CONTROLLING THE POLICE: LOCAL AUTONOMY IN
POLICY AND PRACTICE

R. J. APPLEGATE

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CONTROLLING THE POLICE: LOCAL AUTONOMY IN POLICY AND PRACTICE

By

RICHARD JOHN APPLEGATE

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Department of Social Policy and Social Work
Faculty of Human Sciences

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ABSTRACT

Richard John Applegate

CONTROLLING THE POLICE: LOCAL AUTONOMY IN POLICY AND PRACTICE

This thesis assesses the influence of The Home Office, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Audit Commission, the Local Police Authority, and the Chief Constable on local policy makers and implementers within the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary. It is based on five policy areas: the structure of the organisation, The Citizens’ Charter, Annual Policing (now Performance) Plans, Domestic Violence Policy, and Equal Opportunities Policy.

Unlike previous research, it brings together the issues of policy and practice at all levels of the organisation through interviews with senior managers in the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary and members of the Local Police Authority, and questionnaires to front line police officers; as well as analysis of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary reports and Police Authority Policing Plans, and recommendations made in Home Office Circulars and Audit Commission reports.

The research was carried out prior to the introduction of Crime and Disorder Partnerships and Crime Audits, required by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Both policy makers and policy implementers believed that there was a strong influence from all the key players in the policy areas examined, with the exception of the
Association of Chief Police Officers and the Local Police Authority. There is no evidence to suggest that there has been any change in the power relationship between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority.

For police officers directly involved in the implementation process, The Citizens’ Charter and Annual Policing (now Performance) Plans had made little difference to the way they carried out their day-to-day work. In these more generic policy areas they saw less influence from the key players but perceived greater influence coming from consumers, public opinion, colleagues and immediate supervisors. In the tighter policy area of domestic violence, where there is greater top down control, the influence of the key players was the strongest, and local autonomy, both in policy and practice was hard to find. The police organisation retains many of the attributes of a classical bureaucracy and an ideal form of organisational structure has yet to be found.
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PART ONE

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My thanks to Rob Mawby for his criticisms and comments that have made it possible for me to submit this thesis for examination, and to my wife, Gwen, for her support, patience and understanding.
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University Award.

This study was self-financed, and completed as a part-time student.

A programme of advanced study was undertaken, which included the degree Master of Arts in policy and organisational studies.

One paper has been submitted for publication and a second is in preparation.

Signed: R.S. Applegath
Date: 28/11/02
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The extent to which local police policy and practice can be influenced by those who are recipients of that service, directly or indirectly, and by governmental or quasi-governmental organisations, has increased dramatically over the last ten years.

Historically, police accountability and control has been the subject of much debate, both in terms of the tripartite relationship between Chief Constables, their Police Authorities and the Home Office (Baldwin & Kinsey 1982, Lustgarten 1986, Morgan & Smith 1989) and with the communities they police (Scarman 1981, Shapland & Vagg 1988).

More recently the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 (now incorporated into the Police Act 1996) has resulted in greater involvement of Police Authorities and the public in the production of Annual Policing Plans (Morgan & Newburn 1997) leading to suggestions that this would bring about changes in the relationships between Chief Constables, the re-formatted leaner Police Authorities and the Home Office (Loveday 1994 [a], Savage 1998).

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (which came into effect after the implementation of much of this research) places a responsibility on local authorities, and other agencies, together with the police, to publish joint local crime reduction strategies (Woods 1998), even though similar joint initiatives, for example the Safer Cities Programme and the...
Single Regeneration Budget, were problematic (Pawson & Tilley 1997).

Control over the police remains an important issue in a liberal democracy raising questions of authority, legitimacy and their relationship to other agencies of the State (Jones 1995). Particularly today, where there is a perceived decline of the sovereign state through subsidiarity, decentralism and localism (Hirst 1994: 28) and the effects of globalisation on life, family and society (Giddens 1999). At the same time the police, like other agencies in the criminal justice system, are no longer given the mandate, the money or the freedom to carry out their tasks, but are ‘subject to detailed national standards set by Central Government and are closely monitored and inspected to ensure that practice and resource-use complies with those instructions.’ (Garland 1996: 459).

For the police this pressure has been from a number of sources:

- Home Office constraints to ensure effectiveness and efficiency (for example Home Office Circular 114/83).
- Annual Policing Plans, their associated Ministerial Priorities and performance indicators overseen by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.

Since the introduction of these Central Government initiatives there has been increasing concern about the consequences of over reliance upon performance indicators to measure the quality of policing (Police Review 24/12/99, Oliver 2000, Police Review 10/03/00).
Although the issue of local control, democracy, citizenship and policy making have been touched upon (Gill & Thrasher 1985, Jones et al 1994, Waddington 1999 [a]) the policy making processes and the constitutional influences placed upon police managers and practitioners have received little attention, particularly at the 'sharp end' (Jones 1995: 2).

The object of the research is to obtain the views of local police managers from all levels of the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary, to assess the influence of key players in the policy process, supported by the examination of policy related documents published by bodies such as The Home Office and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, and to discover how these influences affect the day to day work of front line police officers. This will involve linking the two traditions of research into police policy:

- One in terms of a governing relationship between the police and legal and political institutions through constitutional and sociological stand-points.
- One in terms of the day by day work that the police actually do.

A link between these traditions which have been of little concern to previous researchers (Jones et al 1996: 3-4).

As a retired police officer, now an academic researcher, I have become an ‘outside insider’ (Sheptycki 1994), but also as an ‘ex-policeman’ I am still considered to be a part of their extended police family. Consequently I am not presented with any of the problems of conflict between the role of police officer and researcher (Young 1991). However the ever present labelling processes within police culture; the sense of ‘them and us’ (Reiner 1978)
may well have labelled me, firstly as a researcher and secondly as a 'challenger' (Holdaway 1983: 71-77), because research is a form of accountability (Morgan 1989).

The first part of the thesis will outline the background to the issues of police autonomy, accountability and control, and discuss the relationships between the key players in the policy process. It will then discuss the research methods employed and issues surrounding their use.

The second part of the thesis will consider five policy areas in order to examine the various influences over local policy and practice. Each chapter will start with the background of a policy area, from previously published research and other academic sources, because the importance of good literature reviews must not be overlooked, in that it allows the researcher to argue with the available theory, and it is also ‘...a kind of qualitative analysis, not merely a collection of ideas’ (McCracken 1988: 31).

The first chapter in part two will take up the concerns of the organisational structure of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. This is an important issue. Firstly because organisations represent a means of bringing people from disparate backgrounds and opinions together to achieve specified goals and in doing so produces a distinctive culture with its own set of rules and common values. Secondly because there have been demands for organisational 'delayering'; 'downsizing'; and 'networking' (Franklin 1998: 20), the latter more easily accommodated by the introduction of global information.
technology (Morgan 2000: 64). The second chapter in part two describes the policy and implementation processes within this organisational structure.

The Citizen's Charter is included because it was one of the first policy initiatives from central government which brought performance indicators into the police service in any meaningful or major way and it remains a current policy document.

Annual Policing Plans are included because they sought to consolidate the issue of performance indicators within the police service, as well as providing the opportunity for public opinion, the views of the local Police Authority, and Central Government to affect local police policy making.

Domestic Violence and Equal Opportunities policies, represent policy areas which are never far from both public and academic enquiry; and it is here that the range of influence upon police policy and practice is most dramatically illustrated.

A resume of the research is given at the end each chapter, and the overall conclusions and implications are brought together in a concluding chapter.
CHAPTER ONE

POLICE AND CITIZENS - AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONTROL

What the police do and how they do it is particularly important; their role being ‘morally ambiguous’ (Waddington 1997:114), and their profile as being a central public service in a modern state (Jones et al 1994): affecting the lives everyone, they are influential in modern social life, standing up for the traditions of community and the nation state (Ericson & Haggerty 1998:3). However their affect is most noticeable in communities where there is a perceived need for trust, for shared values of morality (Fukuyama 1996), particularly where this trust has been broken by risky behaviour that damages a community’s belief in truth or trust (Misztal 1996).

Policing has been considered in three historical periods. The first prior to the development of the modern state where members of a community were required to police anti-social behaviour individually. The second followed the emergence of the modern state where the police took over responsibility for order and crime control, but this was done within the scope of community values when deciding the type of behaviour which was considered appropriate for formal action. Thirdly, the modern period marked by the loosening of community ties, the expansion of citizenship, extended civil and political rights, and increased affluence obtained through the welfare state, making policing a more difficult task (Clarke 1987: 388).
More recently we can add a fourth period to include private policing (Johnston 1992, Sarre & Prenzler 1999, Hilliard 2000), a move towards the policing of specific places and functions (Johnston 1992, Giddens 1994:38, Jones & Newburn 1998), and the provision of security through surveillance technologies designed to identify, predict and manage risks with the dissemination of this information to other agencies and organisations concerned in the management of risk (Ericson & Haggerty 1998), resulting a perceived dichotomy between police and policing. The former being the institutions which primarily carry out a policing function and the latter the social processes involved in that function (Reiner 2000), such as active citizenship (involvement in re-active policing, by reporting crime) and pro-active policing (taking an active part in various community policing initiatives) (Bennett 1998); despite the criticism that such an approach is only effective in areas where there is solid public support for the police (Arnot 2000).

The degree of interest shown in policing policy varies widely. From those who are direct recipients of police services, either as victims or offenders, to those whose quality of life is affected by what the police do, without the need to make direct contact with them, emphasised by world-wide research which suggests that peace keeping is the primary policing function (Morgan & Newburn 1997: 82).

Defining police work

The role of Peel's 'New Police' was initially seen by its advocates as being that of preventing crime. However this was gradually extended to include that which Parliament wished to be regulated, controlled or licensed (Waddington 1993: 3), although its early
structure and training methods suggest that its primary purpose was to provide a force to police public disorder (Loveday 1994[a]:1).

Seminal research into the work of the police in the United Kingdom by Banton (1964) which set the agenda for future debate (Jones & Newburn 1998:10), suggested a crime detection rather than prevention role and the concept of a dual crime detection and social welfare role. By examining the balance of welfare and crime roles of the police in Britain he concluded that it was an amalgam of both roles: a peace officer rather than a law officer.

At a similar time in the United States of America, Wilson (1966), proposed three organisational styles of policing:

1. Watchman Style - general order maintenance.
2. Legalistic Style - detection of crime and law enforcement.
3. Service Style - providing a service to the public as customers and maintaining order in a welfare context.

More recently, Fielding (1996) defined three ideal models of policing:

1. The enforcement model - crime control.
2. The service model - consultation and maintaining public order.
3. The community model - consultation and active citizenship.

During the mid 1970's it was becoming more acceptable that policing should assume an aspect of social service provision, even if, initially, this may have been as a consequence of it being the only organisation available to deal with such problems twenty four hours a day.
Pressure from the police themselves, notably in Devon and Cornwall (Alderson 1979: Moore and Brown 1981) extended this social service angle by bringing the police more actively into the formulation of social policy, local planning, and other areas which they considered to be part of the crime prevention process. This happened, in spite of the fact that there remained within the culture of ground level police officers, a feeling that a social service role was not what they considered to be ‘real police work’; which they perceived to be ‘fighting crime’ and ‘enforcing the law’ (Manning 1977. Ericson 1982. Reiner 1992). Indeed Reiner (1978) found that only one in twenty officers saw their work as being predominantly a social service rather than that of fighting crime, despite the later claim that the police undertook the role of ‘social workers’ and were seen as ‘the secret social service’ (Punch 1979) with their function being that of care and control (Stephens & Becker 1994).

Apart from grouping policing into activities such as patrolling or criminal investigation, where ‘public tranquillity’ and consent are necessary before they can be carried out, as suggested by Bayley (1994: 13 -35), describing the police role in a sound bite (Marshall 1965) is much more difficult. With attempts ranging from it being:

- To fight and prevent crime; uphold the law; bring to justice those who break the law; protect, help and reassure the community (Home Office 1993, para 1.7).

- If the nature of a crisis is unclear the police are summoned as a default option (Audit Commission 1990).

- like trying to hit a moving target (Shapland & Vagg 1988: 8).
Public influence on police work

Commenting on the issue of local interest in policing, Sir Robert Mark then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, wrote that he thought it unlikely that:

...one in a thousand Englishmen could give even a vague outline of our [the police] organisation, accountability or method of control (1977: 20).

A situation which may well prevail today, because, unless there is a major crisis in policing, those who are not direct recipients show little interest in having any affect over policing provision, except in cases where the abuse of power and authority have come to notice, and only then in an ad hoc fashion (McKenzie & Gallagher 1989: 60).

The fact remains however that local policing responsive to local conditions is vital (Morgan and Newburn 1997: 149), despite the argument that the policing policy agenda should be confined to the minimum requirements of public opinion (Kinsey et al 1986).

The changing face of policing in England and Wales illustrates the importance of considering the issues of local autonomy and control over policing policy, particularly the avenues available to affect policy issues, the groups and individuals who can use them and how effective their influences may be in deciding what the police do and how they do it.

We need only to look back to the 1960's and the work of Maureen Cain (1973), whose research was considered to be definitive in the field of day to day policing at this time, where she found that the community being policed defined the role of the police (p239).
Later research by Shapland & Vagg (1988: 150) suggested that it was still possible for communities to direct what they see as the “right kind” of police attention to local issues by various methods, including the manipulation of information given to the police in order to direct police action towards a particular problem, one that might not otherwise have been policed.

It is not possible to infer public priorities from the demands which are made upon the police (Hough 1989: 48), for example studies in respect of these demands have suggested that crime related issues have been in the minority (Punch & Naylor 1973, Comrie & King 1975, Hough 1980, Ekblom & Heale 1982, Morgan 1990, Waddington 1993, Audit Commission 1993), although Shapland & Hobbs (1989) suggested that calls in respect of crime related demands had increased.

Research into police work published in the *Operational Policing Review* (1990), a joint venture by the Police Federation, The Police Superintendents Association and the Association of Police Officers showed that public opinion of policing tasks ranged from crime prevention and attending emergencies, to school liaison and knowing local people. It also illustrated a wide divergence of policing priorities between the public and the police. The public preferring a service style approach with the police preferring a legalistic approach. Research also suggests that fighting crime is not the only service the public require (Redshaw & Sanders 1995) and that to be able to carry out a crime control function the police also need to be involved in many other activities (Redshaw, Mawby & Bunt 1997).
Although Cain (op cit) saw local community power to be important, she was one of the first to suggest that community power was decreasing and that central power and the power of the professional police officer, to decide the police role, was increasing (p246). She suggested that this was due in part to a single national policing model, increased community mobility, a decline in community power, and the police having no experience of any other policing methods.

It was now becoming more acceptable for senior police officers to make it clear that, as professionals in the field of policing, they should be responsible for deciding what the police do. This had the knock on effect of raising the political profile of the police during the late 1970's and 1980's particularly in respect of public statements made by Chief Constables, such as those by John Anderton (for example in The Times 18 March 1982) and a greater political involvement by the Police Federation during this period, leading to the suggestion that the police themselves at all levels were determined to set down the terms upon which both law and order and social policy would be debated (Thompson 1980).

The three perspectives of conservative; liberal; and radical (Benyon & Solomon 1987) provided a whole raft of causes for the inner city riots of the 1980's, the resultant Scarman Report (1981) argued for consent and balance in policing and indicated that the role of the police was one of the maintenance of public tranquillity over law enforcement (ibid: para 4.57). Going against the policy of the police know best policy stance, his report went on
to note that the police were becoming a corps elite set apart from the rest of society (ibid: para 5.3) and concluded that a police force which does not consult locally will fail to be efficient (ibid: para 5.62).

Consequently the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, together with a model structure set out in Home Office Circular 54/82, implemented the introduction of public consultative groups to provide a vehicle for community involvement in respect of policing policy; having as its prerequisite equal partnership and the congruence of community and police priorities, with the exchange of information between both groups (Morgan & Maggs 1985: 8). They were fairly successful in obtaining the view of, and educating groups within, communities who were favourable to the police but did little to heal rifts between the police and communities who were hostile towards them (Morgan 1989). Indeed research at the time identified more problems than successes with statutory consultative processes (Harfield 1997: 272). To the extent that Lea & Young (1984) suggested that the emphasis should be on the community consulting the police so they may formulate their needs, rather than the police consulting the community to formulate their policies and strategies. Consultative groups were perceived to be in a no-win situation by all groups having an interest in them.

As far as neighbourhoods are concerned they operate in the stratosphere. As far as professionals are concerned they are amateur. As far as politicians are concerned they are not representative or accountable. (Morgan 1987: 42)

As Kleinig argues, many of these problems are caused by the social distance between the police and the communities in which they work and adds:
In an ideal world the police would know and render the service expected of them. But then, in an ideal world police would probably not be necessary. Kleinig (1996: 17)

**Police work and the concept of citizenship, democracy, and the state.**

Although citizenship has its roots in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and the sociology of Weber, Durkheim and Tonnies, it was not until the work of T. H. Marshall that it became a theme of modern social theory (Roche 1992, Bottomore 1992). Marshall considered citizenship in three areas: the civil; the political; and the social.

- The civil comprised of the rights required for a person's individual freedom, freedom of speech and thought, to own property and the right to justice through the due process of law.
- The political being the exercise of political power as a member of a political body such as parliament or local authorities and the election of its members.
- The social is the right to economic welfare and the right to take part in society according to the standards prevalent in that society (Marshall 1964: 71-72).

In his discussion of the development of citizenship in the area of civil rights and the right to justice and in his survey of social services, he underlines the fact that the state guarantees a minimum supply of certain essential goods and services (quoted in Marshall & Bottimore 1992: 32). However the fact remains that social welfare invariably involves regulation either of the conditions of access to the relevant goods and services, or of the recipients of those goods and services (Hindess 1993). As Lenaghan argues in respect of social rights through the National Health Service:

Some claim that the gap between demand and supply will grow ever wider. (ibid, 1998: 280)
The rationing of civil and political rights, through the access to policing services, is a problematical one:

There must be a right to the protection of civil and political rights but there cannot be a right to the services of a policeman, as these are subject to the same problems of scarcity as doctors and teachers. If there is a right to 'enforceable civil and political rights' then this is a positive right to resources. (Plant 1998: 64)

However the work of Marshall has been crucial in the development of citizenship in terms of social and economic rights (Plant 1992) reconciling political democracy and capitalism through the welfare state (Turner 1993: 6), and provoking considerable sociological discussion about the effects of capitalism in the liberal democratic state (Oldfield 1990), with citizenship seen as being concerned with social relationships between people, and between people and organisations or institutions in complex industrialised societies:

Thus exploring citizenship requires an examination of both people and the institutions they have created. (Twine 1994: 9).

The state can be defined in two ways:

- Organisationally: as a set of institutions with identifiable public and private spheres, the sovereign state or supreme power has the ultimate authority for all law, a sovereignty applicable to everyone including members of state institutions, with its staff recruited, and its power to tax.

- Functionally: as a set of institutions which carry out particular objectives, including organisations whose functions overlap state functions; and through the consequences of its actions such as keeping social order. (Dunleary & O'Leary 1987: 4).

The state as described by Weber (1964:156) comprises the institutions which claim the monopoly of legitimate force and it is this sovereignty which makes the state the structure
that exercises absolute power and authority in society and the acceptance of such
sovereignty defines the character of citizenship (Camilleri & Falk 1992: 4). This is
particularly relevant to the police, who are seen as the custodians of state authority, a
power which could, depending upon its use, be capable of damaging civil liberties
(Waddington 1999 [a]). The police role, to maintain a stable society by exercising the law,
and keeping order and peace, were one of the first responsibilities of the state’ (Ham &
Hill 1987: 24), but at the same time policing:

...lies at the hub of the conundrum that has occupied political philosophers for
centuries - the role of the state as both guarantor of and most powerful threat to
democracy. (Waddington 1999 [a]: 21).

The concept of the state is a controversial one:

True, an anarchist would like the state abolished. A Marxist wants the state to
disappear. A liberal would have its powers restricted, while a conservative extols

The relationship between citizenship and the state is often seen in terms of democracy,
defined in the British context by Birch (1993: 56) who suggests it can be seen as a
parliamentary government holding free competitive elections with a wide franchise or, first
and foremost a political system (Bottomore 1985: 16) where powerful positions in society
are open for anyone to contest, with power-holders accountable to the electorate, together
with the associated problems of political elites (Bottomore ibid) and class (Miliband
1983), a system of political power through social or other groups (Nordlinger 1981), or
something which is unattainable (Michels 1958).

However, Ranson (1986) suggests that citizens are active members both of the
community and of the polity, even if community is a difficult sociological concept to describe (Bell & Newby 1971: 31, Walklate & Evans 1999).

Democracy is an essential ingredient of active citizenship, and it is at the macro level of the national polity where there is wider inclusion of individual views upon debates regarding social service provision. However this national polity only permits the electorate to express their views occasionally and then in only the most general terms (Ranson & Stewart 1989:12). But citizens do try to contribute towards and influence public choices, by publicly giving their views of collective needs and general public purpose (ibid: 11), through the civil rights of citizenship. They publicly express their concerns, even if it is only a political elite that can operationalise those concerns (Twine 1994: 174) whilst accepting, at the same time, that perceptions of risky and deviant behaviour will vary widely between different communities (Foster 1995) according to their character (Donnison 1998).

Democracy is also an issue of values, ideals as well as ideas, and the emphasis given to them (Jones et al 1994: 43): the character of which will depend upon whether it is implemented from above, by the state, or below, for example by the labour movement (Turner,1990).

After 1979, Thatcherist doctrine attempted to redefine the relationship between the state and society, leading to critiques of the role of the police and their enforcement of government policies (Brewer et al 1988). In the market approach of New Right doctrine
(Hayek 1960, Freidman 1962) emphasis was placed on individual responsibility (Faulkner 1994); where the welfare state was seen to inhibit individual freedom (Williams 1992) and budgets and outputs of public bureaucratic monopoly providers were seen to be twice that of private sector suppliers (Niskanen 1971, Tullock 1979). The police were portrayed as a classic example of all that was wrong in service provision through a bureaucratic monopoly (Evans 1991: 12).

With the demise of Thatcherism, and under the auspices of Majorism, Conservative policies looked more towards the participation of citizens in the policy making forum. The problem here is the difference between consultation and negotiation. The former can be used in micro or macro decision making which at its worst can be a manipulative process or at its best promoting more open and shared decision making (Coote 1998: 192). The concept of active participation in the policy making process continued under a Labour Government with the introduction of Citizens' Juries for example, which were supported by local authorities and local government (Coote 1998), despite the criticism that there is a danger of resource and service allocation being decided by twelve members of such a jury (The Guardian 2:20/01/99: 9).

Building on the participation model Johnson (1992: 97) puts forward the issue of ‘citizen participation or active citizenship’ in policing crime and public disorder, either responsibly, through the special constabulary, and such schemes as neighbourhood watch, or the extremes of vigilantism. The dilemma being to distinguish between criminal activity and community action.
This participative approach to policing has been encouraged since the 1980's through Neighbourhood Watch (Bennett 1990, Gilling 1997, Crawford 1998) and more recently by influencing police policy making, suggested by the government White Paper on police reform (1993) and extended by the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, allowing an avenue for public input in deciding local policing priorities, within the parameters of the Home Secretary's Ministerial Priorities. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 further extended police public consultation, with local crime audits and statutory inter-agency consultation. However these policies have been criticised in respect of under-funding and similar resource issues (Grundy 1999) and that they remove police governance from the political arena to that of administration, or governance without politics (Johnston 2000: 78).

Taking the view that policing in the United Kingdom is undertaken by public consent (Alderson 1979), and that the accepted politics directing police policy and practice have been 'decided through the ballot box' (Dale 1994), any attempt by the police to take up an independent political line would reduce public consent and consequently reduce their effectiveness. As Kettle (1980: 9) points out, any thoughts about policing and politics not mixing is an illusion, both in terms of overall policy issues, administrative decisions and decisions made by individual officers during their daily contact with the public. Holdaway's (1979: 3) contention that control over the role of the police is the question which affects our 'constitutional foundation', remains as strong as ever.
Police work and Central Government

During the last twenty years, attempts at engineering the role of the police by central government has taken place through three general routes: consumerism, partnership, and the identification of core and ancillary policing duties.

The emphasis upon citizens as consumers (Saunders 1990), where consumerism has been the ‘keynote’ for public service reform, even if the police service has used the concept to avoid more political means of accountability (Reiner 1992: 266), has brought about a change from a consumer with a need, to an economic actor. Turning a consumers’ requirement of quality into a constitutional right, altering the relationship between the citizen and the state, making it a contractual one, removing the social aspect from the concept of citizenship (Barron & Scott 1992). Whilst a contractual approach can keep control over strategic decisions and ‘focus democratic control on key policy issues’, direct accountability is ‘considerably weakened’ if the public sector provides very little, and everything is guided by legalistic controls or regulation (Corry 1998: 75).

The consequence of this has been a more ‘assertive and sceptical public’ who require their share of services provided through the payment of their tax bills (Squires 1998: 171). However the prospect of consumer choice in public policing through competition and the introduction of service providers and purchasers (Loveday 1994 [a]) has yet to materialise. As with the private/public policing dichotomy the concept of consumers, customers, and competition for policing services are dogged with the classical economic problems of perfect competition, public good, and the free rider effect (Olsen 1971, Johnson 1992).
even if there is a difference between a pure public good, and a good used communally but charged to a private user according to consumption (Savas 1982). However the public 'have a much more complex relationship with public services' than being merely consumers or service users (Coote 1998: 216).

The partnership approach has been co-opted by the police in one form or another over the last twenty years (Alderson 1979, 1983, Newman 1984) but it was pressure from Central Government which caused the police to change its attitude towards crime control by involving the community, probation service, and local authorities (Gilling 1997:106) particularly in preventing crime (Home Office Circular 8/84).

The Morgan Report (1991) emphasised that the multi-agency approach to community safety should be the concern of local authorities in conjunction with the police, bringing a multi-agency approach to crime control leading to: difficulties of defining roles (Bright 1987); difficulties over lead agency status (Gilling 1996: 110); the off loading of work between agencies (Bright 1991: 73-74); and conflict between Local Community Safety Groups, Community Safety Plans, and Local Police Authority Annual Policing Plans (Morgan & Newburn 1997).

This multi-agency approach has been extended by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, requiring police, community, Local Authorities, and other partners, including Health Authorities and Probation Services, to produce a strategy to reduce crime and disorder in their local areas based upon a 'joint audit of local crime and disorder to act as a bench
mark for future action’ (Woods 1998).

The goal should be for every partner to configure its input in such a way as to maximise effectiveness without compromising the individual agency’s wider strategic goals. (Home Office 1998: para 1.36)

However the Crime and Disorder Act was intended to make:

...no changes to the Police Authorities statutory responsibilities for consulting the community about policing issues and priorities’. One of the main mechanisms which Police Authorities use for undertaking such consultation and for engaging the public in preventative work is the work of the Police Community Consultative Groups. (Home Office 1998: para 1.31).

Central government has also attempted to reform the police, both in terms of its organisation and its role. The inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards, The Sheehy Inquiry (Home Office 1993) made over two hundred recommendations (Jones & Newburn 1998). Those evoking most reaction were those mainly driven by market forces and included performance related pay, fixed term appointments, and the abolition of three management ranks, but allowed for a broad policing mandate (Leishman, Cope & Starie 1996). Resistance from all levels within the police service eventually succeeded in watering down many of these recommendations (Loveday 1994).

The White Paper Police Reform (1993) focused upon governance of the police rather than their management, with a narrower policing mandate (Leishman, Cope & Starie 1996) one of fighting crime, a role to be shared and supported by local communities (Home Office 1993: 1).
The Home Office (1994[a]) ‘Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks’ intended to set out the role of the police because this was not self evident (Hills 1997: 180), and was seen by many as a precursor to the privatisation of many policing services (Morgan & Newburn 1997, Jones & Newburn 1998), through the establishment of core and ancillary tasks, allowing the police to concentrate on what may be considered to be their prime function, that is crime-fighting (Loveday 1995: 141). The report proved to be ineffectual and made very few changes, if any, to the role of the police (Police Review 7/7/95).

Historically policing has been an issue which is sensitive to local values (Clark 1987: 388), both at the individual level between those involved in an incident, or more locally to those who are recipients of policing’s value in terms of a public good (Loader & Walker 2001). It has also been noted that the police and public are generally in agreement about priorities in respect of the more serious offences, but that public demand is to be more involved in consultation (Dingwall & Shapland 1993).

The problem facing the police is that they have to be sensitive to both local and national values as well as the effects of increasing globalisation (Robertson 1990, Held & McGrew 1993) which affects individuals at the macro level and the ever present need to ration their services as a consequence of fiscal constraints. If a partnership approach with the input of local views in terms of policing policy remains a requirement, seen as it is as facilitating more responsive local policy making (Edwards & Benyon 2000:45), then the power of those who can influence such policy is an important consideration. If consumerism is a strong influence, then we need to know how much it affects what the police do at a local
A more cynical view, perhaps, is one which suggests that:

In the community policed world, the police understand the value of giving people a stake in the process as a viable means of social control (Deleon-Granados 1997).

It may well be that society is reaching a point where the distinction between local, national, and global values are becoming blurred as a consequence of modern communications and information technology, to the extent that, although we continue to court local views, in wider policy terms, they are of little consequence in affecting the role of the police; if this is the case then the concept of citizenship may be changing.

Police work, accountability, control and influence

For governments, police accountability for what they do remains a 'central feature' (Loveday 1999). However accountability and control are used synonymously in respect of police services, more often than not within the same context. Baldwin & Kinsey (1982: 105-106) propose that:

Accountability is liability to account for a decision after it has been taken; control on the other hand exists where influence is exerted in making a decision. The two may fuse together in practice and debate (My emphasis) (ibid).

Bayley (1985: 160) also uses the words control and accountability interchangeably, explaining that both relate to the achieving conformity between police activity and community objectives.
In terms of considering local autonomy in respect of controlling local police policy and practice it is necessary to consider both accountability and control but more importantly to add, or even replace them, with that of influence which in its application is a mixture of both and can be effected by all members of the police policy network.

Day & Klien (1987) state that unlike the National Health Service where accountability was ‘simple in theory but complex in practice’, accountability in the police was ‘not only complex in theory but even more complex in practice’ (p105).

