agreement (within the CPA)
ESI – European Stability Initiative
EU – European Union
EU aid – Denoting the holistic institution of EU-level foreign aid
EUCO – European Council
EUGS – EU Global Strategy (2016)
EUHHRG – EU Human Rights Group (EU-led Afghanistan donor forum)
EUISS – EU Institute for Security Studies (of the Council)
EUPOL-Afghanistan – European Union Police Mission-Afghanistan (Civilian CSDP)
EUMC – EU Military Committee
EUMS – EU Military Staff (of the EEAS, governing military CSDP)
EUROGENDFOR-Afghanistan – EGF force in Afghanistan (supporting ISAF)
EUSR – European Union Special Representative
FCAS – Fragile, Conflict-Affected State
FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FCO-ODA – Overseas Development Administration within the FCO (pre-DFID)
FSG – Fragile States Group (of the OECD-DAC)
FSPs – Fragile State Principles (of the OECD-DAC)
GDI/P – Gross Domestic Income/Product
GIROA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPPO/T – German Police Project Office/Team
GSP – Generalised System of Preferences
GWOT – Global War on Terrorism
HDA – Heads Development Agencies (development grouping in Afghanistan)
HDG – Humanitarian Donor Group (ECHO attending in Afghanistan)
HI – Historical Institutionalism
HOCDC – House of Common’s Defence Committee
HOCIDC – House of Common’s International Development Committee
IDSRAI – International Development Association Resource Allocation Index (World Bank)
IDT – International Development Targets (of the OECD-DAC)
IFA – Institutional Frame Analysis (bespoke to the thesis)
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IO – International Organisation
IR – International Relations
IRR – Inter-Regional Relations
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force (UN until 2003, NATO until 2014)
JACS – Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stabilisation
JCMB – Joint Coordination Management Board (ambassador/ministerial level coordination)
JDN/P – Joint Doctrine Note/Publication
JSR – Justice Sector Reform
KMB – Kabul Multinational Brigade (UK-led for UN ISAF)
LDCs – Least Developed Countries
LOTFA – Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (UNDP-managed)
LWDG – Land Warfare Development Group (UK MOD)
MDG – Millennium Development Goals
MDTF – Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MIP – Multiannual Indicative Programme (EU budget concept)
MOD – Ministry of Defence
MOOD – Ministry of Overseas Development (Labour agency in-lieu of FCO-ODA)
MSB – Mission Support Branch (of the MOD)
MSCA – Military Support to Civil Authorities
MSS – Military Support to Stabilisation
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDFEFS – New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (DAC 2030 Agenda item)
NIHA – Neutral and Independent Humanitarian Action
NSC – National Security Council (UK)
NTM-A – NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (under ISAF)
NUG – National Unity Government (GIROA post-2014 election)
OCB – Oversight and Coordination Board (in Kabul)
OCTs – Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA – Official Development Assistance (defined by the OECD-DAC)
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom (previously US Operation Infinite Justice)
OMLT – Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (UK/NATO concept)
PCD – Policy Coherence for Development
PCR – Post-Conflict Reconstruction
PCRU – Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (UK, latterly the Stabilisation Unit)
PMG – Politico-Military Group
POMLT – Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (of EUPOL, EGF, GPPT)
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team (formerly termed Joint Regional Team(s) in Iraq)
PSC – Political and Security Committee (under the EU Council and EUSR)
RQ – Research Question
SNE – Seconded National Expert (EU, also Commission Expert Groups, Type D members)
SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals (UN)
SSR – Security Sector Reform
SU – Stabilisation Unit
TEU – Treaty of European Union (Treaty of Maastricht)
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of Rome)
TMAF – Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
UIF – United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (the Northern Alliance)
UK aid – Denoting the holistic institution of UK foreign aid (also DFID’s ‘UK Aid’ brand)
UN – United Nations
UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
US – United States of America
In the world’s most difficult development situations, poorly conceived involvement can do more harm than good. Challenges such as poor security, weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, violence or the legacy of civil war require responses different from those applied in more stable situations (OECD, 2011:3).

It is now a bit of a Sunday speech: you cannot have security without development, and you cannot have development without security, they are intrinsically interlinked. The question is, how do you do it, and which takes precedence over the other? (Interview B29).
1 Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to develop our understanding of the Europeanization of holistic foreign aid. The title is double-barrelled: *Europeanization of Foreign Aid* denotes the body of scholarship to which the thesis foremost contributes; *Managing Post-9/11 Fragile, Conflict-Affected States* denotes the empirical ensemble of ideas and practices within which the thesis operates. How an issue/situation is managed by an actor within International Relations entails expansive possibilities. For example, an actor may adopt an isolationist stance, or may intervene. Intervention may pursue containment of the issue/situation, or pursue change. The utility of foreign aid is one avenue to pursuing change, and one which itself entails expansive possibilities. However, ‘foreign aid’, in definition and as a practical policy tool, is governed by the salient ideas and values of institutional actors within a specific historical context, and therefore so ruled are its possibilities. As Keynes wrote on the “ideas of economists and political philosophers”:

> [T]he world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back (1936:383).

As Mallinson sought with his study on the British Army, this thesis does not seek to produce a modern history of foreign aid in fragile states, but “is trying to understand its present in terms of its past” (2011:13). This is through exploring the “ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts, and categorizations”, as Hajer defines discourse (2009:n.p.), anchored to the foreign aid institution(s) that provide structure to and implement them. In turn this permits understanding of potential Europeanization within the European Union (EU) as an extension of this historical and discursive-institutionalism.

Focus is levied upon tracing the resonance of prevalent aid policy ideas pertaining to the problem of fragile, conflict-affected states (FCAS) within the post-9/11 ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (‘GWOT’) (see Bush, 2001c). The United Kingdom (UK) as an EU member state is studied for its prominence as one of Europe’s leading military powers, and its purported reputation as a world leader in foreign aid throughout this epoch. As the Conservative member Double asserted, “[w]e know that the UK is a world leader on international
development” (2016:247WH; also see Mitchell, 2013). However, to reveal potential Europeanization, resonance of ideas is traced at both member state and supranational-level. The thesis additionally studies the empirical case of Afghanistan as a state external to the EU, considering it to constitute the aid-recipient of intrinsic value during this historical context, as Afghanistan was the fragile state that facilitated the 9/11 attacks (Appendix 1). Furthermore, focussing upon a lone recipient also serves to delimit the research, ensuring its scope is befitting of a doctoral thesis.

Statement of the problem
The explicit problem tackled by the thesis is that of understanding:

- How UK and EU-level thinking and strategies to aiding fragile, conflict-affected states (and Afghanistan specifically) progressed, were influential, and were shaped within the post-9/11, ‘GWOT’ epoch.

Fragile, conflict-affected states, sometimes termed ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’, where sovereignty is limited and “basic functions of the state are no longer performed” (Zartman, 1995:5), constitute a longstanding problem within International Relations. Helman and Ratner’s (1993) Foreign Policy article ‘Saving Failed States’, combined with mass-media focus on the US’s contemporary intervention into Somalia, sparked popular interest in the problem during the post-Cold War context of ‘new world ordering’ (see Arfi, 1998; Arrighi, 2002; Zartman, 1995). Such situations were considered a problem confronting broader international order, and not just unto themselves, because their problems often spilled-over, “threatening their neighbors through refugee flows, political instability, and random warfare” (Helman and Ratner, 1993).

Such spill-over of what the thesis collectively terms ‘complex political emergency’ (CPE) through weak, conflict-affected or otherwise absent governance abroad actually possesses older roots, seen in imperial perception of European armies’ “confronting the barbarianism of outer darkness” (Kiernan, 1998:146). Whereas, Europe’s subsequent and often tumultuous withdrawal from empire gave rise to further fragility upon decolonisation, as did the latter collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). However, it was the 9/11 (11/09/2001) attacks upon the United States (US), facilitated by Afghanistan’s endemic fragility, which demonstrated that technological-globalisation had reached the point whereby so-called ‘barbarians’ could now sally-forth and threaten the West from afar. Bush’s emotive framing of 9/11 and ‘GWOT’ speech-act signified the genesis of a discrete securitised historical context, where fragile
states were again high on agendas, instigating a renewed ensemble of ideas and associated practice (see Entman, 2003). As the contemporaneous US security strategy contended:

The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders (WH, 2002:4).

Situations such as that of Afghanistan, and how to manage them, were a pronounced problem within the epoch. The UK’s rationale behind involvement in Afghanistan was often communicated along the lines of “to give Afghanistan the chance of stability and security, and to make sure that it never again is a haven for terror” (Cameron, in HMG, 2014). However, as with the spirit of Hall’s edited volume *The Political Power of Economic Ideas* (1989), understanding the influence of prevalent institutional ideas, their genesis, promulgation, diffusion, adoption and adaptation (or resistance thereto) is itself a problem – how do some ideas grow prevalent, while others do not? With interest in EU foreign aid thinking (its progression, influence and shaping), and the UK’s reputation for foreign aid excellence therein, Europeanization as an extension of institutionalism constitutes the most appropriate theoretical lens to understand this problem. This is through the traditional, but broad-church conceptualisation of Europeanization as an analytical and mapping concept entailing:

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms (Radaelli, 2003:30).

As such, the explicit problem tackled may be rephrased as the research question (RQ):

1. What discernible Europeanization occurred between UK member state and EU-level thinking on managing Afghanistan’s post-9/11 complex political emergency?

However, to answer this question necessitates the consideration of the sub-questions:

2. What relevant aid ideas were prevalent within European discourse upon 9/11?
3. How did UK thinking on Afghanistan progress throughout the epoch?
4. How did EU-level thinking on Afghanistan progress throughout the epoch?
5. Subsequently, which ideas grew salient and led thinking within discourse, those of the UK or those of the EU-level?

Research justification and contribution

As the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) observed, pre-9/11 “most fragile states had little broader strategic significance”, whereas post-9/11, “fragile and failing states have increasingly become a preoccupation of the international community” (2006:17). Within this context it is recognised that “[f]ragile states represent both the crux of today’s development challenge and an increasing source of potential threats to global security” (Patrick and Brown, 2007:1). However, as prior literature from the context of 1990s ‘new world ordering’ found, successful reconstructions were scarce (Zartman, 1995:267). It may be observed that this record of failure remained much the case within the latter ‘GWOT’ context, and what have collectively been termed Blair’s Wars (Bailey et al, 2013; Kampfner, 2004). There subsequently exists a clear public mandate to research into the thinking behind such interventionism, as indicative in the publicly released campaign study on Afghanistan (DLW, 2015) and Chilcot’s report of the Iraq inquiry (2016). This research mandate is bolstered through the UN Sustainable Development Goals further calling for the fostering of “peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence” (UNGA, 2015:2). As such, focus on associated aid ideas concerning the reconstruction of fragile, conflict-affected states may be considered to qualify as responsible research and innovation.

Chapter 2 argues towards the identified knowledge-gap within extant literature concerning the progression, influence and shaping (Europeanization) of EU ideas surrounding this specific foreign aid problem. It finds EU aid to be interesting in terms of Europeanization for its comprising a broadly soft-content, shared-competency policy domain (Horký, 2010). However, Europeanization scholarship on foreign aid has predominantly focussed upon development-cooperation, conditionality, and the accession of new member states (see Bűcar, 2012; Horký, 2010; Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2014; Vittek and Lightfoot, 2009). But, it has been observed that Europeanization and the adoption, adaptation (and/or rejection) of policy potentially differs between established and new member states (Leiber, 2007:249-250). As such, changes within prevalent thinking of established members, and a more holistic conceptualisation of foreign aid that includes the ‘3D’ domains of development-cooperation, defence assistance and diplomatic support constitutes an overlooked opportunity warranting further study.
Further, ‘GWOT’ literature unsurprisingly predominantly focusses upon US designs, conflict framing, and what may be interpreted as forces of ‘Americanisation’, such as Ignatieff’s *Empire Lite* (2003) cited within this thesis. While, the EU has been accused of being “an economic giant, but a political pygmy” (Sonyel, 1998:1), and perceived to wield only secondary-order influence behind the US (Youngs, 2006:230-231). Concerning 9/11 and the intervention in Afghanistan, this may read as an obvious point. However, all but two EU member states deployed troops to Afghanistan (NATO, 2009), while discourse surrounding Afghanistan arguably factored in pressuring the EU to develop greater coherence and more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:279). By furthering critical research on the ‘GWOT’ context, emphasising European perspectives and holistic aid thinking, the thesis is subsequently argued to benefit scholarship.

Presently, scholarship on EU ideas and fragile states remains embryonic, only constituting a noteworthy body of academic literature during the thesis’ research-process (2013-2018) (see Ejdus and Juncos, 2018; Faleg, 2018; Zartsdahl, 2018; but also Gross, 2007, 2009b; Hout, 2010). Limited contemporaneous think-tank literature is identifiable (Babayan, 2016; Castillejo, 2015; Furness, 2014; Marsai, 2018; Montanaro, 2009; Patrick and Brown, 2007). Extant exploration of specific ideas, such as the EU’s ‘comprehensive’ approach also largely omits detailed focus on Afghanistan, despite its centrality within the epoch (see Faleg, 2018; Pirozzi, 2013; Sherriff, 2013). Other work targets the politicisation and securitisation of aid debate, but largely through ‘snapshots’, rather than exploring the shaping of ideas throughout (see Gilbert, 2009; McConnon, 2014, 2014b; Pugh et al, 2013). Gross’s (2009b) focus on Europeanization of foreign policy and crisis-management perhaps comes closest to targeting the identified knowledge-gap. However, Gross only accounts for the early-‘GWOT’ context, through ‘snapshots’, while adopting a broader focus than the specifics of fragile, conflict-affected states. Works tracing institutional ideas pertaining to fragile states are found scarce.

This thesis’ contribution centres upon filling this identified knowledge-gap through applying an innovative framework to the empirical case of UK and EU aid policy in Afghanistan towards the ends of ‘building’ substantive theory. This entails a strong (if secondary) theoretical dimension in the conceptualisation and implementation of institutional frame analysis (IFA), and a strong empirical contribution through analysis of 35 original, semi-structured elite interviews in conjunction with conference discussions and archive documents. Findings from this analysis reveal the foremost theoretical contribution in the form of a
substantive theory of Europeanization, which should enhance what Hill terms “realistic expectations” as to what may be achieved within this policy area (1993, 2003:17).

Approaching and delimiting the research

As the thesis explores qualitative discursive data, collated from interviews and archive documents which demand interpretation, it pursues knowledge by adopting a critical-interpretivist (moderately-constructivist) stance through a reflective and reflexive research-process (see Cox, 1981; Geuss, 1981; Howell, 2013). This entails abductive “empirical rummaging” (Skocpol, 1995b:104), moving back and forth through the data to process-trace the ideas of interest. This process is informed by the bespoke institutional frame analysis – a ‘three-dimensional’ theoretical framework grounded in extant scholarship.

In the first dimension ideas of interest are understood in terms of frames, drawing foremost on Goffman (1974), Entman (1993) and Lakoff (2014). A frame is a “schemata of interpretation” through which agents “locate, perceive, identify and label” issues/situations (Goffman, 1974:21). This permits agents to “evaluate their options for making decisions and taking action” (Benighaus and Bleicher 2018:47). Entman’s (1993) four-dimensional conceptualisation is found useful for delineating aid ideas in terms of the perceived problem, its cause, devised solutions and value judgements. Through this, as Gitlin contends, agents attribute socio-political meaning and perspectives on “what matters” (1980:6). Such frames are anchored to institutions, and operate amidst interactive discursive-struggle with counter-frames, through which some frames grow more salient than others, and potentially agenda-setting (Entman, 1993:50-54).

IFA’s second dimension relates this in terms of new institutionalism literature (see Hall, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Schmidt, 2010; Skocpol, 1996). Europeanization (IFA’s third dimension) is approached as a broad-church, but found to be fundamentally of institutionalism (Bulmer and Burch, 2001, 2005). Aid policy, as a domain entailing ideas, constructs, formal and informal routines, and historical organisational structures, adheres to the conceptualisation of an institution in historical-institutionalist (HI) and discursive-institutionalist (DI) tradition (Hall and Taylor, 1996:6-7; Schmidt, 2010:5). From HI it may be understood that aid institutions operating within a given historical context such as the ‘GWOT’ suffer exogenous shocks/situations to their policy routines (Hall and Taylor, 1996:6-10). DI, in taking ideas seriously, asserts that ideas (or framing) of agents possesses socio-political power through their manifestation, with transformative potential, and so
facilitates endogenous institutional change of these routines (see Foucault, 1980; Hall, 1989:3-5; Schmidt, 2010:2-4; Thelen, 2004). Such institutional change may be understood in terms of policy ‘path-dependency’ concerning extant solutions to problems, and how these change either through incremental ‘branching’, more stark ‘critical-junctures’ and/or ‘revisionist-moments’.

**Figure 1: Thesis Framework**

It is the framing of exogenous shocks/situations by agencies operating within aid institutions at member state and EU-level which gives rise to frame-contestation amidst interactive discursive-struggle, and changes in salience, which are conceived to potentially span these levels in terms of Europeanization’s processes of transformational soft-content. IFA’s third dimension subsequently conceptualises Europeanization as an omnidirectional and/or cyclical process entailing ‘downloading’, ‘uploading’ and ‘crossloading’ of policy content (see Howell, 2004; Major, 2008; Vale, 2009), and indirectly potentially background cultural ‘episteme’ (see Foucault, 1971, 1980). In broadest usage this entails the ‘European-ness’ of content, and comprises “ideational forces for change” through historical actor-relationships and social-learning/socialisation (Schmidt, 2001:2; also Horký, 2010; Horký and Lightfoot,
2012; Lightfoot, 2010; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014). Overall, through operationalisation of this the thesis contends to meet the demands of doctoral research through considering underpinning methodology, abductive theorising, and subject empirics (Figure 1), and through these facets mounts an original argument which contributes towards filling a knowledge-gap.

To delimit the thesis, the research’s remit is that of exploring, describing and tracing ideas with the hope of revealing explanatory potential concerning how some ideas came to be adopted and/or adapted while others did not, between 2001-2016. Judging whether intervention was justified or ethical is beyond the scope of the study. Further, the thesis does not attribute blame where aid ideas demonstrably proved ineffective. Anecdotally, as a British Army officer recounted to a military historian during the ‘GWOT’:

This was not the invasion and so a lot of the moral and political questions were now irrelevant. Should we invade…? Too late, we already have… and we have a moral and legal duty to create security, law and order, aid a transition to self-government, and so on (Rands, in Holmes, 2007:319).

The historical context that actors operated within is important, as are rationales and value judgements, and so discourse surrounding decisions to intervene is considered. However, analytical importance is levied upon tracing aid ideas concerning reconstruction and the alleviation of fragility within the given context. As one interviewed UK Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) official lamented, “[w]hat is it that you do to try and re-establish peaceful and productive politics?” (Interview L19).

Central thesis
The central contention developed throughout the thesis that mounts an original contribution to knowledge is that UK thinking concerning fragile, conflict-affected states, and Afghanistan explicitly, changed significantly throughout the ‘GWOT’ epoch. It is contended that facets of this thinking were influential within EU discourse and were adopted at the EU supranational-level, and potentially more broadly across EU member states through Europeanization’s ‘cyclical’ process. Contemporaneous changes within EU-level discourse are argued to have often, but not always, conformed to UK designs. In terms of Europeanization as an omnidirectional process, significant processes of ‘uploading’ are presented. However, processes of transformational-content between the UK and EU-level are also conceptualised
in terms of ‘downloading’, and to a lesser extent ‘crossloading’, with greater transformational-content identified during the latter-‘GWOT’ context.

This central contention hinges upon importance found in legacy institutional path-dependency from historical precedent, and the shaping influences of less-rational facets of discourse. These include conscious notions and values (Hajer, 2009), but also the influence of sub-conscious background cultural ‘episteme’, governing the possibilities of foreground discourse (see Foucault, 1971, 1980). Conceptualisation of such conditions is contended to add explanatory potential concerning Europeanization through delineating why specific communities were receptive to institutionalising (or otherwise precluding) prevailing ideas from abroad. This is argued to relate to path-dependency in terms of the British Empire, and the UK’s enduring “nostalgia for power” (Duchène, 1972:43), and the EU’s cultural identity as “the most successful peace project in modern history” (EC, 2013), and associated civilian-power reputation. It is argued that greater transformational-content occurred in the latter-‘GWOT’ context through convergent movement between UK and EU continental episteme, notably in terms of underlying presumptions concerning the utility of martial-routines. However, in light of discourse’s mutually-constitutive relationship with social-practice, agencies’ experiential-learning and lesson-drawing are also found significant, through the utility of salient ideas in practice, and value judgements attributed to them.

Structuring the thesis
This chapter has introduced the thesis’ problem, the mandate for its exploration, how the research approaches and delimits it, and highlights the thesis’ central contention. Moving forwards, the chapter signposts the thesis’ structure, and the development of this central contention. This structure comprises two-halves. The first-half outlines pertinent scholarship from which the thesis’ targeted knowledge-gap is identified and cumulative theoretical—methodological framework is developed. The second-half presents original analysis from the operationalisation of this framework through its reflective and reflexive ‘empirical-rummaging’ (Skocpol, 1995b). This provides descriptive detail of evidence, analysis and explanation, and culminates in the thesis’ overarching conclusion, which summarises foremost findings, reflects upon substantive Europeanization identified, and offers recommendations therefrom.

Chapter 2 argues towards the knowledge-gap to which the thesis contributes by mounting a thematic review of pertinent extant work, conceptualisation, and relationships identified. As
such, it contributes towards answering RQ2. Academic peer-reviewed articles and books are emphasised. However, practitioner contributions are also utilised where appropriate. The thesis’ theoretical—conceptual framework builds upon this in Chapter 3, further delineating definitions and justifying the development of IFA, spanning from conceptualisation of ‘foreign aid’ through extant frame analysis precedent, new (historical and discursive) institutionalism literature and meso-level Europeanization theorisation. The research attempts to privilege inductive exploration from a critical stance. However, no research is purely inductive through degrees of unavoidable prior knowledge and presumptions of the researcher as a social-agent, in addition to the extant thinking introduced in Chapter 2 (Howell, 2013; Williams and May, 2005). It would be unduly radical to dismiss pertinent prior work. Rather, IFA as delineated here is devised from such precedent, making the approach more properly abductive through ‘theory-building’ and ‘theory-testing’.

Chapter 4 marks the culmination of the thesis’ first-half, expanding upon and justifying the adopted moderately-constructivist philosophical—methodological framework that underpins the implemented method. This commences with the broad phenomenological philosophical assumptions underpinning the research’s critical-interpretivist paradigm of inquiry, spanning ontology, epistemology and axiology. How this paradigm informs the discursive methodology is then discussed, before detailing how this informs IFA’s operationalisation and associated data collation (see Berg, 2009; Howell, 2013; Lamont, 2015). Chapters 5-7 then detail the research’s analysis and findings, privileging description in tracing salient framing within interactive discursive-struggle. High descriptive detail is argued necessary to reveal explanatory potential and ‘depth’ of Europeanization through the ‘paradox of inquiry’ – having to know the characteristics of something when searching for it in order to find it, while having to find it to reveal its characteristics (Williams and May, 2005:200-201).

Within the reflective and reflexive research-process, firstly UK aid policy discourse is explored, and salient framing traced, before mounting exploration of EU supranational-level aid discourse. The foremost observation here is the magnitude of change and contestation exhibited, especially within UK frame-contestation surrounding Afghanistan. It is found that UK discourse operated through three stages. First, the brief ‘revisionist-moment’ towards ‘low-politics’ pro-poor humanitarianism, post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and statebuilding in the aftermath of assisting the US to vanquish the Taliban/Al Qaeda in late-2001. Second, the ascent to salience of what is detailed in Chapter 5 as the ‘comprehensive’ approach to ‘counterinsurgency’, as conducted in Helmand post-2005 against the backdrop of escalated
violence. Thirdly, Chapter 6 details the subsequently salient ‘integrated’ approach to ‘stabilisation’, prevalent from 2010, which coincided with the transfer of power to Conservative-led government. These stages of discourse, and ascendance of two distinct yet inter-related approaches, are necessarily structured by the thesis through two chapter discussions (5-6).

Chapter 5 traces UK member state frame-contestation and path-dependency, as a reputed leader in foreign aid, commencing with pro-poor and ‘whole-of-government’ thinking from before the 9/11 shock (answering RQ2), and throughout the construct of the UK’s ‘comprehensive’ approach to counterinsurgency (RQ3). The chapter argues that the New Labour government, and subservient aid agencies, re-emphasised pro-poor path-dependency, and held leadership designs to project thinking into, and reform the EU-level. It argues this by discussing where ideas pertaining to the early-‘GWOT’ period originated, and tracing their promulgation and diffusion, including into the EU-level (RQ5). In doing so it finds the UK’s ‘nostalgia for power’, confidence in martial-routines, and legacy path-dependency were influential in shaping thinking concerning Afghanistan. This is found in the rolling rationalisation of the pro-poor focus, as originally derived from postcolonial moral-responsibility, and identified within Blair’s New Labour’s manifesto onwards (1997:38-39; also ActionAid, 2007:1).

Legacy path-dependency is also seen in institutional-layering, stemming from the army’s historical dependence upon ‘small-wars’ to justify its resourcing, and associated utility of counterinsurgency routines from the historical ‘Briggs Plan’ of Malayan Emergency precedent (1948-1960) (RQ2). This latter discourse incited significant professional-contention amongst UK agencies within the ‘comprehensive’ approach, where the defence community grew predominant, layering over aid thinking within ‘low-politics’ (RQ3). This was through Blair’s new-humanitarian doctrine greater entertaining security concerns, conceiving that “[w]ars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health” (Benn, in DFID, 2005:3). While such thinking itself was uncontroversial, the defence community’s power derived from it was not, especially within broader EU discourse. Nonetheless, processes of Europeanization and the transformation of content at the EU-level are identifiable (RQ5), whereas in contrast forces of Americanisation are argued to be relatively insignificant post-2006.
Chapter 6 then delineates the supplanting of such thinking upon experience of its failure in practice, tracing the ascendance to salience of the UK’s ‘integrated’ approach to ‘stabilisation’ (RQ3). This is conceptualised as constituting a ‘critical-juncture’, re-jigging power towards civilian agency, and de-emphasising martial-power routines towards a supportive role. The chapter argues that whereas UK aid thinking significantly changed, efforts to project it into the EU-level endured, and indeed were more successful (RQ5). This is argued through discussing the transformation of UK framing within discourse, and the conduits to diffuse it into the EU while considering background cultural ‘episteme’ (Foucault, 1971), and how this incrementally changed through experiencing martial-routine’s failure to solve Afghanistan’s emergency, while socialising within the EU. This process is argued as significant concerning the UK, but also for how UK framing was interpreted at the EU-level. Other facets of this discussion, building on Chapter 5, highlight the significance of the construct of new aid agencies, and how this indicated the great pressure to change, while empowering fresh perspectives (Bulmer and Burch, 2001:80-82). In this instance this entailed the synthesising of security and development, abridging distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low-politics’ while recognising a salience of politics within a stability agenda, where:

The UK’s aid commitment means we can be proud to be a country that not only meets its responsibilities to the world’s poorest, but in doing so best serves and protects its own security and interests (HMG, in Parliament, 2016).

Chapter 7 then presents analysis from tracing contemporaneous EU-level holistic aid thinking spanning the epoch (RQ4), again commencing with pre-9/11 thinking (RQ2). This chapter is vital within the thesis structure in order to assess the adoption (and ‘depth’), adaptation (and rejection) of UK thinking identified at the EU-level, while also assessing whether ideas found at the UK-level may hold origins within EU-level discourse (RQ5). This is not a comparison in the traditional sense, but explores institutional processes of Europeanization at the supranational-level, and in doing so completes the analytical picture, permitting further qualitative reflection and reflexivity. The chapter argues that change at the EU-level was equally significant to changes identified within UK discourse, albeit perhaps a more bureaucratic, and incremental process. It is contended that the EU-level overcame an inexperience of fragile, conflict-affected states, where the EU’s ‘universalist’ values had framed Afghanistan as like any other least-developed country, whilst emphasising development-cooperation.
This is found through identifying the EU’s adoption of UK aid’s ‘whole-of-government’ thinking (although ‘shallow’ in the case of the comprehensive approach) (RQ5), and social-learning, through which the EU-level is found to have advanced more robust aid instruments, including recourse to supportive martial-routines. This is indicative of incremental-change towards more pragmatic background cultural episteme. The EU-level is found not to have held significant postcolonial moral-responsibility. Nonetheless, it is contended to have been a normative-follower within the international aid regime in terms of pro-poor focus, and principles concerning fragile states. It is further argued that the EU-level shared in the stability agenda, where through an increasingly pragmatic sense of universalism, it sought to export its values overseas, as well as throughout the EU (RQ4). This was in pursuit of the belief that “[t]he best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (EC, 2003:10). This is argued through tracing discourse concerning Afghanistan, as well as broader treaty and structural progressions where pertinent.

Thus, the intellectual context within which the thesis operates is that of transformational ideas surrounding how to aid fragile, conflict-affected states work towards peaceful and productive politics once the decision to intervene has been made. This is conducted through discretely tracing, and collectively analysing, what interactions, changes and Europeanization occurred amongst UK member state and EU supranational-level aid institutions post-9/11. Henceforth the thesis progresses into its first-half, reviewing pertinent extant scholarship through which the thesis locates the identified knowledge-gap.
2 Review: Foreign Aid and Fragility

A man who’s desperate because he has no job and has no money—if the money spent on weapons could be spent on eliminating the cause of his discontent he’s not going to risk his life and go out and kill people the way they do today (Ferencz, 2017).

The purpose of this literature review is twofold, firstly to signpost the Europeanization of foreign aid ‘knowledge-gap’ regarding the post-9/11 management of fragile, conflict-affected states (FCAS). Secondly, it surveys extant pertinent ideas, themes and relationships concerning the research’s empirical subject (through which it contributes towards answering RQ2). Chapters 3-4 then build on this by discussing and developing the thesis’ theoretical and methodological concerns. Foremost, this chapter is mandated as the identification of the edge of the known and the beginnings of the unknown, and subsequently assessing its ‘researchability’ is intrinsic to the justification of any research (Hart, 2001:13; Lamont, 2015:64-68). This notion of ‘researchability’ may be related back to the ‘paradox of inquiry’, and the need to know the characteristics of something in order to search for it, while having to search for something to reveal its characteristics (Williams and May, 2005:200-201). Such assessment permits clarification of the research problem, its associated historically-bound assumptions, and why it is important to address it (Lamont, 2015:66). To this end, the chapter conducts a thematic review, through which it clarifies where the thesis operates and contributes. However, through the research’s critical-interpretivist orientation, this is undertaken with a critical eye, to develop awareness of extant subjective and historically-bound ‘truth’ (see Geuss, 1981; Mutimer et al, 2013; Chapter 4).

It is identified that ideas hold socio-political power (see Hall, 1989), and are consequential to the shaping of both institutional policy-paths and the broader contextual epoch within which the thesis operates. Furthermore, it is found that extant Europeanization scholarship has broadly overlooked critique of such substantive problems as that tackled by the thesis, while precedents such as Gross’s (2009) exploration of the Europeanization of ‘crisis-management’ are now dated. Fitting with best practice, this is argued through consultation of practitioner and commentator perspectives in addition to academic scholarship (Hart, 2001; Lamont, 2015); sometimes the dividing line between perspectives is indistinct, as epitomised by ex-
army officer turned scholar, Martin’s work on Afghanistan (2014). However, through the
problem of ‘infobesity’, where data/literature in the digital-age is readily available, but often
of dubious quality, the review privileges academic scholarship. Nevertheless, sources also
‘snowball’ through the implemented research-process, with interviewees potentially citing
relevant works, thus bestowing them a degree of credibility (see Chapter 4).

The review commences by situating ‘foreign aid’ within International Relations (IR) and
introducing perspectives on its types, and rationale(s). Subsequently, the interrelationships of
the security-development nexus are discussed, including consideration of fragile states, what
the thesis collectively terms their ‘complex political emergencies’ (CPEs), as well as
approaches to aiding their alleviation. This includes the identification of statebuilding and
peacebuilding approaches introduced post-Cold War, but additionally older (but enduring)
doctrine on counterinsurgency from Cold War history. Afghanistan is detailed as the foreign
aid recipient of intrinsic historical value to the thesis (Appendix 1). After this, literature on
European external-actorness, foreign aid and its ‘Europeanization’ are introduced, before
concluding the review.

Foreign aid within International Relations

Within scholarship ‘foreign aid’ is traditionally defined in state-centric terms, involving
international/intergovernmental and multilateral ‘positive-sum’ relationships, with assistance
levied through transfers of resources/services on a concessionary basis, between ‘donors’ and
‘recipients’ (Evans and Newnham, 1998:177; Jones, 2006:23). Such relationships are often
conceptualised through IR’s grand theories, their contrasting perspectives and contested
assumptions. Insight on foreign aid may be gleaned from Kantian Liberal-idealist tradition,
cosmopolitanism, egalitarianism and perhaps utilitarianism; their perceiving scope for
maximising peaceful cooperation among peoples (for example, Friedmann et al, 1966;
Hayter, 1967; Lumsdaine, 1993). However, insight may additionally be taken from
Machiavellian, Realist tradition, with aid viewed in terms of political influence (see
Morgenthau, 1962; Waltz, 1979), and Critical tradition (see Glennie, 2008; Goulet and
Hudson, 1971; Shellhaas and Seegers, 2009). This research takes interest in Critical
tradition, and challenging historically-bound assumptions, including the traditional emphasis
upon the state. Here, it focusses at the substantive and meso theoretical levels, beneath that

1 Otherwise termed ‘international aid’ (see Holden, 2009; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961) or occasionally ‘overseas
aid’ (see DFID et al, 2011).

Fitting with Liberal tradition, Lumsdaine (1993) argues that the post-World War II foreign aid ‘regime’ entailed ‘global North’ developed states aiding ‘global South’ developing states, through moral sentiments of international society and humanitarianism. Historically, this aid regime was broached in terms of goal-driven development, economic statecraft, and capital flows (loans/grants) as an international public good (Friedmann et al, 1966; Mosley, 1985; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961). However, such perspective prompted significant critique, especially during decolonisation and Cold War contexts. This concerned its perceived Western/Eurocentric prejudice, where the under-developed were ‘othered’ as something which ‘they’ (the global South) experience, whereas ‘we’ (global North/Westerners) were developed, and sought to ‘domesticate’ the ‘they’ (Goulet, 1971:15-24; also Conversi, 2016:30). Such critique is also found in Critical works on Western imperialism (see Fanon, 2001; Hudson, 1971; Said, 2003). Specific aid approaches were also critiqued, including the practice of ‘tied-aid’, whereby the transfer of capital necessitated that the recipient purchase goods/services from the donor, significantly tying them to the donor’s interests (Todaro, 1994:705). An historical example of this is identifiable in the US’s attempt to improve their trading position in India (Friedmann, et al, 1966:228-229). Nonetheless, within the literature, liberal sentiments and the North-South divide endure as central themes.

Post-1961, this theme was characterised by Official Development Assistance (ODA), originating from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), of US ‘Marshall Plan’ lineage (see Friedmann, et al, 1966; Haan, 2009). The OECD defines aid as that “designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries”, where “credits for military purposes are excluded”, and where “only aid to these [OECD-DAC approved least-developed] countries counts as ODA” (2017b). Haan interprets ODA to include subdomains of: 1) technical-cooperation, 2) food aid, 3) humanitarian aid, 4) debt forgiveness, but also, 5) administrative costs, and 6), contributions to multilateral institutions, including the EC and regional development banks (2009:22-27). ODA and North-South divide literature further finds ‘pro-poor’ approaches, which Langan and Price (2016) introduce in the context of the EU’s contributions to sustainable development and the post-2015 agenda (the Sustainable Development Goals). Here, they cite the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP)-EU partnership to argue that “renegotiations and ongoing liberalisation of the relationship has placed pro-poor
and poverty alleviation strategies at the centre” (2016:431-432). Although, it is contestable whether the distribution of EU aid demonstrates this in practice; EU aid may also be conceptualised in terms of neo-imperialistic economic penetration (Hill, 2003:247; Holden, 2005b).

As Holden notes, “International assistance of different types has long been a diplomatic tool of states and empires” (2009:20). As such, foreign aid has been conceptualised as a ‘strategic resource’, or ‘soft’ (normative/structural) power (see Denney, 2012; Holden, 2009; Knorr, 1975; Manners, 2002.243-245; Rogers, 2000:147-148; Shiffman, 2006, 2013). Contrasting with Langan and Price’s (2016) purported ‘pro-poor’ approach, the US is often cited as unapologetically utilising aid to bolster political designs (Burnell, 1997; Jones, 2006; Natsios, 2006). Examples include US aid to Yemen, when occupying a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during the First Gulf War (1990-1991), and Guinea (in the same position) during the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War (Glennie, 2008:107-108). From Realist perspective, it is hard to reconcile why a state might transfer strategic resources to a foreign power without finding vested interests (Waltz, 1979:159). Indeed, Morgenthau (1962) theorises all foreign aid as inherently political, excluding only limited humanitarianism, including disaster-relief, medicinal and agricultural aid. In his political theory of aid, Morgenthau (1962) conceptualises other sub-domains entailing 1) subsistence aid (sustaining minimal public welfare services), 2) bribery (for political advantage), 3) military aid (occasionally a façade for prestige), 4) prestige (as influence), and 5) economic-development (either duty-bound for welfare/poverty-alleviation, a façade for bribes, or through ‘fungibility’, for redirection to the military). For example, Collier observes regarding Ethiopia and Cote d’Ivoire, that 11 percent of (French/Italian) development aid was diverted into military spending (2009:110-111).

In latter debate, but still pre-9/11, Schraeder et al argue that Western foreign aid practice is determined by: 1) humanitarianism, but also 2) security maximisation, 3) economic penetration, and 4) ideological competition, while occasionally (France/Sweden) dependent upon cultural and/or historical interests (1998:308-322). Alesina and Dollar’s (1998) contemporary study finds political/strategic considerations and colonial legacy to be dominant, when compared with humanitarianism – indicating a somewhat realist character of aid. Within such rationale, with aid goal-driven, and as Morgenthau (1962) theorises, often operating through façades, aid’s ‘politicisation’ is a prominent sub-debate. Power argues that historically the West, and US especially, prioritises security concerns over affliction abroad.
(2007:512; also OC, 2016). Indeed, security/military aid is normally found possessing a politicised or geo-strategic character (Baines, 1972; Bapat, 2011; Dube and Naidu, 2015). However, development-cooperation has also been discussed as politicised, securitised or weaponised (CIA, 1965; Denney, 2012; Gilbert, 2009; Petřík, 2008; Versluys, 2008, 2008b; Waddell, 2006). While, aid’s failure to buy influence has been argued to result in ‘donor fatigue’, and/or coercive threats concerning the withdrawal of aid (Evans and Newnham, 1998:135).

A notable contention within the politicisation of aid debate is the issue of exported values, as with Goulet’s purported ‘domestication’ of the global South (1971:15-24). Avenues include tied-aid, but also technical-cooperation, as discussed by Haas (2009) concerning ODA. Historically, technical-aid was envisioned to entail not only the provision of expertise to maintain systems, but also to create superior systems (Hayter, 1967:22-24). Implicit in this (and of interest to postcolonial perspective) was the intent to develop recipient states of the global South according to the contemporary ideology of the global North, including through liberal structural-adjustment, democratisation and latterly statebuilding efforts (see Burnell, 1997, 2002; Carbone, 2015; Chandler, 2006, 2012b; Dahl, 1971; Keil, 2013). Parkins (1996) discusses ‘political conditionality’ in light of 1980s and 1990s democratisation within the global South, citing Sørensen's definition, which identifies conditionality as referring to “the linking of development aid to demands concerning human rights and (liberal) democracy in recipient countries” (1993:1). Such themes of exported values, and especially democracy, are found commonplace within 1990s and early 2000s EU (and US) policy documents (Youngs, 2001, 2002, 2006:96; also EC, 1995b, 2003, 2003b, 2005; WH, 2002).

A further notable ‘type’ of aid, open to Liberal, Realist and Critical interpretation, is the ‘trade-track’, including ‘special’ and ‘differential’ treatment for developing states, and ‘most favoured nation’ status (Haan, 2009; Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; Holden, 2009:90, 2014). Focus on trade as/for aid has grown, with pro-free trade Liberals arguing it is “indispensable to the achievement of the sustainable development goals” (CTR, 2015:95). Nonetheless, there exists debate on whether ‘trade is better than aid’, or whether ‘aid should be for trade’ (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; Holden, 2014). Alternatively, Poirine argues in Machiavellian tradition that “aid is trade”, considering that “aid is a payment for an invisible strategic service” (1999:831), for which Poirine cites the historical example of Cuba as an aid client providing strategic advantage to the Soviet Union, specifically in what Ferris describes as their “dogged pursuit of base rights” (2011:37; also CIA, 1961).
In sum, through an overarching survey it is found that foreign aid within IR may be understood from discrete theoretical perspectives and conducted through various rationale(s), including vested interests. Furthermore, reviewing the literature reveals many types of aid, including technical-cooperation, in addition to financial/economic development-cooperation and military assistance, which are often discussed discretely (Jones, 2006:23; Rosenstein-Rodan 1961:6-8). However, as Jakupec and Kelly (2018) observe, prevalent scholarship has been conducted from the Occident’s perspective, on the West’s conceived international aid regime, and with popular focus on development-cooperation between the global North and global South. Notably, Jakupec and Kelly (2018) critically analyse this ‘Washington Consensus’, with reference to the changeable (historically-bound) international political landscape. Post-9/11, this is what Hughes observes as IR’s “new security environment” (2009:6), including the rise of populism, illiberal democracy, de-globalisation, and importantly the resurgence of ‘great power’ competition, namely that of China and the emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’, challenging Western ‘hegemony’.

The security-development nexus and fragility
US Secretary of State Marshall, when discussing the European Recovery Programme, famously noted the linkages between economic health, political stability, demoralisation and desperation – and the role of “friendly aid” (1947, in Williams, 2013:24-25).

Contemporaneous with Churchill’s (1946) equally famous ‘sinews of peace’ speech, such ‘friendly aid’ was argued as much a realist, self-interested act in bolstering Western Europe against the Soviet threat as it was an act of liberal cooperation (Collier, 2009:232; Jones, 2006:23-24). Nonetheless, the perception of linkages between economic health and political stability entered post-war development discourse, evident in Friedmann (et al) discussing how aid’s utility in developing the global South entailed complex interconnected issues spanning economic, political, social and institutional aspects (1966:1-7). Latter global governance literature extended such linkages to include the relationship between economic health, degrees of political freedom, and security (UNDP, 2002; UN, 2015). This included ‘beyond-aid’ thinking, which broadened development-cooperation “to include all the international flows” (UNDP, 1994:61). A plethora of relationships are discussed within the literature, such as the migration-development nexus (see Davies, 2007; Huysmans, 2000; Lavenex and Kunz, 2008), and disarmament-development nexus (Noel-Baker, 1986).

However, the security-development nexus is the most prominent theorised interrelationship
(for example, Beswick and Jackson, 2011; Jackson, 2015; Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009), including explicitly concerning EU aid approaches (Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2012).

Within this literature, the security-development nexus is found foremost discussed in terms of interrelationships and priorities. As Mac Ginty and William’s observe, these interrelationships became recognised through what was previously more segregated scholarship, found in multidisciplinary, but historically-bound development studies, and tripartite conflict studies (including strategic/war, conflict/peace and security studies) (2009:9-18; also Duffield 2002, 2012). That these previously segregated disciplines occupy a nexus is theorised through their deepening focus towards the intra-state, and individual levels of analysis, resulting in the conceptualisation of ‘human-development’, as found in the UNDP’s 1994 report. Here, the individual’s “freedom and autonomy are foregrounded” (Chandler, 2010:143), which in turn widens the security agenda away from its historical state-centric character towards ‘human-security’ (see Chandler, 2008b, 2012c; Paris, 2001). Duffield defines human-security simply as “the ability of the people of former protectorates and colonies to enjoy complete and fulfilled lives” (2012:112). However, its significance is in untying security from state sovereignty, and linking it with wider social, political, economic, environmental, and health concerns pertaining to individual’s perceptions of their needs (see Beswick and Jackson, 2011:8-11; Munslow and Fitzgerald, 1994; UNDP, 1994). This prompts a more comprehensive interpretation of security, where “peace and development are fundamentally intertwined” (Drent, 2011:4), which serves to abridge distinctions between traditional domains of ‘high’ and ‘low politics’. Subsequently, agencies such as the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) have published results of work-streams on the merging of security and development (see DFID, 1999b, 2005, 2005b).

The crux of the interpreted relationship is that security predicates development, and development predicates security in mutually-reinforcing terms, whereby “there is no security without development and no development without security” (Beswick and Jackson, 2011:7). Collier’s succinct contention here is that conflict “powerfully retards development” and so constitutes “development in reverse” (2004:1). In contrast intra-state conflict has been theorised to be caused by grievances through under-development (Sobek, 2009:177-179). While, some argue that development is a foremost means of conflict-prevention (Ashdown, 2008:182), and others that sustained, even-spread development which meets “livelihood needs” may alleviate extant conflict (Munslow and Fitzgerald, 1994:239). Central to this
debate are theorised causes of conflict, such as (economic) opportunities, greed and (identity) grievances (Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009:32). Prioritisation within the nexus stems from perspectives on whether security or development must come first in order to foster the other (see Chandler 2007c, Pugh, 2004). Although, the relationship is often conceptualised in terms of ‘cycles’, as with stages of conflict, or of trade-conflict, inequality-conflict, and poverty-conflict cycles, where one drives the other (see Chandler, 2007; Collier, 2008; Faleg, 2018; Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009:25; WB, 2012). It is those OECD-recognised least developed countries (LDCs), where both development and security are minimal and people lack livelihood needs that discussion on state ‘fragility’ is found.

Helman and Ratner introduced the problem of fragile states into academic debate, in ‘Saving Failed States’ (1993), during post-Cold War ‘new world ordering’. Couching ‘failed states’ as a new problem, Helman and Ratner define them as latter day debellatios (the term previously applied to post-war Germany), where civil-strife, economic privation and collapsed administrations rendered such states incapable of sustaining themselves. Through ‘economic privation’ they likened the problem to the extant global North—South aid relationship. However, they deemed failed states’ collapsing into anarchy not only a problem for themselves, but also for broader international order, as “refugee flows, political instability [and] random warfare” tended to spill-over (1993; also Beswick and Jackson, 2011:95). The article demonstrates marked forethought, published shortly before the infamous October 1993 ‘Blackhawk down’ debacle in Somalia, on which Bowden (2000) offers a detailed narrative, and before Dallaire deployed to Rwanda the same year (Dallaire, 2004). However, the term ‘failed state’ actually grew prevalent through its use by US Secretary of State Albright with regard to US interventionism into Somalia (Albright, in Kaldor, 2010:96-97; also Bowden, 2000:143).

While Helman and Ratner (1993) argue interventionism into failed states such as Somalia to be necessary to contain/prevent ‘spill-over’, it was also in instances motivated by liberal sentiments, as with the ‘CNN effect’, whereby the broadcast of horrifying imagery/narratives arguably led calls to intervene, to aid the afflicted (see Robinson, 1999). Latter notable scholarship entails Zartman (1995) and Rothenberg’s (2003) edited volumes of case studies (and agents); Collier’s (2008) emphasis on ‘traps’, including poverty and its alleviation; Ghani and Lockhart’s (2009) devised salutary framework centred on conceptualising statebuilding, and Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013) emphasis on institutions. Broadly speaking these works are complimentary in their discussions, and cite like examples, such as Chad, the DRC,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan (etc.). Africa is home to many, but also Asia (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Yemen) the Americas (Colombia, Haiti) and indeed Europe (Yugoslavia). A common theme is found in the perceived complexity of the problem(s) faced, and the difficulties inherent in solving them. Further identifiable is the notion of ‘triage’, with Rothenberg (2003) forwarding classifications of failed/collapsed states, the dangerously weak, and safely weak states, while Zartman’s (1995) volume additionally speculates upon states in danger of collapse, such as 1990s South Africa.

Despite the considerable literature on security, development, and fragile states, there is no “binding definition of fragility” (ADA, 2014:1; also Grimm, 2014). ‘State fragility’ has been conceptualised in several ways, including ‘state failure’ and/or the interrelated concept of ‘collapse’ where “[c]ollapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed” (Zartman, 1995:5), through the ‘failure’, or “inability and unwillingness” of the state to perform them (Kieh, 2007:13; also Arfi, 1998; Ghani and Lockhart, 2009; Goodson, 2007; Helman and Ratner, 1993). The discrete character of European and non-European statehood is recognised within the literature (see Arrighi, 2002; also Jackson, 1990).

However, that the ‘state’ is emphasised reveals the literature’s state-centric dependency upon post-Westphalian assumptions. As such, fragility/failure/collapse is usually conceptualised in similar terms to Ehrhart and Petretto’s (2014) ‘limited statehood’, through the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide welfare, monopolise violence, or enforce territorial borders. Here, sovereignty is compromised or contested, with conceptualisation of ‘legitimate authority’ through indigenous leadership usually emphasised, but with the need for external recognition also noted (see, Kyris and Bouris, 2017; Zartman, 1995b).

Perhaps the most popular definition of state fragility, as adopted by the Austrian Development Agency among others, is that of the OECD, whereby, “A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society” (OECD, 2012, in ADA, 2014:1). The OECD definition expands, noting that unlike more resilient states, “[f]ragile regions or states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks” (OECD, 2012:76), whereas ‘resilience’ has been conceptualised as the opposite of fragility, through the ability to withstand such ‘shocks’ (ADA, 2014:4; also Chandler, 2012c; Juncos, 2018; Manyena and Gordon, 2015). The OECD’s definition itself reflects prior EU thinking (see CEU, 2007:2). While, this EU thinking takes from DFID’s definition of 2005, which (akin to Zartman, 1995) contends that fragile states are those where governments fail to deliver core functions to impoverished
peoples, with reference to the bottom quintiles of the World Bank’s assessments (DFID, 2005; also Patrick and Brown, 2007:12).

Consideration of the case study literature (for example, Arfi, 1998; Rotberg, 2003; Suhrke, 2007; Zartman, 1995), finds the cause(s) and character of fragile states’ ‘limited statehood’ difficult to generalise. Attempts at generalising causes usually cite system-wide instability caused by the collapse of the Cold War’s bi-polar system, and/or escalated globalisation (see Bretherton, 1996; Fukuyama, 1989; Huntington, 1993). Mdikumana (2007) conceptualises a generic model of ‘state collapse’, building upon Arfi’s (1998) Yugoslavia case study. Here, firstly ‘factionalisation’ is theorised to progress until reaching widespread negation of political loyalty to the state; the second stage sees erosion of ‘state-binding’ cognitive ideas and a legitimization crisis, progressing to the erosion of state legitimacy, and the third stage being the ‘paralysis of state institutions’ and assault(s) on state authority, leading to the disintegration of state authority and ultimately its collapse (2007:56-58). Avoiding such over-simplification, the issue of ‘limited statehood’ may be interpreted as a ‘complex political emergency’ (CPE) entailing a conflict dimension and poverty/affliction (ADA, 2014; Rotberg, 2003:1). For example, the Aide a la Decision Economique (ADE) review of EU-led conflict-prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) discusses fragility in terms of a “conflict (prone) or post-conflict context” (2011:i-ii), which may be related to Galtung’s (1976) notion of ‘negative peace’.

Collier’s prominent work conceptualises such CPE through four ‘traps’; conflict, natural resources, bad neighbours, and bad governance (2008:17-79). While Collier (2008) interprets ‘conflict’ in terms of organised violence spanning civil-war and coup d’états, all such traps implicitly entail degrees of political conflict beyond the state’s capacity for resilience. For example, citing postcolonial Africa, Kieh (2007) argues that conflict is “a by-product of cultural, economic, political and social failure” (2007:12; also Sachs, 2007). In highlighting the political character of CPE, Keen (2008) argues emergencies such as war, famine and ethnic strife may be conceptualised as systems entailing functions, some of which may be perceived to be beneficial by intra-state protagonists. As such, some agents such as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ may design to prolong CPE “to accumulate political capital by essentializing ethnic difference” (Cordell and Wolff, 2010:75). A discrete, if related notion pertaining to intra-state contested sovereignty may be found in Collins’ ‘insecurity dilemma’ where the state’s foremost threats arise not from external states, but endogenously, where the state elites’ endeavours to consolidate sovereignty and enhance their security is counterproductive,
creating greater insecurity, through alienating intra-state actors such as tribal/ethnic factions (2013:419; also Cordell and Wolff, 2010:26-34).

Where the conflict dimension of such ‘fragile, conflict-affected states’ (FCAS) entails physical violence, this has been conceptualised in a number of ways, including the notion of ‘new war/warfare’ (see Duffield, 2002; Kaldor, 2005, 2010; Rochester, 2016), ‘postmodern war’ (Holmes, 2007), ‘war amongst the people’ (Smith, 2006) and the conceptualisation of war as a cycle (see Melvin and Peach, 2003:188). Alternatively, war has been conceptualised as occurring on a spectrum, where the lower magnitudes entail ‘subversion’, ‘terrorism’, ‘guerrilla war’, and ‘limited war’ (including proxy and civil-war) (Murden, 2009:8; also Pugh 1997). Similarly with ‘othering’, the notion of ‘new war’ (generally perceived ‘abnormal’, illegitimate, asymmetric, intra-state, of the Orient) is contrasted with ‘old war’ (generally ‘normal’, legitimate, industrial, inter-state; of the Occident) in a hotly contested debate concerning its novelty (Fleming, 2009). However, it may be presumed as with any socio-political phenomenon, that the character of war is itself historically-bound. For example, surveying Cold War and decolonisation era literature finds discussion on ‘internal war’, ‘sub-limited war’, ‘political warfare’ and ‘psychological warfare’ among others (see Fall, 2009:369-372), with Fall favouring ‘revolutionary warfare’, which he accredits to Tse-tung’s (1954) combining the ‘guerrilla’ method with ‘political’ purpose. More archaic still are notions such as “savage warfare” (Shadwell, 1898:100, in Freedman, 1994:318; also Kiernan, 1998).

In sum, the security-development nexus is well recognised in the literature, especially at intra-state and individual levels of analysis. Fragile states also became well recognised during the 1990s, with the problem essentially being one of scope for discontent and grievances spilling-over. However, as a socio-political phenomenon, ‘fragility’ is also identifiable in earlier historical contexts. Degrees of political and/or violent conflict, and affliction through the failure of the state to provide basic functions such as welfare, constitute prominent themes within the case study literature. However, while acknowledging exceptions such as Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013) focus on the nation, the popular emphasis of the state reveals the prevalent post-Westphalian, Euro-centric character of debate.
Aiding fragile states

Although scholarship recognises the security-development nexus and the problem of fragile/failed states, foreign aid in this context is traditionally somewhat overlooked. Where aid has been discussed, it is often limited to economic/financial considerations, and found problematic (Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009:153-173). The international dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding finds fragile/failed states to be the furthest removed from attaining the MDGs/SDGs, with around 70 percent of fragile states having experienced conflict since the Cold War’s conclusion, yet only receiving around 30 percent of ODA (IDOPAS, 2012:1). However, FCAS situations entailing hard to generalise CPE makes them hard to aid (Patrick and Brown, 2007:4). Therefore, aiding FCAS is often found couched under broad terms of ‘crisis-management’ and ‘crisis-response’ (Faria, 2004; Fiott, 2015; Gross, 2009b). Hughes argues that such complexity demands new skills within aid solutions, from peacekeeping and counterinsurgency through to constitutional-development and ‘good governance’ (2009:7). Similarly, whereas economists such as Collier (2008, 2009) see foreign aid in financial terms, and usually discrete to other domains such as the military, Collier nonetheless contends that “military intervention has an important place in aiding the societies of the bottom billion” (2008:124). However, where there is limited statehood there exists a legitimacy crisis concerning who to aid.

Intervention into fragile states of the global South is justified in various ways. As aforementioned, historical imperialism is argued to hold bearing on the determinants of foreign aid, through a moral duty to incorporate former colonies into the international community (Bain, 2003; Gong, 1984; Schraeder, et al, 1998:319-320). Humanitarianism is another oft cited rationale, notably in terms of genocide or similar emergency, as with the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) and ‘prevention mandate’ (CC, 1997; Power, 2007; Shapcott, 2010). However, ‘humanitarianism’ has broadened as a concept, from “emergency relief for the effects of natural disasters and wars, through long-term development aid to military assistance and armed intervention” (Shapcott, 2010:123). Of note, the Blair and Bush doctrines (see Blair, 1999, 2004, 2010; Record, 2003; Zonis, 2007) are described as markedly “muscular” humanitarianism, entailing “an age of intervention” (Knaus, 2011:99; Richmond and Franks, 2011:4). This ‘new humanitarianism’ challenges Westphalian sovereign norms of non-intervention, and incites arguments to restrict ‘humanitarianism’ and R2P to the intra-state social-contract, with issues of intervention being the preserve of the UN Security Council (Chandler, 2010:129; Hill, 2003:15). Indeed, Walzer (1980) argues that
humanitarianism amounts to *jus ad bellum* (‘right to war’), excusing the West to justify war on moral grounds. Such ‘muscular’ humanitarian intervention is contentious, not least concerning neo-imperialism (for example, Darby, 2009), but also concerning the perceived politicisation of aid agencies (see McConnon, 2014; Waddell, 2006).

Nevertheless, “there is no view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986:70). From the unipolar Washington consensus, aiding fragile states is state-centric and prescriptive, with ‘statebuilding’ entering discussion as the logical solution, strengthening recipient state capacity, and bestowing legitimacy through liberal internationalism (see Chandler, 2006, 2010). Surveying such literature finds a plethora of related concepts, such as institution-building and nation-building (see Chandler, 2004b; Ignatieff, 2003; Williams, 2019). As Knaus observes critically, there exists a perception of “a quantifiable formula for success” (2011:138). This formula may be theorised as the Neo-Kantian ‘reform-development-liberal peace’ model to liberal-peace transitions and ultimately global stability (see Agh, 1999; Burnell, 2002; Chandler, 2007, 2010; Geddes, 1996; Richmond and Franks, 2011; Richmond and Pogodda, 2017). Before the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’, Chandler describes the EU as being “generally considered to be the statebuilding institution par-excellence”, in exporting good-governance and rule of law throughout its neighbourhood (2010:94). Although, Chandler (2010) also identifies collapsing confidence amongst Western policy-actors concerning statebuilding, including apologetic discourse revealing of low expectations. Furthermore, it has been observed that the model has failed to construct politically viable states, albeit with limited success in the Balkans and Eastern Europe (Juncos, 2018:560-562; Kieh. 2007:11; Knaus, 2011:141).

‘Peacebuilding’, significant for entailing democratisation, also permeates discussion alongside statebuilding, in extension of ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peace-making’ (see Bentinck and Bruijne, 2008; Galtung, 1976; Goodhand, 2008; Goodhand and Sedra, 2010; Juncos, 2018; Pickering, 2007). Regarding the conflict dimension(s) of fragility, this also entails associated concepts including ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’ (DDR), ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) and ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ (PCR) (see Barakat and Zyck, 2009; Heupel, 2016; Pugh and Cooper, 2002; Suhrke, 2007b). All these concepts comprise aid routines to reform and solidify institutions and infrastructure, bestow legitimacy and reconcile conflicting factions. However, despite idealist intentions, such aid intervention is contentious (see Chandler, 2004; Darby, 2009; Paris, 1997). For example, Darby likens humanitarian peacekeeping to neo-imperialism, through dependency on “a profoundly
inequitable global order” (2009:699). While, citing post-2001 Afghanistan, Connaughton highlights the disingenuous nature of ‘peacekeeping’ when lacking unanimous consent from conflicting factions (2002:78). Specific initiatives such as ‘provincial reconstruction teams’ (PRTs) also find critique, one Feinstein Centre report terming them a “laboratory for the militarization of aid” (Benelli, et al, 2012:25). However, the foremost discernible contentions are perhaps ‘modernisation’ and ‘occupation’, with the global North designing to reform the global South in its own image. Here, binary ‘othering’ – civilising the barbarians – is argued to serve as a façade for morality while circumventing responsibility for injustices caused by the liberal peace (Conversi, 2016:30; Shellhaas and Seegers, 2009:10).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, imposing ‘liberal peace’ through democratisation within peacebuilding, risks contention if it overlooks indigenous values. Chandler ultimately contends this to be ‘post-liberal’, through transforming the liberal tenet of sovereignty to legitimise internationalist intervention, and so problematizing state autonomy (2010:43-45). From a more pragmatic perspective, Dahl theorises how imposing polyarchy risks a ‘boomerang effect’, through inadvertently inciting “acute polarization” (1971:106). Citing the Balkans, Pickering (2007) observes how top-down processes are insufficient, noting how ordinary peoples, who she argues are often overlooked and presumed passive recipients, are important and must buy into peacebuilding and democratisation for it to succeed (also Tschirgi, 1996:6). There also exists the dilemma (or ‘capacity trap’) whereby reform to build institutional capacity is desired, but reform itself demands capacity, while pushing too hard for reform strains the system, risking retrogression (Andrews et al: 2017:18; Geddes, 1996:19-20). As Collier notes, today’s successful democracies took time to form (2009:169). For example, Van De Walle’s (2012) somewhat inconclusive paper argues aid pushing Mali’s democratisation strengthened some areas of accountability, but overlooked broader structural issues, which led to the rise of fundamentalist Islamist militias which overturned democracy amidst state collapse.

occupation, Krulak (1999) also conceptualises this merging of fighting, peacekeeping and aid in what he terms ‘three-block war’ (3BW) – where the three traditionally discrete activities occur concurrently and in close proximity. Latterly, such thinking is discussed in terms of ‘stabilisation operations’, conceptualised as beyond consensual peacekeeping, with the Balkans cited as the model to follow (see Muggah and Zyck, 2015; Özerdem, 2015). Aid stratagems therein have evolved to entail the likes of ‘tactical economics’, moving away from expensive, large-scale reconstruction of macro-economics, towards small-scale micro-economics, to achieve specific tactical-level effects such as violence-reduction (Bates, 2016). However, occupations are broadly discussed as rarely resulting in successful outcomes concerning the stabilisation of fragile states (Edelstein, 2010:153; Knaus, 2011:192). Bosnia is the oft cited exception to the rule (see Ashdown, 2008; Pickering, 2007). The search for alternatives to occupation finds radical suggestions such as Luttwak’s (1999) argument to ‘give war a chance’ to locate sustainable peace, and revitalising the (controversial) UN Trusteeship Council (Parker, 2003).

Of interest, literature on stabilisation, occupation and associated concurrent aid activity through a plethora of types and agencies, contains limited discussion on ‘comprehensive’ and/or ‘integrated’ approaches to aid and crisis-management from the mid-2000s (see Torrente, 2004; Gilmore, 2015; Juncos, 2016; Pounds, 2008; Stapleton and Keating, 2015). Here, ‘comprehensive’ approaches are found defined in both broad and narrow terms, from civil-military integration within crisis-management, to ‘whole-of-EU’ approaches towards any given objective (Woollard, 2013). While, Pirozzi conceptualises it as a policy response to consideration of human-security (2013:5). However, the need for coherence in terms of harmonized, mutually supportive and non-contradictory aid policies at national and international levels is longer recognised, especially in the context of the EU, and concerning stove-piped institutional cultures (see Ashdown, 2008; Holden, 2009:22; Loquai,1996; Morgenthau, 1962:308; Olsen, 2008). However, as Pounds observes, there exists a knowledge-gap concerning “where the term ‘comprehensive approach’ was first coined” (2008:226). Furthermore, it must be noted that the empirical literature on such approaches is often highly critical of their effectiveness (for example, Stapleton and Keating, 2015).

That discrete communities governing types of aid operate within stove-piped institutional cultures (as discussed by Ashdown, 2008) is historically recognised, as demonstrable by Machiavelli prefixing his work by detailing discretions between civilian and military cultures (2006:1). As Cox discusses, it is traditional that “[a]cademic conventions divide up the
seamless web of the real social world into separate spheres, each with its own theorising” with subdomains of knowledge often corresponding with affairs’ organisation in practice (1981:126). Scholarly (and practitioner) recognition of the security-development nexus and the need for comprehensive approaches has not necessarily changed such convention.

Rather, “transformative liberal intervention is held to have necessitated the radicalization of both development and security discourses” (Chandler, 2010:26); domains of strategy and development endure as discrete disciplines. This may be understood in terms of discourse’s “rather complex dialectic of reinforcement” where readers’ experiences in/of reality are determined by their reading, which subsequently influences the subjects of writers, as defined previously by readers’ experiences (Said, 2003:94). Here, Said utilises the example of lions, where: “A book on how to handle a fierce lion might then cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of lions, the origins of fierceness, and so forth” (2003:94).

Akin to this, strategy/security scholarship on aiding FCAS situations fosters further nuanced scholarship, and likewise for development scholarship, progressing discourse along potentially divergent, self-reinforcing branches. Natsios identifies this tendency in development experts artificially compartmentalising development by stating “I don’t do politics; I’m into development” (2006:138). Likewise, there exists the ‘COINista’ Western defence community of the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (GWOT’), advocating that “population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) theory should be the sole focus” (Mikolashek and Kalic, 2011:1). As Mikolashek and Kalic (2011) contend, this was a reductionist catch-all answer to the contemporary problems faced in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The COINista’s theory and stratagems take from Vietnam (1945-1975) and Malaya (1948-1960) era thinking, but entail ideas tracing back to Callwell’s (2012) writings on small-wars, originally published in 1896 (see Alderson, 2011; Cassidy, 2004; Ladwig, 2007; Mackinlay, 2007; Mallinson, 2011; Nagl, 2005; Ryan, 2014). As such, unlike Helman and Ratner’s (1993) contention, fragile/failed states were not a new problem to the 1990s, but are identifiable within prior epochs, including decolonisation and Cold War proxy warfare.

However, literature on the ‘GWOT’ era, contemporaneous with Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-) (and Balkan, 1996-) interventions also finds evolved and moderated theorising concerning the limitations of the utility of hard (martial) power (see Ashdown, 2007, 2008; Jermyn, 2011; Murden, 2009; Smith, 2006). This may be seen in defence debate shifting away from discussing ‘war’, and towards ‘operations’ or ‘operational art’, between tactics and
grand strategy, in service of political objectives (Smith, 2006; Strachan, 2010, 2013:210-234). However, within the literature ‘operational art’ is open to interpretation, with defence perspectives often seeing it not as an inter-departmental concern, but a series of military tactics to defeat enemy components, with Strachan viewing it as fundamentally a concern of the military alone, as opposed to political policy, which he argues only relates to operational art at the level of (executive) strategy (2013:210-234).

Of interest, Rotberg explicitly labels Afghanistan as one of the 2000’s foremost failed states (2003:10; also Appendix 1). In reductionist fashion, most modern history literature frames the post-9/11 intervention as a ‘war’ (see Fairweather, 2015; Farrell, 2017; Ferguson, 2009; Harnden, 2011; Martin, 2014). However, surveying the scholarship also reveals considerable literature on the character of Afghanistan’s post-9/11 fragility, usually with focus on the resurgent Neo-Taliban amid fractious politics (see Gannon, 2004; Giustozzi, 2007, 2009; Goodson, 2007). There is also much literature on post-conflict aid and reconstruction dimensions (see Goodhand, 2002, with Bergne, 2004; Goodson, 2003, 2007; Hoffman, 2011). This includes focus on democratisation and peacebuilding (see Enterline and Greig, 2008; Suhrke, 2007, 2007b; 2004 with Harpviken and Strand). While, Nasir (et al, 2012) evaluates regional aid to Pakistan in light of the ‘GWOT’ and Afghanistan. Of special interest is Ghani’s somewhat prescriptive statebuilding work (with Lockhart, 2009), promulgated before he became President of Afghanistan, and founded in his technocratic experience at the World Bank (also Ghani, 2014). In evaluating the EU’s contribution, Buckley (2010) questions whether the EU could be more effective, while Major (et al, 2015) argues Germany’s ‘softer’ approach is insufficient, and Gross (2009) evaluates EU-led SSR contributions, with focus on civilian-power instruments. Otherwise, the EU’s role is notably under-represented within the literature; Oliver and Allen even argue that “the EU was not formally present” (2008:194), despite the EU’s special representative (EUSR) to Afghanistan, the Commission Office in Kabul, and all but two EU member states contributing troops (NATO, 2009).

In sum, aiding fragile states is found prominently discussed in terms of Neo-Liberal statebuilding, peacebuilding and occupation, entailing numerous types of aid, cohered to varying degrees, and debatably politicised. However, the issue of aiding fragile state predates the 1990s, and surveying the literature finds discrete historical assumptions, notably concerning the utility of military assistance concerning peace support and counterinsurgency. The post-2001 ‘GWOT’ context has evoked considerable debate, in instances resurrecting the segregated scholarship of strategic/security studies and development studies (for example,
Cassidy, 2006). Here some interpret the security-development nexus to necessitate the primacy of security to facilitate development, while others view development within the global South as chiefly determinate of conflict within the international community (for example, Ayoob, 2002). Overall, statebuilding and liberal peace transitions are argued as problematic, for both their evident lack of success (see Knaus, 2011; Zartman, 1995), and for contributing vested ideology and unethical processes upon the fragile state (Conversi, 2016; Richmond and Franks, 2011).