There are a number of issues peculiar to the provision of police services which make the issue of accountability, control and influence more difficult than might be the case in other organisations. These can be summarised as follows:

- The state gives the police the right to use legitimate force (Bittner 1967, 1970, Spike 1985, Reiner 2000) and therefore what the police organisation represents is different to any other organisation.

- The relationship between police organisations and political authority is difficult to unravel: the relationship between police officers, police forces, local Police Authorities, the Home Office and Parliament is uncertain and open to different interpretations, where the relationships between the police, and central and local government is difficult (Brogden. 1982: 1-2).

- The services it provides are ‘demand-led, context specific and resource limited’ (Waddington 1993: 192); however, the restraints of economic public good theory makes the service it provides difficult to restrict to direct recipients and commercial provision of police services by public sector police forces, would further complicate the already difficult area of police accountability (Johnston 1992: 69).

The existence of a more mixed economy for policing in the new millennium is becoming more and more important (Jones & Newburn 1998), with private security companies providing policing services to those willing to pay for them, leaving the police to deal with problems in areas where such services cannot be provided privately.
Leaving the issues of private - public policing aside, were there to be direct political control, local or central, or some form of local community control over policing policy the problems remain:

- How can such control be effectively exercised through policy decisions made at Chief Officer level, to those made by officers at ground level, that is, how is it possible to overcome the problem of distinguishing between ‘operational and wider policy matters’ (Baldwin & Kinsey 1982:111).

- How can the problem of pressure from sectarian or minority interest groups be prevented from putting undue pressure upon policing policy, perhaps to the detriment of the community as a whole (Lea & Young 1984: 234).

It is therefore necessary to consider the affect of local and central government involvement in policing and the work of the police in a democracy (McKenzie & Gallagher 1989: 53).

In discussing police powers and accountability Reiner (1992: p221) highlights the fact that the formal rules and accountability functions of police work are indirect and subtle. He goes on to argue that elected control of police decision making is not necessary in a democracy, a view that is contradicted by Lea & Young (1984: 231) who look for greater local democratic control over the police, and Uglow (1988: 143) who suggests that Chief Constables are no longer constitutionally controlled, and calls for greater safeguards against the power of Chief Constables and the Home Secretary (p136). This argument is pursued by Wall (1998: 13) who sees Chief Constables as a self-selecting and externally unaccountable professional elite with influence over the policy making process.

The more interest one takes in issues of police accountability the more obvious it becomes
that accountability is a complex and often a contradictory compromise (Ewing & Gearty 1990: 44). The British policing system is seen as:

... a delicate balance of itemised obligations and sometimes unclear lines of authority; at a time when police work is increasingly scientific and professional, the police feel more than ever “beleaguered by bodies exerting pressure upon them. (Palmer 1990: 541).

The nature of these local and central influences, their relationships and values within the accountability and control process, will be discussed in the next chapter, by examining the key players in the policy process.
CHAPTER TWO

KEY PLAYERS IN THE POLICY PROCESS

Policing in England and Wales has been based, traditionally, upon the local authority and despite increasing influences from central government, there remains a strong political desire to maintain the illusion of de-centralised influence or control over policing (Bayley 1992: 533). Indeed the relationship between central and local government over the last twenty years has become more and more troubled because of the conflict between their respective service provision responsibilities, the adoption of a centralising strategy to deal with this problem, and a strong desire to roll-back the state (Goldsmith 1986), which, although predating the first Thatcher Government, came to a head during that period (Cochraine 1993: Chpt 2), and continues to this day.

This relationship was also affected by the expansion of academic research into the police service, which was seen to high-lighting the politics of policing and police research in Britain (Reiner 1992[a]: 442), increasingly carried out by government organisations, local and central, but with the Home Office being the most important department of central government in terms of funding police research’ (Reiner ibid: 447, Reiner 2000).

However recent developments in police policy making processes underline the premise that ‘local government is an essential part of the system of government in this country’ (L.G.A Paper. 1998:3), although how the results of proposals for regional government (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 1996) will affect the influence of the key players in the
police policy process remains to be seen.

The issue of local and central influences have also affected the work of what were initially seen as internal police pressure groups, concerned with the rights and conditions of police officers, such as the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Superintendents Association and the Police Federation, which have now moved toward more public and pro-active commentators and advisors on policing policy.

*The Police Authority, Chief Constable and Home Office*

These actors in the policy making process represent an ongoing relationship dating back to the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. This Act provided for a balance between the responsibilities of local government and justices of the peace and a measure of central government supervision as well as allowing the Home Office to have central direction over Chief Constables and to construct a large amount of autonomy from local control (Reiner 1992: 22).

Prior to the Royal Commission on the Police of 1962 the many small police forces in England and Wales may have had, by their very localised nature, effective local control and accountability. However the make up of their respective watch committees and standing joint committees, which included local land owners and business elite, gave rise to the view that this control was not democratic (Uglow 1988: 123). Furthermore a number of high profile instances involving questions of who controlled the police (Fisher v Oldham Corp.) gave rise to ‘misgivings about the state of the police’ (Royal
The Royal Commission was given four areas of reference:

- The role and constitutional arrangements of local police authorities.
- Accountability of the police.
- Effective complaints procedures and public relations.
- Pay, conditions and effective recruitment into the police.

The subsequent Police Act of 1964 resulted in the repeal of some sixty Acts of Parliament and the introduction of the so-called tripartite arrangement, consisting of the local Police Authority, the Chief Constable and Home Secretary.

The Police Authority was to consist of one third magistrates and two thirds elected councillors whose responsibility it was: to provide the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force properly housed and equipped, to appoint and remove the Chief Constable, and to call for reports from him on specific policing issues.

Police forces came under the direction and control of their Chief Constable, and with this, the responsibility for the maintenance of the Queens Peace, the protection of life and property, and the prevention and detection of crime. Consequently policing in Britain is acknowledged for the amount of operational freedom given to Chief Constables (McCabe et al 1988), the so-called constabulary independence (Savage, Charman & Cope 2000).
These changes increased the power of Chief Constables, who were now fewer in number but were able to have greater influence over the policy making process; whereas on the other hand, the newly formed Police Authorities had little experience in policing (Pollard 1985). However the end result was seen by some, not only to increase the power of Chief Constables, but also the Home Office, to the detriment of local committees (Marshall 1973, Banton 1974).

The Police Act of 1964 gave the Home Secretary considerable influence over local policing policy through:

- The provision of fifty one per cent of the funding of the police.
- Approval of the appointment of Chief Police Officers.
- The power to call for specific reports from Chief Constables.
- Home Office Circulars to Chief Officers intended to set out best practices in policing.
- The appellant function in cases of discipline in respect of Chief Officers.
- Central Government power to ensure the efficiency of the police, the effectiveness of police authorities.
- The responsibility for such issues as inter-force co-operation and provision of central services.

As a result, Central Government was given the opportunity to place considerable influence upon local policing policy.

The Home Office is thus seen as a powerful, sometimes authoritative, sometimes resented force, directing the shape of police policy and operations. (Reiner 1991: 276).

Effectively the tripartite system initially operated a form of gentleman’s agreement, and
policing policy was neither politically nor socially contentious. However the issues of accountability and control were to become more prominent during the 1980's.

Jack Straw presented an unsuccessful Private members Bill to Parliament in 1980, which suggested the removal of Magistrates from local Police Authorities, powers for Police Authorities to appoint ranks down to Superintendent, decide general policing policies for their area, and for the Home Secretary to intervene in cases of dispute between Chief Constables and their Police Authorities.

The Miners Strike of 1984-85 further illustrated the problems of consensus between Police Authorities, Chief Constables and the Home Office, with contentious issues such as the National Reporting Centre based at New Scotland Yard, that controlled the distribution of Police Officers over the whole of the England and Wales, and finance, with a high profile dispute between the South Yorkshire Police Authority and the Chief Constable regarding the payment for the billeting of such officers (Wright 1985), with payment eventually settled by the Home Office.

Policing industrial disputes was not the only reason for disagreements between Police Authorities and Chief Constables during this period. The most controversial of these were: regularly calling for reports from the Chief Constable about police operations undertaken by the Merseyside Police Authority during the Toxteth riots (Judge 1981); disagreement over the issue of C.S gas or plastic bullets to Northumbria Police from a central store provided by the Home Office after the local Police Authority had not permitted them to be
purchased (R v Sec of State exp. 1988 2 W.L.R. 590); and litigation against the Chief Constable of Merseyside for allegedly acting illegally by failing to police certain areas of Liverpool (Daily Telegraph 31/10/86 p36), albeit unsuccessful.

From the 1980's onwards the relationship between Central Government and the other members of the tripartite arrangement had changed, partly a result of more directional Home Office Circulars which affected police policy. The first of these being Circular 114/83, Manpower, Efficiency and Effectiveness, which set out that in deciding police staffing levels, the Home Office would take into consideration the need for reviews of objectives, resources and priorities. The relationship was also affected by the requirement for greater local consultation through local police consultative groups, required under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and a movement towards consumerism in the provision of police services through the Victims Charter, introduced in 1990, and the performance indicators provided by the Citizens Charter (Cm 1559: 1991).

The changing relationships between these key players is aptly illustrated by the following comments; firstly from Chritchley (1978: 305) suggesting that the tripartite arrangement gives:

...the present advantage of a system that in practice makes ours arguably the most accountable police service in the world.

and secondly, after the intervening years, from Oliver (1996) who writes:

Under the 1964 Act much was left to the good sense, or otherwise of the parties involved; it was recognised that no act of Parliament could cater for every contingency in every relationship and for the partnership idea to work good will and common sense needed to be demonstrated on all sides. Unfortunately experiences since the 1964 Act has shown that people are not always reasonable and several pressures developed
which put a strain on the notion of accountability that, on occasions, seemed to stretch the structure to breaking point. (ibid: 16)

The White Paper, *Police Reform. The Government's Proposals for the Police Service in England and Wales*. (Cm 2281) was published in June 1993. It stated that the arrangements for the relationship between the Chief Constable, Home Secretary and Police Authorities under the 1964 Act created confusion and provided uncertain lines of accountability, in that the Home Secretary was only able to 'set the strategic framework of policing through informal but bureaucratic methods such as Home Office Circulars and guidance' (2.14). The Police Authorities were limited in their ability to ensure the views of local people about policing were 'reflected in the strategic direction of the force' (2.15). The Chief Constable's ability to devolve management responsibility was constrained by 'local and central intervention' (2.15).

The White Paper went on to outline proposals to:

- Allow the Home Secretary to set national key policing objectives. New Police Authorities to consist of half locally elected councillors, with the remainder to be three magistrates and five local people who together with the Chairman would be appointed by the Home Secretary.

- A responsibility for producing a 'costed policing plan based on local needs' within the national key objectives.

- The Chief Constable would be a fixed term appointment with responsibilities to direct and control the force within the local policing plan and national key objectives but remaining operationally independent.

As a result of the White Paper, the Police and Magistrates Court Bill received Royal assent in July 1994 but not without its fair share of controversy. In particular, the clause suggesting that the Chair of Police Authorities throughout England and Wales should be
appointed by the Home Secretary, lead to the suggestions that new layers of Quangos would result, and raised the possibility that the Home Office could effectively become the Chief Constable of Great Britain (Guardian 18/12/93:6). Others however went as far as saying:

Policing is not exactly local now. True local power has gone the way of the Watch Committee and Home Office Control over budgets has steadily grown (Young, 1993: 22).

Further pressure from within Parliament later led to the removal of this clause from the Bill.

The relationship between these parties after the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 (now consolidated in the Police Act 1996) can be summarised as follows:

Police Authorities:

- To consist of seventeen members; nine elected councillors, five independent members and three magistrates, responsible for the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force.

- Determine local policing objectives for their area, in line with the national key objectives and produce an annual policing plan to be drafted by the Chief Constable, setting out these objectives together with respective performance indicators and, at the end of each financial year, to produce a report to assess the effectiveness of the plan and its execution.

- Appoint and remove Chief Officers, with the approval of the Home Secretary and to remain as their disciplining authority.

- Responsible for obtaining the views of local people about policing matters both under the S.106 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Police Consultative Groups) and prior to the setting of local policing plans.

- To call for reports from Chief Constables in respect of any local policing matters.
The Home Secretary is parliamentary accountable for:

- Ensuring the provision of an effective and efficient police service.
- The setting of national key policing objectives.
- The power to direct Police Authorities in respect of the setting of performance indicators.
- Authority to set out codes of practice for Police authorities.
- Enabling Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary to inspect and report upon a force to ensure it is being ‘maintained effectively and efficiently’ and insist on any remedial action if appropriate.
- The power to call for reports from Police Authorities and from Chief Constables.
- The preparation of a ‘short list’ of candidates for independent members of Police Authorities.

The Chief Constable is responsible for:

- The independent direction and control of the force within the Police Authority’s Annual Policing Plan, an independence underlined by the Audit Commission report *Cheques and Balances: a framework for improving police accountability* (1994) which pointed out that policing plan objectives told Chief Constables what to do but not how to do it.

The annual policing budget is to be decided through consultation between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority according to a ‘costed policing plan’, closer to a purchaser provider arrangement. With the Police Authority becoming the purchasers of services, it was intended to enhanced their role through greater control over police services (Loveday 1994). No doubt the lessons learnt from the artificiality of the local market experienced in the Health Service, with the imposition of purchaser/provider arrangements that proved to be so disruptive have been learnt, and will prevent any future need to maintain the impression that a competitive relationship still exists (North 1998). However Loveday goes on to argue that the Police & Magistrates Court Act:
...gives the Chief Constable ultimate responsibility for finance and does not establish the purchaser/provider split which the Major government has found so necessary in all other public services (1996: 31).

The aim of the Act was to clarify the roles and lines of responsibility of these actors in the policing process, in particular to re-organise local Police Authorities, apparently in the belief that ‘Community support for the police would be encouraged.’ (Travis 1993:18) and to provide lines of communication with local communities, in terms of consumers, to allow their input into the policy making process. At the same time it ensured that the Home Office remained the dominant partner through funding, national key objectives, and controls over performance indicators, but still providing a responsibility opt out, should things go wrong, by setting broad policy stances but not prescribing how such policies should be implemented.

Proposals under the Government’s ‘Best Value’ initiative however may redefine the Chief Constable - Police Authority relationship, with Police Authorities having the responsibility to consult to ascertain policing priorities, and the Chief Constables to show they are giving best value based upon those priorities (Jenkins 1998). As well as the requirement for consultation between local authorities and other statutory bodies to present joint crime and disorder strategies under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and the consequences of the affects of research undertaken for that purpose (Reiner 2000: 211).

The present arrangement gives an opportunity to ensure better relationships between the police and the public (Shattock 1995) but at the same time very much rests upon the balance of influence between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority in terms of the
importance and priority of meeting local as against national, key objectives and performance indicators (Newburn 1995[a]:77. Newburn 1995[b]: 54).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

Established in the mid nineteenth century as a result of police reform, the Inspectorate was initially intended to ensure that local authorities provided statutory policing service, and to determine if the service provided was efficient, before local authorities could continue to receive funding from Central Government. They were intended to be independent from government and in the main comprised of retired Chief Constables.

More recently the Inspectorate has increasingly been seen to be working within pre-determined criteria set down by the Home Office (Oliver 1996: 72), with the inspection process becoming more probing; with more binding 'advice' on procedures and standards, and the recruitment of younger Inspectors. This central influence over policing through H.M.I.C has increased (Reiner 1992: 242), with its role being linked much more closely with Home Office policy (Weatheritt 1989: 107 - 112). Home Office Circular 114/83 (Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service) increased the power of H.M.I.C by ensuring that it became the means of enforcement in terms of ensuring effectiveness, efficiency and value for money from police forces.

The Citizens' Charter (1992 Cm 2101: 50) and the Government White Paper, Police Reform (1993. Cm 2281: pp 35-37) has since promised to place the inspection process on a more independent footing through greater public awareness of the role of H.M.I.C, the
introduction of lay inspectors and openness in terms of publication of inspection reports.

In 1995 Her Majesty's then Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Trefor Morris in an article in Police Review made it clear that the Inspectorate:

...has been the lever to bring about change but it cannot direct, only persuade, and rightly so (Morris 1995: 17).

The Inspectorate's remit has now been placed on a statutory base through the Police Act 1996. This includes ascertaining the effectiveness and efficiency of a police force in the manner it thinks best, by using their professional knowledge, based upon:

- The government's national key objectives (now Ministerial Priorities) and local objectives set out in the Annual Policing Plan (now Annual Performance Plan).
- Home Office policy on policing issues.

And to report in respect of the following:

- Performance against performance indicators in respect of national key objectives and any other performance indicators provided by Home Office Circular.
- Effectiveness of force strategies to attain both national and local objectives.
- Adequacy of the partnership between police and community.
- Any other matters affecting the service provided by that force.

H.M.I.C is also expected to provide advice in respect of:

- Policing plans.
- Key objectives.
Inspections are carried out on three levels; a Primary Inspection at three year intervals, an Annual Performance Review, and any number of ‘ad hoc’ Thematic Inspections in respect of various policy issues. Inspectors are based regionally, with a small team of seconded police officers, and civilian inspectors.

In a written answer to a Parliamentary Question on 14 December 1995 (No 306) in respect of the duties of the H.M.I.C, the then Home Secretary Michael Howard said:

I have made it clear that I will also be looking to the Inspectorate to report to me on the progress being made by police authorities and forces in establishing local strategies for building effective partnerships between police and the local community. (Quoted in Circular 67/1994: para 4 (Home Office 1994[b]).

This fuelled the debate that H.M.I.C duties may also include inspecting the performance of local police authorities, leading to the:

Home Secretary imposing his will on police authorities and forces through Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (Grenyer 1993:14-15).

However, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, David O’Dowd has made it clear that he acts as:

...the senior professional police advisor to ministers and as such plays an important part influencing policy making in a positive and constructive way for the service (1998: 7).

He sees the future as one of working within the parameters of the Governments’ Best Value initiative, with further collaboration between the Inspectorate and the Audit
Commission, which will bring H.M.I.C into a role of certification when historically the task has been ex facto review (ibid:7).

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has acquired the dual role of advisor and inspector:

H.M.I.C is charged with the duty to inspect police forces with regard to their efficiency and effectiveness but it also has a clear and formal function to advise, among others, the Home Office, Secretary of State police forces and police authorities. (Hughes et al 1997: 236)

*The Audit Commission*

The Audit Commission was set up in 1938 as an independent body, the members of which are appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment, are responsible to Parliament, to ensure the external auditing of local authority services, and to ensure that such services provide value for money. The Commission employs the District Audit Service, private firms and independent advisors to carry out its work. Since 1986 the Commission has published reports into police policies and practices gradually moving from generic areas of practice to the more delicate policy arena (Love 1991) and has been seen to have decided its role as also being one to change the way in which those being inspected carry out their work (Day & Klien 1990: 13). Audit Commission Police Papers; 'Reviewing the Organisation of Provincial Police Forces' (No9 February 1991) and 'Streetwise - Effective Police Patrol (1996) being good examples of this.

Jones et al (1996: 199-200) indicate that H.M.I.C consults closely with the Audit Commission, in respect of areas under investigation by the Commission, but both organisations stress their individual impartiality and independence. With many Chief
Police Officers having considerable confidence in the work of the Audit Commission and the Home Office, though not obliged to take on recommendations from the Commission, they are in fact doing so. The Audit Commission exerts a great deal of influence, to the point where it has been suggested that there is considerable overlap between its work and that of the H.M.I.C to the degree that a clarification of the roles or a decision to opt for just one of these inspection agencies needs to be urgently addressed (Roberts 1995).

Indeed the Audit Commission itself has stated that the police have been 'among the commissions most enthusiastic partners', that they are prepared to analyse their role and are willing to change (Audit Commission 1995).

The most striking criticism of the Audit Commission is that it does not take social values into account (Butler 1992), emphasising as it does, economy, effectiveness and efficiency; more recently the excessive criticism of its reports; and the problem of its dual role of 'policer and advisor' (Brown 1997).

Recently Government concerns for best value has lead the Audit Commission to suggest that regulation within the public sector should not be affected by organisational and professional divides but that the different systems of inspection and audit should be merged (Audit Commission 1999). Arguably this would allow the Audit Commission to take the leading role over other inspection bodies, including Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (Travis 1999).
The Association of Chief Police Officers

The Association of Chief Police Officers was formed in 1948, as a result of the amalgamation of a number of different associations, in consequence of the insistence of Lord Oaksey, the chairman of the Committee on Police Conditions and Service (Home Office 1949), to deal with representatives of Chief Constables from one association only. It has gradually moved from a loose social group of police officers above the rank of Chief Superintendent, into an association with a full time secretariat, and plays an important role on the policy making stage, through its various committees dealing with issues such as Crime, Traffic, Terrorism & Allied Matters.

Since the 1980’s when A.C.P.O was instrumental in setting up the National Reporting Centre to organise the policing of the National Miners Strike, the Association has been encouraged by the Home Office to maintain a high profile through standardisation and recommendations for good policing practices, being seen along with H.M.I.C as an ‘...important co-ordinating bodies between the Home Office and individual Chief Constables’ (Reiner 1991: 31).

The role of A.C.P.O however is seen as being more than merely a co-ordinating body but one which is active in making policy, particularly in its influence at force level. The more corporate state of the Association, setting agendas rather than attending to them; bringing members into a collective policy setting association, make it more difficult for individual Chief Constables to ignore A.C.P.O policy statements (Savage & Charman 1996 ). This is illustrated by the A.C.P.O Strategic Policy Document which set out the Police Services,
A.C.P.O is therefore a forum through which Chief Police Officers can express a corporate view of police policy. An Association which in practice can be expressed as an ‘emergent network of a national police organisation’ although most of its decision making processes remain outside the public arena and consequently not accountable (Jones et al 1996; Uglow 1988) but which none the less has considerable influence over local policing issues.

Police staff associations

The Superintendents Association, the Police Federation and U.N.I.S.O.N (representing the majority of civilian staff) are included here. Unlike the Association of Chief Police Officers, these groups are more influential in terms of protecting the rights and well being of their members but have now become more active nationally in the policy making process. However, the Police Federation, having been in existence since the police strike of 1919, did not fully involve itself in what may be termed ‘overt political activity’ until the mid 1960’s when it published an article called ‘The Problem’ which argued for better police pay to assist the ‘fight against crime’. Within the next ten years it was placing advertisements in the national press in respect of law and order policy, blaming the government of the day for failing to stop a rising crime rate and continuing to argue for higher pay. The Federation was later to bring pressure upon the subsequent Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Zander 1985) as well as its involvement, together with the

The Police Federation has disposed of the tradition of having a political advisor from the opposition benches in Parliament, leading to the accusation of their having a closer relationship with the party in power (Reiner 1992: 93), and has been criticised for taking out unnecessary litigation in respect of press reports that could identify police officers who are the subject of outstanding complaints; thereby greatly stifling any opportunity to adequately report such cases, which in itself was having an adverse effect upon crime prevention (Campbell 1997: 3).

The number of civilian staff employed by the police has increased over the past ten years and they are represented by the Trades Union, UNISON. Their main concern is the welfare of their members in terms of pay and conditions, and their input into the policy making process has been limited, although the Home Office has been seen to welcome their views (Jones et al 1994: 199).

It is clear that there have been considerable changes in the relationships between the key players, and greater controversy over issues of accountability and control since the late 1960’s. Before considering the research findings regarding the influence these key players have over local autonomy, both in police policy and practice, the next chapter will set out the research methodology.
CHAPTER THREE

THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research process, the desire to provide knowledge, requires the application of proven sociological tools, to ensure its reliability (its ability to be replicated) and to provide validity (the ability to measure what it is intended to measure and how the conclusions are generalised). This has to be coupled with a sound theoretical base, placing the research within a specific academic discipline which gives perspectives methods and a tradition (Gilbert 1993: xi). Account must also be taken of the assumption by social scientists that research which fails to achieve objectivity and truth should be rejected (Blaikie 1995), even if some philosophers argue that there is no such thing as truth (Trigg 1985).

No one sociological tool is superior to another and a wide range of techniques can be utilised according to the problem under consideration.

Such a perspective means that researchers cannot rigidly apply their methods but need to be flexible in their approach and utilise a range of methods for any problem (Burgess 1984: 143).

My first step in the research process was one of finding a problem, rather than producing an hypothesis, preferring a ‘research-then-theory’ approach to that of ‘theory-then-research’ (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1992: 46).

Good social science research requires a significant problem. Social science is a special kind of problem solving by which disciplined and logical social investigation attempts to answer questions about the social world and human existence. The social scientist is a man with a problem or he is nothing (Bulmer 1982: 38).
Sociological method has historically sought to assign labels to various systems of research: to put the science into the social sciences. From Durkheim's need to 'consider social facts as things' (Aron 1976: pp 69-79); the development of positivism, treating research into the social in a similar way to that of the natural sciences; the achievement of objectivity and the extent to which researchers can be detached from the subject under investigation, in order to understand human behaviour both in terms of cause and effect; to that of anti-positivism or realism where the intention is to discover the construction of social relationships in order to understand the reasons why we have the policies and practices we do. (May 1995:5-7).

Because social reality affects both the researcher and the researched it cannot be examined in isolated terms by value free observers, as it is a phenomenon which is constantly changed by the actors involved in the world being researched (Giddings 1976).

As a retired police officer I have to be aware of my own views of reality whilst carrying out this research, particularly in terms of the 'outsider/insider' debate in respect of social research (Brown & Waters 1993, Sheptycki 1994, Blaikie 1995, Reiner 2000). It is essential to ensure that my knowledge and experience of policing does not affect my objectivity, or devalue the response from those being researched, on the grounds that they may believe that my police background means that they do not have to fully explain the reasoning behind their views. For example, interviews with managers about the processes involved in deciding the contents of Force Annual Policing Plans illustrate that they did
not accept that I had any prior policing knowledge when they discussed these processes, and their perceptions of it.

However it is also important to use this knowledge to better describe the processes involved, in terms of participant experiences, rather than a mere commentary on my own experiences (Downes & Rock 1989: 66).

Being a retired police officer removes the problems of conflict inherent when performing the dual roles of police officer and researcher (Young 1991); it has eased the problems of access to the police organisation (Hughes 2000); and has increased the trust of those being researched, not simply by being a retired police officer, but being one that did not attain managerial rank, and therefore did not present a challenge to their knowledge and perceptions of the policy, implementation, and decision making processes. A good example to support this proposition are the responses from managers regarding the power of the Chief Constable in the selection of members of force policy committees, and the influence that these committees have in the local policy and decision making process.

The concept of social reality in terms of research into social policy issues is important and particularly so in respect of policing policy, leaning heavily as it does upon peoples' concepts of crime, public disorder and the correct methods to address these issues.

Man constructs his own reality. And with the help of others, he creates a social world. The construction of this world is related to the knowledge man develops, the ideas to which he is exposed, and the manner in which he selects and interprets information to fit the world he is shaping. Man behaves, then, in reference to his concepts of reality (Quinney 1970:277).
Through the use of triangulation technique (Denzig 1970) this research will endeavour to 'bridge' (May 1995) these approaches: to provide qualitative and quantitative data, with a view to explaining and describing the influences placed upon local policing policy, even if the split between quantitative and qualitative research is not as obvious as it once was (Hall & Hall 1996), nor as problematical as it may appear, (Bryman 1992: 63). Even though, as in my case, qualitative researchers often find it difficult to ignore the powerful argument that figures can bring in social research (Merger 1997:139).

I have deliberately avoided using the term methodology in respect of this thesis because of the problems of confusion between ‘research method’ and ‘research technique’, both of which are used interchangeably under the heading of methodology. Research method is an overall plan a general approach the logic of which guides the investigation and Research Technique is the tools and operations used to achieve the overall plan.

Method consists of a certain sequence of interrelated techniques linked together by the study plan. (Mayer & Greenwood 1980: 49).

The research method

Research plans within the area of public policy research suggest that it can be carried out to predict behaviour within the field of enquiry; to explain the views of those involved in the policy processes; to describe their actions; to interpret their behaviour (Young & Mills 1980), and for policy analysis in terms of ‘description - how policies are made’ and ‘prescription - how they should be made’ (Hogwood & Gunn 1989). It is not my intention to provide prediction or prescription in this research but to consider the influence that
various groups and individuals may have upon local policing both in policy and in practice.

This will be done by examining documents produced in respect of policy issues by The Home Office, The Audit Commission, and H.M.I, as well as Force Policy documents and Local Annual Policing Plans and, because it is important to remember that one of the drawbacks of examining public documents is the difficulty of critically analysing the politics that lay behind their contents (May 1993: 145-146), the perceptions of those involved in the policy process will be examined: those considered to form a part of an elite group within that process, for example; the intellectuals, managers and bureaucrats (Bottomore 1964); the front line service providers and 'gatekeepers' (Hall 1974, Foster 1983); and the interests of the more powerful considered against local, popular representation (Selznick 1966). The intention is to analyse their views, describe their actions, and interpret their behaviour, in terms of policy and practice.

My concern is to describe to those who may have little knowledge of the mechanics of policing policy, the various influences that effect this process in a non - metropolitan English police force and to provide some understanding of the problems involved in providing a public service which is free to users at its point of issue.

Description has a low status in social science. Descriptive studies can be contrasted unfavourably with more analytical and theoretically orientated research, as though description is a ‘low level’ activity hardly worth attention. This is somewhat ironic, since description permeates scientific theory and without it theories could have neither meaning nor application (Spradly 1980: 31).
The research techniques

To square the qualitative/quantitative circle I have employed a variety of techniques which I believe are appropriate for the problems being considered and will provide some balance between these two extremes.

Over a two year period structured interviews were undertaken with chief officers, senior managers and staff employed in departments involved in the policy making process at Headquarters (the top corridor) using an interview schedule (Appendix A). Members of divisional management teams throughout the force were also interviewed, as they are involved at a more local level of the policy process, and middle managers of Inspector rank in Plymouth, (ground level managers) where a type of Basic Command Unit policing system was in operation. In all cases the same interview schedule was used.

Members of the Police Authority were also interviewed to obtain a comparative response from ‘outside’ the police, using a different interview structure (Appendix B). The reason for using a different interview schedule is based upon Moser & Kalton’s (1983: 271) concepts for successful interviewing, namely that: the respondent must have knowledge of the subject in order to answer questions on it; the respondent must know what the researcher wants from him in terms of how technical or personal the answers need to be; and a desire on the part of the respondent to answer the questions truthfully.

These groups were targeted as they formed an elite within the force, who can give greater insight and value to the interview because they live in the world of ideas, politics and the
generalisation of policing (Marshall & Rossman 1995: 84), being directly involved in the business of making, deciding or advising upon force policy and, more importantly, because it is rare for researchers to gain access to the elites of the criminal justice system (Hughes 2000: 241).

The interview method was employed because research into organisational decision making relies upon those involved to tell others what happens:

To discover how anything happens in an organisation we ask people to tell us stories. To convince others that we know something about how things happen in organisations we construct and tell stories about those stories. As others react to our stories, they tell stories about stories we have told - and so on (O’Connor 1997: 304).

The schedule of questions made sure that any variations in the answers were genuine and not caused by any variations in the questioning (Ackroyd & Hughes 1992) and were undertaken as near as possible in the same manner, asking other questions only to:

a] Assist the respondent to talk.

b] Reassure the respondent if there are concerns about personal implications that might affect his/her reaction to the questions.

c] To give praise where necessary.

d] To shift the conversation to include a topic which has been overlooked.

e] To explain ‘implicit assumptions’.

(Rothlisberger & Dickson 1939: 203)

The interviews were tape recorded with the consent of the respondents and were transcribed as soon as possible afterwards, each interview lasting about one hour and its transcription taking about three hours. Each transcript was checked against the recording
and categorised both by question and also according to group, that is, The Top Corridor; The Police Authority; Divisional Managers; Ground Level Managers. This was done to compare individual replies within any one group, to gain an overview of the theme of each interview and also to provide an opportunity to compare replies between groups.

Analysing the results of the interviews was an on-going process, in that categorisation was completed immediately, but further work was carried out until a point was reached where the required information was ready for the thesis. This was done using 'template analysis' (King 1998), an approach which is 'most suited to interview transcripts' where:

The essence of the approach is that the researcher produces a list of codes (a 'template') representing themes identified in their textual data (Ibid: 118).

In this case recurring themes were coded in hierarchical order, under the general headings taken from the interview schedule (Appendix C). The data, in the form of supporting quotes, was finally brought together to provide an account (Dey 1993: 83) of the perceptions of police managers, in respect of the policy and implementation processes in the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary.

In doing this I have tried to reach a compromise of Maxwell’s (1996: 77) arguments about the advantage of dealing with the analysis immediately as against his reference to Seidman’s (1991) preference of leaving this until all the interviews are completed but I have been ever mindful of the need to be selective about the number of themes included, in that:
The critical task in qualitative research is not to accumulate all the data, but to get rid of most of the data you accumulate. This requires constant winnowing. The trick is to discover essences and then to reveal those essences with sufficient contact, yet not become mired trying to include everything that possibly might be described (Wolcott 1990: 35).

At the same time, published quotes from interviewees have not been edited, in order to avoid the possibility of altering the context of the response, whilst some comments representing a minority view have been included to prove that contradictory evidence has also been reviewed (Silverman 1993).

Fifteen respondents, including chief officers, senior managers and staff from departments at force headquarters involved in the policy making process (mainly the Executive Support and Special Projects Departments) were interviewed, representing about 60% of such headquarters staff. In addition, interviews were conducted with nine members (53%) of the Police Authority; twenty five senior divisional police managers (representing some 49%); and twelve ground level managers (90%) from one division. A total of 61 interviews, which compares favourably with the level of interviews in other police related research; for example Hoyle’s (1998) interviews of control room staff in respect of domestic violence issues, Choongh’s (1997) interviews of persons brought into police custody, and Plotnikoff and Wolfsan’s (1998: 2) research into Domestic Violence who interviewed 40 line managers, and 41 domestic violence officers.

Observation was used to gain an insight into the consultation process employed to consider the contents of the annual policing plan: internally within the police organisation, externally at public annual focus session of the regular police liaison meetings, and at three
Police Authority Meetings. Eight out of ten of the police focus group meetings and nine of the sixteen public focus group meetings were visited. Unlike the seminal work of White (1955) and Becker (1963) this research did not require gaining access into a social group, merely, after being permitted access by the organisation, participating as a member of the public or the organisation, as appropriate. Thus making the observation process simple; accessible; unobtrusive; and with activities which recur regularly at each meeting, achieving Spradley’s (1980: pp45-57) criteria for selecting the social structures for participant observation, as well as providing the opportunity to study the consultation process in its every day setting (Hammersley & Atkins 1983: 24) without influence.

Care has to be taken however in respect of what Madge (1969: 119-127) refers to as ‘the inadequacies of our sense organs’ and ‘observation and inference’. The former suggests that what the observer perceives at any given occasion depends upon his/her state of mind and body, in terms of alertness and comfort and that our ‘sense organs’ are not perfect; some things can be missed. The latter suggests that what we see is affected by our knowledge and past experiences, placing our own inferences on what we observe. The observer cannot act as a totally objective recording machine; observation and inference cannot be separated.

Using some concepts of content analysis, to ensure a structured technique and enable me to use non-quantitative documents and transform them into qualitative data (Bailey 1987), Her Majesty’s Inspectors’ Reports, and Home Office Circulars, were assessed to consider their influence upon force policy and practice. Annual Policing Plans were also examined
to describe their development and their effect upon local policing policy and practice.

As content analysis deals with comparison, the type of comparison being decided by the investigator’s theory. (Holsti 1969: 5) the use of a ‘what is said’ category as suggested by (Holsti 1969) and summarised in Frankfort -Nachmias and Nachmias (1992: 315) has been employed, namely:

- Subject matter - what is it about.
- Direction - how is it treated.
- Standard - how is it classified.
- Values - the goals and values revealed.
- Methods - how goals are achieved.
- Actor - who is undertaking particular acts.

Although Holsti (1969:95) believes that it is not sufficient for the researcher to trawl through documents merely to see what information can be used, but should represent the objectives of the research, Krippendorff (1980: 170) sees no methodological difficulty, if, after a general search to discover what information is available, the data is reassessed, to ensure that it is still meaningful, representative and appropriate for the area being researched and the data is justified by what the researcher wishes to discover.

The major part of this analysis will be of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, and as Holsti (1969) and Berelson (1971) have argued, both methods are effective in terms of content analysis.
The quantitative research consisted of a questionnaire (Appendix D) sent to a random sample taken from fifty per cent of the three hundred and ninety five front line police constables and sergeants based in Plymouth. This was done in order to look at policy making from opposing hierarchal ends of the organisation, from ‘below’ as well as ‘above’. Plymouth was chosen because it has the largest pool of officers of all ranks, gender, and length of service within the Force, it is one of the busiest police areas in the force, comparing favourably with similar cities elsewhere in the country (Povey et al 2001), and it has operated a type of Unit Beat Policing for some years.

Using a random digit chart (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1992: Appendix D) a total of one hundred and ninety eight Constables were selected, of whom sixty-seven (33.8%) replied.

Of these 24% had five years or less service; 29% had over five and under ten years Service; 21% had ten years and under fifteen years service; 12% had fifteen and under twenty five years service; and 13% had twenty five years or more service; with one missing value.

The same questionnaire was sent to all the Sergeants in Plymouth, a total of forty two officers, of whom twenty nine (58%) replied. Of these 3% had less than five years service, 21% had over five and under ten years service, 35% had ten years and under fifteen years service, 24% had fifteen years and under twenty five years service, and 17% had over twenty five years service. Of this group eighteen (87%) were male and three (13%) were female.
In total ninety six of the two hundred and forty officers replied (40%) of which 51% had over five and under fifteen years service in the force. A response rate almost comparable with that of Cheurprakobkit's (2001) 49.6% rate in his research into community policing, but far below the 75% achieved by Jones (1986) in her research into women in the police service.

\[ \text{SERVICE IN DEVON & CORNWALL CONSTABULARY} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>15</td>
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\[ (n = 96) \]

This can be further analysed in terms of their length of service in Plymouth, as set out in Figure 2, below:

\[ \text{LENGTH OF POLICE SERVICE IN PLYMOUTH} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>17.7</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
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\[ (n = 96) \]
The age profile of the sample is shown in the following figure; with the largest age group being thirty one to forty, representing 54.2% of the sample.

The work role profile of the sample can be seen in Figure 4, overleaf: the highest response rates coming from officers within the Criminal Investigation Department and Ward Constables.
The sample consisted of eighty-three male (87%) and twelve female (13%) officers, with one missing value (1%).

The results cannot be generalised to a wider population to any great extent; but they do give a description of the views of police officers about the influences they face, in terms of policy and practice.

In my case I am faced with the ‘compromise of what is desirable in pursuit of validity and what is practicable in terms of cost, time, politics and ethics.’ (Jupp et al 2000: 11).

In part two I will discuss the research in specific policy areas: each chapter will commence with an overview of the relevant theoretical issues; set out the research findings by bringing together data from interviews, questionnaires and published documents; and concluding comments. A final chapter will then bring the strands together in an overall conclusion.
PART TWO

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ORGANISATION

Every organisation needs to ensure that its activities are geared towards particular aims that permit its members to share common experiences and develop a corporate understanding of those experiences (Frederickson 2000: 49). Organisational activity is regulated, through task allocation, supervision, and co-ordination. It is these factors which make up the organisational structure, a structure which must be designed appropriately to ensure it is effective (Pugh & Hickson 1996: 4, Pugh 1997).

Therefore the organisational structure of police forces is an important issue when it comes to ensuring effective and efficient service provision (Bayley 1992: 538) but it has been a neglected subject for serious intellectual analysis (ibid: 541).

Using a macro approach (Bryan & Cronin 1986, Robey 1986) to the study of organisational structure, this chapter seeks to consider the higher structures rather than purely managerial aspects of the police organisation.

The study of organisations is an evolving process where earlier theories of organisations should not be forgotten, where classical does not mean outdated (Robey 1986: 26). Indeed police organisations themselves have been developed on classic organisational theory (Moore 1992).
Studies of the formal structural characteristics of organisations over the past thirty years have used the work of Max Weber as the starting point for discussion (Pugh & Hickson 1996: 9). Considering bureaucracy to be features relating to structure and function (Perrow 1972), it is Weber’s, organisational features and characteristics, together with his ‘ideal types’ of social action, and authority, which provide the most rational form of bureaucracy (Albrow 1970).

These ‘ideal types’ make it possible to identify the ‘empirical phenomenon’ that would need to be present in an organisation if it ‘had bureaucratic tendencies’ (Clegg 1994: 60).

Although Weber never defined bureaucracy (Albrow 1970) he listed the characteristics of an ideal type of bureaucracy which can be summarised as follows:

- A continuous organisation with specified function, or functions, its operation bound by rules. Continuity and consistency within the organisation are ensured through the use of writing to record acts, decisions and rules.

- The organisation of personnel is on the basis of hierarchy. The scope of authority within the hierarchy is clearly defined and the rights and duties of the officials at each level are specified.

- The staff are separated from ownership of the means of administration or production.

- They are personally free, subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations.

- Staff are appointed, not elected, on the basis of impersonal qualifications and are promoted on the basis of merit.

- Staff are paid fixed salaries and have fixed terms of employment, the salary scale normally graded according to the rank in the hierarchy with employment being permanent with a certain security of tenure and pensions usually paid on retirement. (Handy 1985: 192, Clegg 1994: 55).
Weber’s concept of bureaucracy as an ideal type is based upon his notion of ‘legal rational authority’ where:

- A legal code claims obedience from organisational members.
- Rules are applied to particular cases and the administration looks after the organisation within those rules/laws.
- The person exercising authority obeys these impersonal laws.
- Obedience is due not only to the person but to the impersonal order that grants him/her that position.


Organisational structure is most likely to be based upon five aspects of rational bureaucracy:

1. Specialisation - of work roles.
2. Standardisation - amount of rules and procedure.
3. Formalisation - amount of recorded instructions and procedures.
4. Centralisation - amount of decision making coming from the top.
5. Configuration - long or short chains of command.

(Pugh 1990: 46).

The label bureaucratic cannot be applied to all organisations (Gouldner 1954) and is less useful in areas where the work is unpredictable and non-routine. Similarly Burns & Stalker (1961) refer to mechanistic organisations where work is routine and the organisational structure is rigid; and organic organisations whose work is affected by the environment and have to be flexible in order to respond quickly to change.
Aspects of bureaucracy can be identified in police organisations, which are rank and power centred and maintain an emphasis on control (Green et al 1994), even though rational bureaucracies can be dysfunctional organisations (Merton 1952) in that strict compliance to the rules eventually become both a means and end in itself, resulting in goal displacement. This is particularly noticeable where government organisations are introduced to attend to social goals, but these are often lost in the pressure of work (Hogwood & Peters 1985: 52).

Organisational control

Gouldner (1954) sought to distinguish between rational rules, punitive rules and mock rules, and others have argued that the efficiency of organisations can be improved by rules, procedures and control (Jaques 1976, Drucker 1989). Conversely it has been argued that bureaucracy causes more problems than it solves (Peters & Waterman 1982, Handy 1988, Roddick 1991) and that a rational bureaucracy merely supports the 'iron law of oligarchy' where the few control the many (Michels 1949).

The introduction of information technology is another major influence which can 'threaten to change the balance of power within police organisations' and affect internal reorganisation between centralised and decentralised structures (Manning 1992: 384-388).

However it is through rules that the norms and expectations of the organisation, that its
social reality is formed, regardless of its personnel turnover (Hall 1972). Rules provide the criteria for decision making, rather than stipulating what the decision should be, they permit greater freedom of action (Blau et al 1973) and allow members of police organisations to participate in the decision making process despite the perceived emphasis on control (Wycoff et al 1994: 89).

Organisational design

In order that organisations can be managed effectively Fayol (1949) proposed that their structure should consist of:

- Specialisation - by function and labour.
- Scalar principle - hierarchical chain of command.
- Unity of command - employees report to one supervisor.
- Span of control - an effective level of supervision.
- Vertical communication - an official means of communication through a chain of command.
- Minimum level of authority - reducing levels of authority.
- Line and staff divisions - line for product decisions staff for personnel decisions.

(Bryans & Cronin 1983: 10, Pugh & Hickson 1997: 100).

Models of organisational design have been criticised for bringing complex sets of relationships into a simple framework (Katz & Kahn 1978: 285). Despite this however, there remains an academic need to classifying organisations, in a similar way to the layman's desire to discover the similarities and differences, both amongst, and between them (Salaman 1979: 55).
Centralisation or decentralisation: the continuing conundrum

Organisational design can be centralised, with an authority relationship between those in control and the remaining staff, which can be achieved, for example, through the following structures:


   b) Functional structures. Director - functional departments.

   c) Divisional structures. Director - product departments.

   d) Dispersed structures. Head office - regional or area departments.


The greater the control the greater the centralisation.

Or they may be decentralised, with control delegated from the centre, which monitors, evaluates and considers strategic issues, rather than controlling operational matters.

As Mintzberg (1979:181-213) points out, issues of centralisation and decentralisation have been discussed since organisations were first written about, but for him, the former means that the power for decision making often lies with one person, at a single point in the organization; whilst the latter allows this power to be dispersed among many individuals at all levels of the organisation: terms representing two ends of a continuum, but still allowing some organisations to partially decentralise, leaving more power than necessary at the apex of the structure.
Organisational structures can also be described as tall or flat. These are identified by the ‘number of levels according to its size’, a tall structure being one with many levels of hierarchy, and one in which managers have ‘a low average span of control’ in comparison to its size (Child 1986: 58-84).

The intractable bureaucracy

Police forces are both complex and formal organisations (Stanyer 1994: 35), the structures of which should be designed to ensure that they function effectively (Gianakis & Davis 1998: 486). However as Crank & Langworthy (1996) argue, a normative approach to the design of police organisations assumes that the organisation can be controlled by its managers (p214), whereas in fact front line police officers are often not controlled by the organisation (ibid: 229), even though policing is a punishment centred bureaucracy (Waddington 1999 [b]: 301).

Following Meyer and Rowland (1977), Crank & Langworthy (ibid) go on to argue that formal organisational goals are separated from the day to day work of front line staff, thereby, allowing them to carry out the day to day work of the organisation whilst organisational structures and formal goal statements can appease managers and institutional authorities (p217). They conclude that ‘fragmented centralization’, brought about by the complexities of local and central government funding, has resulted in organizational structures and policies being grafted, haphazardly, onto existing organisational arrangements (p226).
Others argue that the design of police organisations has been based upon a military model (Manning 1977; Critchley 1978) exhibiting a militaristic attitude to its related tasks and providing an environment best suited to a uniformed service (Hobbs 1989: 79). As such it is, organisationally, based upon a hierarchy, a military model, which generally has not been open to public participation (Gianakis & Davis 1998: 486), a service which is organisationally similar to a militaristic bureaucracy (Chan 1997: 44), where increasing bureaucratisation brings greater task specialisation (Reiss 1992: 71): an organisation based upon a military model, and one that is not suitable for policing (Waddington [a] 1999: 228).

Gianakis & Davis (ibid: 488) argue that if we accept Bayley’s (1994) elements of community policing (namely: consultation, command devolution, mobilisation of agencies, remedying problems that cause crime, and focused problem solving) then police organisations must take up an organic structure. This means adopting a participatory management style, a decentralised command structure and more importantly, ensuring that the structure of the organisation does in fact change, not merely change its operational practices in order to support the legitimacy of the existing structures.

Classic organisational theory has provided what at first glance appears to be a list of simple propositions about the formal structure of organisations that do not do justice to the complex issues which are involved (Ham & Hill 1987: 14). However it should be remember that it is a singular feature of bureaucracy that once it has become established it is in Weber’s words ‘escape proof’. (Giddens 1985: 182).

Bureaucracy, therefore, meant control by experts - men with the skill and knowledge to be able to apply technical rules and norms that govern the functioning of modern organisations (Salaman & Thompson 1980: 11).
Pressure for change

Although police organisations have been described as 'the most intractable of public bureaucracies', capable of resisting external pressures to change, even to the extent of eventually preventing it (Gyot 1979), there has been pressure from the Audit Commission to change the shape of police organisations from tall hierarchical structures, where the 'lines of command are often longer than necessary' to that of 'territorial units' resulting in 'trimmer forces with basic command units being held responsible for policing their own communities, given an adequate share of resources to meet their objectives' (Reviewing the Organisational Structure of Provincial Police Forces. Audit Commission Paper No.9. 1991).

Further pressure at this time came from the recommendations of the Morgan Report (Home Office 1991) for the greater involvement of local authorities in community safety issues.

The basic command unit (B.C.U), comprising Bayley's (1994) attributes of community policing, is another 'buzz word' for the police service, popular in discussions about police organisations.

Notwithstanding the fact that the system remains in its relative infancy, it quickly secured the unqualified support of the Audit Commission, H.M Inspectorate and the Home Office - primarily because of the scope it appeared to offer to reduce management on-costs. It was also seen to be very much in line with contemporary popularise belief that the police service should be more accountable to the local communities policed (Anon.1995: 3).
The Ward Policing system employed in Plymouth was seen as an example of a Basic Command Unit, where the division was divided into two main groups, response officers and community patrol officers; the latter being split into teams each corresponding to the thirteen political wards in the division. The Audit Commission (1996: 67) described Ward Policing as being likely to ‘...increase public reassurance, reduce crime levels, increase detections, raise the status of the patrol constable and strengthen inter-agency links.’

However, in spite of the pressure for the police to become more responsive to local opinion, the police service still feared that the issues of economies of scale and cost effectiveness may result in regional ‘super forces’ (Bourne 1998).

Further changes to the police organisation were suggested by the (Sheehy) Inquiry into Police Responsibility and Rewards (Cm 2281: 1993), a report considered to have been instigated and driven by the influence of market forces (Cope et al 1996). This report made a number of contentious recommendations in respect of structure, suggesting that the management structure was top heavy, and recommending the abolition of three of these hierarchical management levels. In terms of remuneration, it suggested the introduction of performance related pay, the removal of allowances, and new conditions of service, through fixed term contracts. However, as pointed out earlier, these, along with many other recommendations made in the report, have not been implemented.

*The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary - the organisational structure*

Prior to April 1994 organisational diagrams for the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
displayed the functional responsibilities of headquarters departments by specialisation, and dispersed into territorial divisions, each displaying the attributes of Weber’s five prominent characteristics of bureaucracy and Fayol’s aspects of managerially effective organisational design.

Following a traditional structure it set out the Chief Constable as effectively the managing director of the organisation, with a Deputy Chief Constable reporting directly to him and four Assistant Chief Constables (one of whom was a civilian Assistant Chief Officer) who in turn report directly to the Deputy. In addition the Deputy Chief Constable had four staff departments organised by specialisation, for example an Executive Support Department, which also reported directly to him.

Each Assistant Chief Constable had responsibility by specialisation in respect of operational matters, crime matters, personnel, and finance/technical support. These general areas were further divided hierarchically by specialisation, for example operational matters include traffic branch, operations support, policy and planning. Each of these are further divided by specialisation and hierarchy through a rank structure generally consisting of a Chief Superintendent, Superintendent(s), Chief Inspector(s), Inspector(s), Sergeant(s), Constables, Civilian Staff, and Special Constabulary.

In reality however the Force was not seen as exhibiting the expected top down organisational control, with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Report of the Force for 1990 (H.M.S.O) suggesting it:
'.... operated within a strongly de-centralised organisational philosophy, providing a considerable measure of autonomy to territorial commanders.' (para 2.17) and added the caveat of a need to strengthen central support to, amongst other things, '...ensure the communication, practice and monitoring of force policy..' (ibid).

Organisational Diagram - Pre 1994

![Organisational Diagram](image)

The six territorial divisions were similarly organised both by specialisation, hierarchical chains of command, and through dispersed structures, resulting in twenty sub-divisions throughout the force, each with its own hierarchical system of control. The organisation at this time gives the impression of decentralisation with monitoring and evaluation from the centre, a tall structure with many levels of management, low spans of control, and perpetuating the Street Level and Management Level dichotomy, found in police organisations (Punch 1983, Reuss-Ianni & Ianni 1983).

Fig 5
The Traditional Structure of Divisions and Sub-Divisions - Pre 1994

Influencing change: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and The Audit Commission

In their 1991 Report (H.M.S.O) the Inspectorate states that it is '....satisfied that the number and structure of territorial divisions are appropriate for the size of the force and the concentration of operational activity.' (para 2.39).

However the 1992 Report (H.M.S.O: para 8.5) referred to advice given to the Chief Constable by letter from H.M.I.C that year on 'the structure and organisation...taking into account the Audit Commission proposals'(referring to their Paper 9 of 1991 op cit) and making a number of recommendations:

- Leaner and flatter management structure.
- Removal of unnecessary supervisory ranks.
- Greater delegation of responsibility to divisional commanders.
- Setting local performance standards agreed by Chief Constable and Police Authority.
- A published system of measuring those standards.
• Local community consultation and customer surveys.
• Clear policing style based on community needs.
• A performance review Inspectorate above the level of basic command units.

As a result of their 'discussions' with the Chief Constable, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary reported that the force intended to 'undertake a wide ranging review into the command structure at Chief Officer and Chief Superintendent levels within all areas of the force....primarily concerned with the points raised in the Audit Commission Paper Number 9.' [para 8.6].

The Report for 1993 (H.M.S.O) noted that an evaluation of the force operational structure had commenced in 1992 and was based upon the previously noted letter from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Audit Commission Report, which had 'identified the potential for change in the existing force structure' (para 2.34).

Consequently a project team was set up in January 1993 to undertake a 'comprehensive revision of the force headquarters structure' and the 'implementation of a new departmental structure embracing all aspects of operations, crime management, executive support, staff services and administration and technical services.' (para 2.35). The next part of the project entails an '...option for change document in relation to divisional management structures...' with ..... 'identified savings in a number of senior management ranks' which could be implemented by April 1994. (para 2.36).

The Force Structure reproduced in the Chief Constables Annual Report 1996/97, shows the
Deputy Chief Constable as having three departments (Public Relations, Executive Support and Internal Affairs) which report directly to him, and force headquarters retaining three force wide specialist departments each headed by a Chief Officer:

- **Operations**
  - Criminal Investigation Division
  - Operations Division

- **Operations Support**
  - Criminal Justice Department
  - Personnel
  - Community Affairs
  - Training
  - Technology
  - Support Services for Criminal Investigation and Operations Divisions

- **Finance & Administration**

Territorially the force was divided into nine geographical divisions in the form of dispersed structures. Each was led by a divisional management team headed by a divisional commander, and consisting of Chief Inspectors with particular responsibilities for criminal investigation, operational support and personnel, and a civilian administration officer. The use of sub-divisions and their corresponding rank structures and specialises within divisions were removed. Consequently the levels of management were reduced - those which remained were given wider spans of control and the organisation was seen as becoming flatter in design. (Fig. 7).
The organisational diagram does not give an indication of the chain of command between Divisional Commanders and Headquarters but this appears to remain unchanged. The design of territorial divisions does allow them to become more co-terminus with local authority boundaries than the previous arrangement.

Divisional Organisational Diagram - 1994 to 1999

```
Divisional Commander

Criminal Investigation Operational Support & Personnel Administration

Inspectors—Divisional Duty Officers

Sergeants Constables
```

Fig: 7

In the 1994 Report (H.M.S.O) Her Majesty’s Inspector made it clear that the force was undergoing great change and that the intention was to ‘....remove a tier of territorial management and introduce a flatter organisation which is more closely aligned to local communities.’ (para 9.1). They go on to congratulate the Chief Constable for ‘....the bold and positive steps which he and his officers have taken to seek to implement it.’ (para 9.2). The report went on to criticise the force for failing to offer earlier and clearer guidance to divisions from the centre, leaving them to find their own answers to any occurring problems. The H.M.I. felt that further reviews would ascertain if management structures both in division and at headquarters were still ‘too generous’. There was also concern that
the centralisation of certain crime activities may result in 'diffusion of effort' and 'lack of
co-ordination' at local level (para 9.3).

The 1995 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Report, the first after full
implementation of the force organisational change, noted that 'Possibly a casualty of the
re-organisation has been the loss of confidence in the formal internal consultative
processes which should be addressed urgently.' (page 1).

The 1996 Performance Review Inspection (H.M.S.O) report underlined the requirement
for headquarters divisions to support territorial divisions which was not properly shown
either in the planning, decision making or resource allocation processes (p1) and went on
to note that the re-structuring of the force had reduced supervisory ranks as a percentage of
all officers '...from 43% in 1994 to 39% in 1996..' (para 4.22).

By the time of the 1997 Report (H.M.S.O) the Chief Constable had already implemented
another review of the force organisation to '...assess whether the original aims of re-
organisation have been met and recommending any additional changes..' and was expected
to suggest options for rationalising support services (para 2.2).

More recently the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has made it essential that all territorial
divisions are co-terminous with local authority areas, in order that the necessary
consultative and planning processes can be more easily complied with. This was noted in
the 1998/99 Inspection Report (Home Office 1999) in that the Act will '...increasingly
affect policing style and impact on core business. The current management structure needs to be clarified to take account of this significant change. This advice appears to have been accepted by the force, in that as from April 1999, the force now consists of four areas: Cornwall, Plymouth, West Devon, and East Devon. Each headed by a Chief Superintendent or Area Commander, supported by an Assistant Area Commander, a Personnel Officer and an Administration/Finance Officer. Each Area will provide its own policing plans, operations strategy, budget and personnel management, and administration teams. Areas will be sub-divided into Districts, force-wide a total of sixteen, each following district or unitary political boundaries, and headed by a Superintendent or Chief Inspector.

**Area Structure - 1999**

![Area Structure Diagram](image)

Fig: 8

This latest change in organisational structure took place after the research interviews with Top Corridor and Divisional Managers were completed.
Who were the major influencers?

Clearly, then, the 1990’s saw considerable changes in the organisational structure for the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, many instigated by Central Government. However, headquarters had some degree of control over how changes were made, and this is reflected in staff views of the process. Here we consider staff views under the headings: influencing change, why the change, how it was implemented, and future changes.

For top corridor managers

Overwhelming influence from the centre as this quote established:
‘The Audit Commission was the main influence and inevitably the H.M.I.’ [12].

For divisional managers

Views of these managers are summed up in the following quote:
‘I think for me the most powerful influences come from the Audit Commission. The Audit Commission seem to presage any line of approach. The H.M.I.C then takes it on and between the two of them they tend to make the Chief Constable dance, and influence the changes. The primary changes tend to be those that are financially driven. So we’re in the business of giving good value, or value for money. Those are the sort of things which tend to bring about changes. I’m not altogether sure that those on the table at the moment, talking about 30% increase in administrative costs across the force, because you now have nine divisions. I’m not altogether sure that’s the reason why we’ve got that rise in administrative costs. I think we need to look far more closely at what is happening at headquarters, because I think we are far leaner [in division] and meaner. What we see is
that all the administrative work is being palmed out to us, delegated to us, and there’s not been a reduction behind us. If anything there’s actually been an increase in administrative centralisation. Now therefore I think the actual pressures to change come specifically from those two bodies in particular. Subsequently I don’t feel that at the moment there’s been sufficient examination of how those changes are being evaluated, whether they’ve actually addressed the so-called problems in the first place.’ [45].

For ground level managers

For ground level managers - the Chief Constable, the Audit Commission and the Home Office were seen to have the greatest influence:

‘The most influence must have come from the Home Office, Audit Commission and the Chief Constable in person throughout the process of deciding how the force was to be reorganised. There was some consultation, there were some representatives, and these were made known to me, so that I could contact them if I had any ideas. These were put out through weekly orders and through regular documents that came out asking for suggestions. So I think they did ask for ground root views, but I think that pressure was put on, mainly because the Audit Commission and the Home Office were looking to save money and looking to make things more efficient and streamlined.’ [24].

Another manager said:

‘I think the re-organisation along council boundary lines is another thing from the government to make local people feel that they have got a little more control over their
police force, although I think it comes from Central Government from whatever arm of central government. We fail in many areas because of the lack of resources at the front end. Money and energy has gone into the driving and technology side of things and research, but the balance of staffing is not right and if this were right we would be a lot more effective. There are a lot of support divisions to the detriment of those which are operational. This is not the fault of Central Government but of individual forces." [27].