The Europeanization of foreign aid, and fragile states
Surveying scholarship on the ‘GWOT’ epoch’s security-development nexus, and aid interventionism into fragile states such as Afghanistan, finds EU policy and perspectives to be under-represented. Where found, such literature is predominantly published by think-tanks and the third-sector. In contrast, prior European imperialism occupies a central theme within academic scholarship concerning the global South (see Fanon, 2001; Kiernan, 1998; Wyatt, 2011; Said, 2003). This declined focus on European perspective(s) is perhaps unsurprising in light of the post-Cold War unipolar system and near hegemonic power of the US as delineated within Ignatieff’s (2003) ‘empire-lite’ thesis. Further, the EU is not traditionally considered to be as unitary an actor as the US (nor its erstwhile ‘great power’ member states), and has been criticised for its purported incapacity to implement coherent grand strategy or foreign policy (Howorth, 2010:456; also Orbie, 2008). As such, the EU supranational-level has broadly been conceptualised as a weak actor and/or civilian-power within IR (see Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972; Manners, 2002; Orbie, 2006, 2008). The civilian-power Europe debate also owes its genesis to the EU’s own conceptual origins, being born of essentially liberal ideals of peaceful political cooperation, economic regeneration and integration (Berlin, 2008:135; Howell, 2002:ii). Significant early EU aid efforts were internal, through the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Friedmann et al, 1966:124-126).

Reviewing scholarship on EU external-actorness also finds literature identifying structural-power, and indeed more realist practice, especially concerning aid and crisis-management issues such as irregular-migration (Bressand, 2011; Farrell, 2005; Holden, 2009; Lavenex, 2001, with Kunz, 2008). Although, aside from the interpretive character of EU aid policy, its formation has also seen considerable critique. For example, Carbone argues that even post-Maastricht there existed both a coherence and capability gap (2008:339; 2010:25-27). While, citing the Mediterranean, Holden argues EU aid is largely “faith based”, and not grounded in any pragmatic methodology (2005:478). However, that the EU sought cohering reform is
also recognised, including within holistic external-actorness, aid domains, and concerning
fragile states specifically, through the likes of ‘common strategies’ and ‘joint positions’
(Dearden, 2008:114; Hout, 2010:141; Olsen, 2008:157; Risse, 2012:38). Nevertheless,
coherence is a perennial problem for EU foreign aid, given it holds “very little legally binding
development acquis [albeit] a certain moral force”, with development-cooperation and
broader aid policy remaining largely soft-content, belief-based, and shared/mixed-
competency domains (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014:1258).

Pre-2010 scholarly debate focusing on EU aid approaches to fragile states is almost
negligible. Early think-tank publications are of interest, such as Patrick and Brown’s (2007)
early exploration of whole-of-government approaches covering EU member states, and
Montanaro’s (2009) examination of statebuilding in Kosovo. The collapse of Yugoslavia,
and Balkan conflicts did incite more academic debate. For example, Juncos finds the EU to
use both ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ in the Balkans, with interest in how the EU intervention shaped
both the Balkans and the EU itself (Juncos, 2005:202). Later Juncos (2011) explores
Europeanization in terms of EU-led police reform in Bosnia. Earlier, Agh (1999)
prominently utilises Europeanization to explore processes of democratisation in the Balkans
and Eastern/Central Europe, as did Coppieters (et al, 2004; see also Keil, 2013). Perhaps
most explicit (and indeed timely) is Hout’s (2010) discussion of the EU’s technocratic, top-
down capacity-building approach as applied to Africa, with reference to the European
Security Strategy (EC, 2003), consensus on development (EC, 2006b) and conclusions on an
EU response to situations of fragility (CEU, 2007). Hout ascertains that the EU identifies
fragility as having “strong security overtones”, which he argues fitted with a broader trend
argues EU aid sometimes fails to account for recipient voices. Although conversely, others
such as Versluys argue that the Commission has been successful in de-securitising European
aid, pushing aid’s application towards a ‘needs-based’ approach and away from a surrogacy

Post-2010 the literature remains embryonic, only constituting a noteworthy body during the
thesis’ research-process (2013-2018), with much of this published by think-tanks and the
third-sector (for example, Babayan, 2016; Castillejo, 2015; Furness, 2014; Marsai, 2018).
Prominent work post-2015 includes research coordinated by the University of Bristol on the
EU’s capabilities in conflict-prevention and peacebuilding (EUCIVCAP), Finland’s Laurea
University coordinating research on improving the effectiveness of capabilities in EU
conflict-prevention (IECEU), and research on whole-of-society conflict-prevention and peacebuilding (WOSCAP). All of these projects were funded by EU Commission ‘Horizon2020’ monies. That DG-Research and Innovation funded this research is in itself indicative of the EU’s recognition of its inexperience and short-falls concerning FCAS during the ‘GWOT’ epoch, and the associated need to enhance coherence and suitable instruments. To this end, several issues/themes are observed from this research, and build on the prior discussion on aiding fragile states from the EU’s perspective.

For example, the research is found to entail case studies and accounts of roundtable discussions on the EU’s contributions to Afghanistan, emphasising human-security and the likes of gender issues, the various factions involved, and EU-led SSR efforts concerning the conflict dimensions and perceived threats (see IECEU, 2016, 2017). Dirkx’s (2017) study on Afghanistan in particular is markedly detailed, tracing Afghanistan’s context from 1901, albeit with focus on the role of the EU Special Representative, and EU-led SSR post-2001. Here, Dirkx (2017) notes that the EU faced contention amongst its member states and observes the EU’s tall ambitions regarding institution and statebuilding, and correspondingly high aid resourcing, while also arguing that this counterproductively fuelled corruption and discontent in practice. Relating to this observation, Ejdus and Juncos (2018) argue that EU peacebuilding discourse grew to align with the ‘local-turn’, with top-down institution-building challenged by arguments favouring consideration of local dynamics and bottom-up approaches, as Pickering (2007) discusses regarding Bosnia.

Another theme of this collective research is that of civil-military relations. Herein, Jayasundara-Smits cites the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Global Strategy (EUGS) in exploring efforts to enhance synergies at the operational-level, while lamenting the EU’s “conceptual fuzziness” (2016:4). To tackle such contention Zartsdahl (2018) presents a framework for analysis of civil-military synergies within EU crisis-management and peacebuilding, with focus on ‘new wars’, and prioritising the outcomes of coordination. Of broader scope, Benraïs and Simon (2016) discuss the strengthening of multi-stakeholder coherence, considering resources, burden-sharing and coordination, while attempting to identify good practice. Broader still, these projects broach discussion of the EU’s comprehensive approach (EC and HRFASP, 2013), for example with Ehrhart and Petretto (2014) discussing its prospects as applied to Somalia. Of greater interest here, Faleg observes how upon the 2016 EUGS, the ‘integrated’ approach superseded the ‘comprehensive’ approach, while noting how through different policy phases the revised
nomenclature sought to approach all stages of the purported conflict cycle from ‘prevention’ through to ‘resilience’ (2018:180). Surveying broader commentary finds the EU’s need for comprehensive thinking on fragile states to be popularly accepted (see Babayan, 2016; Castillejo, 2015; Faria, 2014; Furness, 2014; Marsai, 2018; Sherriff, 2013).

Whereas this reveals how post-2010 a literature base has formed on EU ideas on fragile states such as Afghanistan, there remains conspicuously limited consideration of the genesis, diffusion and adoption (or rejection) of these ideas. Of interest, Galavan (2015) takes from strategic management literature to provide a basis and definition of key terms for such research. However, considering the maturity of scholarship (including on aid and development-cooperation), Europeanization constitutes a more natural lens to consider the flux of ideas within this domain. However, of note, other than precedents such as Agh (1999), most Europeanization of aid literature focusses predominantly on development-cooperation, with much of this concerned with the EU’s expansion, the Copenhagen criteria, and the accession and transition of new member states from aid recipients to aid donors (see Bučar, 2012; Horký, 2010; Horký, 2012; Horký and Lightfoot, 2012; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, and Tétényi, 2013). This comprises what Henriksson terms the “Europeanization East literature”, largely centred on the principle of conditionality (2015:433).

In contrast, Orbie and Carbone (2016) attempt to move beyond this debate, looking to a new research agenda on the EU’s effect on member state development-cooperation policy, while considering a variety of alternative scope conditions, such as internal state groupings and colonial legacy. Carbone (2017) subsequently developed this, utilising Europeanization to understand trajectories of ‘joint-programming’ within development-cooperation, and the transformative-power of the EU to change the practices of member states towards sub-Saharan Africa. Here, Carbone (2017) argues that EU members’ development policies are affected through their membership, but to varying degrees, and with greater change in ‘headquarters’ than at the operational-level in-country. In part, this is attributed to the complexities of the recipients’ situations, in addition to alternative scope conditions, such as bureaucratic interests amongst donor agencies.

While insight may be taken from such scholarship, examples of broader application of Europeanization within external-actoriness are also of interest. For example, on foreign policy (see Allen and Oliver, 2008; Major, 2005; Oliver and Allen, 2008); security and
defence policy (see Major, 2008), and crisis-management (see Gross, 2007, 2009b). Major (2008) is of particular relevance for taking interest in ‘uploading’ forces of Europeanization concerning CSDP, when literature predominantly emphasises Europeanization as a ‘downloading’ transformative process. Whereas, Gross’s work (2007, 2009b) is of particular interest for its proximity to the identified knowledge-gap. Although, it should be noted that other examples of Europeanization scholarship concerned with conflict-prevention, statebuilding and democratisation utilise Europeanization discretely (see Agh, 1999; Coppieters et al, 2004; Keil, 2013). This is in terms of European influence and conditionality upon third-countries, through the promise of integration/closer ties with the EU, rather than as a tool for understanding flux within EU internal policy diffusion, adoption and/or rejection. In addition to Gross’s (2009) work on EU-led SSR in Afghanistan, Gross (2009b), examines the Europeanization of (national) foreign policy, with a focus on transformational ‘crisis-management’. While somewhat dated, and of broader concern than the specificities of aiding a particular fragile state, it represents perhaps the closest precedent to this thesis.

Gross (2009b) emphasises Europeanization’s traditional downloading focus, with emphasis on whether member state positions (UK, France, and Germany) have been shaped (or constrained) to greater support an EU role within crisis-management, including CSDP (and prior European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP). This was through comparison of four case studies, including Afghanistan, across two ‘snapshots’ in time, of 2001 and 2006. The shaping of EU-level ideas was less discussed, as were the details of significant facets, including the EU’s ‘comprehensive’ approach. However, of interest Gross (2009b) does identify insightful contextual themes, including the domestic sphere (governmental-politics), transnational relations (alliance-politics), and the European sphere (Europeanization). Such insight is valuable for understanding how these ‘spheres’ entail potentially conflicting pressures throughout the shaping of common positions, and how member state preferences prioritise one sphere over another. Of significance, Gross forwarded that the UK adopted a pragmatic character in supporting CSDP frameworks, and occupied a favourable position to shape EU-level thinking, including concerning ‘comprehensive’ thinking, while arguing that UK preferences were not subordinate under those of the EU (2009b:90). Gross (2007), with focus on German preferences, including the propensity to avoid military action concerning Afghanistan is also of interest, notably for more substantially accounting for both ‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’ dimensions of Europeanization.
Like Gross (2007, 2009b) Major (2008) also applies Europeanization to ESDP/CSDP with focus on the UK, France and Germany. However, Major (2008) focusses rather more explicitly on the policy-preferences of the member states and how they sought to shape CSDP, while emphasising that foreign and security/defence policy comprise an intergovernmental domain. In doing so, Major (2008) adopts a ‘cyclical’ conceptualisation of Europeanization, while prioritising the ‘uploading’ dimension. However, Major (2005) also assesses the Europeanization of foreign and security policy in terms of the EU’s shaping of national policy, and how this shapes the role of the member states, while again emphasising the intergovernmental character of the domain. Here, Major predicts greater cooperation within foreign and security policy (2005:187), which notably came to pass. Of additional interest, Major also argues that as a process, Europeanization was possible even without direct cooperation, as “Europeanisation without the EU” (2005:187), through what may be considered a European cultural force for change. However, it is apt to note that in a globalised world, Europeanization is not the sole cultural influence. For example, in addition to Ignatieff’s (2003) thesis on the US’s near hegemony, Kempin and Mawdsley (2013) contend from neo-Gramscian perspective that US designs influenced the construct of CSDP, through US strategic doctrine being accepted by the member states.

The aforementioned literature on fragile states is in part brought up-to-date by Furness and Olsen (2016), who apply Europeanization to the EU’s ‘comprehensive’ approach, with reference to Africa (the Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan). This study is of interest to the thesis, albeit with its focus on discrete geographies. Here, Furness and Olsen (2016) question the extent of the EU’s comprehensive approach in this instance, arguing that whereas member states find added value in the common approach, especially where perceiving a security threat to the EU, they pursue national interests where it suits. As foreign and security policy endure as broadly intergovernmental domains it is unsurprising that national interests are found to be paramount in instances. However, of significance Furness and Olsen further argue that more generally “the comprehensive approach is developing some of the characteristics of a Europeanisation norm, at least at the policy level” (2016:117) – indicating progress towards a greater depth of institutionalisation.

Of additional interest for highlighting the problem of generalisation with regard to fragile state’s CPE, Kyris (2015) mounts a study on Europeanization and fragile states of a different nature, with reference to the ‘contested statehood’ found in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Here, Kyris conceptualises Europeanization in terms of a broad force for change, as
the influence the EU holds over Cyprus as a member state, despite the Turkish North failing to implement the *acquis communautaire*. As such, the Turkish-Cypriot nation is found to pose an anomaly, with Kyris exploring the impact of the EU upon this community. Kyris and Bouris (2017) subsequently develop this work through comparative study with Palestine, as an external ‘contested state’, contributing towards sovereignty literature, including opportunities for development-cooperation and statebuilding, and Europeanization literature on third-countries, concerning “EU-induced changes in national policy, institutions and politics” (Kyris and Bouris, 2017:757).

In sum, it may be seen that within the latter-‘GWOT’ period, post-Lisbon Treaty (2007), a literature base has gradually been developing on the topic(s) of EU approaches to the security-development nexus, and aid interventionism into fragile states. Of note, this literature base entails a clear Europeanization element. Furthermore, whereas in the aftermath of World War II, the European Communities held liberal ideals of peaceful political cooperation, economic regeneration and integration, and perhaps what Lindberg termed “naïve European idealists” (1965:56), it may be argued that through integration and Europeanization of policy areas such as CSDP, the EU has become a more pragmatic power within IR (for example, Bressand, 2011).

**Chapter conclusion**

In conclusion, the literature review has identified a multitude of facets, comprising extant ideas, themes and relationships concerning the research’s empirical subject – the management of post-9/11 fragile, conflict-affected states – and associated historically-bound assumptions from prior contexts. These facets pertain to foreign aid’s salutary utility amidst the security-development nexus and fragility, and pertinent European thinking and Europeanization thereof. Many of the facets identified, such as ‘comprehensive’ approaches, ‘peacebuilding’, and poverty’s relationship with conflict are found diffused throughout European policy discourse(s), and so are of consequence to the context within which this thesis operates (and help to answer RQ2). Upon identifying these facets, significance is found in the (socio-political) power of ideas, and how some grew prevalent within certain communities while others did not. This pertains to the identified ‘gap in the research’ – the Europeanization of foreign aid thinking concerning fragile states within the post-9/11 epoch.

Whereas many policy ideas and academic conceptualisations are found within the ‘foreign aid’ and ‘fragile states’ literature, there has evidentially been little consideration of how some
ideas grew more prevalent than others within European discourse. Nor has there been much overt consideration of the influence of core EU members, as with the UK in this regard, despite the UK’s reputation as an ‘aid leader’ (Double, 2016:247WH; Mitchell, 2013; OECD, 2014). Further, whereas the extant Europeanization literature is broad, including significant coverage of development-cooperation and broader foreign policy, consideration of substantive issues such as aid to fragile states has broadly been overlooked. There is a mandate to better understand this issue, and the historical evolution of associated ideas throughout the epoch studied, and the European institution(s) they are anchored in. This includes exploring their interpretation(s), shaping and influence in terms of Europeanization. This is where the thesis may contribute to knowledge, by developing understanding of how some ideas on aiding fragile states such as Afghanistan grew prevalent within EU communities, while others did not.

In part, the mandate for tackling this knowledge-gap may be found in the identifiable professional-contention within the security-development nexus, between which institutional agency(s) ‘own’ aid to fragile states where diplomatic and developmental concerns meet defence interests, and their discrete (military and civilian) institutional cultures, routines and instruments collide within ‘comprehensive’ dialogues. These are considerations which the research must approach critically, and holistically, in order to account for the many institutional perspectives found present. Additional mandate may be found in the historical lack of success when aiding those fragile states in direst need, which further justifies how the ideas/policies identified within this review warrant further exploration. Recognition of this failure is identifiable within the literature (see Stapleton and Keating, 2015; Zartman, 1995). However, it is also explicitly recognised by the EU-level, as evident in DG-Research and Innovation commissioning Horizon2020 research into enhancing EU policy in this area after the Afghanistan/Balkans/Iraq experience(s). Furthermore, within the UK, the contentious character of such thinking is evident in the public discourse surrounding the Chilcot inquiry (2016), revealing a further mandate for tackling this under-researched domain.

The most pertinent Europeanization literature is found on foreign policy (see Oliver and Allen, 2008), defence/security (see Major, 2008) and development/aid (see Horký, 2010; Horký, 2012). With this thesis taking interest in the management of fragile, conflict-affected states as a specific kind of crisis, Gross’s (2007, 2009b) work on the Europeanization of ‘crisis-management’ is perhaps most directly relevant. Although, latter works are also of interest (see Carbone, 2017; Furness and Olsen, 2016; Kyris, 2015). Nonetheless, few works
exist on the Europeanization of foreign aid thinking concerning specific, substantive-level issues, such as that of Afghanistan’s post-9/11 fragility. To critically explore this problem, those precedents which adopt a more interpretivist approach to Europeanization, as an extension of institutionalism and suited to research on ‘forces for change’, ‘ways of doing things’ and ‘soft-content’ domains are argued to be most useful.

Subsequent chapters build on this discussion of the extant literature. Chapter 3 delineates the development of the theoretical—conceptual framework, exploring how suppositions from extant literature may inform this research. Chapter 4 then details the philosophical—methodological framework, including the implemented method of analysis. These chapters are guided by consideration of the themes identified here, notably concerning the elite interview process where regarding who to interview, and which discussion topics to prioritise (Appendix 3).
3 Theoretical—Conceptual Framework

[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else… Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back (Keynes, 1936:383).

In Chapter 2’s thematic review of the empirical ensemble of ideas and practices within which the thesis operates, additional concepts, theory, and relationships are identified. The purpose of this chapter is to build on Chapter 2 by detailing the development of Institutional Frame Analysis (IFA) from identified scholarly precedent, as a means of exploring ‘Europeanization’ of foreign aid and so contribute to knowledge within the located ‘gap in the research’. The thesis privileges inductive “empirical rummaging” and description (Skocpol, 1995b:104). However, with the value-laden research and researcher as a social-agent interlinked, as through critical theory epistemology (see the philosophical—methodological framework, Chapter 4), the researcher invariably brings a deductive (extant knowledge and assumption-testing) dimension to the otherwise qualitative and inductive (bottom-up, theory-building) research-process. A benefit of the resulting synthesis of induction and deduction is the reflective utility of prior scholarship to provide rigorous guiding forethought. Nonetheless, as Cox observed “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1981:128), and so as Berg demanded, with the research ‘gap’ identified, it is beneficial to reiterate the ‘purpose’ of this theoretical framework (2009:37-38). This being:

Revealing knowledge concerning how UK and EU-level endogenous ideas on aiding fragile, conflict-affected states progressed, were influential, and were shaped within the post-9/11, ‘GWOT’ historical context (Chapter 1).

This may be considered a problem of two-halves. Firstly, historical foreign aid thinking must be identified and its progression explored. Secondly, its diffusion, social interaction and relationship(s) within the EU must be mapped. This may be understood in terms of Gilboa’s two-tiered understanding of policy domains as entailing policy’s ‘making’, and subsequently ‘interaction’ and ‘diplomacy’ (2002:732). Although, this is within the EU’s complex-
dynamic between member state and supranational-level. In consideration of this interest in interpreting thinking and mapping its diffusion and adoption (or Europeanization), the cumulative developed framework is a critical-interpretivist discourse analysis, exploring framing within institutional discourse(s) surrounding foreign aid as the focal ‘conceptual cluster’ of interest (see Berg, 2009:42-43; Lamont, 2015:158).

It is subsequently argued that ‘frame analysis’ may be utilised from a critical paradigm perspective to interpret these institutional ideas (their consciousness, contestation and salience) (see Choudhry, 2016; Meier, 2008). Utility of discursive theory has become popularly recognised as appropriate in such qualitative scenarios (Berg, 2009; Yin, 2009), especially since social science’s post-1960’s ‘linguistic-turn’ (Fairclough, 1995:208-209). This may be supported by Europeanization, as a substantive/meso-level theory (see Howell, 2004c; Major, 2008; Vale, 2009), when understood as an extension of ‘new’ institutionalism (see Bulmer and Burch, 2005), in historical and discursive conceptualisation (see Schmidt, 2010). This culminates in a reflexive three-dimensional approach which spans the ideational and institutional character, and levels of this complex-dynamic, while facilitating for the researcher to (subjectively) ‘stand apart’ and contribute knowledge, challenging extant order, as discussed by Geuss (1981; see Chapter 4). In commencing this discussion, according with scholarly precedent, the chapter firstly details how the thesis conceptualises its foremost concept, ‘foreign aid’ (see Berg, 2009; Lamont, 2015). After this, the chapter progressively builds through its three dimensions by expanding upon critical frame analysis (CFA), before detailing how the ‘new’ institutionalisms may guide the tracing of ideational ‘soft-content’, and subsequently how Europeanization may be conceptualised as an extension of this.

**Conceptualising holistic foreign aid**

As Chapter 2 revealed, reviewing ‘foreign aid’ literature within International Relations (IR) finds definitions focussing on ‘positive-sum’ significances of bilateral/multilateral cooperation entailing resource transfers among exclusive sovereign actors/agents (Evans and Newnham, 1998; Jones, 2006; Shiffman, 2013). Such resource transfers are conceptualised in terms of pacific Kantian ideals, but also through vested security-maximising agendas, as with Machiavellian imaginations of world order (see Alesina and Dollar, 1998; Hill, 2003; Morgenthau, 1962; Natsios, 2006). Traditionally, foreign aid literature broadly abides by

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2 As applied within Discursive Institutionalism to understand Europeanization, rather than applied to news media.
popular academic convention in following and theorising upon practitioner experience (see Cox, 1981:126). For instance, through the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG-DEVCO), the EU holds a focus on development-cooperation, with which scholarly literature corresponds, seen in work on development-cooperation and official development assistance (ODA) (see Arts and Dickson, 2004; Horký and Lightfoot, 2012; Vittek and Lightfoot, 2009). ‘Development Studies’ is arguably a discipline in itself. However, reviewing scholarly literature also finds multiple discrete subdomains of ‘aid’, such as economic, diplomatic and military aid (Chapter 2). Therefore, consideration of ‘foreign aid’ finds ‘3D’ institutional domains of diplomacy, development and defence, entailing many means and purposes of transferring resources (and influence).

In pursuing a critical paradigm the framework attempts to avoid prior reductionist assumptions, and commences by forwarding a holistic definition of ‘foreign aid’, as derived from the literature, where aid entails: tangible resources, technical ideas or values as assistance of any nature transferred from one state/supranational agency (the donor) internationally to a separate state/people(s) (the recipient) on a consenting, concessionary and mutually-beneficial or salutary basis, and by any route or means. This definition focusses upon the state/institutional-level, and does not account for an individual’s altruism. But, it may account for ‘third-sector’ non-government organisations (NGOs) and private initiatives which are regulated by and/or utilised as conduits by the donor. A prominent example is the HALO Trust, a UK humanitarian mine-clearance charity, utilised as a conduit for both UK and EU resourcing in Afghanistan. However, a caveat in this definition, derived from critiques within extant literature, is that foreign aid should be recognised as such by both the donor and recipient (Goodhand and Sedra, 2010; Pugh, 2004, 2005; Shellhaas and Seegers, 2009). Otherwise it may better be conceptualised as coercion. Nonetheless, the strength of the utility of a critical, holistic definition is in accounting for extant understanding, whilst allowing for conceptual movement throughout the reflexive research-process. This is important as the social world comprises a moving-picture, not a snapshot in time. Furthermore, within discourse the utility of language and associated meaning is not static – perspective, values and context matter.

A critical-interpretivist (moderately-constructivist) approach to ‘foreign aid’ is particularly justifiable when studying EU ‘foreign’ and ‘aid’ policy within external-actoriness as they historically lack much ‘hard-law’ within the policy _acquis communautaire_. They are broadly ‘soft-content’, ‘shared/mixed-competency’ and ‘intergovernmental’ domains entailing
principled joint-positions on ‘ways of doing things’ (Gross, 2009b; Horký, 2010, 2012; Horký and Lightfoot, 2012; Lightfoot, 2010; Major, 2008; Orbie, 2012; Szent-Iványi, 2012; Vittek and Lightfoot, 2009). As such, they are largely dependent upon the interpretation of agreed governing norms/beliefs, with agency pooled and often necessitating diplomacy and compromise. Most overt hard-law is found within conditionality applied to accession states through the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ from 1993 (see Horký, 2010; Lightfoot, 2010; Vachudova, 2006; Vencato, 2007). However, compliance may nonetheless be superficial. Although, as broadly liberal, democratic polities the EU (and UK) hold traditions of cooperation and assistance. For the EU this is identifiable in literature interpretations of a ‘civilian-power’ (Duchene, 1972; Manners, 2002; Orbie, 2006). A noteworthy distinction is Holden’s (2009) conceptualising the EU’s utility of aid policy as a ‘structural-power’, and others pointing to the sometimes ‘realist’ character of EU external-actorness (see Farrell, 2005). But broadly speaking, the European character of aid has been discussed as (rhetorically at least) delinked from high-politics, vested interests and tied-aid practices, while seeking to export the EU’s regional model (Glennie, 2008:108-110; Natsios, 2006:131-133; Olsen, 2008; Ölund, 2012; Taylor, 2010).

In consideration of the historical epoch studied, exploration within the post-9/11 international aid regime discourse(s) finds themes including Powell’s “coalition of the willing” (2001, in FPB, 2002:247), Blair’s “humanitarian coalition” (2001, in FPB, 2002:111), and the EU’s purported “common European approach” (Prodi, 2001, in FPB, 2002:31). Within such discourse identifiable aid lexicon is wide-ranging, open to interpretation, and often transient. Prominent examples include ‘emergency-aid’, ‘statebuilding’, ‘nation-building’, ‘capacity-building’, ‘security-sector reform’ (SSR), ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ (PCR), ‘provincial reconstruction teams’ (PRTs), and ‘partnership’ among many others. Some historical terms, such as ‘military auxiliaries’ are found out of vogue, and supplanted by the likes of ‘security assistance’. Further, the lexicon’s meaning regarding which are ‘objectives’, which ‘approaches’, and which ‘activities’ is often unclear, as are the ramifications of these distinctions. SSR constitutes an illustrative example. Instigated by Short when UK Secretary of State for International Development, SSR was attributed broad meaning, as with ‘human security’ (ISSAT, 2017). However, it has often been misconstrued and applied solely to defence institutions. Furthermore, it has both been seen as an ‘activity’, and an ‘approach’.

Here, through the breadth of identified lexicon, ‘foreign aid’ may be considered the apex of a “conceptual cluster” (Berg, 2009:349; Figure 2). This critical, holistic conceptualisation, in
diverging from previous academic convention, where focus is often on ODA/development-cooperation alone, presents an opportunity to re-think established convention and so contribute to knowledge. This spans high-order concerns (including aid dimensions of security) and low-order concerns (including aid dimensions of development) and so finds interest in the security-development nexus (see Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 2012, 2014; Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009). In consideration of the ‘GWOT’ context, it further finds interest in aid’s potential ‘securitisation’, which Wæver conceptualises as “existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (1998:5; also see Gilbert, 2009; Versluys, 2008).

Figure 2: Post-9/11 Foreign Aid Conceptual Cluster (Non-exhaustive)

![Diagram of Foreign Aid Conceptual Cluster](image)

(Author’s conceptualisation, derived from preliminary content analysis)

With critical exploration of UK and EU-level aid ideas of interest to the thesis, their identification, and interpretation of any attributed meaning is sought. Whereas colloquial utility of terms such as ‘comprehensive’ and ‘insurgency’ may be used for their common dictionary meaning, as a UK Stabilisation Unit official observed “we all use certain terms technically” (Interview L19). As such, within policy discourse, terms may be attributed with specific socio-political meaning, resulting in a distinctive ‘comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency’ denoting specific meaning to the conduct of aid, and subsequent interpretations thereof. The attribution of meaning may be manipulated through utility of specific linguistic devices, such as jargon, catchphrases or metaphors to evoke particular imaginations. Otherwise, terms may be ascribed specific legal meaning, as with ‘ODA’ (see Haan, 2009; OECD, 2018).
Taking from precedents such as Keynes (1936), Foucault (1971, 1980), Hall (1989), and Mayr (2008) the thesis contends that ideas/ideology possess power to influence decision-making; that the ideas of agents as well as the agents themselves possess socio-political power. However, interest is not in how one state may affect another, or maximise its power in a traditional IR sense, but in how ideas pertaining to foreign aid may compete for salience and dominate within inter-institutional, inter-discursive struggle. Similarly, interest is not in the ‘why’, ‘where’ or ‘when’ to intervene with foreign aid instruments, as with the prescriptions of an international foreign aid agenda, or ‘triage’, but in investigating ‘how do some ideas grow prevalent, while others do not’ through exploring historical processes (Chapter 1).

**Theoretical dimensions of frame analysis within discourse analysis**

There is no one definitive understanding of discourse analysis within social science, it is broad, with theoretical and methodological dimensions, and spans disciplines (see Howarth, 2000; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2012; Machin and Mayr, 2013; Mayr, 2008). Within IR discourse analysis is inherently qualitative and draws focus towards communicative knowledge, language (and associated social-practice) stemming from and surrounding a specific issue/situation within social-reality (Machin and Mayr, 2013; Mayr, 2008; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2012). Within this, discourse analysis permits understanding of “the social construction and apprehension of meanings thus created” (Berg, 2009:353). Here, ‘discourse’ itself is conceptualised through Hajer’s definition, where it entails:

\[\text{[A]}\text{n ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts, and categorizations through which meaning is ascribed to social and physical phenomena, and that is produced in and reproduces in turn an identifiable set of practices (2009:n.p.).}\]

Unlike Hajer’s prior definition (see 1995:44 in Hajer, 2009:n.p), this accounts for both rational and less-rational facets of discourse, where ‘notions’ indicates devices such as “things reiterated through stories, metaphors or catchphrases” (2009:n.p.). A theoretical example of a ‘discourse’ is Said’s (2003) ‘lions’ discussion, spanning the fierceness of lions, how to handle fierce lions, and where fierceness originates from (2003:93-95). Here, the experiences of readers (who may never have seen a lion) are determined by their reading, which influences how they respond to a lion in practice, while influencing what writers write on, in “a rather complex dialectic of reinforcement” (Said, 2003:94). Thus, discourse and social-practice surrounding a given issue/situation are mutually shaping, through being
“constitutive and constituted” (Jøgensen and Phillips, 2012:68). Discourse (involving frameworks for meaning) may be conceptualised as anchored to a structure in a way that lends itself to understanding institutional thinking (including values for policy formation), as Mayr elucidated:

[I]t implies a two-way relationship between a ‘discursive event’ (i.e. any use of discourse) and the situation, institution and social structure in which it occurs… [where] language represents and contributes to the (re)production of social reality (2008:8).

As such, this ‘constitutive and constituted’ conceptualisation of discourse, as anchored in institutions, facilitates understanding of how institutional discourse engages in “reality construction” (Mayr, 2008b:8). Thus it may be said that institutional discourse is itself a mode of social-practice (Jøgensen and Phillips, 2012:61). Here, change in discourse reflects flux in values, beliefs, positions and contextualised power relationships within institutions, within a given historical context. This theoretical understanding of discourse analysis within social science may be understood as tracing back to the ‘linguistic-turn’ within the social sciences (Fairclough, 1995:208-209). Some argue this ‘turn’ held origins in the 1920s (see Fierke, 2002), others such as Hill (1989) cite Keynes observation on the power of economic and political ideas in ruling world order (1936:383). The thesis takes interest in language as analogous to ‘moves of the social game’. As such, conceptualisation is broadly derived from the 1960-70s critical-interpretivist ‘turn’, and Foucault’s (1964, 1971, 1977, 1978) less-radical historical analysis of institutions within structuralism. Here, Foucault’s critiques sought to advance the cause of given minorities amidst the institutional power-structures within which they operated, as with the ‘insane’ (1964), convicts (1977) and women (1978). This entails conceptualisation of discourse, knowledge and power through a nexus where “power and knowledge directly imply each other” within power/knowledge systems (Foucault, 1977:27, 1980).

This nexus is through discourse(s) constituting what can be known of social-reality, knowledge constituting the exercise of power and power a function of the acquired knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Here, ‘power’ is conceptualised not as with traditional IR understanding, but as a relational, perspective-laden and productive concept, inherent within societal structures, and “immanent in force relationships” (Foucault, 1978:97). Power is not a matter of a causal principle as with “cause and effect” (Foucault 1980:245). For example,
Foucault’s (1977) work on the criminal justice institution perceives discourses and counter-discourses as part of a greater system of ‘truth’, entailing related techniques and the practice of power, whereby “[a] corpus of knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of the power to punish” (Foucault, 1977:23).


[I]n any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse (Foucault, 1980:93).

This is in what Foucault considered “the rules of power and the power of true discourses” (1980:94), for which he cited the further example of ‘confession’, of which he argued (in historical context) “became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth” (1978:59). This is to say, power is ‘productive’ constructing norms through historical processes. Of related interest here, is Foucault’s (1971, 1980) interest in the ‘archaeology’ of science, where he searched for the historical context’s background ‘episteme’, which “defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge” (Foucault, 1971:183). Unlike a ‘paradigm’, as a community’s conscious, political search for knowledge (see Kuhn, 1970), Foucault (1971) conceptualised ‘episteme’ as the subconscious underpinning, founded in a-priori fundamental historical presumptions, and grounding knowledge and its discourses within a particular epoch. As such ‘episteme’ is the ‘epistemological consciousness’ of a community, not only an epistemic-community in the narrow sense of Haas’ “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge” (1992:3), but also in a broader sense, as with a nation’s, (or even continent’s) subconscious culture/belief-system.

Whereas Foucault (1971:182-184) originally conceptualised an episteme as singular and dominant to the epoch, he latter conceptualised episteme(s) to co-exist (see Foucault, 1980:196-198), whereby they interact at the same time and make-up the power/knowledge systems. As such, in underpinning epistemic-communities they are, “the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable”, with the remainder thus being those that are precluded, as a “specifically discursive apparatus” (Foucault, 1980:197[original-emphasis]). Through this, it is surmised
knowledge/power systems and discourse may be conceptualised through the two-tiers of the conscious foreground (discourse and counter-discourse), and the background subconscious (co-existing epistemes). These two-tiers may be understood as broadly interrelated, in consideration that cultural episteme governs what statements/ideas are acceptable within discourse, while as Cornwall introduced, “words make worlds” (2010:1), through accepted discourse contributing to the production of social-reality (Mayr, 2008b:8). Here, the episteme may hold origins in a multitude of additional conditions. A basic example is found in Marshall’s emphasis on (physical) geography within history, and how “[t]he landscape imprisons leaders, giving them fewer choices and less room to manoeuvre” (2016:ix).

Foucault’s works (1964, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1978, 1980) indicate the belief that humanity is not universal and timeless but emerges in relation to changes in historical situations (and discourse) of a given epoch. Equally, a historically constructed humanity defined by discourse can easily disappear or be re-shaped by changing historically located social-practice (with discourse one aspect of this). Indeed, such practices not only produce the subject, they also may act as means of identifying flux within research. However, whereas Foucault’s work (for example, 1980, 1984) became more post-structuralist, appearing increasingly radically-interpretivist, this is not the intent of the research, which pursues a critical-interpretivist (moderately-constructivist) stance (see Chapter 4). This is befitting of historical institutionalist understanding, while accounting for discourse and the power of ideas (see Hall, 1989; Skocpol, 1995b; Schmidt, 2010). As Choudhry elucidated, in building from critical conceptualisation of ‘discourse’:

The purpose of discourse analysis is to examine how taken-for-granted ‘truths’ are in fact the products of intense struggles over power, and to identify how discourses acquire the status of truth. In doing so we uncover how an existing ‘regime of truth’ is formed and the fragility of the grounds on which it rests in order to allow alternative possibilities to emerge (Choudhry, 2016:409).

Within this, the discursive body of knowledge stemming from an issue/situation must be understood within the historical socio-political context of its production, and consumption (Goffman, 1974). Revisiting Mayr’s understanding, here institutions are of interest for how they “are shaped by discourse and how they in turn have the capacity to create and impose discourses” (2008b:1), thus they exercise influence through discourse. Such exercised power is a producer and shaper of social-reality; “it produces identities, knowledge, and possibilities
for behaviour [and policy formation] and it does this through discourse” (Mayr, 2008b:15). It is the institution’s salient discursive framing of issues/situations which creates norms which become wilfully subscribed to, as with Said’s (2003) discussion on discourses and how they are written (produced) and read (consumed) in complex dialectics of reinforcement. This relates to Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’ where through pervasive consensual ideology, the social group/community submits to a purported ‘truth’, consciousness or social order “for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination” (Gramsci, 1971:23). The framework contends that how issues/situations are interpreted and attributed meaning within institutions operating within a specific historical context is of consequence for constructing broader social-reality.

Through the adopted critical paradigm of inquiry (see Chapter 4), the research originally presumed to adopt Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) (see 1995, 2006). Fairclough argued that his approach to CDA permitted:

[E]xplanatory critique of aspects of existing social reality in terms of dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements, as a basis for transformative action (praxis) to change existing reality for the better (Fairclough, 2015:36).

However, for the purposes of this thesis Fairclough’s approach is found an awkward fit. It has been argued to be weak in explanatory power, requiring greater theoretical enrichment (Warren, 2014:46). However, more importantly Fairclough’s first-dimension is restrictive in being overly focussed on the minutiae of textual analysis, linguistic technique and search for subtext. This is not well suited to tackling the thesis’ research problem. In part this is out of practicality, concerning the magnitude of collated data, necessitated by the breadth of institutional perspectives demanding consideration. However, as a theoretical concern, ‘subtext’ constitutes the unstated, and within policy formation cannot deliberately be used to constitute practice, rather, interest is in interpreting the significances of what is stated, as a ‘differential analysis’ (Foucault, 1971:119, 1972:140; Graham, 2011). Therefore, a manner of ‘frame analysis’ is adopted, to differentiate which statements/ideas grew dominant within frame-contestation. This is in consideration of institutional foreign aid ideas and practices foremost entailing stated positions on problems and solutions, formulating social-practice without importance in subtext. As such, the research takes interest in the works of Lakoff.
(2014), Goffman (1974, 1981), and Entman (1993, 2003), but from a critical paradigm, as
with critical frame analysis CFA (see Choudhry, 2016; Meier, 2008).

Goffman (1974, 1981) introduced the concept of a ‘frame’ in social science
(psychology/sociology) to denote a schemata of interpretation in terms of organisational
cognitive structures by which people comprehend social-reality, through classifying unknown
phenomena with reference to the known. Through this, people (or indeed institutional
agencies) simplify phenomena into comprehensible terms, and inform their decision-making.
Lakoff (2014) offers a concise introduction whereby:

Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result,
they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what
counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions. In politics our frames shape our
social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our
frames is to change all of this. Reframing is social change (2014:xii).

‘Framing’, as academic theory, is relatively indistinct to its layman usage. For example, its
layman understanding is accurate insofar as the suspect, who purports to be ‘framed’ for a
crime, is implying that evidence against them has been deliberatively produced (packaged) by
an agent so as to attribute socio-political meaning (guilt) in its interpretation. Further, in
evoking the ‘frame’ of framing the suspect is at
tempting to ‘reframe’ the evidence’s
implications (value). Lakoff, makes a further insightful point in observing, “when we negate
a frame, we evoke the frame” (2014:1). He demonstrates this with the mental exercise with
which he entitled his work Don’t Think of an Elephant (2014), a seemingly impossible task
once evoked. For example, it may be argued that when engaged in reconstructing
Afghanistan, the promulgation of Britain and Russia in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons
(2009), was a counterproductive attempt by the UK’s defence community to negate the
repeating of historical mistakes. To introduce more exacting academic definition, from
extant examples of CFA, a frame is an:

[O]rganising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into
a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or
explicitly included (Verloo 2005, in Meier, 2008:155).

In a similar critical approach, Choudhry’s (2016) application of CFA favoured Ferree and
Merrill’s (2000:454-456) definition, where a frame is “a cognitive ordering that relates events
to one another” and a “way of talking and thinking about things that link idea elements into packages” (in Choudhry, 2016:409). Here, emphasis is found levied upon substantive cognitive organising ‘packages’ of the order of representations over problems and solutions, in which the frame ‘package’ entails fragmented information/ideational facets. Building on Foucault’s (1971, 1972, 1977) understanding, supported by Goffman’s (1974) psychological/sociological conceptualisation of frame analysis, Choudhry (2016) forwards that (critical) “frame analysis identifies cognitive schemata through which people interpret reality or communicate about it” (Choudhry, 2016:409):

Critical frame analysis is thus rooted in an understanding of policy problems as constructions based on competing interpretations of those problems, and in recognition of the fact that policy solutions contain in-built representations of the problem (Choudhry, 2016:410).

Such conceptualisation is fundamentally of discourse and its analysis. Adopting such understanding of CFA within IR discourse analysis draws focus towards the lexicon of interpretive ‘framing’, and through its competition, ‘frame-contestation’ amidst discursive ‘struggles for salience’ leading to potential ‘reframing’ of issues/situations, with ramifications for broader social-reality. An example taken from the research’s analysis is the UK defence community’s promulgated framing of Helmand’s problems as caused by ‘insurgency’, where the recommended solution was historical doctrine on ‘counterinsurgency’. In pushing this schema within discourse, specific linguistic devices are found within the frame ‘package’, such as the well-known catchphrase ‘hearts and minds’ (see Chapter 5). This may be understood with reference to Entman’s (1993, 2003) work post-Goffman (1974), to clarify ‘framing’ within IR and Communication, whereby:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe (Entman, 1993:52[original-emphasis]).

Here may be identified four functions which hold credence for the operationalisation of frame analysis as a method (see the philosophical—methodological framework, Chapter 4): 1) defining the problem (costs and benefits), 2) interpretation of causes (identify forces), 3)
present moral/value judgements (evaluate agents) and 4) recommended or approve solutions (to the problem) (Entman, 1993:52-53, 2003:417). This builds on Goffman’s succinctly conceptualising how frames broadly permit agents to “locate, perceive, identify, and label”, with bearing on interactions, relationships, judgements, and broader social-reality (1981:21). As an indicative example, Choudhry utilised these ideas in critical study on violence against woman (VAW), asking:

[H]ow VAW is problematised; what solutions are offered; where they are located (culture; gender, human rights etc); to what extent they are gendered; and who has a voice in these policy and legal texts (Choudhry, 2016:409).

Entman’s latter work (2003) introduces models within frame analysis, entailing 1) ‘hegemonic’ (elite domineering, ‘manufacturing consent’), 2) ‘indexing’ (to elite frames) and 3) his proposed ‘cascading activation’ (illuminating deviations through top-down and subsequent bottom-up interpretations) to supplement these former. Entman (2003) argued that influential counter-frames to the executive elites’ salient frame demanded elite discord, a lack of unity and dissent. In institutional terms, such elite discord may be understood in terms of ‘professional-contention’ (for example, see Woodward, 2012). Here, framing is a central process by which agencies exercise political influence over each other, where communicated content attributes meaning and possesses tangible effect (Entman, 203:417). As such, ‘professional-contention’ may be found within struggles for salience, as with Gilboa’s ‘interaction’ of policy frames (2002:732), and where ‘salience’ “means making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (Entman, 1993:53), with implications for discursive power-relationships and potentially institutional-dominance.

With ontological consideration of what exists within socially-interpreted reality in a specific historical context, ‘framing’ is thus where actors discern what matters from what happens and subsequently to attribute socio-political meaning to what matters (Gitlin, 1980:6; Paterson et al, 2010; Wu et al, 2012). Some frames may become more salient than others through the interactive, inter-discursive struggle for salience (Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974, 1981). Entman (2003) later conceptualised a spectrum of framing amidst such discursive-struggle, spanning from ‘frame-dominance’ to ‘frame-parity’, where ‘frame-contestation’ occupied the middle-ground, ‘dominance’ entailed silenced counter-frames and ‘parity’ a standoff (2003:418-419; Figure 3; also Collins, 2013:415). This is of interest for its overt implications
for power, and further the potential for a particular frame (and its producing agency) to become agenda-setting with bearing on contemporary decision-making processes, especially within securitised contexts. For example, the EU’s paralysis and failure to locate a common position over Iraq (2003) may be understood as ‘frame-parity’, between ‘old’ and ‘new Europe’.

Figure 3: Spectrum of Salience and Contestation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Dominance</th>
<th>Frame Contestation</th>
<th>Frame Parity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Silenced counter-frames)</td>
<td>(Inter-discursive struggle)</td>
<td>(Equal-play standoff)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Author’s conceptualisation, derived from Entman, 2003:418)

Framing’s function of value-judgements is of significance for the research, in addition to a schemas’ interpretive problems and solutions. This is for its potential influence concerning (aid) solutions as derived from agency perspectives, but also for its relationship with subconscious values of ‘episteme’, potentially precluding certain options from an a-priori, fundamental-level (see Foucault, 1971). With interest for (donor) institutional discursive-struggle, but also broader Europeanization, what may be permitted by one epistemic-community may be precluded by another. For example, Kagan called “to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans… occupy the same world” (2003:1), through divergent belief-systems. Whereas, concerning how recipients interpret aid solutions, it may be theorised that affronting a community’s episteme may invoke push-back, as with Dahl’s (1971) theorised ‘boomerang effect’, whereby communities perceive democratisation efforts (coercive ‘polyarchy’) to be illegitimate, and so resist. Concerning Afghanistan explicitly, this theorisation may be seen in Kilcullen’s (2009) Accidental Guerrilla thesis.

In sum, in revealing knowledge concerning foreign aid ideas, the frame functions of interest include: 1) agency interpretations of the fragile, conflict-affected state (FCAS) (the problem), 2) the interpreted character/origins of complex political emergency (CPE) (the problem’s cause), 3) interpretations of protagonists, issues/situations and historical context (conscious value-judgements, and subconscious episteme), 4) forwarded policy options (the solution). Variations of such frame functions are commonplace within the framing literature since Goffman (1979). However, Entman’s functions are overtly well suited regarding the study of foreign aid, where varieties of aid routines comprise the solutions to fragile states’ problems.
The frames which these functions constitute are identifiable by locating their linguistic devices (‘frames of reference’), such as word-choice, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, speech-acts, catchphrases, slogans, jargon and metaphors (Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Chapter 4). This framing is theorised to be conducted within frame-contestation amidst interactive discursive-struggle at both UK member state, and EU-level, and amongst the two. However, comprehension of the many perspectives and longitudinal ‘moving-picture’ of this demands informing from additional theory – for which ‘new’ institutionalist and Europeanization literature are found suitable.

Institutional framing and the ‘new’ institutionalisms

The ‘new’ institutionalisms entail a group of theoretical/analytical approaches originating from the second ‘great debate’ of IR, through the 1960-1970s, as a turn towards elucidating the role of institutions in determining socio-political decisions and outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996). As such they coincide with the critical-interpretivist and linguistic turns in social science. ‘Historical’ (HI), ‘rational-choice’ (RI) and ‘sociological’ (SI) institutionalisms became the popularly recognised branches (see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 1996; Skocpol, 1995, 1995b), upon which Schmidt (2008, 2008b, 2010, 2011) contributed ‘discursive’ institutionalism (DI) as the fourth. The above discussion on discourse, knowledge, and power contends how through ‘framing’, institutional agents comprehend and constitute social-practice (and thus affect social-reality) through interactive discursive-struggles for salience, and complex dialectics of reinforcement (see Choudhry, 2016; Foucault, 1971; Mayr, 2008; Said, 2003). However, this identifiable ‘snapshot’ of reality offers thin ‘truth’. The ‘new’ institutionalisms offer a dualistic solution to this, accounting for breadth of perspective and the longitudinal-temporal dimension. As Skocpol (1995b) proclaimed why she considered herself an (historical) institutionalist:

By bringing the state and state-society relationships to the fore in the definition of important, substantive problems for research... we were trying to highlight, without descending into functionalist holism, the interconnections of institutions and organizations that other scholars tended to treat separately from one another (Skocpol, 1995b:103).

Such thinking is well suited to approaching the institutionalisation and Europeanization of foreign aid ideas. The ‘state’ is comprised of numerous governance institutions or (polity) agencies (Skocpol, 1995b), as is the EU’s supranational-level. One cannot fully understand
or trace the development of foreign aid ideas/perspectives by adopting a traditional
institutionalist approach, focussing on one organisation/agency in isolation. Rather there is
need to look to the interconnections of a variety of agencies in context, as ‘institutions’
surrounding issues such as foreign aid rarely entail a singular agent. For example, the UK
allocates ODA from 16 discrete agencies (DFID and HMT, 2017:8), not accounting for its
legislation, or other modes of aid.

Were ‘foreign aid’ institutions broadly one-dimensional, comprising a single
agency/organisation, then organisational learning theory (OLT), originating from Business
Studies, may qualify as the theory of ‘best-fit’ to understand how some ideas became
prevalent while others did not. An example of this identified in Chapter 2’s review is Nagl’s
(2005) study on US/UK army learning concerning counterinsurgency in Indochina/Vietnam
and Malaya. However, with UK and EU-level foreign aid thinking divided amongst a variety
of agencies, spanning the ‘3D’ domains of development-cooperation, diplomacy and defence,
such traditional institutionalist and organisational approaches are rejected. Furthermore,
specialised aid agencies themselves, such as the UK’s Department for International
Development (DFID), are not unitary actors. They are distinctly multi-dimensional, as
Molenaers and Nijs concluded:

Aid agencies are politically led, but they are not unitary (within one agency
different actors play a role), or unified (donors are not always on the same page)
or one-dimensional (one donor can pursue different objectives at the same time)
actors. Diverse political processes, actors and interests intersect the long road
from lofty declarations and ambitious goal-setting to real-life actions and
decisions (2009:577).

For example, DFID post-1997 contained CHAD, the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs
Department, which through Iraq/Afghanistan experience metamorphosed into the Conflict
Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE). Skocpol forwarded the example of the
development of American industrial workers’ movements to demonstrate the need to consider
breadth, her HI orientated study necessarily spanning congress, courts and administrative
interconnections illuminates processes of beginnings and ends or ‘production’ and
‘consumption’ through time (see Goffman, 1974), which must be accounted for. Here, ‘new’
institutionalist understanding is also useful for accounting for the genesis of ideas, their
promulgation and their conjunctures, as Skocpol noted of her preferred historical institutionalism:

   Historical institutionalists are more likely to trace sequences of outcomes over time, showing how earlier outcomes change the parameters for subsequent developments. Historical institutionalists are also interested in conjunctures of separately located processes or conflicts (Skocpol, 1995b:106).

To define what is meant by ‘institutions’, historical institutionalists broadly define institutions as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996:6). Interest is in the trajectory of such organisational structure through history, the rules they promulgate, power asymmetries and unintended consequences. Of significance for the research, HI is traditionally accustomed to integrating “institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes” (Hall and Taylor, 1996:7). Nonetheless, HI is a “polity-centred approach” (Skocpol, 1995b:105), albeit of broad scope, looking to tracing processes/trajectories of state-society interactions through time whilst spanning contemporary agencies. Skocpol’s (1992, 1995) analytical framework draws focus towards four varieties of processes:

   One, the establishment and transformations of state and party organizations through which politicians pursue policy initiatives. Two, the effects of political institutions and procedures as well as social changes and institutions on the identities, goals, and capacities of social groups that become involved in politics. Three, the fit or lack thereof between the goals and capacities of various politically active groups and the historically changing points of access and leverage allowed by a nation's political institutions. And four, the ways in which previously established social policies affect subsequent policies over time (Skocpol, 1995b:105).

Of note, this conceptualisation spans vertical agency as well as horizontal politically active social communities, their ‘identity’, ‘capacity’ and the ‘fit’ of policy. HI accepts that institutions operate within a greater system and that the state is important, but advocates that agency structures and ‘path-dependency’ of formal and informal (professional)-routines can influence outcomes. Of note, ‘cultural’ HI accounts for moral/value-judgements and cognitive imaginations in addition to historical factors as through established routines, where
‘path-dependency’ is derived from known history of policy-making and the organisational structure, culture, and values of the agency/community (see Pierson 1996, 2000, 2000b, 2000c, 2004). Although, a given agency may depend on a specific policy-path for a number of reasons. It has been forwarded that the legacy of historical ‘ways of doing things’, whereby “choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is being initiated, will have a continuing and largely determining influence” (Peters, 1999:63). Prominently, an alternative of cost/benefit analysis has also been suggested, concerning interpretations of increasing/diminishing returns (Gains et al, 2005; Pierson, 2000, 2000b, 2000c, 2004). Ideology constitutes another factor governing path-dependency, or ‘branching’ therefrom. As Gourevitch observed:

Within groups there may be reasonable disagreement over which policy best suits a given situation. Where reality permits varying interpretations, ideology is extremely important. Ideology can be seen as a cognitive map, a way of economizing in the face of excess or imperfect information, a way of bringing some order and sense out of the jumble of possible viewpoints and understandings of reality (1989:100).

Such consideration may be seen fitting with frame analysis’ consideration of value-judgments regarding problems and solutions (Entman, 1993), or even Foucault’s (1971) subconscious ‘episteme’ governing the possibilities of discourse/knowledge. Nonetheless, it is once path-dependency is established, that deviations may be identified, as through ‘critical-junctures’, ‘revisionist-moments’ or more incremental-change (Bulmer and Burch, 2001, 2005). The research forwards that conscious and subconscious cultural values/belief systems are important. In part, this is derived from Nagl’s (2005) application of OLT, where the defence communities were found broadly hierarchical, resistant to change, and steadfast in their cultural ‘essence’ to wage conventional war. Within a somewhat similar institutional context to that of the thesis, Howell and Annansingh’s (2012) study on the genesis of knowledge and its dissemination with focus on education and UK universities, found that both institutional ‘culture’ and ‘path-dependency’ played significant roles, while internal and external factors necessitated changes which affected perspectives and structures.

With HI discussed, the thesis adopts further insight from discursive institutionalism (DI), with interest in Schmidt’s (2008b, 2010, 2011) conceptualisation of an ‘institution’, which is more interpretivist in orientation than Hall and Taylor (1996), and Skocpol (1992, 1995,
1995b, 2000) who tends to synthesise HI with more rational modes and believes “causal analysis and hypothesis testing about variations are the way to proceed methodologically” (1995b:105). For Schmidt (2008b, 2010, 2011) an ‘institution’ comprises historical structures and the presence of practices, constructs, ideas and agency. Schmidt (2011) further identifies how the three established ‘new’ institutionalisms are restrictive in their own ways, as with HI’s concentrating:

[O]n the history of political institutions and their constituent parts, which have their origins in the (often unintended) out-comes of purposeful choices and historically unique initial conditions and which develop over time following a ‘logic of path-dependence’ (Schmidt, 2011:47).

However, this slightly reductionist understanding may be bolstered by DI, which adds linguistic and ideational nuance. Whereas HI may be conceptualised as sitting between RI (more positivistic) and SI (more constructivist/participatory) on the spectrum of paradigmatic inquiry, scholars may focus on discourse (or DI) while adhering with any of these (Schmidt, 2010:20), through the interpretivist turn, as DI:

[C]onsiders the discourse in which actors engage in the process of generating, deliberating and/or legitimizing ideas about political action in institutional context according to a ‘logic of communication’ (Schmidt, 2011:47).

Such combination is proven. Examples of scholars adopting a manner of discursive approach in accompaniment with HI include Berman (1998), Campbell (2004), Hall (1989, 1993), King (1999), Lieberman (2005), Schmidt (2000, 2002, 2006) and Weir (2006). Within this thesis, the ‘institution’ is conceptualised to entail two dimensions, organisational (agency structures) and meaning (cognitive structures) (Table 1). This is akin to Foucault’s (1977) discussion *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*; through the ‘meaning’-institution there exists the cognitive issue of discipline/punishment within society, while at the ‘organisational’-institutional level there exists the prison, as with for example Her Majesty’s Prison Service.

Complementing processes of institutional path-dependency, critical-junctures and revisionist-moments, DI may be conceptualised to add endogenous processes including background ideology and foreground discursive ability through ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’ ideas which may promote change and/or continuity (see Schmidt, 2008b, 2010, 2011). Through
such processes, discourse in the public-sphere amongst agencies take the mode of a
cornerstone conversation, or progressive dialogue, moving debate forwards, as previously discussed by
Mehan et al (1990:135-136). Herein, DI further contributes the observation that
ideas/ideology are dynamic. Junctures can originate internally within the institution as well
as externally, as through communicative interaction and debate. Interests may become re-
framed as through advocacy and strategizing, while being dependent upon the legitimacy of
democratic processes (within the UK/EU context).

Table 1: The Informing ‘New’ Institutionalisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Historical Institutionalism (HI)</th>
<th>Discursive Institutionalism (DI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Object of explanation</strong></td>
<td>Historical rules and regularities; structures and practices</td>
<td>Ideas/ideology and discourse(s) of sentient agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic of explanation</strong></td>
<td>Path-dependency</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition of institutions</strong></td>
<td>Organisational historical structures and regularities</td>
<td>Meaning structures and cognitive constructs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to explain change</strong></td>
<td>Static: continuity through path-dependency, interrupted by critical-junctures</td>
<td>Dynamic: change (and continuity) through ideas and discursive interaction (inter-discursivity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanation of change</strong></td>
<td>Exogenous shock, contextual interaction</td>
<td>Endogenous process through background ideational and foreground discursive abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problems of Explanation</strong></td>
<td>Historical determinism</td>
<td>Ideational determinism and/or relativism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovations to explain change</strong></td>
<td>Endogenous description of incremental change through layering, drift, conversion</td>
<td>Endogenous construction through reframing, recasting collective memories and narratives through epistemic-communities, advocacy coalitions, communicative action, deliberative democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Schmidt, 2010:5; 2011:49)

In the context of critical policy studies, Schmidt develops this understanding to call attention
to processes “by which ideas and discourse are generated, articulated, and contested by
‘sentient’ (thinking, speaking and acting) agents” (Schmidt, 2015:172). This thus entails the
genesis, promulgation, and interpretation of ideas, amidst interactive struggles for salience.
As such DI:

Gives a name to the very rich and diverse set of ways of explaining political and
social reality that are focused on the substantive content of ideas and the
interactive processes of discourse in institutional context (Schmidt, 2015:171).
Before this, Schmidt (2010), in compatible fashion with Foucault (1971), differentiated between ‘background ideational abilities’ (roughly ‘episteme’), and ‘foreground discursive abilities’ (discourse), concerning “the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse” (Schmidt, 2010:3), which is understood by the research through framing. As such, in DI institutions are not just constraining, as with path-dependency, but also enabling. Background ideational abilities explain the creation and maintenance of institutions, and foreground discursive abilities permit change (or maintenance). It is HI which provides an understanding of structure, and DI, adding to this tradition, which provides an understanding of political agency (Schmidt, 2010).

However, with this adoption of Schmidt’s work, it should be noted that Schmidt (2006, 2010) adopted a ‘two-step institutionalist approach’, where DI’s interest in sentient agents’ ideas, responses and interpretations are used to add explanatory value when applied to a prior HI examination, where institutional structures, rules and changes are identified as background information. In contrast, here as Schmidt proposed as another option (citing Berman, 1998), the two are interwoven “together in discussions of evolutionary changes across time, while giving primacy to the ways in which evolving ideas affect changes” (2010:12). As such, it is understood that internal agent framing can affect institutional change, in response to shocks/situations of external origin.

In summary, DI betters HI through better explaining actual interests and preferences more so than organisational structure and outcomes alone (Schmidt, 2008b, 2010:13). Schmidt argues this in a critical vein through drawing a distinction between sentient agent’s use of ‘communicative discourse’, stemming from Habermas’ (1989) ‘communicative action’, (identity building, for external audiences/public dissemination) and ‘coordinative discourse’, (internal communication, dispersed polity activity through polyarchy necessitating greater coordination) (Schmidt, 2008:5, 2011). In the EU’s context, ‘meaning’ distinctions between communicative discourse (to citizens) and coordinative discourse (elites’ closed-room discussions) may be perceived constituting of the ‘democracy deficit’, as the latter should democratically be representative of the former (Schmidt, 2015:181-182). Of perhaps most importance is the interactive process(es) of discourse amongst ‘sentient’ agents, with ideological/ideational background abilities and discursive foreground abilities within a given institutional context, where “power and position also matter in terms of ideas and discourse as well as structural constraints” (Schmidt, 2015:186). This understanding challenges
approaches which do not account for such discourse, and rather see policies in reductionist
terms of problems and their solutions alone.

Consideration of these ‘new’ institutionalisms benefits the research-process in simple terms
through providing broad guiding forethought to institutional processes in consideration of
historical context and communicative ability. As a structure (foremost cognitive for the
‘meaning’-institutional dimension, and physical for the ‘organisational’-institutional
dimension) policy and approaches are ‘path-dependent’ stemming from origins, values and
contextual realities. Through the currents of socio-political interactions ‘change’ from
‘continuity’ may be endogenous and in increments through discursive ability, or it may be
rapid where ‘shocks’ of external origin prompt radical internal ‘critical-junctures’, or
counter-balancing ‘revisionist-moments’. Neither ‘history’ nor ‘discourse’ can be ignored,
through the mutually-constitutive nature of discourse and social-practice (operating within
historical contextual realities).

Europeanization of holistic foreign aid

Ultimately, the research is interested in Europeanization of foreign aid in the post-9/11 FCAS
context. However, it is forwarded that Europeanization is fundamentally an extension of
‘new’ institutionalist thought, as “regional economic, institutional, and ideational forces for
change” (Schmidt, 2001:2). ‘Europeanization’ within IR became prominent from the early
1990s, as downward conceptual movement from grand-theory orientated integration debate.
It draws focus towards a multitude of scope conditions, social mechanisms, processes and
transformational-content, including hard-law, soft-norms and ‘ways of doing things’ inherent
within the evolving EU project (see Günay, 2013; Horký, 2010; Howell, 2002, 2004, 2009b;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Infrequently, scholars apply it more broadly unto
European regional transformations including the ‘historicization’, ‘spatialization’ and
However, predominantly extant utilisations of Europeanization explicitly concern the EU,
while adopting a range of definitions, both narrow and holistic, resulting in Europeanization
having many faces (see Borneman and Fowler, 1997; Howell, 2004; Olsen, 2001; Vale,
2009).

The former (narrow/explicit definitions) lend themselves to more rational, positivistic
research-designs and the latter (holistic/inclusive) to more interpretivist endeavours and
methods, focusing on ‘thicker’, more ‘trustworthy’ understanding over the ability to
generalise (see Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009; 2012; Graziano and Vink, 2007; Haverland, 2008:59). As aforementioned, the foreign aid policy domain within the EU during the historical context of interest remained predominantly shared/mixed-competency areas comprising ‘soft-content’ such as norms/beliefs and ‘ways of doing things’, with little hard-law throughout the acquis communitaire (see Horký, 2010; Lightfoot, 2010; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014; Orbie, 2012). This justifies the more holistic and interpretivist understanding of Europeanization being adopted here, at the meso, and substantive-level when tackling a specific situation (Howell, 2004, 2009b). This complements and extends utility of the ‘new’ (historical/discursive) institutionalisms. Europeanization and the ‘new’ institutionalisms have previously been found fundamentally compatible, their mutually increasing explanatory potential (see Bache, 2008; Bache and Marshall, 2004; Bulmer, 2007; Bulmer and Burch, 2001, 2005), while CFA and discursive institutionalism are overtly compatible. The thesis commencing (2013) definition within the (reflexive) research-process is wide-ranging:

[I]nitially [Europeanization] may be considered as an extension of ideas relating to civil constitution and international law through recognition and dialectical or transformational discourse. Second, Europeanization may be seen as the means by which EU polity provisions affect Member States or as an important mechanism for the development of EU structures/institutions and cultural transformation. Moreover, Europeanization may also involve the adaptation of policy from Member State to Member State or even incorporate the formation and exportation of certain ideas that encapsulate a European essence. Through a synthesis of these conceptualisations, Europeanization involves EU ideas and philosophy, polity and institutional development as well as the adaptation of Member States policy and regulation toward EU directed expectations and transformations (Howell, 2013b; also Howell, 2002, 2004, 2004b, 2009b).

Importantly, this inclusive definition accounts for ideas, their formation and projection, discourse(s) and institutional developments at the member state and supranational levels. Furthermore, it also pays credence to ideational soft-content such as culture and values, in addition to hard-law; this being necessary in furthering the tracing of the institutional framing within discourse(s) as a ‘moving-picture’. Building on this inclusive starting definition, this final dimension of the framework pursues the rationale that:
Europeanization provides a means of mapping, analysing and assessing these changes and problems regarding [foreign aid] when assessing the changing role of the nation-state in a transforming global environment. Such have implications for policy options and empowers certain [institutional] actors in the political realm. Furthermore, discourse acts as the point of resistance for prevailing ideas through the formulation of counter discourses (Howell, 2013b).

The pertinent ‘changes’ to be ‘mapped’ here are the transformation(s) of the ‘soft-content’ (ideas). However, it should be noted that through defining ‘discourse’ with reference to Hajer (2009), and utility of framing literature (Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974), the thesis more accurately considers counter-discourses in terms of ‘counter-frames’ and ‘reframing’. But here Europeanization (as a substantive through meso-theory) is necessary for the thesis to ascertain projection, adoption, adaptation (and rejection) of the soft-content within the EU (see Cowles et al 2001:6-12; Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009; 2012; Featherstone, 2003; Howell, 2002:21-23, 2004:11). Of note, this levies focus upon the potential ‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’ of content throughout the EU’s institutions at member state and supranational-level (see Bache, 2008; Gross, 2008; Vale, 2009), to which Howell (2004, 2009b) contributed the potential for ‘cross-loading’ amongst member states (both macro/intergovernmental and micro/sub-national). However, focus falling on a singular member state (the UK) limits opportunity to assess cross-loading herein, although Denmark in particular is identified to hold strong relationships with UK foreign aid efforts (see Chapter 5).

This inclusive conceptualisation of Europeanization as adopted within the framework is partly derived from previous applications to aid and development policy domains (see Bučar, 2012; Horký, 2010, 2012; Horký and Lightfoot, 2012; Lightfoot, 2010; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, 2012; Vittek and Lightfoot, 2009). It should be noted however that these theorisations popularly focus upon the ‘downloading’ or top-down dimension of transformational-content with regard to development-cooperation, often in consideration of Copenhagen-led accession processes and conditionality placed upon aspiring and new member states. This may be interpreted as building from early definition which popularly emphasised downloading, with content first constituted at the EU-level, and subsequently pushed down upon member states, where institutions undertake adaptation accordingly, through a few potential mechanisms. An example of such early definition is that by Ladrech, theorising Europeanization to be:
An incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of policies to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy making (1994:69).

Such top-down theorisation focussing on supranational agency (or intergovernmental cooperation) promoting domestic adoption and adaptation within member states is often found within more positivistic study (Gross, 2008:15-16). Europeanization theorisation has since significantly broadened from this, with the most popularly adopted understanding of Europeanization being that by Radaelli, where Europeanization comprises:

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (2003:30).

Bache, Bulmer, and Gunay interpret this definition as one “which balances the top-down and bottom-up concerns” (2012:68), but perhaps greater emphases remains with the downloading aspect, an unsurprising observation if conceiving Europeanization as relating to broader EU integration processes (of which Europeanization may be considered the mechanism or consequences). However, Radaelli’s (2003) definition is two-dimensional in terms of accounting for both formal institutional arrangements and also for informal cognitive dimensions, as with ‘ways of doing things’. As such it holds broad aptitude, and prominently focusses Europeanization’s usage within IR. For example, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi favour Radaelli’s (2003) definition as conceptually developed by Moumoutzis, whereby:

Europeanization is a process of incorporation in the logic of domestic discourse, political structures and public policies of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes (Moumoutzis, 2011:612, in Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014:1259).