Why was the structure changed?

For top corridor managers

Most ‘top corridor’ managers and staff believed that these changes had been made to flatten the organisational structure by removing a management tier and carried out as a result of influence from the centre:

‘The changes came from an Audit Commission report saying that the police service was top heavy in terms of management costs and required a cut of ten per cent which in turn would get more bobbies on the beat. Less management and more work on the streets with more supervision. The force saw that the old system of sub-divisions was obsolete. The structure should be headquarters and divisions. To do this it has increased the number of divisions but all the little sub-divisions with Chief Inspector ranks went, leaving only Inspectors at the old sub-divisional levels. This proved to be a model for police forces throughout England and Wales to follow. The H.M.I then took it further during his inspection process in respect of management on costs and said to the force, what are you doing about it.’ [12].

And:
We were already aligned with local authority boundaries. The force was trying to get ahead of the game and tried to make changes which it believed would have to be made through pressure from the centre but that eventually didn’t materialise. The whole thing was handled very badly.' [8].

For divisional managers

Divisional Managers followed a similar view with one manager seeing the force reaction as ‘second guessing’:

‘Effectively it started from Sheehey and it started from the push that was there and through the H.M.I to look at basic command units. It was ‘Z’ Department’s (as it was then) job to review how basic command units could brought into the force - if that was the best way forward. And within that there were some good decisions that have lasted the test of time, that came from that, one of them was making co-terminus boundaries with local authorities, which was the right move. It second guessed ‘Batton’ but it second guessed it, well the only one it got wrong was Exeter, because it was second guessed that Exeter may well be a unitary authority and it turned out not to be so.’ [54].

And:

'I think its all about money. Its all about cause and effect and the budgets that the police force spends nationally apart from the treasury set up. It probably was time for a change anyway. I have no problem with the new structure. I think that we were in a management construct, top heavy with managers, and I think that was recognised and that was one positive effect of Sheehey and it receives my total support. I think we are better for it, but the whole motivation probably wasn’t any altruistic concern about improving the service,
taking us through to the year 2000 and the rest of it. It was all about how much bloody money could we save.’ [31].

For ground level managers

Generally a desire to save money:

‘In terms of police management, yes, there was an excessive tier of management which was quite rightly identified. However the savings in terms of salary were not actually re-directed to where they were needed and were absorbed for other reasons, that’s not to frontline policing.’ [29].

And:

‘For this division unitary status was being talked about at the time but the driving force behind it all was the desire to save money. [32].

How was change implemented?

For the top corridor

Many Top Corridor managers said that the changes were decided and implemented by a special project team, with the assistance of work groups throughout the force:

‘A special projects team managed the implementation and the policy. There were also a number of working groups to decide how to implement and what the implications would be of the change. A number of news letters were also published and distributed to members of the force.’ [3].
It was generally agreed that this was not a standard approach to policy implementation, many were unhappy with the process and the end product, the main complaint being that implementation was too rushed with insufficient consultation with staff:

‘...done without a lot of thought as a result of demands from outside and elsewhere and all done urgently, as a result it was introduced so rapidly that it was very inefficient for the first few years.’ [14].

For divisional managers

Divisional Managers saw the decision making process in respect of organisational changes through special project teams or working parties, implemented through a top down approach, which they consider to be the standard method:

‘To my knowledge they set up a force review team which reviewed it. Now we’ve got more pilots in this force than we had in world war one and two put together, and they’re still going on. But yes, it was promulgated from on high, and review teams came out and spoke to divisional commanders to seek their views, which went back up. Some things were taken on board others weren’t. I see this as standard practice, some of it is good. I mean there’s a lot of good ideas, and probably more ideas, from the lads on the ground than there actually is from the top and if the system only works once under the present system and you get a positive result then that’s good.’ [38].

Views on its top down implementation ranged from the philosophical:

‘There was a debate at the time as to whether we had set up working groups to set up the re-structures over a twelve month period or actually get on with it, and deal with it through
what I call rapid prototyping, which is just rebuilding it and do it as we go along, which is what we did, we did for the second one. The reason for not going with the more structured approach was that we knew that if we studied it for a year by the time we got to the end of the year it would be a different world and you couldn’t dot every dot, cross every tee, because we were going into the unknown in so many areas. So I think rapid prototyping actually worked. It gave us a better value but I think it caused more chaos and probably higher anxiety levels, and I’ve just been reading some stuff about other forces who wanted a more studied approach actually found themselves going into rapid prototyping because they found that the only way to go forward.’ [53].

To the blunt reply:

‘I would say it was presented as a fait accompli to the employees of the organisation without much consultation.’ [46].

For ground level managers

Ground level managers were not fully conversant with the decision making and implementation processes involved in the changes to the organisation, but most of those who did, felt that it was generally a top down approach with some consultation:

‘Smack bang wallop! We did have a consultation process, saying we wanted ward officers, with the city broken up into political wards with a sergeant running his own ward because we feel we have to give the constable back to the community - but we’ve got to have this ability to respond, so you have to have response units. So Russ Mitchell put this plan together and there was consultation and there was a bit of tweaking but then it was “Right
‘E’ Division we are going to do it on April 9th, 1994!” It was done a year before anyone else it was up and running, before anyone else had even put a plan in. It was that quick: you are going to have nine divisions and get on with it, but here, because of the strength of character of the Divisional Commander, he has the support of everybody and this is why it has worked. This doesn’t always happen. We were all told on the 9th April you will be here you will be there and we were and within a week it was up and running. This is not normally how this sort of policy would be implemented. Wheels usually turn very slowly.’ [21].

Or perhaps more cynically:
‘I think that some of the consultation that went on was done as a man management exercise rather than actually taking on board the feelings of the staff. They can say they have consulted but really they are listening but taking no notice.’ [19].

Future changes
Top Corridor managers were confident that there would be further changes to the organisational structure as indicated by this manager:
‘Yes, because the decisions taken were based upon the influencing factors at the time. Some of these may have changed. There may be therefore an opportunity to further rationalise the structure of divisions in the future’ [1].

Divisional Managers strongly believed that there would be changes to the organisation over the next few years, some to greater centralisation:
‘I have a feeling that in fact it will become more centralised. Less independence and again
I think that’s because of financial considerations more than operational need. It’s been my experience that organisations which are under pressure financially claw back and take greater and greater control from the centre: whereas in more favourable times they are quite happy to devolved and let people do their own thing. So my own view is that I think that divisions could in fact get bigger.’ [31].

Whilst there is always someone who has seen it all before:

‘Yes, we’re forever changing aren’t we and you’ve got people who are bringing in these changes, who all think it’s a damned good idea but a lot of it has been tried before anyway.’ [52].

However, divisional managers did not envisage that police areas/divisions would ever become autonomous units within the host force, most based this upon logistical difficulties. This was a typical response:

‘That’s an extreme and if it happens it will be a retrograde step because no division on its own has the resources to deal with every issue that comes up and despite the difficulties there are with the ‘support divisions’ the concept of ‘O’, ‘L’ and ‘M’ is right. [41].

Organisational structure - a question of terminology?

Top Corridor Managers considered that the force structure at the time of the research was one based upon the concept of ‘Basic Command Units’. One replied:

‘Yes. However the Chief Constable would be semantic and say that there is nothing basic about a police command unit.’ [10].
Like the Top Corridor Managers, most divisional managers saw the force as taking on board the general principle of basic command units, although many felt there were problems of defining the concept:

‘In a different name yes. I think what you have is you’ve got a number of forces up and down the country using different nomenclature for their policing systems. There’s community policing basic command units you’ve got sub-divisions that others have and other police units having different names.’ [43].

And:

‘Yes all our divisions are B.C.U’s but in another name. It’s just that the decision was that we wouldn’t wish to go with that terminology in this constabulary. Leading on from that however there has been a huge argument as to which devolvement is appropriate to a B.C.U or a division. If the central control and influence is right you’ll get a whole range of opinions about that.’ [22]

Ground Level Managers also believed that the force structure was based on a form of basic command units:

‘I’m not really sure how big a basic command unit can be. We’ve got a basic command unit in Plymouth with a commander in charge of it. You could have a B.C.U, well we have units out in divisions with inspectors in charge and each is a B.C.U, so I don’t know how well it works elsewhere but that’s the style the force is built on.’ [32].

Ward policing

The ‘basic command unit’ in operation in Plymouth at the time of the research was
referred to as ‘Ward Policing’ to further compound the terminology issue.

Described by one member of the Top Corridor as giving:

‘...... total ownership of the problems of an area to a given number of officers and when they go home they retain these problems until they next return to duty. This gives them a commitment to trying to solve these problems. The political ward was chosen as it is the smallest ‘Joe-political’ area where each ward has three elected councillors and larger councils tend to divide their own resources from the centre using the ward system.’ [10]

And that to measure its success it required a ‘before and after’ process:

‘One would be by the ‘before and after’ method. and by looking ahead to compare current crime and incident records with those when ward policing is at its peak. It must be seen agreed that now there are many more abstractions from ward teams to support the response teams. Also qualitative public surveys as well as comparing specifics for example crime patterns.’ [8].

However there was a problem of defining success:

‘The problem is how do we measure success. We need a debate to ask what policing is before we understand success. Operational policing strategy is required to encompass ward policing, patrol and maintain public reassurance. We do not know where these things fit into each other. I believe the government see it as a crime control model only.’ [4].

The majority view was that it was a system that suited a large urban area, to provide both a community policing approach, as well as a parallel quick response to immediate problems, and where policing could be organised alongside existing political boundaries. They did however consider it a scheme that could be used in a number of other areas within the
force and there were comments that this had happened already; there had also been considerable interest from other forces, from the H.M.I and the Audit Commission.

Divisional Managers believed that the system was effective for an urban area such as Plymouth where it had been given considerable momentum by the divisional commander at that time:

‘It was Mr. Mitchell’s [the former Divisional Commander] strategy because it was down to each commander in each division to make the best use of their resources and each commander made that decision.’ [23].

But not just in Plymouth:

‘We’ve got a similar system here. I think it was introduced into Plymouth because the divisional commander had the foresight to do so but my knowledge of policing in Plymouth is not good.’ [44].

Most Divisional Managers saw the success of the system in terms of public satisfaction:

‘In a number of ways. In terms of public opinion, political opinion too, my own understanding is that on both those counts there would be ructions in Plymouth if we tried to disband the ward system because it is very popular with the politicians and by implication by a lot of the public. People like to know that they have their own police officers working in their areas and the ward system is designed to provide them with that. So that is one level where you can measure success through public esteem.[22].
Ground level managers interviewed worked within the Ward Policing structure. Most of them believed that this system was introduced because it suited Plymouth and was supported by the then divisional commander:

'The divisional commander who is very progressive and has done a lot of things here much of which has spread to the rest of the force. It has spread to other parts of the force but it doesn’t necessarily work in other parts of the force where as you have all the infrastructure here and its working very well.' [25].

Once again ground level managers see public satisfaction as the measurement for its success:

'I think firstly there is a public perception and an agency perception as well with the people we work with at ward level be it councillors, voluntary groups and agencies, they are certainly very positive about it and also the influence that ward teams have and the success they have in the projects and initiatives they run.' [28].

And:

'Public opinion. Which is good. This is done through headquarters. It is good but perhaps not as good as in other places where they are less busy, remembering that we have 28% of the force crime here. We are pretty busy but you would never have seen a policeman on the beat before.' [16].

**The outcomes of organisational change**

**Communication - internal and external**

Most Top Corridor managers felt that the organisational structure at the time of the
research did not provide for good internal communication, between local commanders and headquarters, with blocks and black holes, for example:

‘Probably very poor. The flow of information up the organisation is slow but it works. It doesn’t filter down very effectively however. I don’t think the system is in place to allow this. I sure many people think that headquarters is the black hole of the force which everything disappears into’ [9].

However most Divisional Managers felt that changes to the organisational structure prior to 1999 did give better local communication:

‘There is plenty of liaison and good communication. Both Divisional Commanders I have worked with have put themselves out to ensure they have good communication with members of the local community. I think the police service leads the way in all organisations now in communicating with the public and being accessible, so I think it’s good and effective.’ [20].

Externally they felt that changes to the structure had resulted in better communication between the public, Divisional Commanders and Chief Officers, although views varied as to how this had been achieved. This comment is a good summary:

‘You could say that removing the sub-divisions hasn’t helped but removing a tier of middle management may have assisted communication. The number of police liaison groups has also increased and may make communication better. We have more geographically based responsibility. Inspectors and urban ward sergeants now have this responsibility rather than divisional commanders, as previously, which improves communication with the public. Removal of a layer of middle management makes the organisation rely upon a
concerted effort by members of the Divisional Management Teams to communicate because there are less of them and more inspectors. It is harder work for them but the information they receive is better and more realistic.' [3].

Many ground level managers suggested that communication had improved:

'Internally within this division we are far more responsive to public needs and issues and that's mainly through the setting up of the ward structure, the community structure.' [28].

However problems were highlighted with communication between divisions and headquarters:

'We now have three divisions in Plymouth, all fighting their own corner. You've got 'E' Division policing out on the street, you've got 'M' Div. dealing with the prisoners and is telling 'E' Div. what to do. Papers then go to an Admin Support Unit in 'M' division that say what they are going to do with those papers and they tell 'E' division what they do or don't want. You've got 'O' Division which takes the telephone calls from members of the public and work the radios and they decide how quickly 'E' Division will respond to those calls. You've got 'L' Division who deal with serious crime in 'E' Division. You have five divisions but they do get together and talk around a table. Well the inspectors have meetings but all they do is agree to disagree. I would suggest because they've all got their own budgets and they are fighting their own battles. For instance you've got an inspectors meeting where you'll sit around a table but at the end of the day the 'A.S.U' Inspector doesn't come down there with the attitude that we've got a problem in 'E' Division that we must resolve. He is 'M' Division and 'E' Division is causing him problems. The 'Management Team' for 'M' Division is based at Exeter and I would suggest that they do
not communicate with ‘E’ Division ‘Management Team’ at Plymouth. When a major crime is committed, like the on going murder enquiry here, then ‘L’ Division take control but in doing so they take staff from ‘E’ Division, so do we really need a separate ‘L’ Division under these circumstances. Even our crime squads and intelligence officers are all ‘L’ Division. We have created lots of Divisions which are putting up barriers.’ [34].

However information technology was seen to carry out a ‘big-brother’ role in respect of how incidents were dealt with at a local level:

‘Since the force took on its ‘IT’ systems with the computer for example everyone in the organisation has great communication skill right through the organisation. The paper-less system we have got is excellent. Sometimes it is too good and you find that someone at headquarters is making decisions on the computer message log for you on the job you are doing down here. It can be too good.’ [16].

The views of front line staff

Front line staff were questioned in respect of the most recent change to the organisational structure. Constables saw the Chief Constable, senior managers in the force and the Home Office/Central Government as the major influencers. They were almost unanimous in the view that they themselves, and public opinion had little or no influence over these changes. These views were echoed by those of the Sergeants: except that they were unsure about the influence of the Audit Commission and A.C.P.O (28.6% not knowing in each case) and H.M.I.C (with 25% not knowing). Details of their responses are shown in the figures on the following pages.
INFLUENCE OVER ORGANISATION CHANGE - SERGEANTS
(n = 28)

- Very Influential
- Influential
- Not Very Influential
- Not Influential
- Don't Know

Percent:

- Front Line Staff
- Public Opinion
- Chief Constable
- Senior Managers
- A.C.P.O
- Audit Com.
- Pol. Auth
- H.M.I.C
- Cent. Govt.
Accepting the problems of terminology; front line staff were asked if the present force structure consisted of ‘basic command units’. Of the sergeants, 69% either strongly agreed or agreed that this was the case. The views of the constables were less positive with 44.8% either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that this was the case (Fig. 11). Although the percentage of those who neither agreed nor disagreed from both groups is remarkably similar, there is a more positive acknowledgement of the introduction of B.C.U’s from all levels of the organisation, apart from front line staff.

![Organisation is Based on B.C.U Principle](image)

Fig: 11

Front line staff were also asked if they saw the Basic Command Unit system employed in Plymouth under the heading of Ward Policing, as an effective method of combining a desire for immediate response policing with that of community policing (n = 95). The results (see Fig. 12) indicate that front line staff are critical of Ward Policing, and by inference Basic Command Units, in this context. It would seem therefore that the views of The Audit Commission, The Home Office, and senior managers in the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary are at odds in respect of the effectiveness of the use of
According to a report of [cite source], the firm's profit margin is decreasing. The company's strategic plan is to focus on expanding its market presence, which has led to an increase in revenue. However, the cost of raw materials has also risen, affecting the overall profit margin. Despite these challenges, the company has implemented cost-cutting measures to mitigate the impact on profits.

[Graph or chart image]

Company revenues have shown a steady increase over the past five years, with slight fluctuations due to external factors. Despite the challenges, the company remains optimistic about its future prospects.
B.C.U's, with practitioners at ground level, who felt they were not consulted in the first instance.

**EFFECTIVENESS OF WARD POLICING - Sergeants & Constables (n = 95)**

- No Opinion: 14%
- Very Ineffective: 6%
- Ineffective: 42%
- Effective: 38%

![Pie chart showing effectiveness of ward policing](image)

Fig: 12

**Concluding comments**

Despite the changes made to the force structure over the last ten years, its formal structural characteristics are designed according to classical organisational theory and management ideology. It remains a hierarchical organisation - a rational bureaucracy, with internal communication seen as problematical.

It is both rank and power centred, with an emphasis on control. This control is achieved through information technology (which is easily accessed throughout the force) and through centralisation and specialisation: this, despite the fact that policing is a process which requires quick responses to change, and with a decentralised organisational diagram for the force, one would expect the organisation to be more organic than it actually is.

Examination of Constabulary Annual Reports, and documents published by The Audit
Commission and H.M.I, clearly indicate the strength of influence that these two groups had upon the changes made to the organisational structure of the force.

This is supported by those interviewed, who suggested that the changes were made for political and economic reasons, with the result that there is no evidence to indicate an improvement in members' shared meaning of the goals of the organisation, nor anything to indicate that the changes have been other than 'bolted on' to the existing organisational arrangements, resulting in 'fragmented centralisation'.

Overall the research, from published documents and from the existence of a general agreement at all levels of management, indicates that the Chief Constable, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Audit Commission and the Home Office had the greatest influence upon the introduction of these changes, with employees and staff associations/ unions having had the least influence.

Although a large percentage of front line officers felt that they made a difference to policing in the city, they are not convinced that an organisational structure based on Basic Command Units is an effective system of combining pro-active and re-active policing; in spite of the opposite view expressed in an Audit Commission Report. Even though they are important decision makers at the point of service delivery, they feel that they have had little impact upon how changes in the organisational structure were decided.

The next chapter will consider the influences placed upon the policy making and implementation processes within this organisational structure.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE POLICY PROCESS

Although often quoted, Cunningham’s (1960: 229) remark that, ‘Policy is rather like an elephant - you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it.’, remains valid to this day. Perhaps even more so, with divisions in society now making agreement on policy goals much more problematical, where there now tends to be ‘marginal changes’ in policy rather than new policy approaches (Radin 1997: 213).

It also has to be acknowledged that the central/local relationship in policy making and implementation has been seriously undermined over the last twenty years. This can be seen through the haemorrhaging of power from local government to appointed Quangos and Agencies (Twine 1994:87) where decision making is often made out of the public view (Sperling 1998) and under pressure from central government in many policy areas (Laffin 1989: 30). A situation which can cause tension between central policy makers and local implementers.

Policy and practice - the problems of definition

Separating policy making and implementation may be achieved in the private sector, which is more product orientated, by suggesting, for example, that policy making is a theoretical consideration and implementation a practical one: where implementation means to rigidly follow the courses of action set out in that policy without considering its
overall aims or problems (Dunn 1981: 56). However, this approach is especially difficult in a police organisation: firstly because it is a process rather than a product', where science cannot provide clear answers to our social problems (Williams 1980); secondly because of the considerable discretion given to staff at its lower levels (Wilson 1968, Bottomley 1973: Ch. 2, Scraton 1985:40-57, Waddington 1993, Morgan and Newburn 1997: 82); and thirdly because there is little direct supervision over ground level staff (Muir 1977).

Policy making continues during the course of implementation. In fact Hogwood & Gunn (1989:198) argue that there is no division between policy formation and implementing that policy, whilst Heclo (1972: 85) blurs the distinction even further by stating that policy should be not be considered as any specific decisions or actions but rather as a course of action or inaction.

Because the implementation process is interactive, any consequent responses to a given policy whilst it is being implemented may result in it being influenced or changed (Barrett & Fudge 1981: 26), especially where implementation can only be achieved through negotiation and bargaining. This applies to both inter and intra-organisational interaction, and is particularly relevant to the concept of a partnership approach to crime and disorder.

Policy

The term 'policy' is problematical: ranging from a decision, to a general view. It is hard to pin-point whether policy is made, or whether it evolves during implementation (Hill
1997 [a]). Although policy is an ‘amorphous’ subject, Hogwood & Gunn (1989:13-19) have identified ten categories, all of which are applicable to the research:

- As a label for a field of activity, a policy space or ‘stance’ (Friend et al 1974).
- As an expression of general purpose or desired state of affairs.
- As specific proposals.
- As decisions of government.
- As formal authorisation through Act of Parliament to permit/require such activity.
- As a programme. A package of legislation, organisation and resources.
- As output, what is actually delivered, rather than what has been proposed.
- As outcome. What is actually achieved.
- As a theory or model in respect of cause and effect.
- As a process.

Policy is also a series or weave of many different decisions and actions (Easton 1953:130 quoted in Ham & Hill 1987) which are carried out within a policy network involving the interrelationship of three elements; public policies, policy stakeholders and policy environments (Dunn 1981: 47).

Public policies, Dunn (ibid) suggests, are decisions made by governmental bodies or officials, and the interrelationships between these three elements can be identified by policy decisions made by The Home Office:

- Public policies: crime - suggesting policy issues regarding law and order, that may be publicly controversial.
• Policy stakeholders: those who can affect public policy such as the Chief Constable, Audit Commission, and pressure groups.

• Policy environment: being the immediate context in which policy issues occur and are influenced by the various stakeholders.

Practice

Hill (1997 [a]. pp375 -385) argues that when the implementation of most policy fields is closely examined it can be ascertained that:

• New initiatives probably have scope for multi-choices in the policy making process.

• Policy initiatives require support from people who have made compromises to reach the policies they value.

• Many policy initiatives are intended to solve earlier policy problems.

• The majority of policy initiatives enter policy arenas which are ‘crowded’ where their affect is likely to be minimal.

• Many policies, particularly in policing, address issues of resourcing, measuring and structure, rather than outputs which directly change the services provided to the public.

Within the police organisation top down control over policy implementation through complete and perfect compliance is difficult (even assuming that implementation is just ‘the stage between decision and operation to make operational what has been decided.’ [Williams 1980:1]), not only for the reasons previously discussed but because of:

• The multitude of services the organisation provides.

• The difficulty of setting tight and unambiguous objectives for each service.

• The links in the chain of command are not tight enough.

• The expertise of specialists providing services at ground level is greater than that of their managers.
Unlike the private sector, services provided by the police are free at point of issue, consequently there is often a perceived need by street level staff to slowdown or ration the demands upon these services. This is possible because prospective consumers have to argue their need with an expert, who can control the situation through professional knowledge and power (Day & Klien 1987). Such experts can use their power base within the organisation to change public policy, either by not taking into account organisational rules (enabling them to relate more easily to their peers and adapt to the public who use the services they provide), or through informal routines, working practices and methods (Blau 1955). These so called ‘street level bureaucrats’ have evolved practices to make their working life easier, so that what they decide to do translates into the policy they carry out (Lipsky 1980: xii) turning the customer/client relationship into essentially a social/organisational construct rather than a legal one. (Fineman 1998).

Research into this phenomenon suggests that public policy reforms have not been fully implemented by street level bureaucrats who were more concerned with rationing claims and scarce resources than implementing new policies (Meyers et al 1998).

The issue of ‘gatekeepers’ in public services becomes more apparent in policing, because many recipients are socially powerless and have gone to the police as a last resort (Waddington 1993). Although, as Doern (1993) infers when he writes of ‘co-determination of public services’, to be effective the public have to contact the police in the first instance, either as consumers or in terms of active citizenship. These ‘citizens as clients’ are at the same time both the targets and the final agents in the policy process, who
together can produce policy outcomes. And of course, not all recipients of public services are merely 'passive consumers' (Hasenfeld 1983, Hasenfeld 1992, Johnston 1992).

How much consideration is given to the effects of implementation upon policy, at the decision making stage, in terms of 'backward mapping' as suggested by Elmore (1979), to discover how implementation affects policy, remains to be seen. It is arguable whether police organisations (as opposed to private sector organisations) would easily fit into any of the four models he suggests as being essential to the study of implementation namely:

- The systems management model - value maximising with implementation ordered and goal directed.
- The bureaucratic process model - emphasising the role of discretion and routine behaviour with implementation controlling discretion and routine.
- The organisational development model - the need for individual participation and commitment where implementers shape and own the policies.
- The conflict bargaining model - treating organisations as areas of conflict with implementation a bargaining process. (Elmore 1978: 185).

**Decision making**

Throughout the processes involved in policy formulation and implementation there lies the fundamental ingredient of decision making. This has been analysed in terms of three elements (Rivett 1994:19):

1. The range of choice.
2. The Consequences of each of these choices.
3. The objective(s) involved.
Decision making is central to the study of the process through which policies are both decided and implemented (Smith & May 1980: 1). However it is within the organisational context, that this notion becomes complex. This is firstly because of:

- Ambiguity in respect of issues, preferences, and information.
- Decision makers often form part of an ongoing policy process.
- Incentives and penalties may have an adverse affect.
- Middle management decisions can be repeat decisions on similar issues.
- Conflict and power issues in organisation effect decision making.

(Shapira 1997).

Secondly, particularly in the policing policy arena, the decision makers can be citizens and recipients of policy as well as being those in an authorised position (Hambrick 1998: 533).

It is also important to understand that most organisations do not actively look for problems that entail decision making, this is only done when it is faced with a potential problem, and even then to prevent uncertainty, it will attempt to find answers that provide speedy feedback (Hill 1979: 93). This is particularly true in the case of policy and decision making in the police.

A number of models have been developed to describe decision making within the public administrative process, and these can be placed into three historical periods (Self 1997):

- Prior to 1900. The attempt to attain impartial implementation of policy by separating public administration from political intervention.
• 1945 to 1970. An ‘exceptionally rich period of administration theory’ which considered the actions of bureaucrats, goals, tactics and the removal of the insulated public administrators of the previous period.

• From 1975 an era of new public management (Pollit 1990) where public servants pursued their own personal goals, with lean public administration and the application of market principles, even though such principles were seriously flawed because public administration is different to private administration which has no market parallel (Self 1993).

Work published between 1945 and 1970, particularly that of March, Lindblom and Perrow remain as relevant today as when they were first published (Armson & Paton 1994: 155-174, Heinman et al 1997: 21). Papers first published by Herbert Simon in 1945 and since reprinted, provide the seminal work for the development of decision making models and became ‘the basis of two decades of development of the theory of choice’ (March 1978).

Taking as his starting point that a decision is making a choice between different options, Simon goes on to describe rational choice as a decision between a number of alternatives which will achieve a desired goal. His Rational Comprehensive Model takes the following form:

• Set out the desired overall goals.

• Set out the available means to achieve them.

• List the means to maximise the decision makers values.

• Consider any alternatives means.

• List the cost and value of each.

• Reconsider the available means which maximise values.

• Choose the best one.
The model is accepted as being an ideal type and is dependent upon the subjective nature of the choice environment (Elster 1986). Simon went on to amend this model by suggesting that choice remained a rational process but was bounded, substituting 'economic man' with 'administrative man' who, using past organisational experience, limits the alternatives by choosing those which will satisfy the required standard, known as satisficing.

March (1994) believes that decision makers will always try to find answers that will best suit their own organisational interests (p17), that the idea of 'maximising' alternative policy choices means choosing the best alternative, whilst 'satisfying' means choosing an alternative which will exceed a given target. Having said this he goes on to say, 'Decision makers often seem to satisfice rather than maximise'. (p18).

Further criticisms of models of rational choice, came from Lindblom (1959, 1979) who disagreed with the 'means/end' approach and went on to describe a model of 'incrementalism' or muddling through'. A system of 'making successive limited comparisons' by assessing information, values, means and ends at the same time, reaching the desired goals by comparing various policy options, in terms of what they are achieving and making changes when required. The aim is to ensure agreement on the policy without a need to agree the most appropriate method of achieving the agreed goal. However power relationships between the groups involved in this process may mean that partisan mutual adjustments to policies (where independent decision makers in an organisation adapt to each other decisions) cannot be fully achieved (Harrison et al 1990).
Writing in 1967 Etzioni described a model consisting of a mixture of the rational comprehensive models and incrementalism which he called 'mixed scanning'. This involves two phases:

- First a broad search of general policy alternatives are considered and listed.
- From this list decisions are made incrementally in terms of specific details or problems.

The caveat to such decision making processes is of course that the alternatives, consequences, and preferences for the political actors who are able to make these choices are often constrained by the 'institutional context' in which they operate (March & Olsen 1996).

Richardson & Jordan (1979) suggest that rational and incremental policy making systems have been seen as two alternatives as extremes along a continuum, but that in practice there is remarkable agreement between them. Forced to choose they would describe decision making in Britain as being incremental. This view is echoed by Hill (1997: 78) who sees the incrementalist approach as being 'easy to apply to social policy'.

Public administration has been subjected to initiatives to reduce bureaucrats, to encourage greater co-operation between public agencies, the business community, and voluntary groups, to improve local policy initiatives (Osborne & Gaebler 1992) and a reduced role for the interventionist state, but at the same time there has been a corresponding increase in the regulationary state (Majone 1997). There still remains the virtuous triangle of the
individual, the state, and society/community where the case for the autonomous individual and his/her liberated relationship with the state is clear, as is the historical presence of some form of community, and their relationships with each other. The problem today is who is the senior partner and who the junior (Norman 1996). In terms of the Police Authority Annual Policing Plan for example, the search for an effective method of using democracy to its fullest, by giving absentees a voice in order to improve the influence of the ordinary citizen rather than those from elite groups (Lindblom & Woodhouse 1993) continues.

Therefore it may be too early to assume the demise of the traditional bureaucrat: indeed as the work of March and Simon suggests such bureaucratic tasks are still important (Kooiman 1993).

**The issue of power**

It is all very well to consider various models of decision making and implementation processes but of course, they cannot be applied to a policy issue if that policy does not reach the political agenda. Hogwood and Gunn (1989) suggest that there are six general circumstances which make a new policy issue most likely to reach an agenda:

- An issue has reached crisis proportions.
- The issue underlines a greater problem which needs to be faced.
- An issue has an emotive impact.
- The issue will have a wide impact upon society as a whole.
- The issue is one which raises questions of power, authority and legitimacy.
An issue has become popular and is in the public eye for some reason.

Earlier work by Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970) pointed out that issues also fail to reach the agenda because power relationships within the political process ensure that contentious issues do not become subject of public discussion, thereby suppressing conflict through 'non-decision making'. Limiting practical decision making to 'safe' issues by utilising dominant community values, accepting prevailing power relationships, and ensuring that 'when non decision making occurs, issues do not even become matters for decision': they remain latent and do not enter the decision making process. If conflict can be found then non decision making does not occur (Hill 1997).

The issue of power according to Dahl (1957) is one where one person has the power over another so that he can get that person to do what they would not otherwise do. He went on to suggest that although no one group was powerless to affect decision making, neither was any group dominant (Dahl 1958). Power can only be understood by examining the relationships of those actors involved in the decision making process. Through the analysis of the decisions that have been made, where there have been differences of opinion between the actors in question (Ham & Hill 1984). The confusion arises when we have to differentiate between power and the concepts of authority, influence, manipulation and force (Glegg 1997: 79).

Essentially then, in a pluralistic political system power is fragmented and diffused, and the basic picture presented by the pluralist is of a political market place where what a group achieves depends upon its resources and its decibel rating (Hill 1997 [b]: 33).
With recent emphasis upon consultation in respect of police policy, the issue of power and its affect upon the decision making process, for example in terms of Annual Policing Plans, is an interesting concept. Even more so, if we consider the relationships between the key players in the policy making process, relationships which some commentators (for example Savage et al 1996) saw the Police and Magistrates Courts Act of 1994 as being likely to change.

Lukes (1974) third dimension of power is an important issue in this context; its existence having been noted in early research into the relationship between a Chief Constable and his Police Authority (Brodgen 1977). Lukes argues that power can be put into three dimensions:

- Power employed by actors in observed overt conflict over major issues in the policy arena (Pluralism).

- Power employed by actors in observed covert or overt conflict over issues or possible issues before they reach the policy arena (non-decision making).

- The third dimension - the power to shape peoples’ views so that neither overt or covert conflict exists - ‘latent conflict’.

The essence of this third dimension is the ability of an actor to shape another actor’s perceptions in order to persuade him or her to accept, value and not to question the status quo for any reason, without that person being aware that such power is being exercised. ‘A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.’ (ibid p27), and in doing so negates conflict. Therefore the absence of conflict does not mean that power has not been used or that a consensus is genuine.
Decisions in organizations involve processes of power and conflict between groups within the organization. From this point of view a particular decision or a particular structure is not an expression of the organisation’s goals but of the ability of particular groups to impose their definition of the situation and their solution to it on other groups within the organisation (Morgan 1991:81).

Wildavsky (1979) believes that it is more effective to undertake policy analysis than it is to describe what policy analysis is, a view for which I have some sympathy. However some concepts of policy analysis and decision making have been necessary, as a foundation for the research.

It has been suggested that policy analysis can be separated into two areas: analysis of policy and analysis for policy. Or descriptive, how policies are made and prescriptive, how policies should be made (Hogwood & Gunn 1989: 3). In respect of social policy issues, analysis has concentrated on the rationale behind policy, its operation, and its goals (Gordon Lewis and Young 1977), a route I intend to take in terms of considering control of, and local autonomy in, policing policy and practice. Concentrating on the descriptive, rather than the prescriptive.

The policy making process - planned policing to policing plans

Historically Central Government has attempted to control policing policy, for example, for experimental purposes, between 1969 and 1974, some police forces were subjected to a method of measuring performance in terms of cost benefit analysis under a Home Office ‘Programming and Budgeting System’, which was eventually abandoned, partly because of difficulties in defining separate police functions (Horton & Smith 1988).
However, the police service was one of the last public sector organisations to feel the effects of Thatcherism, and the Conservative Government’s pledge to roll back the state. After an initial honeymoon period, with law and order a government cause celebre, the police service was gradually brought to heel through the introduction of new management systems, driving private sector ideas into the heart of the public sector (McLaughlin & Murji 1997: 82).

Pro-market Thatcherite policies saw the introduction of managers from the private sector into government under the Rayner reforms and the establishment of a ‘Prime Minister Efficiency Unit’, intended to deal with public sector inefficiency. This led to the implementation of the Financial Management Initiative (H.M.S.O 1982) which introduced accountable management systems into government and the public sector, delegating responsibility to lower levels of management, who were responsible for achieving performance standards within set budgets, and the Next Steps Programme (H.M.S.O 1988 [a]) bringing into focus the contracting out of government services with laid down objectives, budgets and performance indicators. The result was the so called New Public Management (Barberis 1998, Walker 1998), with management information systems, contracting out of services, internal quasi-markets, short term contracts, the concept of value for money, and the attainment of effectiveness and efficiency.

Here effectiveness can be defined as a measure of how successful an organization is in reaching its goals and operating as a social unit, and efficiency as a measure of how well an organization uses its resources to achieve its goals (Bryans & Cronin 1983: 121).
All these measures were intended to reduce public expenditure and to require large public sector bureaucracies to be more effective and responsive (Barron & Scott 1992). However the Cabinet Office Paper, ‘Service to the Public’ (H.M.S.O 1988 [b]) then proposed ‘a consumer orientated approach’ to public services, with a requirement to ensure service provision has matched needs, and to show that this match has been achieved through effective evaluation methods.

These issues were not lost on the police service, which was hit by Home Office Circular 114 of 1983, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service (Home Office 1983). This document required the service to consolidate rather than to continue to expand and to make more efficient and effective use of its current resources, making it clear that further growth in personnel would not be considered unless it could be shown, through assessment, that force objectives and priorities could not be achieved without such increase. It introduced the system of new public management into the police service by emphasising the need for objectives, good practice, and a more assertive management style.

Managers in the police service looked towards the private sector to adapt methods of control over the activities of the work force to assist in complying with this circular and the ‘even tougher Home Office Circular 106 of 1988’ (Reiner 1992: 241) regarding the issue of setting organisational objectives: being convinced that the issues raised would be the benchmark for future policy making and budgetary control (Sincalir & Millar 1984, Horton & Smith 1988). This took the form of a ‘closed system’ based on inputs in respect
of resources and outputs in terms of specified organisational goals (Warhurst 1998: 470).

The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary undertook a system of Planned Policing based upon policing by objectives (Lubens & Edgar 1979), consisting of:

- The Chief Constable setting out an overview of Force Priorities.
- Goals of the force based upon Force Priorities.
- Objectives to enable the achievement of force goals.
- Action Plans setting out the actions needed to achieve the objectives.
- Monitoring and Evaluation.

This system utilised an annual planning cycle during which all members of the organisation were expected to take part, using a cascade of staff meetings starting at the top of the organisation with the Chief Constable’s Policy Committee to set Force Goals, Divisional Policy Conferences of senior managers to approve their Objectives, Sub-Divisional Tactics Meetings of junior managers to set their plans, Operational Meetings of constables and other support staff to suggest ideas, give feedback and implement plans.

The introduction of Planned Policing, together with its associated performance indicators, brought the issue of organisational goals into focus much more sharply than at any other time in the history of the police service. Setting out the objectives for the force in specified policy areas, it effectively began a process of telling both members of the organisation and potential consumers, exactly what they could expect from the police.
Further attempts to control organisational goals have been made through Intelligence-led Policing, requiring the collection, analysis and storage of information about active criminals who are then targeted through special operations, and Problem Orientated Policing, the identification of continuing social or crime related problems and the introduction of strategies to counteract them, in consultation with the public and other agencies (Goldstein 1990). The introduction and execution of both these developments has proved to be difficult (Maguire & John 1995, Amey et al 1996, Leigh et al 1996), because, it is argued, it is people who have goals and objectives not organisations, and that, where objectives are set, it is difficult to foresee, in their application, how much front line staff may adjust them (Hogwood & Gunn 1979), resulting in goal displacement (Perrow 1961).

The Association of Chief Police Officers, the Superintendents Association and the Police Federation, brought their collective weight to bear upon the issue of effectiveness and efficiency, management initiatives and public expectations of policing, by publishing their Operational Policing Review (1990) which paved the way for the publication of their ‘Statement of Common Purpose and Values’ - a mission statement for the police service. This was followed by their ‘Strategic Policy Document - Setting the Standards for Policing: Meeting Community Expectations’ (1990) that gave notice to the police service of performance measurement, quality of service, customer satisfaction and community consultation. This document would be a ‘base point’ for the police service to respond to short falls in areas of police provision to the public (p14), leading one Chief Officer to suggest that the police were the prime movers in terms of consultation, rather than government. (Hirst 1992: 40).
The introduction of this new approach to police management, in terms of balancing the needs of the consumer and the quality of service, with effectiveness, efficiency, and economy, marked a changing point in the relationship between Central Government, the police, and the public, and altered the attitudes of staff within the police service whose working practices were affected by it. It paved the way for John Major’s *Citizen’s Charter* (1991) programme, with its emphasis on consumerism and then through the *Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994* (consolidated into the *Police Act 1996*) to Annual Policing Plans, and the concept of public consultation, that was itself extended by the *Crime and Disorder Act 1998*.

More recently there has been increasing demands from central government for Best Value in public services, driven by the need to avoid recurrence of poorly managed local authorities which dogged the Labour party in the 1980’s (Travers 1999). The duty of Best Value is given as one where local authorities (including police and fire authorities) have to obtain best value by providing economic, efficient and effective services.’ (D.E.T.R.1998: para 3.1), consult locally (ibid: para 4.14) and produce *Local Performance Plans* (ibid: para 4.21). Even if consultation is not easily defined and there are no plans for implementation, Best Value is seen as strengthening earlier local government reforms’ (Geddes & Martin 2000).

There needs to be a balance between ‘competing values of efficiency and equity, cost and quality’ (Erridge 1998), such that costing police work ‘...doesn’t necessarily mean forces
should be providing the cheapest service available.' (Jenkins 1998). Nevertheless, Howarth (1998) argues that in the police service the search for efficiency and cost remain dominant, noting that:

There have been four Audit Commission police reports published in the last three years, and to this can be added the H.M.I.C thematic reports, of which three (Beating Crime; Lost Time and What Price Policing) have been received in 1998. In addition to these national studies - which incidentally are genuinely welcomed as adding value - forces are routinely audited by a combination of H.M.I.C and internal and external auditors (ibid: 17).

There does appear to have been the required change of emphasis within the police organisation to reflect the private sector, and market forces; to accept the view that services should be consumer-led rather than producer driven, as suggested by Connelly et al (1994:23).

**The policy process in the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary**

To consider the local policy making process, Annual Inspection reports published by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary were examined. However the policy making process is not the subject of the same amount of comment by the Inspectorate, as is for example, domestic violence issues.

Their report for 1998/99 'compliments the structured approach to policy-making and the involvement of divisional and departmental heads', going on to note that 'policy ultimately depends upon the acceptance and approval of the policy group' (para 2.4). The report emphasises that 'the structures and systems of management are well developed and provide a comprehensive flow of information to the policy forum, chaired by the Chief..."
The Report for 1995 (Appendix D) sets out the following diagram of the meetings structure for the force, which effectively can be seen as the 'decision making structure'.

**The Decision Making Structure**

![Diagram](image)

The senior officers' planning seminar and the Chief Officers strategy weekend noted at the head of Figure 13 above are annual events and relate solely to deciding the contents of the Annual Policing Plan.

Reports from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, however, provide only one perspective. To probe the policy and decision making processes within the force, managers were asked to describe the processes involved in deciding local police policy. The following sections probe, respectively, the views of senior management, divisional management, ground level managers and ground level staff.
Although many Headquarters top corridor managers and staff believed that policy could originate from divisions, almost everyone referred to the use of decision making policy committees:

'Force Policy can come from anywhere. For example a constable who suggests a policy at a 'five-weekly' section meeting which is taken from the minutes by a member of the divisional management team to the appropriate Strategy Review Group. That group considers it and may task someone to research, trial or otherwise comment on it. If appropriate the matter would move from that group to the Policy Advisory Group and then to a the Chief Constable Policy Committee where it would be accepted as policy or otherwise. There are five Strategy Groups (Sub-committees) each chaired by a Chief Officer and consisting of senior management: Performance Review; Personnel & Training; Operations; Finance; Marketing & Resources. They meet quarterly and would report anything of interest upwards to the Policy Advisor Group which meets monthly and then the Chief Constable Policy Committee Meeting.' [7].

Although policy can come from the ground it is the policy committees which are seen as the decision makers:

'It is possible for divisions to have a direct influence on a policy. It starts by a report to the Division Commander or the Force Suggestion Scheme or to a Force Strategy Sub-Committee. There are key players for each part of the policy process. For example the relative department (i.e. C.I.D) will be given the report for discussion, where it can be placed into draft policy form. It would then go back to the Strategy Sub-Committee to
debate and question the policy initiative. If agreed, it would then pass to the Policy Advisory Group, when it should be in a draft form, suitable for consideration by both Chief Officers and Divisional Commanders. For example the policy in respect of Mental Health was an idea suggested by ‘R’ Department which went directly to the Policy Advisory Group, where it was discussed and then back to the Chief Constable’s Policy Committee. It is quite a laborious method which can take a long time.’ [6].

Most top corridor managers felt that new policy was tested through pilot schemes and trials. However many felt that not all policy was tested and that when it was, it was ineffective:

‘Testing a policy depends if it is an operational or resource issue. If there is a direct saving then it will be done without testing. If operational then it may require a pilot scheme. This is decided at the Policy Advisory Group. In my view the evaluation process is not effective and there are not enough staff to evaluate all new ideas.’ [6].

And:

‘In so far as testing is concerned, this is something I am relatively disappointed with. We don’t do much policy review, for example our new intelligence lead crime model has been a policy driven/made process which has commenced, and I don’t know how effective it will be. There are no plans for post implementation review to see if the policy was done for the right reasons and if it works for the right reasons.’ [1].

Divisional Managers

Most divisional managers saw policy as being made by the force policy committees,
although many believed that policy could originate from ground level:

‘From strategy sub-committees run by headquarters based at headquarters. Some staff throughout the force are party to these but all policy, as far as I’m aware, are set by those strategy sub committees. These are sent to the policy committee who say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as to whether it will be force policy. It’s a top down system.’ [38].

Many managers saw the possibility of policy originating from division but even then it would be subject to decisions made in force policy committees:

‘I think it is possible for a constable in Honiton for example, to influence or bring about policy change, and indeed as a constable in -------*, admittedly some years ago now, I was able to bring about a policy which was --------------,* because it was something we didn’t have and I came with my previous experience in ------* as a -----.* It’s something I acted as catalyst for. I think that this is still possible, the force suggestion scheme has been the catalyst for policy change and policy introductions. In terms of how or what, the process for influence, for people like myself, on policy, well I am less satisfied. Because there are different types of policies aren’t there. I think that, yes, individual constables, with a good idea can bring about a change, any officer can do that, but when it comes to amendment of existing policy it is the Policy Advisory Group of which I am a member as a Divisional Commander, that has the power. However, I don’t feel that I am really able or given an opportunity to influence policy in a way which is meaningful because that environment is one run by an autocratic style and this is where I’m glad that this is not attributable. But its not an environment where I feel that I can challenge things in a comfortable way. I’m there to be told I’m either performing or non-performing and hand-bagged around the head
if I'm doing it wrong. And if I speak up then my experience to date has already been that
I've been summoned into the Chief's office on three occasions to be told that I was
speaking out of turn and perhaps, diplomatically, I'm not putting that quite right, but it's
not a comfortable enough environment to challenge or confront policy issues. The Chief
Constable is very clever by introducing the Steering Group, the policy steering group, in
between his Chief Officer Team or his Policy Team and the Policy Advisory Group
because that diffuses confrontation. That small group of senior sycophants, all senior
Chief Superintendents, are just a barrier between the Chief Constable and people like me,
and presumably I won't be allowed into that little nucleus until such time that he thinks I
am sufficiently well trained and I won't confront him.' [45].

* Removed to preserve confidentiality

The power of the policy committee was always evident:

'There is a simple way of looking at it in that policy is decided in committee by the Chief
Constable and his team having had advice on policy matters from the policy advisory
group and also potentially from one or more of the Strategy Sub-Committees and from
Unison and the Police Federation. That is the model and I think that you can show that the
model actually works to an extent that policy matters are discussed in the Policy Advisory
Group. They are discussed in liaison with the staff associations there's no doubt about
that, it's there for all to see. I'm not aware of any officer within the constabulary having
created or initiated a policy. I'm not saying it's never happened, I'm just not aware of it.
The model allows for it and the section meetings which are supposed to be held every four
to five weeks, where if a police officer says this would be a very good idea and the
Sergeant or Inspector agrees, and then it goes to the Divisional Commander who also agrees, then in six months time it could be a policy. The reality is that this doesn’t happen. Now some people would say as a result of that, well, that means we don’t have a say in policy matters to be brutally frank. It doesn’t show that they don’t have a say, frankly not surprisingly policy matters are not debated at section conferences. They debate different things there, not to be disparaging about section conferences, far from it, I think they have a different purpose. It’s a two way thing and if its working properly, and its not working properly, I’m well aware of that, then a constable or a civilian can express a view then as policy is disseminated downwards they have a say as to how its is implemented.’ [22].

This suggestion that front line officers could influence policy through its implementation was commented on by other managers:

‘It depends how you define policy really. I would say overall, no, they shouldn’t be making policy. But we live in the real world. We accept that if you say policy is actually what we do, what we’ve done, then yes, on the street, when they take a decision to either arrest or not arrest somebody, then they are not necessarily making policy, but they are interpreting policy based upon what they think is within their remit.’ [54].

Divisional Managers saw problems with testing and evaluating policy, for example:

‘The difficulty arises in that we introduce policies but never evaluate them. If I can go off on a slight tangent with the crime management model, quite a nice little system, a very good piece of work, very useful, but nobody has evaluated it. Nobody is now looking at it to see if we can automate it more, use the I.T more. It’s very manpower intensive and in
theory fine. It's a Rolls Royce running around on a Reliant Robin engine at the moment because we haven't got anybody out there to do anything with it. So we need to review how we are doing and I know for a fact that there are people in this force who do not believe in evaluating.' [44].

Ground level managers

Ground level managers also believed that policy could emanate from their level:

'You can start things locally perhaps at an Inspectors meeting with what you could call good practice. I suppose that it would go up the system, perhaps as good practice and then be adopted by others and then perhaps become force policy. Things like Domestic Violence Units. Soon I can see us having a unit looking out for abuse against the elderly because it becomes the buzz thing. We have to be seen to be doing something about it. You have to be ahead of the game. To be seen to already be doing something about it before it is recognised as a problem. Some of the people at Middlemoor give us the impression that they are chivvying away to know what is coming before it arrives, so the force can say, yes we know about that, we are already dealing with that.' [19].

Most saw greater influence over policy decisions coming from force policy committees under the control of the Chief Constable:

'I presume it's discussed at Policy Advisory Group, but at the end of the day I get the impression that the Chief Constable is a very authoritative type of leader and I think he listens to the view of the Policy Advisory Group and then makes his own decision. I don't know if a constable could start off a policy but I suppose an inspector could come up with
a suggestion but this would be in terms of practice rather than policy making.' [34].

Front line managers can also distinguish between policy and practice:

'First of all I think that policy is completely different from the idea of having a business plan. Policy is created in a number of ways, because of things that impact upon the organisation, where we have to make a policy, for example; a change in legislation or a particular problem arises on your patch which means that you've got to do it. I think though, mainly because of a change in legislation, because of Home Office Circulars, policy has to be created. Now 'X' Department does the research and actually provides a draft policy for senior management. A.C.P.O then agree to it as a particular policy. Things happen outside the force which create policy through our reactions to it. Policy can also happen where an individual in the force identifies a particularly effective way of doing something which seems to just grow rather than being steered effectively. You have an idea that might be put into action in an area which is then put up as best practice to a Policy Advisory Group meeting. There is a difference between policy and practice. An idea I put up can be put into place, for example I was tasked to look at the way property is handled within the division and found what I thought was a better way to deal with it. So I put pen to paper, which resulted in me running a working group and come up with a policy for the force which was then fed into the system and I'm now waiting to see if they act upon it or not, but this where force policy is agreed.'[24].

There was concern at to its effectiveness:

'It will be tested very poorly. This force has got very little idea, I think, in terms of
testing. Setting out what the objectives are of a new policy, setting out how its going to be measured, needing to measure it properly and changing it if it doesn’t work. We don’t seem to set targets and review the results in any cohesive sort of way other than in the divisional planning process through targets where our aim is to reduce burglary offences by 3%. We will look every three months to see how we are doing, after twelve months someone will either get a ‘bollicking’ or a pat on the back. We are all right at that, but introducing new policies, we’re not very good at, or setting our targets and then testing how well we are achieving them.’ [26].

Outcomes - the views of front line staff

Having considered how managers within the organisation envisage the policy making process, ground level staff were asked to assess how various people, groups and organisations influenced what they actually did during their normal working day. If we accept that police officers at the front line of the organisation retain their ‘gate-keeping’ properties in respect of access to police services, then it is important to understand who influences them when they implement local police policy.

The research shows that 78.6% of Sergeants thought the Audit Commission had a great deal or some influence over their day to day work, however 58.2% believed that the Home Office/Central Government had very little or no influence. 57.2% indicated that the Chief Constable had either a great deal, or some influence over what they actually did during the course of their normal working day. The Police Authority was seen to have little influence - with 35.7% indicating it had either a great deal or some influence over their work.
Local influences were stronger:

- 96.4% indicated that colleagues had a great deal or some influence over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day.
- 89.3% indicated that their immediate supervisors have either a great deal or some influence over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day.
- 75% indicated that their area police managers had either a great deal or some influence over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day.
- 96.4% indicated that consumers of police services had either a great deal or some influence over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day.
- 60.7% indicated that local public opinion had either a great deal or some influence over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day with 64% of sergeants believing that police policy should reflect public opinion not direct it (21% being unable to agree or disagree).
With the exception of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Central Government, Constables saw central influences as weaker, with over sixty percent of respondents believing that A.C.P.O, The Audit Commission, The Police Authority, and the Chief Constable as having very little or no influence over their day to day work.

See Figure 16, overleaf:
Their views of local influence on their work reflects those of Sergeants:

- Their colleagues were influential - 85.1% indicating they had either a great deal or some influence over what they actually did during the course of their normal working day.
- Their supervisors - 89.6% indicating they had either a great deal or some influence over what they actually did during the course of their normal working day.
- Their area managers - 65.7% stating they had either a very great influence or some influence over what they actually did during the course of their normal working day.
- Consumers of police services were seen to be influential - 85.1% seeing them as having either a great deal or some influence over what they actually did during the
course of their normal working day.

- Local public opinion was seen to be influential - 50.8% seeing them as having either a great deal or some influence over what they actually did during the course of their normal working day, with 67% of constables believing that police policy should reflect public opinion not direct it.

![Local Influences Over Implementers - Constables](image)

**Local Influences Over Implementers - Constables**

(a = 67)

Fig. 17

**Concluding comments**

The strong influence of policy committees in the policy process, especially the Chief Constable’s Policy Group, where most policy decisions are made, is highlighted in reports from H.M.I.

Managers within the organisation believed that they were able to distinguish between policy and practice. Although control over policy making is top down, even if such control is normally difficult to achieve in organisations like the police service, where there are
looser links in the chain of command, and a requirement to provide a variety of services, managers believed that front line staff were in a position to affect policy through their discretion as to whether to implement a particular policy or not; thereby either making a policy redundant or at least rationing its use.

Local influences over what the police actually do remains strong at the delivery end of the organisation, with the greatest influence coming from consumers of police services. Both sergeants and constables also believed that their colleagues, supervisors, and managers, consumers of police services, and public opinion have a very considerable influence over their day to day work: much greater than that from the centre, where they saw the Audit Commission and the Home Office as having the most influence.

New policy initiatives are decided through policy committees, using multi choices within the policy process, resulting in marginal changes in policy. In terms of decision making there is evidence to suggest it is one of Bounded Rationality, ‘satisfying’ rather than ‘maximising’, and it is, over-all, incrementalist, conforming to Elmore’s (1979) description of a ‘systems management model’, but constrained within the organisational context, and prescribed by Central Government, for example, through Policing Plans. The influence of local authorities and other agencies, within a Partnership Approach to policing policy, and the implementation of Crime Audits under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, will also affect police policy making in the future: factors which were not present at the time of this research.
Policies often address problems of measuring, resourcing, and structure rather than making radical changes to the actual policies delivered.

Top corridor groups, using their positional power within the organisation can decide the membership of policy committees, suggesting evidence of Lukes (1974) ‘third dimension of power’ to shape the views of lower order managers, to accept the power of the Chief Constable in the local policy process, without any signs of overt conflict. The use of policy committees also permits organisational goals to be decided by a particular group according to its ‘resources and decibel ratings’ (Hill 1997) even if this may be to the detriment of other more complicated theories of organisational power.

For front line staff, the issue of police/public compromise at street level (Cain 1973, Shapland & Vagg 1988) remains: policy may change, but practice does not.

The next chapter will consider issues relating to local autonomy in policy and practice in respect of the Citizen’s Charter policy initiative.
CHAPTER SIX

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER

Seen initially as an attempt by the then Prime Minister, John Major, to make his own mark on the political arena without moving away from Thatcherism (Doern 1993, Connolly et al 1994), The Citizen’s Charter: Raising the Standards (H.M.S.O.1991), and the accompanying performance indicators, was imposed upon the police and other public services. It set out to treat people more as citizens than subjects, more as consumers than citizens, and although the idea of charters in the United Kingdom was not new (Hambleton 1991, Moore 1997), it brought the concept of reducing public expenditure and increasing effectiveness and responsiveness into public sector bureaucracies (Barron & Scott 1992).

Despite the fact that it was neither a single charter document, nor founded on any concepts of democracy, ‘The Citizen’s Charter’ has resulted in improvements in the general area of public service provision (Wilson 1996). However, although the services provided by public sector organisations can be improved where mechanisms are in place to encourage complaints, such organisations are unable to react to them with the same determination as those in the private sector, who have to compete in order to survive in their particular market spheres (Blackmore 1997).

In managerial terms (Doern 1993) the following initiatives could be seen as a base for the introduction of the Citizen’s Charter and the introduction of performance indicators:
• The Rayner reforms of the early 1980’s with the introduction of managers from the private sector into central government.

• The formation of the Prime Ministers Efficiency Unit intended to seek out and redress public sector inefficiency.

• The Financial Management Initiative (H.M.S.O 1982) introducing accountable management systems throughout government with responsibility delegated to lower management levels responsible for accountable performance within set budgets. In policing this was employed in specific operations and for individual officers’ work as well as in the provision of management information systems and measuring techniques to monitor police performance (Sinclair & Miller 1984).

• The ‘Next Steps’ programme, allowing many governmental functions to be contracted out to ‘quasi-independent agencies’ with a strong emphasis on value for money.

It was Home Office Circular 17/93 ‘Performance Indicators for the Police’, that set out the performance indicators required by the Audit Commission under the Local Government Act 1992. It made it clear that the indicators had been developed jointly by the Audit Commission, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the police service, the Home Office and the Local Authority Associations (Annex A. para 6).

The Circular reduced the number of performance indicators initially suggested by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, and included a qualitative dimension requested by the Association of Police Officers. It required forces and police authorities to set and monitor local quality and performance levels, taking into account local problems, with full dialogue between them and the community: in spite of the problems associated with the bench-marking of public services (Coe 1999, Ammons 1999).
The circular required the force to maintain forty six performance indicators under the following headings:

- Call management.
- Crime Management.
- Traffic Management.
- Public Reassurance Management.
- Community Policing Management.
- Resources/costs.

Of these 20 (43.5%) are required by the Audit Commission; 20 (43.5%) by H.M.I.C and 6 (13.0%) by A.C.P.O.

There have been many difficulties regarding the reliability of measuring police activity (Davidoff 1993); problems in defining quality (Walsh 1991, Hirst 1991, Waters 1998 [a], 1998 [b]); gaps between the service customers expect, and that which managers think they should expect; and gaps between the standards set by the provider and the service it actually delivers (Bland 1997: 6). Nevertheless the concepts of total quality management (Shashkin & Kiser 1992, Zbaracki 1998) have found their way into the policy making process and the everyday working lives of members of police organisations (Warcup 1992).

**The Citizen's Charter initiative**

The white paper *The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standards* (1991) describes its four
main themes (p4) as:

- Quality - a sustained new programme for improving the quality of public services.
- Choice - whenever possible providing choice between competing providers to improve quality.
- Standards - the publication of the standards available and the ability to act where service is of unacceptable standard.
- Value - public services must give value for money, within the bounds of an affordable tax bill.

The white paper went on to outline The Principles of Public Service (p5):

- Standards - explicit standards prominently displayed at point of delivery.
- Openness - as to how services are provided, their cost, whether published standards are being achieved.
- Information - as to services provided; targets, details of results achieved.
- Choice - regular surveys to assess customer satisfaction.
- Non-discrimination.
- Accountability - services should be organised to suit customer needs not the needs of the staff. There should be a well publicised complaints procedure.

The Charter applies to all public services and requires a ‘commitment to the reality of raising standards at local level’ (p7) with individual organisations publishing their own charters, setting out their statements of service standards.

Addressing policing issues, it set out the need to provide a standard of service expected by the public, high-lighting measurable standards, objectives agreed through consultation with the community, and a fair, prompt and courteous response to the public. Forces were
expected to publish target times for response times to the more serious incidents and the answering of telephone calls (Audit Commission 1993: 1994).