As an alternative conceptualisation favoured here, with multi-directional aptitude, Featherstone defines Europeanization as a multipronged concept through his focussing on the four dimensions of 1) ongoing process, 2) culture, 3) institutional adaptation and 4) policy adaptation (2003:5). This is desirable for permitting Europeanization to be utilised as a broad
mapping and analytical tool over soft-content through ‘cyclical’ understanding (see Howell, 2004; Major, 2008; Vale, 2009; Figure 4). Ability to account for uploading is of great importance, as found in Major’s (2008) study on member state uploading into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). But, it would be reductionist to focus on downloading or uploading in isolation (as Major, 2008 essentially did), as it would risk needlessly curtailing the study, when the reflexive research-process may reveal both, leading to focus on the more inclusive ‘cyclical’, or ‘omnidirectional’ approach.

**Figure 4: Europeanization’s Meso-Level 'Cyclical' Model**

(Author’s conceptualisation, adapted from Bache, 2008; Gross, 2008:16; Howell, 2004; Major, 2008:33; Vale, 2009)

Here, Europeanization is understood as an ongoing and mutually-constitutive process (meso-theory) and the transformation of content (including substantive-theory) spanning the EU supranational and member state institutional levels, as building on Bache (2008). It is fundamentally mutually-constitutive through the nature of political ‘union’, where states enter a cohering dynamic (Figure 5). In terms of mutually constituting ‘ways of doing things’, as discourse and social-practice are mutually-constitutive of each other; member state institutional ideas and EU-level institutional ideas are mutually-constitutive of shared/mixed-competency policy domains (including holistic foreign aid), as part of what may be conceptualised a greater historical and discursive dialogic of production—consumption, entailing logics of path-dependency and communication. For example, it is found that the EU supranational-level has affected the structure and ‘ways of doing things’ within the UK’s FCO over the years (Allen and Oliver, 2008; Oliver and Allen, 2008), as it is found that the
UK has significantly affected the development of the CFSP and CSDP (Major, 2008) – they are both holding influence over ‘foreign aid’ as an eclectic, broadly shared/mixed-competency set of policy domains.

As Major (2008) forwarded in her study on the Europeanization of CSDP:

By linking national and European levels in a mutually constitutive process, Europeanisation attempts to capture the relationship between the actors and the system, between the nation-states and the EU, and thus between attempts for collective action and the persistence of national policies (Major, 2008:11).

**Figure 5: Europeanization’s Omnidirectional Mutually-Constitutive Process**

![Diagram](Author’s conceptualisation, adapted from Major, 2008:39; Jørgensen, 2004:34)

However, while Major utilised a simplistic ‘policy-analysis’ and ‘policy-cycle’ mode of tracing content (2008:47-50), one which is not well suited to investigation beyond the singular institution, utilising Europeanization to extend ‘new’ institutionalist understanding holds clear advantages in breadth of scope, as is demonstrated in Bache (2008). Importantly, Europeanization in terms of salient framing of foreign aid approaches may be through harmonization and the cohering of policy or the adaptation of policy approaches amongst institutions (see Brazys and Lightfoot, 2016:123). Whereas Gross (2009b) argued that the post-9/11 context, including interventionism into Afghanistan in particular, strained EU policy coherence (foremost in crisis-management and reconstruction) as some member states sought to bandwagon with the US, whilst equally ensured renewed efforts to cohere
CFSP/CSDP and locate a clear role for the EU (Gross, 2008:38-39) – an interesting finding for the research to critique.

Table 2: Europeanization Processes and Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Social Mechanism</th>
<th>Underlying Logic of Action</th>
<th>Sense of Loading</th>
<th>Foreign Aid Relevance</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Coercion/Conditionality</td>
<td>Rationalism; Logic of consequentialism with high opportunity costs</td>
<td>Foremost downloading</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited hard-law within the total of foreign aid policy domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accession conditionality</td>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Rationalism; Logic of consequentialism with high opportunity costs</td>
<td>Solely downloading</td>
<td>Limited (Not Applicable for UK)</td>
<td>Limited hard-law present in accession negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic incentives</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Rationalism; Logic of consequentialism</td>
<td>Downloading/Cross-loading</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Aid can little interfere with the common market; limited financial opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global or contextual incentives</td>
<td>Collective action</td>
<td>Rationalism and Interpretivist logics</td>
<td>Downloading/cross-loading/uploading</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Collective action may serve better individual interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social learning (and socialisation)</td>
<td>Change in beliefs/Communication</td>
<td>Interpretivist; Logic of appropriateness</td>
<td>Downloading/cross-loading/uploading</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mostly soft law/norms; low enforceability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson drawing</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Rationalism and Interpretivist logics</td>
<td>Downloading/cross-loading/uploading</td>
<td>Moderate-High</td>
<td>Most horizontal laws/norms institutionalised within vertical norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Horký’s, 2010:4 compilation from Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Bauer et al, 2007)

Informed by the above mentioned precedents, the research design develops Horký’s (2010) typology of social mechanisms relevant to foreign aid policy domain(s) (Table 2). Of most interest this finds ‘social-learning’ and ‘lesson-drawing’ in terms of informal transformational-content, in addition to institution’s interpreted ‘incentives’ (2010:27). These social mechanisms are broadly in fitting with notions of ‘socialisation’ (from Sociology) (see Checkel, 2001; Juncos, 2011; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). However, institutional path-dependency, led by culture, values and/or increasing/diminishing returns, is a significant scope condition mandating consideration with regards to ‘social-
learning’ and ‘lesson-drawing’, whereas the context of ‘GWOT’ macro-securitisation is of overt significance in terms of ‘incentives’ (for instance, with bearing on DFID’s perceived role). As a result, the framework may be said to pursue Borneman and Fowler’s succinct if dated definition that Europeanization is best dealt with “as a spirit, a vision, and a process” (1997:510); the social mechanisms inform the framework, but are considered non-exhaustive.

As interest is not in the grand level of EU integration, Europeanization is not conceptualised a mechanism. However, the formal policy processes of the EU (and compliance thereto) do necessitate consideration as an additional social mechanism in themselves, with structures such as the European Council (EUCO) and Council of Ministers (CEU) holding overt bearing, as with how rules and processes are constituted at the EU-level (see Buonanno and Nugent, 2013). This is especially where they contain identifiable vested-interests, as with Chapter 2’s aforementioned Kantian and Machiavellian stances on foreign aid.

It is notable however, that social mechanisms relating to socialisation are most cordially fitting in consideration of the critical-interpretivist orientation of the framework. ‘Socialisation’ here is demanding of further explanation. It is understood in terms of the process of adopting and adaptation to the norms of the larger power/community within which the individual actor operates (see Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). Otherwise, as Checkel cites, ‘socialisation’ is the “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (2005:804). In terms of the EU, this is perceived as the member state and institutions operating within the greater EU (Checkel, 2005b; Hooghe, 2005; Lahvinets, 2006; Lewis, 2005). Overall Europeanization is considered mutually constituting, with socialisation foremost considered within ‘downloading’ through internationalisation and institutionalisation of roles, interests and the ‘ways of doing things, and ‘social-learning’ considered foremost in terms of ‘uploading’ (and potentially cross-loading) dimensions, where soft-content becomes transformed through (macro and micro) member state-led influences.

In sum, one may argue that Europeanization as an EU-specific, institutional force for change reflects changed values and beliefs amongst EU supranational and member state level, and the impact each level has on the other (and indeed each member state on each other) in terms of formulating shared beliefs as these become policy and polity. Europeanization consists of process, situation and content. Process and situation identify different notional directions that Europeanization may take within a given context, and indicates the means by which
Europeanization may be realised. Through discourse, underpinned by episteme, content provides an indication of what fundamentally transforms or is transcended when Europeanization processes occur. In relation to Europeanization, discourse encompasses an interactive process (the interplay between policy-makers and policy-formation in relation to political-communication) and a set of ideas, beliefs and values (means by which individuals’ comprehend the world), in this instance the EU and relationships with member states.

In light of the above discussion it is presumed appropriate to present a pre-emptive rejoinder to likely avenues of critique. ‘Europeanization’, especially in its more inclusive and interpretivist guise as favoured herein, has been critiqued within extant literature through the common theoretical fallacy that if a theory purports to be everything, then it is useful for nothing. As such, Europeanization may be labelled a façade, or ‘pareidolia’, whereby patterns, structure or meanings are perceived where none exists. Thus, as Bache (2008) noted, “those looking for it tend to find it” (2008:160). However, Europeanization is invariably found because it is indeed ever-present in the inclusive context of ‘Europeaness’ and ongoing EU processes and discourse(s), other for where a policy domain possesses overt polarising cleavages.

Europeanization’s ‘depth’, however, and contextual consequence(s) vary significantly. Extant study utilising Europeanization has identified inconsistencies between law/norms being purportedly adopted, and their being implemented in practice (see Börzel, 2002; Wagner, 2005). This has been labelled ‘shallow Europeanization’ (see Czernielewska et al, 2004; Goetz, 2005; Horký, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2008). The profundity, or ‘depth’ of Europeanization processes in terms of transformed content may be understood to be shallow or deep, or otherwise ‘low’ (absorption), ‘modest’ (accommodation) or ‘high’ (transformation) (Börzel and Risse, 2003:69-70; also Brazys and Lightfoot, 2016:123).

Otherwise, in Horký’s theorisation, Europeanization may be differentiated between three levels of implementation, from the discursive level (whereby actors raise norms within discursive practice), the institutional level (whereby actors institutionalise norms) and the behavioural level (whereby actors act in compliance) (2010:9). However, as discussed above, Horký rather emphasises outcomes of ‘downloading’.

Furthermore, the research acknowledges that investigation of specific research problems, scope conditions and relationships may reveal non-Europeanization processes (or non-EU structures or agency) to be of greater significance. Rather than take the inclusive approach to
Europeanization to its extremes and forward everything within Europe to entail Europeanization, the research, through prioritising inductive ‘empirical rummaging’ identifies opportunity for alternative findings. For instance, the research perceives interest in relationships inherent within North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership, and bi-lateral relationships and the US, as with models of “alliance politics” and the “chain of decision-making” within “governmental politics” (see Gross, 2009b:8-9), in addition to EU membership.

The summative institutional frame analysis framework

Europeanization as discussed above is highly complementary with the ‘new’ institutionalisms. Such combination has previously been found to be a promising dimension of Europeanization and cohesion literature (Bache, 2008; Bache and Marshall, 2004; Bulmer, 2007; Bulmer and Burch, 2001, 2005). Of note, Bulmer argues how to study Europeanization “an awareness of the new institutionalisms is indispensable” (2007:51), to which Bache added that the two theories are fundamentally compatible through both being at the meso-level while both are ‘broad-churches’ in scope (2008:12-13). Bulmer and Burch’s (2001) study on the Europeanization and historical institutionalism of UK government is perhaps the foremost precedent. However, it may be inferred that Europeanization’s theorising always entails institutionalist underpinnings, discussed as such or otherwise. For instance, Jordan’s (2003) departmental perspective of Europeanization is a notable example of utilising Europeanization theory at the agency/institutional-level, despite not explicitly terming it such.


This summative framework, entailing frame analysis, ‘new’ institutionalisms and Europeanization, is purposed towards tackling the research’s specific problem (see Cox, 1981:128; Figure 6). It is through identification of agencies’ frames (schemata of interpretation) covering problems, causes, solutions, value-judgements, and linguistic devices to this end, within institutional discourse that foreign aid ideas (and attributed meaning) may be systematically unravelled and understood (Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974). Through interpretation of frame-contestation amidst discursive-struggle, the period’s dominant,
agenda-setting frame may be identified, from which practice was constituted and power-relations shaped. Beyond the theoretical dimensions of frame analysis, in theorising where ideas come from and tracing where they go, a distinction is drawn between the agency institutional-level and the broader level of Europeanization, which extends this to span member state and supranational institutions. As a result the genesis of ideas, their promulgation, and interpretation is foremost ascribed at the agency institutional-level, in accordance with logics of path-dependency and communication, whereas projection/diffusion, adoption, adaptation (and/or rejection) are ascribed at the level of Europeanization processes, and transformational-content amongst levels. This is seen in terms of Gilboa’s two stages of policy (2002:732), frame-contestation broadly constituting the ‘making’ and the ‘new’ institutionalisms extending into Europeanization constituting ‘interaction’ and ‘diplomacy’.

Figure 6: IFA’s Reflexive Three-Dimensional Framework

It is within this innovative theoretical—conceptual, three-dimensional framework that the analysis of collated data is informed through rigorous forethought. These ‘dimensions’ are not a sequence or order, but a matter of breadth of scope, to be conducted in a critical, reflective and reflexive manner (see Chapter 4). As such the first (most focussed) dimension is where agent’s perspectives, as cognitive ideas, are explored as frames operating within
struggles for salience. It is the second (intermediary) dimension, entailing ‘new’ institutionalism insight which traces the ‘moving-picture’ of these frames through the policy-paths they depend upon, and locates the junctures (and revisionist moments) they suffer, including the framing’s genesis, promulgation and interpretation (by other institutional agents), and potentially revealing institutional dominance as salient frames effect power-structures. As the moving-picture of these agencies’ framing transcends levels of governance the third (broadest) dimension, informed by Europeanization, maps processes of transformational-content through framing’s diffusion/projection, adoption and adaptation (or conversely, its rejection).

It is thus contended that frame analysis (as discourse analysis) is strongly compatible with (discursive) institutionalism, and discursive institutionalism with historical institutionalism, entailing logics of path-dependency and communication. Further, these ‘new’ institutionalisms are fundamentally compatible with interpretivist theorisation of Europeanization. It is in sum that this developed theoretical and conceptual framework may be considered a three-dimensional approach:

- Agency framing – ideas as problems/solutions/values and contestation for salience
- New institutionalism – path-dependency, communication, institutional domination
- Europeanization – analysing processes and mapping transformational-content

To clarify this in the context of the research (on how aid ideas progressed, were influential, and were shaped), IFA may be operationalised to answer the research question(s) by identifying change and influence throughout the post-9/11 epoch (2001-2016). By emphasising induction, the contextually specific aid ideas of agents may be interpreted in terms of institutional framing (ideas being anchored in institutions). This qualitatively breaks down these ideas into their functions, including perceptions of problems, their cause(s), solutions and value-judgements thereon. As such, it reveals the perceptions of institutional agencies during specific periods. Consideration and comparison of multiple institutional agencies (spanning frame-contestation) may further reveal the salient frame of each period. Change is foremost identifiable through subsequent critical, reflective and reflexive analysis (‘empirical rummaging’) tracing ebbs and flux in discursive salience throughout time. For example, the prevalent ideas within the UK defence community regarding Afghanistan in 2006-2010 (emphasising counterinsurgency, including kinetic-warfighting), when broken down into a frame table, may be seen to contrast significantly with the same community’s
prevalent ideas of 2010-2016 (where they had changed to emphasise military support to stabilisation, including ‘courageous restraint’). During the earlier period, UK defence framing was salient and the UK defence institution dominant; during the latter period, Stabilisation Unit-led framing was salient (see Appendix 5.5 and 5.7). Ultimately, the character of Europeanization may be revealed through reflexive analysis of progressing EU-level framing, juxtaposed with contemporary UK framing, to highlight which led the other whilst qualitatively revealing its processes. For example, ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature is found prevalent within UK discourse(s) before it was prevalent in EU-level discourse(s).

Chapter conclusion

In conclusion, the development of IFA is through a synthesis of extant theorisation, to orientate towards revealing knowledge concerning how UK and EU-level ideas on aiding fragile, conflict-affected states progressed, were influential, and were shaped within the post-9/11, ‘GWOT’ epoch. IFA guides the research-process through a three-dimensional, critical-interpretivist discourse analysis with focus levied at the institutional-level. However, emphasis is on informing the research-process without overly constraining its privileged inductive (‘empirical rummaging’) dimension. When presented within interview discussions this framework’s holistic conceptualisation of foreign aid, as applied foremost to Afghanistan, is found well received by practitioners as a means of critically contributing to knowledge, including notably a former head of the UK’s Overseas Development Administration and a former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan (Interviews L16, L19). As a result, it is hoped that it holds aptitude for creating impact through ‘praxis’.

With interest in revealing knowledge concerning institutional thinking, IFA adopts a mode of CFA to interpret prevalent ideas, taking from the works of Choudhry (2016), Meier (2008), Lakoff (2014), Entman (1993, 2003) and Goffman (1979, 1981). However, frame analysis in isolation only provides a ‘snapshot’ in time, while the research focus is on a longitudinal temporal-dimension, and so only goes so far in tackling the research problem. To reveal knowledge on the interactive ‘moving-picture’ of ideas/framing, spanning the genesis of ideas, their promulgation, diffusion/projection, and salience necessitates further theory. Therefore, the ‘new’ (historical and discursive) institutionalist literature is consulted to guide analysis of this institutional ‘moving-picture’ (see Hall 1989; 1996, with Taylor; Pierson, 2000, 2000b; Skocpol 1995, 1995b; Schmidt 2010, 2011). To roundly complete consideration of the research problem, Europeanization theorisation is also consulted, to reveal knowledge on subsequent interpretation, adoption, adaptation (or rejection) of
ideas/frames between the UK and EU-level. This is understood as an extension of institutionalism, through an ongoing ‘cyclical’/‘omnidirectional’ process of transformational-content (see Bache, 2008; Bulmer, 2007:51; Horký, 2010:8-9; Howell, 2004; Major, 2008). As such, these insights guide the tackling of both-halves of the research problem in full, through the identification and mapping of institutional thinking throughout the complex-dynamic between member state and supranational levels, while the innovative synthesis of this theorisation contributes new understanding in itself.

Through consulting Europeanization literature on similar ideational, ‘soft-content’ domains, processes of social-learning/lesson-drawing and socialisation are identified as most pertinent to consider (see Bučar, 2012; Gross, 2008; Horký, 2010, 2012; Horký and Lightfoot 2012; Lightfoot, 2010, 2014; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, 2012; Vittek and Lightfoot, 2009), as are the interrelated notions of communicative content’s production and consumption (Goffman, 1981). Historical and discursive institutionalisms compliment this application of Europeanization in terms of agents’ path-dependency, critical-junctures therefrom, revisionist-moments, and how these may occur through endogenous framing in response to exogenous ‘shocks’, in addition to experiential-learning, and contradictions between communicative and coordinative communication (see Pierson, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004; Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2011; Skocpol, 1992, 1995, 1995b, 2000). It is through the internal influence, or normative power, of Europeanization processes and the transformation of content through the longitudinal temporal-dimension, that institutional agents as historical structures adhere to (or resist) the institutionalising of governing norms. Exploration of this may reveal ‘thick’ understanding concerning the interactive dynamics within the ‘moving-picture’ of history (see Pierson, 1996).

Chapter 4 progresses this chapter’s distinctly theoretical contribution (essentially the building of the thesis’ deductive, knowledge-testing dimension) by detailing the underpinning philosophical deportment of its approach, and the operationalisation of its method. It is through this cumulative framework that the thesis proceeds towards its second-half, and the presentation of analysis and findings.
4 Philosophical—Methodological Framework and Methods

I’m no prophet. My job is making windows where there were once walls (Foucault, in Freedman, 2013:414).

The purpose of this chapter is to build on Chapter 3’s discussion on concepts and theory, and the construct of institutional frame analysis (IFA) therefrom. It does this by delineating the researcher’s philosophical assumptions that underpin the research-process, and how these inform the paradigm of inquiry, including the operationalisation of the adopted discursive methodology and methods. ‘Research’ is a broad concept, encompassing perspectives on truth, knowledge, reality and theory. Its constitution is dependent upon both the academic discipline scrutinised and the subjective beliefs of the researcher as a social-agent (Howell, 2013; Williams and May, 2005). For instance, as an article of research, Marx’s *Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy* (1887) differs significantly to Einstein’s *On the Movement of Small Particles* (1905). This contrast is through discerning what contributing to ‘knowledge’ mandates, Marx’s search for historical insight, or Einstein’s identification of immutable laws. Yet, despite their divergent approaches, both publications constitute ‘research’. This issue originates with distinctions of understanding concerning the subjective-objective dichotomy. Indeed, assumptions concerning the methodological conduct of research must be qualified with the epistemological note that there is no singularly accepted academic understanding. International Relations (IR) as a discipline may be approached from many perspectives, spanning the spectrum of positivist, post-positivist, and interpretivist paradigms (Howell, 2013:29; Lamont, 2015:30-44).

With interest in tracing and revealing knowledge on historical ideas, through IFA’s framing, ‘new’ institutionalism and Europeanization (Chapter 3), the research adopts a qualitative paradigm accounting for interpretation of social-phenomena. Social-reality is subjective, and comprises historical insights, not immutable laws (Potter, 2000:58-59). As Puchala noted, the EU as a political phenomenon itself holds discrete significance to different communities (1972:267-268). This scope for interpretation is especially evident within EU policy domains which lack much ‘hard-law’, such as development-cooperation (see Horký, 2010; Orbie, 2012). A holistic conceptualisation of foreign aid finds a multitude of agency perspectives, including complex contradictions amidst aims and means, problems and solutions (see
Glennie, 2008; Olsen, 2008:168; Pospisil and Khittel, 2010:125-127). These depend upon communities’ conscious values, belief-systems, governing norms, institutional preferences and subconscious episteme(s) housed within socio-historical context. Therefore, this necessitates the (qualitative) research to adopt a critical-interpretivist (moderately-constructivist) approach.

The objective of the philosophical-methodological framework is therefore to facilitate the critique of existing popular conscious understanding through collating and analysing discursive data to expand ‘thick’ abstraction of communicative ideas/framing to reveal the ‘truth’, and so contribute to ‘knowledge’, facilitating of change. For the research, this entails the ‘moving-picture’ of institutional policy developments (see Pierson, 1996; 2000b). Agreeing with Mason’s (2002) evaluation of methodological contributions, such qualitative research privileges language, with the aim “to understand and (perhaps) explain how a specific set of people experience and interpret their social and cultural environments” (in Handwerker 2006:106-107). This is through perceiving IR to be a value-laden ‘social science’, where ‘praxis’ as a via-media permits reflexivity between theory/knowledge systems and communities of practice.

**Figure 7: Philosophical-Methodological Framework and Methods**

![Philosophical-Methodological Framework and Methods](Image)

(Author’s conceptualisation)
The construction and justification of this framework is detailed progressively. It commences by introducing the qualitative phenomenological philosophical deportment which informs the critical theory paradigm of inquiry (Figure 7). Foucault (1971, 1972, 1980) is then invoked regarding the discursive methodology within which IFA is operationalised. The chapter subsequently elucidates how the accumulative framework (including the theoretical—conceptual framework, Chapter 3) leads the structuring of the thesis’ discussion(s), data collation and the applied IFA method. Firstly, however, an explanatory note is forwarded on the research’s origins.

The research-process is “question-led” and “resource-driven” (Williams, 2003:173), with the question’s origins derived from observations made by the researcher when serving as a Rifleman within 3 Commando Brigade on Operation Herrick 9 (2008-2009). This was as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan, alongside American, Danish and Estonian soldiers. Undertaken while studying for a first-degree in IR, a research-diary (comprising text and imagery/video) was maintained throughout. The worth of this data is contestable, considering the researcher enjoyed a narrow perspective, obscured within the fray of concurrent activity. As such, limited weight is accredited to it beyond locating the problem/question. Nevertheless, the observations made unavoidably contributed to the knowledge/prejudice of the researcher as a social-agent. Some observations prompted awareness of archive documents to subsequently collect, while others provided insight into the specific historical context and discrete perspectives therein. However, the foremost subject-matter observation was the contemporary predominance of the defence community within the aid reconstruction and security assistance mission in Helmand, and the stagnation of this mission. This prompted the research’s critical inquiry.

Qualitative phenomenology and the critical theory paradigm

All research is underpinned by philosophy, the deportment of which informs the consciously adopted paradigm, methodology, methods, and their interrelationships (Howell, 2013:32). Standpoints of ‘positivism’ and ‘phenomenology’ have become ascendant. However, the historiography of the process of science, with emphasis on quantification/measurement, reveals that positivism has traditionally dominated both natural and social sciences (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:105-108). Howell traces this back to Comté’s (1853) ‘hierarchy of the positive sciences’ (through ‘theological’, ‘metaphysical’ and ‘scientific’) and the subsequent popular mimicry of the ‘natural’ scientific method (2013:40). Within IR this is identifiable from the

Positivism favours quantitative data, ‘thin’ abstraction through measurement, and usually ‘deductive’ (theory testing) research. Contrariwise, phenomenology favours qualitative data, ‘thick’ abstraction through description, and usually ‘inductive’ (theory building) research (Kurki and Wight, 2010; Lamont, 2015). Whereas positivism views objective and subjective, research and researcher, and external and internal as exclusive, phenomenology perceives intrinsic relationships (Howell, 2013:55-56). While, this thesis contends that all research is actually necessarily ‘abductive’, entailing degrees of induction and deduction, with the researcher a social-agent operating within the social world. Although a generalisation, positivism may be considered stronger in reliability, repeatability and generalisation, and phenomenology stronger in trustworthiness, credibility, and dependability. This is especially the case when regarding non-standardised data which mandates interpretation through the data being of socially-constructed character (Hansen and Sørensen, 2005:98-99). This is relevant for IR research generally, as structures within IR may be social and ideational, in addition to material and physical (George and Bennett, 2005:129). However, with this research focussing on ideational ‘soft-content’, including less-rational facets of discourse such as ‘notions’ (see Hajer, 2009), such scope for trustworthy interpretation is vital. As such, phenomenology is the adopted perspective of the researcher, its deportment challenging the ‘natural scientific method’ and objectivist understanding by offering qualitative reflexivity between researcher and research and finding that “truth may be discovered through philosophy and history” (Howell, 2004c:25, 2013:189; also Williams and May, 2005:75-76).

Within phenomenology, the adopted ‘paradigm of inquiry’ constitutes the basic belief-system of the research. It is the researcher’s ‘worldview’, housing positions on ontology, epistemology and axiology, and influences understanding of theory, and methodological approaches towards attaining objectives (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:107-108). The thesis pursues a ‘critical theory’ (moderately-constructivist) paradigm, emphasising the reflective and reflexive critique of existing popular understanding(s) of issues/situations and power-structures (see Geuss, 1981; Habermas, 1994; Howell, 2013:29; Williams and May, 2005). This is derived from Habermas’ favoured concepts of ‘social critique’, and the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’, where knowledge revealed through critique may facilitate change (Habermas, 1989, 1994; also Howell, 2004c:5). As Cox notes, ‘critical theory’ “stands apart
from the prevailing order and asks how that order came about”, as a “theory of history” (1981:129-130). This is the spirit in which the research adopts the critical paradigm – trying to understand the present in terms of the past.

There exist progressive schools of thought of ‘critical’ theorists (Geuss, 1981). Their lineage traces back to Marx and Engels (1888, originally 1848) and ‘Hegelian tradition’, through evolutionary debate seen in Gadamer’s notion of ‘truth’ emerging through experience (2004, originally 1960) within the ‘Frankfurt School’, which also includes Habermas (1989, 1994, 2004; see Geuss, 1981:55-60). Foucault’s conceptualisation of knowledge/power systems and subjective institutional standpoints is also relevant here (see Foucault, 1972, 1980; Chapter 3). The adoption of a Frankfurt School-esque critical paradigm is justified for its reflective and reflexive character linking the researcher and the research in dialogue, and for its revealing insight into hidden power-structures by challenging dominant understandings within historical context (Geuss, 1981:55-56). Unlike Marx and Engels’ work, it recognises that values shift with changes in circumstance (Blunkett, 2014). In this sense, the thesis challenges the prevalent narrow conceptualisation of ‘aid’ as broadly entailing development-cooperation alone, the UK and DFID’s purported reputation as a leader in aid, and the popular layman presumption that the post-2001 intervention in Afghanistan was just about fighting the Taliban/Al Qaeda. But foremost, by focussing on Europe the thesis challenges the historical predominant focus on American discourse on/in Afghanistan. However, unlike the Frankfurt School, the thesis is not preoccupied with ‘emancipation’ in terms of freeing peoples from slavery (see Howell, 2013:53, 85; Williams and May, 2005:118-124).

Ontology is the paramount paradigmatic assumption, being “the nature of those things that exist” (Williams and May, 2005:200), the relationship between object and subject. From critical theory, the adopted ontological position is ‘historical realism’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:112; Howell, 2013:29; Table 3). This finds social phenomena to be ‘real’, yet necessitating the perception of social-agents, thus ‘reality’ is largely subjective and ‘crystallised’ through time, with internal consciousness and external world interlinked (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:105; Howell, 2013:76-77). As such, ‘reality’ is a product of, and research thereon operationally bound by, its socio-historical context. For example, Howell cites the changing role of the ‘nation-state’ within IR (2004:5), and evolved understandings of ‘democracy’ (2013:221). Likewise, the character of ‘war’ evolved between that of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (2004, originally 403BC), and that of Blair’s Wars (Kampfner, 2004). While, accepting insight from ‘relative realist’ thinking, including
Foucault (1980), different communities’ contextual experiences may produce different interpretations on ‘reality’ (Howell, 2013:29). For example, the interpreted reality within Downing Street during the build-up to Iraq (2003) was different to that of the Élysée Palace, through their discrete experiences and perceptions. Previously cited examples include how the post-2007 financial crisis effected the aid policies of the EU’s new member states (Horký and Lightfoot, 2012), and the effects of communist legacy on latter policy-making (Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, 2008).

Table 3: Paradigm Perspectives and Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Critical Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inquiry Aim</td>
<td>Critique; identification of prevailing ideology and power-structures, revealing knowledge, challenging extant order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Truth, Knowledge, Reality</td>
<td>Phenomenology; verified through practice, structural/historical insights and experience; accumulated through historical revisionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Historical realism; reality shaped by and embedded within communities’ socio-political historical context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Acceptance of subjectivity; research and researcher as interrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axiology</td>
<td>Values as formative, crystallised through time and may influence the inquiry to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Requires dialogue with the research/data and a reflexive process; emphasises the dialogic and dialectic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness and Quality Criteria</td>
<td>Historical situatedness; stimulus to erode ignorance, status quo understandings of power structures and consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Present and intrinsic; morally emphasising revelation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Incommensurable; foremost qualitative, historical and social</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Habermas, 1994, 2004; Howell, 2013; Williams and May, 2005)

This ontological understanding, with reality embedded in and shaped by communities’ historical and contextual experiences, poses implications for epistemology and axiology. Critical theorists view social-processes as transactional and value-mediated between the subjective and objective, and so with the researcher and the research as intrinsically interlinked in dialogue (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:110; Howell, 2013:29). As an axiological concern, values are perceived to be formative, and crystallised through time. As such, value-judgements are not considered static, but evolutionary, permitting for movement in interpretation. Objectivity remains sought, but through the researcher seeking the normative “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986:70), and with the researcher’s (subjective) point of view accepted (Williams and May, 2005:119). It is through searching for context-bound values, experiences of reality and their themes within a fundamentally reflective and reflexive
process of confirmation that critical theory challenges existing understanding and may subsequently reveal knowledge (Geuss, 1981:91; Howell, 2013:190; Williams and May, 2005:85).

In this manner the resultant critical paradigm explores what lies behind existing and potentially superficial consensus regarding ‘truth’ (see Habermas, 2004:10-12). Overall the research may be considered to be ‘critical-interpretivist’, as with the interpretivist social science tradition (see Schutz, 1962; 1964; 1966), with ‘historical realism’ erring towards ‘relativist realism’ within a moderately-constructivist approach to IR (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:112; Howell, 2013:29). This locates (subjective) truth, and potentially promotes change through historical insight inspired revelation.

Discourse analysis as methodology
Critical theory ontology and epistemology influence a distinctive methodological approach emphasising domains of the dialogic and dialectic, searching for truth within dialogue, with structures and theory changeable and dependent on historical context (Howell, 2004c:5-6). Through this, ‘discourse analysis’ constitutes a suitable methodology, it being adept in questioning qualitative data of socially-constructed character, and relationships thereof, including where domains such as ‘security’ and ‘development’ are bridged (Hansen and Sørensen, 2005:98; Howarth, 2000; Jøgensen and Phillips, 2012). It is also justified as a ‘best-fit’ for the thesis through IFA’s aforementioned utility of frame theory for systematically understanding ideas, and how this is conceptualised as entailing frame-contestation within interactive discursive-struggle (Entman, 1993; Chapter 3). As such, discourse analysis as a methodological approach is implemented through IFA’s (critical) frame analysis method, as discussed beneath. Here, discourse encompasses an interactive process through interplays between different agencies/policy-makers and policy-formation in relation to communication, where communication involves the ensembles of ideas and values by which agents’ comprehend the world. As introduced in Chapter 3, this is understood with recourse to Hajer’s latter conceptualisation, where discourse is:

[A]n ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts, and categorizations through which meaning is ascribed to social and physical phenomena, and that is produced in and reproduces in turn an identifiable set of practices (2009:n.p.).

This understanding, unlike Hajer’s earlier thinking (see 1995:44, in 2009:n.p.), accounts for rational ideas, concepts, and categorisations, and less-rational notions and values (Chapter 3).
Within the adopted critical paradigm, insight is also extrapolated from Foucault’s earlier, structuralist work on ‘archaeology’, as a “historicophilosophical approach” to a differential discourse analysis (Lupton, 1992:145). As Chapter 3 noted, Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) was considered, but rejected (as a methodology/method) in-part for its interest in the minutiae of textual analysis and drawing inferences concerning subtext (see Fairclough, 1995, 2015). Whereas a ‘best-fit’ here is Foucault’s indifference to subtext, where:

Our task is not to give voice to the silence that surrounds [statements], nor to rediscover all that, in them and beside them, had remained silent or had been reduced to silence… but to define a limited system of presences (1971:119; also 1972).

Interest here is not “in rediscovering the unsaid… but on the contrary in discovering what special place it occupies” (1971:119, 1972, 1980). This discursive methodology fits with the thesis mantra’s emphasising ‘how some ideas grow prevalent, while others do not’, and the Europeanization of this between the UK member state and EU supranational-level (Chapter 1). However, Foucault’s work is nonprescriptive, there is “no model for discourse analysis quo Foucault” (Graham, 2011:663). Graham contends that:

[T]he main aim of a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis is to trace the relationship between words and things: how the words we use to conceptualise and communicate end up producing the very ‘things’ or objects of which we speak (2011:668).

Similarly, Jøgensen and Phillips contend that Foucault’s less-radical work on ‘archaeology’ holds the objective to study “the rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a particular historical epoch” (2012:12; also Howell, 2013:218). This is the excavation of ‘episteme’, underpinning possible knowledge and its contextual operating. However, here it is also considered a means to understanding Europeanization, and the institutional interactions that lead to the adoption (or rejection) of ideas. Through the adopted critical paradigm, Foucauldian-istic insights into discourse analysis may be understood as not pursuing any one immutable ‘truth’ but “to question the intelligibility of (subjective) truth/s”, where substantive ‘truth’ is “contingent and subject to scrutiny” (Graham, 2011:666). As such, the thesis does not attempt to operationalise a post-structural
Foucauldian discourse analysis, but extrapolates Foucauldian-istic insights therefrom, within a critical discursive methodology³.

The rationale for adopting such a methodology within the research is through the need for a reflective, reflexive, and ‘open-minded’ yet systematic approach to locating historically-bound processes and forces for change, as inherent within critical theory’s challenge to existing popular understanding(s). In the study of discourse, an element of subjectivity and interpretation is essential, and of benefit, as it facilitates a reflexive and abductive dialogue with the research and its ambiguities (Howell, 2013:64, 158-159; Kinsella, 2006:1-3). As a result, through reflexive, dialogical processes, discursive data may be interpreted within the situated context from which it originates, where understanding is pre-determined. However, it is feasible to surpass the original author’s understanding through reflectivist hindsight, facilitating understanding of “underlying” phenomena (or ‘subconsciousness’ such as episteme) (Gillham, 2000:7; Howell, 2013:156-157). Thus, discourse analysis as a methodology, holds strength in seeking understanding of text, language and meaning, while acknowledging the presence of interpretation and ambiguity, bridging the “gap between the known and the alien”, and understanding “other minds” (Williams and May, 2005:67).

Institutional frame analysis: structure, data collection and method

In implementing this methodology and structuring analysis, Afghanistan is predominantly utilised as the referent fragile, conflict-affected state. The selection of Afghanistan is justified for its being where the research problem was conceived, and for its enduring fragility both instigating and spanning the longitudinal temporal dimension of interest – the post-9/11 epoch. Within this historical epoch, Afghanistan was of consequence for, and recipient of, varieties of UK and EU foreign aid instruments and professional-routines, and so is construed to be of ‘intrinsic value’ (see Berg, 2009:325; Yin, 2009:91). The three analytical chapter discussions comprise two on the UK (5 and 6) and one EU-level (Chapter 7), fitting with Jordan (2003) and Allen and Oliver’s (2008) departmental precedents in exploring Europeanization, but at the institutional-level. Through predominant focus on Afghanistan, this may be considered to adhere with Schramm’s (1971) traditional conceptualisation of a case study design, in illustrating a set of decisions, discourse(s) and power structures in context (in Yin, 2009:17; also Lamont, 2015:125-127). However, through interest in tracing UK/EU ideas, analytical discussion is informed by IFA’s three-

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³ The operationalisation of IFA may be considered a Foucauldian-istic manner of Discursive Institutionalism.
dimensional approach, including Europeanization’s processes and transformational-content between member state and supranational levels, institutional logics of path-dependency and communication, and at its centre critical frame analysis (see Chapter 3). This analysis necessitates consideration beyond Afghanistan’s immediacy.

This presented chapter break-down is rationalised by findings throughout the reflexive research-process’s inductive “empirical rummaging” (Skocpol, 1996b:104). The UK is selected given its popular reputation as a prominent power in ‘3D’ diplomacy, defence and development-cooperation domains within the ‘GWOT’ (Dunne et al, 2011; Gross, 2009b; Major, 2008). Two distinct, yet inter-related chapter discussions are devoted to the UK through preliminary analysis revealing considerable flux in UK aid thinking. The EU supranational-level constitutes the third analytical discussion, to facilitate reflective triangulation of traced ideas from this level’s discrete institutional perspective(s), so completing the Europeanization ‘picture’. It is within these chapters that analysis of institutional agencies’ framing, path-dependency and ideational flows are presented. While, these chapter discussions themselves are useful for defining the limits of data collection, through the promulgated discourse being anchored to definable agencies operating within the epoch (see Howarth, 2005:329-331). Discursive data is collated on these institutional structures through further ‘triangulation’ (of method), approaching raw-data from different viewpoints to ensure heightened trustworthiness, dependability, and potentially transferability (Berg, 2009:271; Yin, 2009:114-115). This is especially important when researching complicated issues/situations, such as conflict-affected contexts (Barakat et al, 2002; Haar, 2013). As such, and with interviews being identified as a proven method within the Europeanization literature when supported by archival research (see Szent-Iványi, 2012), data collection is foremost through an interview strategy (comprising 35 elite, semi-structured, reactive interviews), supported by an archival strategy.

The interviews are ‘elite’, through deliberately selecting interviewees for their institutional perspectives, experience(s) and/or expertise covering aid to Afghanistan (Appendix 2). Tools such as the EU’s ‘Whoiswho’ database are found useful here. They are ‘reactive’ through the interactional character of the face-to-face interview process being emphasised to garner insight through positive rapport (see Berg, 2009:105-106), with depth of expressed perspective valued over quantity. Facilitating rapport, interviews are ‘semi-structured’ only, and guided by an aide-memoire (Appendix 3.1). This permits flexible (inductive) prompting and probing where appropriate, allowing interviews to be more receptive to interviewee
responses, and easing discovery of unconstrained expression(s) (Berg, 2009:105-108). Of importance, as the thesis’s remit spans the ‘security-development’ nexus and ‘3D’ domains, there exists significant scope for spill-over amongst agencies, especially where cohering activity is identifiable. As such, following-up deliberate selection, ‘snowball’ sampling is utilised. This is a further benefit of positive rapport, in opening new interview-access opportunities through introduction to new participants. As a former EU special representative to Afghanistan interviewed advised, “the best way to be clear who to talk to in the EU is to ask people, in related roles, who they talked to” (Interview L20).

Of additional importance, the 35 interviews reveal insight spanning the whole policy-process, including its authors (policy’s formation), practitioners (implementation), and observers (evaluation). This overcomes the limitation of the supporting archive documents’ published text, which cannot reveal insight into the compromises and conditions of policies’ formation. Nonetheless, archival data is valued in support. As Fairclough attested, “texts constitute a major source of evidence for grounding claims about social structures, relations and processes” (1995:209). Published works are also found frequently cited by interviewees. However, archives are not considered unprejudiced data-repositories. They are themselves bound with ‘power’, as Foucault discusses on knowledge/power, the voices of some are preserved whereas others are overlooked or silenced, dependent upon a given archive’s source, affiliations and purpose (1980, 1984). Archived data also contains (accidental) omissions and errors, which without complimentary angles of critique may go unnoticed (Berg, 2009:5, 271-272). Consequently, the thesis makes broad use of physical libraries, digital archives, and special collections, supporting the interviews.

This is permissible through EU-level and UK government (and development domains especially) comprising relatively transparent agencies, albeit with agendas present. DFID for instance prides itself in transparency concerning accessible record-keeping (Interview P1), demonstrable in DFID’s online ‘tracker tool’ and ‘research for development’ (R4D) website. Additional prominent datasets include ‘Hansard’, ‘Lexis’, the National Archives, online department pages through gov.uk/Europa.eu, international media-outlets (prominent for speech transcripts), and elite memoires/histories. Even coordinative defence publications are often accessible through the promulgation of doctrine online. Furthermore, where reflexive research generates knowledge which greater informs the researcher’s inquiries, as per the ‘paradox of inquiry’, progressive ‘freedom of information’ (FOI) requests are useful. However, while useful for accessing ‘coordinative’ discourse, FOI requests can be evaded on
grounds of national security, defence, and indeed international relations (HMG, 2000:15). Nonetheless, in sum, this “multi-data method” of collection accounts for communicative and coordinative discourse covering the complete aid policy-process (Hansen and Sørensen 2005:102), and so benefits the trustworthiness of the data analysed.

Table 4: The Dominant UK Defence Insurgency Frame (prominently 2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>Organised, homogenous violence through Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan; perception of shadow-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>Taliban-led shadow-government and competition for the Afghan peoples against the post-Bonn Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA); abetting of international terrorism (Al Qaeda) and illicit narcotics economy; collapsed, war-torn physical infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>Taliban/Al Qaeda as ‘evil enemy’, GIROA as legitimate government; dependency, cultural confidence and expectation of success in ‘small wars’; a competitive spirit vis-à-vis the US military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Defence-led, ‘comprehensive’ approach to counterinsurgency; civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), but military primacy; kinetic-warfighting sweeps including Operation Panther’s Claw; aid in the Afghan Development Zone (ADZ); government-in-a-box; Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT); largely taken from the ‘Briggs Plan’ of the ‘Malayan Emergency’ (1948-1960) and legacy doctrine; Physical infrastructure focussed post-conflict reconstruction (PCR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frame devices (constituting the frame)

- Language of insurgency/counterinsurgency: Afghan war; ‘Helmandshire’ colloquialism; military jargon of ‘kinetic’, ‘high-intensity’, ‘enemy’, ‘warfighting sweeps’; Taliban/Al Qaeda; references to ‘shadow government’; catchphrases including ‘hearts and minds’, ‘ink-blot’, ‘consent-winning activity’, ‘clear-hold-build’; the Malaya analogy; civilian agencies discussed as ‘blisters on the side’

(Author’s conceptualisation from: DLW, 2015; MSB, 2008; Interviews E13, L9, P3, P12, P15, P35)

Building on Chapter 3, this analysis, informed by IFA’s three-dimensions, is operationalised to identify change (and influence) in the context of the research undertaken. Foremost this is through the identification, and subsequent tracing of salient/dominant frames, by which to develop a deep understanding of aid agencies’ ideas, and their makeup. Table 4, above, is an
indicative example of one of the thesis’ keystone identified frames, as revealed through the reflective and reflexive process of analysis (discussed in Chapter 5).

This analysis entails the researcher entering dialogue with the research, as demanded by critical theory, to become familiar with context-specific ideas ‘and ways of thinking’ (Kant, 1995:62-63). Here, accurately identifying and describing others’ thinking is essential – as with Foucauldian-istic (differential) discourse analysis, what is said is more significant than interpreting the ‘unsaid’. As such, this identification entails a manual, qualitative analysis (‘empirical rummaging’) to identify the keystone frames of consequence from a potentially vast number. As critical-interpretivist (moderately-constructivist) research, inductive ‘open-coding’ of frames within the discourse(s) is privileged, with the data driving the research (see Berg, 2009:348-358; Williams, 2003:173). Although, this is guided by frame analysis precedent, foremost found in Entman’s (1993) four frame functions (comprising the identification of problems, their contextual causes, policy solutions, and value judgements thereon), which permits for a consistent and systematic reading of the data from which frames are identified (and may subsequently be compared). This analysis is further guided through exploration for, and consideration of, ‘frame devices’ (including agencies’ word-choice, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, speech-acts, catchphrases, slogans, jargon and metaphors) which constitute the frames within discourse.

Evidence of change is foremost identifiable through observation of difference(s) when interpreting early and latter agency framing (and differences amongst the agency structures themselves). Guiding insight from IFA, especially regarding institutional logics of path-dependency and communication, are operationalised here by ‘process-tracing’ throughout the research’s longitudinal temporal-dimension. Van Evera described this as “inferring from the context what caused each cause” (1997:70, also 64-75). From a critical paradigm, this entails qualitatively tracing the ‘moving-picture’ of context-bound institutional processes, with ‘truth’ located through historical insights revealing agency relationship(s), policy formation and flux (George and McKeown, 1985). In practical terms, as Skocpol observed, “processes are traced in order to discover the inter-sections of separately structured developments that often account for outcomes” (1995:104). This analysis is through a ‘reflexive-reading’, traversing back and forth through the collated data in a reflexive dialogue, while being subjectively aware and incorporating reflection of previous interpretations (Howell, 2013:187) (with keystone frames signposted in Appendix 5). This operationalisation of IFA’s guiding insights is extended towards interest in identifying evidence of influence,
revealing its processes/mechanisms, and the substantive character of Europeanization between member state and EU-level by exploring differentiation and similarities amongst longitudinal framing spanning these institutional levels. Here, correctly tracing and interpreting the sequencing of increasing or decreasing similarity amongst framing (and interpreting agents’ designs and the ‘depth’ of institutionalisation therein) is of utmost importance in revealing influence’s directionality and processes (who led who and how) at this level, especially where regarding the ‘building’ of a substantive theory.

To assist this time-intensive research-process several working documents are progressed. These include an informal research diary to clarify holistic reasoning, a literature database to develop subject-domain awareness, a typology of basic beliefs developing theoretical-methodological considerations, and an interview transcript master-document, from which keystone frames and their devices are identified. It is within the operationalisation of this framework that interpretive attributed meaning within framing, through frame devices, and identifiable conscious (and subconscious) values are found to be significant. Although, as with critical frame analysis, analysis informed by IFA does not focus solely on the minutiae of semantics or “how affected the word(s) may be... how strong or weak a word (or words) may be in relation to the overall sentiment” (Berg, 2009:349). Rather, focus is in interpreting the characteristics of an idea, how agencies attribute meaning through framing (the idea), the salience, promulgation and dissemination of this, and how other agencies interpret, adopt, adapt (or reject) this, in terms of institutional logics and Europeanization. In sum, analysis is orientated towards revealing knowledge through tracing ideas and their significance(s).

**Ethical considerations and qualified limitations**

It is recognised that “[r]esearch ethics are an essential component to every step of the research process” (Lamont, 2015:49). In observance of this it is further recognised that consideration “to the ethical implications of research for research subjects, researchers and research sponsors is an intrinsic part of good research practice” (UOP, 2012:79). It is considered that the utility of archival strategies is largely unobtrusive and non-reactive (Berg, 2009:271-272; Howarth, 2005), although ethical and legal considerations arise where documentation of a confidential nature is sought (found foremost when handling defence publications). More significant ethical concerns arise through the research’s dependence on interviews as a foremost means of data collection. As a result, an ethical code of conduct is adhered to throughout, as derived from cited best practice (see UOP, 2012:83-84; Lamont, 2015:58). This ethical strategy has been presented to and peer-reviewed by the Faculty of
Business’ Research Ethics Committee, reporting to the University Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC) (Appendix 4).

Secondary sources of data and primary archive documents utilised (including policy-releases and speech transcripts) have been deliberately disseminated and in many cases produced explicitly for public scrutiny through third party exploration (Berg, 2009:271), as with communicative discourse (see Schmidt, 2010). As such, ethical concerns are largely limited to the “long tail of digital archiving”, where risk is in referencing digital footprints in ways other than those intended (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2012:115). In consideration of this, original sources and expressed interpretations are sought where possible, including through ‘triangulation’, and the context of production kept in-mind, according with the adopted paradigm of inquiry. The thesis abides by UK/EU law, inclusive of concerns of intellectual property and copyright, and the UK official secrets act (HMG, 1989). Confidential documentation cited (as with coordinative defence publications) have been formally released to the researcher and in instances redacted.

Of most significance, the thesis’ elite interviews constitute discursive data of a confidential nature. This data is particularly useful for understanding thinking within the process of policy formation, notably when coordinative-discourse may be analysed in comparison with communicative-discourse, as through discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010). However, it is necessary to protect the source(s) of this data. As a result, all interviewees are offered anonymity, with their institutional affiliation and/or experience noted only (Appendix 2). All interviewees are made aware of and enjoy the common rights of informed consent and rights over withdrawal.

From its deportment the research’s strengths are in qualitative ‘thick’ abstraction and trustworthiness. It provides ‘deep’ understanding, contributing knowledge on subject matters of interest. The research’s foremost limitations are in concerns prioritised by the natural scientific method. These include immutably proving causality between quantifiable variables, reliability/repeatability, and external validity (the ability to generalise findings) (see Berg, 2009; Yin, 2009). However, such limitations are only perceptible when adhering to a ‘naïve realist’ imagination of the world. They are broadly considered moot to the research, which as a qualitative, critical study is optimised to substantively critique the identified problem alone (see Cox, 1981). Furthermore, regarding reliability, the study may be repeated by a separate researcher, provided that the subjective character of the research is
acknowledged (along with the normative/ethical rationale, where exploration of aiding fragile states is construed to be a worthwhile endeavour within IR). Much of the data analysed (discounting confidential interviews) is commonly available, as is the method detailed herein.

Nonetheless, the thesis, as a historical critique, is constrained by the sources of data utilised (Baker, 1997:234-235). A practical issue is found in seeking access to archives and elite interviewees to facilitate primary data collation. A hurdle here is identified in accessing defence information, due to the Ministry of Defence’s research evaluation criteria (MODREC) process severely restricting access to serving defence personnel through requiring internal sponsorship. This hurdle is indicative of a broader issue in accounting for compromise, contextual incentives and/or constraints and bureaucratic bias. However, this specific issue may be overcome through the research’s historical character, with several individuals found willing to participate. More broadly, access is acquired for interviews through a mixture of the researcher’s prior contacts (and persistence), complemented by building positive rapport and ‘snowballing’ from interviewee to interviewee.

A final caveat is that while this enacted method and its presentation is representative of the cumulative research-process, the generation and dissemination of knowledge as a foremost purpose of academia is itself subject to cultural expectations (Howell and Annansingh, 2013:32). Within the remit of a doctoral thesis, and its word-limit (see UOP, 2012), the thesis cannot exhaustively present all work undertaken. Therefore, the thesis aims to clearly present findings within these limits, whilst maintaining scope for praxis as the via-media between ‘built’ theory and practice. As such, its rhetoric is traditional academic third-person, but accounting for the subjective.

Chapter conclusion

In conclusion, the research’s philosophical—methodological framework adheres to the process of a social science. It approaches the research-process in accordance with Ayoob’s “plea against mindless ‘scientism’, which attempts to find law-like generalizations on the model of the physical sciences” (2002:28). Herein it adopts a critical paradigm of inquiry, subjectively locating reality and truth, and furthering knowledge through historical insight. ‘Scientific law’ is not considered immutable within the favoured interpretivist social science tradition, and so positivistic understanding is refuted – it is fundamentally infeasible to immutably hold a social theory (Potter, 2000:58-59). Rather, it is understood that ideas possess power, language is instructive, and discourse and social-practice are mutually-
constitutive. As such, contemporaneous institutional framing within foreign aid may be deconstructed to reveal social meaning. Therefore, to revisit the chapter’s introduction, the research is in spirit a socio-political critique. In conjunction with the research’s theoretical—conceptual framework (Chapter 3), this cumulative, innovative framework focusses on trustworthiness, expanding understanding through qualitative, ‘thick’ abstraction. In itself this framework may be seen to represent a secondary contribution to knowledge.

In reflexively approaching the research, a variety of research-designs were considered. However, for reasons inclusive of the subjective, value-laden, and soft-content nature of the identified problem and policy domain(s) under scrutiny, and the contextual prominence of the ‘GWOT’, critical theory (including historical realism) is the ‘best-fit’, within phenomenology. Additionally, through the reflective and reflexive research-process, it is noted that as the research progresses its critical character becomes more interpretivist, with greater consideration of co-existing subconscious epistemes (Foucault, 1980). Nonetheless, the research paradigm’s ontology, epistemology and axiology are extrapolated from critical theory, and orientate towards exploration of historical context and value-bound discourse. This is implemented through IFA’s frame analysis within a historicophilosophical discourse analysis. Through this, ‘raw’ data is explored, analysed, and questioned through privileging inductive ‘empirical rummaging’ to reveal subjective knowledge.

The resultant methodology may be considered to operate within the fourth ‘great debate’ of IR, as a reflectivist approach. In reductionist terms, it is a critical-interpretivist (exploratory, descriptive and potentially explanatory), qualitative and non-experimental discourse analysis. Through its ‘triangulation’ in data-collection it mitigates bias and assists interpretation. However, while comprising three analytical chapter discussions, predominantly focussing on Afghanistan from UK and EU-level viewpoints, it is not considered a traditional comparative case study design (see Yin, 2009). Rather, interrelationships, forces for change and transformational-content are of interest, as per Europeanization’s processes, continuity and change. It is contended that findings and substantive theory garnered from this accumulative framework possess aptitude for the ‘impact, engagement, environment’ praxis synonymous to ‘new’ academia. This being through critical theory induced reflection, making agents aware of how they acquired attitudes (Geuss, 1981:91), in the spirit of seeking knowledge to promote beneficial change.
This chapter has contributed the philosophical–methodological approach underpinning the research, and its method of operationalising IFA. In doing so, it marks the end of the thesis’ first-half. Henceforth the analytical chapter discussions are presented, before culminating in the thesis’ overarching conclusion.
Towards UK ‘Comprehensive’ Foreign Aid: Dominated by Defence

Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health (Benn, in DFID, 2005:3).

Prior chapters have introduced the problematic nature of fragile, conflict-affected states (FCAS), both unto themselves and the broader international community (Chapters 1-2), and developed a research framework to expand upon UK and EU aid thinking towards them (Chapters 3-4). Henceforth the thesis presents analysis and findings through three chapter discussions (Chapters 5-7), with emphasis levied upon Afghanistan as the FCAS of greatest value within the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (‘GWOT’) historical context.

The thesis contends that UK aid thinking concerning fragile states changed significantly throughout the ‘GWOT’, and that facets of this thinking were projected into EU-level discourse. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the UK’s prevalent thinking during the early-‘GWOT’ context. It commences with identifying UK framing and path-dependency pre-9/11 (addressing RQ2 from the UK’s perspective), with consideration of professional-routines and underlying rationale, before tracing the shaping of these through the exogenous shocks and endogenous institutional framing of the early-‘GWOT’ context, culminating with UK endeavours in Helmand, Afghanistan (2006-2010) (contributing to answering RQ3). This exploration reveals UK aid’s early thinking concerning FCAS’ ‘complex political emergency’ (CPE) surrounding 9/11, and builds towards revealing Europeanization between UK and EU-levels of discourse, in terms of the diffusion and shaping of ideas (contributing towards addressing RQ5). Explicitly, the chapter traces the construct and projecting of the UK’s ‘comprehensive’ approach in pursuit of the defence ‘insurgency’ frame, which grew dominant concerning Afghanistan.

The chapter argues that UK aid thinking pre-9/11 exhibited a pro-poor path-dependency, emphasising poverty alleviation, which was re-emphasised by Blair’s New Labour government (1997) and the Department for International Development (DFID). This pro-poor focus is argued to be pivotal within Blair’s new-humanitarian doctrine, and socialised with EU values (see Blair, 1999, 2003, 2010, 2014; Schümer, 2008). However, it is argued to
entail underlying rationale from the UK’s historical, colonial legacy. This included sentiments of postcolonial moral-responsibility, complemented by the pragmatic desire for a prosperous international community, facilitating free-trade. Concerning Afghanistan, it also included associated professional-routines of historical colonialism, seen in the maintenance of whole-of-government thinking. However, it is argued that in tackling Afghanistan’s CPE UK aid thinking underwent change throughout, notably through shifting power-structures amidst defence and civilian agencies operating within the aid institution, and how these agencies’ framing of Afghanistan’s problems ultimately invoked solutions prioritising martial-power routines.

Europeanization is argued to be present, but limited through the EU’s cultural identity as a ‘peace-project’ proving resistant to adoption of such martial routines, while framing Afghanistan as like any other least developed country (LDC) (see Chapter 7). Nonetheless, Blair’s government and subservient agencies pursued leadership ambitions, and sought to project thinking into, and reform the international aid regime, including EU supranational-level institutions. This is most overtly found when tracing the UK’s ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature, and how it entered EU-level formal discourse, while complementing progressions in European/Common Security and Defence Policy (E/CSDP) concerning fragile states. This is in addition to UK aid thinking being identified as uploaded into Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) discourse on fragile states. However, through the ‘special-relationship’ with the US during Blair’s tenure, forces of ‘Americanisation’ are also identified as a competing influence during the early-‘GWOT’ period (see Baines et al, 2001; Ignatieff, 2003).

These findings are revealed through implementing the institutional frame analysis (IFA) framework, through the critical-interpretivist paradigm, as aforementioned (Chapters 3-4). UK foreign aid, as a domain entailing historical organisational structures, routines, constructs and ideas adheres to the conceptualisation of an institution in historical institutionalist (HI) and discursive institutionalist (DI) tradition (Hall and Taylor, 1996:6-7; Schmidt, 2010:5). HI argues that institutions operating within a specific context, such as the ‘GWOT’, suffer exogenous shocks to their routines (Hall and Taylor, 1996:6-10). DI complements this, asserting that agent’s ideas possess socio-political power through their manifestation, with transformative potential (see Foucault, 1980; Hall, 1989:3-5; Schmidt, 2010:2-13; Thelen, 2004). With utility of frame analysis, and explicitly Entman’s (2003) four functions of a frame, it is theorised that shocks do not force institutional change themselves, but promote
endogenous agent framing which may. Europeanization constitutes the extension of this in terms of “ideational forces for change” throughout the EU (Schmidt, 2001:2; see also Bulmer and Burch, 2001, 2005; Howell, 2004; Radaelli, 2003:30). For contemporary UK aid policy, this foremost entails ideas promulgated by DFID, the MOD, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Cabinet, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) from 2004, and indeed private, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, thinking was also derived from Labour’s historical Ministry of Overseas Development (MOOD), and the FCO’s historical Overseas Development Administration (FCO-ODA).

The chapter commences by discussing the framing surrounding the 9/11 exogenous ‘shock’ during New Labour’s tenure, including ‘GWOT’ securitisation, and Blair’s framing which elevated Afghanistan’s situation into a concern of high-politics. Subsequently, framing surrounding the 2003 ‘Iraq-turn’ is detailed. This complements discussion on Afghanistan, highlighting how alliance-politics imperatives temporarily overshadowed UK aid’s routines within low-politics, and how the experience of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) in Iraq was incorporated in Afghanistan. Finally, UK thinking surrounding Helmand post-2005 is discussed, revealing institutional-layering as an unintended consequence, through defence agency ascending to dominance within UK foreign aid thinking. Here the defence community acted as a via-media interfacing with historical defence doctrine, resulting in the promulgation of the dominant defence ‘insurgency’ frame and associated ‘comprehensive’ approach. This evolved ‘whole-of-government’ routines in an imbalanced fashion, as the defence community layered above UK aid’s civilian agencies, resulting in instigating a mode of warfighting broadly antithetical to aid, and contrary to EU values. Nonetheless, through frame-contestation, facets of UK thinking, such as the ‘comprehensive’ approach, were adopted within EU-level discourse, while other facets were rejected.

**Identifying UK aid’s pre-9/11 path-dependency**

Firstly, it is important to identify prevalent UK foreign aid thinking in terms of policy, path-dependency, and underlying rationale pre-9/11 (addressing RQ2), before progressing to explore framing surrounding the 9/11 shock, and how this affected it (addressing RQ3). This finds the New Labour government (1997-2010) and an internationalist, pro-intervention and pro-poor agenda within Blair’s new-humanitarian doctrine, including intent to “lead a campaign for reform in Europe” (Blair, in New Labour, 1997:3; see also Blair, 1999, 2003, 2010). Concerning aid thinking specifically, it has been argued that the pro-poor emphasis under New Labour as detailed in their 1997 manifesto represented a juncture of “refocusing”
(ActionAid, 2007:1; also Morrisey, 2005; Webster, 2008). However, dependency upon pro-poor efforts are contended to trace back to historical underlying rationale and cultural values. Further, within ‘low-politics’, these values were broadly socialised with the European character of the policy domain.

By the 1990’s the UK was arguably declining, and relegated to a subordinate role within the US’s ‘new world ordering’, with the Empire a distant memory. This is what Ignatieff theorised in *Empire Lite*, the US’s humanitarian-imperialism, where:

> Americans essentially dictate Europe’s place in this new grand design… in which America does the fighting, the Canadians, French, British and Germans do the police patrols in the border zones and the Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavians provide the humanitarian aid (2003:18).

However, contrasting with this reductionist interpretation of the UK’s role, it has been argued that the UK maintained a cultural “nostalgia for power” (Duchêne, 1972:43), and “collective memory of greatness” (Marshall, 2016:109). Marshall argued that this “persuades many people on the island that if something in the world needs to be done, then Britain should be among the countries which do it” (2016:109), and led to an enduring confidence in martial-power solutions within ‘high-politics’. This cultural nostalgia constituted the UK’s background ‘episteme’, governing the possibilities of discourse (see Foucault, 1971:183). It may be traced back to the historical experiences of imperialism and military victories in both world wars, where the UK was the only European protagonist to go undefeated and unoccupied. It also underpinned New Labour’s internationalist manifesto. While, in practical terms, in 2000 the UK was the world’s fourth largest economy, with productivity growth lagging only behind that of the US (Corry et al, 2011). This justified UK elites to claim global influence beyond the UK’s relative size, as DFID’s inaugural white paper delineated:

> No other country combines membership of the Group of Seven industrialised countries, membership of the European Union, a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) and membership of the Commonwealth (DFID, 1997:20).

Within ‘low-politics’, aside from alliance-politics and defence obligations, it is argued that atop such background cultural episteme, UK aid thinking traditionally depended on a pro-
poor stance, emphasising poverty-alleviation. This dependency was largely through sentiments of postcolonial moral-responsibility, identifiable in historical communicative-discourse from Labour’s MOOD explaining how UK aid “goes to the developing countries of the Commonwealth [because] we have inherited a special responsibility” (1976:3). This responsibility was an obligation towards the wellbeing of erstwhile colonies after the tumultuous period of 1950-1970s decolonisation. However, poverty-alleviation was also depended upon for the more pragmatic reason that it was perceived to benefit global stability, permitting free-trade and thus prosperity. This is identifiable in the MOOD communicating how UK aid must “help the poorer countries in their own efforts to improve the living standards of their people” because:

> World events increasingly show us that we depend one upon another, that we are all members of an interdependent global community. We cannot therefore be assured of an untroubled future while two out of every three inhabitants of this planet are living in extreme poverty… It is in the interests of every one of us that the world community develops economically and grows healthily (MOOD, 1976:1).

This interpretation of an interdependent community of states, and seeking to ensure international stability within this paradigm, represented a vested interest. It permeated both Labour and Conservative discourse, seen in Carrington’s supplementary statement of 1970, during Heath’s government, calling for “Britain to resume, within her resources, a proper share of responsibility for the preservation of peace and stability in the world” (MOD, 1970:1). Such discourse did not just hold connotations for defence policy, but also emphasised the dependency upon aid’s pro-poor focus as a route to global stability. The ramification of this path-dependency would see UK aid thinking looking beyond erstwhile colonies and Commonwealth states, to broader multilateral partnerships. These included the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development—Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) from 1961, and the EU’s European Development Fund (EU-EDF) and Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group (1973).

From within the European Economic Community (EEC), the UK had made concerted early efforts to influence European aid policy, projecting UK thinking while socialising within EEC norms of the contemporary development *acquis communautaire*. As the contemporary MOOD communicative-discourse noted:
The UK has consistently pressed for a major programme of Community aid to the world’s poorest and most populous countries, particularly those in South Asia, which do not have access to the EDF (MOOD, 1976:3).

Then EEC aid *acquis* traced back to the Treaty of Rome’s (1957) declaring solidarity with then-overseseas countries and territories (OCTs). France, of the original ‘EU6’, was the EC’s largest empire, and sought to reconcile OCT’s and newly independent colonies within the customs union, institutionalised as the ACP group through Yaoundé and Georgetown conventions (see EEC, 1963, 1975; also David, 2000; Farrell, 2005). However, the UK’s 1973 accession surpassed France as the member state with broadest colonial legacy. This was evident in the significant expansion of the ACP group as UK OCT’s and newly independent states attained special preferences under the Lomé convention (1975). Henceforth UK and broader EU aid thinking within low-politics advanced together along intergovernmental-lines but in a broadly mutually-supportive fashion. Nonetheless, the UK occupied an influential position, and cultivated pro-poor focus within low-politics, through both sentiments of postcolonial moral-responsibility and as a pragmatic route to stability (Appendix 5.1).

Within this aid thinking the UK sought coordinated solutions. Here MOOD (and FCO-ODA) historically perceived aid to be “one factor in the network of interdependent relations between countries... linked to issues of trade [etc.]”, while arguing that “[n]one of these issues can be solved in isolation” (MOOD, 1976:i). This interpretation of interdependent issues, and their not being solvable piecemeal, led UK aid to grow accustomed to ‘whole-of-government’ professional-routines comprising coordinated and concurrent activity, providing “money… expert advisors and consultants; education and training; research and practical work” (MOOD, 1976:1). This also included recourse to outside expertise. Two illustrative examples are found during the 1980s and 1990s, where use of such routines led to increased returns. One, as delineated by a former head of the FCO-ODA, was the Anglo-Franc consortium aiding the building of the Trans-Gabon railway. From the UK’s perspective this necessitated “a relationship with the indigenous community” and “a good deal of understanding”. The interviewee contended that the French, despite “loads of experience in Africa, had not seen the need for [this]”, and indeed the EU were “very surprised” by it (Interview L16). Nonetheless as a result of this interpretation, whole-of-government routines were employed, whereby:
We brought in specialists from [the Department of] Transport and SOAS [the School of Oriental and African Studies]… to help the [private-sector] companies… government departments in the UK work together across these things (Interview L16).

The Trans-Gabon railway example is indicative of contemporary British professional-routines, but also innovative thinking and potential processes of Europeanization through the crossloading of such soft-content (to France) and uploading to the EU-level. This soft-content concerned liaising inside and outside government (including universities and the private-sector), emphasising indigenous leadership (assisting Gabon’s initiative) and engagement with indigenous communities. Principles that emphasise local relationships, indigenous leadership, and whole-of-government routines to their attainment may now be construed as norms of best practice. The second example of UK aid’s whole-of-government professional-routines in aiding erstwhile colonies, but in a more fragile context, is found in mid-1990s Jamaica. This example demonstrates the endurance of such thinking, but significantly also reveals the utility of supporting military capabilities concerning fragile state situations. As discussed by a former military officer and latter politician:

Jamaica was on the edge of becoming a failed state… engulfed by drug cartels. A bright young British ambassador spotted this… persuaded HMG to use every instrument they had to first protect Jamaica and then begin to tackle the issues of a failed state… they used British aid… to strengthen the police service, to strengthen systems of government, to strengthen systems of law, they used the Special Boat Service, secretly, to tackle the drug smugglers – they used every instrument. And who knows about Jamaica? We avoided the failed state… by using our aid (Interview L7).

Here, Jamaica’s exogenous situation was endogenously framed by the UK Representative (UKRep) as tantamount to a fragile, conflict-affected state. This led to implementing an aid solution entailing whole-of-government routines. Jamaica was then an independent state, yet it is noteworthy that the implemented solution bore striking resemblance to historical Colonial Office precedent, as with the whole-of-government powers of a colonial governor, including over colonial-policing (for example, Ray, 2012:part.1).

UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency, (relatively) high resourcing and whole-of-government thinking was perhaps not always prioritised, yet endured by degrees into the 1990s and found
success, as demonstrable in the Jamaica example (and indeed later in Sierra Leone). As such, within political discourse it sat comfortably upon the UK’s cultural ‘collective memory of greatness’ and was building cross-party support (Interviews L2, L5, L7, LT6, L10, P1). One senior political advisor interviewed reflected upon the UK’s proactive stance once an EU member state, observing:

We can play a leadership role and drive the agenda… it is one issue where we have real moral leadership, compared with most other EU members… most were cutting their aid budget while we were increasing ours (Interview L2).

Blair’s internationalist New Labour manifesto both re-emphasised UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency within low-politics, and sought a broader leadership ambition amidst multilateralism and the international aid regime. This was identifiable in reaffirming commitment to the 0.7 percent OECD/UN official development assistance (ODA) target as a “a leading force for good in the world” (New Labour, 1997:39), while pledging to use the permanent Security Council seat to reform the UN, and leadership status in the EU to enhance the position of the world’s poorest (New Labour, 1997:38-39). Blair’s new-humanitarian doctrine actually spanned international security as well as development considerations, revisiting Carrington’s (1970) observation that “the security of Britain is best served in a secure world, so we should be willing to contribute to wider international peace and security” (New Labour 1997:38; also Blair 1999). This discourse emphasised humanitarianism and human rights, promising to:


This did not represent a discursive ‘refocussing’ so much as it re-emphasised historical path-dependency and underlying rationales of historical precedent. Upon winning the 1997 election Blair’s promises were implemented in practice through replacing the Conservative’s FCO-ODA with DFID, idealistically devised to resemble “a non-government organisation (NGO) within government” (Blair, 2010:24). This marked an institutional change fitting with Labour’s legacy of the MOOD as a distinct (albeit junior) department, taking the (significant) aid budget from the FCO and ceasing practice of ‘tied-aid’ (DFID, 1997:43; 2000:94). This
further socialised UK aid with EU cultural values as “the most successful peace project in modern history” (EC, 2013). Delinking low-politics aid concerns from foreign policy and vested interests may be broadly characterised as the European approach, with aid focussed on development-cooperation (Glennie, 2008:108-110; Natsios, 2006:131-133; Chapter 7). However, paralleling this, Blair also withdrew the UK veto over progress in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), at the UK-France St-Malo summit (1998), and so advanced a (potential) European security track to global stability. Blair’s doctrine, as with the UK’s cultural episteme, retained confidence in martial-power solutions, observable in Iraq (1998), Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000), where intervention was “based not on any territorial ambitions but on values” (Blair, 1999). Thus, Blair may also be contended to have been an agent of the US’s ‘empire-lite’, providing Ignatieff’s “police patrols in the border zones” (2003:18).

With interest in DFID, at the centre of the UK aid institution, pro-poor path-dependency overtly endured in the inaugural white paper championing Eliminating World Poverty (1997), under Short’s tenure (1997-2003). During this period DFID’s overarching objective became the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015 (DFID, 1997, 2000b; HMG, 2005). This communicative-discourse was subsequently enforced by the International Development Act, legally binding UK development aid to (sustainable) poverty-alleviation and humanitarian aid to disaster-alleviation (HMG, 2002:1-3). Greater multilateralism through incremental-change in focus beyond erstwhile colonies towards the MDGs was significant (see DFID, 1997, 2000, 2005; HMG, 2005; Interview LT17). As Benn, DFID’s third secretary of state noted, “the [MDGs] are at the heart of the work of the UK’s Department for International Development and of the wider UK government” (in HMG, 2005:6), and indeed “the response of governments” (HMG, 2005:34), constituting a multilateral “shared vision to rid the world of poverty” (HMG, 2005:7). An interviewed director of DFID’s Europe department observed how this conformed to the EU’s values:

We’ve all signed up to the MDGs, and we’ve all signed up to the subsequent SDGs… in terms of what we are trying to achieve there is an awful lot of agreement (Interview LT17).

Unlike earlier observations on EU aid thinking (Interview L16), DFID continued whole-of-government professional-routines, as well as the pro-poor focus. The importance of consistency amidst structures of external-actorness, through the inability to solve issues
piecemeal, was recognised through the continued interpretation of “a complex web of environmental, trade, investment, agricultural, political, defence, security and financial issues which affect relations with developing countries” (DFID, 1997:50). This theme was reiterated concerning the MDG’s, it being observed that “[b]ecause the goals are inter-related, the response of governments needs to be” (HMG, 2005:34). The security-development nexus featured here, as thinking greater synthesised security/conflict and development/poverty, through a cyclical model whereby “[c]onflict prevents development and increases poverty” (DFID, 2000b:28). DFID, and parliamentary oversight, grew aware of the aptitude for aid within fragile state situations, with intent to use “resources proactively to promote political stability and social cohesion and to respond effectively to conflict” (DFID, 1997:7). This entailed resourcing for conflict-prevention, post-conflict reconstruction (PCR), security-sector reform (SSR), and greater regulating arms-sales (see DFID, 2000:30-35; HOCIDC, 1999:para.64-70). As the oversight select committee observed:

Not only must developmental activity aim to prevent conflict and the poverty that inevitably results from it, it also has the task of assisting societies coming out of conflict. Only thus can we avoid the cycle of poverty leading to conflict, that conflict further impoverishing and producing more conflict (HOCIDC, 1999:para.64).

However, as McConnon observed, during Short’s tenure DFID would only contribute in fragile, conflict-affected states under legitimate civilian oversight of involved armed forces, and where SSR primarily benefitted the impoverished (2014:144, citing DFID, 1999:6). Afghanistan’s pre-9/11 fragility constituted a problematic example, as Kabul’s then-Taliban regime was perceived as illegitimate (see UNSCR1267, 1999). Consequently, UK aid contributions were limited, and focussed on humanitarianism using NGOs, entailing disaster preparedness/relief, emergency food aid, mine action and short-term refugee relief (DFID, 1999:76-77; DFID 2001:90-91), in addition to limited human rights initiatives to expand girls’ education (DFID, 1999:22). This was socialised with the EU’s ‘peace-project’ values, and European character of the policy area, so constituting Europeanization in the broadest sense of ideational influence (see Schmidt, 2001:2). One NGO director, with Afghanistan experience since 1988 described then-aid endeavours as “pure humanitarianism… pretty successful… [before] the international aid circus arrived, generating a work load that is, dare I say it, almost irrelevant to Afghans” (Interview ST14).
In sum, as an avid internationalist Blair sought a closer relationship within the EU, and socialised UK aid to conform to prevalent EU cultural values. However, rather than refocus UK aid thinking, Blair’s doctrine re-emphasised extant path-dependency, and through leadership ambition sought to project UK thinking into EU supranational-level institutions, constituting Europeanization in terms of the uploading of soft-content. Furthermore, Blair’s doctrine entailed security dimensions as well as development. These helped shape ESDP discourse. However, involving (defence) security thinking within aid epistemic-communities of low-politics had scope for significant contention, as identifiable in Short’s tenure ending upon the 2003 ‘Iraq-turn’. Nevertheless, while undergoing incremental-changes, UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency never ceased, demonstrable by DFID’s white papers remaining prefixed with *Eliminating World Poverty* (1997, 2000b, 2005, 2006, 2006b, 2009b), and Blair’s ‘make poverty history’ campaign and focus on Africa, introduced at the 2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles. This was in addition to more explicit poverty-reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), and so indicates the persistent gravity of the path-dependency, and perhaps socialisation within EU ‘peace-project’ ideals.

The 9/11 shock and overshadowing of aid’s pro-poor focus

The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that technological-globalisation had escalated to where FCAS-domiciled terrorists could sally-forth to strike across unprecedented distances, and that US hegemony within ‘empire-lite’ had limits. This exogenous shock spurred a critical-juncture within international relations, surpassing the act itself. Bush’s rejoinder speech-act, “this crusade, this war on terrorism” (2001c), instigated a new epoch of ‘macro-securitisation’ – the ‘GWOT’. As Blair observed, the events “marked a turning point in history” (2001). Similarly, the contemporary European Commission (EC) president characterised it “a watershed event” where “life will never be quite the same again” (Prodi, 2001). An experienced Royal Marine sergeant-major interviewed recounted how “we knew that our lives had changed when the twin towers went down. As military men... we knew things were probably never going to be the same again” (Interview P15). Within this new securitised context, institutions within low-politics risked being overshadowed or co-opted through extraordinary measures to target perceived security imperatives (see Buzan et al, 1998). Indeed, during 9/11’s immediate aftermath, UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan were temporarily overshadowed by alliance-politics and defence obligations.
Exploring the White House’s framing of 9/11, Entman cites Bush’s speech-acts to argue that “Bush defined a problem in simple and emotional terms as an ‘act of war’ and identified its clear cause as an ‘enemy’ that was ‘evil’” (2003:415-416; Appendix 5.2). Similarly, Haine emphasised how Bush’s frame entailed “a conviction in military solutions” (2004:48). As such, the US endured as a martial-power, as Kagan contended, “exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world” (2003:1). A British general interviewed, who observed US coordinative-discourse surrounding 9/11 through a staff secondment at US Central Command (CENTCOM) noted that the genesis of ‘GWOT’ discourse stemmed from the interpretation “that we have to show the Afghans that they cannot allow people to do this” (Interview E13). This may be understood in terms of the failure to deter 9/11. However, it also represented the US’s imperative to enact justice. Indeed, the US’s military response seen in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was originally termed Operation Infinite Justice (OIJ). Re-framing occurred because OIJ, combined with Bush’s ‘crusader’ speech-act, risked inciting mass Islamic unrest, given the Quranic teaching that only Allah may provide ‘infinite justice’ (BBC, 2001).

Under Blair’s internationalist leadership the UK was predisposed to be pro-US and pro-EU, while the Blair doctrine bore similarities with the Bush doctrine in legitimising coercive liberal-interventionism (see Blair, 1999; Record, 2003; WH, 2002; Zonis, 2007). As such, Blair supported Bush’s framing of an ‘act of war’ which necessitated ‘military solutions’, and pledged “profound solidarity with the American people” (2001:273-274), including committing UK troops in practice (Appendix 5.3). This may be understood in terms of Churchill’s popularly remediated historical “special relationship” (1946) with the US, and potentially Americanisation. However, Blair also later elucidated within his memoirs that he perceived “a direct threat to our society” (2010:357), whereby FCAS-domiciled terrorists would utilise weapons of mass destruction (WMD) if they obtained them, which legitimised military intervention as a means of defence in an uncertain world (2010:635-636). Where directly pertaining to 9/11 and the Taliban/Al Qaeda, the EU also legitimised Bush’s ‘act of war’ framing within communicative-discourse, with the EC president reaffirming:

[T]he need to send the strongest possible signal of European solidarity with the American people… Our co-operation with the USA in the fight against terrorism is more necessary than ever and must be pursued with renewed vigour...

European Institutions and Governments will work closely together with our American friends (Prodi, 2001).
What may be observed during the discourse of this period was the construct of parallel policy-paths of US ‘empire-lite’. These entailed, firstly a punitive military response seeking regime-change, seen in US OEF, US coalition-building and alliance-politics discourse surrounding NATO’s invocation of Article 5 (see Buckley, 2006), but also secondly, bolstered humanitarian aid within low-politics. These parallel policy-paths were observed by the British general seconded to CENTCOM, who noted:

The conversations that I was having with USAID about dropping aid packages into Northern Alliance areas to feed the population were being run in parallel from what Rumsfeld saw as: ‘We just want [special forces] on the ground doing the job killing Al Qaeda and as many Taliban as possible’ (Interview E13).

Prevalent US framing, as a martial-power retaining confidence in military solutions, led to the interpretation of a literal war and prioritised the former, punitive policy-path. While, as a ‘peace-project’, EU framing emphasised the latter, interpreting aid to be an instrument within a metaphorical war (Patten, 2002), “to build a safe, democratic world for all our peoples” (Prodi, 2001). Meanwhile UK framing entailed both policy-paths, between the US and EU positions and broadly fitting with Ignatieff’s (2003) theorisation. This was evident in Blair’s pledge to “not rest until this evil is driven from our world” (Blair, 2001a), while also doing “what we can to minimize the suffering of the Afghan people” (Blair, 2001c) – demonstrably socialised in-part with both US and EU values-judgements. Importantly, these two policy-paths were not mutually-exclusive. Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts constituted Bush’s ‘evil enemy’ to be punished. While, for their plight within Afghanistan’s complex political emergency there was popular sentiment that “[t]he Afghan people are not our enemy… they have our sympathy” (Blair, 2001c). Thus, under Blair, UK aid discourse, while perhaps less prevalent, endured in terms of humanitarianism, and arguably the pro-poor focus.

In practice, diplomacy with the Taliban was largely limited to the US’s 20th September demand that the Taliban immediately hand-over Al Qaeda (Bush, 2001d). Upon the Taliban’s rebuttal of this, US strategy through OEF came to essentially repeat the 1980s experience of assisting the United Islamic Front (UIF; comprising former Afghan mujahedeen) in their extant conflict against the central government in Kabul. However, in this context the contested Kabul government was Mullah Omar’s Taliban, not the 1980s Soviet-sponsored People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Martial-power routines utilised to push the UIF towards victory comprised expeditionary special forces and airpower, and
may be understood in terms of Luttwak’s theorisation concerning civil wars, where “[war] can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace” (1999:36). UK communicative-discourse legitimised the policy, arguing:

Bin Laden and his people organised [9/11]. The Taliban aid and abet him. He will not desist from further acts of terror. They will not stop helping him… There is no compromise possible with such people (Blair, 2001:274).

The UK’s legitimisation of US framing, and Blair’s pledge to “stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends” (Blair, 2001a), constituted practice, seen in expeditionary warfighting professional-routines. This was in contrast to the broader EU, which popularly understood Bush’s “war on terrorism” (2001c) as a metaphorical war (Patten, 2002). The UK like the US retained confidence in martial-power solutions. As such, the UK dispatched Royal Navy, Royal Marine and special forces to intervene in aid of US OEF under UK Operation Veritas (including Operations Oracle, Fingal, and Jacana), coordinated with the UK defence community via British staff-officers in US CENTCOM (HMG, 2014; Interview E13). As a senior government advisor noted of this support rendered to the US “when a close ally suffers an attack in the way that America did after 9/11, sometimes it’s very important for relationships that you are good allies” (Interview L2). In practical terms, as the interviewed sergeant-major, having deployed on UK Operation Jacana, recalled of the lower-levels of the UK’s defence community’s coordinative-discourse:

Our sole purpose was to assist removing the Taliban from Afghanistan. Operation Jacana was… a one-off operation that was used to assist the Americans and the special forces… In our eyes it was a warfighting operation…we thought we’re going out to support these guys and oust the Taliban (Interview P15).

Foremost this shows Americanisation within ‘empire-lite’, as the UK rallied behind US military interventionism into Afghanistan, when the EU did not. Driving this for the UK was the imperative to assist the US in practice both through the ‘special-relationship’ at the executive-level between Bush and Blair, but also the ‘special-relationship’ at the institutional-level between US and UK defence communities. This close relationship traced back to World War II, while its endurance was indicative in UK staff-officers’ preferential access to US CENTCOM, as well as prior joint operations in Iraq (1990-1991, 1998), and Kosovo (1999). However, this institutional ‘special-relationship’, where the UK constituted the
junior partner, also fostered a competitive dimension, through the UK’s cultural collective memory of greatness.

Perhaps the broader framing surrounding 9/11 was that of Western liberal democracy, in terms of Prodi’s universalism in promoting “our common values” (2001), arguably demonstrating Europeanization in the broadest terms of achieving a European consensus in thought. However, as Patten (2002) and Kagan (2003) observed, contemporary EU and US imaginations of world order differed. The US remained “a nation in which flag, sacrifice and martial honour remained central to national culture and identity” (Ignatieff, 2003:15). Whereas, the EU held a cultural reluctance and through this an institutional incapacity to engage in expeditionary warfighting to export ‘common values’, through continental anti-war episteme precluding such martial discourse (see Chapter 7). The European continental experience was one of defeat and occupation during the world wars, and with martial discourse precluded, it could not constitute practice. As a result, the EU possessed limited martial-power capabilities during this period through an embryonic European security and defence identity (ESDI). Only a handful of member states (the UK, France, and perhaps Italy) possessed noteworthy expeditionary capabilities upon 9/11, and only the UK retained confidence in martial-power solutions. Nonetheless, agents operating within UK aid with Afghanistan experience contested Blair’s framing, and mounted counter-frames within interactive discursive-struggle (Appendix 5.4). An example is found in a letter to Blair from the director of the HALO Trust, a mine-action NGO in receipt of DFID’s funds in Afghanistan:

> It would be tempting to let opposition forces take advantage of US/UK air strikes on Taliban positions. Please be very wary of the results… Defeating the Taliban and restoring peace across Afghanistan is going to be very hard and will require sustained political will if the country is not going to return to the truly horrendous years of 1992/96 (Willoughby, 2001).

The employment of UK martial-power in Afghanistan overshadowed UK aid’s routines and pro-poor path-dependency within low-politics, as championed by DFID. Under Short’s tenure, DFID prioritised dispensing aid, not supporting a war effort, and so the new agency originally remained within background low-politics (Strachan, 2015:339). The task of providing relief to Afghan peoples in the shadow of warfighting was problematic for DFID due to mandating legitimate civilian oversight while operating within fragile, conflict-
affected states, where it was likely development considerations would be secondary (DFID, 1999b:6; McConnon, 2014:144). This occurred in Afghanistan upon 9/11 where development aid was a less politically salient dimension. Nevertheless, DFID bolstered humanitarian aid, and UK aid resources allocated to Afghanistan rose exponentially, from £9,694 thousand during 1996-1997 and only £72 thousand (ODA) planned pre-911 for 2002-2003, to £200 million pledged at the Tokyo Conference of January 2002 alone (DFID, 1999:76; DFID, 2001:160; DFID, 2002:69). Underlying this escalated resourcing, within discourse Afghanistan is cited only four times in DFID’s 1999 report, yet 22 times in 2002, after the Taliban had been vanquished.

Within the Blair doctrine relationships between (martial-power) interventionism and (aid) humanitarianism grew increasingly nuanced, and a strong role for UK aid was constructed within discourse. Blair’s assistance to the US could not overlook that the terrorist perpetrators of 9/11, Al Qaeda, found harbour in Afghanistan, an impoverished, fragile, conflict-affected state afflicted by drought and repressive leadership, but where the ordinary Afghan people were innocents (Blair, 2001b:111, 2001c:86; DFID, 1999:90). The UK’s recognition of the poverty-conflict cycle (see HOCIDC, 1999:para.64) mandated that to tackle the cause (and prevent repetition) of 9/11 necessitated alleviating Afghanistan’s fragility that underpinned this terrorist-harbouring context. Through this underlying rationale Blair contended “the humanitarian coalition to help the people of Afghanistan to be as vital as any military action” (2001b:111). As such UK aid’s pro-poor focus, entailing top-down statebuilding (and welfare provision), and bottom-up poverty-alleviation, was depended upon within the FCAS context. As the interviewed senior government advisor observed, “it is important to our security that you don’t have a whole load of ungoverned spaces, whether that’s in Somalia or Afghanistan or wherever” (Interview L2).

With the Taliban regime vanquished and the Bonn Agreement’s (UN, 2001) interim political-arrangements building towards the new constitution (IROA, 2004), the British warfighting troops on Operation Jacana believed they would “never see Afghanistan again” (Interview P15). Meanwhile, DFID persisted with humanitarian and ‘disaster aid’ routines in Afghanistan, albeit incrementally-changed to suit the post-Taliban context. Therefore, with the UK’s martial-power contribution to Afghanistan winding-down, UK aid thinking in Afghanistan undertook a revisionist-moment back to UK aid’s pre-9/11 pro-poor path-dependency, albeit now higher on the agenda and greater resourced. However, the renewed pro-poor focus within the ‘GWOT’ context was dependent upon the rationale of the poverty-
conflict cycle, and entailed a limited peacekeeping dimension within the UN’s mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (UN, 2001:annex.1).

UK aid framing throughout the 2003 ‘Iraq-turn’
Tracing UK thinking beyond the immediate aftermath of 9/11 finds how the parallel policy-paths of high, alliance-politics and aid’s low-politics endured. Within this, the UK’s cultural socialisation within the EU, as a process of Europeanization, was challenged by forces of Americanisation, seen in Blair’s executive-level partnership with Bush. This was through ‘GWOT’ alliance-politics discourse surrounding the ‘Iraq-turn’ (2003), where the US’s coalition-building, and the UK’s leadership ambitions, sought to rally the EU behind invading Iraq and so lead EU thinking. However, significant resistance was found within interactive discursive-struggle, paralysing any common European position, as a result of the EU’s ‘peace-project’ values, anti-war episteme, and associated ‘civilian-power’ reputation (see Bull, 1982; EC, 2013; Manners, 2002; Orbie, 2006). Meanwhile, the Iraq-turn overshadowing Afghanistan within discourse further facilitated UK aid’s revisionist-moment in Afghanistan, back to the pro-poor focus. However, humanitarian routines incrementally-changed to greater emphasis ‘whole-of-government’ PCR thinking amidst multilateralism, including security sector reform (SSR) through ISAF within the post-Taliban context. This aid thinking within low-politics was compatible with, and potentially shaped, EU thinking concerning FCAS situations.

Bush’s ‘GWOT’ discourse did not exclusively target Afghanistan but framed the ‘evil enemy’ to comprise “states… and their terrorist allies – an axis of evil” (2002). When US ‘GWOT’ discourse switched focus to Saddam’s Iraq, as part of this ‘axis of evil’, UK discourse adhered to US designs and switched focus accordingly, evident in Blair promising Bush within coordinative-discourse that “I will be with you, whatever” (2002c:1). This convergence of UK and US thinking concerning Saddam’s Iraq, while new within the ‘GWOT’ context, actually traced back to Blair previously assisting Clinton to bomb Iraq within Operation Desert Fox (1998), legitimised by arguing Saddam inhibited UN weapons inspectors (see Blair, 1999). This demonstrated the magnitude of contemporary US influence, or Americanisation, upon UK thinking. Moreover, within the UK defence community’s coordinative-discourse, the interviewed sergeant-major revealed that popular interpretation was that Afghanistan was part of a broader war, “because the American president had declared war on global terrorism, and he had named his targets” (Interview

The UK government recognised that supporting the US’s invasion (Operation Iraqi Freedom) was controversial within European discourse. This was evident in Blair noting in the House of Commons how trans-Atlantic discourse was indicative of “Europe and the United States dividing from each other” (Blair, 2003b), which Patten (2002) and Kagan (2003:1) had already publicly observed. However, Blair’s leadership ambition to reform the EU and contribute to wider peace and security (New Labour 1997:38) sought to transform EU thinking along lines supportive to the UK (and US), and bring other member states into the pro-intervention camp. In doing so Blair somewhat disingenuously framed the European debate as comprising 15 member states supporting invasion, and only 10 against (including Germany and France), through counting states yet to accede, arguing:

Spain, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Portugal - have all strongly supported us… [and] if we include, as we should, Europe's new members who will accede next year, all 10 of whom have been in our support (Blair, 2003b).

This disingenuous framing within European discourse bore striking semblance to contemporary US framing, where Rumsfeld had rhetorically divided Europe between ‘New Europe’ and “Old Europe… [where] Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem” (2003). Arguably, in addition to crafting New Labour domestically, Blair ambitiously sought to craft a ‘New Europe’. This may be observed in Blair’s efforts through Cooper, his FCO advisor, and Patten, the EU Commissioner responsible for external-relations, in shaping the European Security Strategy (EC, 2003) (see Oliver and Allen, 2008:195; Patten, 2004). Regardless, UK executive-framing surrounding the Iraq-turn during the early-‘GWOT’ context demonstrated the UK’s retained confidence in martial-power solutions, and the salience of the UK-US ‘special-relationship’, over foreign policy alternatives (see Blair, 2010; Brown, 2011; Chilcot, 2016). As such, the Iraq-turn had constituted an additional exogenous shock to Europe, where the UK had aligned with US designs within ‘empire-lite’, but where much of the EU had not. This frame-parity, between pro-intervention and anti-intervention camps paralysed any common European position (see Chapter 7).

Discrete to this discourse where ‘GWOT’ alliance-politics refocussed upon Iraq, UK aid contributions in Afghanistan under DFID’s normative leadership pursued pro-poor
humanitarianism (see DFID, 1999b, 2002, 2003). As Blair declared, “when we invade Afghanistan or Iraq, our responsibility does not end with military victory. Finishing the fighting is not finishing the job” (2003). However, incremental-institutional change was provoked through the post-Taliban context of ‘legitimate’ governance and Afghanistan’s newfound international prominence. This was evident in Germany hosting the UN’s 2001 Bonn Agreement, mediating interim political-arrangements, and the UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) being established (2002). Under the UN’s auspices aid to Afghanistan was framed as essentially statebuilding, to bolster Afghanistan’s governance, constitution, and institutional capacity (UN, 2001:annex1). Within this, UN ISAF’s objective was essentially peacekeeping, “to ensure such security, including for all [global governance and non-governmental] organizations deployed” (UN, 2001:annex.1.1; also UNSCR1378, UNSCR1386, 2001). It was further qualified that “[s]uch a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded” (UN, 2001:annex1.3). This need to support Afghanistan post-2001, espoused by Bush (2002) and Blair (2003), was akin to a 21st Century ‘Marshall Plan’.

Post-Bonn (2001), with UK FCO/DFID civilian oversight secured in-country, the Taliban vanquished, and the UK defence community’s interest lessened, UK aid to Afghanistan escalated, but maintained its humanitarian and ‘emergency aid’ focus. This entailed greater utility of NGO’s through the “international aid circus” (Interview ST14), and whole-of-government routines in pursuit of disaster-relief and PCR, while supporting multilateralism, including through the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Notably, this involved DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) and new (since 2000) inter-departmental Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) monies. These resourced four of Afghanistan’s new Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), to assist the reach of Afghan governance into the provinces, with the UK leading PRTs in Maymaneh and Mazar-e-Sharif (see HOCDC, 2003:12; HOCDC, 2007:8; HOCIDC, 2004:Ev15; Stapleton, 2003). As DFID reported within communicative-discourse:

Since [9/11], we have contributed over £110 million [to PCR/disaster-relief]… initially provided through multilateral agencies (such as UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs) to address immediate humanitarian needs and refugee assistance… We also provided £4.8 million specifically for de-mining… [and] funds direct to the new Transitional Administration through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and… help to clear Afghanistan’s historical arrears to
the International Development Banks, releasing up to $1 billion (£628 million) in highly concessional loans to support development (2003:85).

This aid provision was socialised within EU ‘peace-project’ values, and innovative through inter-departmental resourcing within whole-of-government routines. It was setting a valuable precedent for EU thinking concerning FCAS. Indeed, under the UN’s mandate UK aid was well placed to assert a leadership role within the EU through experience in bolstering the institutions of erstwhile colonies, seen in the 1990s Jamaica example. Within conflict-affected contexts, this included the defence community’s historical professional-routines of colonial-policing. In contrast, the legacy of the ‘Blackhawk Down’ debacle in Somalia (1993), during the Clinton administration, resulted in US military culture being uncomfortable with peacekeeping (Bowden, 2000; Connaughton, 2002:89). UK competencies and confidence here led to instigating and inaugural command of ISAF’s Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMB) under Operation Fingal and subsequently Herrick 1-3 (see BBC, 2001b; UN, 2001b). Europeanization may be identified here through the cross-loading of routines, as additional EU member states, including France, Germany and Spain subsequently participated in the KMB, and in a manner broadly fitting with the European character of aid, using minimal force, and seeking indigenous consent. Indicative of the KMB’s compatibility with EU values, member states’ troop contributions consistently favoured supporting ISAF, in preference to US OEF. The KMB may further be interpreted as precedential in shaping future CSDP and EU Force (EUFOR) endeavours (see Chapter 7).

Meanwhile, the UK’s Iraq-turn proved contentious within discourse, and was broadly framed a mistake (see Brown, 2011; Chilcot, 2016; Fairweather, 2011; Interview L2). Destroying Saddam’s regime had proven easier than managing the post-conflict reconstruction. As Cross elucidated, the US-led protagonists “were war-fighters [who had rebuffed] any attempts to introduce Phase IV reconstruction planners” (2005:70). Subsequently, reconstruction efforts floundered amid what Holmes described as “a postmodern conflict comprising extreme violence” (2007:135), and the UK’s contribution in Basra grew tenuous as insecurity escalated (Cross, 2005:70-72). Significantly, however, the experience of floundering PCR in Iraq affected UK aid’s institutional thinking and structure, which then shaped aid in Afghanistan (Interviews L8, L18, L19). Changes included greater emphasising PRTs (termed Joint Regional Teams in Iraq), but more significantly, the 2004 genesis of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). That a new agency was established through the Iraq-turn,
rather than just extant structures adapted, is indicative of the period’s significant pressure to change institutional thinking (see Bulmer and Burch, 2001:80-82).

Then prevalent understanding of PCR was to pursue (foremost physical) reconstruction “when war is declared officially at an end” (HOCIDC, 1999:para.64). This framing endured, for example Ashdown declared, “what needs to be done – bring the rebuilders in straight after the solders have finished fighting” (2009). However, UK aid’s institutional-level coordinative-discourse grew to perceive that this framing did not account for fragility-led endemic conflict through the poverty-conflict cycle. An interviewed senior FCO/PCRU official detailed this as “the difficulty of identifying when you’re ‘post’ and ‘during’ conflict, when there still seemed to be quite a lot of violence some years after intervention” (Interview L19). An interviewed senior FCO official elucidated that “the lesson taken from Iraq”:

Was the problem was a failure literally to build power-stations and rebuild houses and police-stations and all the rest of it… putting emphasis on security and development actors working together and having electricians and plumbers on the backs of your tanks to fix things as soon as you’ve broken them (Interview L18).

This early-PCR thinking, incrementally-changed through the Iraq experience, was rudimentary, emphasising physical reconstruction alongside and in the immediate aftermath of martial-power routines (Ashdown, 2009; Interviews L8 L18, L19). Nonetheless, it was significant for further institutionalising pro-poor path-dependency through the poverty-conflict cycle (and conceptually broader security-development nexus) within the FCAS context. Formed as an inter-departmental agency to learn from the Iraq-turn and improve UK aid (interview L8), the PCRU interfaced across the ‘3D’ domains of Diplomacy (FCO), Development (DFID) and Defence (MOD), so that ‘Phase IV’ reconstruction would not again be neglected (Interviews L8, L19). As such, it facilitated endogenous institutional-change by formalising whole-of-government thinking and professional-routines within the ‘GWOT’.

Concurrent to the Iraq experience, UK aid’s reverted pro-poor policy-path in Afghanistan struggled with endemic violence (Interview L19). Observers such as Cassidy (2004, 2005), Giustozzi (2007) and Pounds (2008) warned of a renewed ‘Neo-Taliban’ ideological insurgency, growing since 2003. Conspicuously, the Taliban were not represented in the 2001 Bonn Agreement, whereas the UIF former-mujahedeen warlords who vanquished them demanded the UN recognise their “heroic role” (UN, 2001:annex.III). In what Gannon termed “a deal with the devil(s)”, the UIF went on to dominate Bonn’s interim administration
in Kabul (2004:36), and Karzai’s latter government. Gannon observed how “Karzai has praised the [UIF] mujahedeen as heroes… but that is not how ordinary Afghans view them” (2004:39). As such, during the post-2001 settlement the UIF were privileged and all opposition ‘othered’ by exclusionary practice. This was despite the Taliban never being militarily defeated in south Afghanistan (Pashtunistan). This is what cautionary counter-fames had forewarned (for example Willoughby, 2001), as Bonn provided international legitimacy to the (majority Shi-ite) UIF warlords that would become the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), despite them lacking indigenous support in (majority Sunni) Pashtunistan. The Iraq-turn grew to be framed in the UK as an unnecessary distraction from Afghanistan, which hindered progress. An interviewed senior government advisor observed with hindsight:

> The great tragedy post-9/11 was not that we acted in Afghanistan – was that we didn’t act in Afghanistan and focus all our resources there, instead of becoming distracted and spending trillions of dollars in [Iraq] which we should never have become involved in (Interview L2).

This distraction posed by the Iraq-turn resulted in curtailed attention on Afghanistan, and the stagnation of the ongoing complex political emergency. However, the UN Security Council had authorised the “expansion of the [ISAF] mandate outside of Kabul” expanding the sovereignty of the UIF/GIROA (UNSCR1510, 2003:2). This necessitated a broader multilateral effort than that of the KMB, and led to UN ISAF being placed under NATO’s operational control:

> [T]o enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists (NATO, 2015).

The UK had legitimised this, with Blair stating “if Afghanistan needs more troops from the international community to police outside Kabul, our duty is to get them” (2003). That this expanded ISAF mandate, with its third-stage taking ISAF to south Afghanistan in 2006, coincided with the deteriorating situation in Iraq, provided the UK government with an opportunity to re-frame foreign policy priorities (Interview L18). This led to a revisionist-moment which again focussed UK alliance-politics upon Afghanistan, a refocussing that permitted Blair to honour his ‘special-relationship’ commitments to Bush within the ‘GWOT’, while framing an honourable withdrawal from the Iraq debacle. The interviewed
British general recalled how within the UK defence community’s coordinative-discourse Afghanistan was framed as “the good war” (also Fairweather, 2015) with:

The opportunity to get out of Iraq in 2006 and shift focus into Afghanistan being two-sides of the same coin. As we drew-down in Iraq we would ramp-up in Afghanistan (Interview E13).

The revisionist-moment was predicated by Whitehall policy-planners interpreting Afghanistan to be a “softer”, more viable alternative for the UK, when compared with Iraq (Interview L18). This was a gambit taken from Cold War history, where the UK had aided the US by countering Maoist-insurgency in Malaya (1948-1960) and elsewhere, while sidestepping intervention in Vietnam (1955-1973).

However, the UK defence community also held a bureaucratic vested interest to find a new ‘small war’, to justify high defence resourcing. One senior diplomat interviewed lamented how the defence community’s drawdown in Iraq and escalation in Afghanistan to garrison the provinces was “viewed as an opportunity to keep and use the battlegroups from Iraq”. Underpinning this was the PCR rationale pushed by the defence community that “you have to secure the area otherwise you can’t deliver the aid” (Interview L9). This bureaucratic interest actually related to an older institutional path-dependency, not of UK aid, but defence. As an island nation with defence imperatives largely falling upon the Royal Navy, the army had since the 1660’s, depended upon ‘small wars’ such as colonial-policing and counterinsurgency to justify its number of regiments beyond the sovereign’s guard, if not its very existence (Callwell, 2012; Mallinson, 2011). Through this experience the army had constructed its own cultural “expectation of success” when undertaking such tasks (Mallinson, 2011:83), within the UK’s broader ‘collective memory of greatness’.

Nevertheless, within interactive discursive-struggle counter-frames were promulgated, not least from ‘third-sector’ aid communities, who wished for civilian humanitarian activity alone (Willoughby, 2001; Interviews LT11, ST14). But, also including Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff, who “kept saying, ‘are we sure we’re not going to get our hands stuck in a manacle’” (Interview E13).

The UK’s communicative-discourse evolving to legitimise increased UK aid interventionism into Afghanistan, in-lieu of the Iraq debacle, fitted with broader multilateralism, the UN mandate and EU values. However, it again saw UK aid’s pro-poor focus in Afghanistan subsumed within the context of ‘GWOT’ alliance-politics. The 2001-2006 period, including
2001-2002’s counter-terror warfighting in Afghanistan, the 2003 Iraq-turn and decision-making to reprioritise ISAF, may be interpreted as the height of Americanisation during this period. Nonetheless, UK aid’s pro-poor thinking itself endured, albeit dependent upon poverty-conflict cycle rationale. Moreover, where UK aid thinking concerning Afghanistan evaded being overshadowed by alliance-politics, it was not only demonstrably socialised to the European character of aid, it was at times innovative and potentially led EU aid thinking, while setting valuable precedents for then embryonic CSDP frameworks.

The salient ‘insurgency’ frame and unintended ascendance of defence agency
Blair’s support of Bush in the ‘GWOT’ by refocusing upon Afghanistan during ISAF’s expansion (2003-2006) amplified holistic UK aid as the alliance-politics policy-path and aid’s low-politics pro-poor policy-path converged. However, defence contributions notionally constituted just one component of whole-of-government professional-routines within the framed solution, with a small brigade deploying to Helmand, peacekeeping for the PRT. As the secretary of state for defence declared, “[w]e would be perfectly happy to leave in three years and without firing one shot because our job is to protect the reconstruction” (Reid, in BBC, 2006), in what defence coordinative-discourse “regarded as a principally humanitarian and stability operation” (Interview E13). Considering the EU’s limited utility of martial-power following the KMB precedent, seen in EUFOR Artemis in the DR Congo (2003) for example, this fitted with contemporary EU thinking.

Meanwhile DFID’s leadership over UK aid’s pro-poor focus had stepped-off from prioritising humanitarianism (through CHAD) and ‘disaster aid’ during Short’s tenure, towards a PCR focus that looked to longer-term development-cooperation post-2003. Here, initiatives such as DFID’s Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme (ASP) complemented broader multilateral and EU efforts (see DFID, 2006, 2006b, 2007, 2009). This reconstruction and development-cooperation constituted a mixture of peacebuilding and statebuilding. It empowered Afghan central-governance through the World Bank’s ARTF (and other issue-specific trust funds), while supporting the Afghanistan Compact process, which itself was significant for being instigated through the 2006 London conference (GIROA, 2006). This built towards the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) process, and the associated Development Partnership Arrangement (DPA). These efforts broadly adhered to UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency, as underpinned by the poverty-conflict cycle, entailing capacity-building and good governance to facilitate welfare provision (see Bennet et al, 2009). However, not all aid actors supported the shift towards
development-cooperation, demonstrable in counter-frames, as espoused by Médecins Sans Frontières (UK) critiquing that:

[M]ost of us were considering that Afghanistan was in a conflict-situation [but] the UK were saying “we’re all about reconstruction and peacebuilding”, whereas we considered it a humanitarian situation (Interview LT11).

Nonetheless, under DFID’s leadership, UK aid’s civilian agencies provided innovative assistance, with a specific fragile states work-stream promulgating FCAS-specific solutions (see DFID, 2005, 2005b, 2010). Further to the inter-departmental PCRU and pooled conflict monies, UK aid’s whole-of-government professional-routines were facilitated through the 2005 genesis of the Afghanistan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit (ADIDU), assisting both DFID’s efforts and the FCO’s British Embassy Drugs Team (BEDT) to enact the UK’s counter-narcotics focus under the G8 ‘lead-nation’ framework (ADIDU, 2006, 2007). A DFID report evaluating Afghanistan country programmes critiqued UK aid’s efforts as weak in areas, including DFID’s own stabilisation programme (ASP) and Strengthening Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan Project (SCNIAP). However UK aid’s civilian agencies were found highly influential in other areas, including the ADIDU, which was credited as successfully influencing ISAF (including EU) partners against countering-narcotics through punitive measures (ADIDU, 2007; Bennet et al, 2009:3-6).

Contemporaneously UK aid’s progressive whole-of-government routines were being uploaded into OECD thinking, benefiting from PCRU and ADIDU experience, as well as DFID’s work-stream on fragile states, emphasising “joint working with other Government Departments” (DFID, 2005b:6). This was deliberate uploading, via the Development Assistance Committee’s Fragile States Group (DAC-FSG), instigated in 2003 with the UK as co-chair. It was also observable in Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States (OECD, 2006), which elucidated links amongst “political, security, economic and administrative domains” (OECD, 2006:7). Further, in 2005 the UK hosted the senior-level forum on fragile states in London, from which the OECD drafted ten Fragile States Principles (FSPs), prioritising local-context, statebuilding, and peacebuilding, while warning against exclusionary and other harmful practices (OECD, 2006, 2011:45-47). These principles were predominantly derived from UK experiences and DFID’s fragile-states work-stream, and subsequently diffused throughout OECD members, including the EC and EU member states.
This may be understood as a further conduit of Europeanization, albeit an indirect one outside of formal EU institutional structures.

However, UK aid’s innovative pro-poor focus suffered a significant exogenous shock when the UK refocussed upon Helmand in Afghanistan, and redirected ISAF contributions accordingly. This shock was the occurrence of radically escalated violence, which undermined development-cooperation during 16 Air Assault Brigade’s deployment on Herrick 4 (2006), when UK troops increased from a few hundred to 4,500. The brigade characterised this escalated violence as “the Taliban offensive” (Mallinson, 2011:14), in what one of the PCRU’s original stabilisation advisors (a retired army brigadier), and the broader UK defence community, framed as “an ideologically inspired insurgency” (Pounds, 2008:225). The Brigadier also identified the counter-frame to this, contending that “the insurgency was triggered by the arrival of significant Western military forces” (2008:230), but argued:

The truth is that the insurgency was quietly well underway but had no need to take military action, since there was little to challenge their growing activity… with many areas already run by a Taliban shadow administration (2008:230-231).

This ‘insurgency’ frame grew dominant concerning Helmand, and ultimately agenda-setting (Appendix 5.5). As such, the ‘insurgency’ frame’s schema promoting kinetic-counterinsurgency as the solution resulted in significant institutional change within the UK, with defence agency dominating UK aid thinking in Whitehall, and in Helmand itself. The subsequent Herrick tour’s commander (the interviewed general) described his pre-tour training as optimised for peacekeeping, whereas:

By the time we finished training the meltdown actually took place… so we trained to go for one mission… but the mission we ended up going into was completely different… it was what I termed high-intensity counterinsurgency (Interview E13).

This defence-led re-framing of the aid mission into kinetic-counterinsurgency, a mode of war against an irregular but organised enemy (Galula, 1964; MOD, 2009; Murden, 2009:8), was not through Blair’s (or Brown’s) consciously pursuing warfighting as a solution to security imperatives (as with 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq). It was what historical institutionalists such as Hall and Taylor (1995) and Skocpol (1996) may term institutional unintended
consequences. These consequences may be understood as resulting from Bonn’s (problematic) interim arrangements which failed to reconcile the ‘othered’ Taliban and their supporters in Pashtunistan, combined with the UK defence community’s historical path-dependency when perceiving insurgency, drawn from colonial-policing. Furthermore, political leadership to keep the mission to its mandate was incongruent, under five different Labour defence secretaries (2005-2010).

Foremost, UK troops rotating into Helmand held recent experience of counter-terrorism warfighting in Afghanistan (2001-2002) and fraught counterinsurgency within Iraq (2004-2009). Afghanistan was interpreted to be “the good war” (Interview E13; also Fairweather, 2015), and presented what one British general purportedly termed, the opportunity to “fight a proper war” (Interview P12). The Army’s own campaign study found “by 2008 there was a growing sense that we had ‘tried to fit the campaign to the Army’” (DLW, 2015:xxxv), indeed the Chief of the Defence Staff declared, from 2009 “we had to go on a ‘war footing’” (Richards 2013, in DLW, 2015:xxxv). This discourse demonstrated how the defence community, dependent on ‘small wars’, was culturally inclined to solve perceived organised violence with violence. In practice this entailed the brigade of 4,500 by end-2006 growing to 9,500 by 2010 (DLW, 2015). Many of this number were “aggressive shock-troops intent on killing an enemy” (Interview P12), as opposed to those more inclined to peacekeeping. As one officer reported to The Sunday Times:

> We had all these study days before deploying, looking at how we dealt with the Malaya insurgency of the 1950s and how we were going to use the same strategy of first creating these secure zones or ink-spots around the main locations of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk (Docherty, in Lamb, 2006:3).

This suggests the UK defence community was not orientated towards ISAF’s peacekeeping mission (as with the prior KMB) but rapidly branched away from this mandate, and indeed the mission’s European character. Rather, the salient defence ‘insurgency’ frame in Afghanistan encouraged employing professional-routines taken from historical experience in Kenya (1952-1960), Cyprus (1954-1959), and the ‘Briggs’ Plan’ from the ‘Malayan Emergency’ (1948-1960), where UK counterinsurgency routines were honed. These entailed ‘new villages’ (securing indigenous communities), ‘warfighting sweeps’ (killing terrorists/insurgents) and ‘executive committees’ (for cohering activity), supported by ‘ink-blot’ focussed consent winning activity to win ‘hearts and minds’ (targeted aid projects to
inspire societal-support) (see Hack, 1999b, 2000; Short, 1975, 1979; Stubbs, 1989). Some of these routines, such as ‘hearts and minds’, dated back to the 1700s, seen in the opening of Highland schools, funded from seized Jacobite estates (Mallinson, 2011:102). Others, such as ‘ink-blot’ potentially derived from French colonialism and tache d’huile, or ‘oil-spot’ (see Finch, 2013; Griffin, 2009). Regardless, they were of distinct colonial path-dependency, derived from the defence community’s historical dependence on colonial-policing to justify its existence, despite Helmand not being an erstwhile colony, and despite ISAF’s UN mandate being discrete to such precedent.

Such martial thinking was governed by a variety of UK defence agencies, such as the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), and Army Land Warfare Centre (LWC) (see Hazel, 2008:156). Insurgency framing in Afghanistan grew in salience as expert commentators abetted a greater discourse of counterinsurgency (see Cassidy, 2004; Donnelly and Schmitt, 2008; Giustozzi, 2007; Kilcullen, 2009; Ladwig, 2007; Mackinlay, 2007; Nagl, 2005). This was akin to Said’s “complex dialectic of reinforcement” (2003:94), whereby heeding literature on the topic of lions resulted in the promulgation of more literature about lions, and their features. Here, discursive reinforcement instigated a newly promulgated British Army Field Manual (AFM) on counterinsurgency (MOD, 2009), which cited the US’s counterinsurgency manual (Petraeus and Amos, 2007). Despite this, forces of Americanisation did not overly influence UK thinking in Helmand. The interviewed general illustrated this autonomy in noting:

Britain wanted to run its own campaign… we used to talk about the campaign within the campaign… you’ve got the NATO ISAF campaign and you’ve got the British campaign that runs in it… the term ‘Helmandshire’ was used (Interview E13).

Somewhat ironically, General Dannatt was cited by a historian using ‘lions’ in a different metaphorical sense to that of Said (2003), where the UK’s experience in Helmand from 2006 was likened to a lion’s cage, where the insurgent was the lion. Dannatt noted, “[i]f you left him alone, he’s only kipping in the corner. If you gave him a prod with a sharp stick, he’d jump up and attack you… that’s pretty much what we did” (in Harnden, 2011:45). This use of metaphor indicates how ‘poking’ the Pashtuns, and the resultant perception of a homogenous ‘insurgency’ was unintentional, and against the spirit of the reconstruction mission. Blair had actually contended privately to Bush, albeit concerning Iraq, that “the
danger is, as ever with these things, unintended consequences” (2002c:1). Due to this unintended turn, the UK’s kinetic-counterinsurgency routines in Helmand were insufficiently resourced. This was revealed by both the officer reporting to *The Times*, and by a (deceased) officer’s journal being released to *The Guardian*, illuminating how:

> We’re now scattered in a shallow, meaningless way across northern towns where the only way for troops to survive is to increase the level of violence so more people get killed (Docherty, in Lamb, 2015:286).

> As it stands I have a lack of radios, water, food and medical equipment . . . injuries will be sustained that I will not be able to treat and deaths could occur which could have been stopped. We are walking on a tightrope and… are likely to fall unless drastic measures are undertaken (*The Guardian*, 2009:12).

Recognition of the mandated need to build “credible Afghan security forces”, rather than fight a wholly independent campaign, was present within the coordinative-discourse promulgated to those deploying (MSB, 2008:1.5). This entailed MOD supported reforms which evolved into the multilateral efforts within NATO-Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), to build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including UK Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) embedded within ANSF in Helmand. Nevertheless, emphasis was on “military operations to defeat insurgency and criminality” (MSB, 2008:1.1), popularly termed “clear-hold-build” (Interviews E13, P12, P15). This element was observed by the researcher (see Chapter 4), including privileged access to additional (restricted) coordinative-discourse such as *Counterinsurgency in Helmand–52 Brigade Perspective* (2008) – a document more pointedly emphasising warfighting, clearing out the enemy, holding territory, and only then peacebuilding.

This emphasis on warfighting may be understood in terms of the background cultural episteme underpinning the defence community, and decision-making thereof. The defence community was more familiar with defence professional-routines than those of UK aid, and while contributing in Afghanistan acted as a via-media interfacing with these alternative routines. As Machiavelli prefaced *The Art of War* (2006), there exists a stark distinction between civilian and martial thinking through different imaginations of world order. Bowden identified three problematic components here, “timeframe, strategic understanding and expectation, and culture” (2010:275), which impact socially-attributed meaning and interpretations thereof between policy communities. For instance, whereas the UN framed
ISAF in terms of peacekeeping (see UN, 2001), colloquially speaking, if the defence toolkit entails predominantly tools of organised violence, when perceiving the threat of violence, regardless of cause, the defence community will be predisposed to respond (or pre-empt) with violence. Certainly, defence’s promulgated coordinative-discourse devised to encourage learning from the Soviet’s historical mistakes in Afghanistan achieved little (see LWDG, 2009; Stonehouse, 2010). The former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan interviewed perceived that:

For the military Afghanistan was a huge sort of almost live fire exercise, they loved it; they go out for six month tours, they got medals, they got homecoming parades, they got new equipment, and it wasn’t a particularly bloody war, and the ordinary soldiers weren’t conscripts they were volunteers… and you feel a bit of a hero… the desert is fun, and the helicopters, and the excellent food, and the camaraderie… (Interviews L9).

This was an individually-held sentiment, and not how any agency officially framed ISAF. However, it was an interpretation from a privileged position, and similar sentiment was common amongst troops, who desired to undertake the combat missions that they had joined and trained for. Infantry soldiers are foremost trained “to close with and kill the enemy” (Interview P12), not as peacekeepers or ‘reconstructors’. One former Territorial Army (reserve) soldier interviewed noted, Afghanistan could be “just like a gap year with your mates, but with machineguns, helicopters, landrovers tearing around the desert and action” (Interview P12).

Significantly, however, the UK defence community’s undertaking of kinetic-counterinsurgency routines, was predicated by the Bonn Agreement (2001) promoting exclusionary practice as a significant if unintended consequence of legitimising the UIF (and subsequent GIROA) within communicative-discourse, while disregarding the Taliban and associated factions. Bonn presented a façade of stability in Afghanistan, which formalised a framed imagination of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ in Helmand, where those supporting arrangements other than GIROA-led governance were ‘othered’, delegitimised and labelled the ‘evil enemy’. From the humanitarian perspective, “they were only treating the so-called ‘good guys’, according to them” (Interview LT11). This provided the army with an enemy to fight, and distracted from the UK’s executive mandate to protect the reconstruction (Reid, 2006). A foremost act of the UK contribution in Helmand was the demand that President
Karzai, newly appointed in 2004, sacked Helmand’s governor (Akhundzada), as a purported drug-lord and so of the ‘other’. This was despite Akhundzada’s governance holding fidelity with the indigenous people. In contrast, his successor, ‘Engineer’ (an honorific) Daud, was a ‘good guy’ multilingual technocrat, but lacked any indigenous support (Interviews E13, L9).

‘Helmandshire’ thus grew prevalently framed as a war between the ‘legitimate’ GIROA and ‘illegitimate’ shadow government, regardless of indigenous support or their constitution. This may be seen to render discourse professing to “improve the lives of ordinary Afghans [and being] in Afghanistan at their invitation” (MSB, 2008: 1.1) increasingly rhetorical, with many Afghans becoming marginalised. Violence also continued to escalate – in 2009/2010 over 100 British servicemen were dying a year (108 in 2009, from 51 in 2008). UK Operation Panther’s Claw (2009) was a largescale warfighting sweep completely antithetical to the ISAF mandate, humanitarianism and development-cooperation (see DLW, 2015; MOD, 2014, 2014b). Such efforts were contradictory to the UK supported FSPs, failing to pay heed to context, not peacebuilding, not statebuilding, but pursuing highly exclusionary practices. The remediated humanitarian counter-frame came to interpret the presence of armed factions of any allegiance as possessing vested interests and contributing to, rather than alleviating, insecurity (Willoughby, 2006: 4-7; Interviews L4, LT11, ST14). However this counter-frame did not grow politically salient during New Labour’s government.

Regardless of whether escalated violence in Helmand constituted an ‘insurgency’ or not, the UK defence community pushing this frame to dominance within UK aid thinking, and directly enacting kinetic-counterinsurgency routines in 2000s Afghanistan as though re-enacting the 1950s ‘Malayan Emergency’, branched UK aid thinking in a manner wholly antithetical to what was acceptable to the EU’s continental anti-war episteme. It was infeasible that UK leadership ambitions would succeed in leading EU thinking concerning fragile states in this direction. Both Denmark and Estonia also contributed in Helmand, and broadly abided by UK routines as “reasonably willing partners” (Interview L9). However, they were subordinate to UK command, while other EU members contributing elsewhere, such as Germany, operated differently, “nervous about projecting coercive power” (Interview L2). This dominance within UK aid thinking was not through Americanisation, nor Europeanization, but was an unintended consequence of historical path-dependency, facilitated by Blair’s alliance-politics decision-making, Bonn and the army’s dependency on ‘small wars’.
Whereas the EU is contended to have marginalised the UK’s martial-power insurgency schema, whole-of-government thinking concerning fragility endured within broader discourse (see OECD, 2006), and was not necessarily precluded by the EU’s anti-war episteme. The Malaya precedent mandated whole-of-government activity to win ‘hearts and minds’. However, the defence community’s historical interpretation was biased through General Templer’s presumption of leadership, where the UK governor held complete power over military and civilian efforts (Mallinson, 2011:523). This position in Malaya was derived from Colonial Office precedent and the powers of the UK representative, and ‘unity of command’ grew to be a foremost ideal of UK counterinsurgency doctrine (MOD, 2009:1.11). As such, in Afghanistan the UK pursued counterinsurgency through “the application of the Comprehensive Approach” (MSB, 2008:1.4).

Re-framing ‘whole-of-government’ thinking as ‘comprehensive’
The apparent branching of UK ISAF contributions away from the UN mandate, and EU character of aid, and towards counterinsurgency warfighting, led to the unintended ascendance of defence agency within UK aid in Helmand. Here, the army’s historical dependence upon colonial-policing to justify its existence, challenged UK aid’s traditional dependency upon poverty-alleviation, as re-emphasised through the rationale of the poverty-conflict cycle. Within discourse whole-of-government thinking endured; the secretary of state for defence boasted of “[a]n unprecedented degree of cross-governmental co-ordination… addressing governance, security and political and social change” (Reid, 2006:Column.1529). The interviewed FCO official supported this, recalling how, “by the time we got to Helmand it was taken as read, at least doctrinally, that it would need to be all-arms, or rather all-branches-of-government” (Interview L18). This was reported to Parliament as “a coordinated comprehensive approach to the reconstruction of Afghanistan” (HOCDC, 2007:5). After Iraq (2003) derailed prospects for any common European foreign policy position, and with ISAF’s expansion in Afghanistan, it also rhetorically offered the coherence the EU needed.

The UK defence community’s dominant framing of Afghanistan’s emergency as an ‘insurgency’ mandated whole-of-government routines within the solution. This was to provide “consent winning activity” to win Afghan ‘hearts and minds’ (MOD, 2009:6-2/6-4; MSB, 2008), in addition to the ‘warfighting sweeps’, such as Operation Panther’s Claw (2009). Outposts of troops were to secure the local population akin to Malaya’s ‘strategic hamlets’, where the ‘ink-blot’ stratagem was employed in what was termed the Afghan
Development Zone (see Harnden, 2011; MOD, 2014b; MSB, 2008). As such, the defence ‘insurgency’ framing did not profess that coercive force could ‘win’ in isolation, but (rhetorically at least) did involve protecting the reconstruction, as 16 Air Assault Brigade’s commander stated:

I describe our task as being about setting the conditions for the defeat of the Taliban insurgency. In essence, we are engaged in a contest for the will of the people… and to enable construction and development to improve the lives of the people (Carleton-Smith, in MSB. 2008).

For this to be practiced within ISAF, extant UK defence Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) thinking was insufficient. CIMIC was the defence community’s interface with civilian agents, “the mechanism for commanders to be aware of, and actively engage with, the civil sector to enable a coherent and co-ordinated response to crisis” (JDCC, 2003:2E11). However, this interface was interpreted as dubious by other agencies/NGOs operating within UK aid, as a way “to keep the civilians out of the commander’s hair” (Interview L19). CIMIC did not theoretically empower defence agents to command and control civilian agencies. Nonetheless, as a former military officer and latter politician observed, within the defence community “the paradigm structure that still dominates thinking is the old vertical hierarchies of the Victorian age” (Interview L7). The defence community was rigidly linear in thinking, and designed to re-enact the ideas extrapolated from Malaya, regardless of civilian sentiment. As a latter secretary of state for international development reflected:

The generals used to think that DFID were full of tree-hugging sandal-wearers who spent their time around the swimming-pools of Dubai fornicating and drinking, and that they should be in fatigues and at the frontlines digging trenches. And DFID thought that the military were not ‘winning hearts and minds’ (Interview L10).

The unsuitability of CIMIC doctrine in practicing the dominant defence ‘insurgency’ frame led to the re-framing of UK aid’s longstanding whole-of-government thinking within solutions, towards ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature⁴. Regardless of the UN mandate, the Royal United Services Institute explicitly detailed to the Common’s defence select committee

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⁴ Fergusson argues that ‘comprehensive’ thinking was discussed from the offset of refocusing to Helmand, within Herrick 4’s planning (2009:202-206). However, the term was not prevalent before 2006.
that the aim of ISAF itself was to deliver the ‘comprehensive’ approach, entailing “the military creating the secure conditions in which reconstruction and development work can be delivered by government officials and NGOs” (in HOCDC, 2007:12). That the defence dimension was placed foremost was unsurprising, given then-extant PCR thinking, and the nomenclature tracing back to UK/NATO defence discourse in the aftermath of 1990s Bosnia, Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000) (Ashdown, 2008; HOCDC, 2010; Pounds, 2008; Smith, 2006). This first appeared in formal MOD defence joint doctrine note *The Comprehensive Approach* (MOD, 2005) calling for “commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation” (2005:5, also HOCDC, 2010:11). Subsequently, and more pointedly concerning counterinsurgency, it is found in *Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (MOD, 2007b), promoting:

[A] combination of diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, together with an independent package of developmental and humanitarian activity and a customised, agile and sensitive influence and information effort (MOD, 2007b:1.1).

This discourse presented ‘four guiding principles’; proactive engagement, shared understanding, outcome-based thinking and collaborative working (MOD, 2005). Of these, ‘shared understanding’ was perhaps the most interesting, for being both pivotal to ‘whole-of-government’ thinking, whilst challenging through distinctions in perspective amongst communities operating upon potentially discrete episteme, as with defence and civilian aid communities. It was well recognised that there was no “commonly agreed” or “universally accepted” definition of what a ‘comprehensive’ approach should entail (HOCDC, 2010:11; also Hughes, 2009:8).

Beyond UK defence discourse, ‘comprehensive’ thinking may be traced to multilateral allied joint CIMIC doctrine within NATO, responding to 1990s contentious discursive-struggle between these aid communities concerning their relationship (see NATO, 2000, 2001; Rehse, 2004:14-15). CIMIC had already crossed-over defence communities and been adopted within early EU CSDP discourse (see CEU, 2002b). However, ‘comprehensive’ thinking may further be traced to discourse contemporaneous with the Iraq-turn in the form of Denmark promoting Concerted Planning and Action (CPAA) in NATO in 2004. CPAA was also an initiative to alleviate shortfalls in collaborative interventionism first identified during
1990s Bosnia and Kosovo, where “[t]he aim was to link up development and reconstruction with military effect” (Williams, 2011:65; also Ashdown, 2008). This reveals how the contextual need for whole-of-government thinking was broadly recognised, including within EU member states’ defence communities. However, NATO was also used as a forum for the UK to lead and project favoured ideas (as with the OECD). As ‘comprehensive’ re-framing occurred within UK discourse, it was projected into NATO nomenclature overtly at the Riga summit, prominently by Professor Lindley-French (see NATO, 2006; also Hughes, 2009), and again at Bucharest, calling for “a ‘comprehensive approach’ to stabilization that will include combat and economic reconstruction” (NATO, 2008:2). As NATO’s Riga report outlined, the experiences in Afghanistan and Kosovo served as keystones, demonstrating “that today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments” (2006:para.10).

While the PCRU institutionalised ‘comprehensive’ whole-of-government thinking in Whitehall, in Helmand this role fell upon the PRT. In Afghanistan PRTs were “to act as a mechanism to enable the central government to extend its authority [and] planned to extend civil-military involvement in support of the international assistance effort” (Stapleton, 2003:5). However, despite the Helmand PRT being civilian-led under periods of FCO, DFID and Ministry of Justice leadership (FCO, 2017), staffing was predominantly military. Within the defence insurgency frame, the UK’s PRT acted as an ‘executive committee’ akin to colonial Malaya. This became highly contentious within aid discourse through interpretation of defence domination leading the PRT to pursue, what the MSF (UK) director lamented as “a political objective”, whereby:

The locations where they chose to build schools or maternity clinics [etc.] were not necessarily those with the most need, it’s part of the counterinsurgency. We saw the PRTs as wolves in sheep’s clothing, with political and sometimes even military objectives (Interview LT11; also HOCIDC, 2004:Ev15).

This was due to privileging ‘ink-blot’ consent winning activity in the Afghan Development Zone, where DFID’s development-cooperation resourcing was co-opted within the defence insurgency frame, pursuing what the aid community critiqued as “wasteful quick impact projects” (Interview L4, also L10, LT11; PCRU, 2007:20). Despite UK ‘comprehensive’ thinking distinguishing between levers of state and independent humanitarianism, or military and civilian ‘effects’, in practice it was perceived by other aid agents to undermine neutral
and independent humanitarian action (Red Cross, in HOCDC, 2010:ev136), when neutrality for humanitarian NGOs was perceived as critical to their security (Interviews L16, LT11, ST14). A prominent example was the UK defence community’s (2008) notion of “government in a box”, where like the aforementioned plumbers jumping off tanks, DFID and NGOs were to ‘unpack’ a government immediately after the military had secured territory (Interviews L18, L19). This relates to an additional critique levied upon the PRT within the ‘comprehensive’ approach, where as one interviewed aid expert described:

The [Afghan] provincial structures aren’t being relied upon, so you’re delegitimising local authorities… People didn’t go to the governor anymore or the local Community Development Councils, part of the National Solidarity Programme… Basically people just cut out the middleman, and the middleman was the Afghan Government (Interview L4).

This demonstrates how the UK’s ‘comprehensive’ whole-of-government discourse was problematic in practice, alongside the defence insurgency frame, and utility of the Malaya precedent. The predominance of UK defence agency in Helmand undermined civilian aid agencies development-cooperation, co-opting their resources for quick impact projects under extraordinary measures, and marginalised their assistance to the Afghan central government, while also marginalising the Afghan GIROA itself. For example, the PRT competing with indigenous local governance initiatives, which benefitted from the ARTF, undermined UK aid (and EU) contributions thereto, and complicated welfare provision. The former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan noted how “there was much talk of ‘jointery’ as it was called, but inevitably the military were in-charge [through] a huge disparity” (Interview L9). As a PCRU official supported, in-country “the military had sheer capacity to get out and about on the ground – the sheer ability to dominate” (Interview L8). The interviewed Ambassador elaborated, emphasising the army’s ineptitude concerning how aid should be used:

I saw DFID and the other aid agencies put under huge pressure… to use their aid funds in a rather misguided attempt to stabilise areas which had been occupied or garrisoned by NATO forces… and the military showed a pretty superficial understanding of the way in which aid can be used… They believed that spending money on quick impact projects would win the population over and cause them to reject the Taliban (Interview L9).
The UK’s ‘comprehensive’ approach thus was imbalanced, with the power-structure within the UK aid institution tilted towards the defence community, and away from civilian aid oversight, where this whole-of-government thinking originated. This was not necessarily in conception, but because of framing and path-dependency, through the dominant defence ‘insurgency’ frame’s solution doctrinally privileging defence agency within UK aid (see MOD, 2009:1.1). Popular critique that the ‘comprehensive’ approach became quite incoherent is largely with reference to this UK defence interpretation (see Stapleton and Keating, 2015; Williams, 2011). Notably, this was contrary to the UN’s assistance mandate, Short’s original leadership ambitions for DFID, the OECD-DAC’s fragile state principles, and most importantly the European character of aid and EU ‘peace-project’ values.

Nonetheless, while contested in discourse, the UK’s ‘comprehensive’ approach was significant concerning Afghanistan, and marked a change in UK aid’s prior whole-of-government thinking. As the senior FCO/PCRU official observed, ‘whole-of-government’ was clumsy within discourse through its “very unfortunate acronym in the Anglo-Saxon world”, potentially precluding its usage within discourse (Interview L19). Whereas, ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature was innocuous, relatively transparent and could be “applied to a whole load of different things” (Interview L19). As a result, ‘comprehensive’ became commonplace within UK aid discourse, suiting the executive mantra that “[t]he UK strives for policy coherence across government as a whole” (HMG, 2005:9). According with Blair’s desire to reform the EU, the ‘comprehensive’ approach subsequently became deliberately projected upwards into EU-level discourse, notably by the PCRU, and the MOD’s think-tank, the Defence Concepts Doctrine Centre (DCDC) (Interviews L18, L19, L21). Evidence of the ‘comprehensive’ approach resonating within EU-level formal discourse is first identifiable in Suggestions for Procedures for Coherent, Comprehensive EU Crisis Management (CEU, 2003), prior to being found evident within UK member state discourse. However, the UK purposefully exploited the opportunity, through what was essentially a concerted effort by UKRep in Brussels, and less formal processes. As the senior FCO/PCRU official recalled:

I personally specifically remember working with our people in Brussels who were trying to push it into the EU… I remember we had meetings with EU military and civilian staff… this was even before the [European External Action Service] came in (Interview L19).
The senior FCO official interviewed further substantiated this deliberate uploading of whole-of-government thinking in the guise of the ‘comprehensive’ approach by UKRep, with reference to “secondments…, British diplomats in Brussels, and… the whole range of EU working groups” (Interview L18). This entailed UKRep at EU Council meetings as well as working groups of interest to both foreign aid and security thinking, in addition to UK aid experts being trained and seconded into EU supranational-level institutions, and potentially European-based NGOs. However, perhaps most significant at the institutional-level is the hosting of less-formal seminars through which to share ideas, including the comprehensive approach, with EU contemporaries. The FCO/PCRU official recalled how:

We brought them over to the UK, and sat down with them, and they all came and said ‘oh my God this is revolutionary, we are forbidden from talking to each other, we have to have lunch together to be able to try and talk to the military’ (Interview L19).

This may be understood in terms of socialisation, or social-learning as the uploading dimension of socialisation, with the UK constituting a member of the larger political grouping. Subsequent EU-level discourse is found in the Council’s *Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning* (2005), contemporaneous with UK efforts. Here, the purpose of ‘comprehensive’ thinking is stated in terms of building upon extant ideas pertaining to CIMIC, to enhance “the possibility for the EU to address complex crises in a coherent manner” (CEU, 2005:4), much in fitting with UK designs. Although, within the EU (pre-Lisbon treaty) context, this entailed cohering needs “designed to address the need for effective intra-pillar and inter-pillar co-ordination of activity by all relevant EU actors… on the basis of an all-inclusive analysis” (CEU, 2005:5). This was the product of the UK designing to reform the EU, with utility of discourse and experience to which the EU did not have recourse without the UK’s contribution. Through UK-led pressure, the clear desire to influence EU-level thinking, and evidence to this effect, the ‘comprehensive’ approach would become synonymous within the evolution of EU overseas crisis management and the CSDP framework (see Chapter 7). The UK, largely through the historical ‘special-relationship’ traditionally favours NATO over EU security and defence integration. However, in terms of greater ‘jointery’ as with UK aid thinking concerning fragile states, the UK pushed for CSDP and expanded EU capacity in a supportive role, notably including whole-of-government, ‘comprehensive’ approaches.
Chapter conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter contributes towards the overall thesis by tracing prevalent UK aid framing pre-9/11 (contributing towards addressing RQ2), and tracing the progression of UK framing throughout the early-‘GWOT’ period (addressing RQ3). The chapter argues that 9/11 posed an exogenous shock to UK aid’s extant pro-poor path-dependency, as recently re-emphasised within the Blair doctrine (Blair, 1999; DFID, 1997, 2000b; New Labour, 1997). Nonetheless, it is argued that the pro-poor focus endured (rhetorically at least), as seen in DFID’s communicative-discourse, and through the perceived poverty-conflict cycle (2005, 2005b, 2006, 2009b). Furthermore, during Blair’s tenure the impoverished Afghan citizenry were framed as victims, warranting sympathy and support, and discrete to the ‘evil enemy’ (Blair, 2001c). However, this pro-poor focus was often overshadowed by alliance-politics security-imperatives, illustrated by Blair supporting Bush vanquish the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (2001) and the subsequent ‘Iraq-turn’ (2003). Overshadowing was further evident upon the UK’s withdrawal of troops from Iraq to refocus upon peacekeeping in Afghanistan, while in Helmand pro-poor thinking ultimately grew co-opted within defence ‘insurgency’ framing. This was the product of unintentional institutional-layering (see Thelen, 2004), as the defence community grew dominant and layered over civilian agencies operating within UK foreign aid. This was a consequence of refocussing UK military contributions within the ‘GWOT’ towards Afghanistan, and one which prompted significant contention within discourse (Interviews L4, LT11).