The Citizen’s Charter concluded that there would be close co-operation between Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Commission in setting and managing standards to improve efficiency and quality of service (H.M.S.O 1991: 40).

The White paper went on to suggest that organisations which consider they have achieved the charter standards can apply for an entitlement to use the Charter Mark. The key principles required to achieve the Charter Mark award (p6) are:

• Publication of standards of service provided and performance against those standards.
• Evidence that the views of the customer have been taken into consideration in setting standards.
• Clear information of range of services provided.
• Courteous and efficient service from named staff.
• Well publicised avenues of complaint.
• Independent valuation of performance against standards.
• Improving value for money.

At the time of its introduction The Citizen’s Charter was criticised for attempting to introduce consumerism and private sector economics into the provision of public sector services (Economist 1991, Coote 1991, 1992). Alternatively the Charter Mark has been hailed as John Major’s ‘legacy to the nation’ (Moore 1997).
Bynoe (1998: 232-235) sees three possibilities for the future of the Citizen’s Charter:

- A retreat from public consumerism which is very unlikely.
- A Mk II Citizen’s Charter - continuing the decline of citizenship towards that consumerism.
- A social rights perspective - setting out the rights and duties that services are expected to provide.

The Devon & Cornwall Policing Charter

The Devon and Cornwall Police Charter was first published in September 1993 and since 1995 has been included as an appendix in Annual Policing Plans. Introduced as ‘Our Commitment to you. A Charter for the Policing of Devon, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly.’, it sets out the standard of service under the following headings:

- Communication.
- Complaints.
- Victims.
- Witnesses.
- Crime Prevention & Public Order.
- Road Users.
- Consulting the Community and Monitoring our Progress.

Performance standards are given for each, and range from the quantitative to the qualitative. For example in respect of the Communication section:

- If your call is an emergency and you dial 999 we aim to answer in ten seconds of the call being transferred to us by British Telecom. We provide a 24 hour service and aim
to answer all routine telephone calls within 30 seconds.

- Whether your call is an emergency or not you will be answered politely by our staff who are trained to help you. Whoever answers your call will be prepared to identify themselves and tell you what action is proposed.

- If you are told an officer is going to call, you will be given the opportunity to arrange a mutually convenient time.


The Force Charter does not set out specific services that the police will provide. It does not take the opportunity to set out the services that the police will not provide and where those services could be obtained. It does not take the opportunity to reduce demands for services to which the force does not intend to respond.

**Police perceptions of the development of the Force Charter**

All levels of management believed that the greatest influence upon the contents of the Force Charter came from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Chief Constable, the Audit Commission and the Home Office. There was no suggestion that public opinion or the views of members of the organisation had any effect upon the Force Charter. For example:

“I think the Audit Commission and the H.M.I. Well what I think is that this came out from Central Government. I don’t know how they came out with it, or how the Performance Indicators were decided. It just seems that this is what we were told, this is what the response times will be, how they got fifteen minutes to get to an incident and not fourteen for example, I’ve got no idea. I think all this stuff came from Central Government. They
were the only people who influenced us and had any say in the matter unless there was a headquarters department involved.’ [32].

And:

‘The Chief Constable, wanting to be very politically correct and being in the limelight. I’m going to have a Charter tomorrow and get myself a Charter Mark so we can have it on the top of our letter-heads. Police officers are very cynical people and they tend to think that the Chief Constable has influenced this one because he wants a Charter Mark on the top of his letter heading, and what does this actually mean to people on the ground.’ [21].

More realistically:

‘The Charter isn’t headlines anymore. It’s on the back burner. We give information about how we are doing in respect of the Charter performance indicators and this is published.’ [11].

Considering the acknowledged affect the Citizen’s Charter has upon the Force, it is perhaps surprising to learn, that those interviewed had no knowledge of how the contents of the Force Charter had been decided. For example the top corridor view was:

‘My hearsay evidence on this is that the Chief Constable said that’s a good idea I want one too. A few people sat down and put something together and the Chief said that’s O.K. It’s a gimmick, however once you do something like this, you have to live up to it.’ [13].

The view of Divisional Managers, is encapsulated by the following quote:

‘No. I think if you ask anybody they’ll say well I don’t know. ‘X’ Department produced this booklet and there it is.’ [21].
Which was echoed by Ground Level Managers:

'It was formulated in 'X' Department following consultation with other forces and whatever Home Office documents there were. I know from my own perception of it that some of the Charter limits that we set out were unrealistic, and had been identified as such from the very beginning, but the Chief is such a strong personality that his individual views were set out, some of which were contrary to those making the suggestions.' [29].

*Maintaining interest in the Policing Charter*

If we accept that there was little local consultation during the formulation of the Force Charter, how then does the force maintain interest in their Charter, firstly by the public and secondly within the organisation. There was overwhelming disappointment that the Force Charter, published locally, had no interest to local people, despite the fact that the performance of the force was measured and could be compared nationally. The majority of all those interviewed believed that public interest was awoken once a year through the publication of its charter results in the local press:

'I don't think the public are very interested in the Force Charter. It gets an annual impetus in that we publish our Charter results in a local newspaper once a year. If you put it to the test very few people would know of its existence.' [5].

Interest within the organisation was also seen to be problematical:
‘I don’t think there is any staff interest at all to be honest. It’s just too many slogans really I think. A lot of these things are not revolutionary, they just encompass what we should be doing.’ [27].

There was a suggestion that the Force Charter was kept prominent through the constant reminder of the need to achieve performance targets, but this also applied to those contained in the Annual Policing Plan:

‘We have to give a quality of service and a lot of their training is actually targeted at this, in that the service is something that you and the force are going to be judged on, so let’s give a good service. It might be the tenth burglary you’ve been to in four days but it’s that person’s first. There’s a lot of training effort going in on this, and if you look at Plymouth now, and at the response teams, they are very young in service. If you have an officer with more than four years service then you think they are old sweats. So through their training the term ‘service provider’ is lodged in their minds. To provide a good service. This is also put over at public consultation meetings to the public.’ [21].

More cynically:

‘It’s because they’ve got to do it because the big stick waves over them and they get told off if they fail to do it. They know they are under pressure to answer within the set time and if they fail to give their name or number or crime reference number to a victim they get a shitty note.’ [34].

A manager within the Criminal Investigation Department described the local effect of the
Force Charter in the following terms:

‘Well they’re all given the Charter, and the Quarterly Review tells management right the way down through, what we are doing in respect of it, tells them that we are not meeting our targets and management then move manpower accordingly. That is exactly what’s happening in this division in respect of our response times. With burglary it has given me emphasis, because we have to do so much in respect of house burglaries under the Charter, and I’ve got to make sure it works. Whereas in the past I didn’t really have to account to anyone. Our burglary figures were what they were, the only person I was accountable to was the Divisional Commander who was accountable to the Chief and then to the Police Authority, but now its much more intense that we get it right, which is good.’ [16].

Confusing Signals - Force Charter, Charter Mark, Annual Policing Plans

During the course of these interviews it became increasingly apparent that there was some confusion between the Force Charter and the Police Authority Annual Policing Plan. However the presence of performance indicators and their affect upon local policing policy and practice is a constant factor, and where these indicators originate is irrelevant. How this has affected local policing autonomy can be gauged from the following comments:

‘I am a great believer in simplicity and the simpler it is the better it will work. There are lists for this and goals for that, people end up getting confused. We are spending more time doing the measuring then doing the job. In my view the resources we are putting out now are less than they were twenty years ago.’ [17].

And:

‘I am getting very confused between the Force Charter and the Annual Policing Plan. It
shows how long it is since I saw a copy of the Force Charter, because I can’t remember what the document was all about. There are so many Performance Indicators that they just can’t remember them all, that’s the trouble, you know, speaking with the lads on the ground when they come in [from patrol], which is why we have given them a single page ‘flyer’ in the hope they will be able to read and digest it. They come on duty at three o’clock and they will be told, don’t worry about reading that, the Force Charter worry about it later on, because there’s a burglary at so and so, or an accident at so and so, and that’s what you’re up against. You keep ramming it down, you know it’s such a lot of stuff to take in, it really is. They are saturated with information if you like.’ [32].

And duplication:
‘There is a lot of duplication between everything at the moment. There should be one document with a list of performance indicators showing what they refer to and what they are. One document. It is getting very confusing for people. There are so many things which relate to one subject giving the view that “We’ve done this before”. It would be better to have one document.’ [14].

And Emphasis:
‘There is now more emphasis on the Annual Policing Plan. It is more our bible now and more of an issue. The H.M.I criticises the Chief for not getting people to be accountable enough on issues in the Annual Plan and so we spend more time looking at performance indicators the plan.’ [11].

And density:
‘The Annual Policing Plan is a very dense document with lots of information. A lot of the public would not be interested in much of the data and information in the Annual Plan. But
the Charter gives them the basic standards of service which is what the public wants to know.’ [9]

Finally, as one divisional manager commented:

‘You know with the best will in the world we can sit here and talk about what should be or what shouldn’t be, but the reality is, once you get outside, is totally different. I’m not a negative person, it’s just a matter of volume. Everybody wants to give a good service, well most people, as best as they can, but everybody has their own areas to worry about. If you’re a Detective Constable you want to clear crime and so on. Everyone has their own tunnel vision about the job, depending upon what their work is.’ [19].

Outcomes of The Citizen’s Charter

As in other areas of public service provision, the Citizen’s Charter has had a considerable impact upon local police managers: now having to contend with issues of quality of service, through performance indicators and consumer accountability.

However, both the ‘top corridor’ and middle managers saw the Citizen’s Charter as having a positive impact upon the police service.

In terms of Quality and Performance Indicators, for example:

From the top corridor:

‘The Force Charter however has improved services to the public particularly for victims. It has highlighted awareness of giving a quality service and can be seen through survey
results for example, that officers now treat victims more effectively, because it's monitored through service reviews. The words Quality of Service have become incrementally more accepted as a part of the police culture. The implementation of force charters and awards has had a great impact upon policing. However the Force Charter is more relevant to local people than the award of the Charter Mark. [2].

This is reflected by Divisional Managers:

'I think it made us take a close look at ourselves, and sharpen up our act a bit on day to day things. That we, you know, we tended to devote all our energies to things we thought were important. Things like answering letters and getting people to incidents on time were lower priority and I think it made us take a closer look at our daily business. So it was probably quite a good thing.' [48]

This has led to improved services, as reflected by these top corridor staff: 'Quite a radical effect, particularly on the culture of the organisation. Over the next five years this will be more, so with the concept of satisfying our customers. No more, "we're the police" business. This has totally turned around. Satisfying 'Joe Public' is now the number one priority now that performance indicators are now involved. A quite big effect. How do we speak to the public? Much more politely! We are now getting to incidents within standard times, giving information to people, providing leaflets, all of which is geared to making the bureaucratic experience less so for the public. It evolved out of social circumstances. If John Major hadn't of done it then someone else would have.' [12].

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And from Divisional Managers:

'I don’t think a great deal. I think there were already influences which effected the way we became more accountable and addressed certain issues and I don’t think that the Citizen’s Charter has made any difference whatsoever. It’s for the benefit of the Chief Constables more than anything else.' [20].

The majority of ground level managers also saw the Citizen’s Charter as making the police more accountable, particularly by enabling the public to be more aware of their rights:

'It’s a matter of making us accountable. First of all it was good to get it and now once we’ve got it we’ve got to keep it but its given us things we have got to achieve. We have got to achieve time limits in telephone answering, we’ve got to achieve time limits in getting to scenes. In other words, where in the past where we had a responsibility to do it, we would just say we are doing to do our best, it does now give us accountability to members of the public who can say, you’re not meeting your Charter, which makes us look at ourselves, address ourselves, and see if we can do what we said we could do.' [16].

One manager, whilst reflecting this general view, was more outspoken:

'I think to be honest and you may have heard a snort there. I think the Citizen’s Charter was John Major’s great idea and I can imagine people in the Cabinet Office shuffling embarrassingly, saying oh yes, well let’s go along with it. My impression is that its a ‘P.R’ thing its very limited, in fact it’s a nonsense. It’s the same with the Health Service. You will get one person in one hundred thousand, Mr Awkward, who will get the Citizen’s Charter out, and I get the impression from all services who are trying to comply with the
Front line staff were split over the idea that the Force Charter had increased public awareness of the services provided, with 33% neither able to agree or disagree on this point. However only 24% agreed that it had improved the quality of service they provided.

Although 61% of those who were members of the force prior to the introduction of the Charter felt that the consequent performance indicators decreased the level of discretion available to them in their work, 53% agreed that the introduction of the Charter had in fact made no difference to the way they carried out their work.

There is no doubt that it is possible to speculate from this research, that police officers below the level of senior managers, believe that the problem of supply and demand are important variables when it comes to providing policing services, to the point where front line staff are more concerned with satisfying this demand, than they are in complying with Charter targets.

A figure showing the major influencers in this policy area is given overleaf.
In retrospect it can be argued that the Citizen’s Charter was the precursor to the introduction of Annual Policing Plans, which in their turn gave rise to the present Annual Performance Plans, and it is the development of annual plans which will be considered in the next chapter.
POLICING PLANS

The policy process, consisting of many policy networks, includes independent people, pressure groups, and other organisations, each having some knowledge and or interest in policing (Leishman et al 1996: 17-19). This chapter will consider how these policy networks influence the contents of annual policing plans. It will show that these plans have become more complex over time, by comparing the 1995/1996 Annual Policing Plan with that of 1998/1999.

The outputs of these plans will then be considered to understand how they affect the practice of front line officers during their day to day duties.

The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 (now consolidated into the Police Act 1996) imposed a responsibility upon Police Authorities to publish a costed Annual Policing Plan, setting out local policing objectives. These objectives must be in line with Central Governments’ Key National Objectives, (now Ministerial Priorities) and their associated performance indicators, set locally, but open to criticism from Her Majesty’s’ Inspectorate of Constabulary.

The Home Office

Home Office Circular 27/1994 - Policing Plans, makes it clear that the Police Authority will be required to issue a local policing plan. The Chief Officer of police will be required
to produce a draft of this plan but the final contents of the plan rests with the Police Authority. The Annual Plan represents ‘a shared understanding about policing priorities and objectives’ (2.3), but in carrying out the objectives of the plan the Chief Officer ‘retains the direction and control over the force and it is open to him to depart from the plan if in his operational judgement he (sic) considers it necessary’ (2.4), but he or she must explain to the Police Authority the reasons for any deviation from the plan.

The circular went on to indicate that policing plans have the following objectives:

- To act as an agreement between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority as to the priorities for policing the area during the year.
- To tell the public what policing services and standards they can expect to receive.
- To aid performance monitoring by the Chief Officer the Police Authority, H.M.I and the Home Office.

The Circular also makes it clear that Annual Policing Plans will be one of a number of documents which set out police performance, and that it may need to be supported by more detailed in force plans for divisions or basic command units, as well as any force charter documents.

Annual Policing Plans will, the circular suggests, include:

- A statement of the Police Authority’s priorities for the year and the financial resources available.
- The National Key Objectives.
- Performance indicators set by the police authority within the parameters set by the Home Secretary.

The plan should also contain an assessment of the policing of the area, an idea as to the
broad approach to its policing, an indication of the consultation process undertaken to produce the plan, any partnership initiatives with other agencies, how performance against the plan can be monitored, and the financial resources available to execute the plan.

Both Chief Constables and Police Authorities must publish their own Annual Reports relating to the policing of their areas.

National Key Objectives/Ministerial Priorities

The following Key National Objectives were introduced by the Home Office on 1st April, 1995, and remained unchanged for three years:

- To maintain and if possible increase the number of detections for violent crimes.
  
P.I: The number of violent crimes detected per one hundred officers.

- To increase the number of detections for burglaries of people’s homes.
  
P.I: The number of burglary dwellings detected per one hundred officers.

- To target and prevent crimes which are a particularly local problem, including drug related criminality, in partnership with the public and local agencies.
  
P.I (1): On crime prevention, work remains in hand, to develop a PI aimed at reducing repeat victimisation.

P.I (2): On drug related criminality, work continues to develop a high level.
  
P.I based on the White Paper, ‘Tackling Crime Together,’ and measurement will be assessed by measurement of the number of if arrests and disposal of offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, per 1,000 population.
• To provide high visibility policing so as to reassure the public.
  P.I: Public satisfaction with levels of foot patrol and mobile patrol.
• To respond promptly to emergency calls from the public.
  P.I (1): Percentage of 999 calls answered within the local target time.
  P.I (2): Percentage of responses within local target time to incidents requiring immediate response.

On 15th August 1998, Mr Alun Michael, Minister of State at the Home Office for the new Labour government, wrote to the President of The Association of Chief Police Officers setting out proposed new Key National Policing Objectives and Performance Indicators for 1998/99. He emphasised that these objectives were produced in consequence of recommendations from a review by a Home Office Task Force, which consisted of representatives from the police service and police authorities, who reported to a Consultative Group on Key Objectives and then to Ministers.

The Key National Objectives for 1998/99 were:
• To deal speedily and effectively with young offenders and to work with other agencies to reduce offending.
  P.I(1): The percentage of cases dealt with within pre-trial time guidelines and the percentage of cases meeting joint performance management quality targets.
  P.I (2): In consultation with other relevant agencies, to have established local mechanisms to measure activity on, and the success
of, work in partnership to provide a quicker and more effective local response to youth crime.

- To target and reduce local problems of crime and disorder in partnership with local authorities, other local agencies and the public.
  P.I (1): To have established local mechanisms in partnership with other agencies to measure activity on and success in tackling problems of crime and disorder with local targets for performance.
  P.I (2): To have mechanisms in place locally to measure forces’ success in tackling repeated victimisation.

- To target drug-related crime in partnership with other local agencies.
  P.I: The number of arrests for the supply and possession with intent to supply controlled drugs per 10,000 population.

- To maintain and, if possible, increase the number of detections for violent crime.
  P.I: The percentage of violent crimes detected.

- To increase the number of detections for burglaries of people’s homes.
  P.I (1): The percentage of primary and overall detections of burglaries of dwellings.
  P.I (2): The number of such detections per 100 officers.

- To respond promptly to emergency calls from the public.
  P.I (1): The percentage of 999 calls answered within the local target time.
  P.I (2): The percentage of responses within the local target time to incidents requiring immediate response.
For the 1999/2000 Annual Plan these National Key Objectives were changed again. Now called 'Ministerial Priorities' and were based upon Home Office 'Overarching Aims and Objectives for the Police Service' which set out:

A Statement of Purpose:
'To help secure a safe and just society in which the rights and responsibilities of individuals, families and communities are properly balanced'

Aims:

• Promote Safety and order.
• Reduce crime and the fear of crime.
• Contribute to delivering justice in a way which secures and maintains public confidence in the rule of law.

Objectives:

• Keep order (and restore it where necessary) and reduce anti-social behaviour.
• Reconcile conflicting rights and freedoms of the public.
• Improve safety and reassurance of public, especially those at risk of harm.
• Contribute to improving road safety and the reduction of casualties.
• Disrupt organised international crime.
• Prevent terrorism.
• Reduce crime through investigation, detection, and addressing the causes of crime.
• Reduce the fear of crime.
• Provide high quality, timely evidence contributing to a fairly conducted prosecution.
• Deal with suspect fairly.
Help meet the needs of victims and witnesses.

(Devon & Cornwall Annual Policing Plan 1999/2000 Appendix A)

Supporting these, the Home Office set out three Ministerial Objectives namely:

1) To deal speedily and effectively with young offenders and to work with other agencies to reduce offending and re-offending.

2) To identify and reduce local problems of crime and disorder in partnership with other local authorities, other local agencies and the public.

3) To target and reduce drug-related crime in partnership with other local agencies via the local Drug Action Teams in line with the Government's strategy "Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain".

These aims and objectives were also to be read alongside nine National Performance Indicators, one of which, for example is: 'The number of arrests for supply and possession with intent to supply controlled drugs per 10,000 population and of those how many related to heroin.' (Devon & Cornwall Annual Plan 1999/2000 p 11).

In broad terms it can be argued that for the first time central government is attempting to define the role of the police in England and Wales.

The Research

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

Reference to the planning process is first seen in the report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary for the force in 1991 where it praises a 'long tradition of co-operation and partnership with its public', with a 'clear commitment to continue this co-operation' through the endorsement of the Victims Charter as force policy, 'which plays a major part
in his [the Chief Constable's] Planned Policing Strategy. (p51).

The 1992 Report comments that, unlike most forces who set annual aims, the Chief Constable believes that 'many objectives cannot be achieved within a 12 month cycle' and that current force aims and objectives are no longer set on an annual basis but are 'flexible in time scale, responding to the nature of the particular problem being addressed' (p24) which appeared to satisfy the Inspectorate.

However it is the 1994 Report which set the pace for more detailed and critical comments on the force planning processes, being linked, no doubt to the proposed annual planning requirements of the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 and Home Office Circular 27/1994. It concluded that it was important that the 'organisation moves forward as one and this requires meaningful consultations with all concerned, followed by precise and detailed planning at all levels...'. The Force Strategic Five Year Plan, although 'well crafted' was criticised in that:

- It did not attribute clear accountability to those who were managing change.
- Did not include unambiguous time scales for change.
- Did not include clear measures against which performance could be measured.
- Failed to cost proposals or include broad financial considerations to facilitate longer term financial planning.
- Did not describe a procedure to inform the public or the workforce of developments so that direction or behaviour could be modified.
- Did not acknowledge the importance of human resources in the organisation and the appointment of qualified professional 'non-police' staff to key positions both managerial and non-managerial.
It went on to indicate that without the inclusion of these points the good work already completed would be lost, and a fragmented approach would result.

The 1995 report places a great deal of emphasis upon annual policing plans. It criticised the force for not taking its Strategic Plan to include the year 2000, and whilst accepting that Home Office Circular 27/1994 provided for the structure and format of the Annual Policing Plan to 'be a matter for forces and police authorities' (2.2), it went on to suggest that it should complement and support the force strategic plan. It also pointed out that the performance indicators in the Annual Plan for 1996/97 made measurement difficult in that, apart from the Charter performance indicators, none of the indicators in the plan were quantitative, but were stated mainly in terms of "to increase" or "reduce" based upon previous years performance (2.6). The Inspectorate was however 'impressed with the determination of the Chief Constable and members of the Police Authority to produce a plan which represented their collective values' (2.8).

Varying from the view of the Audit Commission (1994) that the Annual Plan should provide the 'what' and the Chief Constable the 'how', and that of Home Office Circular 27/1994, which emphasised the operational freedom of the Chief Constable, the report went on to suggest that the Annual Policing Plan should be '...precise on the what but also broadly indicating the how. Whilst this guidance goes beyond the legislative requirements, it is within the spirit of the proposed development of a partnership between the force and the Authority, and fosters greater community support which is essential to policing with consent.' (2.10).
The report also criticised the involvement of staff in the consultation process during the production of the plan, particularly the communication process through the organisation, which it believed could be improved if divisional commanders ‘occasionally met service deliverers face to face’ (2.21) and suggested that implementers in the policy process should have greater ownership of local policing plans.

In respect of divisional policing plans the Inspectorate underlined the importance of allowing departmental/divisional commanders ‘delegated authority to produce their own plans to support the local environment’ but only if they are linked to the ‘corporate aims and objectives in the local policing plan’. (2.25).

The main complaint in respect of the 1995/96 Annual Policing Plan was the lack of ‘specific performance targets’ (2.26) and of the Five Year Strategic Plan, until 2000, in that it was not an effective ‘business plan’ (2.2).

A large proportion of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Performance Review Inspection report of the force for 1996 dealt with the issue of policing plans. The report criticised the link between operational and support strategies in respect of the five year Strategic Plan (para 2.1; 2.2) but praises the introduction of the youth issues section introduced as a consequence of local consultation (para 2.3), as well as pointing out that it complies both with the Key National Objectives; Home Office Circular 27/1994; and a letter from the Home Secretary to Chief Constables of 14/12/95 to include ‘Traffic’ as an issue. Overall
the Inspectorate considered that the document was a ‘clear readable and practical document which provides an unambiguous statement of what is to be achieved’ (para 2.4) but does little to secure ‘the improvement in confidence of ethnic minority groups’ (para 2.5).

The 1997 Inspection Report referred to the following developments in producing the 1997/98 Plan:

- Brief analysis of the crime profile.
- Overview of internal planning mechanisms.
- Greater reference to the role of the Special Constabulary.
- Use of predictive techniques in target setting.
- Greater emphasis on the role of public consultation.

(para 2.14)

The first four of these issues were put forward by the 1996 Inspection Report as improvements which should be considered by the Force in respect of this, the next Annual Policing Plan (1996: para 2.3). An example of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary congratulating the Force for taking up its earlier recommendations.

The 1997 report went on to suggest that Divisional Commanders have sufficient flexibility to set their own targets for each of the objectives provided in the Plan Template set out by headquarters in order to ‘address their local problems’ (para 2.20).
Consultation

Opportunities for public consultation in respect of the Plan is provided through an agenda item at one of the Police Liaison Meetings, run jointly by the Police Authority and the police, in each of the district council areas of the force, between June and September each year.

This was done by asking those present to list their policing priorities for the force as a whole for the forthcoming year, initially to the meeting as a whole, with their replies written on a flip chart, but with their ultimate views expressed on a ballot paper giving their top five priorities, which are handed in at the end of the meeting.

At the same time, focus group meetings are held with police staff to gauge their views about the contents of the Annual Policing Plan.

The views expressed during this consultation are then discussed at an Annual Senior Officers' Planning Seminar, to present a draft plan for the attention of the Chief Constable and other Chief Officers at a Chief Officers' Strategy Weekend, where the contents of the draft plan are decided. The draft plan is then given to the Police Authority for discussion and their approval, and has to be published by 1st April each year.

It should of course remembered that almost two thirds of Police Authorities in England and Wales had their annual policing plan drafted by the police (Weatheritt 1997:12).
Police liaison meetings

Sixteen Police Liaison Meetings were held in the research force area, each congruent with local council political boundaries. Eight of these meetings were attended, to assess the level of local public consultation in deciding the contents of the Annual Policing Plan. The length of this agenda of the meeting and the attendance of these meetings can be summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 18 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol. Auth.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting (Mins)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

At all of the meeting attended the first item on the agenda was the Focus Session for policing priorities for the next Annual Policing Plan. The Clerk to the Police Authority or
a police officer from Headquarters Executive Support Branch, introduced this part of the meeting, by pointing out that this focus session was intended to achieve a public assessment of the priorities for the force for 1998/99, and underlined the importance of looking at force wide key issues, to think force-wide and not to merely consider local problems:

'We want broader issues not just for your street but for the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary.' [Gp.3].

'We need to find out what will be in next year's annual plan, our on-going plan. Key issues, but at a more force wide level, rather than a local one.' [Gp2].

'Think force-wide, think about force wide issues, about where we need to commit our resources. A steer to target key issues which effect you. Many local issues will be reflected in our force issues but please try to prioritise these issues.' [Gp 5].

At one meeting the Police Authority Member who chaired the meeting complained: 'There is a difficulty of those present to understand the purpose of the Focus Section in that local issues continually interfere, for example cycling on the pavement; excessive use of police vehicles at road accidents, enforcement of laws relating to litter and drinking in public parks. Local issues are taking over policy issues for the Policing Plan rather than general issues.' [Grp 8].

An overview of the policy issues suggested by those attending these public focus group meetings is given in Fig. 24, overleaf.
People attending could generally be described as 'middle-aged' and 'middle-class'. They came with their own agendas, found it difficult to think 'force-wide' and had little understanding of what the focus sessions for the Annual Plan was intended to achieve. Their interest in the Plan was minimal.
The focus sessions proved to be a difficult process, with the Clerk to the Police Authority, needing on many occasions, to expand local complaints into wider policy issues, for example 'Quality of Life'. This can be illustrated by the following comment from the floor of one meeting:

'I don’t know much about what goes on in the Police Authority and the police, but the public need to know, to understand how it all works. As far as accessibility to public meetings is concerned I can only get there by bus, which is very difficult. I can’t understand why it is called a public meeting because it is too private. There are too many people who cannot attend this meeting'.

And a quote from a Police Commander who was surprised by the lack of interest in the Plan:

'I thought the focus group would have lasted longer so I have not brought too much with me tonight.’ (Grp 4).

These meetings conformed in many respects with earlier research regarding police/public consultative group meetings, for example that most peoples’ concern for crime is parochial, and the meetings do not represent the community, regardless of how the concept of community is defined (Morgan & Maggs 1985, Morgan 1987, Morgan 1989) and as Johnston (2000: 87) points out, are in need of greater critical and constructive input from the public.

Police focus groups

The consultation process continued within the force, with the introduction of staff seminar
and focus group meetings. Four of ten internal focus group meetings held in one division of the force were attended. Initially they were slow to attract the attendance of response police officers and members of the C.I.D, this did improve, but there was a consistently high number of traffic wardens and un-sworn (civilian) staff. No Special Constables were at any of these meetings and no officers above the rank of Sergeant was present, apart from the Divisional Commander or his deputy who introduced and closed the meeting and his staff officer, who remained for the duration.

The introduction to these meetings was based on the premise that the Divisional Commander felt it important that staff should be given the opportunity to give their views of their priorities for a future policing agenda. In all cases it was based upon the need to work within limited resources. As one senior officers said:

‘To get the best out of what we’ve got, as we live in a world of finite resources.’ [PF4].

The meetings were asked to choose and discuss their views on policing priorities for their division and when these had been listed on a flip chart to complete a personal top five, from this a list of priorities was agreed at each meeting. Drugs; burglary; violent crime; high profile policing were the areas which caused the most concern at all the observed meetings. There was great awareness from staff of how police resources were used, and the services they were expected to provide, as one officer said:

‘We should be addressing how these issues will work, how we will deal with them, because every plan will have these issues. That list is what we’re here for. The problem we should be tackling is how we do it.’ [PF3]

And:

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‘Don’t let the public dictate to us which is what they often do. We are getting sent to jobs we don’t really need to go to.’ [PF4].

There was, of course, the ever present police cynicism at all the observed meetings about the requirement, aims, and the consequent effects of these focus groups:

‘How much has this meeting cost us today? Is this meeting necessary? Is it a good training exercise? This meeting will have no effect on the plan. You’ve got to be very naive if you think this will have any effect on what happens.’ [PF1].

The issues brought out from these internal police focus groups are summarised below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES SUGGESTED AT INTERNAL LIAISON MEETING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GROUP 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More police patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less wasteage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High profile policing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the Police Liaison Meetings, the majority of those who attended the police focus groups were more concerned with parochial problems, than force-wide policy matters.

*Consultation - a difficult concept?*

Those interviewed expressed concern about the consultation process both internally and externally.
From the top corridor:

'Public opinion has a strong influence. Great weight is placed upon public opinion in respect of the content of the plan. The plan must reflect local public views, which the force does do. I have to say that the public in general are very cynical about this.' [8]

More forcibly two people interviewed commented:

'Well I would ask, does the Home Secretary listen to the public, or does he just take a common sense view of what he thinks are the public fears. I am not aware of a consultative process carried out by the Home Office to substantiate the National Key Policing Objectives. At a force level public consultation at the county shows indicated that disorderly behaviour and vandalism was quite high on the list of public fears of crime and for public concern. I don’t think that these problems are going to find their way into the Force Annual Plan.' [3].

Employee influence was also seen to be difficult to achieve:

'[It’s] Very important but it is difficult to give examples of something that has gone into the plan directly from their influence. If the plan is to mean anything it must belong to the people in it. We’re not very good at this but we are getting better. Some divisions give officers and staff responsibility for a particular area of the plan to ensure that it is delivered.' [4].

Divisional manager’s views were similarly critical:

'Public opinion; a great amount of emphasis is placed upon focus groups etc, but when you actually look at the numbers it’s not representative, in fact it’s a bloody joke. We only had about eighteen people turn up and eight of them were policemen and women. So it’s
essential, but we're not very good at it.’ [31].

And for Front Line Managers:

‘Public opinion, yes I would say the Chief Constable does listen to public opinion, but that public opinion is not local public opinion, it’s national public opinion. National public opinion is effectively the mover for local opinion. They have become the same.’ [34].

Annual Policing Plan 1995/96

The first Police Authority Annual Policing Plan produced by the Police Authority was for the financial year 1995/96, with an introduction from the Chief Constable and the Chairman of the Police Authority and it set out their aim:

‘To provide the highest standards of policing for people in Devon and Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly.’ This has remained constant throughout all the policing plans published to date.

The plan reproduced the Key National Policing Objectives and the Force Aim and then its goals under the following sections:

- Goal 1 - CRIME. To tackle effectively, in particular drug related crime and public disorder, wherever possible with the cooperation of other individuals, groups or agencies, whether statutory or voluntary.

- Goal 2 - DRUGS. To reduce abuse of controlled drugs and associated crime.

- Goal 3 - OPERATIONAL POLICING. To provide an appropriate and effective response to demands from the public for police assistance or attention.
• Goal 4 - PERSONNEL. To optimise the use of all our staff to meet the requirements of policing.

• Goal 5 - CONSULTATION. To enhance the public's understanding of policing issues and to create ownership of a shared vision and commitment to agreed strategies.

Each Force Goal was further sub-divided into objectives; each objective came with its own target and performance indicators. For example, Goal 1 - CRIME, was divided into four objectives each with their respective Targets and Performance Indicators. In this case the first objective was set out as follows:

Objective 1: To reduce the level of all crime in Devon & Cornwall.
Target: To achieve a reduction in overall Force recorded crime
P.I: Overall Force recorded crime for 1994 was 109,809.

Objectives, targets and performance indicators are set out in general terms, no commitment is made to quantify these criteria. Objectives can have more than one target or performance indicator attached to them. The Police Authority Plan 1995/96 gives targets which look to exceed the respective performance for the previous year therefore last years results became next years Performance Indicators.
The Plan for 1996/97 moved towards giving a set target for the following year, with performance for the previous year for comparison. This method was continued in the 1997/98 Plan, but full annual figures were not given, being either Apr - Dec or estimated statistics. Arguably anyone wishing to compare results of performance indicator statistics can look to the Police Authority Annual Report for this information.

*The Annual Plan 1998/99*

The Annual Plan for 1998/99 (p13) pointed out that focus group sessions were held in ‘schools and other educational establishment throughout the force area’ asking ‘some 430 young people between the ages of 11 and 18’ to vote for their policing priorities for the force with the following result:
ANNUAL PLAN 1998-99
OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES & P.L.

The focus for 1998-99 is on increasing the volume and quality of the following work, with

- improvements in the provision of online resources
- increased user engagement
- enhanced library facilities

The plan also focuses on the development of new library services and the implementation of

- improved cataloguing and classification systems
- enhanced user support services

This plan is based on the need for a more integrated and user-friendly library service, with

- increased collaboration with other library services
- improved communication with users

The plan aims to

- increase the number of users
- improve the overall service quality

This plan is subject to the following assumptions:

- continued funding for library services
- continued support from users

The plan is subject to the following risks:

- changes in user needs
- changes in funding levels

The plan will be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure its effectiveness and adaptability to changing circumstances.

The plan is subject to the following constraints:

- limited resources
- limited staff availability

The plan is subject to the following objectives:

- increased user satisfaction
- improved resource utilization

The plan is subject to the following strategies:

- increased user engagement
- improved service delivery

The plan is subject to the following actions:

- development of new library services
- implementation of new technologies

The plan is subject to the following measures:

- increased user surveys
- increased user feedback

This plan is subject to the following resources:

- increased financial resources
- increased staff resources

The plan is subject to the following dependencies:

- increased user support
- increased library space
• Drags
• Sexual Offences
• Violent Crime
• High Visibility Policing
• Burglary
• Weapons
• Vandalism

From the responses of all sixteen public focus group meetings and from internal force consultation, the Police Authority chose the following top ten local policing objectives for the force for the 1998/99 Plan:

• Drugs
• Quality of Life Issues
• High Visibility Policing
• Burglary
• Licensing Issues
• Traffic Issues
• Violence
• Vehicle Crime
• Youth Issues
• Community Policing

The Plan points out that 'the Police Authority in consultation with the Chief Constable set the following key policing priorities for 1998-99 (p16):
Operational Policing - Crime

- Drugs
- Violent Crime
- Burglary (Dwelling)
- Vehicle Crime

Operational Policing - Public Reassurance

- High Visibility Policing
- Emergency Response
- Injury Road Traffic Accidents

Community Affairs

- Youth Issues
- Community Safety

The Plan focused strongly upon partnership with other agencies, youth crime and local crime problems/community safety:

The concept of partnership acknowledges the police service cannot tackle issues within the community alone. Police officers, special constables, and un-sworn staff across the Force spend many hours in pro-active work with other agencies or individuals, their aim being to improve the quality of life for everyone in the community and maintain a vital link with the Constabulary (p30).

Reference is made to ‘partnership’ and ‘other agencies’ on eleven occasions in the plan, almost twice as many times as in the previous Plan. This would appear to reflect the recent changes in the National Key Objectives, and the forthcoming requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
Targets and Performance Indicators in the 1998/99 Plan can be shown by this example from the Drugs section of the Plan:

Target: To increase the number of detections by 5% for the supply and possession with intent to supply controlled drugs.

P.I: The number of detections for supply or possession with intent to supply. (1997/98 forecast 640 detections)

Seven other performance measures are also given in this section, including the National Key Objectives.

Although included in the 1997/98 Plan and the 1998/99 Draft Annual Policing Plan, the published 1998/99 plan does not include details of performance against indicators for the previous year, or part thereof.

The 1998/99 Annual Plan includes 'The Police Statement of commitment to Fair Treatment and Equality of Opportunity' (p9) a paragraph which was not in the Draft Plan for that year and has not appeared in previous Annual Policing Plans.

**Targets and performance indicators**

Examination of the Annual Policing Plans for the last five years indicate an increase in the number of policing priority targets with performance indicators having increased from nineteen in 1996/97 (having fallen from the previous years plan) to sixty eight in the 1999/2000 Plan.
of members of the division. However their discussions do not cascade out and members do not consult with their peers. Through the section five weekly meetings the divisional plans are discussed. The Police Authority hold public meetings around the force to gauge their views. The force plan is also guided by the Audit Commission and the National Key Objectives. Consultation defines local issues which gives the material for the Force Annual Policing Plan. The plan belongs to the Police Authority and then to the Chief Constable. Senior Officers planning conferences are held in October of each year which force a stage in the process. The product from of this goes to the Chief Officers Planning Conference which produces a draft annual plan that Divisional Commanders take to their staff and ask how they should go about making a divisional plan within the force plan. The Force plan is the ‘What ‘and the Divisional Plans are the ‘How’ - in theory.’ [3]

However changes to these plans tend to be incremental:
‘The plan tends to change very little and the Force Annual Plan, being the first year of a five year plan, says what you hope to achieve during the next twelve months. Therefore, unless there is something new on the policing agenda, the chances are that the annual policing plan will remain relatively the same year in year out. Things to be changed are defined largely by outside influences such as a change in government priorities, national key objectives or public priorities, perhaps heightened by the media, domestic violence is probably a good example of that.’ [1]

For divisional managers

Divisional managers identified the same major processes as the ‘top corridor’:
'Well the concept is one where every year the Chief Constable calls a senior officers seminar, and I think he tries to encourage as many senior managers within the force that he can to the weekend seminar at 'Middlemoor'. That's normally done in September, when there is some indication as to what the key national objectives may be about, and what the public have indicated should be there, because of the focus group activity that goes on at the consultative group meetings. Obviously what we feel as senior managers ought to be the operational priorities within the force, or our perspective on those national key objectives that we may be aware of, or what we did last year. So in theory there is a consultation exercise and in practice there is a consultation exercise. I don't think that it is effective, in the sense that these things are very often prescribed any way from the centre. So if the Home Secretary says we will have a focus upon dwelling house burglary, crimes of violence drugs, then no Chief Constable is really going to say, no I'm not going to do that. But I don't see any harm in that because that's probably what we would say needs to be done any way. So its a common sense approach. The key national objectives are sufficiently wide enough and they address areas which we, professionally, would agree needs to be addressed anyway. Whether the actual weekend seminar is a consultative exercise in the true sense of the word is probably where I'm more cynical. I think it's an opportunity for people to say what they think needs to be done but I often wonder if there's a prepared agenda anyway' [31].

Divisional Managers saw it as a 'top down' process:

'The Chief Constable sets his priorities in line with the national key objectives, sets his aims and intentions for the year and then it's those which are taken down through
consultation to divisional level. And again through consultation, based upon the Chief Constables aims, divisions build their own plan and aims, and hopefully produce their own plan as well. This local consultation was carried out both with the public and staff through focus groups.’ [20]

And:

‘I still see it as very driven by the Chief Constable, and that overall it is a top down process. The Chief Constable is very much driving his team as to what is included in the plan, and so we see top down control and we have to fit in with what’s there. Also I don’t think the Police Authority are adding value to what’s in the policing plan currently. I think they’re having to learn their role in actually having to set priorities in the areas we are looking at.’ [53].

For ground level managers

These managers, tended to be more critical of the processes involved:

‘I attend local police consultative committees and the force sent members of ‘X’ Dept from Headquarters. We asked people what their priorities were and the same old chestnuts came up, the drugs and the auto crime and people were throwing those in. I don’t know how representative they were, because at the meetings, when you consider a city of 200,000 people in Plymouth, I think about 20 people turned up when the people of ‘X’ department did their survey for the plan. So how representative is that? And again how representative is Plymouth of Devon & Cornwall, because Plymouth is often seen as a wart on Devon & Cornwall, and if you cut it off Devon would be a nice place to live. So they did have a consultative process but I’m not convinced that actually produced what people out there thought their priorities were, because I consult with groups, councillors, local
resident associations almost on a weekly basis and they’re interested in parking, groups of youths wandering around and quality of life issues, so I’m not convinced that it is representative.’ [21].

They also viewed the process as an even more top down approach than ‘top corridor’ or divisional managers:

‘The whole idea of the policing plan in the force at this time is that it cascades down from the top to the bottom. The major objectives are set out at headquarters in line with the Home Office National Objectives and any other major issues that the force wants to look at. It is then cascaded down through the divisions and through to the divisional annual plans, and the divisional plans have their own objectives, in there which again are in line with the force plan. So we are looking towards achieving the same end.’ [23].

Comments on the central influences on the Local Annual Policing Plan

As Reiner points out debates about policing invariably return to the questions of accountability, control, and who governs (1992: 249), particularly in respect of policy issues.

From the top corridor

It was generally accepted that an Annual Policing Plan was produced only because it a legal requirement, for example one said:

‘Historically, without legislation we wouldn’t go down the route we have been forced to take. Legislation has dictated the reasons that underpins the force annual plan.’ [8]
Home Office influence was noted by all on the top corridor, ranging from:

‘Yes they have influence because they dictate the key sections which should be in the plan, for example partnership and target setting’ [6].

To:

‘The Home Office has the greatest influence of any of these groups you have in your list, over the contents of the plan. Every year they set the five key national objectives, these mean those areas where police responses should be concentrated. Those objectives form the major part of the force annual plan. The Home Office also controls the budget of the force, because they set the capping limit for which the constabulary can go to the community charge and tax payers to get the revenue. As money is the major area for resource allocation this is why they set the policing objectives and they control the finance. They also set down through Home Office Circulars the style and content of the force annual policing plans.’[10].

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary were seen as a strong influence, for example:

‘Any shortcomings they may have found in the last plan would be implemented’[13].

The background influence of the Audit Commission was also noted:

‘The Audit Commission are not actually consulted in respect of our annual policing plan but they provide the performance indicators and the papers for example Street Wise. They are influential.’[3]

And that:

‘The Audit Commission has no direct influence, but is indirectly influential in respect of
their papers on targeting resources and value for money, decisions on what your priorities
should be. They are quite an influential group which comment upon the way funds are
spent.' [2].

The majority of those interviewed suggested that A.C.P.O had no influence over the
contents of the plan, one going as far as to say:

'A.C.P.O could well be the least influential of all the groups.' [4].

From divisional managers

The Audit Commission, the Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
are seen by these managers as the main source of central influence:

For example:

'I would say that the two that stand out most are the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's
Inspector of Constabulary, sorry three, and the Home Office. The Home Office driving the
Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, following on from any consultation they would
have had. I don't see any influence from public opinion.' [44].

'The H.M.I well yes they do influence it by virtue of their support for any Government
initiative or Home Office initiative and so I am quite sure that this years inspection will be
crime reduction based, whereas last years inspection was intelligence-led policing crime
detection based. So this years plan inevitably reflects crime reduction, in a way, as a
priority and yes they are quite influential. So too the Audit Commission. The Audit
Commission put more influence clearly on what the Police Authority are asking the Chief

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Constable. Home Office, yes, not through circulars but because the Home Office is now so instrumental in the Crime and Disorder Act. What is going on there is that Jack Straw is using the Home Office, as I know from friends in the Home Office, that for two years before this government was appointed, he was in and out of the Home Office formulating this very strategy. Therefore it must be a very strong influence and the new national key objectives, I forget what they are called now, but clearly they are setting the new national key objectives, or the modern equivalent, which are basically the same thing. [45].

From ground level managers

Ground level managers also saw the Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Commission as having the most influence over the Annual Policing Plan:

'I think the ones that are really driving at source are the Audit Commission and this filters down to the H.M.I and I see them today as little more than a puppet of government. I think probably police authorities do have more of a role in interpreting the local needs of the force, that's how I see them, and being able to translate it into what is required in Devon & Cornwall, you know what they want. I would say that they are the main influences. Public opinion, I don't know, I mean yes up to a point, but I think now the ones that are really pushing things is the Audit Commission.' [25].

And:

'H.M.I, yes a definite influence and A.C.P.O definitely, but I've got no doubt at all that the pressure from the Home Office is able to bear on chief officers has increased and the independence of the Chief Constable I believe has eroded. (A) because of their selection
procedure as senior ranks are managed by the Home Office, you don't get promoted unless they approve and (B) the rewards remuneration and contracts are all based upon factors set by the Home Office in respect of him.' [26].

Comments on the local influences

From the top corridor

All those interviewed believed that the Police Authority could influence the contents of the plan in that:

'They have been very complimentary about the plan, and there is of course always a dilemma with the annual plan as it is the Police Authority’s plan. This begs the question - How does the H.M.I influence the contents of their plan?’[6].

But:

'It could be argued a great deal, but they don’t necessarily have a great affect on the content of the annual plan. I think this will change as they become more familiar with the planning process. Overall they do influence the plan.’ [8]

The Chief Constable in person appears to be seen by all those interviewed as having considerable influence over the contents of the plan. This view varies in its strength of conviction. From the suggestion that:

'The Chief Constable is responsible for producing the draft of annual policing plan for presentation to the Police Authority. He is also very significant in respect of producing the contents of the plan.’ [3].

To the strongest viewpoint:
‘The Chief Constable is very influential. Our Chief is very detail conscientious and he reads and makes prolific alterations to the plan. He questions the targets, he questions the methodology and he questions the structure of the plan and its grammar. He is very influential.’ [4]

The general view in respect of Police Staff Associations (Police Federation and Superintendents Association) and other Unions was that they generally had no influence over the contents of the plan. The most forceful comment was:

‘They take part in the senior officers planning weekend but what is apparent is that they are dis-interested in becoming actively involved in the strategy making and delivery of force policy. They want to be there in a listening and criticising role but do not want an active part or any responsibility for decisions taken within the policy making process. There is a form of cabinet responsibility here, where you argue your case in the meetings but once strategy has been decided within the meetings everyone must be bound by the decision.’ [10].

From divisional managers

Divisional Mangers saw the Chief Constable as the greatest local influence over the Annual Policing Plan:

‘The Chief Constable in person. Can you ask an easier question? A lot of this stuff naturally in his role is prepared for him but we do have a Chief Constable who does dot the I’s and cross the T’s and does actually look at what’s in the plan to ensure that it’s
something he can deliver on. Because obviously that’s his job. He’s accountable to the Police Authority on it, so I think he’s got a major role in it, and also in terms of allowing resources to get on and do the work. But he doesn’t get to the nitty-gritty side of it. Employees in the organisation, I think this had been a difficult area for us. Whilst we have had the will to try and set up focus groups, discussion groups, or whatever, I don’t think they have been particularly satisfactory, and it may be because of this top down approach that they see as a fait-accompli. Also to be quite honest, they’re too bloody busy, and they actually think they don’t want to think about those things. When we’ve consulted, in my last division, I did it more bottom up and we had some very valuable things come up from rural divisions because they could tell me about this or that, whatever and it worked quite well.’ [53].

They also saw the Police Authority as having some influence:

‘I think the Police Authority have a measure of influence in as much as they must approve the Chief Constable’s plan. In fact it does now become the Police Authorities plan under present legislation and they have for instance, in the 1997/98 plan, they have actually included something which the Chief Constable didn’t. So I suppose you could argue that this proves that they have some executive authority.’ [31].

Views in respect of public opinion were less enthusiastic:

‘Public opinion, well I still think we have an arrogant approach to public opinion. Whilst they’re going through the mechanisms of police liaison groups and the focus groups that go on, and data gathering, we’re not into a wide cross section of the community. In fact we are into a very specialist group of people, age group, class group etc and we’ve gone out in
different ways to try and get information from the public and I suppose we get the same as with our staff. Do the public really want to get involved, are they informed enough about what they’re being asked about, to make considered and constructive suggestions? But the arrogance comes, in that we know damned well that the public are concerned about quality of life issues, what’s happening in their own locality. Yet the plans don’t reflect that because we’ve got what we call professional judgement on it, and say, yes of course they’re not mentioning murders or burglaries and that’s our core business and we’ve got to do it. And we haven’t got it right yet, haven’t got the balance to listen to them.’ [53].

From ground level managers

Ground level managers saw local influence coming from the Police Authority, public opinion and the Chief Constable:

‘I would say the new make up of the Police Authority through the Home Office has probably had to a large extent the majority of influence. They are probably informed through the H.M.I and the Audit Commission and I think they would like to think that it reflects the majority of public opinion, and also the police as well, but this is not always the case.’ [28].

Again where public opinion is considered, it is often seen as being in the back-ground:

‘Public opinion in its broadest sense I think must somehow influence the decisions made by the Home Office when they come to decide the key national objectives, but how they do that I don’t know’ [24]
Or a difficult concept:

'Public opinion is a problem because everybody wants the same thing but everybody wants it a different way. So I feel that the public have been made to feel that they have been able participate, but the only thing about this is that if you or I were told that a survey had taken place, do you accept what's said? Because if you go back and say, well who said this, and where, and why, and how? The people who have done these surveys don't like that very much. Once you start asking questions upstairs like that, then you are really made to feel out of order.' [19].

The Police Authority view

All the members of the Police Authority who were interviewed saw their Authority as being able to influence the contents of the Plan:

'I think the Police Authority has a tremendous input. There's no doubt about it, that when we are circulated with the draft copies of the annual policing plan the Chief Constable will always discuss in depth, his team, his senior team, will always discuss it in depth with us. And if there's any amendments that the Authority members want to make then, you know, we know very well that if we make a case it will be changed. But if we don't make a case then we accept that the Chief Constable, being responsible for operation matters, will probably be right. He'll talk us out of it, but I think the Police Authority has got tremendous influence.' [9].

Many also saw the Chief Constable as being influential:

'The Chief Constable and his senior officers would have an input because they are going to
discuss the publics’ perception of the priorities and decide, in the main, with the key objectives how they fit into the policing plan.’ [8].

However there were those who also saw influence coming from the Home Office and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary:

‘The Home Office. I don’t know. I wouldn’t like to throw that out, because one must always be aware of what sort of comes out from their on the air waves, as it were, to be aware. You have to be aware of it. I’m quite sure we’re influenced by it, you know, what they are wanting and so forth. You might say ‘poo - poo’ to this sort of thing but you know very well at the end of the day that you have to tow the line.’ [2].

And:

‘H.M.I, yes, fine, O.K but we are conscious of the fact that, correction, I am conscious of the fact that they are the mid-station between the Chief Constable and the Home Office. And whilst they may have a wider view of the issues beyond the force area, I do tend to take note of what they say, particularly in relation to this particular force. But theirs is a stand back view of things and we can’t always do that, they lend a critical eye as we know, but they do not have to take into account all the reasons why things are done, or why things are not done, or are unable to be done. It’s usually finance.’ [4].

Opinions about the amount of ‘hands-on’ involvement the Police Authority and its Clerk have in writing the plan varied, however most members felt they had sufficient input:

‘I think we have sufficient input. I’m sure we could get more input if we wanted it. It’s simply just making the point that we do need to have more input. Unless we had an
authority set up here which is bigger than the one we've got, and this is quite a lean Police Authority, what's the point in replicating what's down the road anyway [i.e. police headquarters]." [7].

But there was concern about the control over items reaching the agenda of Police Authority meetings:

'It is really delegated down to the Clerk. He's got close liaison obviously with the treasurer because most of the headaches as with all committees are financially based, and obviously he looks at the and has close contact with the Chief. Our agendas, as do most agendas in local government in its widest sense, seem to follow a particular pattern and there are just slight amendments as it goes along. But what happens is that the Clerk, he'll call me as the ........* reporting anything that comes up, and so he confers with me to put things on the agenda. We have a pre-meeting anyway, maybe a week or so or may be longer than that, before the full Authority meeting, when the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Clerk, Treasurer, the Force Financial Officer, the Chief and probably his deputy are there. So that we chew these things over, and stuff that is relevant to it, that's a sifting effect, taking out some things that there is no need to put to the authority anyway. Some of it is basically information - full stop, and also it might well bring in stuff which we might feel ought to be placed in front of the full Authority. [4].

*Removed to preserve confidentiality

Divisional Policing Plans

Local police commanders were given the opportunity to produce their own Policing Plans,
for each Division. Four Divisional Plans for 1997/98 were taken as examples, representing about half the number of Force Divisions at that time. Two documents give the same précis of how the plan was formulated, namely through:

- The Home Secretary’s National Key Policing Objectives.
- Local objectives set by Police Authority after ‘listening to public views’.
- Performance targets set by the Police Authority.
- The financial resources available.

The other two give a more detailed description of how the plan was devised, including:

- Public and internal police consultation.
- Monitoring and evaluation of previous performance/crime trends.
- Policing priorities set by Government and the Police Authority.

All four plans set out their Divisional Key Policing Priorities. These follow the same headings as given in the Police Authority Annual Policing Plan, namely: Operational Policing; Public Reassurance; and Community Affairs. They also include a section for ‘Investors in People’ under the heading of Personnel & Training. There is no reference in any of these documents to policing budgets.

There was a variance between performance indicators, both between Local Plans and the Police Authority Plan. For example under the heading ‘Emergency Response’, the Local Plans examined all had a different indicators in respect of immediate response times, with three of the four plans having lower performance indicators than shown in the Police Authority Plan.
The Plymouth Division of the Force produced copies of Local Policing Plans for the public and also for their staff in respect of ‘Ward Officers’, ‘Response Officers’, ‘Crime Management’, and ‘Support Staff’. The documents published for Divisional Staff set out in detail all the performance indicators required for both the Force and the Division for the year, and set out how staff in these departments are expected to contribute to the attainment of these goals.

The divisional plans examined suggest that, although they closely follow the force plan, both in terms of design and the key national objectives, there is scope for local commanders to make their own adjustments.

*Divisional plans - the top corridor view*

Top Corridor staff agreed that there was considerable freedom for divisions but most added the caveat that they must follow the Force Plan:

‘Within the constraints of the force annual plan. They must satisfy the general areas of that. They were given quite a lot of scope and a free range within the guidelines of the force plan which were the general areas they worked within.’ [13].

One person interviewed said:

‘Initially for the first year they were given tremendous freedom but they didn’t want it. They wanted to be guided and led and given a template on how to do it. They are becoming better at it now but quite clearly divisional plans must correlate with the force plans and achievement can only be through divisions.’ [10].
For the future one interviewee said:

'It will be tighter in future but they must include those points which are in the Annual Force Plan, which I don't think they did before. So I think they will not have quite so much freedom now as they have had before.' [15]

Divisional Plans are seen as a means of enforcing performance indicators from the Force Plan, which in turn are based upon the National Key Objectives from the Home Office through the police organisation to local commanders and ultimately to the individual officer. As one interviewee noted: 'All divisions have to follow the force plan, based upon Home Office Key Objectives.' [2].

**Divisional plans - the view from divisional managers**

They believed they had some freedom to produce their own divisional plans:

'We are given a good bit of freedom. We have to produce a plan that will support the force plan above the divisional plans, we're talking now about unit plans or whatever. There is complete autonomy there. But we have to produce a plan that will support the force plan. [39].

Constraint from the Force Plan was often quoted:

'Limited, limited. They have some but it has to be in a fixed format set by 'X' Department which is not easy all the time. It has to fit into the force plan obviously, and again to be, really, to be quite honest, I think it plays lip service to a lot of the local problems that the
small amount of local consultation brings up. When I talk about local consultation I mean police liaison groups which are a handful of converted people, usually elderly and well off and pro-police, who attend and do very little to influence. We sent out some questionnaires, the questionnaires were great but I feel that the people who answer questionnaires are not the people we want to get to really. [48].

Divisional plans - the views of ground level managers

The views of ground level managers were mixed. Some felt there was considerable freedom:

'I think they have a lot of freedom, I think in reality. In practice you’ve got to link your plans with the force plan. For good organisational reasons there has got to be a trickle down cascade effect from the centre but its the tactical freedom. I mean once the objectives are set, and I pick up the same tune from the centre, how I actually effect those plans or operationalise them, then that’s where I have the greatest freedom. I set my own P.I’s, effectively now they’re approved by the Chief Constable, so if he didn’t agree with them I wouldn’t be allowed to have them, because all our plans are approved by the Chief Constable and I know that he has queried some of the divisional commanders plans this year. So whilst I make a conscious effort to make sure it links and that’s how it should be but how we tactically achieve it I have a great deal of latitude.[31].

But only as additional local priorities:

'The local policing plans now completely reflect the priorities that have been identified in the force plan, so therefore operational policing personnel matters and training matters, and community relation matters, all form part and parcel of the divisional plan. The
They agreed that policing plans mean that the police give too much priority to tasks on which they are measured, with just over 83% either agreeing or strongly agreeing:

![Annual Plans Improve the Quality of Police Service](image)

However they believed that policing plans had made no difference to the way most police carry out their job, with just over 45% either agreeing or strongly agreeing that this was the case, illustrating the existence of the ‘street-level bureaucrat’ within front line service.
Inspectorate of Constabulary. Once again examination of published documents from H.M.I, the Home Office, The Audit Commission and Force Annual Policing Plans, illustrate the strong influence that these groups have upon the contents of the local Policing Plan, a view that is supported by members of the organisation.

For example managers saw central influence over the contents of the Annual Plan coming primarily from The Home Office, The Audit Commission, and the H.M.I, and locally from the Chief Constable, who was seen as having the greatest influence, being responsible for the production of the draft Annual Plan; although they believed that the Police Authority did have some influence.

Police Authority members believed that they had some control over the contents, but admitted to the power of the Chief Constable.

Consultation was seen as a problem at all levels, both internal and external, and despite efforts to employ a ‘rational comprehensive model’ of decision making, by necessity this was reduced to one of ‘muddling through’.

Although Her Majesty’s Inspectors reported that there was sufficient flexibility for local commanders to produce their own area policing plans, the general view was that this flexibility was limited by the need to follow the Police Authority Plan and its Ministerial Priorities, and a perceived reluctance to produce extra local targets and performance indicators.
Front line staff saw Annual Plans as placing greater influence on tasks upon which they were measured without a marked increase in quality. They were undecided about public influence over their work but they saw greater influence coming from both central government and the local Police Authority.

However over forty five percent of those who were members of the force prior to the introduction of Annual Policing Plans, believed that plans had made no difference to the way they carried out their work.

A flow chart of the major influencers is shown in the following figure:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY

Although domestic violence has been defined as 'gender neutral' (Buzawa & Buzawa 1990: 9), with evidence to suggest that men can also be the victims of such violence (Mirrlees-Black 1999, Straus 1999 pp17-44), it has to be acknowledged that it was pressure from women's groups and the feminist movement which placed it firmly in the policy arena.