UK aid as an institution entails numerous agencies within a power-structure, including foremost DFID post-1997 (albeit junior still to the FCO) and the PCRU post-2004, but also prominently the MOD and tri-services of the defence community. Within ‘military operations other than war’, such as the UN’s mandate for ISAF in Afghanistan (see UN, 2001), defence capabilities are of utility in assisting peacekeeping, security sector reform and robust logistical and engineering support within PCR (JCS, 1995; JDCC, 2002; MOD, 2007). Such capabilities offer valuable components within whole-of-government routines when aiding fragile states. However, the UK defence community’s culture and professional-routines are unsurprisingly traditionally weighted towards conventional warfighting within the discrete defence institution, and as revealed here can present an awkward bedfellow within aid endeavours when the division between conflict and post-conflict contexts is unclear (Interview L19).
Tracing salient framing amidst this power-structure finds less-rational facets of discourse such as notions and values, and background cultural episteme to be important in constructing the defence ‘insurgency’ frame and associated ‘comprehensive’ approach. Framing Afghanistan as an insurgency was desirable for the UK’s defence community, which held a bureaucratic incentive to justify its continued resourcing. The British Army held a cultural expectation of success in counterinsurgency derived from the ‘Malayan Emergency’ (1948-1960). The UK, as Europe’s premier military power, going undefeated and unoccupied during the world wars, unlike the protagonists of continental Europe, retained confidence in martial-power solutions as did the US. Nonetheless, the UK defence community’s framing of Afghanistan as an insurgency, akin to the Malayan precedent, when Malaya was a British colony, held loaded ramifications for the conduct of aid, with defence agency foremost and other assistance subservient as occurred with the Briggs’ Plan. The result in ‘Helmandshire’ could be considered 21st Century ‘colonisation-lite’, with indigenous governance marginalised and the Afghan’s subjugated.

Episteme, and values were also important in terms of the Europeanization of soft-content. Through the cultural “nostalgia for power” (Duchêne, 1972:43), or “collective memory of greatness” (Marshall, 2016:109), the UK possessed a longstanding leadership ambition. Blair’s New Labour government reinvigorated this, seeking to “lead a campaign for reform in Europe” (in New Labour, 1997:3). This entailed desire to enhance consistency among policy domains of external-actorness, including security and development, and to advance the position of the world’s poorest (1997:38-39). As such, Blair had de-restricted progress of CSDP at St-Malo (1998), while within the early-‘GWOT’ context, the UK’s whole-of-government thinking and peacekeeping of the Kabul Multinational Brigade presented useful precedents for the EU, and promoted new norms. Moreover, deliberate uploading, and shaping of EU-level thinking was seen in efforts such as PCRU-led seminars projecting ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature into EU-level formal discourse (an important revelation for the thesis concerning RQ5). Leadership ambition to shape aid thinking was also evident in UK interest in the OECD Fragile States Group, and hosting the London Senior-Level Forum on fragile states (OECD, 2006). Utilisation of the OECD as a forum permitted the UK to indirectly project thinking into EU discourse through an external multilateral institution at a time when the EU was markedly inexperienced of FCAS situations and intra-state crisis (see Chapter 7).
In contrast, forces of Americanisation were found to be insignificant beyond the Iraq-turn (2003-2006). The ‘special-relationship’ bred competitiveness as well as supportive alliance-politics, and indeed arrogance within the UK defence community concerning confidence in counterinsurgency. The UK campaigned independently in ‘Helmandshire’ – “the campaign within the campaign” (Interview E13), however, Americanisation should not be overlooked during the Blair-Bush years. Indeed, while the ‘comprehensive’ approach’s mode of whole-of-government thinking is in-part traceable to Danish concerted planning and action, it was mediated through NATO’s coordinative-discourse, which doubtless included US voices. Further, the underlying rationale legitimising continued intervention remained the ‘GWOT’s’ security imperatives, as epitomised by 9/11 and the recognition that through the poverty-conflict cycle, without adequate welfare provision fragile states such as Afghanistan held the tendency “to destabilise their neighbours, to create refugee flows, to spread disease and to be bases for terrorists” (DFID, 2005b:5). To withdraw prematurely from Afghanistan was contended by Blair as tantamount to committing “a craven act of surrender that will put our future security in the deepest peril” (2006).

While controversial within frame-contestation, the UK’s use of ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature, as a development of whole-of-government thinking, constituted a progressive institutional change within UK aid thinking concerning FCAS. Attempts to upload it into EU-level discourse, including by the new PCRU, are significant for the thesis’ broader findings, as is the importance found in less-rational facets of discourse and underlying cultural episteme regarding the adoption or preclusion of ideas. For example, the UK’s defence ‘insurgency’ frame was never going to be welcomed within EU-level discourse, considering the EU’s peace-project cultural identity. Chapter 6 builds upon this, elucidating latter salient ‘integrated’ and ‘stabilisation’ nomenclature within UK aid thinking, and how this transformed institutional power-relationships, dispelling the co-option of UK aid’s pro-poor focus, and the consequences of this for processes of Europeanization during the latter- ‘GWOT’ context.
6 Towards UK ‘Integrated’ Foreign Aid: The Salience of Politics

Law and order and security are not provided by foreigners. They’re provided by locals who agree enough on where power lies, and should lie, in their societies... Without political deals there will be people who want to undermine all of these things (Interview L18).

Chapter 5 introduced historical UK foreign aid pro-poor path-dependency, ‘whole-of-government’ thinking, and associated underlying rationale and professional-routines pre-9/11 (addressing RQ2). Subsequently it highlighted the effects of the 9/11 exogenous shock and early-‘Global War on Terrorism’ (‘GWOT’) context concerning fragile, conflict-affected states (FCAS) (contributing towards addressing RQ3). Afghanistan was referred to as the FCAS aid recipient of greatest value. This revealed incremental-change within UK aid’s operation within low-politics, and also the overshadowing of this by perceived security imperatives of high, alliance-politics, including forces of ‘Americanisation’. Further, Chapter 5 revealed how, through defence ‘insurgency’ framing, ‘whole-of-government’ thinking moved towards the imbalanced ‘comprehensive’ approach. Herein, defence agency ascended to dominance within UK aid, which led to unintended institutional-layering and the implementation of professional-routines more attuned to defence being employed in Helmand, with civilian aid co-opted. However, significantly, the chapter introduced the UK’s historical cultural “collective memory of greatness” (Marshall, 2016:109) and “nostalgia for power” (Duchêne, 1972:43) from prior imperialism. This included international leadership ambition, with bearing on processes of Europeanization (of note regarding RQ5).

The thesis contends that UK aid thinking concerning fragile states changed significantly throughout the ‘GWOT’ epoch, and that facets of this thinking were projected into EU-level discourse. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the UK’s prevalent thinking during the latter-‘GWOT’ context (addressing and resolving RQ3). It illustrates divergence from prior insurgency/comprehensive framing, and expands upon the latter salient ‘stabilisation’ frame and ‘integrated’ whole-of-government approach, predominantly constructed through civilian discourse. This change in discursive-salience was overseen by the new Conservative-led Coalition within a new stability agenda. This agenda greater synthesised high and low-
politics, valuing UK aid’s civilian agencies over coercive martial-power, with contribution of the defence community (Ministry of Defence [MOD] and tri-services) reduced to a supportive role. This change entailed the dispelling of institutional-layering and previously developed emphasis upon martial-power solutions in Helmand. It may be explained through movement in the UK’s background cultural episteme, defining “the conditions of possibility of all knowledge” (Foucault, 1971:183), and thus the prevailing framing within discourse.

The chapter contributes to knowledge through discussing and assessing UK aid’s institutional change post-2010. It contends that UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency was further entrenched, despite the Coalition perceiving to have inherited more a ‘war’ and less an ‘aid/reconstruction’ endeavour in Afghanistan. However, through ‘stabilisation’ framing, problems of uneven-development (inequality) became emphasised as much as under-development (poverty) when concerning Afghanistan’s complex political emergency (CPE), demanding political-settlement. ‘Integrated’ thinking and institutional agency relationships progressed accordingly. The rationale of path-dependency also progressed through the stability agenda, from increasingly dated notions of postcolonial moral-responsibility, through vested security interests and the poverty-conflict cycle, towards a pragmatic Eurocentric notion of a responsibility to stabilise. This is contended to have been less dependent upon imperial legacy than the EU’s rising power within the international community, its ‘neighbourhood’, and vested interests. Progression in UK aid thinking was possible through its background episteme losing confidence in martial-power, having experienced its limits in Helmand, and coinciding with socialisation within the EU’s growth as a global actor and pragmatic ‘civilian-power’ (Chapter 7). As a member of the broader “peace project” (EC, 2013), movement amongst co-existing epistemes affected scope for Europeanization of ideational ‘soft-content’. This contrasted with the US’s enduring martial-power, and contemporaneous relative decline through “imperial-overstretch” (Kennedy, 2017:666).

The chapter subsequently reveals reduced forces of Americanisation and greater processes of Europeanization concerning foreign aid in Afghanistan. The UK continued to project thinking into the international aid regime, including uploading into the OECD, and EU-level during this latter period (an important revelation concerning RQ5). This was through the UK’s enduring ‘collective memory of greatness’ and leadership ambitions to ‘upload’ content (Chapter 5). In part the chapter couches this through the UK’s high aid resourcing and situation within Afghanistan, and so becoming a ‘gatekeeper to knowledge’. However, more
significant Europeanization is found to be facilitated through converged background cultural epistemes. Through the UK’s movement towards the continent’s background post-martial, anti-war episteme, which underpinned foreign aid’s epistemic-community(s) of professionals and experts, the UK’s prevailing ideas could act as forces for change beyond the member state. Therefore, ‘uploading’ by UK aid was as much through what the EU-level was receptive to hear, as what UK aid sought to promote, whereas the UK’s movement in episteme was itself perhaps through socialisation (the EU’s ‘downloading’ influence), in addition to experiential-learning and lesson-drawing.

The Institutional Frame Analysis (IFA) adopted is consistent with the previous chapter, while emphasising change in background cultural episteme to greater extent. Europeanization is viewed as a ‘cyclical’ and/or ‘omnidirectional’ extension of new institutionalism (see Bulmer and Burch, 2005; Ladrech, 1994; Major, 2008; Chapter 3). Prior works on Europeanization concerning aid within ‘low-politics’ find a shared-competency domain exhibiting little hard-law in the acquis communautaire, leading focus here to be upon tracing ideational ‘soft-content’, including ideas, notions, and professional-routines (‘ways of doing things’) through historical actor-relationships and social-learning/lesson-drawing/socialisation (see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Hajer, 2009; Horký, 2010, 2012; Horký and Lightfoot, 2012; Lightfoot, 2010; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014). As Schmidt (2008b, 2010, 2011) demands, ideas are ‘taken seriously’ through employing frame analysis, drawing foremost on Goffman (1974) and Entman (1993), and traces how exogenous shocks and endogenous framing constituted institutional-change. Discursive institutionalism is used in the tradition of historical institutionalism to this end (see Hall and Taylor, 1995; Skocpol, 1996). As with the previous chapter, discursive data is collated from interview and archive sources pertaining to UK (and EU) aid.

The chapter firstly explores the political discourse of the Coalition government, including key policy-documents and speech-acts demonstrating enduring support for UK aid to Afghanistan, and pro-poor path-dependency. Subsequently, the UK aid institution’s progressions in thinking are discussed, formulated through frame-contestation amidst interactive discursive-struggle (see Entman, 1993; Lakoff, 2014). This includes progression from defence ‘insurgency’ framing towards (civilian) ‘stabilisation’ framing, the ‘comprehensive’ approach towards the ‘integrated’ approach, civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) towards military support to stabilisation (MSS), and physical-infrastructure focussed post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) towards the salience of politics. The sum of this
change may be considered the focal critical-juncture of UK thinking pertaining to FCAS. In consideration of evolved thinking and development of the stability agenda, the chapter then alludes to other fragile states in tracing ideas, in a similar manner to how Iraq was previously cited (Chapter 5). Finally, supportive conduits of ideational influence are discussed before concluding the chapter. Implications for processes of Europeanization and transformational-content beyond the member state are discussed throughout, but are more explicitly discussed with reference to the complementing analysis chapters within the thesis conclusion (Chapter 8).

The Coalition’s inheriting a ‘war’ in Afghanistan

The situation that the Coalition inherited in Afghanistan as of 2010 contrasted significantly with the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF’s) extended UN mandate (UNSCR1510, 2003), and New Labour’s designs to “not desert the Afghan people [but] stick with them until the job of reconstruction is done” (Blair, 2002b), as well as with the European character of aid. It also contrasted with the post-2005 designs in Helmand, where the UK’s mission had purportedly remained “primarily reconstruction” (Reid, in BBC, 2006). This was evident through ‘whole-of-government’ professional-routines, which rhetorically were “addressing governance, security and political and social change” (Reid, 2006) becoming dominated by ‘kinetic’-warfighting. This is illustrated by New Labour’s final incumbent defence secretary observing:

Our forces in Afghanistan - necessarily our current Main Effort - are fighting hard… They are protecting Britain’s national security by denying a safe haven to violent extremists… We must continue to resource operations in Afghanistan appropriately (Ainsworth, in DCDC, 2010:5-6).

This excerpt highlights the Coalition’s inherited context of Afghanistan as popularly perceived upon the transition in government – warfighting through what the interviewed general described as “high-intensity counterinsurgency” (Interview E13). This depended upon vested security interests, and with civilian agency in a supportive capacity within the imbalanced ‘comprehensive’ approach (Chapter 5). When the Conservative, Fox, replaced Ainsworth as defence secretary, he seemingly legitimised this framing, observing on BBC Radio 4’s The World This Weekend:

When I took up this job last week, I immediately asked myself first of all, do we need to be in Afghanistan, and my answer was yes, for reasons of national
security, because we don’t want Afghanistan once again to be used as a safe haven for terrorists who could launch attacks against this country or others and we saw that before in 9/11 (2010).

As such, the rationale of prolonging the army’s brigade in Helmand was more counter-terrorism than peacekeeping. Within broader discourse(s), the British public were increasingly primed to interpret Afghanistan’s situation as ‘war’, evident in the term’s mass-remediation. This was not explicit within technical coordinative-discourse, such as the Army’s counterinsurgency and peacekeeping doctrine, or Herrick campaign study (MOD, 2009, 2011, 2015). Although, ‘Americanisms’ such as Krulak’s (1999) ‘three-block-war’ and the related UK interpretation of ‘clear-hold-build’ had become popularly adopted within less-formal defence-discourse (Holmes, 2007:105; Interviews E13, P12, P15). Rather, ‘war’ priming was widely promulgated by commentators, whose works explicitly employed the term as a frame-device in their titles (for example Bailey et al, 2013; Fairweather, 2015; Farrell, 2017; Harnden, 2011; Martin, 2014). From this it may be couched that the army’s historical dependency on ‘small wars’ had succeeded, with its existence and size justified through the interpreted need to war-fight in Helmand (see Chapter 5).

This frame of ‘war’ may be understood as an extension of Said’s ‘complex dialectic of reinforcement’ (2003:94), whereby the perpetuated technical ‘insurgency’ coordinative-discourse surrounding Afghanistan (and Iraq), was remediated into the public-sphere, in a reductionist, less-technical manner. Such commentary was predominantly negative or otherwise mounted postcolonial critique (see also Edelstein 2010; Knaus, 2011; Shellhaas, and Seegers, 2009; Stewart, 2011). These cited examples also expanded the extant discourse highlighting the diminished returns and futility of martial-power/warfighting as a solution to Afghanistan’s emergency, and fragile states more broadly (see Ashdown, 2008; Kilcullen, 2009; Murden, 2009; Nagl, 2005). This perceived futility coincided with declining public support, with prior study finding that by 2009-2010 “the British public voiced considerable scepticism” towards military intervention in Afghanistan (Reifler et al, 2014:36; also Scotto et al, 2011). Doubtless, this constituted a scope condition to New Labour’s (2010) electoral defeat.

Like New Labour, the Coalition framed the solution to Afghanistan’s complex emergency as demanding an enduring commitment, to benefit the Afghans, but more so to secure the UK (and broader EU) (Appendix 5.6). This is evident in Fox’s (2010) comments, and those of
other cabinet ministers, including then-foreign secretary Hague, who noted that Afghanistan remained the UK’s top foreign policy priority, to help the Afghan people “reach the point where they can look after their own security without presenting a danger to the rest of the world” (in FCO, 2010). However, deviating from New Labour’s tenure, the Coalition’s framing of Afghanistan within communicative-discourse de-legitimised the defence community’s dominance within UK aid, and therefore the extant schema’s solution of kinetic-counterinsurgency. Instead, confidence was levied on political-settlement within fragile contexts; DFID’s commissioned work on the issue found that aiding FCAS necessitated “a highly political process” (John and Putzel, 2009:18). As Mitchell observed when development secretary:

Well spent aid is in our national interest. Nowhere in the world is this clearer than Afghanistan. While the military is there to bring much-needed security, peace will only be achieved through political process backed by development (in DFID, 2010b:1).

Indeed, Operation Panther’s Claw (2009) was the UK’s final military offensive, although, assistance was lent to US Operation Moshtarak (2010), which was conducted by US Marines during Obama’s ‘surge’ into Helmand upon the perception of the UK’s failure. After Panther’s Claw, the Coalition’s communicative-discourse was indicative of seeking to de-layer defence’s professional-routines from UK aid concerning Afghanistan. Support for the defence community’s role, viewable within the Conservative’s 2010 manifesto, and latter Coalition Agreement promising to “support our Armed Forces in Afghanistan” was largely rhetorical (Conservative Party, 2010:106-107; HMG, 2010c:20). This was indicative in Fox’s comment that “[o]ur troops have done a wonderful job in Helmand” (2010), significant for its past-tense signifying the end of their leading role within the emergency. In part, this may be explained through the compromised nature of the Coalition Agreement (HMG, 2010c), where it has been argued that the Liberal Democrats secured “a ‘left’ slant” concerning foreign affairs (Quinn et al, 2011:305). Here, it is contended that this ‘left slant’ emphasised soft/civilian-power over hard/martial-power, EU-like values over the US, and processes of Europeanization over Americanisation.

The rhetorical nature of the Coalition’s communicative-support for the defence community is apparent in its failure to constitute practice within the Conservative-led post-2010 austerity agenda. Here, the defence budget was not ‘ring-fenced’, despite the 2010 Strategic Defence
Security Review (SDSR) explicitly linking “national security and fragile states” (HMG, 2010b:11), and the National Security Strategy (NSS) elucidating “fragile, failing and failed states… provide the environment for terrorists to operate” (HMG, 2010:28). Contrary, the SDSR/NSS process actually cut defence capabilities. Statistics reveal a distinct downward curve in defence spending from 2010-2011 (Dempsey, 2018:3). This was despite the government ‘shifting the goalposts’ by counting expenses such as pensions within defence spending, to superficially meet NATO’s two-percent target (HOCDC, 2016). An example pertaining to Afghanistan was the Coalition’s “reluctantly [retiring] the Harrier aircraft, which… served our country so well” (HMG, 2010b:5). In Afghanistan Harrier had operated since 2004, and released the most weapons, including precision-guided munitions, in support of the kinetic-counterinsurgency campaigning (MOD, 2015:1). Similarly, Bush’s overextension within the ‘GWOT’ also led to change in the US stance.

Obama’s presidency (2009-2017) progressed away from Bush’s ‘GWOT’ speech-act, finding it a “boundless ‘global war’” (Obama, 2013), and instead re-framed terrorism as “no longer defining… national security and foreign policy, but rather serving as a vital part of those larger policies” (Brennan, 2009). Nonetheless, the US remained an overtly martial-power, seeking martial-solutions, and observed the Coalition’s defence cuts, and less aggressive posture in Helmand disdainfully. This was seen in Obama’s ‘surge’ (2009-2012). Within discourse it was further viewable in the American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI’s) assessment of UK hard-power finding a “shrunk” strategic vision, which it argued to be “systematic of a deep malaise in the British national psyche: a form of strategic ‘declinism,’ perhaps” (Cornish, 2014:2). This perception contrasted with the UK’s cultural “collective memory of greatness” (Marshall, 2016:109), and international leadership ambitions. However, the AEI’s framing of a ‘deep malaise’ conflated political-ambition with hard-power capability. Whereas it is observable that the Coalition de-emphasised the utility of martial-power, especially in the context of FCAS, the real significance was in the institutional-path depended upon, and associated professional-routines empowered to attain ambitions.

Already considered a “post-military society” by some (Holmes, 2007b:11), the thesis couches that the Coalition’s re-framing of priorities was indicative of the UK becoming a post-martial power, in contrast to the US, thus deviating from Ignatieff’s theorised Empire Lite (2003). The Liberal Democrat’s challenged the deep-rooted and long-running Atlanticist notion of a UK-US ‘special-relationship’. Their manifesto highlighted “the dangers of a subservient relationship” with the US, which neglected “Britain’s core values and interests” (2010:63),
with thinly veiled contempt for the Bush-Blair relationship, while Ashdown described, “an unequal dialogue between a giant and a parliament of [European] pigmies” (2009). Further undermining any ‘special-relationship’, Cameron’s relationship with Obama was relatively weak compared to that enjoyed by Blair with Bush. Instead, Obama had sought Merkel as America’s European point of contact, describing her as, "my closest international partner these last eight years" (in BBC, 2016).

Unlike defence agency, the Coalition’s communicative-discourse levied confidence upon civilian agencies and pro-poor focus within UK aid thinking. This constituted and was substantiated in practice. The Coalition Agreement promised to “maintain [DFID] as an independent department focused on poverty reduction”, emphasising a perceived “moral responsibility” to this end (HMG, 2010c:22). While, Mitchell, when development secretary asserted on The Politics Show that the UK “will not balance the books on the backs of the poorest people in the world” (Mitchell, 2010, also Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012:130).

Various explanations have been couched on this legitimation of UK aid (and DFID), with interest in its apparent deviation from tradition, given that Conservative governance historically relegating foreign aid to administration within the FCO (see Dunne, et al, 2011; Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012; Mulley, 2010). These explanations include Liberal Democrat influence, desires to decontaminate the ‘nasty party’ reputation, the values of key personalities (such as Mitchell), national interest, and “effective machinery-of-government” drivers (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012:132-133; also Quinn et al, 2011).

However, concerning FCAS, and Afghanistan explicitly, the theorised ‘poverty-conflict cycle’, and associated thinking promulgated by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (Stabilisation Unit [SU], post-2007), likely constituted a foremost factor here, especially after experiencing martial-power’s failure(s). This may be explained through the mutually-constitutive nature of discourse and social-practice (see Foucault 1980:93). The defence community’s implementation of warfighting professional-routines in Helmand, in accordance with the salient defence ‘insurgency’ frame and ‘Malayan Emergency’ (1948-1960) precedent, had failed to attain perceptible gains. As a senior diplomat and subsequent advisor to Cameron observed, “the military were honestly in out of their depth” (Interview L9). The threat of terrorism exported to Europe endured, violence in Helmand had escalated (see Maryland, 2018), and casualty-fatigue as coffins paraded through Royal Wooten Basset contributed to delegitimise the defence ‘insurgency’ frame, as well as broader interpretations
concerning the utility of martial-power. Civilian agency within UK aid appeared a more viable alternative. As a Conservative minister interviewed noted:

It was about tackling conflict, conflict is defined as ‘development in reverse’ [Collier, 2004], and also about building prosperity… it’s about results… tackling corruption, the focus on poverty-reduction, focus on conflict-resolution (Interview L10).

As a government advisor interviewed noted, aid was perceived “quite an easy thing to cut, and actually we felt that it was a critical part of our security” (Interview L2). This had been argued through the NSS and SDSR linking foreign FCAS with UK security (HMG, 2010, 2010b:11), but was also supported by DFID’s practice paper, Building Peaceful States and Societies, pushing the need for ‘whole-of-government’, politically-focussed aid engagement “for more effective engagement in the most difficult, fragile environments” (DFID, 2010:48).

As the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer-review of UK aid recognised:

DFID is committed to engaging in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Alongside contributing to the MDGs, the focus on fragile states responds to the need to protect the UK’s interests, as set out in its National Security Strategy (OECD, 2014:16).

Under the Coalition this discourse constituted practice. This is viewable in initiatives including the Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF) benefitting UK NGOs, DFID’s “poverty reduction diagnostic”, the construct of the “UK Aid: aid from the British people” ‘brand’, but most significantly in ‘ring-fencing’ UK aid’s budget during the austerity agenda (DFID, 2014; Mitchell, 2013:23; OECD, 2014:66). Concerning Afghanistan’s emergency explicitly, it may be viewed in Cameron’s hosting and co-chairing the 2014 London conference on Afghanistan, renewing promises from the prior 2010 London conference, and launching the ‘transformation decade’ (2015-2024) upon draw-down of ISAF (London Conference, 2014:1). Further, greater entrenching the pro-poor path-dependency which had been re-emphasised within New Labour’s communicative-discourse, conflict-poverty cycle debate, and officialised in the International Development Act (2002), the Coalition not only ‘ring-fenced’ the aid budget, but pursued the UN’s 0.7 percent GNI Official Development Assistance (ODA) target. This is evident in communicative-discourse of both Conservative and Liberal Democrat manifestos (Conservative Party, 2010:78, 117; Liberal Democrats,
2010:57), the Coalition Agreement (HMG, 2010c:22), and the Conservative’s green paper on aid, One World Conservatism (Conservative Party, 2009:51).

As the senior government advisor noted, “reaching the 0.7 percent ODA target was very important because we saw the role of development aid in trying to minimise conflict and use the soft-power of the UK (Interview L2). Mitchell, when secretary of state, framed this as “not about soft-hearted altruism [but] a clear and hard-headed approach to our own security and prosperity [and] also morally right” (2013:5), while furthering the cultural ‘collective memory of greatness’ by constructing a historical narrative where:

Britain has a proud history of going to the assistance of those who are suffering, whether it is campaigning to abolish slavery in the nineteenth century, the fight against fascism in the twentieth century, or ‘making poverty history’ in the twenty-first century (2013:5).

Johnson later poetically reiterated the post-martial emphasis of this message under the latter Conservative government, noting how “up the creeks and inlets of every continent on earth there go the gentle, kindly gunboats of British soft-power” (2016). New Labour had also reaffirmed commitment to the ODA target (New Labour, 1997:39). However, in 2013 the Coalition attained it in practice, and officialised it through the International Development (ODA Target) Act (HMG, 2015; also Lunn and Booth, 2016:3). Its salience under Coalition tenure was further observable in its withstanding frame-contestation. This included The Mail on Sunday’s petition to “[s]top spending a fixed 0.7 per cent slice of our national wealth on Foreign Aid” (Wellington, in Parliament, 2016), which achieved 235,979 signatures and was subsequently debated in parliament. HMG succinctly retorted:

The UK’s aid commitment means we can be proud to be a country that not only meets its responsibilities to the world’s poorest, but in doing so best serves and protects its own security and interests (HMG, in Parliament, 2016).

Heeding the 0.7 percent commitment fostered significant international prestige, seen in the OECD finding that “[t]his commendable, well planned achievement adds weight to the UK’s internationally recognised leading role” (OECD, 2014:17). As such it bolstered the UK’s ‘collective memory of greatness’, and demonstrated the utility of UK aid as a means to further strategic leadership ambitions. It also bolstered UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency. This was because the target was tied to OECD-DAC definition (see OECD, 2018). This held
a longstanding focus upon least developed countries (LDCs), and poverty-alleviation, which parliament’s select committee on international development and UK NGOs, including International Alert and Save the Children were keen to safeguard (see HOCIDC, 2017:35).

As such, UK aid (and DFID) enjoyed “cross-party support” (Interview L2), and a favourable international (OECD recognised) reputation, which in part was through its utility in solving the inherited situation in Afghanistan. UK aid’s civilian agencies (DFID, the FCO and SU) offered more ‘effective machinery-of-government’ than the defence community, and subsequently appeared to offer more viable professional-routines and increased returns in solving Afghanistan’s CPE. Therefore, the Coalition’s framing of Afghanistan’s CPE favoured a solution comprising re-balanced ‘whole-of-government’ professional-routines through reinvigorating UK aid’s civilian agency. This may be seen in the Coalition constructing the National Security Council (NSC) in 2010, to govern the Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund (CSSF, formerly the conflict pools), to which the inter-agency SU would report, while assisting to cohere UK aid’s operation under the increasingly salient ‘stabilisation’ framing.

The Coalition’s executive-level value judgement to support UK aid’s civilian agencies over the defence community concerning FCAS, including the de-layering of defence’s favoured professional-routines from aid in Afghanistan, is indicative of movement within background cultural episteme, as discussed by Foucault (1972, 1980), with the UK progressing towards becoming a post-martial power during the epoch. As such, it is indicative of relative movement away from the mid-Atlantic positioning of New Labour’s tenure, and away from the US. Rather, the UK’s cultural episteme was converging towards greater alignment with the EU as a post-martial, civilian-power. In terms of Europeanization, this demonstrated potential ‘downloading’, through the UK’s socialisation within the EU peace-project. As discourse(s) came to operate upon a mutually familiar background cultural episteme governing discourse, it also facilitated greater transformation of ideational, soft-content (and potentially uploading). This constituted a juncture in thought for the UK’s executive, partly through experiential-learning and how discourse and practice are mutually-constitutive, and potentially partly through the impact of the EU in formulating shared cultural beliefs.

Branching from ‘insurgency’ framing towards ‘stabilisation’ framing
Whereas the defence-led ‘insurgency’ frame was dominant (2006-2010) and agenda-setting concerning UK aid’s schema of problems and solutions in Afghanistan (Chapter 5),
‘stabilisation’ was the salient frame throughout 2010-2016 (Appendix 5.7). The frame-contestation that resulted in this metamorphoses occurred within executive-level governance, as the Coalition empowered UK aid’s civilian agencies, and sought to “harness” the UK’s “unparalleled experience in this field” (HMG, 2010:5), but also traced back to ‘stabilisation’ counter-framing amongst institutional-level agencies from 2006. This counter-framing traced back to earlier institutional experience in Afghanistan and the ‘Iraq-turn’, in addition to 1990’s experiences in the Balkans. Northern Ireland also warrants mention for the salience of politics evident in Blair’s management of the ‘Good Friday’ process.

The UK reconstruction mission in Helmand was only ‘unwinnable’, as Farrell (2017) framed it, when interpreted as a ‘zero-sum’ war, comprising winners and losers, as the defence ‘insurgency’ frame had popularly reduced to (despite this not being the mandate). However, with the diminished returns of martial-power concerning FCAS becoming popularly acknowledged, including within defence-discourse, where key personalities began to “grasp that the armed forces were at war and not winning” (Mallinson, 2011:629), the ‘Malayan Emergency’ (1948-1960) analogy and doctrine grew increasingly tenuous (Alderson, 2011). As such, the defence community’s cultural ‘expectation of success’ at the institutional-level waned, as confidence in martial-power solutions was rescinded at the executive-level. Identifying the cause of Afghanistan’s ongoing CPE as an ‘insurgency’ orchestrated by a homogenous ‘evil enemy’ was incrementally accepted to be disingenuous within defence coordinative-discourse. It became recognised that while displaced Taliban leadership operated from Pakistan, the cause comprised heterogeneous ‘spoilers’ ranging from international-terrorists through impoverished drug-addicts (MSB, 2008:8.2-8.3; also MSB, 2013), evident in operational guides which detailed:

The threat to ISAF’s mission comes from a variety of different sources in many different forms. The situation is volatile, unpredictable and above all complex.

The Taliban are not the only threat (MSB, 2013:1.9.1).

The ‘insurgency’ frame’s reductionism and schema including warfighting routines supporting PCR and democratisation, had promoted a ‘boomerang effect’ akin with Dahl’s (1971:189-201) theorisation, whereby coercive polyarchy risked promoting a backlash. As a senior SU official argued, the conflict cycle “simply didn’t exist [through under-development]… reconstruction needs were not physical but institutional” (Interview L19), through endemic uneven-development. The ‘democracy’ of the new Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIROA) was perceived by Afghans as “based on kleptocracy, capitalism and corruption… propped up more and more by Kalashnikovs and poppies” (Willoughby, 2006:2). Helmand’s CPE was of feudal character, with Pashtunwali honour obligations and blood-feuds between tribes and their confederations. Kilcullen (2009) forwarded that so-called ‘accidental guerrillas’ constituted the violent resistance confronting the intervention. Ignatieff had more colloquially noted, “nothing makes an Afghan reach for his rifle faster than the presence of an occupying foreign power” (2003:88). While Roy suggested a multitude of impassioned socio-political contentions spanning state-society, urban-rural, and modernist-conservative dialectics, including Pashtunwali and valuing interpretation over imitation (1990:79-81). Defence coordinative-discourse acknowledged these intricacies rhetorically (see MSB, 2008, 2013), but were tentative in permitting such discourse to constitute practice through the army’s dependency on ‘small wars’.

Nonetheless, the inability to manage violent conflict through ‘insurgency’ framing, when conflict-reduction was necessitated within UK aid’s entrenched pro-poor path-depending, through conflict powerfully retarding development (Collier, 2004:1), impinged its legitimisation within UK aid’s epistemic-community, in addition to the Coalition’s communicative-discourse, so precluded its salience. This opened discursive-space to counter-frames from UK aid’s civilian agencies, newly empowered by the Coalition. In addition to DFID, this notably included the supporting inter-agency PCRU, constructed after the 2003 ‘Iraq-turn’, to “help countries put in place quickly the civilian capabilities needed for a stable environment in the aftermath of war, so that reconstruction can begin” (DFID, 2005:16; Chapter 5). It was through the “difficulty of identifying when you’re ‘post’ and ‘during’ conflict” that the PCRU underwent its own metamorphosis of identity post-2006/2007 (Interview L19; also HOCDC, 2010). This saw the agency re-framed the SU. ‘Stabilisation’ framing, from Balkan and Iraq experience derived from this changed nomenclature, as:

[T]he process by which underlying tensions that might lead to a resurgence of violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer term development (PCRU, 2006).

As Gilmore surmised, ‘stabilisation’ “lies at the intersection between development, security and intervention” (2015:113), positioned equidistantly within the security-development
nexus. It significantly abridged distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low-politics’, underpinned by vested security and pro-poor rationales, muting vested interest’s layering the former over the latter, and potentially de-militarising aid to FCAS. As such, ‘stabilisation’ was discrete to army ‘small war’ path-dependency. The PCRU/SU forwarded ‘stabilisation’s’ objective to be “to support countries emerging from violent conflict by buying time for a sustainable and inclusive political settlement and demonstrating a peace dividend” (PCRU, 2007:1), reprioritising from (physical) PCR towards political-settlements within uneven-development, what one government official termed “the salience of politics” (Interview L18). The relevance of this interpretation to Afghanistan was introduced at the Royal United Service’s Institute (RUSI) as comprising the demobilisation of spoilers, building legitimate security forces and workable political-settlements, addressing underlying causes of conflict, while capacity building the indigenous government’s authority, and supporting sustainable development (Teuten, 2007). Nonetheless, before the Coalition government’s empowering civilian agency, ‘stabilisation’ remained less-salient than defence ‘insurgency’ framing, and physical infrastructure remained prioritised over political-settlement.

NATO defence discourse couched ‘stability’ in terms of “consolidating zones of stability” (Ignatieff, 2003:125), such as ‘safe-havens’. NATO conceived that “military peace support operations are the platform on which stabilisation is mounted” (Pounds, 2015:228). Derived from the 1996 ‘stabilisation force’ (SFOR) deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the defence community’s assertion of this doctrine led to privileging defence agency in Helmand, within the ‘comprehensive’ approach (Pounds, 2015:227-228). Within which, NATO’s operational plan (OPLAN10302) envisioned ‘stabilisation’ as a subsidiary element of counterinsurgency (phase three), being: “the creation of a secure environment [including] well trained and reliable Afghan Security Forces” (MSB, 2008:1.3). The metamorphosis towards favouring ‘stabilisation’ framing, prioritising the ‘salience of politics’, was attained through the Coalition empowering DFID and the SU. This enabled the SU to harness the instructive power of language. A senior SU official observed how “we all use certain terms technically [and we] created the ‘stabilisation’ concept as a result of our work” (Interview L19). The PCRU/SU had deliberately attributed meaning to ‘stabilisation’ to challenge earlier thought by interjecting a novel linguistic devise – ‘Hot’. ‘Hot stabilisation’ abridged ‘insurgency’ and ‘stabilisation’ frames through permitting the latter to ride the coattails of the former, before branching into the agenda-setting counter-frame. It constituted:
An effort to create building blocks for development and state-led security, rule of law and governance when the bullets are still flying… [so was] effectively counterinsurgency by another name [but] making use of all available entry points to maintain momentum towards a political settlement (PCRU, 2007:3).

The deliberate intent to branch off from then-prevailing defence thinking explains why commentators such as Gilmore conflated early SU ‘stabilisation’ thinking with the defence community’s interpretation, arguing “[s]ome elements of stabilisation operations are… inherently enemy-centric and might also be understood as programmes of pacification” (2015:115). Here, Gilmore is describing the abridgment, ‘hot stabilisation’, not the long-term ‘stabilisation’, which held as its objective the attainment of “structural stability”, through establishing the conditions under which inclusive political settlements may be achieved (SU, 2014:2). This long-term ‘stabilisation’ was not ‘enemy-centric’ as with counterinsurgency, but accounted for political ‘spoilers’. As a director of the SU interviewed explained:

‘Hot stabilisation’ has been used to reference to ‘immediate stabilisation’ to newly liberated areas. So, almost fitting into a ‘clear-hold-build’ [counterinsurgency] framework. It’s not used quite as much anymore because we’ve moved on… it’s a nice framework but it doesn’t cover all the nuances (Interview L21).

In constructing this, the work of the PCRU/SU lesson-drew from continental precedent, while UK cultural episteme converged towards that of the continent, where Europeans “generally favor peaceful responses to problems” (Kagan, 2003:5). This was a deliberate Europeanization process at the institutional-level above the incrementally-changing cultural background, whereby it was recognised that other members approached Afghanistan differently, as had the aforementioned Germans (Chapter 5). The paths to this realisation and learning were likely the same seminar-like sessions where the PCRU/SU and DCDC among other UK agencies pushed ‘whole-of-government’ thinking in the ‘comprehensive’ approach. Herein the PCRU/SU observed “[m]aybe it doesn’t have to be so hot”, where:

Instead of engaging militia groups militarily, the Italian contingent in Dhi Qar in southern Iraq approached town elders with offers of reconstruction assistance in exchange for pledges that the elders would ensure security. In Uruzgan in southern Afghanistan the Dutch have taken a similar approach, but with the aim of generating confidence in the Government of Afghanistan. Dutch funded local
intermediaries and NGOs approach villages trading small-scale targeted projects for security. This creates entry points for local security deals and government engagement (2007:7-8).

The UK had trialled similar in Helmand, observable in the 2006 ‘Musa Qala truce accord’, where a temporary political-settlement was negotiated between the UK brigade (and GIROA), and resisting Pashtun village elders. Some commentators supported this, interpreting it as a pioneering ‘Afghan-led solution’, facilitating de-escalation through minimal force when amidst significant violence (see Burke, 2007; Willoughby, 2006:3). However, then-prevailing martial-thinking adhering to the defence ‘insurgency’ frame couched it as tantamount to cowardice by legitimising the Taliban ‘evil enemy’, and wilfully neglecting to ‘hold’ previously ‘cleared’ territory (see Chandrasekaran, 2012; Donnelly and Schmitt, 2008; Gall and Wafa, 2006). It was only post-2010 that the UK’s changed cultural episteme met the threshold whereby such discourse proved possible. Pre-2010 it was precluded by the UK’s confidence in martial-power solutions, and the army’s expectation of success therein.

That SU-led ‘stabilisation’ framing adopted from EU (member state) thinking, with predisposition to favour peaceful solutions, ensured as a schema it was subsequently well received within Europe, as understood through the ‘cyclical’ processes of Europeanization (Chapter 3). This is evident in the EU’s seeking to stabilise FCAS during the contemporary ‘migrant crisis’. As a DFID director interviewed argued, “in terms of targeting funding for development for refugees, for root causes, and the use of instruments… [we saw] a significant shift on how the Commission does things” (Interview LT17). The results of this change may be seen in the EU’s Global Strategy’s usage of ‘stabilisation’ delineating how:

When the prospect of stabilisation arises, the EU must enable legitimate institutions to rapidly deliver basic services and security to local populations, reducing the risk of relapse into violence and allowing displaced persons to return. We will therefore seek to bridge gaps in our response between an end of violence and long-term recovery, and develop the dual – security and development – nature of our engagement (EU, 2016:30).

This EU-level thinking adhered with prior SU communicative-discourse, and was targeted to this end. The SU had deliberately identified lessons and constructed guidance for UK personnel seconded to EU/CSDP missions under the seconded national-expert (SNE)
instrument, ensuring prevailing UK thinking was uploaded (SU, 2010, 2014c). DFID also “helped through the provision of seconded national experts to agencies such as the Commission” (Interview LT17). This facilitated social-learning as “UK staff preparing to deploy… [had] the relevant background information, including the main UK stakeholders in London and in-country” (SU, 2014c:15). A freedom of information request revealed that on 5 May 2016 (the research’s conclusion), 70 DFID and SU officials were seconded (DFID, 2016). This was a significant number, considering the size of these agencies, permitting considerable transformation of soft-content.

With the ‘stabilisation’ frame salient within UK aid, as a stakeholder in foreign FCAS, the UK’s schema (spanning ‘high’ and ‘low-politics’) grew to promote solutions that worked with the grain of indigenous values and contextual intricacies’ in seeking inclusive political-settlement. This is argued to constitute part of a broader EU ‘stability agenda’ discourse (see DFID et al, 2011; EU, 2016; FCO et al, 2014; SU, 2014). The objective being ‘structural stability’, aiding the development of “political systems which are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully” (DFID et al, 2011:5; also SU, 2014:1). The experience of civilian agencies, as derived from Afghanistan and Iraq, by 2010/2011 had concluded that beyond physical reconstruction, security assistance, and the simplistic poverty-conflict cycle, the fundamental problem was that “the politics were broken”:

It wasn’t just a question of not enough police and law and order and courts…. Whole sections of the community and power-holders were being excluded from power in Iraq, in Afghanistan more generally, in Helmand, wherever. What do they do? What do you do when there are guns, men and money lying around when you’re excluded from power? (Interview L18).

Accordingly, ‘stabilisation’s’ professional-routines evolved through “more of a venture capital approach… towards a political settlement” (PCRU, 2007:4). Herein DFID focussed on the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), statebuilding, governance and security initiatives, allocating “at least half our annual budget through Afghan Government systems since this is the most effective way of ensuring the state can deliver [welfare] directly to its people” (DFID, 2015:2; also 2017:1). Spoilers were to be tackled individually and with nuance, not homogenously; ‘personality-politics’ were shunned (PCRU, 2007:8-9; SU, 2014). Indeed, “Western-orientated English speaking technocrats” were found to seldom
possess power in-country (PCRU, 2007:8-9). The UK’s installed governor in Helmand (‘Engineer’ Daud) was soon ousted. His replacement, Wafa, was considered “an irascible old git” in the UK brigade (Interview E13), but he represented local peoples, and could viably be linked to the GIROA. Mirroring popular postcolonial critique concerning liberal interventionism (see Goodhand and Sedra, 2010; Shellhaas and Seegers, 2009), a popular sentiment amongst UK aid policy-makers grew that:

It’s not the development agencies view, it’s the view of the local people that matters (Interview L16).

You’ve got to engage with people on the ground who may not be people who you want to engage with (Interview L2).

Law and order and security are not provided by foreigners. They’re provided by locals who agree enough on where power lies, and should lie, in their societies... Without political deals there will be people who want to undermine all of these things (Interview L18).

This explicit emphasis on empowering locals to reconstruct broken politics to attain settlement(s) was not necessarily a new notion. It may be related back to Galtung’s thinking on approaches to peace; addressing underlying causes of conflict and supporting local peoples to manage them, where “structures must be found that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur” (Galtung, 1976:298[original-emphasis]). Nonetheless, it was new to the epoch, and distinct to prior emphasis on attempting to reconstruct broken (physical) infrastructure, whilst ‘othering’ spoilers as ‘evil enemies’. That ‘stabilisation’ had truly replaced ‘insurgency’ framing is demonstrable in the rigidly hierarchical defence community adopting the schema, with coordinative-discourse recognising that “security may be provided by an absence of armed-men, rather than their presence” (Interview E13), and with the new catchphrase, “courageous restraint”, governing UK troops utility of force (Interviews P15, P35; also Harnden, 2011). The interviewed sergeant-major, who served in Afghanistan on multiple occasions described how:

Young Royal Marines and paratroopers… they wanted to get the rounds down… [but] it got to an extent prior to Herrick 14 [2011] where nobody wanted a firefight anymore. Herrick 14 was a completely different operation, there was much better preparation regarding stabilisation… it was a case of getting the men
to buy into that… [we] adopted the ‘ten principles’ that these guys had to live by (Interview P15).

These principles were how the interviewee’s sub-unit interpreted the defence community’s adoption of ‘stabilisation’ framing (see DCDC, 2011, 2012; MSB, 2013; UKLSCC, 2011). The unit’s post-tour internal magazine revealed how the “mantra” was to “protect the people; never act myopically or in the heat of the moment; think long-term; place Afghans first; be patient; foster friendship”, while empowering indigenous governance to locate political-settlements, seen in seeking to “enable the Afghan government to appeal to the people [and] enable the Afghan forces” (45CG, 2012:1). ‘Insurgency’ nomenclature endured within defence thinking concerning Afghanistan, but had waned in salience as defence framing metamorphosed in-line with SU thinking, and adhered with contemporary discourse such as the OECD DAC’s ‘fragile state principles’. Implementation of this thinking permitted the interpretation that:

The outcome was an irrelevant insurgency [and so an irrelevant ‘insurgency’ frame]… Violence fell by 86% on 2012 and the inevitability of summer fighting was disproven… [with] the District Governor and wider legitimate structures credible (45CG, 2012:1).

To relate this back to the Coalition’s inheritance of ‘war’ in Afghanistan, as it was popularly perceived in 2010, executive-level re-framing empowered civilian discourse within UK aid, while more broadly and culturally moving the UK towards the EU’s continental anti-war episteme. Contemporaneously, the PCRU/SU had constructed a counter-frame to the defence ‘insurgency’ frame, which had learned from European thinking. In combination with the defence community’s declining cultural ‘expectation of success’ concerning counterinsurgency campaigning, this constituted a discursive-struggle that culminated with the frame-dominance of ‘stabilisation’, derived from the SU’s attributed meaning. This constitutes the foremost critical-juncture identified by the research, in conjunction with re-framing the ‘comprehensive’ approach into the ‘integrated’ approach. The dominance of defence framing within UK aid concerning Helmand subsided, and FCAS reconstruction became envisioned through a post-martial ‘salience of politics’, broadly socialised with the European character of aid.
Re-framing solutions from ‘comprehensive’ towards ‘integrated’ thinking

‘Stabilisation’ framing counteracted the unintentional institutional-layering through defence predominance, as observed throughout the UK’s escalation of troops in Helmand which increased violence. This demanded a re-balancing of institutional power-structures to emphasise civilian-power within ‘whole-of-government’ thinking. This is observable in the ‘comprehensive’ approach, promulgated by the UK (and NATO) defence communities, within the solution of ‘insurgency’ framing, being supplanted by the ‘integrated’ approach, borne of the SU’s ‘stabilisation’ frame (SU, 2014). DFID had actually utilised ‘integration’ nomenclature in a generic manner since the inaugural Eliminating World Poverty white paper, seen in ‘integrated’ rural development, water management, and management strategies (DFID, 1997:8, 24, 49). When re-emphasised, this older nomenclature within UK aid, in-lieu of ‘comprehensive’, attributed new meaning to ‘whole-of-government’ thinking regarding solutions to FCAS. Through enduring leadership ambition this re-framing was also projected towards the EU-level.

As Chapter 5 discussed, whole-of-government thinking, entertaining of the private and third-sectors, was a norm of UK aid pre-dating DFID. It fitted with the UK’s liberal democratic values, where citizens were at liberty to venture, and was pragmatic within broader multilateralism. UK aid’s latter metamorphosis through ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ approaches was one of incremental-change, but significant nonetheless, as SU officials sought to access “all available entry points” to FCAS (PCRU, 2007:4) while realising “the comprehensive approach wasn’t really a useful way of describing what we wanted” (Interview L19). As Teuten contended when originally introducing ‘stabilisation’ at RUSI, such operations entail “military, political and development actions” underpinned by “effective strategic communication” (2007). The PCRU/SU had stressed in coordinative-discourse how ‘hot stabilisation’, branching focus away from ‘insurgency’ framing required:

[S]imultaneous and compatible effort between military containment, political accommodation, and generating confidence in the ability of government to deliver… It will need to find the right balance between creating a sense of momentum around short-term results that demonstrates a peace dividend and longer-term sustainable development objectives (PCRU, 2007:4).

This was nuanced, including “differentiated tactics” throughout different regions, and supporting the central GIROA, but at “provincial, district and village levels” (PCRU,
Inde, ‘stabilisation’ framing “hinges on coherence of effort between security, political and development actors” at all levels (PCRU, 2007:9; SU, 2014:1-2). This is why, as a director of the SU noted, “we dropped ‘comprehensive’ and started talking ‘integrated’… [through] an evolutionary linguistic journey” (Interview L21). The SU’s rationale was that:

‘Comprehensive’ means, crudely, all bases are covered, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that they all work together… The reason we use ‘integrated’ is rather than just have all three ministries working in the same location vaguely towards the same objective, we actually want integrated programmes, so that the programmes actually mesh at a local-level (Interview L21).

This was in pursuit of increasing returns in stabilising Helmand, demanded by UK aid’s reasserted pro-poor path-dependency, through recognition of the poverty-conflict cycle. The prior approach had failed, and the insecurity faced by impoverished “women and girls” who were argued to “suffer first and hardest from conflict” was pressuring change (Interview L10, also DFID, 2009b, 2011b; Mitchell, 2013). This dependency permitted ‘integrated’ nomenclature to contest defence’s “militarisation of ‘comprehensive’ thinking, where civilian activity was a bolt-on” (interview L21; also L18). Initiatives including defence-dominated PRTs and the ‘government-in-a-box’ concept had antagonised agency relationships, provoking professional-contention, and diminishing returns (Chapter 5). Nonetheless, ‘stabilisation’ and the ‘integrated’ approach in Helmand remained tied to managing an overseas “threat to UK interests [and] wider international peace and security” within a constructed ‘stability agenda’ (SU, 2014:3; also DFID et al, 2011). The high-politics security rationale endured, and Afghanistan remained framed within executive-level communicative-discourse in terms of protecting our security “by helping the Afghans take control of their own” (FCO et al, 2014).

However, with the defence community de-emphasised under the Coalition, and defence’s cultural ‘expectation of success’ concerning ‘insurgency’ waned, defence’s own presumption of leadership also diminished. Within the UK’s cultural metamorphosis towards that of a post-martial power, the military contribution grew subservient to civilian agency. This was repackaged through the frame device ‘military support to stabilisation’ (MSS). This was evident in Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (DCDC, 2012), and externalised in NATO’s The Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction (NATO, 2015b). New UK defence structures were instigated to assist constitution of suitable
practice, including the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force (SRF), Military Support to Stabilisation Groups (MSSGs), and UK Land Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency Centre (UKLSCC), institutionalising how within MSS “[t]he military’s role is to provide security” (UKLSCC, 2011:3), envisioned through ‘4Ps’:

- Prevent or reduce violence
- Protect the population and key infrastructure
- Promote non-violent politics and local good governance
- Prepare for long-term social and economic development (UKLSCC, 2011:2).

Within the defence community the rationale behind the new ‘integrated’ approach’s institutional power-structure was to allow “the root causes of the conflict to be resolved through improvements in economic development and governance, led by civilian experts from Other Government Departments” (UKLSCC, 2011:3). Accordingly, within Helmand associated professional-routines adapted as the PRT became “a suitably civilianised effort”, benefitting, as one SU official observed, from the SU’s new ‘roster of experts’ (Interview L8). Here, DFID’s aid to GIROA structures became prioritised over the PRT’s operation akin to a colonial ‘executive committee’ (Chapter 5). As a latter defence guide noted, all UK aid endeavours were to contribute towards building effective indigenous capacity, where contrasting with prior defence-dominated PRT practice, “empowerment and development at the local community level” within the provinces were valued as “essential ingredients” (MSB, 2013:1.6.7). As such, aid focus shifted to supporting the Afghan National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and its 30,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs), and Karzai’s Policy Action Group (PAG), to coordinate aid in south Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the army’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), with their imperial-like presumption of agency over the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), were replaced by the concept of Partnering Indigenous Forces (PIF). This revised security sector reform (SSR) routine was indicative of MSS in practice. It entailed “building the capacity and capability of indigenous military forces during a deliberate intervention to stabilise a fragile or failed state” (DCDC, 2011:iii). ‘Partnership’ in this aid context was conceptualised as:
[A] formal relationship based on a sound legal arrangement, trust and mutual respect, where the partners are otherwise independent bodies who agree to cooperate and share risks to achieve common goals that are mutually beneficial (DCDC, 2011:1.3).

This was more compatible with UK aid’s evolved consideration of politics under civilian leadership (and indeed the European character of aid), than prior thinking. Although, interestingly, while the ‘partnership’ concept was common amongst European development-cooperation communities, DCDC accredited its origins to South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service (in DCDC, 2011:para.106). That DCDC referenced the fire service demonstrated how disengaged from broader development discourse (and resistant to change) the defence community could be, despite the PCRU/SU. Nonetheless, defence-led PIF constituted only part of SSR within the ‘integrated’ approach towards fragility. Where security was understood as derived from broader political-settlement, SSR also necessitated broader politics, as with ‘human security’ (see ISSAT, 2017; also Interview L18). Such re-framing affected the defence community beyond Afghanistan, evident in the 2015 NSS-SDSR (HMG, 2015b), including the construct of 77 Brigade, utilising softer “non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers… [within] “the Army’s Integrated Action model” (MOD, 2018). Extant structures also adapted, evident in ‘specialised infantry’, “experts in Train, Advise, Assist, Mentor and Accompany operations” (MOD, 2016), what an interviewed Army officer described as “specialists in defence engagement, training, partnering and operating with indigenous forces” (Interview P35). As such the broader role of British infantry evolved to include softer “stabilisation, capacity building, assurance and national resilience tasks”, in addition to warfighting (MOD, 2018; also HMG, 2015b:31), attuning them to support civilian-led aid overseas.

The metamorphosis from the defence-led ‘comprehensive’ approach to ‘integrated’ thinking within solutions became officialised within further coordinative defence-discourse. In UK Joint Operations Doctrine, ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature is not evident, nor is ‘integrated’ (JDCC, 2004). Contrastingly, in the 2014 edition, ‘comprehensive’ is present no less than 20 times, and ‘integrated’ 31 times (DCDC, 2014). Likewise, in the UK’s premier joint doctrine publication, JDP0-01 UK Defence Doctrine (DCDC, 2014b), ‘integrated’ is employed 23 times, with ‘comprehensive’ present four times only. This incremental-change is explainable through the hierarchical defence community’s resistance to change, which can “take a good
five-to-ten years for it to actually properly enter the bloodstream” (Interview L19). As one interviewed senior advisor noted, there were enduring:

Understandable concerns where you’re using the military to assist… trying to stabilise countries, [concerning] how much that is actually a development thing, and how much of it is actually a military thing (Interview L2).

It took time for the new structural power equilibrium regarding FCAS to become institutionalised. However, as the director of the SU attested, “operating in a comprehensive or integrated way has become a part of the default thinking” (Interview L21). Indeed, the interviewed development secretary who highlighted inter-agency professional-contention (see Chapter 5), argued relations between military and civilian domains “got radically better and by the end of the Afghan crisis and Britain’s involvement in it, actually DFID and the MOD were working really quite well together” (Interview L10). When dominant, stabilisation framing bred synthesised understanding spanning security and development, alleviating contention. This is seen in DFID’s practice paper Building Peaceful States and Societies (2010) proving significant not only for progressing the aforementioned, OECD legitimised, fragile state principles (FSPs), but also for its contemporaneous adoption of SU thinking. Here, DFID interpreted the ‘integrated’ approach through four objectives, with which the UKLSCC’s ‘4Ps’ were compatible:

Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms

Support inclusive political settlements and processes

Develop core state functions

Respond to public expectations (DFID, 2010:51-54).

Within this practice paper, emphasising “ways of addressing causes and effects of conflict and fragility” though utility of the integrated approach for different FCAS situations (DFID, 2010:49-50), DFID clarified how the defence community was a subordinate, supportive agent (as with the ‘4Ps’) from the civilian perspective. Indicative defence contributions were through measures to counter violent-extremism, including delivery of SSR during the prevention phase, but also civilian protection and ensuring access during violent conflict, and disarmament post-conflict where fragility remained (DFID, 2010:49).
The prevalence of this ‘integrated’ thinking transcended UK aid into the broader “cross-
Whitehall agenda” (Interview LT17), seen in the ‘one Her Majesty’s Government overseas’
initiative from 2011, to change the UK’s culture of external-actorness to remove barriers to 
jointery (NAO, 2015). This built on the interpretation that a genuine integrated approach 
within solutions “requires clear national objectives, strong political leadership and 
collaboration across departments” to ensure that UK influence is maximised (DCDC, 
2015:9). Such thinking bore further consequence for UK institutional structures. Concerning 
UK aid and FCAS, the Coalition created the National Security Council (NSC), a more 
specialised coordinative-forum than ‘COBRA’ (Cabinet Office Briefing Room A), to govern 
the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) utilised by the SU. As one SU official 
noted, this was “in an attempt to bring a degree of coherence and overall kind of strategic 
political direction to its spending” (Interview L8). This amalgamated ODA and non-ODA 
budgeting towards fragile states. Further change in Whitehall included the cross-
departmental Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) instrument, and the National 
School of Government International (NSGI), nurturing an inter-agency ‘epistemic-
community’, and supporting the SU’s roster of experts, co-located with the SU (SU, 2015).

This cross-Whitehall agenda’s mutually-constitutive discourse and practice of ‘integration’ 
also held consequence for the UK’s cultural ‘collective memory of greatness’ and coherence 
amidst leadership ambitions within the EU. This was especially when UK aid’s civilian 
agencies were perceived to offer better machinery-of-government, and increased returns from 
more viable routines, through the UK’s background episteme converging towards the post-
martial sentiments of the continent, which further facilitated for the EU to be more receptive 
of UK designs. Indeed, as a senior DFID official interviewed argued, despite much 
commonality between member states through mutually supporting the pro-poor Millennium 
and Sustainable Development Goals (M/SDGs), “not all member states are equal” (Interview 
LT17). As with all member states, the UK had to abide by Council Conclusions once 
negotiated, but as the official expanded, “obviously we make sure there’s nothing in there 
that we disagree with” (Interview LT17). As such, UK aid policy-makers held a clear 
interpretation of holding influence over EU policy formation, while actively projecting UK 
positions.

This interpretation of an unequal relationship among member states (contrary to EU values) 
through influencing “how the Commission prioritises what it does” (Interview LT17), where 
a separate official observed, “the UK leads the way, in spending and ideas” (Interview L2),
was indicative of confidence in the UK’s ability to lead. This may be accredited to reputation-building through practices such as officialising the 0.7 ODA target (see OECD, 2014:17), but also through the momentum of reinforcing discourse(s) concerning UK aid’s effectiveness. Here, the broadly commendable track-record, high-resourcing and nurturing of an ‘epistemic-community’ of experts translated into moral authority, despite mixed results in Afghanistan. Through exploiting this perceived influence, it is couched that UK aid thinking did influence the EU in terms of Europeanization, by projecting ideas towards receptive EU-level agencies.

One formal process utilised was the aforementioned SNE instrument, where the senior DFID official championed, “we have helped move the Commission’s agenda forwards in areas that are key priorities for the UK”, including having “helped draft large portions of the gender action plan” (Interview LT17), of importance to UK personalities (see Mitchell, 2013). Less formal processes involved DFID’s relationship-building, particularly with Scandinavian nations, which as the interviewed advisor noted “have traditionally spent much more on aid and been much less involved directly on the military side” (Interview L2). As the advisor elucidated, this presented an opportunity for interjecting the UK’s integrated thinking, where the UK played “a good role bridging the two” (Interview L2). Discreet coordinative-discourse among likeminded groupings can construct reinforcing frames pre-emptively of formal negotiation processes. For example, as the senior DFID official explained:

“We have a sort of likeminded group of member states… it’s Germany, the Dutch, Poland, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark and us, and we meet at my level every six months or so, and talk about what’s going forwards and there’s a lot of e-mailing and sharing of positions and thoughts in-between (Interview LT17).

Such coordinative-discourse was pursuant of the ‘collective memory of greatness’ in leveraging UK influence through civilian agency within the EU’s post-martial environ. However, it also furthered UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency, prioritisation of civilian agency and multilateralism. This was through omnidirectional Europeanization processes, whereby UK aid was also socialising with the cultural values of these EU states, while through integrated thinking, sought the then-longstanding desire for “multi-national coherence [through] shared analysis of the problem and a jointly owned strategy for addressing it” (PCRU, 2007:13).
The results of UK ‘uploading’ efforts are identifiable in ‘comprehensive’ nomenclature continuing to be adopted within EU-level agencies, beyond its re-framing into the ‘integrated’ approach within UK communities. Beyond the Council’s *Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning* (2005; see Chapter 5), and a number of Council Conclusions on security-development and CSDP frameworks (CEU, 2007, 2011, 2013, 2013b), that ‘comprehensive’ thinking became institutionalised within the EU-level is evidenced in the *Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises* (2013). This was a joint communication from the Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security to the EU’s Parliament and Council, and promoted understanding synthesising with that of the UK, especially in terms of pro-poor path-dependency and the poverty-conflict cycle, where:

Sustainable development and poverty eradication require peace and security, and the reverse is equally true: fragile or conflict-affected countries still remain the furthest away from meeting the Millennium Development Goals. The connection between security and development is therefore a key underlying principle (EC and HRFASP, 2013:4).

EU-level emphasis was levied upon whole-of-government thinking and policy coherence, but through discrete rationale concerning Afghanistan and broader needs within the EU external-actoriness (see Chapter 7). As the SU director delineated, rather than ‘integrated’, “‘comprehensive’ was the sort of term *du jour* which most people have now adopted and started operating on” (Interview L21; also Hauck and Rocca, 2014). UK aid’s relationship-building entailed seminars to this end, uploading into the EU-level, through social-learning, and subsequent ongoing cyclical processes of Europeanization, resulting in the term’s pervasive adoption. Focal examples of this are found in Wilton Park conferences for the FCO, conducted in 2012 and 2014, to progress the *European Security Strategy* (2003) and subsequent Lisbon Treaty (2007) thinking regarding ‘comprehensively’ providing “an orchestrated response to state fragility, failure and conflict” (FCO and WP, 2014:3). That the latter ‘integrated’ approach was successfully uploaded into broader EU discourses is also overtly identifiable from such processes, seen in the European Union Global Strategy’s (EUGS’s) sub-section, “An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises” (EEAS, 2016:28-32). However, this was perhaps superfluous, as the EU-level never suffered the pitfalls of defence community dominance and institutional-layering as seen in the UK.
In sum, the rallying behind overarching civilian politics, inherent within the ‘integrated’ approach to ‘stabilisation’, rescinded the prior thinking’s weighting awarded defence within UK aid’s discourse surrounding Afghanistan. The need to tackle conflict was entrenched within pro-poor path-dependency, through the poverty-conflict cycle, and appreciation of the suffering of women. Defence’s previously predominant professional-routines had rhetorically always been an indirect way to alleviating such CPE, and ultimately poverty. However, they had failed, and defence agency occupying a supportive, if pragmatic, peacekeeping role was more intuitively in-line with pro-poor path-dependency, and importantly, the contemporary European character of aid. ‘Integrated’ thinking within stabilisation framing’s solution had converged with continental, anti-war cultural episteme, after the experience of ‘Blair’s wars’, where martial-power solutions had lost favour within discourse. The UK’s historical ‘collective memory of greatness’ came to be pursued through this thinking. While, discourse and social-practice being mutually-constitutive, reputed leadership equated to degrees of leadership in practice. Nonetheless, through Europeanization’s processes within a shared-competency domain, EU-level thinking could only be led where post-martial, peace-project values permitted.

Towards broader stability agenda discourse
This newly prevalent ‘integrated’ approach to ‘stabilisation’ framing within UK aid’s institutional-level, facilitated by the Coalition’s empowerment of civilian agencies, and exemplified by DFID’s Building Peaceful States and Societies (2010) and the MOD’s Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (DCDC, 2012), constituted broader foreign policy discourse at the executive-level beyond the 2010 SDSR and NSS (HMG, 2010, 2010b). This is identifiable in the cross-Whitehall Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) (DFID, et al, 2011), supported by the ‘whole-of-government’ 1HMG Overseas initiative5, and latter Conservative aid strategy, UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest (DIFD and HMT, 2015) and 2015 NSS-SDSR (HMG, 2015b) (Appendix 5.8). Such thinking also permeated parliamentary discourse, beyond that regarding Afghanistan. For example, Hughes remediated how “[p]overty rates are 20% higher in countries hit by violence, so aid should target violence” (Hughes, 2011:2WH). While,

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5 Alongside the FCO, DFID, MOD and SU, the 1HMG Overseas initiative also partners with the UK Joint Force Headquarters (UKJFH) for global crisis response, with utility of Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams (OLRTs).
Downing Street’s coordinative-discourse also recognised this broader theme, an interviewed aid advisor recalling discussions concerning how:

The countries with the biggest development challenges… are disproportionately concentrated in states where there is conflict, insecurity and instability… demanding a stronger focus on conflict and stability and investment in fragile states (Interview LT6).

New Labour had sought to construct more proactive, engaged foreign policy, resulting in renewed international leadership ambitions and the catchphrase ‘Blair’s wars’ (Dyson, 2011:64-75). Nonetheless, foreign policy decision-making and strategizing is often reactive (Jermy, 2011). The research framework accounts for this, by emphasising exogenous shocks spurring endogenous framing. However, this prevalent Coalition discourse constructed proactive strategizing through an aid stability agenda concerning FCAS, entailing experience-led and principled signposting, informing how to frame future shocks. Again, this is understood in terms of background episteme governing what discourse was feasible. Where epistemes converged, the EU shared in this agenda, through international terrorism and irregular-migration spilling-over from FCAS situations. Within parliamentary discourse, the UK’s interpretation of this agenda was detailed through “four strategic principles”:

[F]irst, strengthening global peace, security and governance; secondly, strengthening resilience and the response to crises; thirdly, promoting global prosperity; and fourthly, tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable (Double, 2016:252WH).

This further demonstrated the enduring pro-poor focus within the epoch, with the 2015 aid strategy delineating the foremost objective’s intent as being to:

[I]nvest more to tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict, and to tackle crime and corruption… fundamental to poverty reduction overseas, and will also strengthen our own national security at home (DFID and HMT, 2015:3).

Under Coalition tenure, as one interviewed parliamentarian noted, this was economised within coordinative-discourse as “an investment with an expectation of a return… to live in a more prosperous and therefore safer and more stable world” (Interview P1). It is deduced that this executive-level stability discourse thus furthered the ‘stabilisation’ frames synthesis of poverty and conflict, security and development, high and low-politics, through implicitly
linking vested (security) interests with the pro-poor focus. This was supported by the interviewed development secretary’s comments:

Security and stability are absolutely essential, not only for the poor people who are mired in conflict, they are also essential for us because there are more British citizens with British passports training in Somalia terrorist camps four years ago than in any other country, and they are a danger to us (Interview L10).

For the UK, this agenda to aid global stability traced back to Lord Carrington’s call for “Britain to resume… a proper share of responsibility for the preservation of peace and stability in the world” (MOD, 1970:1), revealing the UK’s historical sentiment of postcolonial moral-responsibility, and contemporary ‘nostalgia for power’. More directly, the BSOS represented only incremental-change from Blair’s new-humanitarian doctrine, where “the security of Britain is best served in a secure world, so we should be willing to contribute to wider international peace and security” (New Labour, 1997:38). However, through the Coalition’s change in prioritising UK aid’s civilian agencies and pro-poor focus in-lieu of defence resourcing, this stability agenda prioritised the salience of politics, and civilian professional-routines, covering initiatives such as education, women’s rights and good-governance programmes (DFID, 2015, 2017), over martial-power. This was through interpreting that structural stability could only be attained when a society held legitimate governance and capacity to manage conflict peacefully, which required:

[A]n integrated cross-government strategy to address conflict issues… [by investing] in upstream prevention to build strong, legitimate institutions in fragile countries so that they are capable of managing tensions and shocks (DFID et al, 2011:2).

Thus, the UK sought to aid afflicted peoples, and link them to legitimate government, to peacefully alleviate causes of instability and its spill-over. As such, the Conservative 2015 aid strategy argued that the UK “not only meets its responsibilities to the world’s poorest, but in doing so best serves and protects its own security and interests” (DFID and HMT, 2015:4). This was by cohering “the government’s global efforts to defeat poverty, tackle instability, and create prosperity in developing countries” (DFID and HMT, 2015:9). However, resonance of the historical sentiment of moral postcolonial-responsibility was superseded by greater pragmatism concerning FCAS in this new epoch, beyond the facilitation of free-trade. Nonetheless, this agenda necessitated an enduring dependence upon the pro-poor focus, it
becoming the preferential path to implement the ‘collective memory of greatness’ in pursuing stability, then termed “beyond aid” thinking (HOCIDC, 2015). Indeed, Osborne and Greening had described the 2015 aid strategy as a:

[F]undamental shift in how we use 0.7% of our national income [showing how] there is no distinction between reducing poverty, tackling global challenges and serving our national interest (in DFID and HMT, 2015b).

However, whereas the new strategy prominently decreed to “allocate 50% of all DFID’s spending to fragile states” (DFID and HMT, 2015:4), it did not signify a critical-juncture in itself. Rather, it was indicative of further incremental-change, whereby the stability agenda progressed from the previous juncture, which saw ‘stabilisation’ framing superseding ‘insurgency’ framing through frame-contestation.

The agenda did not preclude the utility of force, but as with the institutional-level discursive struggle, re-framed the military contribution as supportive. In time DCDC’s Security and Stabilisation (2012) was itself superseded by the grander Shaping a Stable World: The Military Contribution (DCDC, 2016), with explicit reference to the BSOS (2011), and NSS-SDSR (2015). Additionally, it cited Hammond’s new International Defence Engagement Strategy (MOD, 2013), utilising non-warfighting defence capabilities in pursuit of regional stability, conflict-prevention, PCR and stabilisation. This overtly emphasised the agenda itself and defence’s subordination therein. As such, the AEI’s conflations of the UK’s de-prioritisation of defence capabilities with “strategic ‘declinism’” (Cornish, 2014:2) was a misinterpretation. The ‘collective memory of greatness’ endured, only the preferred avenue to its attainment changed. However, as the interviewed sergeant-major observed, an interpretation grew that:

‘Blair’s wars’ may mean a political generation who are unwilling to deploy ‘boots on the ground’ in the pursuit of British values or national interests for the foreseeable future (Interview P15).

This observation reflected the UK’s changing background cultural episteme. The “first duty of government” remained “to safeguard our national security” (HMG, 2010b:8, 2015b:23). However, framing surrounding exogenous shocks posed by FCAS, where troop deployments were perceived as elective, grew contentious. For the inherited situation in Afghanistan explicitly, Fox had demanded “a stable enough Afghanistan, able to manage its own internal
and external security without our involvement” (2010). Mitchell similarly declared, “peace will only be achieved through political process backed by development” (in DFID, 2010b:1). Subsequently, prevalent thinking as seen in the UKLSCC’s ‘4P’s’, DFID’s ‘four objectives’, and the OECD-DAC promulgated fragile state principles, demanded empowering Afghans (Afghanization). As the interviewed Downing Street aid advisor noted, in practice:

> Aid came to play a far greater role in Afghanistan under the Conservative-Coalition, running a whole series of state-strengthening and state-building programmes (Interview LT6).

This was through the Coalition (and latter Conservative government) empowering DFID to empower the GIROA. Responsibility for security in Helmand was formally relinquished to the GIROA in 2011, with most UK troops withdrawing by 2014 upon Operation Herrick’s conclusion (HMG, 2014). However, within the new agenda, the end of Herrick did not signify the end of the mission. The Conservatives again pledged to “support the Government of Afghanistan in ensuring that the country remains stable and never again becomes a haven for international terrorists” (Conservative Party, 2015:76). Accordingly, the MOD lent military support (MSS) to DFID’s endeavours, largely through partnering indigenous forces under Operation Toral, seen in the Sandhurst Group’s commitment to the Afghanistan National Army Officer Academy, colloquially termed “Sandhurst in the Sand” (Interview P35). The Coalition also withdrew the last troops from Iraq in 2011 (Chilcot, 2016:145), demilitarising aid through ending what some construed occupation, progressing towards:

> [R]efocusing our aid budget to support fragile and broken states and regions to prevent conflict – and, crucially, to promote the golden thread of conditions that drive prosperity all across the world: the rule of law, good governance and the growth of democracy (HMG, 2015:6).

Incremental-change within the agenda, including MSS, is further identified through frame-contestation surrounding exogenous shocks beyond Afghanistan, viewable in the ‘Arab Spring’. As Holland and Aaronson (2014) argued, Cameron’s frame for intervening in Libya (Operation Ellamy, 2011) was principally, “the strategic rhetorical balancing of calls to protect civilians with the language of the national interest” (2014:14). The intervention was legitimised under the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), in UNSCR1973 (2011). However, it was indicative of the evolving stability agenda, seeking to pre-empt and prevent a new FCAS situation within Europe’s ‘neighbourhood’, as Cameron contended:
If Gaddafi’s attacks on his own people succeed, Libya will once again become a pariah state festering on Europe’s border, a source of instability, exporting strife beyond her borders (2011).

Despite coinciding with Afghanization, Libya was not considered a ‘soft option’ for the UK to contribute troops to, as had the 2005-2006 Helmand precedent when compared with Iraq during the early-‘GWOT’ context (Chapter 5), indicating the change in background episteme. Troops were not deployed to aid stabilisation and reconstruction, demonstrating how the army’s historical ‘small war’ path-dependency was no longer politically viable. Further evidencing changed episteme, the public’s support for elective defence interventionism concerning FCAS declined, and martial-power grew increasingly ‘democratised’, and voted upon as parliamentary prerogative usurped royal prerogative’s historical decision-making (Gray and Lomas, 2014; Strong, 2014). Significantly, the late-‘GWOT’s’ episteme was such that these votes were failing. This was evident in Cameron’s failed vote to punish Assad’s (2013) utility of chemical warfare in Syria. This vote had been framed in terms of the stability agenda, with Clegg emphasising “our commitment to peace and stability around the world” (2013:Column.1546). However, akin to the interviewed sergeant-major’s observation, the episteme’s new aversion towards martial-power was recognised, with Cameron identifying “the damage done to public confidence by Iraq” (2013:Column.1428).

Whether votes succeeded or failed, as Miliband interjected during this debate, “[w]e all know that stability cannot be achieved by military means alone” (Miliband, 2013:Column.1448).

The problems presented by FCAS-led instability abroad affected all of Europe, ensuring that the EU-level was receptive to this stability discourse. The EU itself was promulgating more pragmatic peace-project values, complementing civilian-power instruments with greater security integration, indicated in Mogherini’s foreword to the EUGS noting how a “fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union, it calls for an outward- and forward-looking European foreign and security policy” (in EU, 2016:5). In addition to terrorism/extremism, as with the 9/11 shock, FCAS-led irregular-migration was also explicitly recognised as destabilising by both the UK and EU, as the Conservative’s 2015 aid strategy observed:

Violence and conflict in Africa and the Middle East are causing unprecedented migration flows to Europe. In the past decade, weak and unstable institutions overseas have allowed threats to the UK to emerge (DFID and HMT, 2015:13).
Through shared problems, it was only logical that promulgated schemas and solutions within the EU developed commonality within a shared ‘responsibility to stabilise’. This is evident when tracing discourse surrounding the construction of the EU security strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (EC, 2003), *Neighbourhood Policy* (EC, 2004; EEAS, 2015), and the EUGS, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe* (EEAS, 2016) (see Chapter 7). These progressed common foreign and security policy (CFSP), aid instruments (EU-level aid), and notably the European Stability Initiative (ESI). Commonality between the Coalition’s stability agenda and the EU-level is overtly observable in the EUGS’s recognition how:

> Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world (EU, 2016:14).

The UK held significant input into the construct of the EUGS, even delaying its publication, to avoid influencing the ‘Brexit’ referendum, as one interviewed expert revealed (Interview, B31). If not for ‘Brexit’, this pragmatic civilian-power discourse may have represented the genesis of a fledgling counter-frame to the UK’s historical dependence upon NATO concerning European security. The 2015 Conservative government itself acknowledged that problems posed by foreign conflict, instability and weak governance were “priorities identified in both the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review and EU Global Strategy” and that the UK and EU share “commitments to eradicate extreme poverty and to build prosperity, peace, stability and resilience in developing countries” (Patel, 2017:1). As the stability agenda and EUGS were constructed contemporaneously, it is no surprise that UK sherpas and EURep toiled to project thinking from the stability agenda into the EUGS, especially with the UK growing relatively distanced from the US as a martial-power.

Thus, it is couched that the agenda-setting ‘integrated’ approach to ‘stabilisation’ frame, led to new foreign policy strategizing in the guise of the stability agenda’s synthesis of security and development, and perception of a mutually-beneficial ‘responsibility to stabilise’. As such, perceived security imperatives and pro-poor path-dependency coincided. Whereas under New Labour, high-politics concerns could overshadow those of low-politics, seen in the Atlanticist ‘special-relationship’ and alliance-politics overshadowing UK aid’s pro-poor...
focus and institutional-layering in Afghanistan, the Conservative-led stability agenda conjoined them. This was better socialised with the EU’s peace-project values, and the continent’s anti-war cultural episteme. UK aid’s entrenched pro-poor path-dependency endured, while its professional-routines changed, growing more intuitively pro-poor, as martial routines reverted to supportive roles, paralleling contemporary EU thinking.

Supportive Europeanization conduits and processes
That facets of UK framing concerning stability, integrated thinking and pro-poor focus are found adopted in EU-level discourse, including the EUGS, is indicative of UK leadership ambitions being realised within aid’s shared-competency domain. Newly converged UK-EU cultural epistemes, through the UK’s experiential-learning in Afghanistan, and socialisation within the EU, diminished frame-contestation within European interactive discursive-struggle. This more amenable discursive environ facilitated the UK to project ideas upwards. As such, this may be understood as the conscious uploading of ideas, but, underpinned by subconscious cultural change it potentially entailed downloading, through socialisation. While uploading through personality-politics, seminars/conferences and secondments has been discussed, consideration of additional avenues may help explain this uploading dimension specifically. Here, discursive fora of interest include those of the international-level aid regime, and at the lower level of analysis, interactions within Afghanistan itself.

By treaty, all EU members are notionally equal, and all are signatories of the MDG/SDGs. However, as the interviewed senior DFID official noted, this equality was not perceived within UK aid’s coordinative-discourse (Interview LT17), nor was it the prevailing European interpretation. This was a unanimous finding spanning all UK and EU interviews conducted. With discourse and social-practice understood as mutually-constitutive within power/knowledge systems (Foucault, 1980), such popular interpretation concerning where power lies can be significant. Certainly, within international forums, UK governments consistently championed the UK’s development credentials, promoting the ‘UK Aid’ brand as an international leader, serving national and international interests and moral responsibilities (see DFID and HMT, 2015). This reputation-building is identifiable within discourse(s) surrounding fragile states, including Afghanistan and Iraq, but also more broadly. For example, as Mitchell noted when international development secretary:

Britain’s contribution, through David Cameron’s co-chairmanship of the High Level Panel, draws the international communities’ attention to the persuasive
argument that promoting good governance and accountability while tackling corruption and supporting a rule of law deserves much greater attention (2013:21).

This was with reference to the UK’s leadership within the UN’s forum concerning the post-2015 agenda, which influenced the construct of the SDGs (see HMG, 2012). Further, the UK occupied the permanent UNSC seat, contributing towards multiple resolutions on Afghanistan and other FCAS situations, and held the 2013 G8 presidency, leading discussions on Afghanistan, the Syrian crisis, and other issues such as ‘aid for trade’ and WTO trade facilitation at Lough Erne (G8UK, 2013). Engagement also endured within the OECD-DAC, demonstrable in furthering the aforementioned FSPs (see OECD, 2015). The interviewed aid advisor supported Mitchell’s (2013) assertion of UK leadership herein, arguing how “it’s a matter of public record that the UK plays a leading role in aid through the 0.7 percent target”, while further observing that “the PM [Cameron] has spoken publicly about how other states need to step up to the plate” (Interview LT6). Through utilising these international forums, combined with the high resourcing of UK aid, in gross terms and as a percentage of GNI, the UK occupied a conducive position to achieve this. Officialising the 0.7 percent GNI target arguably held greater resonance than the two-percent NATO defence target. It forwarded a new international norm, and so signified progressive change.

As a rule-abiding state within the international community, the UK’s efforts to influence others to colloquially ‘step up to the plate’ in the UK’s image entailed attempts to lead in the construct of the rules governing the international aid regime, ‘above the head’ of the EU. Beyond Blair’s desire to reform the EU and UN (New Labour, 1997), this intent was evident in the Conservative Party’s 2015 manifesto, observing how “[o]ur aid budget meets the OECD aid rules”, and declaring intent to “actively engage in international discussions to ensure that these rules fully reflect the importance of peace, stability and effective institutions for reducing poverty” (2015:78). Peers within the OECD-DAC looked favourably upon the UK’s engagement and leadership ambitions, reporting that “[t]he UK has an excellent reputation among partners” during a period when there was a considerable rate of world-wide reshaping and transitional power structures (OECD, 2014:2, 19). The interpretation that UK aid was influential for other states is evident in the OECD peer-review elaborating how the UK:
Continues to lead in shaping the global development agenda. The UK uses its position strategically to address global public risks and bring development concerns into international policy fora. Its peers value the UK’s leadership in driving the development agenda (OECD, 2014:15).

As such, this communicative-discourse revealed that the UK’s enduring cultural ‘collective memory of greatness’ and leadership ambition were recognised within the international aid regime. The UK had persistently pushed for increased multilateral resource-allocation towards FCAS (see DFID, 2009b; DFID and HMT, 2015; OECD, 2010:11). In practice, achieving this had been a lengthy effort, traceable back to Coalition legacy, and arguably New Labour before this, including the G8 meeting of 2005 at Gleneagles, and the senior-level forum in London, from which the OECD drafted the FSPs (OECD, 2006, 2011). DFID later reported how:

Under the UK’s leadership, the DAC initiated a process to update the rules in 2012. This phase of reform culminated in February 2016 and, as a result, the organisation now recognises the role of aid in tackling the challenges of conflict, insecurity and violent extremism (DFID and HMT, 2017:1).

This was part of the ambition to modernise and redefine ODA rules to conform with the integrated approach to stabilisation, conducted through the 2012, 2014 and 2016 meetings of the OECD-DAC. As Anders (2016) observed, this entailed change to “include more peace and security-related costs [including] countering violent extremism”. The DAC reported on this process at the February 2017 high-level meeting in Paris, detailing the commitment to the ‘New Deal’ concerning fragile states within the 2030 agenda (OECD, 2017:1). It further recognised that those states most in need included “fragile and conflict-affected contexts” necessitating increased “peace and security expenditures” (OECD, 2017:2). It also introduced the issue of a new “Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities” (OECD, 2017:3). UK aid discourse interpreted that this entailed progress “to work towards a more effective multilateral development system” (DFID and HMT, 2017:4), but more significantly for the thesis, noted:

An increase of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations ODA coefficient, more than doubling the percentage of contributions to eligible UN peacekeeping missions that may be counted as ODA from 7% to 15% (DFID and HMT, 2017:3).
This was the product of UK communicative-discourse at this level. As discussed above, peacekeeping and military support were essential within UK aid’s evolved integrated approach, as practiced in contributing to latter UN sanctioned missions to South Sudan (UK Operation Trenton, 2016-) and Somalia (Operation Tangham, 2017-). Beyond the construct of the UN’s SDGs, including greater focus on peaceful societies, the UK was also recognised for supporting the UN’s ‘Delivering as One’ country-level strategy initiative (OECD, 2010:11), which was compatible with DFID’s contemporary country strategies (see for example Bennett et al, 2009; DFID, 2017). Fundamentally, however, latter UK efforts to lead aid thinking, especially those concerning FCAS situations, were borne within the stability agenda and the observation that historical contexts evolve, as the Conservative government noted:

The international rules governing aid were first established nearly 50 years ago. The Government believes these rules need to keep pace with a changing world… We operate in a context in which global insecurity is rising and violence and conflict is pulling people back into poverty (DFID and HMT, 2017:2).

Through successfully influencing the rules of the international aid regime, the UK indirectly further influenced EU-level thinking, where the EU adhered to OECD rules. However, such influence and resultant transformation of content occurred outside of traditional conceptualisations of Europeanization, which emphasise EU structures (Howell, 2004). Furthermore, with consideration of the converged UK-EU background cultural epistemes, and potential socialisation as the UK operated within the EU, facets of such influence may perhaps be understood as holding origins in EU-level ‘peace-project’ thinking.

Other fora of interest include the discourse and practice that occurred within Afghanistan, which also demands comment. It may be presumed that representation in-country broadly paralleled the aforementioned discussed frame-contestation. However, a foremost reason as to how the UK defence community’s ‘insurgency’ framing endured in degrees for so long, was through the discrete episteme of the army’s ‘frontier-like’ culture in Helmand. Here the interviewed humanitarian aid experts and UK ambassador had observed “a huge disparity” between civilian and defence agency (Interview L9; also L4, LT11, ST14). Simply put, until the 2014 conclusion of Operation Herrick, there remained thousands of UK troops in Helmand, and only hundreds of aid workers. The UK held the second largest defence budget in NATO after the US (the largest in the EU) in addition to the 0.7 percent aid target. The
UK was the largest EU (gross) bilateral aid donor to Afghanistan, and cumulatively was the most significant after the US. Simon and Rogers even argued that relative EU geopolitical power was subsiding and that from 2010, “[a]ll roads run through London”, through the UK’s ‘special-relationship’ with the US (2010:57). The thesis contests this assertion, finding a weakened relationship between Cameron and Obama (see BBC, 2016). However, that such sentiment was present among observers was significant.

In-country processes of Europeanization may be viewed in terms of the UK enjoying a realist-like notion of comparative power. This was derived from this resourcing, but also through necessarily acting as a closer partner of the US in Helmand post-2009, and Obama’s troop ‘surge’ into the province. This forced UK troops and officials to work ever-closer with those of the US, ensuring that the UK acted as a ‘gatekeeper to knowledge’, as others, including the EU sought knowledge on US decision-making. This is discernible in EU-level and member state representatives seeking an audience with UK representation in Afghanistan, in-lieu of the US directly. The former ambassador interviewed recalled how:

> Every week [there was] a meeting of EU Ambassadors under the presidency… It wasn’t very productive for us because we were always being milked for information, because we knew more about what was going on than the others, but it was for the others… they felt that they were part of the effort (Interview L9).

Similarly, from the perspective of an aid expert and subsequent EU official interviewed, discussing ‘heads of missions’ (HOMS) and ‘power-seven top-secret’ meetings:

> You would sit there and you knew which member states were going to be able to speak more than others… The UK definitely had a bigger voice in the EU than other countries (Interview L4).

Significantly, the army was a rigid hierarchy, and the notion of independently-minded campaigning in ‘Helmandshire’ did not easily subside. As the MOD’s Operation Herrick Campaign Study (DLW, 2015) revealed, the UK treated the thinking of the subordinate Danes and Estonians, embedded within the UK’s brigade, as unimportant. This contrasted with the conduct of other, more independent member states operating in other provinces, including the Netherlands and Italy, from whom the SU lesson-drew (PCRU, 2007:7-8). While, although the defence cultural ‘expectation of success’ had waned by the post-2009 US surge, Americanisation was no greater evident during this latter period. The ‘special-
relationship’ bred a competitive attitude towards the US troops. UK defence’s coordinative-discourse debated concerns of ‘strategic embarrassment’. As one senior British officer cited by Harnden (2011) elaborated on Operation Panther’s Claw (2009):

The message the British therefore wanted to send to the Afghans was, ‘Don’t worry about the central belt where the people are, because that’s British.’ Parochial, I know, but seriously important in the great scheme of things. It could have gone completely pear-shaped. The Americans were coming in. The governor’s position was looking quite dodgy. And so, we needed a bit of a victory (in Harnden, 2011:109).

This perceived necessity to achieve a symbolic military victory by the UK defence community, amidst the publicly experienced failure of UK kinetic-counterinsurgency thinking, may be accredited to less-rational discursive-sentiments of ‘wounded pride’. The experience of failure had made the defence community receptive to the SU’s ‘stabilisation’ counter-frame. However, the fear, as interpreted by one interviewed officer, was that the US’s immense martial-power would pacify Helmand through brute force, where the UK had failed (Interview P3). This risked embarrassing prior UK efforts, as had Brown’s “[u]sing politics to paper over what looked like defeat” in Basra, when US troops ‘bailed out’ the UK in Iraq (Fairweather, 2011:314). As such, until 2014, despite undertaking significant change in routines post-2010 within the ascendant ‘stabilisation’ frame, it was partly through the army’s sentiment of ‘wounded pride’ that the realist-like notion of comparative power endured in-country, with the UK acting as the ‘gatekeeper to knowledge’ for Europe.

Less overt, but perhaps of more significant interest, was that UK NGO’s utilised to disseminate aid by DFID in-country, comprised some of those most experienced in operating within fragile states such as Afghanistan. These included the British Red Cross and Oxfam International, but also smaller NGOs such as Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief (Red R) and the HALO Trust humanitarian mine-action charity (Interviews L16, LT6, ST14). Such NGOs could not saliently contest the defence community’s framing in Helmand, especially during the earlier years. However, they long operated in Kabul, and in terms of resourcing, both Red R and the HALO Trust (among others) in time achieved EU-level recognition and resourcing while operating in pursuit of UK aid efforts in Afghanistan (Interviews L16, ST14). For their localised expertise if not the magnitude of their
promulgated discourse, they may be considered an additional potential conduit into the EU-level.

These discourses operating at different levels are indicative of frame-contestation occurring within interactive discursive-struggle. That the defence ‘insurgency’ frame was found to have failed did not mean that it was dispelled overnight within all epistemic-communities. However, where deliberately orchestrated by the UK executive-level and supported by the institutional-level, through international leadership ambition in pursuit of the cultural ‘collective memory of greatness’, UK aid sought ‘all available entry points’ to project the prevailing thought of the period. This is similar to ‘stabilisation’ framing when pertaining to fragility (see PCRU, 2007:4), but on a broader political scale. Although, further demonstrated here is the difficulty inherent in delineating Europeanization processes when the EU itself operated within a broader international community, and where shared-competency domains such as aid operate within a broader international aid regime. However, there can be no confusing the enduring UK desire to lead in aid thinking, as seen in one of the most sceptical Conservative development secretaries declaring on the cusp of ‘Brexit’, how:

[T]he UK will continue to play a leading role… we want to play our part in making sure that Europe remains strong and prosperous and able to lead in the world, promoting our shared values and tackling shared threats. We are seeking a deep and special partnership with the EU (Patel, 2017:1).

Chapter conclusion

Chapter 5 revealed how during the early-‘GWOT’ period, Blair often prioritised the historical ‘special-relationship’ with the US and alliance-politics obligations, which overshadowed UK aid’s operation within low-politics. However, under New Labour, UK aid’s pro-poor path-dependency was re-emphasised within discourse, albeit through evolved rationale concerning FCAS, as vested security interests and interpretation of a poverty-conflict cycle supplanted postcolonial moral-responsibility. Whole-of-government thinking also endured, albeit re-framed as the ‘comprehensive’ approach within solutions where insurgency was interpreted part of the problem. Here, the defence community assumed a dominant role, and pursued the army’s ‘small-war’ path-dependency, pushing schemata prioritising historical professional-routines. This constituted unintentional institutional-layering concerning aid in Helmand. A broader finding was in identifying the UK’s cultural confidence in martial-power, ‘collective memory of greatness’, and longstanding leadership ambition to export ideas, including the
‘comprehensive’ approach. However, UK aid’s emphasis of martial-power during this period was incompatible with the EU’s post-martial, anti-war continental episteme.

This chapter builds on this by tracing framing and path-dependency under the latter Coalition and Conservative governments (addressing and resolving RQ3), and further explores background cultural episteme, as popularly interpreted diminished returns of martial-power post-2010 rescinded defence agency’s influence within UK aid’s epistemic-communities. The Coalition predominantly framed the inherited situation in Afghanistan as a war. However, despite Conservative governance traditionally being relatively disparaging of foreign aid, they communicated greater support for UK aid’s civilian agencies (and pro-poor path-dependency) than defence, and framed the solution to Afghanistan’s CPE accordingly. This is demonstrated by the Coalition protecting the UK aid budget, including officialising the 0.7 percent GNI target, despite the austerity agenda. In contrast, defence capability was cut. The experiment of applying defence’s historical ‘insurgency’ schemata to foreign FCAS had failed. The experience of this incrementally changed UK cultural episteme to preclude martial-power focussed solutions within discourse, while the UK was further socialising within the EU’s peace-project.

The UK executive-government empowered UK aid’s civilian agencies (and associated framing) over defence from the 2010 NSS and SDSR onwards. ‘Stabilisation’ framing, derived from SU discourse, became the salient, agenda-setting frame of the period. It built on the fragile state principles, prioritising local-context, state-strengthening, and peacebuilding while avoiding harmful exclusionary practices (see OECD, 2011:45-47). In Afghanistan the poverty-conflict cycle entailed less problems of under-development so much as uneven-development, seen in the feuds of Pashtunwali, which presented a complex socio-politics of grievances and loyalties amidst feudal-like tribalism. ‘Stabilisation’ framing recognised the salience of politics, and the need to attain popular interpretations of fair and inclusive political-settlement(s), while linking local peoples with legitimate local governance, permitting fair welfare distribution while avoiding ‘othering’.

Of note, stabilisation framing drew (cross-loaded) from contemporaneous European experience to this end, and unlike prior ‘insurgency’ framing, its facets were successfully ‘uploaded’ into the EU-level (an important revelation regarding RQ5). The associated ‘integrated’ approach complemented ‘stabilisation’ framing, entailing socially-attributed meaning which furthered the re-balancing of institutional agents, de-layering defence
dominance from UK aid concerning FCAS, and supplanting ‘comprehensive’ thinking. Through this thinking, not only were ‘all-bases’ notionally covered, they were arguably cohered towards pursuing a greater political objective, with defence agency reaffirmed as subservient, yet qualifying of ODA in the context of peacekeeping. Within the UK’s BSOS strategy (2011) and latter UK aid Strategy and NSS-SDSR of 2015, this constituted the ‘stability agenda’, synthesising traditional distinctions between high and low-politics. While less distinct at the EU-level, the integrated approach was also successfully uploaded into EU discourse, found overtly in the EUGS’s ‘integrated approach to conflicts and crises’ (2016:28-31).

The purported reputation that the UK was influential in foreign aid (see Double, 2016), appears substantiated within discourse concerning FCAS. However, the movement of UK aid’s background episteme was significant in facilitating ‘uploading’ processes of Europeanization (of fundamental importance regarding RQ5 and thus RQ1). A mid-Atlantic power during New Labour’s tenure, between the US (a martial-power) and EU (a civilian-power), under Coalition tenure the UK converged with the EU’s continental episteme. Counterinsurgency was no longer perceived as a viable schema when framing solutions to Afghanistan’s CPE. The US’s overextension in ‘empire-lite’ and the UK defence community’s quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan had precluded any receptive audience. The historical ‘special-relationship’ between the UK and US had also waned post-Bush/Blair, with Obama looking to Merkel instead. In ramification, the UK maximised geographical, historical and cultural ties with Europe, through similar post-martial episteme, converging with (pragmatic) peace-project values. It was from this changed foundational cultural perspective that UK thinking could greater influence the EU.

Certainly, not all EU member states were equal, the UK was a ‘gatekeeper to knowledge’ for Europe in Afghanistan. However, the successful uploading of ideas during this period was dependent as much on the UK’s communication of content that the EU-level was receptive to hear, as the UK’s efforts in pushing it. This was not simply a matter of discursive flows through socialisation/social-learning, but deeper cultural resonance through the converged background co-existing epistemes concerning what discourse was possible within the holistic European foreign aid epistemic-community (see Foucault, 1971, 1980). It was the UK’s experience of failures, a weakened ‘special-relationship’ with the US post-Blair/Bush, and relatively closer ties with Europe, that deepened Europeanization’s processes whereby the ‘integrated’ approach to ‘stabilisation’ was found mutually acceptable.
Chapters 5 and 6 have focussed upon UK aid’s institutional framing and path-dependency concerning FCAS’ CPE, through early and latter ‘GWOT’ periods, while emphasising Afghanistan as the aid recipient of greatest value. However, ideas are little constrained by borders, especially not within the EU, where there exist degrees of commonality that may constitute converged epistemes underpinning discursive-possibilities. To further understanding in terms of Europeanization, Chapter 7 traces the institutional framing and path-dependency within the EU’s holistic supranational-level foreign aid institution. Here, the thesis qualitatively assesses the resonance, and permeating depth of UK ideas. Again, Afghanistan and the ‘GWOT’ context are emphasised, both for Afghanistan’s value within this epoch, and for methodological considerations – to limit data and focus analysis.
EU-Level Foreign Aid: Learning to be ‘Comprehensive’

I always appreciated, from the British ministers and Prime Minister, the British sense of pragmatism. It was a gift given by Britain to the European Union – down to earth common sense, we will miss that (Juncker, in BBC, 2018).

Chapters 5 and 6 expanded upon UK foreign aid (UK aid) towards fragile, conflict-affected states (FCAS) (addressing RQ2, RQ3 and in-part RQ5). Afghanistan was emphasised as the aid recipient of intrinsic value within the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (‘GWOT’) historical context. These chapters revealed that UK aid’s discourse undertook significant, if often incremental change, which amounted to a critical-juncture in thought between New Labour’s early, and the Conservative-led Coalition’s late-‘GWOT’ periods. This change entailed the ascendance of, and subsequent metamorphosis away from, predominant defence agency and martial-routines derived from imperial legacy. This was seen in the dominant defence ‘insurgency’ frame and imbalanced ‘comprehensive’ approach that exacerbated the complex political emergency (CPE) in Helmand. After experiencing this failure, the Coalition discursively re-jigged UK aid’s power-structures, de-prioritising defence agency in favour of empowered civilian agency, and civilian-routines.

UK aid’s latter thinking privileged the salience of politics, seen in ‘stabilisation’ framing and the re-balanced ‘integrated’ approach. High-politics’ prior overshadowing of low-politics receded as the two grew synthesised within a stability agenda. However, UK aid’s broadly pro-poor path-dependency endured throughout, re-emphasised under New Labour and further officialised within legislation by Coalition and Conservative governments. Pro-poor significance to FCAS was discursively entrenched through popular acceptance of the security-development nexus (poverty-conflict cycle, and its spill-over). Nonetheless, the historical sentiment of postcolonial moral-responsibility subsided as vested security imperatives became associated with instability and affliction overseas, leading to a more pragmatic, politicised aid agenda.

Regardless of changed aid thinking, the UK’s cultural collective memory of greatness and leadership ambition also endured. The prior chapters revealed the UK’s efforts to influence EU-level foreign aid (EU aid) thinking pertaining to FCAS. Evidence suggests that
significant ideational facets of UK aid succeeded in permeating EU-level discourse, including focal Commission communications and Council conclusions (for example CEU, 2003, 2005; EC, 2011; EC and HRFASP, 2013). However, to roundly complete the research’s analysis, the resonance of such permeation within the EU-level demands further consideration, as does the potential for deliberate downloading of EU-level thought. As such, this chapter traces contemporaneous EU-level discourse to reveal a fuller understanding of Europeanization’s transformative processes within the shared-competency policy domain (addressing RQ2 and RQ4, whilst in-part addressing RQ5).

Focusing on Europeanization, the chapter contends that UK discourse did resonate upwards, into EU-level discourse. However, the ‘depth’ of pervasive discourse, transformational-content and norm transferal is revealed to constitute broadly ‘shallow’ Europeanization. Whereas ‘insurgency’ framing was only begrudgingly tolerated, ‘comprehensive’ whole-of-government thinking was well adopted, albeit in European interpretation(s). However, Europeanization is revealed to be more a matter of convergence in this substantive instance. Both UK and EU-level aid discourse moved towards pragmatic, politicised, stabilization thinking within the security-development nexus, with UK thinking metamorphosing from martial-power thought, and EU-level thinking from civilian-power thought.

The theoretical—methodological approach taken was Institutional Frame Analysis (IFA), consistent with the prior chapters, with Europeanization understood as a ‘cyclical’/‘omnidirectional’ extension of institutionalism, with interest in critiquing the process and situation of transformational-content (see Chapters 3-4; Bulmer and Burch, 2005; Howell, 2004c; Major, 2008). IFA was derived from framing literature (see Choudhry, 2016; Entman 1993; Goffman, 1974) and ‘new’ institutionalist literature, in discursive (DI; see Schmidt, 2010) and historical guises (HI; see Hall, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Skocpol, 1995b). Here, discourse was ‘taken seriously’, but pursued in the manner of HI’s conceptualisation of path-dependency, change, critical-junctures and/or revisionist-moments. This permitted further understanding of contemporary UK-EU-level thinking and assessing Europeanization’s relations through a reflective and reflexive process.

Discourse, as the “ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts, and categorizations through which meaning is ascribed” (Hajer, 2009:n.p.), is found anchored in institutions, outlining values for policy-formation. Its interactive nature enables frame-contestation, where frames are understood through Entmans’s (1993) four functions; the problem, its cause, values, and
solution. The salient framing of an issue/situation may become agenda-setting, potentially promoting change through affecting an institution’s extant path-dependency. This discourse may further be understood as fundamentally underpinned by a-priori cultural episteme (see Foucault, 1971, 1980), influencing what political-communication was possible for a given epistemic-community, within a set epoch. Thus, background cultural values influenced what discourse was possible, but experiential-learning through practice was also a condition. For example, the experience of failure such as that delineated of UK defence insurgency thinking (see Chapter 6), of ‘small-war’ path-dependency, invalidated that frame, opening space to counter-framing that then grew salient, with ramifications for institutional power-structures.

The extension from institutional discourse at member state or supranational-level into Europeanization’s processes reflected changed beliefs/value-judgements spanning these levels, potentially formulating shared values/policy. However, multiple epistemes may co-exist as the ‘epistemological consciousness’ of co-existent communities. This is significant, as the UK’s episteme is contended to have been originally distinct to that of the EU-level. Although, of note, as with UK aid, the EU-level aid ‘institution’ comprised multiple agencies and/or epistemic-communities. This included the Commission’s Delegate General-External Relations family (DG-RELEX), comprising DG-Trade, DG-DEVCO⁶ (development-cooperation) and DG-ECHO (humanitarians), plus the distinct European Development Fund (EDF) and other bodies, including the Foreign Affairs Council. Similarly to UK aid, institutional structures changed throughout the epoch, seen in the post-Lisbon European External Action Service (EEAS). It is through background episteme, and framing within discourse, underpinned through cultural values and preconceptions, that changed content provides insight into Europeanization.

The chapter’s argument is detailed through identifying the EU’s pre-9/11 episteme and EU aid’s extant thinking and path-dependency (addressing RQ2 from the EU-level’s viewpoint), before tracing apt discourse throughout the ‘GWOT’ period (addressing RQ4). Fitting with the revelations of previous chapters, foremost interest was in tracing EU-level endogenous framing responding to exogenous shocks/situations, and the presence of facets of the comprehensive and/or integrated approach, insurgency and/or stabilisation thinking. As such, attention was levied upon the progress of security-development integration pertaining to

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⁶ Formerly the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) from 2001, and prior Directorate-General for Development and Relations with ACP States (DEV) with DG-RELEX from 1958.
FCAS and the construct of the EU’s comprehensive approach, as applied to Afghanistan, and more broadly. Europeanization is alluded to throughout, including its perceived ‘depth’ prior to concluding the chapter. However, summative findings of this nature are outlined within the subsequent overarching thesis conclusion (Chapter 8).

**Identifying EU aid’s history, pre-9/11 path-dependency, and fragile states**

Post-World War II Europe was a fragile, conflict-affected continent demanding colossal post-conflict reconstruction (PCR). As Horký and Lightfoot (2012) noted, the Western European states that originally constituted the European Communities were aid recipients before they metamorphosed into aid donors. This was within “the rehabilitation of Europe” (Marshall, 1947) – the Marshall Plan. Post-war continental episteme was such that renewed war was utterly unthinkable, and yet its threat perennial, as discourse celebrating fascism’s defeat competed with vitriol towards the perceived Soviet threat. This contention was demonstrated in Churchill’s (1946) ‘sinews of peace’ speech, introducing the “special relationship” and “iron curtain” into popular-discourse. As the EU’s External Relations Commissioner contended in hindsight, “The impulse behind the new European architecture was ultimately a political one, to end the possibility of further war” (Patten, 2002b). This ‘impulse’ endured; the Commission identified the EU as “an on-going exercise in making peace and prosperity” (EC, 2001:4). It was this anti-war episteme that underpinned discourse concerning the construct of the European Communities and latter EU.

The Communities’ origins stemmed from the ‘EU6’, war-torn states that had experienced occupation (Benelux, France, Italy, and West Germany). Lineage traced back to the Treaties of Rome (1957), establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC; latterly TFEU), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC/Euratom). These two communities emphasised energy, industry and economy – including aid through the European Investment Bank (EIB) – but conspicuously not defence. However, the ‘EU6’ group itself traced further back to the Treaty of Paris (1951), instigating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This supranational body was to regulate war-resources and de-militarise Europe, so that France and (West) Germany, as belligerent ‘great powers’, “could hug each other so tightly in a loving embrace that neither would be able to get an arm free with which to punch the other” (Marshall, 2016:104). Meanwhile, defence concerns were tackled by the Western European Union (WEU) initiative, stemming from the Brussels Treaty (1948), and the Washington Treaty (1949) instigating NATO – both prominently including the UK, which having evaded wartime occupation endured as an Atlanticist, martial-power.
The anti-war episteme underpinning continental discourse ensured that the three Communities’ integration emphasised economic community and political cooperation (see for example, ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1988). This coordinative-discourse constructed an evolutionary ‘peacebuilding project’ of unique identity, through recognition among elites that:

[T]he only way forward for Europe was in breaking down barriers and encouraging co-operation between states, on the basis of common values and common interests, both political and economic (EC, 2001b:7).

Indeed, the Commission contended that “[t]he EU is the most successful peace project in modern history” (EC, 2013). As interviewed Commission and Council officials noted, many worked ‘supranationally’ within this project to the point where “they forget their nationality”, adopting an EU identity (Interview B30, also B26, IT22). Likewise, external observers such as Marshall perceived Europe as ‘post-conflict’, where “Europeans find it difficult to imagine the opposite” (2016:99). Such pervasive sentiment explains why academic debate popularly couched the Communities in terms of Duchêne’s “world’s civilian centres of power” (1972:43; also Orbie, 2006), or otherwise discounted them altogether. For example, Bull remonstrated that the EEC was “not an actor”, at least not one of traditional conceptualisation (1982:151; also Manners, 2002). Only the member states held recourse to the hard-power that traditional International Relations (IR) emphasised. This ‘peace-project’ discourse jarred with US, and to a degree UK (and perhaps French), martial-power sentiment. As Kagan argued:

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world… American and European perspectives are diverging (2003:1).

Kagan observed this post-9/11, but digression of thought across the Atlantic traced back to divergent World War II experiences, and consequentially epistemes. Whereas US martial-power discourse could be bombastic of the Soviet threat, continental states sought peaceful PCR. Even through the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992; TEU), signed by the enlarged ‘EU12’, the EU endured as a ‘civilian-power’. However, provision for greater political and security integration through embryonic common foreign and security policy (CFSP) had been established under ‘Title V’, including development-cooperation, and with the Council empowered to define common positions (CEU and EC, 1992:123-129).
WEU supported this integration through Maastricht and Petersberg declarations, cohering European security and defence identity, and promoting capabilities for conflict-prevention and crisis-management (WEU, 1991, 1992). Throughout this, the EU was arguably developing latent-power within IR through sheer mass, conceptualised to influence through ‘normative’ or ‘structural’-power interpretations (see Holden, 2009; Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005; Manners, 2002).

The distinctive supranational peace-project or civilian-power thinking promoted an institutional culture that favoured regionalism and inter-regional relations within the communities’ external-actorness. As one interviewed policy expert noted:

The idea of Europe as a model and norm-setter are ingrained in the way that people think. We used to think of ourselves as a model for the rest of the world… a kind of hub whereby we would create cross-national solutions which we would then upload to the global level… a normative-power where it comes to regional solutions (Interview B32).

The foremost inter-regional relationship pertained to overseas countries and territories (OCTs) and fragile (newly-independent) states of Europe’s imperial legacy. Prior to the joining of the UK (1973), these mostly comprised French territories. French influence at Rome ensured relations with OCT’s were reconciled within the customs union through an association agreement, even as decolonisation was underway. The framework was institutionalised through Yaoundé, Georgetown, and latter Lomé agreements (see EEC, 1963, 1975; also David, 2000; Farrell, 2005). Herein, the OCTs became the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states, while Lomé introduced the principle of equal, mutually-beneficial, ‘partnership’. As the Commission President, Ortoli noted at Lomé:

What we want while respecting our partners’ options, is to bring into one joint scheme our know-how and technological capacity, our markets and… our capital and our products… together with the resources at the disposal of our partners and their desire to use this… to build up their own development (in Frey-Wouters, 1980:3).

Benefits of ACP membership entailed the twin-tracks of non-reciprocal trade-preferences, and development aid (financial and technical) through the EDF. As one interviewed DECVO official noted, the EDF was separate from the EU budget, “a pooling of resources… the
biggest chunk going to Africa and countries with special interests want money to former colonies” (Interview B28), such as France and Francophone Africa. Although institutionalised, the EDF remained strongly intergovernmental.

Upon Lomé, with the UK and Iberian Peninsula’s ascension, the number of ACP signatories grew considerably (from 18 to 46), reaching 77 by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) of 2000 (see EC, 2006). This expanding institutional relationship demonstrated a Community policy-path within external-actorness that depended upon civilian-power instruments in the pursuit of trade, cooperation and prosperity. The tendency to ‘partner’ through inter-regionalism, as with the ACP-EU relationship, and to engage multilaterally and with international organisations (IO), seen in close cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), constituted the prevailing routine of this (CEU and EC, 1992:121). Of note, the EDF instrument itself developed relationships with the US, UN, OECD and World Bank (see Friedmann et al, 1966:126).

Through Maastricht (1992), aid in terms of development-cooperation was entrenched within EU external-actorness and CFSP (CEU and EC, 1992:123; David, 2000:11). However, defence policy (ESDP/CSDP) remained contentious through encroaching on NATO’s institutional territory (Shea, 2016). The French favoured EU CSDP whereas the UK, among other EU members, depended upon NATO (and Atlanticism); France only deviated from this path and communicated intent to re-join NATO in 2009 (Cody, 2009). Other member states, such as Germany, sought to maximise the post-Cold War ‘peace-dividend’. Thus, stalled defence integration, combined with historical anti-war episteme, ensured that ‘civilian-power Europe’ prevailed. Therefore, in defence and hard-power the EU arguably remained a political pygmy when compared to America, as Sonyel contended (1998:1).

Member state and EU-level Aid progressed upon a complementary basis pre-Lisbon Treaty amendments (2007; see FCO, 2008). As one interviewed DFID director noted, “member states and European assistance goes hand in hand… with an awful lot of agreement” (Interview LT17). However, Title XVII Article 130a of Maastricht, stating that EU policy “shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States” perhaps emphasised member state agency, and thus intergovernmentalism over supranationalism (ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1992:60). Fitting with this assessment, the interviewed UK development secretary was keen to observe that DFID operated “at arms-length” of EU bureaucracy (Interview L10). From this it may be inferred that the aid policy domain’s ‘cycle’ of Europeanization
was weighted to operate more easily as an uploading process, than downward, with EU-level aid operating as a normative follower. As one interviewed DG-DEVCO official noted, the construct of DEVCO’s ‘EuropeAid’ brand itself was taken from member state practice, such as DFID and the Swedish International Development-Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (Interview B28).

EU aid developed pursuant of pro-poor path-dependency, emphasising poverty-alleviation (see EC, 1994, 2000b). This fitted with member state preferences, such as those of the UK (see Chapter 5), the broader international aid regime (including foremost the UN, OECD and World Bank), and endogenous supranational-level peace-project values. As one interviewed DEVCO official noted:

In principle, development aid for us is mainly geared towards eradicating poverty; that is our overall objective in development, and worldwide, and we have a lot of tools and it works quite well (Interview B29).

Elements of poverty-alleviation had featured within the historical ACP-Communities relationship since Title II measures under Yaoundé, which emphasised “economic and social development”, including aid towards social projects and vocational training (EEC, 1963:4). That this sentiment endured is evident in its restatement under Maastricht’s Article 130a, while emphasising “the campaign against poverty” (ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1992:60). When devising a new strategy for Asia, poverty-alleviation also featured, including towards Afghanistan explicitly, where conditions permitted (EC, 1994:24). This was enacted through DG-ECHO’s “support to Afghan refugees”, “support for returnees to peaceful areas of Afghanistan” and “humanitarian aid in conflict-affected areas” (EC, 2007c:13). More broadly, EU aid’s historical pro-poor commitment was observed within academic debate. For example, Langan and Price found that “renegotiations and ongoing liberalisation of the relationship has placed pro-poor and poverty alleviation strategies at the centre” (2016:431-432).

The significant pan-EU agreement highlighted by the DFID director (Interview LT17), stemmed largely from supportive consensus over the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their prioritising poverty-alleviation, and the 2001 Gothenburg European Council endorsement of the Commission’s strategy for sustainable development, which also identified poverty as a foremost threat (EC, 2001:4). The latter European Consensus on Development (EC et al, 2006) demonstrated the enduring nature of this consensus
(rhetorically at least) concerning “the common values, principles, objectives and means in favour of poverty eradication” (Michel, in EC, 2006b:3). It argued how poverty-alleviation was “not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world” (EC et al, 2006:1). One interviewed DEVCO official described how this discourse led to “movements to try and objectivise [the EU budget], and come up with real metrics, for poverty indicators and material deprivation relating to the MDGs” (Interview B28). However, EU aid’s distribution was not necessarily structured towards poverty-eradication in practice, but ‘neighbourhood’ needs (Holden, 2009).

Nonetheless, the Commission’s final report on the MDGs rhetorically opened by pledging the EU’s commitment, alongside other world leaders, “to reduce global poverty and save millions of lives” (EC, 2015b:1). Emphasising a threat to life, as a device when framing poverty, promoted an economic focus within solutions to tackle impoverishment. Such pro-poor thinking, emphasising economic development had perhaps historically prevailed within DG-DEVCO, through a distinct aid ‘purist’ cultural identity (Appendix 5.9). Herein, DEVCO favoured aid of an apolitical character, in the spirit of what one interviewed DEVCO official termed “an aid revolution”, where:

Experts in pure development want to be separate from foreign policy… there was a desire to put a firewall around development aid to make it less dependent upon the moods of foreign policy makers (Interview B28).

This ‘purist’ aid thinking during the 1980-1990s context of community consolidation and union upon Maastricht was shared by the (highly autonomous) EU-level humanitarians in DG-ECHO, who sought to “work on a most-need basis, [where] political visibility can become a hurdle” (Interview B28). Underpinning this was Council regulation 1257/96 Article 7G, which emphasised the “impartiality in the implementation of humanitarian aid”, accepting international norms whereby “humanitarian aid decisions must be taken impartially and solely according to the victims’ needs and interests” (EUC, 1996:1-2). In seeking separation of aid from high-politics, this thinking disparaged linking EU aid with donor interests, as was commonly identified within aid practice (see for instance Friedmann et al, 1966; Killick, 1998; Morgenthau, 1962; Schraeder et al, 1998). The result of this ‘aid revolution’ was an epistemic-community around DEVCO comprising aid purists, seeking poverty-alleviation distinct from high-politics, and operating upon aid’s own timetable. Such
thinking was idealistic, but nonetheless prominent, if perhaps not salient across EU external-actorness.

Concerning EU external-actorness, the Commission’s DG-RELEX family were perceived in the UK as not being “accustomed to working together” through the ‘whole-of-government’ routines familiar to UK aid (Interviews L16, LT17). Rather, EU aid may be understood to have developed along stove-piped lines; ‘functionalist’ in the biological sense, with each organ pursuing its own discrete objective. This stove-piped structural character posed problems for policy coherence, demonstrated in dissonance between DG-DEVCO and DG-Trade once the EU embarked upon its (pro-trade, pro-poor) interpretation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agenda post-1995 (see EC, 1996; Farrell, 2005; Holden, 2005b, 2014). This new trade thinking was increasingly neo-liberal in character, demanding the opening of markets, and thus proving incompatible with Lomé’s historical non-reciprocal trade-preferences (see EC, 1996). Nonetheless, DG-RELEX discourse sought to create coherence around political-dialogue, development-cooperation and trade (EC, 2000b:10). Herein, discursive-struggle resulted in the amended Lomé agreement (1995) and subsequently the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA; 2000) (see David, 2000). As Farrell noted, the EU moved towards prioritising market-liberalisation and trade over development-cooperation, seen in the Commission’s reorganisation of 1999, and DG-DEVCO’s aid purists yielding ACP trade matters to DG-Trade (2005:268-269). From such dissonance, coherence of activity became a foremost EU-level concern, as communicated within the EU’s sustainable development strategy (EC, 2001:4-5). However, from this it may further be seen that DEVCO’s ‘purist’ aid thinking was perhaps not salient, and thus susceptible to ‘counter-revolution’ and politicisation.

The EU’s external-actorness, and DG-RELEX, arguably developed a distinctly political character, including the application of conditionality (see Farrell, 2005; Holden, 2003, 2006, 2009b; Keukeleire, 2000). This grew more evident as Europe developed in contrast with Africa’s failure to do so, and the ACP-EU’s mutually-beneficial, equal ‘partnership’ grew increasingly asymmetric. DG-DEVCO’s ‘purist’ pro-poor thinking was one response to this growing North-South asymmetry. However, the EU also sought to externalise (vested) peace-project and neo-liberal values through its civilian-power instruments, with sometimes coercive undertones (see Gnomes, 2013; Hurt, 2003; Price and Nunn, 2016). A priority of development-cooperation under Maastricht Article 130a, in addition to overseas poverty-alleviation, was the general objective of “consolidating democracy…the rule of law…
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” (ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1992:60),
externalising the values of the peace-project.

That the EU was growing accustomed to imbalanced relationships, political manoeuvring,
and implementing conditionality was most overtly seen in the accession process through the
1993 Copenhagen criteria (see EUC, 1993) as discussed by Horký and Lightfoot, (2012; also
Lightfoot, 2010:331). Furthermore, the rationale underpinning the embryonic Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was
to reinforce “the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security
and progress in Europe and in the world” (ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1992:4). It is thus hard to
content that DEVCO’s ‘purist’ aid thinking and utility of civilian-power instruments were
salient or agenda-setting across EU-level external-actorness. Instead, unequal ‘partnership’
facilitated the EU to influence through what has been discussed as ‘normative’ or ‘structural-
power’ (see Holden, 2009; Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005; Manners, 2002).

EU aid, while unaccustomed to ‘whole-of-government’ thinking, had grown accustomed to
multilateralism through consultative dialogue with international organisations, and inter-
regional professional-routines, favouring regional solutions, regional-integration and
partnership (Interview B32; EC, 1995). The OCT’s of Francophone Africa, the ACP’s latter
institutionalisation, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) within Cotonou, and
consensus over the UN-MDGs are all indicative of this. However, a further example which
demonstrates the EU’s externalisation of (vested) peace-project values is found in the
Barcelona Declaration (1995) on European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), including a
free-trade area, and MEDA aid. It rhetorically supported “the interests of the peace, stability
and development of the region” (EC, 1995:2). It further observed that to do this:

[R]equires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights,
sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat
poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures (EC, 1995:2).

Rhetorically, the EMP was communicated as a cooperative partnership entailing association
agreements. However, as Joffé (1997) argued, it was distinctly Eurocentric, and was
perceived as such by southern states that did not adhere to the Westphalian norm. Arguably,
the legacy of (French) colonialism in North Africa constituted a condition of its pursuit
(Marks, 1996:7, in Joffé, 1997:12). However, more contentiously it belied the EU as an
apolitical peace-project, through demonstrating the utility of civilian-power instruments to externalise EU (vested) values.

The OCT legacy meant, as Furness noted, the EU of the ‘GWOT’ context possessed “cultural and historical ties with many FCA [fragile, conflict-affected] countries” (2014:7). However, the EU-level was markedly inexperienced concerning fragile states. As a peace-project, and with DEVCO’s ‘firewall’ surrounding ‘purist’ aid thinking, EU aid was distanced from member state experiences and interests stemming from colonial legacy. The EU-level did not appropriate postcolonial moral responsibility. Rather, as with the other half of UK aid’s historical rationale, the EU sought peace and stability at-large, to facilitate trade and prosperity. Further, the pursuit of multilateralism, such as through the UN and OECD (see ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1992:60), within a perhaps self-important, peace-project culture legitimised universalism, seen in supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see EC, 1995b:2). The Commission’s communication outlining Community development policy even declared the role of Europe to be “[t]he global projection of European values” (2000:10). However, aside from basic human needs, that ‘universal values’ exist at all is fundamentally contestable, even if rhetorically recognised at state-level or above. For example, Afghanistan’s Pashtunwali honour code certainly did not heed European ‘universal values’.

EU policy towards FCAS of the period, and into the 2000s, was argued to be a broadly “one-size-fits-all approach” (Babayan, 2016:4; also Börzel et al, 2008). Despite Cotonou having introduced a greater intra-state emphasis, including covering civil-society and the private sector (EC, 2000:1), the EU was inexperienced in relating to foreign intra-state instability, preferring the inter-state and regional-level. As Farrell observed on EU-Africa relations of the period, the EU “was treating the African states as if these countries had the requisite capacity to implement such reforms and conduct policies with the same degree of effectiveness as Western states”, when they were incomparable (2005:270). Despite developing regional routines (such as the ACP-EU and EMP), the EU proved incapable of managing even local foreign CPE, as had occurred in the Balkans. The Council’s Declaration on Bosnia-Herzegovina for example, belied the limits of EU civilian-power instruments. The EU could only mediate, encourage and urge “Member States to comply with that [UNSC] request within their abilities” (EUC, 1993:36), with martial-power being the recourse of the member states. In time, as one senior Commission official noted, the Balkans became framed “a more conducive environment because there was the prospect of European integration”
(Interview B29). However, coercive-force had proven a necessary instrument prior to this. As a result, as Dwan observed, the “WEU, and subsequently EU, states opted to define the scope of their military cooperation around crisis management [Petersberg] tasks” (in Rotfeld, 2001:53). With the WEU mandate absorbed by CSDP at the Cologne European Council (1999), exogenous fragility may be inferred to have been an historical impetus to furthering ESDP/CSDP, however this remained a contentious issue.

The overseas ‘new war’ context was broadly alien to the EU-level. However, elements of EU discourse did grow to rhetorically entertain overseas fragility and the security-development nexus. Conflict, its prevention, and peace-building in Africa was emphasised (see EC, 1996b), notably in relation to the securitisation of irregular migration (see Davies, 2007; Huysmans, 2000; Lavenex, 2001). The Commission’s green paper on aid had further delineated the poverty-conflict cycle, highlighting how:

[W]e fault lines are being opened up by the effects of social exclusion, by the fragmentation of the social fabric… by widening inequalities and by the marginalization of the poorest countries. These fault lines are destabilizing and lie behind the upsurge in extremism (EC, 1996:i).

The Commission reconciled this understanding with the externalisation of EU peace-project values, by communicating how EU global poverty-alleviation and equality initiatives were “closely linked to the quest for peace and stability” (EC, 1996:iv). Unsurprisingly, this discourse prioritised European peace and stability, over foreign states. This may be inferred from the Commission’s strategy for sustainable development prioritising changes to benefit European society, “a society which delivers a better quality of life for us, for our children, and for our grandchildren” (EC, 2001:2). However, the Commission did demonstrate further awareness of fragility overseas, seen in their communications on conflict-prevention, human rights and democratisation (EC, 2001b, 2001e). This mainstreamed conflict-prevention within development-cooperation, while justifying the EU’s externalising values. This discourse was pre-9/11, but after the USS Cole bombing in Yemen (2000) and prior US embassy bombings in East Africa (1998). It demonstrated the EU’s interests in projecting a stable political environment through regional-integration, while arguing that “[d]evelopment policy and other co-operation programmes [such as trade-links] provide the most powerful instruments at the Community’s disposal” (EC, 2001b:4). The Commission sought to
‘mainstream’ the externalisation of EU values to achieve what it termed ‘structural-stability’, defined as:

[S]ustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without to resort to conflict (EC, 2001b:10).

‘Structural-stability’s’ importance was as the “ultimate goal” in the communication on the issue of conflicts in Africa (EC, 1996b:2-3), and the Commission took credit for projecting it into OECD-DAC guidelines in 1997 (see EC, 2001b; OECD, 1997:9). It also became implicit within the UK PCRU/SU’s ‘stabilisation’ discourse (see PCRU, 2007; SU, 2014; Chapter 6). EU discourse thus rhetorically related poverty with conflict and instability, although with focus on the regional-level. However, the EU also related overseas regional peace and stability with universalism of the EU’s own peace-project values, so prompting dissonance within the DG-RELEX family between the aid ‘purists’ and those constructing the EU’s high-politics within IR. Even ECHO’s humanitarian policy, autonomous in thought and impartial by Council regulation 1257/96, was somewhat affected through the Commission’s demand to “contribute to the protection of the human rights of the victims of armed conflict” (EC, 2001e:12). This externalised value, legitimised through universalism, did not denote impartial humanitarianism.

The Communities’ post-Cold War metamorphosis into Union solidified the EU-level as an agent within IR. EU aid developed to be supportive of member state policies, yet constructed a distinctive identity. Within external-actoriness, aid became predominantly framed in terms of pro-poor path-dependency and poverty-alleviation, while communicating core EU peace-project values of democracy, good governance, law and order, human rights and fundamental freedoms. To attain prosperity on these terms the EU-level favoured civilian-power professional-routines. In addition to trade, diplomacy and political-mediation, these entailed various financial and technical aid instruments, but also the concept of partnership, in bilateral, multilateral and inter-regional guises. However, contrasting with UK aid, and despite some recognition of the problem, the EU-level was not adept in ‘whole-of-government’ routines. Growing pains of union created dissonance amongst the DG-RELEX family concerning aid, trade and political interests. Although, there did exist indications from pre-9/11 discursive-struggle that the EU was willing to evolve into a more pragmatic civilian-
power, and influence situations of interest according to its own distinct values. Nonetheless, the EU lacked experience in managing foreign intra-state fragility.

EU-level framing of the 9/11 shock, ‘GWOT’ and Afghanistan

Upon the 9/11 attacks, the EU immediately supported the US within communicative-discourse, and broadly legitimised Bush’s emotive framing of the event as an ‘act of war’ by an ‘evil enemy’ (see Entman 2003:415-416; Chapter 5). The EC President forwarded a clear value-judgement, describing 9/11 as a “barbaric attack… directed against the free world and our common values… a watershed event”, and declared “the strongest possible signal of European solidarity” (Prodi, 2001). This included supporting the US in the ‘fight against terrorism’, which the Spanish president symbolically demanded be incorporated in the TEU (Ortega, 2004:76). This was not implemented, but the EU adopted the EU Action Plan to Fight Terrorism, on which the EC Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs also declared “particularly focus… to improving co-operation with the United States” (Vitorino, 2002). The EU’s supranational Western identity and attributed universalism in values promoted framing 9/11 as an attack on Western democracy at-large (Appendix 5.10). Indicative within Prodi’s ‘watershed event’, where ineffective governance afar had wrought harm upon Western institutions, was the interpretation that this was an exogenous-shock of vast scale, which posed a significant challenge to EU external-actorness. Whereas some argued the EU lacked direct interest in Afghanistan (Marsai, 2018:3), by legitimising Bush’s framing, the EU could not overlook Afghanistan’s situation, nor FCAS’s afar more broadly.

The 9/11 attacks posed not one, but two exogenous-shocks to the EU – the significance of the event itself, but also the US response, invading Afghanistan through Operation Infinite Justice (OIJ/OEF). This punitive retaliation through martial-power was anathema to the EU’s anti-war episteme and peace-project values. The UK, exhibiting a martial, mid-Atlanticist stance, stood alone in directly abetting the US vanquish the Taliban/Al Qaeda ‘evil enemy’, while Germany and France indirectly contributed. Meanwhile, the EU-level, accustomed to civilian-power professional-routines within external-actorness, favoured a more moderated solution, resisting forces of Americanisation. This was evident in Belgium’s permanent EU representative remediating that while 9/11’s “barbarous acts” constituted an attack on democracy at-large, “this fight against terrorism should be coupled with the search for sustainable solutions for human and political dramas” and be conducted “with respect for fundamental freedoms” (Ruyt, 2001). Here, ‘fight against terrorism’ was a metaphor, with framing emphasising the mediation, political-cooperation and cultural-understanding.
traditionally sought by EU peace-project thinking. In terms of solutions, within the EU it promoted invigorated security integration, while externally it promoted partnerships, inter-regional relations, and multilateralism, trade and aid routines to bolster stability. As one DG-DEVCO official described it, “there was this huge sense of emergency after the fall of the Taliban – and then we start to reconstruct the country” (Interview B27).

This framing and promoted routines deviated from the US martial response, and associated forces of Americanisation. Nonetheless they were compatible with the ‘new’ humanitarianism of the Bush and Blair doctrines, where Afghanistan’s peoples were perceived as distinct to the ‘evil enemy’, and warranted enduring support (see Chapter 5). One DEVCO official noted that the EU “came in as an extended chequebook initially” (Interview B29); and notably contributed significantly to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan (LOFTA). As such, it fitted with Ignatieff’s (2003) thesis, where Europe was the peacekeeper and aid-donor within America’s ‘empire-lite’. However, EU aid’s coordinative-discourse struggled to reconcile civilian-routines with the invasion of Afghanistan.

Interviewees popularly interpreted that EU aid’s engagement with Afghanistan was fundamentally politicised post-9/11, posing a challenge to purist aid thinking, shown in the sudden escalation of aid to Afghanistan (Interviews B24, B28, B29, B36, IT22). It was perceived, in the words of one DEVCO official, as “hypocrisy to have the military intervention engaged in warfare while talking about reconstruction and development” (Interview, IT22). As one NATO Assistant Secretary General argued, the US had sought unilateralism and coalition-building for OEF over multilateralism, contending “that the mission determines the coalition” (in Buckley, 2006). However, within coordinative-discourse mutual EU/NATO member states resisted triggering NATO’s collective-defence provisions over 9/11 without guarantees that:

Sovereign decision-making rights would not be affected as regards the nature, scale and timing of actions deemed necessary to restore peace and security - in other words they wanted it to be clear that each Ally would deem for itself what was “necessary” (Buckley, 2006).

This reported discourse reveals how EU member states were broadly reluctant warfighters, demanding further consultation concerning the utility of martial-power, and persisting with path-dependency befitting of peace-project values. This also explained the US’s coalition-
building from the more martial-minded for the invasion – the UK. This left the EU at-large to provide aid and other softer routines, distinct to the more martial dimensions, but this did not sit easily within the EU. As the French Prime Minister petitioned at a European Parliamentarians’ conference:

We hope the [US] does not give in to the strong temptation of unilateralism… We cannot reduce the problems of the world to the single dimension of the struggle against terrorism… nor rely on the predominance of military means (Jospin, 2002)

Jospin’s (2002) comments befitted Europe’s, anti-war, continental episteme, in pushing for a more moderate, multilateral approach. Nonetheless the political and martial manner of Afghanistan’s appearance as a high-politics situation, exogenous and confronting the EU, posed an unambiguous shock to EU aid within broader EU external-actorness. As one DEVCO official described:

Afghanistan is quite a specific case, there are only few that compare to it I think, because it started as a military invasion and has become a statebuilding exercise, which is not what you do normally in development (Interview B29).

That the EU’s moderated framing of 9/11, Afghanistan and the greater ‘GWOT’ depended on solutions favouring civilian-power routines was evident in humanitarian aid immediately escalating. A DG-ECHO office opened in Kabul, and monies were channelled through UN, European NGO, and regional partners (EC, 2001c:2-3, 8; also EC, 2001d, 2002). Germany’s hosting of the UN’s Bonn Agreement, mediating Afghanistan’s provisional political arrangements governing the re-constituting of Afghan government institutions in the EU was also significant. Bonn pushed democratisation and complementary ‘universal’ values upon Afghanistan, while overlooking certain conflict-dynamics in empowering UIF warlords whilst unseating the Taliban (see UN, 2001; UNSCR1378, UNSCR1386, 2001). As a Council official observed, there existed an:

Historical and ideological assumption that with the Taliban gone, Afghanistan could become like any other developing country. The Taliban was seen as the source of Islamic radicalisation within Afghanistan, instead of seeing Afghanistan’s problems as entailing broader conservative attitudes; lack of
education, thirty years of conflict; a social class-system that prevented education… (Interview B30).

Bonn symbolised the building of a legitimate state for the EU and broader international community, yet one which was contested within Afghanistan. However, constituting this (façade) state was mandatory for the EU to establish a partnership facilitating EU aid’s routines. EU aid discourse rapidly progressed beyond humanitarianism towards prospective statebuilding, the External Relations Commissioner noting “[w]e have to look on how we can mobilise resources to rebuild Afghanistan” (Patten, in EC, 2001d:2). Such discussion was coordinative, but also multilateral through further international conferences, including Berlin (2004), and London (2006) where the Afghanistan Compact was agreed (see GIROA, 2006).

EU focus post-Bonn was identifiable in supporting the UN’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including the UK’s inaugural leadership of the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMB). This fitted with EU values concerning peacekeeping, law and order, while learning from the UK’s experience in Northern Ireland. Some EU members, including Belgium, favoured the KMB operating under embryonic CSDP frameworks (Gross, 2008:82). Progress in CSDP had been relatively rapid after agreeing CSDP’s ‘headline-goal’ at Helsinki (1999) to deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days. While this was never achieved, progress entailed instigating the EU Military Committee (EUMC) (2000), EU military staff (EUMS) and military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) (2001), the EU International Security Institute (EUISS) (2002), and the European Defence Agency (EDA) (2004). Such progress was permitted through Blair’s mid-Atlanticist internationalism withdrawing the UK’s veto over CFSP/CSDP at the UK-France St-Malo summit (1998). However, upon 9/11 the UK defence community perceived CSDP as immature and prioritised the ‘special-relationship’ with the US until the ‘Helmandshire’ experience (2006-2014) (Chapter 5).

While the KMB was not formally a CSDP undertaking, it set a precedent and perhaps promoted norms for European peacekeeping. UK thinking became well-represented within EU foreign and security communities, notably evident in the European Security Strategy (ESS) (EC, 2003), including through the efforts of Cooper, Blair’s FCO advisor (Oliver and Allen, 2008:195), and Patten, Blair’s choice for EU Commissioner responsible for external-relations. Under the G8’s Afghanistan ‘lead-nation’ framework, the UK was further responsible for counter-narcotics, while other EU member states took responsibility for assisting law and order, with Germany leading police reform, and Italy justice reform. The
German police project office (GPPO) was established in Kabul in 2002. Some argued that for post-martial Germany, the GPPO was a way to avoid contributing fighting troops (Friesendorf, 2013:338). However, Germany also possessed an historical tradition in aiding Afghanistan’s police (see Feilke, 2010:3). Meanwhile, at the supranational-level, EU aid operated through the EC’s Kabul delegation working towards the first Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2003-2006. This “promoted stability and poverty reduction by supporting, mainly, rural development, food security, governance, infrastructure and health” (EC, 2012:3).

This step towards development-cooperation from humanitarianism pursued pro-poor path-dependency, and statebuilding. As one DEVCO official noted, “to be the most efficient possible, the EC tend to limit our intervention between three main sectors” (Interview B27). For Afghanistan these were, 1) governance/order, 2) society/health and 3) rural-development/agriculture. They favoured established civilian professional-routines, including sub-contracting NGO’s, notably to provide the basic package of health services (BPHS) (Interview B28). However, in Brussels coordinative-discourse increasingly recognised FCAS’ security dimensions within development space, taking the security-development nexus seriously. The Balkans experience had already provided impetus towards CSDP’s ‘headline-goal’ and to further the EU’s ‘Petersberg tasks’ (see Ortega, 2004).

Popular recognition of international-terrorism’s links with instability (and under-development/poverty) overseas inflamed frame-contestation between those emphasising short-term security concerns, and those defending historical peace-project desires for mutual-prosperity through structured partnership and socio-political cooperation (see Youngs, 2006). This included Blair’s support of CSDP, to constitute a transatlantic bridge between the (martial) US and (post-martial) EU, presuming that the two could prove mutually-supportive (Gross, 2008:74). Indeed, the Seville Council conclusions directly linked the 9/11 shock with furthering CFSP/CSDP (CEU, 2002:31-32).

Afghanistan’s unique challenge for the EU also led the EUMC and Council to accept UK/NATO civil-military-cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine. From this, the EU constructed the in-house civil-military-coordination concept (CMCO) at the policy-level, and more ‘comprehensive’ crisis-management, incrementally-changing discourse to account for security dimensions within development-cooperation (see CEU, 2002b, 2003, 2003b). This was further evident in EU aid incrementally-changing to emphasise aid for conflict-
prevention and peace-building (CPPB), including through the Commission’s communication on conflict-prevention’s rhetorical ‘integrated approach’, “restoring or consolidating structural stability in all its respects” (EC, 2001b:10). Security revisions also appeared within EMP association agreements adding clauses concerning terrorism and associated nefarious activity (see EC, 2002). The CPA governing ACP-EU relations was also revised to add counter-terrorism and WMD clauses (EC, 2006; also Smis and Kingah, 2008).

A significant German initiative after Bonn, finding pan-EU support, was the EU Council’s Special Representative (EUSR) to Afghanistan. This was a mediating role “supporting the community in Afghanistan of a stable and legitimate broad-based multi-ethnic Government” (CEU, 2001:1). It provided the EU with political agency, where it could present itself as “more than the sum of its parts” (Manners, 2002:244), notably for the EU’s distinctive identity as a civilian-power and aid donor. This fitted with the US’s designs within Ignatieff’s (2003) interpretation. However, an interviewed EUSR contended that the office was not to further Americanisation, but to further aid through UN Secretary General Brahimi’s slogan, “Afghan-led”, whereby:

The effort of the EU and member states was to normalise the country, by ensuring good governance, and end to impunity; DDR [Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration] and support in general for the Afghan government (Interview L20).

This indicated the EU’s prioritisation of statebuilding, law and order. However, ‘normalise’ was a telling word-choice. It may be inferred that the EUSR did not mean normality by Afghan standards. Afghanistan was a FCAS since 1973, and traditionally possessed a weak government in Kabul and contentious relations with the provinces. Rather, the EUSR meant Eurocentric normality and ‘universal’ values. The EUSR constituted a political-track to externalise values, not aid ‘Afghan-led’ initiatives. This was indicative of the broader burgeoning trend towards incremental politicisation of EU external-actorness, as also seen in the CPA replacing Lomé, and the EMP, where ‘partnership’ was increasingly asymmetrical. However, it was unprecedented in ambition. The desire to democratise Afghanistan was popularly accredited to US biases (Interviews B30, B32). However the EU was perhaps an opportunist agent here. While not explicitly related to Afghanistan, both Ignatieff (2003) and Holden (2009) recognised the EU utilising aid routines as a structural-power to influence external change according to EU thinking. This may be evidenced in the 2003 ESS’s desire
to spread good-governance, while noting how “[t]rade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform” (EC, 2003:10). But, without recourse to hard-power, as the interviewed EUSR described, the EU-level’s political influence was a matter of “smoke and mirrors”, as they expanded:

It depends how you present yourself and how they perceive you… I could have been undermined by every bilateral ambassador if they had so chosen, but I was known – I had some respect and so my voice and the voice of my office… carried weight (Interview L20).

As such, the EU’s political influence was largely dependent upon personality-politics, which made the social, and processes of socialisation, important. This also goes some way to explain Blair’s ability to influence. However, the stove-piped nature of EU external-relations, presented ‘firewalls’ to coherent political agency. Not only was the hard-power capability of member states departed from the EU-level, but the EUSR in Afghanistan was also separate to the Commission’s delegation in Kabul, and EU aid agencies of DG-DEVCO/ECHO, including the aid ‘purists’.

Despite broadly legitimising the US’s framing of 9/11 and the ‘fight against terror’, albeit with reservations, efforts to cohere “a common European approach” (Prodi, 2001) within the ‘GWOT’ context were paralysed upon contradictory member state positions concerning the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Here forces of Americanisation clashed with Europeanization, through what Haine termed Bush’s “blind faith in a democratic domino effect and a conviction in military solutions” through a “global interpretation of the threat and its ideological perspective in framing the answers” (2004:48). Blair had promised to Bush “I will be with you, whatever” (2002c: 1), committing to the Atlanticist ‘special-relationship’. However, the prospect of militarily invading Iraq without a second UNSC Resolution, legitimising such martial-force, and after the failure of the inspectors mandated by UNSCR1441, was again anathema to Europe’s anti-war episteme, and EU peace-project values. Opening debate in the House of Commons on 18 March, Blair admitted how Iraq discourse led to “Europe and the United States dividing from each other”, but as aforementioned (Chapter 5), contended this was “[n]ot all of Europe”, with several member states communicating support of the US position (Blair, 2003b).

That the smaller and Eastern EU members such as Denmark, and Poland (then acceding), directly abetted the US invasion may be explained through the perceived need to pay ‘geld’
towards the US security-umbrella. However, this left Germany, and significantly, France opposing reliance on martial-power within the ‘GWOT’. The gravity of this contention was such that in April 2003 Belgium convened a discussion on constructing a new European defence headquarters, independent from US/NATO influence, attended by France, Germany and Luxembourg (Giegerich, 2015:452). The French foreign minister contended to the UNSC that consideration of “the recourse to force” was justified only “in the event inspections failed”, that any war “will be long and difficult” while:

No one today can claim that the path of war will be shorter than the path of inspections. No one can claim that it would lead to a safer, more just, more stable world, for war is always the sanction of failure (De Villepin, 2003).

This contention is what Rumsfeld (2003) termed as between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. However, for EU aid, as with UK aid, the high-politics struggle surrounding Iraq (2003) permitted a limited revisionist-moment in Afghanistan, as reconstruction devolved into low-politics development-cooperation after the immediate humanitarian focus. One DEVCO official argued “Afghanistan could be described as a reverse gold-rush, with people rushing there to spend aid money” (Interview B28). This was the “international aid circus” one interviewed NGO director observed (Interview ST14), partly through the interim political processes of Bonn finding the Afghan state an ineffectual partner for implementing EU aid’s three focal areas during the early years. This necessitated what one DEVCO official termed “a substitution approach – through NGOs” (Interview B28), akin to UK aid’s (DFID’s) routines in Afghanistan. Indeed, some NGO’s received funds from both the UK and EU, such as the HALO Trust, and later Red R (Interviews L16, ST14). As a result of decades of conflict, not only was Afghan governance ineffectual, demanding statebuilding, but the Afghan people were largely “either untrained, dead, or fled” (Interview L16). Several DEVCO officials interviewed cited the BPHS (health initiative) as the prime example of EU aid’s ‘substitution approach’ outsourcing to NGO’s, while other non-focus areas including education focussed on reactivating the ministry within statebuilding (Interviews B24, B27, B28).

In summary, the 9/11 attacks and resultant US-led ‘GWOT’ discourse had posed a challenging shock to EU aid and broader EU external-actorness. Exogenous security situations, and further foreign and security policy integration were already contentious issues within EU coordinative-discourse. The construct of a common EU position was largely
precluded by frame-parity surrounding Iraq (2003), underpinned by the continent’s anti-war episteme, and its contrast with the UK. The EU frame’s resultant solution during the early-‘GWOT’ period was therefore to treat Afghanistan “like any other developing country” (Interview B30), pursuing extant development-cooperation pro-poor path-dependency. This was after all EU aid’s “overall objective” and illustrated by the description of the EU’s early role as an “extended chequebook” (interview B29). DEVCO purists couched this position as advantageous, whereby the:

Privilege of being a developmental actor in the classic sense based in Kabul is that we had exchanges with the World Bank there and the Afghan ministries – we had a country-wide, sector-wide approach (Interview B29).

As such, forces of Americanisation and martial-power routines beyond peacekeeping were resisted within discourse. Civilian-power routines were favoured, such as mediation, multilateralism and the provision of financial aid. Nonetheless, the shock of Afghanistan’s appearance highlighted the EU’s institutional inexperience concerning fragility overseas. Within the EU’s desire to export regional stability, burgeoning incremental-change within endogenous framing became evident, if not salient. The ‘GWOT’ was re-focussing discourse (including from member states) upon security issues, and so further legitimised and provided impetus to EU foreign and security integration, especially concerning overseas fragility and crisis-management. This was evident in CSDP, EUISS and CPPB discourses, as the ‘fight against terrorism’ nomenclature struggled against EU aid’s ‘purist’ epistemic-community, and compounded contentions within the EU’s fragmented DG-RELEX family.

**EU aid’s branching through the ‘comprehensive’ approach**

EU aid’s early framing of post-9/11 Afghanistan as like any other developing country, promoting established pro-poor path-dependency, betrayed the restrictive nature of peace-project values and anti-war episteme. This promoted impractical solutions for a fragile context, dependent upon aforementioned CSP/MIPs and annual action programmes (AAPs) within the EU’s long-term Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (see EC, 2012:2-4).

Conceived for peaceful economic-development, these financial routines were found unsuited to rapidly reacting to foreign CPE, producing limited returns (Interview B30; also ECA, 2012:28; Gräßle, 2015:44-45). Furthermore, described by one DEVCO official as “sort of partnership agreements between the EU and the recipient government” (Interview B28), they depended on a legitimate government with which to partner. Subsequently, the EU treated
the chairman of the Afghan interim authority (Karzai), as what one EU official termed “a darling of the international-community” (Interview B30). This was regardless of democratic process or conflict-dynamics – the Bonn Agreement was official ‘track-one’ mediation, but “not a peace agreement” (Interview B30), and Karzai’s 2004 presidential election was of questionable legitimacy (Johnson, 2006; Katzman, 2006). Nonetheless, formal EU-GIROA partnership commenced upon a joint-declaration of 2005, including preferential market access under the ‘everything but arms’ initiative (EBA) (EC, 2007:13). As a result, Babayan’s “one-size-fits-all” critique concerning the EU and fragility appears justified (2016:4; also Börzel et al, 2008).

The EU was confronted by an additional exogenous-‘shock’ in Afghanistan when ISAF expanded under NATO’s operational-planning (2004-2006). This situation was foreseeable; it was mandated under UNSCR1510 (2003), most ISAF troops were European, and NATO-ISAF was for a time under European command. Nevertheless, it exacerbated incoherence within EU external-actoriness in Afghanistan, with UK troops/officials deploying to Helmand, Germans to Kunduz/Badakhshan, French to Kabul, Italians to Herat, Dutch to Uruzgan, Spanish to Badghis, and so forth (NATO, 2008b). As an EU crisis-management expert observed, “suddenly the member states chose to take leadership in certain provinces”:

> The UK for example became extremely Helmand focussed. For a couple of years it wasn’t about Afghanistan, everything was about Helmand; the same happened with other member states... After 2005 the national-level was under-resourced (Interview B30).

European efforts fragmenting into the provinces meant that European aid in Afghanistan spanned the Council’s EUSR, the EC’s delegation, and independently-minded member states through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) structures, “in parallel” to EU-level efforts (Interview B29). This was at a time when observers were contending that the EU lacked capacity to construct a strong strategic-culture (Rynning, 2003), undermining prospects for the strategic-autonomy France desired, and weakening European agency within multilateralism. Within Europe there developed two broad interpretations of ISAF. The peace-support mission mediated at Bonn and legitimised by the EU-level, to which EU post-martial member states such as Germany, Italy and the Dutch contributed, and the kinetic-counterinsurgency campaigning conducted by the UK as a martial-power, supported by Denmark and Estonia. Some, including the UK and Denmark, valued extant ‘special-
relationships’ with the US (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015). Central and Eastern European members like Estonia wanted to enhance relations, as aforementioned (concerning Iraq), deploying troops to Afghanistan as ‘geld’ for the US’s security umbrella (Interview LT34). Meanwhile, post-martial Germany “used national caveats to prevent the Bundeswehr from fighting at night or in the more violent south” (Langlois and Capstack, 2014:26-27). The EU-level perceived these missions as “competing” (Interview B30).

Confronted by this problem of fragmentation, the EU sought new cohering initiatives, presenting an opportunity to be exploited by the UK’s leadership ambitions (Appendix 5.11). The ‘comprehensive’ approach, from defence discourse, was growing dominant within the UK as the step beyond the CIMIC interface within complex security-development environs, and fitted what the EU sought. During ISAF’s expansion, the UK Council presidency, emphasising counter-terrorism (see UKP, 2005), took the opportunity to instigate the EU’s concept for comprehensive planning through the Council’s Politico-Military Group (PMG), citing the problem of state failure and need “for the EU to address complex crises in a coherent manner” (CEU, 2005:4). This coordinative-discourse built on the prior CSDP-CMCO concept, and furthered broader ESS discourse on the security-development nexus, poverty, conflict and fragility, with the EU-level seemingly adopting the UK’s ‘fragility’ definition in 2007 (see CEU, 2007:2). The UK’s defence select committee observed that the comprehensive approach as interpreted in the UK, was also projected into the EU by the UK, with Danish assistance (HOCDC, 2010:15).

Comprehensive nomenclature remained conspicuously absent from the Commission’s Afghanistan CSP for 2007-2013 (2007c) beyond inexplicit details concerning rural-development, alternative livelihoods, and the return of refugees integrated within the national reconstruction programme. This may be accredited to the cultural and bureaucratic ‘firewall’ surrounding DEVCO/ECHO. Nonetheless, beyond security discourse, comprehensive thinking did permeate development and partnership discourse, and surpassed the EU’s prior integrated approach to CPPB (see EC, 1996b, 2001b). In communicative-discourse this was seen in the Commission’s Strategy for Africa (2005) calling for “a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework” (2005:2[original-emphasis]). Marking more significant change, the European Consensus on Development pushed the Commission to “develop a comprehensive prevention approach to state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises” (EC et al, 2006:14). Furthermore, it permeated the amended CPA governing ACP-EU relations, which noted:

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The Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace building and conflict prevention and resolution… It shall in particular focus on building regional, sub regional and national capacities… with an adequate combination of all available instruments (EC, 2006:10).

This was the first EU-wide communicative-discourse to link pro-poor path-dependency with state fragility, in addition to comprehensive nomenclature. Further, it reveals how comprehensive nomenclature coincided with the EU’s embryonic refocussing towards the intra-state-level, necessary to manage fragility, as recognised in the OECD, of which the UK and Commission were members (see OECD, 2006, 2011). Comprehensive thinking was also inexplicitly evident in the Commission’s *Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy* (2007; also EC, 2007b) including the conceptualisation of ‘complementarity principles’ through “in-country, cross-country complementarity, cross-sector, vertical and cross modality/instrument dimensions” (EC, 2007:11). Here, complementarity is defined as, “the optimal division of labour between various actors in order to achieve optimum use of human and financial resources” (EC, 2007:5[original-emphasis]). It also more explicitly appeared in the Commission’s communication on *Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)* (2009) detailing the ‘whole-of-the-Union’ approach, which entailed “a comprehensive peace building agenda” in working towards the broader MDGs (EC, 2009:10). Certainly within DEVCO/ECHO coordinative-discourse in Afghanistan, and their liaising with other agencies, comprehensive nomenclature was frequently if informally “thrown around in conversation” (Interview B24).

Council communicative-discourse also evoked comprehensive thinking within PCD, including concerning the migration-development nexus and security-development nexus. This was largely in the context of “Treaty obligations on consistency between all the Union’s policies and its external activities”, including member state activity (CEU, 2009:1; also 2012:2). Nonetheless, the EU’s comprehensive approach was only explicitly finalised in communicative-discourse within the 2013 joint-communication by the Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EUFASP). Here, under the Labour Peer Ashton’s inaugural tenure, it was conceptualised within the post-Lisbon/EEAS context where “the EU has both the increased potential and the ambition… to make its external action more consistent” (EC and EUFASP, 2013:2). Pre-Lisbon it was debatable how effective this thinking was for the EU. However, whole-of-government thinking, including comprehensive nomenclature, became widely adopted throughout the member states (see Hauck and Rocca,
This wide uptake may be understood as socialisation, and potentially indicative of ‘crossloading’, notably through the informal ‘likeminded’ aid grouping described by the interviewed DFID Director (Interview LT17, Chapter 6).

Concerning EU aid discourse in Afghanistan, development officials perceived that “talk on the comprehensive approach was mostly linked to our police mission, EUPOL and our contributions in the security sector” (Interview B29). Whereas the counterinsurgency campaigning practiced by the likes of the UK post-2005 dominated public interpretations, constructing imaginations of ‘war’, Afghanistan and the broader issue of fragility was recognised in the ESS as a direct threat to EU citizenry (EC, 2003:4-5). While NATO-ISAF was in practice divided between KMB-like peace-support/peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, the office of the EUSR argued that “the EU was leading on key issues like police reform” (Interview LT34). This was through the EU’s civilian-CSDP mission, EUPOL-Afghanistan, welcomed by the UN under UNSCR1746 (2007). EUPOL-Afghanistan was itself a cohering initiative within law and order, justice and security sector reform (SSR), building on German (GPPT/GPPO) and Italian (Justice) initiatives from 2007.

As a civilian-CSDP mission EUPOL-Afghanistan was interesting for embodying contemporary EU peace-project values. It was ODA accountable within EU aid, managed by the pre-EEAS civilian crisis-management directorate. It was also multilateral in supporting the Afghanistan Compact (2006), reforming Afghanistan’s policing holistically (EUMS, 2007:2/12; 2008:17), including “through, amongst other means, monitoring, mentoring, advising and training” (Hagedorn, in EUMS, 2007:16). This included front-line Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (POMLT). The training covered “criminal investigation, training strategy, border management, counter-narcotics actions, human rights and gender balance” (EUMS, 2008b:16). This was working with, but not under ISAF, from dispersed field-offices, including in Helmand (see ECA, 2015:42). As such, EUPOL-Afghanistan’s remit demonstrated an awareness of the conflict dimension of FCAS, while exporting the EU’s values of good, democratic governance and the rule of law. This recognition constituted practice, seen in law and order resourcing becoming effectively the fourth focal area for EU aid, with the EU being the largest donor into the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOFTA) (EC, 2012:4). One senior EUPOL-Afghanistan official observed:
We consider that civilian policing is key if you want to achieve long-term stability. Counterinsurgency is one thing but you must protect the citizens, not just defeat the Taliban (Interview BT33).

Similarly, the EU crisis-management advisor noted how in partnership with the GIROA through the Afghanistan Compact (2006), the EU’s framing of security focussed “interest in police-reform and disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG)” (Interview B30). Development-cooperation discourse encompassed the EU-level desire for aid to be Afghan-led, and so wanted to empower central government-capacity (Interview B28). Therefore, the EU aided the Afghan National Police (ANP), but not US-led efforts in rebranding militias as Afghan Local Police (ALP). From EU aid’s perspective the ALP initiative, like the PRTs “did not allow us to help government build capacity to do its own job” (Interview AT22). Rather, “both PRTs and the US-led ALP bypassed the state and reinforced fragmentation and ethnic problems; they led to mini-states in every province” (Interview B29). Another DEVCO official termed these initiatives “quick build – quick destroy” (Interview B28). In sum, they were considered contradictory to EU aid values.

Rather than directly fight any perceived insurgency (or abet militias to do so), EU aid’s framing sought to strengthen the GIROA, imperfect as it was, to resist any spoilers, including the resurgent Pashtun-Taliban. This framing was shared by the post-martial EU member states contributing to ISAF, including the Germans, Italians and Dutch. These were examples cited by the UK Stabilisation Unit (PCRU/SU) in their construct of the moderated military support to stabilisation (MSS) concept, and associated ‘courageous restraint’ principle (PCRU, 2007; Interview P15). As a EUSR official observed:

The Dutch were hugely criticised for not taking the fight to the Taliban. But they also took a ‘do no harm’ approach, which meant that a much greater number of aid agencies and other development partners worked with the Dutch in Urzugan (Interview LT34).

This security frame, emphasising peacekeeping, mediation and statebuilding to the ends of stability, as with the Bonn Agreement and KMB precedent, is what the EU broadly pursued concerning FCAS as CSDP advanced. This was a pained progression, frame-contestation occurred between the UK and France concerning CSDP and EU strategic-autonomy vis-à-vis NATO. Herein, Blair’s desire for a bridge between the US and EU was frustrated by what an EU security official termed CSDP’s “lack of success on the capability side” (Interview B31;
also Rynning, 2003). Nonetheless CSDP discourse entered practice from 2003, through conducting civil-military operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYOM), and from end-2004 inheriting the NATO operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) (EEAS, 2016). French troops in DR Congo were also rebranded as a CSDP operation (Artemis) under Chirac in 2006 (Giegerich, 2015:454), and the EU supported the African mission in Sudan (AMIS). All these operations (less so Artemis) entailed significant UK input in areas inclusive of policy and planning, and logistics (EUMS, 2006:6-7), for example, Althea, which replaced NATO-SFOR, was commanded by the British General Reith.

Nonetheless, these fledgling EU-led military operations were accompanied by 11 civilian missions by 2006 alone, spanning capacity-building, rule of law and monitoring focusses (EUMS, 2006:8). The EU largely endured as a civilian-power within IR. Indeed Shirreff, when programme head of EU external-action argued “the EU’s most successful comprehensive approach engagement to date was in response to conflict in Aceh-Indonesia” (2013). This Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM; 2005-2006) monitored the implementation of the peace-agreement between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (see EUCS, 2006), a more modest undertaking than EUPOL-Afghanistan. As the security official noted, compared with UK and NATO capabilities the EU had “all the situational-awareness [but] very limited planning capacity”, while the UK’s efforts “could not stimulate member states to generate more capability” (Interview B31).

It could be argued that EU martial-power remained undernourished. However, the EU’s values remained predominantly those of a peace-project, and while pushing CSDP, the UK and Blair specifically did not seek to transform the EU into a martial-power. The British politician, Patten, when Commissioner responsible for external-relations, was instrumental in crafting the 2003 ESS, and was adamant that “a European Security Strategy cannot exclusively be based on a military approach to security issues” (Patten, 2004:15). The ESS recognised the security-development nexus, contending that security was a requirement for development. Patten, among others such as Ashton later, restructured EU frameworks after the Balkan experiences to these ends, including instigating the agency for reconstruction, ‘EuropeAid’ brand and the ‘rapid-reaction’ mechanism (see Brok and Gresch, 2004:180-181).
Despite predominantly civilian-power framing, and learning concerning FCAS (from the likes of the UK, but also OECD within broader multilateralism), EU aid’s early post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) was markedly crude. When UK aid was preoccupied with physical-reconstruction for ‘consent winning activity’ (CWA), EU aid’s contributions were notably concerning livelihoods, derived from pro-poor economic-development thinking. However, as one DEVCO rural-development lead noted, the EU was unfamiliar with operating within violent-conflict, perceiving “warfare while talking about reconstruction” hypocritical (Interview AT22). Further, the EUSR’s political perspective on the “jobs-jobs-jobs” preoccupation in DEVCO argued this was unsuitable, as:

The imposition of the free-market upon Afghanistan was very controversial when Afghanistan products couldn’t compete with cheaper prices from Pakistan, China and Turkey (Interview LT34).

As such, jobs were not secure. Furthermore, the defence ‘insurgency’ frame, while resisted by the EU’s peace-project values, did somewhat co-opt EU aid’s PCR agenda towards CWA. As an EU security expert lamented:

We’ve been frankly a bit poor at really using job creation as a blunt measure of counterinsurgency… we create infrastructure jobs basically wherever violence takes place… you can map where the job creation projects have been and where there have been instances of violence. It doesn’t make sense in an economic perspective (Interview B32).

More bluntly the rural-development official argued, “The idea that someone will put down their gun and pick up bricks to build a bridge does not work” (Interview AT22). However, a senior DEVCO official inferred distinctions, arguing that whereas under member states PRTs “development became very much an effort in winning ‘hearts-and-minds’, as a sub-set for military strategy”, the EU-level “looked to the country as a whole [and] tied into the overall strategy, but was never a sub-set to military strategy in a narrow sense” (Interview B29). Further, it was observed that member states pushed other agendas upon EU aid that they knew better fitted with EU values, including woman’s rights and partnership principles pushed by the UK and Scandinavia, in addition to job-creation (Interviews B26, B28, B29). Thus it may be seen that EU aid’s PCR thinking in Afghanistan was rudimentary and tacked upon pro-poor thinking, but was also somewhat contested within coordinative-discourse
through stove-piped institutional-structures and discrete cultures therein, when operating within a multilateral space.

In sum, EU aid’s pro-poor path-dependency endured the early-‘GWOT’ context. This was evident, at least rhetorically, throughout communicative-discourse concerning Afghanistan, seen in the objective of the 2007-2013 CSP/MIP being declared “to create the conditions for sustainable development and poverty reduction” (EC, 2007c:3). Beyond the specifics of Afghanistan, within EU aid’s Agenda for Change it was further communicated that the EU “should strive to help countries in situations of fragility to… support poverty reduction” (EC, 2011:5). Indeed, EU aid was incrementally-changing. The UK, among other member states, pushing whole-of-government thinking in the guise of the contemporary comprehensive approach constituted part of these cohering efforts to construct “a stronger Europe, capable of improving the living conditions of the world's poorest” (EC, 2007:3). Afghanistan did not force a critical-juncture upon pro-poor path-dependency, but through recognition of the security-development nexus and associated poverty-conflict cycle, it branched pro-poor thinking in a direction that took conflict more seriously. The other part of this was in pushing progressions in CSDP and overarching ESS – all of which emphasised foreign fragility and crisis.

The securitising discourses of the early-‘GWOT’ context, and experiential-learning in practice, promoted recognition within EU aid that it was not viable to frame Afghanistan’s FCAS situation as like any other developing country, or to rely solely on civilian-power instruments. Afghanistan was a high-politics issue; the only partner with its own budget-line within the greater EU budget, and by end-2011 the EU had committed “some €2.5 billion assistance” (EC, 2012:1). Pro-poor path-dependency was seen in this monies resourcing rural-development, but in time EUPOL-Afghanistan and law and order assistance effectively became EU aid’s fourth focal area, in seeking increased returns (see EC, 2012:4). The comprehensive approach appeared mandatory. However, it was forcing a political-turn upon the DEVCO/ECHO aid purists who were already beset by the prioritisation of DG-Trade under WTO rules. This represented what one senior DEVCO official termed EU aid’s “counter-revolution” (interview B29). As Hadfield (2007) argued of the amended CPA (2005), this political-turn synthesised in ‘Janus fashion’ politicised and securitised principles within pro-poor path-dependency. However, the institution of EU aid lacked the coherence to erode sub-cultures and fragmented, stove-piped behaviour, and CSDP structures remained separate from DEVCO/ECHO.
The EU-level stability-agenda and adoption of integrated thinking

EU aid’s changed discourse between early and late-‘GWOT’ periods was less stark than that of UK aid. CSDP frameworks within the EU’s ‘peace-project’ were embryonic upon 9/11, so could not dominate early-framing of Afghanistan as the UK’s defence community had. Therefore, the EU’s interpretation of the ‘comprehensive’ approach was not defence-dominated (as with the UK). To some degree this muted discursive distinctions concerning guises of whole-of-government thinking at the EU-level. Nonetheless, within interactive discursive-struggle the salient frame concerning Afghanistan changed as the exogenous situation was perceived to. When Afghanistan was originally prioritised by the EU, it was after 9/11 demonstrated how international-terrorism could spill-over from foreign FCAS, and hence emphasised the need to reconstruct a legitimate state. However, a further example of spill-over was later demonstrated by irregular-migration – promoting a reimagining of the historical ‘Fortress Europe’ contention (for example Kofman and Sales, 1992). A head of DG-DEVCO’s operations in Afghanistan observed explicitly:

Afghanistan has become re-framed by the whole migration issue which is now very dominant. It is a joke but five years ago you couldn’t mention Afghanistan without someone saying “jobs” or “women’s rights”, now if you say Afghanistan people say “refugees” (Interview B26).

This further exogenous situation was open to securitisation and further contributed to EU aid’s motivation to address foreign FCAS such as Afghanistan and other fragile “aid orphans” (EC, 2007:5). This was not only a discursive-issue concerning EU external-actorness, but also concerning internal contentions that more fundamentally threatened the EU’s unity as a peace-project. In terms of the management of irregular-migration, one EU security expert observed “obvious splits between member states – even if just between east and west” (Interview B31). This opened discursive space to a reinvigorated stability-agenda (Appendix 5.12). As the interviewed DFID Europe director argued it also “forced EU institutions to work closer together” (Interview LT17).

Irregular-migration becoming problematized in EU discourse was explicitly accredited to Afghanistan (Interview B26). However, it was a broader issue that also entailed geographies of the EU’s neighbourhood. Afghanistan’s physical and psychological distance was something of an anomaly for the EU; Afghanistan had its own budget-line, and was not within EMP or latter European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) frameworks (see EC, 2004).
Within the post-2010 ‘GWOT’ context, the EU also had to contend with the closer ‘Arab Spring’ and Libya’s turmoil, where NATO (including the UK and France) intervened. As one European expert described, the EU popularly framed the ‘Arab Spring’ as having “happened in spite of Europe, not thanks to Europe” (Interview B31). However, Farrell had observed that part of the EU’s motivation behind the CPA was “to protect European interests, while also facilitating a mini-‘regime-change’ in the African countries, in accordance with EU values” (2005:270). The exportation of EU peace-project values such as democracy, which the EU understood to be universal, was a historical routine for EU aid, within the idealist pursuit of regional stability and thus prosperity – and pro-poor path-dependency.

Through the experience of Afghanistan’s kleptocracy post-Bonn (under Karzai and post-2014 under Ghani’s National Unity Government), combined with the ‘Arab Spring’ experience, the EU security expert highlighted change within the EU aid’s framing on democracy-promotion, arguing, “we see now that actually to somehow engineer democratisation from the outside just doesn’t work” (Interview B31). Even the EU’s more moderated approach to democratisation, as a route to regional stability, had failed. This re-framing, where democracy-promotion was de-emphasised was significant. Compromise of a focal peace-project value signified movement towards pragmatism within discourse concerning EU aid. For example, aid officials grew to discuss Afghanistan’s democracy in terms of “Afghan-good”, as one former EU and NGO expert noted “the elections are not free and fair and transparent, but are ‘Afghan-good’” (Interview L4). Such pragmatism may also signify more fundamental movement in the continent’s background episteme, thus permitting such discursive-change.

Further indicative of this movement towards pragmatism, the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy directly linked the established pro-poor path-dependency with both international-terrorism and irregular-migration, whilst de-emphasising “common values” within communicative-discourse when discussing revising the ENP, declaring:

> A stronger partnership with our neighbours is key… The terrorist attacks… show once more that we are confronted with threats that are global and have to be tackled by the international community united. We have to build together a safer environment, try to solve the many crises of our common region, support the development and the growth of the poorest areas, and address the root causes of migration (Mogherini, 2015).
This discourse publicly prioritised perceived security threats to the EU over the exportation of the EU’s peace-project values. One DEVCO official noted that the EU’s universalism had been “self-deluding in many ways” (Interview B26). While, the security expert couched this de-emphasising of democracy-promotion as being “a bit more realpolitik”, where “we’ll talk about democratisation with those that want that, but it’s no longer a compulsory part of the package”. Instead, the expert contended that coordinative-discourse was then focussed on the aim of “stability, so that we can protect our interests in terms of security, energy and migration” (Interview B31). Nonetheless, through popular uptake of the poverty-conflict cycle even this security perspective found that “the main cause of instability is inequality” and therefore we must “continue to try and alleviate inequality” (Interview B31). Thus, EU aid’s pro-poor path-dependency endured. However, the notion of ‘pragmatic idealism’ entered public-discourse concerning EU external-actorness, which Biscop couched as forging new EU strategy governing CFSP/CSDP “that allows Europe both to remain true to itself and to become more effective in a world of both cooperation and competition” (2015:2-3). This was perhaps unsurprisingly fitting with UK designs for the EU and CSDP.

The UK had deliberately projected whole-of-government thinking in the guise of the comprehensive approach into the EU when this thinking had grown salient within UK aid concerning Afghanistan. That the nomenclature so widely appeared in EU-level communicative discourse indicated some degree of success. However, in the EU, the fragmented nature of the DG-RELEX family constrained this thinking from affecting practice to some degree. This only changed upon the 2010 formation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), instigated through the 2007 Lisbon Treaty amendments (see FCO, 2008; FFEUD, 2009). The formation of the EEAS added further bureaucracy. However, it facilitated then prevalent discourse to greater constitute practice, while facilitating new framing, through fresh institutional cultural-identity, much as the PCRU/SU had within the UK. Many personalities were seconded from other departments, including DEVCO/ECHO. Thus, it re-jigged power-structures, especially in-country. As one EU aid official observed of the transitional period:

There was a real discussion around 2009-2012 on this politicisation of development-aid and with development actors wanting to remain purely neutral in development and everyone else going “take the wool down off your eyes, all of this aid is political because they shouldn’t even be having this level of aid” – this aid was political (Interview L4).
For Afghanistan, it was the formation of the EEAS during this context of professional-contention within the DG-RELEX family that broadly concluded the discursive-struggle between the epistemic-community of aid purists and the other EU agencies that greater accepted comprehensive thinking. As Faleg argued, for the EU the ‘comprehensive’ approach was not only a professional-routine but a means of instilling a culture, “and related practices of coordination, among the different actors involved in the conflict cycle” (2018:1). Fragmentation and stove-piped practice in Afghanistan had demonstrated the need for this revised culture. The EEAS was operating in Afghanistan formally from beginning-2011, but in practice the EUSR governed both the EUSR’s office and the Commission’s delegation in Kabul from April 2010, under Ambassador Ušackas. This linkage of the Council and Commission agencies through the EEAS framework meant the EUSR could more holistically undertake their remit, to support “the transition in Afghanistan through a comprehensive approach covering political, security and development support” (EEAS, 2018b). Discourse surrounding Afghanistan and its situating within the ‘GWOT’ was of intrinsic value in shaping this new EU agency, and the erosion of the stove-piped external-actorness previously found in the DG-RELEX family. A DEVCO official with experience of both periods commented on the change that:

The operations were completely interwoven in my view – the politics would definitely have an influence on the space in which the development people would work, and vice-versa since we had all the means – that also had some type of impact on the politics (Interview B26).

The formation of the EEAS and erosion of fragmentation and ‘firewalls’ within the Commission institutionalised a politicisation that again signified movement of the EU’s underpinning episteme towards greater pragmatism. Civilian-power instruments were no longer likely to operate in isolation when managing foreign FCAS, beyond limited humanitarian action, through adherence with international norms (see FCO, 2008:137). Although, the de-emphasising of projecting ‘universal’ values perhaps depoliticised EU aid’s humanitarian activity to some degree. However, as Article 43 stated, post-Lisbon Treaty amendments:

[T]he Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories (FCO, 2008:29).

Of perhaps most interest here, other than the summative martial-power language and confidence in CSDP and the use of ‘stabilisation’ nomenclature, was the willingness to combat terrorism overseas through military means. This arguably chimed with the kinetic-counterinsurgency campaigning within ISAF, which the EU had previously avoided in lieu of civilian law and order and justice assistance. As such, the EU’s ‘fight against terrorism’ became less metaphorical. The CSDP mission in Mali (EUTM-Mali) was an example of this new thinking. Here, as the security expert elucidated:

We had a French combat operation with UK logistic support which was followed by an EU training mission - military, but just training, not on the front-line. Then all the other instruments, political, economic, trade, development (Interview B32).

Within the late-‘GWOT’ context, EU aid could utilise a more genuine ‘comprehensive’ approach, as an EEAS director observed “having CSDP missions working in sync with EU development policy” (Interview B25). Some DEVCO officials became socialised to this change, as one argued “by walking together, by harmonizing the approach – everybody’s winning” (Interview B27); another DEVCO official elucidated:

For development, when moved closer to politics, visibility is a big ticket – you want to improve your visibility, your visibility gives you leverage, which you can spend on the political market (Interview B28).

Where the EU-level had rejected the UK’s early defence ‘insurgency’ frame, the SU’s efforts to export new stabilisation thinking into the EU-level were well received. EU aid discourse had adopted a semblance of a stability agenda long before the UK’s explicit Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) (DFID et al, 2011). Whereas the UK constructed this path, synthesising security and development, high-politics and low-politics, predominantly through PCRU/SU discourse concerning Afghanistan and Iraq, the EU had incorporated stability thinking within the whole of ACP, EMP and latter ENP frameworks. The overt distinction within discourse was the EU’s focus on inter-regional relations, where a security expert observed “the functioning of the regional project is a norm-setter. Those who work
within and believe in it seek to apply it elsewhere” (Interview B32). Meanwhile, the UK had emphasised the salience of politics within intra-state settlements.

With the UK moving towards the cultural-episteme of a post-martial power post-2010 (see Chapter 6) and the EU’s underpinning episteme greater tolerating martial-power thinking, stabilisation discourse grew highly-compatible, with UK and EU-level positions able to ‘meet in the middle’. As such, the EU-level’s security perspective endured in contending “there is no such thing as a military solution here” (Interview AT23), which the UK also accepted beyond rhetoric post-2010. Unlike prior ‘insurgency’ framing, the concept of military support to stabilisation (MSS) was accepted, as a logical extension of the pre-9/11 Petersberg tasks concerning crisis-management, befitting with CSDP progressions. Indeed, the ultimate goal of UK stabilisation thinking, ‘structural-stability’, was conceived at the EU-level (see EC, 1996b:2-3; SU, 2014:1). However, the EU crisis-management official was keen to emphasise that in no way was stabilisation under the EU’s comprehensive approach “military-led” (Interview B30). Rather, the SU’s ‘stabilisation’ may be construed as an extension of political-focussed PCR and ‘peacebuilding’, and the associated ‘resilience’ concept as an extension of conflict-prevention, as with the EU’s historical integrated approach to CPPB (see EC, 1996b, 2001b).

That similar thinking prioritising political-settlement and inclusive-societies was contemporaneously remediated by the OECD and the ‘New Deal’ for fragile states ensured its acceptance within the EU (see EP, 2013b; IDOPAS, 2012). The EU depended upon the OECD for its definition of fragility, upon which DG-DEVCO’s new Fragility and Resilience Unit (DEVCO-B7) operated (see Pape, 2016:4-12). From a practical perspective in Afghanistan, the EUSR official perceived that “no effective stabilisation strategy for Afghanistan existed until very late in the day” and that this was “led by the British”, with the SU’s integrated approach to stabilisation specifically “growing popular in Europe [as] one of the cutting-edge approaches” (Interview LT34). One of the DEVCO officials, on the salience of politics within stabilisation, observed that consensus was that the 2015 “fall of Kunduz” was caused by “bad governance and the repression of the local population surrounding and in Kunduz, along ethnic lines by militias or ALP” (Interview B29). Thus demonstrating the practical salience of politics, and dangers of it going unheeded.

EU framing of Afghanistan’s FCAS did not ignore the traditional regional emphasis, however. For instance, one security expert observed how the EU looked to Iran and Turkey
to stabilise Afghanistan and manage irregular-migration flows, including through use of negative-conditionality and/or incentives (Interview B32). Cited examples included the withdrawal of aid and trade privileges. Further evidence of UK thinking on Afghanistan (and the BSOS) complementing EU-level regional discourse was found in the third CPA, revised at Ouagadougou, where Article 11 observed that to obtain sustainable development, peace and security “[t]he Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace building and conflict prevention and resolution” while:

The interdependence between security and development shall inform the activities in the field of peace building, conflict prevention and resolution which shall combine short and long-term approaches, which encompass and go beyond crisis management. (EC, 2014:25).

This implicitly called for stabilisation by another name. The subsequently revised ENP more explicitly took “stabilisation as its main political priority”, seeking “to comprehensively address sources of instability across sectors” and an “integrated approach” to partnerships (EC and HRFASP, 2015:2, 3, 15). More explicit still was the contemporary communication, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crisis, and subsequent action plan (EC and HRFASP, 2013, 2015b). However, the European Global Strategy (EU, 2016), surpassing the 2003 ESS’s discussion on the EU’s responsibility concerning fragile states (EC, 2003:1-6), was the summative document adopting the UK’s integrated approach to stabilisation and BSOS at the EU-level. It also overtly indicated the changed continental episteme, communicating how “[p]rincipled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead” (EU, 2016:16).

The EUGS, largely driven by Tocci’s “inspiring thinking” (EU, 2016:56), effectively became the grand strategy that governed the EEAS. It institutionalised whole-of-government thinking at the EU-level at-large, incorporating attributed meaning from all of ‘whole-of-the-Union’, ‘complementarity’, ‘comprehensive’, and ‘integrated’ nomenclature. It further added “joint programming in development” (EU, 2016:49; also EC and HRFASP, 2013:9), from the Commission’s Agenda for Change (2011). This was the joint-programming of development-cooperation between the EU-level and member states, as one DEVCO official described, “to avoid inconsistencies and overlap” (Interview B25). As another official noted, “Afghanistan was the Guinea-pig for joint-programming – to maximise synergies” (interview B28),
reaffirming Afghanistan’s intrinsic value for the EU during the epoch. The resultant EUGS’s integrated approach called for:

[A] *multi-dimensional* approach through the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution… *multi-phased*… acting at all stages of the conflict cycle… *multi-level*… acting at the local, national, regional and global levels… *multi-lateral*… engaging all those players present (EU, 2016:28-29[original-emphasis]).

Marsai argues that the EUGS “explicitly rules out a more robust intervention (e.g. peace-keeping missions) to stabilise states” (2018:4). To this end, the EUGS does emphasise preemptive peace, preventative diplomacy, conflict-prevention and the monitoring of root-causes over forceful interventionism (EEAS, 2016:29). However, Marsai’s interpretation shows a fundamental miss-reading of the EU’s evolving CFSP/CSDP frameworks, which were growing more pragmatic and wilful in supporting civilian-power instruments with martial-power in the context of stabilization. The EUGS describes this in terms of engaging “more systematically on the security dimension… better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives” (EEAS, 2016:30). Within this vision:

The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises… able to provide security when peace agreements are reached and transition governments established or in the making… ready to support and help consolidating local ceasefires, paving the way for capacity building… [And] counter the spill-over of insecurity (EEAS, 2016:30).

Marsai highlights a more astute point in noting that within external-actorness the EU provides greater resourcing towards soft-means of influence, such as diplomacy and development-cooperation, than defence (2018:2). This contrasts with the EU’s member states, which possess larger defence budgets than aid budgets. However, it helps explain the discursive resonance within the EU of UK aid’s implementation of the 0.7 percent ODA target during austerity, while UK defence spending and martial-power stagnated in the post-2010 period. In review of the EUGS and contemporary EU-level discourse, EU communicative-discourse declared “building more effective partnerships between the EU and its neighbours, and supporting stabilisation as a top priority” (EC and HRFASP, 2017:3).
Branching towards this changed thinking towards FCAS, Afghanistan during the late-‘GWOT’ period serves as an indicative microcosm. Whereas early PCR thought was somewhat crude and co-opted within the counterinsurgency, the EUSR crisis-management official elucidated how through time the EU’s framing of Afghanistan’s CPE evolved to account for “Afghanistan’s broader problems of conservative attitudes”, including the:

- Lack of education, 30 years of conflict, and other push-and-pull factors within a conservative state that encouraged the youth to join certain movements… where radicalisation of the youth is also linked to a lack of opportunity and expectations that were not met (Interview B30).

Similarly, one EU security expert recounted how the EU looked at “spots where there’s high unemployment and high instances of youth violence and so on and re-thought how policies ought to look” (Interview B32). Revisiting the issue of livelihoods within PCR, EU aid re-framed the issue post-2010 to focus upon the quality of employment (or lack thereof), and other associated grievances, which potentially facilitated radicalisation and spoilers, instead of simply focussing on the quantity of employment. As a result, linear economic aid thinking of a ‘development-ladder’, where creating basic employment would lead to climbing the ladder to the middle-classes, “who would demand good-governance” (Interview B32), which EU aid customarily applied to any developing state, underwent a metamorphosis within coordinative-discourse towards discussion of “humps”, where:

Even as people become wealthier, they become more dissatisfied, and use the material means that they suddenly have in order to leave the country or to fund XYZ unpleasant activities (Interview B32).

This demonstrated a significant revision in thinking, in part derived from experiential-learning and the experience of high-order organised violence ongoing in Afghanistan. However, it also fitted with the UK’s stabilisation discourse by taking into account the salience of politics and popular indigenous interpretations of fair political-settlement; emphasising the quality of employment and under-employment over unemployment. As such, it demonstrated UK influence, direct or indirect. Furthermore, a digression in EU aid thinking between early and late-‘GWOT’ periods was also observable in EUPOL-Afghanistan, of a lesser order but nevertheless of interest for indicating the change towards pragmatism.
This civilian-CSDP operation met significant criticism, and further demonstrated why Afghanistan’s CPE could not be treated like any other developing state. The European Court of Auditors argued, “EUPOL paid insufficient attention to the need for a comprehensive approach under which projects would contribute to the delivery of the mission objectives” (2017:27). However, more prominently, as Gross argued, it was under-resourced and with little political agency to engage Afghan authorities, and struggled with Afghanistan’s FCAS context (2009:30-31; also IECEU, 2017:18-21). As a civilian mission EUPOL-Afghanistan was counted as ODA. However, numerous EU interviewees argued that the Afghan National Police were not civilian, arguing how, “militias were folded into the Afghan police” (Interview LT34); “ANP do counterinsurgency, rather than community-policing” (Interview L4); “If you have seen the ANP in action, it’s anything but civilian-police” (Interview B29). Nonetheless, EU aid paid the police salaries through LOFTA, as the DEVCO official noted, “[a]t the urging of NATO we continued anyway, to some €500 million” (Interview B29). To have stopped would have meant thousands of militarised, unemployed young males, adding to the emergency.

EUPOL-Afghanistan’s pragmatic answer, described by its officials, was to refocus assistance to the strategic-level, away from the civilian POMLT initiative on-the-ground and towards mentoring the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), where UK DFID also assisted from 2011 (Interviews AT23, BT33). In this latter capacity one official noted:

Our job is trying to improve the strategy and strategic thinking and leadership of the Ministry of Interior, along with promoting gender-equality and human-rights, along with sorting out their criminal-convict and disciplinary procedures – and also rule of law (Interview AT23).

Thus, the exportation of EU peace-project values became somewhat lessened, and the ANP became another instance of accepting ‘Afghan-good’ standards, provided basic norms of human-rights were not compromised. A perhaps greater indicator of pragmatism was found in the European Gendarmerie Force’s (EGF’s) deployment to Afghanistan from December 2009, double-hatted under EUPOL-Afghanistan and the NATO-Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which in turn operated under ISAF command (EGF, 2016:85; also NATO, 2013:3). This challenged former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld’s paradoxical assumption that “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only soldiers can do it” (in Mallinson, 2011:585). While not formally an EU structure, the EGF’s military-status
civil-police were envisioned under the Treaty of Velsen to contribute towards CSDP missions and the stabilisation of crisis outside the EU (see EGF, 2016). As EUROGENDFOR-Afghanistan they complemented EUPOL-Afghanistan, by undertaking the POMLT role, building Afghan policing capacity to cope with Afghanistan’s FCAS context. However, that EUROGENDFOR-Afghanistan’s advisory mission involved more pragmatic, frontline peacekeeping, is indicative in the deaths of three Gendarme in 2010/2012 (EGF, 2016:7).

In sum, as Bressand (2011) argued, there is reason to find that the EU’s external-actorness had moved towards greater pragmatism. However, this movement within discourse was indicative of a more fundamental movement within the continent’s underpinning cultural episteme. As the EU security expert stated, “the idea that we could stabilise these places and then return people there… That sense of being able to effect the rest of the world has disappeared” (Interview B32). EU aid’s discourse on FCAS, stabilisation and the whole-of-government means to its attainment did grow to strongly align with the UK’s framing, indicating the presence of Europeanization as an uploading process within discourse. It was argued by a DEVCO official that “the integrated approach worked more equally amongst agencies towards greater objectives” (Interview B26) when compared with the EU’s comprehensive approach. But, at the EU-level these approaches lacked the stark distinctions found at the UK level. Nonetheless, that the UK necessitated to change whole-of-government nomenclature, and that this changed nomenclature later entered EU-level discourse, is overtly indicative of the UK’s influence until 2016.

**Depths of whole-of-the-Union and stabilization thinking**

Whereas tracing EU-level framing throughout the ‘GWOT’ context reveals what thinking was present, a more critical consideration is mandated in order to assess the ‘depth’ of Europeanization in terms of the transformation of content (see Chapter 3). This is to say, while discourse reveals EU aid did adopt facets of UK aid thinking, seen in the discursive remediation, formal acceptance or other acknowledgment of its value – did it affect EU aid’s practice, or was it rhetorical? For example, while it is explained above why the EU-level as a peace-project rejected the UK’s defence ‘insurgency’ frame, it is argued that UK aid’s projecting of whole-of-government thinking, including comprehensive and integrated nomenclature, was accepted by the EU. Indeed, it was shown as cross-loaded throughout the Union. However, recognising that prior study on Europeanization of development-cooperation has found how Europeanization can be ‘shallow’, this must be considered in this instance (see Horký, 2010, 2012; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014).
Prior research evaluating the Commission’s support to conflict-prevention and peace-building (CPPB) found that “the Commission has implemented a substantial shift in support to CPPB by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments” (ADE, 2011:ii). Nonetheless, the report was broadly negative concerning the implementation of any comprehensive or integrated approach spanning policy instruments. Similarly, an in-house study by the policy department of the European Parliament’s External Policy directorate (DG-EXPO) reported how coordinative-discourse witnessed the integrated approach (to CPPB) superseded by the comprehensive approach, as pushed by the UK, but that any common understanding on what this meant “proved elusive” (EP, 2013:16). Another study assessing the role of the military within EU external-actoriness contended that “[a]lthough the CA [comprehensive approach] has no shortage of proponents, in practise it is still conspicuously absent” (Langlois and Capstack, 2014:36). Faria similarly described it as “unfinished business” (2014:1). Again, when discussing whether the EU’s latter uptake of resilience nomenclature within the EUGS’s (2016) communicative-discourse on stabilisation and fragility signified a pragmatic turn, Juncos explicitly dismissed the ‘comprehensive’ approach as “mere rhetoric or another ‘buzzword’ in the EU’s jargon”, comparing it to the EU’s superfluous use of “effective multilateralism” (2016:1).

In a rather literal sense such critiques are unjustified. Despite nuanced distinctions in usage, the EU’s comprehensive approach and latter more holistic integrated approach (plus associated cohering initiatives), are found discussed in considerable detail, honed and legitimised through a decade of communicative-discourse (see CEU, 2003b, 2005, 2012; EC, 2007; 2009, 2011; EC and HRFASP, 2013, 2015, 2016; EU, 2016). This discourse may be seen to contribute significantly to the framing of solutions concerning foreign FCAS. However, analysis of interviewees’ memories of the EU’s use of comprehensive nomenclature concerning Afghanistan within coordinative-discourse, in comparison with what was found in communicative-discourse, did reveal ‘shallow’ Europeanization. This was at both a practical and an informal, social-level. As the head of EU external-action lamented, “Ask 10 people from across the EU institutions to define the comprehensive approach and chances are you’ll get 10 different answers” (Shirreff, 2013; also Furness, 2014:10-11).

From a practical standpoint, the EU-level recognised a semblance of whole-of-government activity was a necessity to manage Afghanistan’s multifaceted CPE upon the expansion of ISAF and further fragmentation of European assistance. However, the lack of any singular, popular definition attributed to the then prevalent comprehensive approach led to
inconsistencies in interpretation. This was problematic for EU-level policy programming and implementation. An ambitious EU security perspective was to praise the comprehensive approach for accounting for military contributions “not necessarily deployed under the EU flag”, where:

The military in theatre can be European but deployed under a NATO flag, can be blue-helmets with Europeans, or can be an ad-hoc coalition which does not necessarily have to stop you from building on the EU bits in the other dimensions (Interview B31).

This permitted the EU-level to focus on what it was good at (Interview B32). But, this framing furthered the UK’s practice of comprehensive thinking, where the defence community dominated, and as a DEVCO official observed, “with other agencies as blisters on the side” (interview B26), thus contrary to the spirit of EU-CMCO. Furthermore, with ISAF under NATO’s leadership, EU member states’ security contributions were beyond the EU’s institutional reach. Development-cooperation officials disagreed with this security perspective, and whether European contributions to NATO-ISAF were accommodated under the comprehensive approach. They argued within coordinative-discourse that “were ISAF to have been an EU-CSDP military peacekeeping mission, this would have been part of the EU’s comprehensive approach”, but not otherwise (Interview B26). The implication being that EUPOL-Afghanistan under Council CSDP frameworks could be cohered, but not ISAF. Theoretically, the EU could outsource military options through NATO under the Berlin-plus agreement. However, this was not evoked after the Balkans experience (Interview, B31).

The NATO/CSDP distinction meant that the office of the EUSR had to liaise with NATO. However, as one EUSR exclaimed, his number-three, responsible for the comprehensive approach, “went quite crazy about it – I don’t think much was achieved… I never understood it and I never thought it was going to work… the question was, how was it done (Interview L20). It was perceived among the EU-level that the member states were to an extent disingenuous, whereby, “there is what they say in Kabul, and there is what they do when they are in the provinces” (Interview B28). The UK was a prime example, with early professional-contentions amongst DFID and the defence community. The UK had supported the EU in Kabul and pushed thinking such as the gender priority, yet conducted independently-minded counterinsurgency in ‘Helmandshire’. As contended in Chapter 5,
whereas the UK also prominently pushed the comprehensive approach, their own practice of it was distinctly imbalanced.

Cohering efforts in joint-programming, unlike the whole-of-the-Union approaches, were broadly less about cohering multi-agency efforts holistically, than vertically cohering development-cooperation’s programming between the EU-level, the member states, and the recipient within the ‘agenda for change’ (see EC, 2011). As such, development-cooperation officials deemed efforts in joint-programming as less than the comprehensive approach (Interviews B27, B28). In practical terms it was argued that, “it wasn’t actually joint-programming, it was joint-implementation, because the programming had already taken place – the funds allocated” (Interview B28). Whereas, concerning joint-implementation, “in Afghanistan there was a very high politicisation of aid and very weak coordination mechanisms and [recipient] government leadership” (Interview B28). Nonetheless, the greater explainer of ‘shallow’ Europeanization was perhaps not practical, but cultural, through the traditionally fragmented character of EU external-actoriness and the ‘firewall’ surrounding the epistemic-community of aid purists constructed by the ‘aid revolution’.

During the early years especially ‘whole-of-government’ approaches were controversial among EU-level aid officials socialised to believe DEVCO/ECHO should work in isolation towards its objective, separate from politics. Officials observed EC delegation coordinative-discourse focussed on the difficulties of joint-programming; ‘comprehensive’ was seen as something relating to politics and the military, and “the military was something different” (Interview B28; also B26). A function of this cultural ‘firewall’ was that, whereas Brussels officials frequently adopted the EU’s supranational peace-project identity, many DEVCO/ECHO officials identified not “necessarily as representatives of Europe” but “more development/aid technicians” where:

Generally most of the people working in EU-DEVCO come from NGOs... a lot of people come and go – there is a lot of change and people always come to these things with their own ideas. People relate with what they’ve done previously – you bring in these ideas into the EU context. You don’t read all the strategy documents in-post, you read some of it, but forget it (Interview B24).

Among this epistemic-community of aid purists, sentiment was that “the political-arm and the development-cooperation-arm should be separated to depoliticise aid and to make aid move on its own lengths” (Interview B28). DEVCO officials observed they struggled with the
comprehensive approach (Interviews B24, B26, B28, B29), even observing a cynical interpretation that “the issue with the comprehensive approach… is it means you want development to pay for security expenditures” (Interview B29). While, from the contemporaneous EU security perspective, a senior EEAS official with EUPOL-Afghanistan experience sardonically observed, “The comprehensive approach is where you coordinate the left-hand and the right-hand, but we cannot even coordinate our own fingers” (Interview BT33). This security-development ‘cross-isle’ agreement on the troubled nature of the EU’s comprehensive approach, when this was the epicentre of cohering efforts, was indicative of the broader cultural and practical problem.

Post-2010, when the UK framing of Afghanistan de-emphasised defence agency in favour of projecting the new integrated approach to stabilisation, with the defence community in a supportive role through MSS, ‘deeper’ Europeanization occurred as an ‘uploading’ process transforming content. As aforementioned, the new thinking fitted with the EU’s peace-project values and underpinning continental anti-war episteme – especially so as the EU turned towards pragmatism. Rather than completely re-constructing EU thinking, it instead developed it, through incremental-change and consideration of intra-state fragility, beneath the regional focus that the EU’s stability thinking was greater accustomed to. However, it was the genesis of the EEAS that permitted EU aid’s whole-of-government thinking to affect practice in Afghanistan, and forced the aid ‘counter-revolution’ post-2011 in Afghanistan. Here, as one DEVCO official observed “the political and development side strongly integrated” and EU development-cooperation developed into a “political-process to empower the recipient government” (Interview B29). If not a critical-juncture in thought in itself, the EEAS built structural linkages between the EUSR, EC delegation and EUPOL-Afghanistan. This permitted the fruition of then-accepted normative best-practice from the international aid regime concerning fragility. That what the UK was projecting into the EU was remediated within the international aid regime in OECD discourse, legitimised it for the EU, with the EU favouring multilateralism and partnership (for example, OECD, 2006).

In sum, while what thinking EU aid adopted was conditional on background episteme (and entrenched pro-poor path-dependency), the depth of Europeanization where thinking was adopted, largely depended upon extant institutional bureaucracy/practicality issues and culture. The EU’s early ‘comprehensive’ approach prior to new integrated thinking marked the Afghanistan context’s foremost example of ‘shallow’ Europeanization, where thinking was accepted formally, yet was evaded informally or otherwise failed to affect practice. As
one former EU official noted, “Every single international entity will talk about its comprehensive approach” (Interview L4). However, with discourse and practice understood as mutually-constitutive, weakly (or overly broad/vague) attributed meaning within discourse undermines any constituting affect upon practical embodiment, evident here in distinctions between coordinative and communicative-discourse. Thus, the comprehensive approach developed Juncos (2016) ‘buzzword’ reputation. The aforementioned institutionally-fragmented nature of EU external-actorness and ‘firewall’ surrounding the aid purists marked a practical and cultural hurdle that slowed the institutionalisation of a whole-of-government, or rather whole-of-the-Union approach. This is not surprising when considering that coherence had long been a perennial problem of the Union.

Chapter conclusion
In conclusion, whereas Chapters 5-6 traced UK aid discourse surrounding Afghanistan, revealing significant transformation between early and late-‘GWOT’ periods (including unintentional institutional-layering and what amounted to a critical-juncture in thought), this chapter has focussed upon tracing the EU-level (addressing RQ2, RQ4 and contributing towards RQ5). It reveals that EU aid thinking concerning Afghanistan, but also FCAS more broadly, also underwent significant transformation throughout the ‘GWOT’ epoch. The previously revealed thinking within UK aid, including pro-poor path-dependency, understanding of the poverty-conflict cycle, whole-of-government approaches, and the integrated approach to stabilisation, are found to be important in shaping this process of change (Europeanization). This may be largely accredited to the UK’s relative power within the EU, and leadership ambition derived from the cultural collective memory of greatness – deliberately projecting aid thinking into the EU. However, whereas Europeanization is identifiable, some ideas resonated within the EU more-so than others, and processes of transformational-content amongst the UK and EU differed dependent upon fundamental episteme(s). Overall, and in consideration of RQ1, Europeanization may be understood as conditional.

Interviews conducted at the EU-level, spanning officials in Brussels and those with experience in Afghanistan, revealed a popular interpretation of a power-structure within multilateralism (Interviews B26, B28, B29). The US constituted the foremost actor. This was unsurprising considering the US experienced the 9/11 attack, and instigated the ‘GWOT’ – the speech-act and the punitive martial-power response that presented the second shock to the EU. The UK, as Europe’s enduring martial-power with the historic ‘special-relationship’
with the US, was perceived second in this power-structure. As the EUSR contended, “the UK had the most privileged position” (Interview L20). However, then came Germany, and possibly the Dutch, before the EU itself, and other IOs such as UNAMA and the World Bank. The EU, often conceptualised as a civilian-power, resided in a relatively muted position due to early prevalent forces of Americanisation through Bush’s martial-power call-to-arms and unilateral coalition-building.

Forces of Americanisation were an early social-condition surrounding 9/11, as the ‘GWOT’ defined the epoch. That the EU framed 9/11 as an attack on all Western democracy, supporting the ‘fight against terrorism’ fitted with US designs, depicted by Ignatieff in Empire Lite (2003), whereby Europe was the peacekeeper and aid donor – the ‘chequebook’. As a peace-project, entrenched within anti-war episteme, the EU was broadly inexperienced concerning foreign fragility, post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and conflict-prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) beyond limited Balkan insight. The EU-level was departed from the UK’s historical imperial experience and sentiment of postcolonial responsibility. As such, EU aid attempted to treat Afghanistan like any other developing state. The diminished returns if not outright impossibility of this opened discursive-space to alternative frames, and crafted the EU as a normative-follower, receptive to thinking from the likes of the UK, and OECD, provided it synced with core EU values.

EU aid’s purist epistemic-community surrounding DG-DEVCO/ECHO, seeking separation from politics, faced a counter-revolution where incremental-change greater synthesised EU aid with high-politics. In broader discourse this was overtly identifiable through their recognition of the poverty-conflict cycle, progressions in CFSP/CSDP and changes between the 2003 ESS and 2016 EUGS. Concerning Afghanistan’s fragility specifically, it was identifiable in discourse emphasising security dimensions including SSR and law and order, including through EUPOL-Afghanistan. Fragmentation into the provinces, the PRT structures, and (kinetically) fighting any perceived insurgency as the UK did was anathema to the EU’s values and so vehemently resisted. The EU favoured building a legitimate state and associated institutions to partner with, over fragmented efforts that competed with the state. However, coherence existed as a perennial problem of union, highlighted by paralysing frame-parity surrounding Iraq (2003) and ISAF’s expansion (2004-2006). With such impetus, the EU-level rapidly accepted UK aid’s projection of whole-of-government thinking, and comprehensive and integrated nomenclature became commonplace. Other UK concerns which fitted with EU values, such as the gender focus, SSR thinking and latter
partnership discourse were also adopted by the EU, both through social-learning and personality-politics. Personalities such as Ashton, Blair, Cooper and Patten and institutional secondments (within ESS, CSDP and EEAS) were instrumental to changing EU-level thinking.

EU discourse within external-actorness at-large took a turn towards pragmatism after the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and EEAS (2010). In conjunction with the EUGS, the EEAS was to the EU what the PCRU/SU had been to the UK in facilitating the institutionalisation of new thinking concerning Afghanistan, and a broader stability agenda. CSDP frameworks progressed towards PESCO and frames entailing martial-power solutions were no longer precluded. This implied movement in the continent’s underpinning episteme, away from the generic integration as peace-project model. Afghanistan did not force a critical-juncture upon EU aid’s pro-poor path-dependency. However, through highlighting fragility, the security-development nexus and poverty-conflict cycle, it branched EU pro-poor thinking in a direction that took conflict more seriously. Within this branching, UK influence is apparent, direct and indirect.

Although identifying as a peace-project, the EU grew in strategic-autonomy, and developed political agency within the international community. This was through the recognition that civilian-power routines necessitated complementing with martial-power routines, if the EU was to pursue integrated capabilities towards management of foreign fragility and associated complex political emergencies, and so build regional stability and prosperity. As such, of note regarding RQ5, the EU took from the SU’s emphasis on political-settlement through the integrated approach to stabilisation, albeit in EU interpretation. Here, EU thinking on regional and inter-regional stability, which preceded the SU’s conceptualisation of stabilisation, was adapted and applied at the intra-state level. It was at this level that the UK’s thinking on stabilisation offered insights that the EU’s historical vision lacked. Of note, this saw the exporting of EU values such as democracy de-emphasised after experiencing the ‘Arab Spring’ and renewed irregular-migrant crisis.

The next and final chapter of the thesis roundly concludes the research, answering RQ1 by presenting overarching findings which span the three inclusive analytical discussions.
8 Thesis Conclusion

What the technical discussions ignore is fundamentally that all processes of state formation are political and moral… you have to generate political capital, not political division (Ghani, 2014:3).

The thesis’ analysis (Chapters 5-7) explored the foreign aid institutional domain, and how some ideas grew prevalent while others did not, by tracing and describing frame-contestation amidst discourse, and associated practice, at UK member state and EU supranational-level. Focus was levied upon aid towards fragile, conflict-affected states’ (FCAS’) complex political emergencies within the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (‘GWOT’), and the management of Afghanistan’s emergency specifically. This was with the purpose of addressing RQ2 through RQ5. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to answer RQ1 (see beneath) by presenting the thesis’ contribution to knowledge, including the ‘built’ substantive theory of Europeanization, and the implications thereof, as derived from the research’s findings.

The original contribution to knowledge
The research’s contribution to knowledge is empirical and theoretical – ‘testing’ and ‘building’ theory through the abductive, reflective and reflexive research-process. Firstly, the thesis advances Europeanization of foreign aid scholarship by conceptualising it from an institutionalist perspective that understands ideas through framing. This contribution entails developing Institutional Frame Analysis (IFA), an innovative theoretical framework synthesising extant thinking on frame analysis, historical and discursive institutionalism, and Europeanization. Secondly, it operationalises IFA by applying it to the empirical case of UK and EU-level aid policy thinking towards Afghanistan, and in doing so reveals a substantive theory of Europeanization, explaining what is explicitly found in this instance, including how the UK led EU-level thinking. This second theoretical facet constitutes the thesis’ primary contribution. Thirdly, as the tracing of frames entails method as well as theory, the operationalisation of IFA as devised here may further be considered a progression of this mode of analysis. Finally, through presenting findings on foreign aid from analysis of original interview and archive data (with some documents not previously publicly discussed), the thesis further mounts a rich empirical contribution.
Fragile, conflict-affected states constitute a broad and longstanding problem within International Relations (IR). They were notably observable within the post-World War II context of decolonisation, and the legacy of this tumultuous transitional period, but also within comparable turmoil upon the collapse of the bipolar system through the Soviet Union’s disintegration (1991). However, as the OECD observed, it was post-9/11 that fragile states grew popularly perceived to hold greater strategic significance (2006:17). Bush’s emotive framing of 9/11 and “war on terrorism” speech-act (Bush, 2001c; Entman, 2003:415-416), constructed an epoch within IR that endured, despite latter efforts to moderate it or re-frame it as countering violent-extremism (see Obama, 2013). That fragile states provided harbour to such terrorists/extremists ensured that their management was high on agendas within this securitised context. The case of Afghanistan was of intrinsic value – Afghanistan’s complex emergency facilitated the 9/11 attack and persisted throughout the epoch.

The US suffered the 9/11 attack, and so traditional focus on US foreign policy and forces of Americanisation are of interest. Ignatieff’s Empire Lite (2003, cited throughout) provides an insightful interpretation of early US designs here. However, the EU and Europeanization are underrepresented within the literature, despite spill-over of fragile states’ emergencies also presenting an exogenous problem confronting the EU. This justifies the thesis’ critical approach, focussing upon contemporary European thinking. That an irregular non-state actor, facilitated by Afghanistan’s situation, mounted the 9/11 attack thrust fragile, conflict-affected states upon the EU’s agenda with renewed vigour, ensuring Europe’s assistance within the ‘fight against terrorism’, and that fragile states would never again be ‘aid orphans’ (see EC, 2001c, 2003; 2007). Aid here was holistic through the increasingly popular mantra that “you cannot have security without development, and you cannot have development without security” (Interview B29). As such, and observed within extant debate, within the ‘GWOT’ European aid thinking risked politicisation (see Gilbert, 2009; McConnon, 2014; Pugh et al, 2013). The thesis has advanced knowledge on this aid thinking, by commencing with identifying the UK’s leadership reputation (see Double, 2016; Dunne et al, 2011; OECD, 2014), and building towards a substantive theory of Europeanization.

The specific problem tackled was understanding how UK and EU-level thinking and strategies to aiding fragile, conflict-affected states (and Afghanistan specifically) progressed, were influential, and were shaped within the post-9/11, ‘GWOT’ epoch. This constituted the foremost research question (RQ):
1. What discernible Europeanization occurred between UK member state and EU-level thinking on managing Afghanistan’s post-9/11 complex political emergency?

In answering this research question, associated queries demanded exploration:

2. What relevant aid ideas were prevalent within European discourse upon 9/11?  
   (Addressed in Chapters 2, 5 and 7)
3. How did UK thinking on Afghanistan progress throughout the epoch?  
   (Addressed in Chapters 5 and 6)
4. How did EU-level thinking on Afghanistan progress throughout the epoch?  
   (Addressed in Chapter 7)
5. Subsequently, which ideas grew salient and led thinking within discourse, those of the UK or those of the EU-level?  
   (Addressed throughout Chapters 5-7)

In tackling the research, analysis adhered to the theoretical—methodological framework detailed throughout Chapters 3-4. Rather than employ a generic content or discourse analysis, Institutional Frame Analysis (IFA) was devised as a bespoke framework and mode of discourse analysis focussing on tracing framing, path-dependency and ultimately Europeanization among institutions at member state and EU-level through a longitudinal temporal-dimension. This was guided by prior scholarship, with examples detailed throughout (see Entman, 1993; Foucault, 1980; Hall, 1989; Horký, 2010; Howell, 2004, 2013; Radaelli, 2003; Schmidt, 2011; Skocpol, 1995b, etc.). It was mandated in order to reveal knowledge on ideational soft-content, operating within interactive discursive-struggle among institutional agencies, and ultimately Europeanization in terms of processes of transformational-content beyond the member state. This was conducted from a critical-interpretivist paradigm of inquiry, necessary to understand discourse and its mutually-constitutive relationship with practice, including how salient frames can prove agenda-setting, and how through discrete viewpoints, facets of frames may also hold discrete attributed meaning.

Research findings and reflections
Analysis found significant change amidst foreign aid thinking, and Europeanization to be present throughout the research’s remit. This finding was not an example of confirmation bias. Through the UK being an EU member state within a tumultuous epoch, discernible Europeanization was all but inevitable. What the IFA informed research-process’s reflective
and reflexive ‘empirical rummaging’ revealed was the substantive character of this Europeanization. In consideration of the ‘paradox of inquiry’ (Williams and May, 2005:200-201), this was facilitated by IFA’s delineating what to search for in order to find it. This entailed abduction, the combination of deduction and induction, ‘theory-testing’ and ‘theory-building’. From this, the overarching thesis contention is that UK aid thinking pertaining to fragile, conflict-affected states’ complex political emergencies, and Afghanistan specifically, changed significantly. Further it is contended that this thinking was indeed influential and did affect EU-level and therefore potentially pan-EU thinking. It is argued that the transformation of content at the EU-level largely conformed to the designs of UK leadership ambitions. However, this discursive process was omnidirectional, and took place upon a background of incrementally-changing cultural epistemes.

Chapter 5 found that the legacy of the British Empire, and victory in the world wars, contributed to the construction of what Duchêne termed the British “nostalgia for power” (1972:43), and Marshall a cultural “collective memory of greatness” (2016:109). This cultural identity entailed international leadership ambition, and a retained confidence in UK martial-power. The legacy of empire and decolonisation shaped UK aid policy thinking. Colonial governors were accustomed to ‘whole-of-government’ powers, including over the defence community’s colonial-policing. By necessity this synthesised high and low-politics, countering Maoist/Communist insurrection within overseas territories and newly independent states during the Cold War context, in combination with perceiving a postcolonial moral-responsibility. Post-world wars, UK aid policy retained whole-of-government professional-routines, demonstrated in the Gabon and Jamaica examples (Interviews L7, L16).

Meanwhile, the defence community retained its own dependence on ‘small wars’, including erstwhile colonial-policing and counterinsurgency, to justify its resourcing, and held a cultural ‘expectation of success’ therein, largely through the legacy Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) (Interviews E13, P15, P35). Upon such legacy New Labour’s 1997 manifesto explicitly sought to reform EU external-actorness, to enhance consistency among policy domains, and to advance the position of the world’s poorest (1997:38-39).

After 9/11, Blair’s executive-level partnership with Bush and the defence community’s ‘special-relationship’ with the US at the institutional-level overshadowed low-politics aid thinking, as the UK abetted Bush’s vengeance upon the Taliban/Al Qaeda and subsequently invaded Iraq. However, through Blair’s new-humanitarian doctrine (see Blair, 1999), post-Bonn Afghanistan reverted to being framed as a low-politics aid endeavour, albeit entailing a
peacekeeping dimension, with the Afghan people framed as victims (Blair, 2001c). This reversion fitted with the identified continental EU peace-project values, with UK whole-of-government thinking and the Kabul Multinational Brigade constituting valuable precedents for EU thinking, including within embryonic common security and defence policy (CSDP).

However, the UK’s heavy-handed response to violence during ISAF’s expansion into Helmand (Pashtunistan) post-2005 led to unintended institutional-layering as the UK defence institution layered over UK aid concerns. This was through the genesis of the defence ‘insurgency’ frame, the adoption of the ‘comprehensive’ approach which superseded civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) by building upon Danish concerted planning and action (CPAA), and ultimately the predominance of defence agency. As Patten observed when EU Commissioner for External Relations, the “‘war on terrorism’ has been understood in Europe as a metaphor”:

[A] phrase to describe the myriad responses required of the civilized world to address problems that do not allow of definitive solutions, let alone of military ones. America, by contrast, has really felt itself to be at war, and it is a war that ratcheted up patriotic sentiment to unparalleled heights (2002[original-emphasis]).

For the EU-level, as a peace-project and civilian-power, ‘fight against terror’ nomenclature could only serve as a metaphor. This contrasted with US framing, but also it transpires the ‘insurgency’ frame pushed to dominance by the UK’s defence community. Prevalent UK martial sentiment was to manage Helmand as though it were Malaya, with aid interpreted in terms of physical-infrastructure focussed post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) led by the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) (Interview L9). This entailed consent winning activity to win ‘hearts and minds’ amidst kinetic-counterinsurgency campaigning. Such martial-power implemented in the provinces was anathema to EU values, and EU statebuilding in Kabul. Nonetheless, facing diffused efforts the EU required greater joined-up thinking, and so the comprehensive approach, then prevalent within defence discourse, was adopted, as were defence notions of CIMIC/CMCO as CSDP advanced (Chapter 7). This was largely through the UK’s behest and projection – concerning Afghanistan “the UK definitely had a bigger voice in the EU than other countries” (Interview L4).

Chapter 6 found enduring leadership ambition, but significant change amidst UK frame-contestation. Popularly perceived failure to solve Afghanistan’s emergency through
diminished returns of practicing martial-routines re-opened debate, prompting latter Conservative-led government to re-frame solutions to favour military support to stabilisation (MSS), as championed by the UK’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit when re-branded the Stabilisation Unit (SU). This dispelled the early institutional-layering and predominance of defence agency within UK aid policy in Afghanistan. Within frame-contestation amidst discursive-struggle the comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency was supplanted by the newly dominant integrated approach to stabilisation, including promulgation of the building stability overseas strategy (DFID et al, 2011). Herein, UK aid policy’s pro-poor path-dependency evolved from emphasising under-development, towards emphasising uneven-development, recognising the salience of politics and political-settlement (Interviews L18, L19).

This change amounted to a critical-juncture in UK aid policy thinking concerning fragile states, rebalancing power-structures in favour of civilian agency. The rudimentary infrastructure-focussed PCR of consent winning activity was supplanted by attention to local communities, their linkages with local governance, and prioritising their wishes and interpretations of fair settlement over presumptions concerning their needs. Not only were facets such as MSS more acceptable to the EU’s post-martial, peace-project values, it additionally indicated movement within the UK’s background cultural episteme towards that of a post-martial power – the defence community having failed to attain the expected success. As such, the UK’s episteme converged towards that of the continent.

Chapter 7 found that unlike the UK, the EU-level appropriated little sense of postcolonial moral-responsibility, despite legacy member state associations and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group. Rather, the EU itself may be conceptualised as a form of benevolent empire; an evolutionary supranational peace-project upon the continent’s background anti-war episteme. The EU sought stability overseas to facilitate inter-regional prosperity, and through a perceived universalism, idealised exporting the EU’s own values and regional model that contributed to pacifying Europe as an avenue to this. As a peace-project emphasising civilian-power instruments, EU aid policy constituted a central component within this external-actoriness. However, with longstanding focus on inter-regionalism, the EU was inexperienced concerning fragile states and the management of overseas intra-state fragility. Additional early contentions were found amongst aid and trade agendas, through the fragmented, stove-piped character of EU external-relations seen in the Commission’s
RELEX family, which traditionally lacked whole-of-government professional-routines (Interview L16; Farrell, 2005).

With member state aid agencies at ‘arms-length’ EU aid policy tended to operate as a normative-follower, treaty-bound to adopt complementary policies to those of the member states (CEU and EC, 1992:60), and other actors of the international aid regime, including the OECD. As such, and as a civilian-power, EU aid traditionally remediated pro-poor discourse, especially DG-DEVCO at the centre of EU aid policy’s epistemic-community of aid-purists, albeit prioritising the inter-regional-level, pursuant of economy-focussed development-cooperation partnerships with overseas states. This thinking resulted in EU aid treating Afghanistan like any other least-developed country (LDC), focussing upon the three focal areas of governance/order, society/health and rural-development/agriculture (Interviews B27, B28). This aid was not tailored to contextual specificities, seen in legitimising the post-Bonn state regardless of identified corruption, and in livelihoods programmes aimed at providing alternative work to young males crudely correlating with conflict-affected areas (Interview B32). Afghanistan’s intra-state complex political emergency and the ‘GWOT’s’ associated securitising discourse challenged this.

EU-level values (and anti-war episteme) had precluded support for the kinetic-counterinsurgency as conducted by the UK in ‘Helmandshire’ (Chapter 5). However, the EU did recognise the need for, and adopted, whole-of-government routines of the comprehensive and latter integrated approaches. Further, EU aid policy thinking also advanced, like UK aid, to recognise the salience of politics, seen in livelihoods programmes evolving to greater emphasise quality of, and under-employment. Also, and paralleling greater security integration through CSDP, after the UK permitted this at St-Malo (1998), the EU grew more pragmatic in accepting an interpretation of MSS within EU external-actorness. EUPOL-Afghanistan, as a civilian-CSDP mission, fitted with EU values, but was out-of-step with Afghanistan’s contextual needs, producing negligible returns. Subsequently the EU enthusiastically adopted an interpretation of the UK’s integrated approach to stabilisation, as observable in Tocci’s thinking within the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) (EU, 2016:28-32). This built upon UK thinking, but also furthered sustainable ‘structural-stability’ as the objective of stabilisation efforts (see EC, 2001b; OECD, 1997:9; PCRU, 2007; SU, 2014:1). Importantly, the EUGS and surrounding discourse’s acceptance of supportive martial-power indicated movement within the EU’s continental anti-war episteme, it changing to no longer preclude martial-power discourse.
Ultimately, throughout framing of Afghanistan, pro-poor path-dependency within foreign aid endured. However, when managing Afghanistan’s complex political emergency within the ‘GWOT’ context poverty-alleviation was not necessarily the end objective in and of itself, nor was it purely rationalised through a sense of moral-responsibility, nor broader designs for inter-regional prosperity. Rather, high-politics and perceived security imperatives grew synthesised with low-politics through the security-development nexus and understanding of the poverty-conflict cycle within a stability agenda. Thus, pro-poor path-dependency was co-opted within the need to prevent complex political emergency within fragile state situations from spilling-over and threatening the West through international terrorism/extremism or irregular-migration. Nevertheless, even when the UK was conducting kinetic-counterinsurgency in ‘Helmandshire’, aiding the indigenous poor was rhetorically prioritised, but through vested rationale, it being utilised as a routine of counterinsurgency. Through such co-option it is justifiable to contend that aid was politicised.

**Implications for substantive Europeanization**

In addressing RQ1, as the research problem is rephrased, the thesis’ focal contribution is in ‘building’ a substantive theory of Europeanization within the research’s remit. Significantly, the implications of these summarised findings foremost reveal the character of Europeanization to be that of an ‘uploading’ influence, with UK thinking on Afghanistan projected into the EU-level. However, Europeanization was also multi-dimensional, entailing formal and informal processes, and fitting with Europeanization’s ‘cyclical’ conceptualisation (Chapter 3). In contrast, findings reveal forces of Americanisation to be less influential. Through alliance-politics the UK aligned with the US in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) as a martial-power, yet operated broadly independently, especially in Helmand post-2005. The UK’s ‘nostalgia for power’ and defence community’s cultural ‘expectation of success’ bred competitiveness within the ‘special-relationship’ – the UK sought to surpass US designs, not mimic them.

Foreground Europeanization is most strongly explainable as comprising processes of uploading ideational soft-content from the UK member state into the EU-level. This is representative of enduring UK leadership ambition within foreign aid throughout the epoch, the UK’s deliberate projecting of contemporary ideas, and the evidential success of this through the content of EU-level discourse transforming to accommodate interpretations of these projected ideas (see foremost Chapter 7). Whole-of-government thinking seen in the comprehensive and integrated approaches within solutions at the EU-level constitute overt
examples, along with understanding of intra-state stabilisation, and the supportive role that defence agency may play concerning fragile, conflict-affected states. Another example is the emphasis the UK placed on women’s rights being uploaded within the pro-poor focus.

Such transformation of EU-level content was sequential and deliberate. However, it was also accumulative through often less-formal conduits. UK aid policy’s leadership at Cabinet-level sought to reform the EU through the European Council, while ambassadors were influential within EU heads of mission’s meetings (EUHOMS) in-country (Chapters 5-6). However, UK agencies also sought to promote change through organising seminars and partaking in secondments. For example, as aforementioned, during May 2016 70 DFID/SU officials were on secondment in the EU, a relatively significant number (DFID, 2016:1). Such practices facilitated high-levels of social-learning and norm-transferal. Nevertheless, it was easier for the UK to block ideas from being institutionalised at the EU-level through formal processes, or release such blocks, as seen in the instance of Blair’s derestricting progress in CSDP, than to force the EU to adopt ideas that conflicted with the EU’s values, as seen in the example of kinetic-counterinsurgency.

Adding nuance to this substantive theory, Europeanization may also be identified in terms of downloading, as conceptualised in two forms. Firstly, through Europeanization’s cyclical processes throughout the epoch, facets of EU-level thinking were adopted within UK agencies, and subsequently adapted within UK aid’s framing, before being projected back into the EU. This entailed the EU-level promoting the UK’s socialisation into background post-martial cultural norms and values in addition to specific foreground concepts, such as ‘structural-stability’ (EC, 1996b:2-3; SU, 2014:1). Secondly, with consideration of the EU’s horizontal structure and recourse to member state expertise, downloading is further explainable in terms of the EU-level identifying knowledge-gaps regarding fragile states, and subsequently deliberately summoning appropriate expertise from its constituent member states. Here, the EU-level decided what interaction was required. Whole-of-government thinking constitutes an interesting example of this – the UK wanted to reform EU aid policy in this manner, but the EU-level also sought greater coherence (Chapters 5, 7).

Through this second interpretation, the remediation of UK thinking within the EU-level may be conceptualised through both processes of uploading and downloading, dependent on nuances of where power sat at given points within discursive-struggle – the summoning and projecting of ideas. For example, in consideration of secondments, such technical experts
must be favourably received by the EU agency, as well as their being despatched by the member state. Where sentiments (and background epistemes) aligned, resistance to ideas was minimised and transformation of content was maximised, incrementally-changing institutional path-dependency accordingly. Nevertheless, whether adopted within EU-level discourse through the summoning or projecting of ideas, depth of institutionalisation was found limited in instances. For example, interpretation of the comprehensive approach’s meaning, and its added-value, at the EU-level was incongruent (Chapter 7). It found greater favour amongst CSDP agencies and those who perceived value in the politicisation of aid, than amongst the EU-level’s aid-purists. As a result, much of this foreground Europeanization must be deemed shallow, through a laboured process.

Crossloading of content through EU institutional structures, as with Howell’s (2004) theorising, may further be identified within the thesis’ findings, albeit to a lesser degree. This final recognised dimension of cyclical Europeanization is fundamental within the EU’s formal treaty processes. What is institutionalised at the EU-level within shared-competency areas (as clarified through Lisbon Treaty amendments; see FCO, 2008:39) may in-turn filter throughout the constituent member states. This is a formal process, complemented by socialisation. For example, UK aid policy was the first to adopt whole-of-government professional-routines, from colonial legacy (Chapter 5). However, this holistic, joined-up thinking grew prevalent throughout EU member states (see Hauck and Rocca, 2014; Patrick and Brown, 2007; Rasmussen, 2013). As well as demonstrating crossloading, this also further evidences the acceptance of this thinking within the EU-level – colloquially ‘what goes up must come down’. Member states must observe EU-wide decisions once mutually agreed. Although, member states do hold power over such mutual decision-making, including through informal state groupings, and purportedly none were institutionalised when unacceptable to the UK (Interview LT17). Nonetheless, Lisbon’s amendments may be interpreted to have incrementally shifted agency towards the EU-level and ‘ever closer union’ (see Chapter 7).

This theorisation reveals ‘mechanisms’ (processes) of Europeanization through socialisation and social-learning/lesson-drawing to be significant, in addition to discrete agents’ experiential-learning, and the EU’s formal treaty-bound processes. Herein, socio-political factors of specific epistemic-communities, personality-politics and informal groupings are found important where concerning values and the pushing/defending of agendas. Cultural identity as a scope condition is argued to be especially significant here. For instance, Blair’s
new-humanitarian doctrine; the UK’s historical ‘collective memory of greatness’; the UK defence community’s ‘expectation of success’; the EU’s ‘peace-project’ credentials and ‘universalism’ in values; the EU’s epistemic-community of aid-purists, and the more pragmatically minded. In addition to Blair, Tocci, Ashton and Patten many senior officials, generals and their communities were cited by interviewees as being instrumental in progressing, shaping (and resisting) change.

The research originally adopted a broad-church ‘omnidirectional/cyclical’ interpretation of Europeanization. However, through honing conceptualisation within ‘building’ theory as the reflexive research-process progressed, the character of Europeanization within the research’s remit is revealed to comprise two separate, but related levels. In the foreground was the frame-contestation amidst interactive discursive-struggle (and mutually-constitutive practice) anchored to institutions. This discourse produced the salient, agenda-setting, framing of problems and solutions among EU-level and member state foreign aid institutions. Analysis of this could trace the genesis, promulgation, diffusion and adoption of ideas. However, it could not adequately explain the depth of adoption, adaptation of and/or resistance to ideas. Such queries are more fully explainable through the revelation that this foreground discourse operated upon community and context-specific background cultural episteme, which Foucault contended “defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge” within knowledge/power systems (1971:183). It was the fundamental (subconscious) presumptions of a given communities’ episteme that influenced what frame was permissible and which precluded.

Here, several epistemes were identified, which co-existed and interacted indirectly through foreground discourse. This conceptualisation of the Europeanization of soft-content explains why thinking such as the UK’s defence insurgency frame, discussed in Chapter 5, was precluded from EU discourse, its kinetic-counterinsurgency being anathema to the EU’s continental anti-war episteme. Whereas, the UK’s latter stabilisation framing, entailing MSS, discussed in Chapter 6, was acceptable to the EU’s episteme, especially when considering the EU’s broader movement towards pragmatism (Chapter 7). That the UK grew to greater emphasise ODA in-lieu of defence spending further indicated movement in the UK’s episteme, in de-emphasising martial-power within future solutions in favour of civilian agency (Chapter 6). As such, episteme is revealed necessary to explain substantive Europeanization to a greater degree than presumed upon the research’s commencement. As with ‘Miles’ law’– “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Miles, 1978:399), and
whether Afghanistan was framed foremost as a war, or as a development-cooperation
endeavour depended largely upon the episteme that a given actor operated upon at the time.

This discussion on Europeanization possesses some broader implications for further
scholarship. Perhaps foremost, if Europeanization is understood as fundamentally of
institutionalism, institutions themselves cannot be conceptualised as singular organisations
when a multitude of agencies likely hold influence over the institutional turf, as was found of
foreign aid, itself constituting a broad-church entailing expansive possibilities. Further, when
exploring Europeanization within soft-content domains, taking ideas seriously, the depth of
the institutionalisation of transformed content must be emphasised as much if not more-so
than the identified presence of Europeanization. The identified presence of an idea should
not be conflated with it affecting practice. Additionally, when exploring soft-content within
discourse, the foundations or broader context should be considered in order to add
explanatory value, as with episteme (Chapter 3). Finally, when researching the
Europeanization of aid, it may be suggested that with significant extant work on
development-cooperation, a more critical or holistic conceptualisation may also add value to
the field.

Reflections on strengths, limitations and recommendations
This research fills a knowledge-gap surrounding Europeanization of foreign aid concerning
the management of fragile, conflict-affected states. Its strengths are in reflexive exploration
and description of qualitative discursive data, revealing explanatory potential. No significant
academic hurdles presented themselves. During data-collation interviews successfully
snowballed towards further interviews, and additionally led to pertinent archive documents.
The lone anomaly here was not gaining access to a senior ECHO official with Afghanistan
experience, which would have been desirable. The analysis also progressed consistently.
However, the reflective and reflexive research-process in combination with the vast amount
of discursive data collated made for an arduous undertaking. A software-package such as
‘NVivo’ could be utilised if revisiting the research-process, to assist data management.

Presented findings and descriptions from this analysis are representative of the summative
research. However, through being limited to the remit of a doctoral thesis, words were not
available to detail everything exhaustively (while protected documents could not be directly
cited). Nonetheless, the research findings detailed are trustworthy, in that the research
authentically assessed what it claims to, conclusions drawn are warranted and may be acted
upon. As qualitative data is inherently subjective and demands interpretation, this was achieved through strict adherence to the thesis’ theoretical–methodological framework, as derived from reputable precedents. This ensured the research-process was credible in its analysis, with findings produced consistently, and with a similar subjective outlook the process could be repeated. However, in terms of repetition the subjective nature of the research must be accounted for.

Further, the research being qualitative and thick in description, is limited in transferability. While other EU member states were alluded to (including Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), further research here would be beneficial to greater understand them, especially concerning processes of their lesson-drawing and crossloading. Nonetheless, the thesis’ conceptualisation of IFA on how frame analysis, historical and discursive institutionalism and Europeanization may be synthesised, constitutes a focal theoretical contribution of the thesis, and may be applied to these other member states, or other policy domains. However, an additional limit in transferability is found concerning fragile, conflict-affected aid recipients. While Afghanistan was found of intrinsic value here, other contemporary states and territories could qualify (such as Libya, Somalia and Sudan). However, this limitation in transferability was located through empirical findings more-so than research-design. It is understood that no two fragile state situations are identical, while “[w]hat constitutes stability in one context may not be stable enough in another” (PCRU, 2007:15).

The thesis’ exploration of UK and EU-level foreign aid thinking, and associated practice, holds additional implications for practitioners. Foremost, explicitly concerning Europeanization and UK efforts to reform or otherwise change EU-level thinking, aid practitioners should be aware that UK influence was influential within Europe. Informal member state groupings, hosted seminars, and secondments were valuable conduits to change, provided that the UK agents were empathetic to broader EU values. However, the unknowable long-term ramifications of the UK invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty (‘Brexit’) constitutes the colloquial ‘elephant in the room’, and again demands further research. Nonetheless, in a globalised world, UK aid thinking may well endure as relevant to Europe.

Concerning the foreign aid subject matter, it is recommended that foreign states are no longer envisioned in terms of the Western, Westphalian ideal. Universalism of values is not only
demonstrably wrong, as seen in *Pashtunwali*, it risks Orientalism (Said, 2003). Thus, preconceptions concerning values should be avoided. On managing fragile, conflict-affected states explicitly, the combination of the UK Land Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency Centre’s “4Ps” (UKLSCC, 2011:3), DFID’s four objectives of the UK’s integrated approach (DFID, 2010:51-54), and the OECD’s ten fragile state principles (FSP’s) (OECD, 2011:45-47) provide an experience-led and broad-brush starting point from which to instigate foreign aid. However, no two fragile state situations are identical. The EU’s early framing of Afghanistan as like any other LDC (Chapter 7), was as erroneous as the UK’s early presumption that Afghanistan’s fragility could be alleviated by re-enacting historical solutions implemented in Malaya (Chapter 5).

The overriding principle in any foreign aid endeavour to a fragile, conflict-affected state must be that all such emergencies are distinct, and therefore fostering structural-stability and prosperity through the location of popular indigenous perceptions of fair and inclusive political-settlement must be understood in terms of local context. Pro-poor focus prioritising poverty-alleviation in terms of economic aid is insufficient when it is the underlying politics that are broken. Poverty-alleviation efforts must state-build to re-establish peaceful and productive politics amidst uneven-development as well as tackle poverty in terms of under-development. Thus, as with the prominent theme of the thesis, whole-of-government routines must be championed. Traditionally perceived distinctions between development-cooperation, diplomatic support and defence assistance hinder the location of workable solutions when they promote stove-piped behaviours that incite professional-contention.

**In coda**

In coda, the thesis traced UK and EU-level institutional aid framing pertaining to fragile, conflict-affected states, and Afghanistan specifically, within the ‘GWOT’ context. Research revealed that not all EU member states were equal, whereas UK aid thinking was highly influential in terms of Europeanization. Transformed thinking was identified in terms of incremental-change, institutional-layering and what amounted to a critical-juncture in the UK’s case. However, analysis supports the contention that UK leadership ambitions to transform EU-level soft-content (and indeed pan-EU content) to fit with contemporary UK designs far surpassed those transformations within UK content towards EU-level designs. The UK affected change amidst EU-level thinking, whilst socialising within the EU.
The keystone to explaining transformational soft-content is found in background cultural episteme. UK episteme moved towards that of a post-martial power, away from prioritising martial-routines within solutions concerning fragile, conflict-affected states. In contrast, EU continental episteme broadly grew to be more pragmatic as a post-martial, civilian-power, greater accepting of supportive martial-routines. It was the two converging that facilitated the mutually agreeable transformation of content. Through this convergence, the institutional aid discourse explored is found to have progressed towards popular recognition of the salience of politics, including within linkages between security and development, and poverty and conflict. Solutions broadly grew to favour interpretations of the UK’s integrated approach towards stabilisation, working towards structural-stability. This was within a ‘stability agenda’ which prioritised popular indigenous perceptions of fair and inclusive political-settlements, with local communities represented by good, local governance.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Research Notes on Afghanistan

1.1 Summary

In consideration of practitioner and academic definitions, Afghanistan constitutes the epitome of a fragile, conflict-affected state, and has done for much of its modern history, especially since the fall of the Musahiban dynasty in 1973 (Barfield, 2010; also see CEU, 2007; DFID, 2005b; Kieh, 2007; Mdikumana, 2007; OECD, 2011, 2012; Zartman, 1995). Since this time Afghanistan has suffered all four of Collier’s (2008) theorised ‘poverty traps’ to varying degrees, entailing: 1) organised violence spanning from coup d’états through large-scale internecine civil-war; 2) bad governance in Kabul, and in the rural provinces through incapacity and feudal, tribal politics (neopatrimonialism); 3) being landlocked, with what Collier would consider bad neighbours, preventing stable access to sea ports and land caravans for trade; and 4) natural resources, although not through the abundance of resources as Collier theorised, but through their absence, while lacking capability to benefit from natural resources where present (2008:17-78). Through such ‘traps’ Afghanistan is popularly understood to be one of the most highly ODA eligible states, and has been subject to political, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions (IDOPAS, 2012; WB, 2015). Afghanistan is ranked 171 in the UN’s Human Development Index, and has developed much slower than neighbouring Iran, despite Iran suffering significant economic sanctions in contrast to the vast aid flows into Afghanistan during the post-9/11 period (UN, 2014). As one US government report noted indicatively:

[D]evelopment in Afghanistan is an exceedingly difficult and complex issue. It occurs in a country with no substantial natural resources, a population devastated by decades of war, and an ongoing insurgency (SIGAR, 2008:2).

1.2 Physical Geography

Afghanistan is a vast, landlocked country, considerably larger than metropolitan France for a point of reference (652,230 square kilometres compared to 551,500), and exhibits highly varied terrain (CIA. 2019). The Hindu Kush Mountains dominate Afghanistan, running northeast to south-southwest, with two arid plains, the northern Turkestan plains and the southwest plains, including the Dasht-e Margo (‘desert of death’) in Helmand province.
Kabul is situated in a basin surrounded by mountains, with most of the country comprising rugged, dissecting ranges. However, rich vegetation is found around the four major river systems (see MSB, 2008:1.2-1.4; Shah, 1982:9-18). As a vast country of diverse physical geography, the researcher’s (2008-2009) experience in southern Afghanistan (predominantly in Helmand province, around the ‘desert of death’) and observations derived therefrom, are likely highly distinct in comparison to the discrete physical environment of the Hindu Kush, amongst the mountains.

Transportation around Afghanistan is highly restrictive through inadequate infrastructure: the railways of British-India did not extend into Afghanistan, and airports are largely negligible, while the major road network comprises only the legacy Soviet-era ring road system (see CIA, 2019; MSB, 2008:2.1-2.4). The only other lines of communication comprise largely neglected canals and the river systems, although the river wadis provide traversable routes during the dry season. This context of restrictive lines of communication means that rural communities are often relatively isolated. Furthermore, during periods of instability it facilitates nefarious activity such as illegal vehicle checkpoints and ambushes.

Within its region of South Asia, Afghanistan is landlocked, sandwiched between China in the east, India/Pakistan in the south and east, Persia/Iran in the west, and the Russiansphere to the north (modern day Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) (LWDG, 2009:2). Historically, these borders have been somewhat changeable, especially with regard to British-India and Persia. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s four major river systems, with their origins in the mountains, are the source of regional tensions over vital water resources. For example, the Iranian Sistani region depends upon water from the Helmandi River, and so development aid projects such as the Kajaki Dam (for power-generation) which reduce the flow of water aggrieve Iran (Martin, 2014:211-212).

1.3 Human Geography

Afghanistan’s population as of 2018 was estimated at 34,940,837, with over 60 percent of this under the age of 25; as of 2015 it was estimated that approximately half of all males over 15 were literate, and a quarter of females (CIA, 2019). With few major population centres, human geography is predominantly rural, comprising small/medium communities and nomadic peoples at 38 people per-square kilometre, compared with 248 in the UK (MSB, 2008:4.1). Most Afghans are Muslim, and most of Sunni denominations, although the Hazaras (descended from the soldiers of Genghis Khan’s invading army, and the third largest
ethnic group) are Shi‘ite. There remain minority religions in the form of Sikhs, Hindus and Jews, among others (although many have fled). In total there are ten major ethnic groups, with the Pashtun’s (mostly in the south) constituting the largest, and the Tajik’s constituting the second largest (mostly in the north). There are estimated to be approximately 60-70 tribal groupings, with these comprising multitudes of confederations, with as many as 32 spoken languages (CIA, 2019; MSB, 2008:4.2-4.7). As a result, Afghanistan’s human geography is highly factional. National identities are complex and defined by differences more-so than commonalities, with considerable social and violent conflict through family blood-feuds and tribal strife (see Barfield, 2010; LWDG, 2009:40; Martin, 2014; Roy, 1990).

With Afghans holding low life-expectancy, low rates of literacy and poor lines of communication, much of Afghanistan’s culture and tradition is localised, and found in oral histories, songs, sayings, legends and religion (see Shah, 1982). It is popularly observed that holistically Afghans are a very proud people, aware of their history, and relations with foreign powers (for example, LWDG, 2009:40). It is further observed that Afghan society is afflicted by what Dirkx describes as “an almost dialectical process [where] modernist and traditionalist forces have competed for power and invoked increasingly violent reactions to each other’s attempts to rule” (2017:45). This traditional—modernist contention is well recognised. On this theme, Shah observed how:

[T]he evolution of Afghanistan, it has been decreed, and wisely, must take place strictly on native lines. The lessons of Western civilisation will be carefully acquired and absorbed, still they will be turned into the channels of Afghan thought and necessity (1982:237).

Fitting with Fanon’s (1961) more general observations on urban—rural divides within the global South, Roy identified broader, interrelated socio-political contentions spanning state—society, urban—rural, and modernist—conservative dialectics (Roy, 1990:10-13). Of additional note here, while significant tribal strife may be considered an historical Afghan norm, including through padshahgardi (persistent political infighting within ruling circles, with trust not reaching beyond ones qawm (sub-tribe), Afghan factions are quick to unite in resisting against an outside invader (Farrell, 2017; LWDG, 2009; Martin, 2014; Roy, 1990). This tradition relates to the practice of Pastunwali (the Pashtun’s honour code) demanding Sahat (devoted loyalty to one’s tribe) and Gharat (loyalty and willingness to defend the
homeland) and associated values of *ijtihad* (personal-interpretation) over *taqlid* (imitation) concerning foreign practices (MSB, 2008:5.1-5.2; Roy, 1990:79-81).

Through the dynamics of Afghan society, and in part Afghanistan’s physical geography, Afghanistan holds the colloquial reputation as the ‘graveyard of empires’ (Barfield, 2010:2). To this end, the British Empire and Soviet Union are often cited (see LWDG, 2009). Although, it could be argued that interventionism into Afghanistan, and pushing foreign modes of modernity, offers a historiography of failure dating back to ‘Alexander the Great’. As Sir Lawrence purportedly declared when Viceroy of British-India, “the Afghan… will not tolerate foreign rule” (1867, in Loyn, 2009:68). Ignatieff more colloquially noted, “Nothing makes an Afghan reach for his rifle faster than the presence of an occupying foreign power” (2003:88). These are powerful statements, but also reductionist ones, there evidently being no single ‘Afghan’ identity, while ‘foreign’ is a subjective term. The peoples of Afghanistan’s rural provinces appear to find grievance in interference in their affairs from governance in Kabul almost as much as more distant places. Afghanistan’s reputation for being the ‘graveyard of empires’ may well be through Afghanistan’s endemic fragility and conflict.

1.4 Historical Context

Afghanistan’s modern history entails two periods of relative stability, 1880-1919 and 1933-1973 (see Barfield, 2010; LWDG, 2009; Martin, 2014). The first period commenced under the rule of Rahman Khan (the ‘Iron Amir’) from 1880 until his death in 1901, who purportedly framed Afghanistan as “a grain of wheat between two strong millstones” in reference to the ‘Great Game’ between British-India and Russia (in Harnden, 2011:32). While Afghanistan was never fully colonised by British-India, Rahman was notable for surrendering all Afghan territorial claims to British-India upon the conclusion of the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), and his acceptance of subsidies as a proxy under British foreign policy (Harnden, 2011; LWDG, 2009:13; Wyatt, 2011). However, of further note, every 20th Century ruler of Afghanistan after Rahman was either assassinated in office or pressured into exile (Barfield, 2010:12; Dirkx, 2017:3) – indicative of *padshahgardi* and the inherent tenuous character of central governance in Kabul. Rahman’s successor, Habibullah attempted to extricate Afghanistan from British influence, but was assassinated in 1914. After a power struggle, his successor, Amanullah sought to regain the territories Rahman had relinquished, instigating the third Anglo-Afghan war (1919), on the conclusion of which
Afghanistan gained complete independence. However, under Amanullah’s subsequent modernisation agenda, Afghanistan eventually succumbed to civil-war, with Amanullah exiled in 1929 (LWDG, 2009:17). After which, Afghanistan was briefly governed by a Tajik, interrupting approximately two centuries of Pashtun rule. However, power rapidly reverted to the Pashtun, Nadir Khan (Amanullah’s cousin), who was himself assassinated in 1933 (Dirkx, 2017:4; LWDG, 2009; Martin, 2014).

It was under Zahir Shah’s rule (Nadir’s son) throughout 1933-1973 that Afghanistan enjoyed relative stability. Despite this, governance from Kabul remained weak, with a minimal taxation base, and limited sovereignty. With complete independence from British-India upon the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi, British-Indian subsidies had ceased, and foreign aid became a mandatory resource (LWDG, 2009:25; Martin, 2014:26-27). Various states subsequently aided Afghanistan, including Germany, the US, and (post-1947) Pakistan and India, but predominantly Soviet-Russia (post-1921 Treaty of Friendship) (see Braithwaite, 2012; Goodson, 2007; Greaves, 1993; LWDG, 2009; Martin, 2014). Conversely, Britain’s 1947 withdrawal from India marked a juncture, removing British imperial security imperatives from the region. After this time Afghanistan was non-aligned within the Cold War context, with Zahir free to court aid from the East and West, notably receiving canal infrastructure from the US, and subsidised oil, roads, dams, and the Salang highway tunnel through the Hindu Kush from the Soviets (Braithwaite, 2012:205-206; Griffiths, 2011:132-133; Martin, 2014:27-36). However, while accepting foreign aid, Zahir was also modernising Afghanistan, including movement towards a constitutional monarchy and elections, building on student union flirtations with democracy from the 1950s (Griffiths, 2011:150-151).

Ultimately in 1973, he was dethroned and exiled by his erstwhile prime minister, Daud, ending the relative stability of the Musahiban dynasty (1929-1973) (LWDG, 2009:17-27; Martin, 2014:27).

Notably, not only are the traditional Afghan contentions concerning modernisation and outside influence clearly evident here, they were magnified by foreign interference. The Soviets were subversively aiding the Afghan communists even before the formation of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), while Pakistan was supporting tribal confederations in opposition to Daud’s government from his taking office, largely driven by contentions over the Durand/Pashtunistan frontier, a legacy contention from British-India (Griffiths, 2011:52-66; LWDG, 2009:26-27; Roy, 1990:247). Afghanistan entered into the Sovietsphere when Daud succumbed to a coup d’état led by Taraki’s PDPA government in
1978. Unsurprisingly, the ensuing ruthless atheist modernisation affronted Afghan feudal conservatism, and provoked the infamous 1979 Herat revolt. Taraki sought direct military assistance from Moscow as a client state, but received only increased military and economic aid, without direct assistance. The Herat uprising was suppressed, yet Taraki was promptly assassinated by his erstwhile prime minister, Amin, which finally triggered the Soviet intervention (see Braithwaite, 2012:5-8).

It may be contended here with some irony that it was largely modernisation and foreign interference, combined with padshahgardi, which gave rise to Afghanistan’s instability, which itself prompted the Soviet intervention, and so greater interference and modernisation. The Soviet’s intervened as they interpreted it to be necessary in order to solidify their Afghan PDPA client, amidst instability. In doing so the Soviets were pushing a progressive development model which had stabilised other Islamic Asian states within the Sovietsphere (Braithwaite, 2012). However, this model itself was a foreign modernisation initiative which further affronted Afghan conservatism, and competed with Pakistan-led Islamism as a modernising force, so spurring mass-resistance and further instability (see Braithwaite, 2012; Roy, 1990). It was the contemporaneous Western framing of this, within the Cold War context, that prompted the abetting of this resistance by the US and their allies, including the UK. This entailed clandestine military aid and advisors to Pakistan (within the Western sphere of influence) and various tribal mujahedeen factions to counter-Soviet interventionism, while Saudi Arabia also sent finance and their radicals to die (Crile, 2002; Martin, 2014; Roy, 1990).

As Braithwaite (2012) delineated, the Soviets could not pacify Afghan society’s backlash against interference. It is difficult to be clear from the literature how much of this was due to the greater Cold War context. However, post-1988 with the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, which ended the greater ideological struggle, the conflict between the rural mujahedeen and the Afghan state continued unabated (Roy, 1990:207). Roy’s argument upon identifying this was that Afghan resistance was not foremost ideological, but rather through disdain for foreign modernity, and even Kabul’s bureaucracy, when interfering in provincial affairs (1990:10-14). Whereas Western-sourced counter-Soviet aid waned upon the Soviet’s withdrawal (other than from Pakistan), Soviet aid to the Afghan PDPA government of Najibullah endured through 1991. This largely succeeded in containing the mujahedeen. However, Najibullah became marginalised after dismantling the PDPA (1989-1991) and pursuing power-sharing through the National Reconciliation Government. This
collapsed when rotational power-sharing floundered upon Hikmetyar’s mujahedeen refusing to relinquish power, resulting in renewed civil-war (1992-1996).

After assisting the factional mujahedeen, Pakistan subsequently abetted Mullah Omar’s Taliban to rise in ascendency over the majority of Afghanistan as a client-state of sorts (Goodson, 2007). Shortly thereafter, post-Soviet Russia came to recommence aid, but to the mujahedeen of the largely Shi-ite United Islamic Front (UIF), so preventing all of Afghanistan from falling to the Taliban’s brand of conservative, fundamentalist Islamism. Nonetheless, the Taliban regime grew dominant, albeit widely condemned as illegitimate by the international community, with only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognising them (UNSCR1267, 1999). As such, Afghanistan remained amidst a stagnated internecine ‘new war’ context, as conceptualised by Duffield (2014) and Kaldor (2005, 2010), exhibiting endemic political-conflict. Although, it is highly contestable whether this was ‘new war’, or whether it was a continuation of Afghanistan’s historical socio-political contentions.

1.5 The Modern Complex Political Emergency

It was Mullah Omar’s providing sanctuary to Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda (as demanded by Pashtunwali) which wrought the Taliban’s downfall over the 9/11 (2001) terrorist attacks. Post-9/11 and the US-led destruction of the Taliban regime, the Afghan state was reconstituted under the auspices of the UN through the interim political processes of the Bonn Agreement of November the same year. After which, the US-led coalition contributing to the reconstruction of Afghanistan grew to 43 states, with all EU member states deploying troops to the ISAF peacekeeping mission (excluding Cyprus and Malta) (LWDG, 2009:40; NATO, 2009). Notably, Connaughton critiqued the Bonn Agreement (UN, 2001), and early ‘peacekeeping’ in Afghanistan, arguing that by excluding the Taliban from the negotiations, the ISAF mission lacked “the consent of representative parties involved” (2002:78). Indeed, literature popularly attributes Afghanistan’s post-9/11 fragility to a resurgent or ‘Neo’-Taliban, amid fractious regional politics (for example, Giustozzi 2007; Goodson 2007; Pounds, 2008). However, of significant interest, Kilcullen (2009) forwards a thesis far more in fitting with prior observations on Afghan socio-politics and culture (see Roy, 1990; Shah, 1982).

Rather than accredit Afghanistan’s escalated violent extremism and insurgency to the Taliban as a homogenous political actor, Kilcullen (2009) forwards that so-termed ‘accidental guerrillas’ constituted the violent resistance. Kilcullen theorised that Al Qaeda purposefully
ingratiate themselves within Afghan Pashtun society, building alliances while exporting their own ideology and brand of international terrorism, and subsequently exploited the popular backlash against the resultant Western intervention (2009:32-37). The West’s pursuit of democratisation within reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts further incited such a backlash, as is explicit to the Afghan case, but also more generally theorised (see Dahl, 1971). Relating to this theorisation, Hoffman (2011) observed ‘dangerous aid’ in Afghanistan, concerning the problematic nature of the afflicted peoples within fragile, conflict-affected states unintentionally choosing sides (and making enemies) through the acceptance of welfare or other aid from one faction over another. As such, by accepting aid, Afghan peoples risked becoming enemies of the ‘accidental guerrillas’.

In sum, Afghanistan may be deemed the epitome of a fragile, conflict-affected state, not only in the post-9/11 context, but throughout much of its modern history. Its geographical characteristics have at times exacerbated socio-political tensions, fuelled also by the complexities of outside ‘foreign’ interference and Afghanistan’s cultural and social norms. While Zartman argues, “Probably the ultimate danger sign is when the centre loses control over its own state agents, who begin to operate on their own account” (1995:10), this may be read as the traditional status quo in Afghanistan. In combination with having facilitated the 9/11 international terrorist attacks, this ensures that Afghanistan is the fragile state of intrinsic value within the post-9/11 epoch.
Appendix 2: Interview List

A focal source of primary discursive data, underpinning the thesis’ analysis, was collected from a series of semi-structured elite interviews conducted predominantly in 2016. These were conducted with various pertinent UK and EU agencies, NGOs and think-tanks. All interviews conducted by the author, and face-to-face, with the exception of telephone interviews (denoted by a ‘T’). The interviewees are listed beneath, including a brief description of their seniority, experience(s) and affiliations. For ethical considerations, they are all coded in order to protect anonymity. The majority are cited within the body of the thesis where apt. However, all interview data was transcribed and analysed through the process as delineated in Chapters 3-4, to the ends of locating the thesis’ conclusions.

P1. (2015) Member of Parliament; Minister of State (Department for International Development) and Defence Committee experience, 19/03/15

L2. (2015) House of Lords Peer; Former Senior Advisor (Policy and Communications) and former political party Chief of Staff, 02/12/15

P3. (2015) Former Army Commando Engineer Officer with Afghanistan service and Provisional Reconstruction Team experience, 09/12/15

L4. (2016) Royal United Services Institute Research Fellow; Former Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Senior Researcher and former EU External Action Service Political Advisor (Office of the Special Representative of the EU for Afghanistan), 21/01/16

L5. (2016) Member of Parliament; Former Minister of State (Department for International Development); Former Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and former Cabinet Office experience (Minister without Portfolio), 22/01/16

LT6. (2016) Former No. 10 Special Advisor for International Development, (Telephone Interview), 14/03/16

L7. (2016) House of Lords Peer; Former head of political party; Former EU Special Representative and International High Representative; Former Royal Marine Officer, 15/03/16
L8. (2016) Senior Stabilisation Unit Official at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office King Charles Street Office; Former Foreign and Commonwealth Office Official with Central Asia (Afghanistan and Insurgency) expertise, 16/03/16

L9. (2016) Formerly Her Majesty’s Ambassador (in Afghanistan); A former extensive diplomatic career, 18/03/16

L10. (2016) Member of Parliament; Former (Shadow and subsequently Government) Secretary of State (Department for International Development), 22/03/16

LT11. (2016) Humanitarian Director, Medicine Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), with significant NGO experience (Telephone Interview), 04/04/16

P12 (2016) UK Army Officer and previous junior rank with significant operational Afghanistan experience, 05/04/2016

E13. (2016) UK Royal Marine General Rank Officer with experience of various staff-officer roles and Afghanistan experience, including Commanding Officer of 3 Commando Brigade on Operation Herrick, 06/04/16

ST14. (2016) Former Director of the HALO Trust (humanitarian anti-mine charity) with extensive Afghanistan and NGO experience, (Telephone Interview), 06/04/16

P15. (2016) UK Royal Marine Senior Non-Commissioned Officer; with roles including the Brigade’s senior Regimental Sergeant Major, and with significant Afghanistan experience (including operations Jacana and Herrick), 14/04/16

L16. (2016) Baroness; Former head of the UK’s Overseas Development Administration (FCO-ODA), predecessor to DFID, 06/05/16

LT17. (2016) Head of Department; Department for International Development, (Telephone Interview), 10/05/16

L18. (2016) Senior Government Policy Official with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with considerable Afghanistan and Iraq experience, 12/05/16

L19. (2016) Senior Government Policy Official with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with considerable Afghanistan, Iraq and Stabilisation Unit experience, 12/05/16
L20. (2016) Senior Diplomat with UN and EU experience, Former EU Special Representative, and Former UN Representative to Afghanistan, 12/05/16

L21. (2016) Director of the UK’s Conflict and Stabilisation Unit, 13/05/16

IT22. (2016) EU Official and Project Manager with the Commission’s Cooperation and Development Office (DEVCO); with long-term experience of Kabul, Afghanistan and Pakistan, (Telephone Interview), 27/05/16

AT23. (2016) EU Police (EUPOL) lead, reporting to the EC and EEAS, based in Kabul, (Telephone Interview), 11/06/16

B24. (2016) Former EU Commission Development and Cooperation Official, posted to Kabul Afghanistan, mostly responsible for human rights portfolios, in addition to former relevant NGO experience, 14/06/16

B25. (2016) Senior Diplomat with the EEAS, with considerable Asia experience (including Head of Division), 15/06/16

B26. (2016) Senior DEVCO Official with considerable Afghanistan experience, including as Head of Operations in Kabul and senior policy and donor conferences in Brussels, 16/06/16

B27. (2016) DEVCO and EEAS Official with considerable Afghanistan experience, including time spent in Kabul and on policy in Brussels, 17/06/16

B28. (2016) Senior DEVCO and EEAS Official with considerable Afghanistan experience, including as acting Head of Operations in Kabul and on policy in Brussels, 18/06/16

B29. (2016) Senior DEVCO and EEAS Official with considerable Afghanistan experience, including as Head of Operations in Kabul and on policy in Brussels, with additional prior fragile states expertise, 19/06/16

B30. (2016) Former Senior Policy Advisor in the Office of the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan, Founder of the Afghan Analyst Network, with significant experience in and on Afghanistan and other fragile states, 21/06/16

B31. (2016) Senior academic and think tank expert at the Egmont Institute; Director of the Europe in the World Programme, with a focus on foreign, security and defence issues, 22/06/2016
B32. (2016) Policy expert at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, including expertise on EU cooperation among other areas, 29/06/2016

BT33. (2016) Senior EU Police (EUPOL) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (EEAS) Official with significant Afghanistan experience, (Telephone Interview), 15/07/2016

LT34. (2016) Senior NGO and subsequently EU political advisor in Afghanistan, (Telephone Interview), 15/09/2016

P35. (2017) Former British Army Officer, education branch, with significant previous Afghanistan experience while an infantry soldier 25/08/2017

B = Brussels
E = Exeter
I = Italy
L = London
P = Plymouth
S = Scotland
T = Telephone
Appendix 3: Interviewee Materials

The beneath two documents were disseminated to the interviewees prior to the interview itself, in order to ensure they were fully informed of the interview topic and their rights of anonymity and withdrawal. However, as semi-structured interviews, the questions are only indicative.

3.1 Interviewee Information Sheet:

The Europeanization of Aid Policy: Managing Post-9/11 Security and Development

Conducted by James Flint, Doctoral Researcher and Associate Lecturer, Plymouth University
James.flint@plymouth.ac.uk

Researcher Intent:
To mount an exploration of the EU’s international aid policy, its ‘Europeanization’ and member state cooperation post-9/11. To this end the research project is concerned with how discourse/communicative ideas surrounding international aid policy are instituted, adapted, and adopted (or otherwise resisted). Focus is on the processes, mechanisms and norms of aid policy amongst UK agencies (foremost Parliament, the FCO, DFID and MOD) and the EU supranational-level of organisation, within the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ political narrative and historical context. As a result, specific interest is levied towards discourse(s)/ideas pertaining to the interrelationships between security and development, with the contemporary Afghanistan intervention serving as a seminal example and starting point.

Why am I being asked to participate?
Semi-structured ‘elite’ interviews form an essential part of the research’s methodological approach. As a professional or prominent stakeholder in international aid, broader foreign policy, or the intervention in Afghanistan, your perspective and contribution is highly valued.

What is asked of me?
Preferably a face-to-face interview (or via telephone/skype), lasting approximately 20-30 minutes. The interview is loosely signposted by the attached aid memoir, but what information you contribute is entirely up to you. Interviews may be recorded, and direct-quotes may in instances be extracted, but only at your discretion. If significant use is made of your interview with regard to a specific issue, you will be consulted with a ‘right of response’.

What risks are present?
The research is conducted in adherence with Plymouth University ethics policies and associated norms of social science best practice. As far as is humanly possible, the study is free from any bias. As a doctoral research thesis, there is no agenda or commercial interest present. Whereas, any insights provided by you will benefit the resultant finding’s validity.
**Rights of the Interviewee:**
To be informed of the purpose of the research and its rationale
To provide information and opinion as the interviewee deems appropriate
To have data wilfully provided secured appropriately and confidentiality safeguarded
To anonymity as requested (there should be no discernible impact on the interviewee)
To withdraw from the study at any time (prior to publication in 2017)
To have any personal data/recordings held destroyed (the research aims to be unobtrusive)
To have access to any resultant open-access documents/publications in due course
To contact the researcher if there are any questions or concerns

**3.2 Interview Aid-Memoire:**
**The Europeanization of Aid Policy: Managing Post-9/11 Security and Development**

*From the perspective of the interviewee, or their role/office/organisation:*

**On Afghanistan:** The historiography of the Afghanistan intervention and counterinsurgency
(The UK/EU’s cooperation and aid relationship with Afghanistan post-9/11, with regard to ‘helping the Afghan people’, during the ‘Global War on Terrorism’)

1) How have we assisted Afghanistan, and how did this aid assistance progress/evolve?

**On Europeanization:** The process or mechanism of transforming content throughout the EU
(The Europeanization of international aid policy, associated discourses and communicative ideas- specifically with regard to cooperation between the UK member state and EU supranational-level of organisation)

2) Have EU-level laws/norms affected member state policy programming and preferences?
3) Have member state (UK) preferences affected EU-level law and norms?
4) What formal/informal mechanisms existed between UK and EU-level organisation?
5) Was there cross-loading of preferences/policy content between state-level or EU agencies?
6) Is aid assistance foremost a member state (bottom-up) or EU-level (top-down) policy area?

**On Security—Development:** As a policy nexus, or sub-field consideration of aid policy
(Within the geo-political historical context of the post-9/11 ‘Global War on Terrorism’ narrative and Afghanistan- where aid may entail any means of assistance or cooperation)

7) How do/did security and development (their ideas or provision) relate to one another?
8) How have your policy preferences, programming or conduct progressed on this issue?

9) Does aid (developmental?) feature within security, such as counterinsurgency strategy?

10) During the ‘Global War on Terror’ did aid become politicised? Securitised? Militarised? Alternatively, did ideas relating to security/defence become influenced by developmental aid?

11) What security/development lessons-learned may we take from the post-9/11 Afghanistan intervention? What changes may we see as a result?

Other:

12) Is there any other issue which you feel is pertinent with regard to international aid ideas (be it defence, developmental or diplomatic) - especially concerning Europeanization and cooperation (or lack thereof) within the policy area between the UK and the EU?
Appendix 4: Ethical Approval

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W www.plymouth.ac.uk

James Flint
PGR Student
Faculty of Business
Ref: FoB/UPC/FREC/FREC1516.13/clc

Date: 17 December, 2015

Dear James

Ethical Approval Application No: FREC1516.13
Title: The Europeanisation of Aid Policy: Managing Post-9/11 Security and Development

The members of the Faculty Research Ethics Committee were in agreement that this was an extremely well written and comprehensive application which was very thoughtfully considered. The background information carefully informed the research aims, and the concise statement of research questions and objectives. The approach to the data collection, potential respondents and how they would be recruited, and the sample size, were critically discussed with clear justifications provided for the choices made. All potential ethical issues were also clearly identified and critically discussed to the extent to which they would be managed.

Our only comment is that since you intend to interview elite interviewees it might have been prudent to have given a couple of examples of who these might be and any contacts made already in this respect.

In spite of this, we have no hesitation in approving your application.

Approval is for the duration of the project. However, please resubmit your application to the committee if the information provided in the form alters or is likely to alter significantly. We would like to wish you good luck with your research project.

Yours sincerely

Dr James Benhin

Chair
Faculty Research Ethics Committee,
Faculty of Business
Appendix 5: Frame Tables

The beneath tables are representative of the focal discursive frames cited within the thesis. They were identified throughout the reflective and reflexive analysis of the collated discursive data. To ensure a consistent and systematic approach, Entman’s (1993) four framing functions are utilised as a model, with core frame devices also noted. They are the author’s interpretation of the given institution/agency’s interpretation(s) of the given situation/shock.

### 5.1 UK aid’s Historical/Summative Pro-Poor Frame (approximately from 1970 onwards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Definition of the problem</strong></td>
<td>Poverty; under-development in the global South; Instability; impeded international trade; barriers to prosperity within the interdependent global community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</strong></td>
<td>British imperial legacy and rapid decolonisation; bad/inexperienced indigenous governance; weak institutions; corruption; criminality; conflictual post-colonial politics; perception of aid policy nexuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</strong></td>
<td>Postcolonial moral-responsibility; constitutional importance of the Commonwealth; liberal desire to promote stability for free trade and prosperity; belief in interdependent community; cultural collective memory of greatness and nostalgia for power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Promulgated solution</strong></td>
<td>Multifaceted ‘whole-of-government’ bilateral aid; building rapport with indigenous communities; state and institutional strengthening; discrete (direct) military assistance; multilateral pursuit of OECD International Development Targets (IDTs), EU European Development Fund (EDF); UN Millennium/Sustainable Development Goals (M/SDGs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frame devices (constituting the frame): ‘Extreme poverty’; language of ‘responsibility’, ‘interdependent global community’; desires to ‘protect’; to ‘tackle issues’; references to imperial legacy and especially British-India

(Author’s conceptualisation from: Blair, 2010; DFID, 1997; Duchêne, 1972; MOD, 1970; MOOD, 1976; Morrisey, 2005; Interviews L7, L16)

### 5.2 The Bush White House’s Just War Frame (2001-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Definition of the problem</strong></td>
<td>The 9/11 attack on the US/West; international terrorism; act of literal war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2 Interpreted cause of the problem

Hostile foreign and irregular enemy; international terrorists; rogue states; explicitly Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, Mullah Omar, the Taliban, but also others

### 3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)

US/West as good; enemy as evil; quasi-religious necessity for good to defeat evil; forceful retaliation/revenge as necessary; legitimised just war; a with us or against us attitude

### 4 Promulgated solution

Military-centric and Hobbesian; rally the country; build a coalition of allies; wage literal global war on terrorism (GWOT); invade Afghanistan and destroy Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts; assist the enemy’s enemy (the United Islamic Front); wage war on other rogue states and terrorists; save peoples under tyrannical regimes; bolster deterrence

### Frame devices (constituting the frame)

‘Crusade’ and ‘war on terrorism’ speech-act; ‘deliberate and deadly’; ‘steadfast resolve’; ‘monumental struggle of good versus evil’; ‘axis of evil’; ‘global insurgency’ language of grievance, justice and freedom


### 5.3 The Blair Government’s Executive-Level Special-Relationship Frame (2001-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>Act of international terrorism; War; US ally attacked; British citizens killed; threat to UK, EU and broader Western society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>International terrorism; a failure of deterrence; fragile/collapsed states; illegitimate and despotic regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>Utmost necessity to rally behind US ally; maintain credibility of the defence-alliance (NATO); US ally as legitimately aggrieved; terrorists as evil, but Afghan peoples as innocents and requiring humanitarian relief; an entrusted confidence in UK martial-power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Diplomatically and tangibly aid the US; lend legitimacy to US-led retaliation(s); support US in literal war in destroying the Taliban/Al Qaeda; subsequently alleviate the cause of Afghanistan’s fragility; later legitimise and support Bush to invade Iraq (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame devices (constituting the frame)</td>
<td>‘With you, whatever’ (coordinative) relationship with Bush; references to NATO, defence obligations, ‘common values’, ‘national interest’; language of innocent peoples under despotic regimes; desire ‘not to desert’ Afghan peoples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 The Third-Sector Humanitarian Counter-Frame (prominently 2001-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>Risk of escalating violence towards the levels seen in the 1992-1996 Afghan civil war; inciting a backlash; spiralling instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>Overly zealous Western intervention; factional nature of Afghan socio-politics; character of Afghan culture; evolving conflict situation; humanitarian crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>Pure traditional humanitarian values; anti-military intervention; anti-politicisation of aid; anti-imposition of Western values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief; disaster aid; reconstruction of infrastructure; sustained political will, but third-sector resourcing and implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame devices (constituting the frame)</td>
<td>‘Conflict situation’ observations; ‘stuck in a manacle’ fear; language of humanitarianism; highlighting plight and the afflicted; use of Afghan civil war analogy; citing the intervening elite’s lack of knowledge of local Afghan dynamics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Author’s conceptualisation from: Willoughby, 2001, 2006; Interviews E13, LT11, L4, L16, ST14)

5.5 The Dominant UK Defence Insurgency Frame (prominently 2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>Organised, homogenous violence through Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan; perception of shadow-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>Taliban-led shadow-government and competition for the Afghan peoples against the post-Bonn Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA); abetting of international terrorism (Al Qaeda) and illicit narcotics economy; collapsed, war-torn physical infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>Taliban/Al Qaeda as ‘evil enemy’, GIROA as legitimate government; dependency, cultural confidence and expectation of success in ‘small wars’; a competitive spirit vis-à-vis the US military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Defence-led, ‘comprehensive’ approach to counterinsurgency; civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), but military primacy; kinetic-warfighting sweeps including Operation Panther’s Claw; aid in the Afghan Development Zone (ADZ); government-in-a-box; Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT); largely taken from the ‘Briggs Plan’ of the ‘Malayan Emergency’ (1948-1960) and legacy doctrine; Physical infrastructure focussed post-conflict reconstruction (PCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame devices (constituting the frame)</td>
<td>Language of insurgency/counterinsurgency; Afghan war; ‘Helmandshire’ colloquialism; military jargon of ‘kinetic’, ‘high-intensity’, ‘enemy’, ‘warfighting'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sweeps’; Taliban/Al Qaeda; references to ‘shadow government’; catchphrases including ‘hearts and minds’, ‘ink-blot’, ‘consent-winning activity’, ‘clear-hold-build’; the Malaya analogy; civilian agencies discussed as ‘blisters on the side’

(Author’s conceptualisation from: DLW, 2015; MSB, 2008; Interviews E13, L9, P3, P12, P15, P35)

### 5.6 The Coalition’s Executive-Level Reluctant War Frame (prominently 2010-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Definition of the problem</strong></td>
<td>Inherited internationalised war in a fragile, conflict-affected state (FCAS) (Afghanistan); a legacy quagmire; unabated terrorism threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</strong></td>
<td>Prior executive leadership; mission-creep; magnitude of violent opposition; legacy of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks; risk of fragile states (FCAS) spill-over; poverty-conflict cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</strong></td>
<td>War as undesirable; reduction into a no win situation; desire to extricate; lost faith in defence capabilities; need to save face (and not to be seen to abandon Afghans); yet imperative to secure the UK/EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Promulgated solution</strong></td>
<td>Prioritisation and empowerment of civilian aid agencies; de-layer prior defence routines; build-up Afghan capacity; hand-over to Afghan agencies (‘Afghanization’); enduring commitment, but declared withdrawal date for troop contributions (2014); emphasis of politics, but need to secure Afghanistan to secure the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frame devices (constituting the frame)</strong></td>
<td>Language of ‘war’; praising UK soldier’s efforts; ongoing ‘high-intensity counterinsurgency’; language of ‘national security’; implicit notion of fragile states as ‘safe havens for terrorists’; latterly countering violent extremism (CVE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 5.7 The SU-led Stabilisation Frame (prominently 2009/10 onwards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Definition of the problem</strong></td>
<td>Extant defence-led counterinsurgency amplifying Afghanistan’s fragility and complex political emergency (CPE); escalating endemic violent conflict; floundering post-conflict reconstruction (PCR); diminished returns of counterinsurgency approach; heightened instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</strong></td>
<td>Multi-faceted; broken underlying Afghan politics; uneven-development; poorly integrated and incoherent Defence-dominated ‘comprehensive’ approach(es); professional-contention; contrasting cultures/structures; misguided ‘kinetic’ campaigning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</th>
<th>All violent conflict as antithetical to productive politics; belief in necessity of popular indigenous perceptions of fair political-settlement; inclusive politics; incapacity for the defence establishment to lead in this</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Civilian-led, coherent, ‘integrated’ whole-of-government aid activity and approach to stabilisation; integrating agencies under civilian oversight; military support to stabilisation (MSS); pursue OECD fragile state principles (FSPs); locate political-settlement(s); demonstrate a peace dividend; link local peoples with representative local governance; fix broken politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame devices (constituting the frame)</td>
<td>‘Hot stabilisation’ concept abridging counterinsurgency and stabilisation thinking; ‘MSS’; Cited lessons from prior experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans; courageous restraint principle; language arguing the salience of politics, political-settlement, peace-dividend, local-representation; emphasising values, context, ‘structural-stability’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| 5.8 The UK’s Executive-level Stability Agenda Frame (2011/12 onwards) |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Frame Functions                                 | Issue/Situation                                                                 |
| 1 Definition of the problem                     | Post-‘Arab Spring’ international instability; prevalent poverty and grievances; unrest; exported violent extremism |
| 2 Interpreted cause of the problem              | Context specific fragile, conflict-affected state’s (FCASs); multifaceted complex political emergencies (CPEs); poverty-conflict cycle; under/uneven-development; grievances; breakdown of productive politics; spill-over of crises |
| 3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme) | Imperative to secure the UK and greater EU; limited sentiments of responsibility for overseas strife; lost confidence in martial-power and military-led solutions |
| 4 Promulgated solution                          | Holistic UK aid; salience of politics; ‘integrated’ approach to ‘stabilisation’; multilateralism through the OECD, UN and EU; locate peaceful and productive politics in fragile states |
| Frame devices (constituting the frame)          | Language of global fragility, conflict and stabilisation, as well as capacity, peace and statebuilding; integrated approach; beyond aid thinking; language of the national interest; highlighting the need to ‘tackle extreme poverty’ and the world’s ‘most vulnerable’; beyond Afghanistan/Iraq thinking |

(Author’s conceptualisation from: FCO. et al, 2014; DFID et al, 2011; DFID and HMT, 2015; HMG, 2015; HOCIDC, 2015; Stapleton and Keating, 2015; Interviews L8, L10, L19, LT6, P1)
### 5.9 The EU-Level (RELEX/DEVCO) Traditional/Summative Development-Cooperation Frame (approximately from 1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>Under-development in the global South; poverty; impeded prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>Imbalanced, inequitable global status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>Highly limited postcolonial moral responsibility (within intergovernmental ACP-EU group); supranational intrinsic belief in the EU as a peace-project and norm-setter; Western universalist values; latterly European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP); Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Liberal-idealistic/Neo-Liberal economic development-cooperation; apolitical humanitarian relief; utility of EU expertise and resources; inter-regional relations; multilateralism; pure development thinking; latterly prioritising trade (with contention between Commission Directorate Generals); exporting the peace-project norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frame devices (constituting the frame)


### 5.10 The EU-Level 9/11 ‘Fighting’ Terror Frame (prominently 2001-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>9/11 as an attack on Western democracy at-large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>International terrorism; instability abroad; illegitimate Taliban regime and Islamic radicalisation in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>Terrorists as barbaric; an affront to common democratic values; US as victim; unchanged anti-war episteme and peace-project values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Legitimise the US as the victim; support the (metaphorical) ‘fight’ against terror; adoption of new action plan, seeking greater cooperation with the US; search for sustainable solutions; pursue diplomacy through special representative (EUSR); enact reconstruction of Afghanistan post US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); treat Afghanistan like any other least-developed country (LDC); long-term budget frameworks of Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP); NGO substitution approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frame devices (constituting the frame)  ‘Barbaric attack’ and ‘watershed event’ speech-act; language of common values; references to the ‘free world’ and ‘fundamental freedoms’; language of traditional economic development-cooperation, mission to ‘mobilise resources to rebuild Afghanistan’, to ‘normalise the country’, ‘ensuring good governance’, through a ‘country-wide, sector-wide approach’

(Author’s conceptualisation from: CEU, 2001; EC, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2002; Jospin, 2002; Ortega, 2004; Patten, 2002b; Prodi, 2001; Ruyt, 2001; Vitorino, 2002; Interviews B24, B27, B28 B29, B30, IT22, L20)

5.11 The EU-level Cohering External-Actoriness Frame (prominently 2003 onwards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>EU issue of incoherent and ineffectual external-actoriness; failure to locate a common position over the Iraq war (2003) contention; fragmented and incoherent EU and member state contributions in Afghanistan; institutional contentions between development/aid and security communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>Divergent member state vested interests and fragmentation; divergent epistemic-communities at EU-level; discrepancies in professional-routines; US influence/Americanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>EU cohering initiatives as mandatory; EU integration as good; EU strategic autonomy as desirable; anti-war episteme and peace-project values, but acknowledging discrete positions of UK (and France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Progress Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); European Security Strategy (2003); European consensus on development; state-strengthening and peacebuilding; job-creation and woman’s rights; civilian-CSDP EUPOL-Afghanistan mission, cohering EU security sector reform (SSR) and justice sector reform (JSR); pursuit of ‘comprehensive’ thinking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frame devices (constituting the frame)  Language of comprehensive, consistency and coherence; recognition of ‘parallel’, ‘competing’ efforts, ‘extreme focus’ on provinces; emphasis of ‘regional, sub-regional and national capacities’; desire for ‘optimum use of resources’; ‘whole-of-the-Union’ speech-act; references to treaty obligations; emphasis of civilian, sustainable national policing, not segregated, competing efforts of militias, or ‘mini-states’

### 5.12 The EU-Level Pragmatic Stability Frame (prominently 2015 onwards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Functions</th>
<th>Issue/Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Definition of the problem</td>
<td>Spill-over from fragile states affecting EU affairs; irregular-migration; ongoing terrorism; failure to increase returns of civilian-power instruments in fragile, conflict-affected states (FCAS); failure of democratisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interpreted cause of the problem</td>
<td>Fragile state’s complex political emergencies in the neighbourhood and further afield; extremism and violent extremism; bad governance; inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moral/value judgements (and subconscious episteme)</td>
<td>Enduring peace-project values, but new sense of pragmatism; some harder, martial instruments believed as justified; heightened ambition for strategic autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Promulgated solution</td>
<td>Emboldened military-Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions; better alignment with development-cooperation; less-rigorous exportation of democracy into third countries; inter-regional relations, but factoring for the sub-national; prioritising stabilisation at all levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frame devices (constituting the frame)

Language of integration replacing language of comprehensive; emphasis on ‘refugees’; issue of ‘aid orphans’, references to ‘Arab Spring’, and post-Bonn Afghanistan; notion of ‘Afghan-good’; critiques of destabilising effects of prior ‘democratisation’ endeavours; calls for ‘stronger partnership’ with the international community, a ‘safer environment’ in the EU’s ‘common region’, ‘pragmatic idealism’ and ‘principled pragmatism’ speech-acts; notion of linking CSDP with development-cooperation and ‘everybody winning’

(Author’s conceptualisation from: Biscop, 2015; EC, 2007, 2014; EEAS, 2016; EU, 2016; Mogherini, 2015; Interviews B26, B27, B28, B30, B31, B32, L4, LT17)