Since the 'first wave' of feminism (Hearn 1996: 25) of the early twentieth century and its 're-emergence in the 1960's' (Dobash & Dobash 1992: 73), as well as widely published feminist academic research (Walklate 1996), the issue of male/female power relationships, particularly in respect of domestic violence and female rape, has provoked considerable reaction (Dobash & Dobash 1979, Hammer & Saunders 1984, O'Donovan 1985, Kelly 1988, Stanko 1988, MacKinnon 1989), and produced 'their own politics of victimisation' (Rock 1990: 178), even if the images represented have had more impact than their theories (Heidelsohn 1989).

Milestones of change

The impetus for change in policing domestic violence has been world wide. Research in the United States of America on policing domestic violence, the starting point for many British policing initiatives (Morgan 1997, Pollard 1998), involved the wider use of police arrest powers in domestic violence situations. Known as the Minneapolis Experiment (Sherman & Berk 1984) it was later replicated in London, Ontario.

This so called ‘victim protection - offender arrest’ policy, it was argued, would reduce re-offending and was widely circulated to British Police Forces (Sheptycki 1993). It was a policy which consequently received their considerable support (Edwards 1986, 1989, Sheptycki 1993), even though it was questionable that this lessening of police discretion would overcome the ‘particular situational factors’ which have shaped police action in the past (Martin 1997).

These factors included:

• The public/private crime divide (Womens National Commission 1985: 51).

• The parties involved, their values and previous domestic violence history (Hammer 1989, Home Office 1997[a]: para 1.4).

• Any assumptions by some young people that violence towards females was occasionally acceptable (Zero Tolerance Trust 1997).

• That communities themselves would push for greater police intervention in policing domestic violence (Walklate 1998: 64).

Within the United Kingdom one of the first milestones of change was the so called fly on the wall documentary made by Peter Greaf in 1982, which illustrated the unsympathetic attitudes to female victims exhibited by some British police officers. This dramatically changed public opinion, putting pressure on both the Home Office and the police, to
change their policies in respect of policing domestic violence (Bourlet 1990: 65).

Subsequent changes to the criminal law, intended to enhance the power of victims in cases of domestic violence, affected police policy and practice, for example:

- The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provided that wives could be both competent and compellable witnesses against husbands in criminal proceedings, unless jointly charged (Zander 1985: 17-118).

- The Family Law Act (Part IV) 1996 (see Lockton & Ward 1997, Bird 1996) provided means of protecting the residential rights of victims of domestic violence, with the facility for powers of arrest in certain cases.

- The experimental use of Domestic Violence Courts to encourage victims to give evidence in such cases (Guardian 3rd June 1999).

- The experimental use of Restorative Justice to enable reconciliation and the rebuilding of relationships (Paradine & Wilkinson 2000).

However two Home Office Circulars to the Police have been the most instrumental in changing attitudes towards the policing of domestic violence. The first, 69/1986 - 'Violence Against Women' (Home Office 1986[a]) made it clear that the police must ensure the safety of spouse and children at domestic disputes, although it made little change to policy (Freeman 1987, Edwards 1989) except in the Metropolitan Police where the use of arrest powers was emphasised (Sheptycki 1993, Mullender 1996: 4). The second Circular, 60/1990, 'Domestic Violence' (Home Office 1990[a]) related solely to the issue of policing incidents of domestic violence, and made it clear that the Home Secretary had been influenced by concern from the public about domestic violence and a requirement to ensure the protection of victims from physical attacks that take place in the home.

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Since the research was completed an additional Circular (19/2000[b]) 'Domestic Violence' has been published placing more emphasis upon local police policy and greater prescription of how incidents of domestic violence should be policed, and a further Home Office Document 'Domestic Violence: Breaking the Chain Multi Agency Guidance for Addressing Domestic Violence' (2000[c]) which gives detailed advice on a partnership approach to policing domestic violence.

THE RESEARCH

Home Office Circular 60/1990

The summary to the Circular underlined the message that ‘......all police officers involved in the investigation of cases of domestic violence regard as their overriding priority the protection of the victim and the apprehension of the offender. To this end they should be made fully aware of their responsibility to respond as law enforcement officers to requests from victims for help, and of their powers to take action in cases of violence.’ (ibid para 30). It then goes on to set out a number of policy recommendations to Chief Officers:

- Liaise with other agencies and voluntary bodies.
- Consider establishing dedicated domestic violence units.
- Set out a force policy statement.
- A need for positive action in all cases of domestic violence.
- Employ an effective recording system of offences.
- Recommend officers not to use reconciliation where there is a suggestion of violence.
- Provide medical facilities for victims.
• Ensure officers are aware of their powers of arrest.
• Ensure officers consider charging offenders and explain need for victims to give evidence.
• Use bail to protect victims when no charges are brought.
• Pass background information on to Crown Prosecution Service.
• Arrange for continued support for victim prior to court.
• Advise Crown Prosecution Service if victim wishes to withdraw complaint.

The Circular concludes with a message from the Home Secretary in which he states that:

He hopes that chief officers will find the advice and recommendations in this circular helpful and that they will implement them fully in their force areas (ibid).

*Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary Reports*

Whilst the influence of these Home Office Circulars brought about a ‘flurry of police activity’ (Leishman et al 1996: 196) throughout England and Wales, it was pressure from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, which sought to ensure the implementation of these policy recommendations.

Taking for example, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Reports for the Force, between 1990 and 1994, the following number of references to domestic violence issues were made:

• 1990 ......................One paragraph.
• 1991 ......................One paragraph.
• 1992 ......................Seven Paragraphs & three recommendations.
The report of Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary in respect of the force for 1990 was carried out before Home Office Circular 60/1990 had time to take effect. Paragraph (4.4) of this report refers to domestic violence issues: it states that the force '...has a decisive and caring attitude towards domestic violence' and where there has been a complaint and evidence of an offence it has been 'recorded as a crime'. Where children are involved and if appropriate families are directed to other agencies. The Inspectorate considered that, 'Force Standing Orders clearly set out the procedures for officers dealing with cases of domestic violence.' No recommendations were made by the Inspectorate in respect of force policy or practice regarding this issue.

The report for 1991 has one paragraph (5.7) relating to issues of domestic violence and it emphasises the need to respond to this problem by:

- Setting out a Force Policy Statement and Strategy which, it was noted, was then currently in preparation.
- Setting up Domestic Violence Units. A policy that the force had decided not to implement, due to problems of size and geography, instead appointing Liaison Inspectors in each division to provide a co-ordinated and inter agency approach to this issue.

This policy appeared to satisfy the Inspectorate, which made no recommendations.

The report for the 1992 inspection contains the greatest coverage of force policy and practice in respect of domestic violence issues. It re-enforced the importance set out in Home Office Circular 60/1990 of taking 'positive action against the perpetrator by arrest.
when justified’ and the welfare of children (para 3.3), and goes on to point out that the Force Standing Order relating to domestic violence was ‘in being prior to the current Home Office Guidance and did not fully embrace the radical changes in attitude in the guidance’ (para 3.4). Once again pointing out that a new Standing Order was ‘currently being prepared’. Comment is made of the failure to set up Domestic Violence Units, and the Inspectorate, although in agreement with their current policy, required the force to reinforce and monitor its commitment to domestic violence policing policy. The report, although praising a multi-agency initiative in Plymouth, criticised the force for not routinely referring incidents of domestic violence to other agencies.

The Inspectorate recommended that the force:

- Considers producing an advice leaflet for domestic violence victims.

- Undertake an evaluation of domestic violence incidents after implementation of its new Force Standing Order.

- Introduce a structured domestic violence referral system.

(p21).

The Inspectorate report for 1993 noted that the force follows the principles of the Home Office Circular and the publication of its Policy and Procedure Guidelines. Due to delay in publishing these guidelines, no monitoring of domestic violence had taken place and it recommends that this should now be carried out.

In respect of the recommendations set out in 1992, the Inspectorate reports that:

- The force has produced leaflets for victims of domestic violence.

- Responsibility for evaluation had been devolved to Divisional Detective superintendents.

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• Guidelines in respect of a structured referral system had been issued so that liaison could take place locally on this issue.

The 1994 Report points out that the force is tackling domestic violence ‘in accord with Home Office guidelines’ (para 5.17). The Inspectorate welcomed the introduction of nominated trained officers to co-ordinate the policing of domestic violence and having pointed out the advantages of Domestic Violence Units, ‘...understands consideration is being given to the formation of dedicated units’. (para 5.17). In respect of recommendations made in their 1993 report the Inspectorate notes that the monitoring of incidents now occurs (p47).


Examination of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary reports reveals a change of emphasis in respect of domestic violence policy over the five Force Inspection Reports between 1990 and 1994.

The 1990 report was complimentary; the force had a caring and decisive attitude to policing domestic violence and Force Standing Orders clearly set out procedures for policing them.

The 1991 report was more critical and compared force policy with recommendations set out in Home Office Circular 60/1990, emphasising the need for the Force to publish a Force Policy Statement and Strategy and set up domestic violence units.
The Report for 1992 was the most critical in respect of Force domestic violence policy; it made direct reference to home Office Circular 60/1990 in respect of positive police action, that there was as yet not published Force Standing Order about police procedures for dealing with domestic violence, and commented about the lack of Domestic Violence Units.

The 1993 Report notes that the force is following the principles of the Home Office Circular 60/1990 and has published its Policy and Procedure Guideline, with the 1994 Report noting that the Force is tackling the problem of domestic violence in accord with the Home Office Circular, and that the Force is considering the setting up of Domestic Violence Units - which were subsequently introduced.

It is clear that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary had taken up the issue of policing domestic violence (both policy and practice) and intended to ensure that the force implemented the recommendations contained in Home Office Circular 60/1990.

*The force policy statement*

The resultant force policy and procedures document states that, "It is the overriding duty of police officers and civilian staff, when dealing with domestic disputes, to protect victims and children from violence. They will treat domestic violence as seriously as other forms of violent crime by making full use of the relevant powers of entry and arrest, and avoid the dangers of seeking conciliation between assailant and victim, when an assault has taken place. Domestic violence is a crime and should be recorded and dealt with
Force policy goes on to detail police powers and all the recommendations given in the Home Office Circular are addressed.

The role and responsibilities of staff employed in Domestic Violence Units are defined. These include:

- Improving the awareness of staff to the issue of domestic violence.
- Support and help victims.
- Co-ordinate this help through the other statutory and voluntary agencies which may be involved.

Unlike the Home Office Circular, force policy is 'gender neutral' in that it does not show any suggestions of bias towards violence against women, but rather refers to terms such as 'partner', 'family members', 'people in a close relationship', and 'children'. It emphasises the need for officers to use 'positive action'.

Comparing the contents of Home Office Circular 60/1990 and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Reports of Force inspections between 1990 and 1994, with the contents of the Force Policy Statement, it can be seen that together they have brought about a major change in force policy and practice in the policing of domestic violence.

Therefore, in terms of local police policy and practice, 'Circular 60 [can] be seen as an important directive, reflecting government and Home Office Policy.' (Mawby & Walklate 1994: 99), having itself been influenced by international policing initiatives, national public opinion and academic research papers.
These local policy and procedural changes can be summarised as follows:

- A Force Policy Statement which sets out the requirement of ‘positive action’ by officers when they police domestic violence incidents.

- The introduction of Domestic Violence Units in each division of the force, staffed by dedicated officers and setting out their roles and responsibilities.

- The requirement to monitor the policing of domestic violence incidents, both by line supervisors, Domestic Violence Units, and Divisional Managers.

- The requirement to record the policing of domestic violence incidents through the submission of a completed ‘pro-forma’ to their respective Domestic Violence Unit, setting out details of the incident.

- Close co-operation with divisional Child Protection Teams, and with other agencies.

- Flagging up on the force command and control computer system of domestic violence incidents where there is concern for repeated incidents.

The force is one of a majority of that have produced a Policy Statement, and one of the minority with dedicated Domestic Violence Units (Grace 1995: vii) albeit that Domestic Violence Officers have had ‘little impact on the general police response to domestic violence’ (Grace 1995: 55).

_The making of domestic violence policy - who influences?_

Managers at all levels believed that the main pressures on local policy in respect of domestic violence came from public opinion, in all its forms, from the Home Office, and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.

_a) Public Opinion_

‘Something which has evolved over time, with the benefit of hindsight. Outside influences are important but at the end of the day we make policy and take into account of all these factors and opinions of those who have any relevant knowledge. We have implemented as
public pressure has forced us to do it. It [domestic violence] was once not even considered a police issue' [13].

With public opinion exerted through pressure groups:

'Public opinion yes, I mean, yes in terms of pressure groups rather than people turning up at public meetings en-mass and saying we're really worried about domestic violence. Pressure groups really.' [35].

And:

'Like other areas for example searching problems which resulted in P.A.C.E, came about as a result of pressure groups. With domestic violence it was brought about by the feminist movement, which had a large part to play in pushing those issues, and I have got to say that what we did before was abysmal, until we were made to look at ourselves. This had a lot of impact on our policy. A large amount of police policy is influenced by outside factors. We tend to reflect social change not to be leaders of it.' [18].

b) The Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

In terms of local autonomy over the policing of domestic violence, the influence of the Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary provoked as much comment as that in respect of public opinion:

'The Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, but really the Home Office Circular which drove it and the H.M.I beat us up for not implementing it. I do know there were several members of the Police Authority who questioned me very closely at the time, why we weren't doing it, and were very critical of the Chief, and went back and had a go at him at Police Authority meetings, a Labour member, under the old system.' [18].

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And:

‘Now we have Domestic Violence Units in each division with dedicated officers to provide better service to victims. This is totally reactive from other agencies. Politically whatever is flavour of the day we do it. If the Home Office says, this is good practice, so we do it. Strategically we are not totally in control of our policies: in the vast majority we are totally reactive to local political audit and consumer pressure. We are here to police the community and we should respond to customer pressure and issues raised by the public. [12]

Home Office Circulars were seen as important in respect of policing domestic violence incidents:

‘I think that force policy in respect of domestic violence started from a Home Office Circular and it ran from there. [2].

And:

‘Home Office Circulars, definitely. Our policy in respect of domestic violence is basically word for word the same as that home office circular.’ [28].

The views from managers at all levels of the organisation suggest that public opinion, the Home Office, and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary have had the most influence over force policy and practice in respect of domestic violence issues.

Domestic violence - the local policy making process

Managers were asked how they would describe policy making in respect of domestic violence policy; most considered it to be an incremental process:
'Incremental, yes. We looked at other police forces and other agencies and their reactions and decided that the best method was through inter-agency working. I believe the force has a considered and well thought out strategy which has been fully validated by a pilot scheme.' [6].

And:

'I think it was incremental. For example this is shown by the time it's taken to get all divisions fully involved. I'm not sure the force is purely re-active in deciding policy, we can be pro-active as well.' [3].

And from a variety of sources:

'In general terms the majority of police policy is decided internally but it is an interesting mix. Often we read about a policy idea and say we should try this, and small ideas grow. It's a strange mix, and of course, nothing is unique in this world. Look at zero tolerance level policing in New York and you find that this has already been done in the United Kingdom. Such elements of policing policy can be found everywhere.' [10].

*Control over the implementation of domestic violence policy*

Interviewees were asked their view upon how the force monitored the effectiveness of domestic violence policy. In all cases reference was made to:

- Statistical returns - from recorded crime/arrests.
- The supervising of domestic incidents on the force computer command and control system.
- Reports of officers who attended incidents.
- The number of referrals to domestic violence units for further action.
For example:

'We have statistics on it, as each domestic violence unit puts details on the force computer system. We can measure the quantity of referrals and arrests which relate to domestic violence and can look at the numbers, but have no idea of the quality. We do surveys of victims of crimes and we have to take out any references to domestic violence. It's difficult to measure the quality of service they receive, or the effectiveness of it because it's a very sensitive issue.' [11]

And:

'How effective it is in the police service, we've had to be very explicit to rank and file and say this is what you will do otherwise you're looking at neglect of duty, because people with their own opinions are very reluctant to deal positively with private violence, due to their own value systems or what they do themselves.' [28].

**Policing domestic violence - the outcomes**

*a) For top corridor and divisional managers*

These managers, none of them directly involved in front line policing, believed that present force policy in respect of domestic violence was one of 'positive action' or 'positive arrest'.

The view of two members of the top corridor are typical:

'The force takes a positive crime focused approach to the problem of domestic violence, with positive action by officers on the ground and the encouragement of a multi-agency approach to support this, together with specialist police back-up teams.' [8].

And:

'A tightening up on the issue of what we do. I have heard this described as a positive arrest
policy. Also a feeling amongst some people that the issue of domestic violence is increasing, probably because our domestic violence units are recording more cases. However there is no solid evidence here, but I'm sure it has increased.' [11].

The issue of increases in recorded crime as a result of this policy is noted by many of these senior managers.

Divisional managers had stronger concerns about the way domestic violence issues had been policed in the past:

'We've made leaps and bounds. We have a positive arrest policy. Every division has a domestic violence squad, well when I say a squad each division has a person. Incidents are now collated, recorded and we look into the action taken by the officer and the actions checked. We don't treat domestics like we used to. It's now a positive arrest policy. As I say, you know, we are looking to prosecute but constantly frustrated that despite of agreements with C.P.S. They won't prosecute despite changes in legislation where you don't have to evidence from the complainant to proceed. In reality despite all those things when the victim withdraws the complaint there is hardly ever a prosecution. That's not our fault.' [48].

Managers at this level had strong views about changing police attitudes to domestic violence:

'It's galloping into the 21st century if you like. We have come a long way in the last two or three years. We've moved away from the old attitudes of domestic violence and I don't think I need to expand on what I regard as the old attitudes. We are now extremely
positive in our response to it, to the extent that now if you look at a [message] log and an arrest hasn’t been made you will be asking questions as to why it wasn’t made. The old fashioned values attributed to the police service, although they may exist to some small extent in some parts still, are largely gone, and we are into early intervention positive enforcement. If that means that in some peoples views we have wasted our time because the complainant withdraws later on, then that is not a consideration.’ [35].

As well as better understanding and greater compassion for victims of domestic violence:
‘We haven’t been very good at dealing with domestic violence for years and years and years, we’ve, to use a police term, ‘cuffed’ ninety five per cent of it. It is a crime, it is something which I think the statistics say that a women suffers sixty three, if it is a female, she suffers sixty three acts of violence on her before she decides to report it once. We’ve been very poor at dealing with it, so domestic violence policy is designed improve our working relationship in that respect. To make the way we deal with it better.’ [38].

Divisional managers in particular, also believed that there had been a change in police culture over the last twenty or thirty years, for example:
‘Its a measure of both the police and public pressure. I think the impetus to address domestic violence slightly differently was external. The pressure to do so was external, through H.M.I.C and various pressure groups that exist, but I think there’s also been a change of culture in the police service. We are a much younger organisation than we used to be and police officers now come from a different background to the men predominantly men that tutored me when I joined. They were ex-service all Second World War veterans and that sort of thing, and they themselves had a different culture and view of life and of the role of women in society. So I think it has been of benefit, a beneficial change of
culture, brought about by a more educated society which we recruit from, with greater equality between men and women. It's still not right, but there is greater equality between men and women now than there ever was, and all that has tended to make the change of police tactics in regards of domestic violence easier to achieve. We've got a good Domestic Violence Unit in this division, in fact it was a model for the Force. It's now moving down into youth and avenues that are multi-agency based. It's made positive changes and I think can only get better. The main influence is an external, and more fertile environment for it to grow in, than previously when I joined. Police officers are totally different to those when I joined thirty years ago and that's not being disrespectful to them. They were men who reflected society of their time as we do today. As society changes so do the police. This is the case in terms of policing policies which relate to social issues.' [31].

This was a recurring theme:

'Domestic violence policy is probably a very good example of the force responding to social change, in other words greater concern about domestic violence. But I think also that would have been re-enforced by the fact that people would have joined the police force in fairly recent years who would have shared a different view about domestic violence than if they had joined twenty years ago.' [22].

Because:

'I think, again, that the young officers on the street, they are more, I was going to say politically correct, but they are more aware than people of our generation. If you like, that women who continually get beaten up by the same husband, well that that's not a correct thing to do, and even if the woman withdraws her complaints, and all that sort of thing,
even then more ought be done.’ [33].

Local policing practice, through the implementation of force policy, has also been effected by the criticisms of lack of support for female victims within the criminal justice system and this was highlighted at this level of management:

‘Previously as a commander in —— * I had the school of thought that at domestic violence incidents it was only necessary for the police to be the mediator and the gauge of success was for the police to leave the scene all quiet and without being attacked. As it was a ‘left wing’ borough I was forced to re-consider my views and look again at the problem. The result was that I was transformed in my views and realised that the only correct way to deal with unprovoked violence and assault in a domestic situation was for it to be dealt with in the same way as if it had happened on the street. Outside influence caused me to implement this and make it force policy.’[10].

* Removed to preserve confidentiality

There was a general belief that force policy represented an acknowledgement that acts of violence committed in private, within a domestic environment were criminal acts and should be dealt with and recorded in the same way as those committed in public:

‘Public opinion in its broadest sense, was the initial factor which influenced the policy through press and media coverage.’ [26].

And:

‘Public opinion has changed the way in which we deal with domestic violence and the police react to opinions rather than leading it. It also resulted in media coverage of the way we deal with domestic violence which has changed our practices’[34].
b) For managers at ground Level

The interviews would suggest that greater legal support for female victims coupled with the importation of the ‘victim protection - offender arrest policy’ have had the greatest effect upon the practical policing of domestic violence incidents:

‘The policy is very good, excellent now. I wasn’t a great believer of it in the beginning but from personal experience, I believe it has worked very well. It is a positive arrest policy. I didn’t agree with it initially I must admit, but certainly I can think of one or two incidents where, believe it or not, I actually had letters from individuals who had been arrested and thanking us for taking action at the end of the day, because they realised that they had got a problem and now they can cope. They actually thank us and I now think there has been a reduction’ [17].

And:

‘A positive response to domestic violence. It has changed attitudes to policing and involving other agencies. However the positive arrest policy nearly always ends up with the male being arrested and of course it takes two to tango and it is often the case that the woman could also be arrested, but of course this would lead to other problems if you have children in the house. The result is that usually the man gets busted and spends a night inside.’ [27].

Whilst others were concerned about the about prescriptive stance of force policy:

‘I think we have gone one step too far in domestic violence in terms of taking discretion out of the way in which we deal with individual incidents. A rigid policy that says we will act and we will arrest and in my experience as a response Inspector I have had difficulty in
enforcing that policy, as it has taken away my discretion." [29].

c) For front line staff - putting policy into practice

Constables and Sergeants were asked to rank the strength of influence placed upon the formation of Force domestic violence policy.

For the sergeants the greatest influence over Force policy came from the centre, with Office/Central Government (69% believing them to be very influential and 27.6% influential), H.M.I.C (51.7% seeing them very influential and 41.4% believing them to be influential) and the Audit Commission (20.7% seeing them as very influential and 65.5% as being influential). Locally senior managers and the Chief Constable were seen as having a strong influence, and public opinion (13.8% believing the public to be very influential and 41.4% as influential). Only front line staff themselves were seen to be less influential.

For the Constables the greatest influence came from the Home Office/Central Government (with 71.4 seeing them as very influential and 22.2% as influential) and H.M.I.C (42.9% seeing them as very influential and 44.4% as influential). The Chief Constable (with 87.6% seeing him as either very influential or influential), senior managers (35.9% seeing them as very influential and 53.1% as influential) and public opinion (18.8% seeing it as very influential and 50% as influential). those with the least amount of influence were front line staff (sergeants and constables) with 40.6% seeing them as not being very influential and 14.1% as not being influential. These details are set out in Figures 34 and 35 on the following pages.
Officers were asked how they thought force policy had changed working practices in respect of domestic violence issues. The overall view was that there had been considerable change, particularly in respect of positive action:

‘Dramatically, we have gone from dealing with the issue by stating ‘its private sort it out amongst yourselves’ to positive action [arrest/prosecution]. Follow up support from Domestic Violence Officers, liaison with C.P.S., Probation, Courts, referral to Social Services and counselling.’ (076)

There was some concern about the resultant rise in crime statistics as a result, for example:

‘It has increased violent crime figures, making the recording of very minor assaults now almost obligatory by officers attending domestics. These offences in the past months have now been counted into the violence in public places figures leaving force aims at keeping the decrease downs to +5% impossible to do.’ (008).

And some concern about police discretion:

‘There is a much more positive approach by officers now. It takes some responsibility off
the victims of domestic violence to initiate action. Only note of caution - some victims are 'playing the system' - i.e. telephoning the police suggesting assaults knowing their partner will be arrested. However there is still some discretion.' (059).

Whilst the opposite view was expressed:

'It has removed any modicum of discretion and common sense policing, even when it is obvious to those concerned what action is required, in favour of dictatorial methods, which at times cause more problems then they are supposedly designed to resolve.' (163).

There were also more extreme views:

'I feel the force policy discriminates against the male involved. The police officer attending a domestic situation will, 99% of the time, side with the female because he is aware of the policy.' (023).

Concluding comments

There is no doubt that published papers from the Home Office and H.M.I, when compared to Force Policy, have had the greatest affect upon the policing of domestic violence issues. It is a good example of police policy being influenced by pressure group and academic pressure, in this case, not placed upon individual police forces, but directly at the Home Office and Central Government, who consequently sought to change policy from the centre, through Home Office Circulars and H.M.I inspection reports; resulting in a force policy which exactly reflects the advice given by the Home Office and its implementation policed by the Inspectorate.
This is, once again, reflected in the views of managers from all levels who saw influence over force domestic violence policy as coming from The Home Office, H.M.I.C, and public opinion in its widest sense.

The research confirms that police attitudes towards the policing of domestic violence is much more enlightened than it was twenty years ago. Many of the managers who were interviewed were embarrassed by earlier policy and practice.

For ground level staff, force policy has been influenced from a variety of sources, however the greatest influence was seen to come from Central Government, H.M.I.C, the Audit Commission and the Chief Constable. They felt that their own front line staff had the least influence.

Police officers generally see their role as being one of taking ‘positive action’ in terms of an ‘offender arrest/victim protection’ model, which they support; apart from some concern for the corresponding increase in reported crimes, which result from such a policy.

The issue of police discretion was seen as more problematical by constables than it was by sergeants. In terms of length of service in the police, those with less than five years service, ten years and under fifteen years service and twenty five years or more service, see it as more of an issue. Although senior managers suggested that officers entering the police service had a more worldly view of domestic violence issues, those with less than five years service formed the group who had the greatest problem with discretion in policing this policy area. Even though the number of female respondents is small, they do
not see policy as being detrimental to their discretion.

The policy making processes is an example of an incrementalist approach, one of successive limited comparisons, consequent to external pressures, building from the ground and taking alternatives that vary slightly from existing policies and altering them over time, until the desired objective is achieved.

Through the use of the force command and control computer system and 'Domestic Violence Report Forms' the implementation of force domestic violence policy can be easily monitored, both by line supervisors and Divisional Domestic Violence Unit Personnel making it a policy which is perceived as being very much top down controlled.

In terms of police practice, it is interesting to note that, although there are some problems in respect of discretion in dealing with incidents of a domestic nature, officers from all levels of the organisation are willing to accept and describe force policy as being one of 'positive arrest'.

There is a suggestion that the feminist's view of the 'politics of victimisation' has been an important influence upon the police organisation in this policy area, and a perception that police officers today are much more aware of the social and economic issues which effect peoples' behaviour and the problems that various groups may experience within society; in particular the power relationships between men and women in domestic relationships, even if many officers had formed this view before they joined the organisation.
Meanwhile the Home Office appears to be content with present domestic violence policy, particularly the issues of positive intervention by the police and their ‘increased awareness of domestic violence issues’ (Grace, 1995: iii). A view illustrated by the following comment by the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw:

Like racial harassment, domestic violence is one of those rare fields where we want to see an increase in recorded crime. We have left the dark days when people were told to stop bothering the police over ‘mere domestics’, but it isn’t acceptable that on average it takes 35 alleged assaults before a case comes to court. (The Guardian 03/06/99: 9).

The major sources of influences over local domestic violence policy are illustrated overleaf:
In the next chapter I consider issues in respect of force equal opportunity policy.
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY

To understand the problems associated with equal opportunities policies within the police service it is necessary to consider aspects of police culture which can affect this issue.

There is evidence to suggest that it is a culture based on social isolation, danger, resistance to change, male domination, and professionalism; as well as exhibiting aspects of racism, sexism and homophobia (Brown & Campbell 1991, Reiner 1992, Brown & Campbell 1994, Holdaway 1996, Walklake 1996[a], Brown 1997). This is taken as true, even if it transpires that the police do not, as a consequence, necessarily act in a discriminatory manner (McConville & Shepherd 1992: 169), or that their views might in fact be nearer to the norms of society than has been suggested (Scripture 1997).

Leishman et al (1996: 193) suggest that equal opportunities policy can be considered using two approaches: its relationships with the public, and the internal dynamics and composition of the police organisation. Each approach can be discussed in three areas: women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians.

Women, the police and equal opportunities

The affect of the relationship between the police and the public, particularly on women's experiences of the criminal justice process, has been well documented (Dobash & Dobash 1970; Chambers & Miller 1983; Hanmer et al 1989; Gelsthorpe & Morris 1990), and
discussed earlier in this work. The importance of considering the relationship between the police and the public, as well as internal structures, in respect of women in the police service has been highlighted by Holdaway & Parker (1998).

Historically women in the police service have been subjected to apathy, neglect and prejudice, particularly between the two world wars, when they could be employed as ‘an adjunct to the regular police, ’[but] they cannot properly be sworn in as constables or be regarded members of the police force’ (Exeter City Council Watch Committee 01/04/1919).

Despite the findings of the 1920 Baird Committee report recommending more policewomen and their greater use in the police service, the 1924 Bridgeman Committee Report and the Royal Commission into the Police of 1929, the ‘face of male prejudice’ prevented any progress (Pollard 1985: 47). The second world war brought a greater emancipation of women in the world of work and the police service saw a wider use of policewomen but within ‘separate departments with their own structure and pay scales’ (Brown & Campbell 1994: 84), which was set to remain for some thirty years. Traditionally women in the service have been expected to take on an extension of what was perceived to be a traditional maternal role (Bryant et al 1985) a history which has continued to affect peoples attitudes towards them (Radford 1989).

The Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 made it illegal to directly or indirectly prevent women from accessing opportunities in employment, promotion, obtaining any other benefits or services, or subjecting them to any detrimental practice. However its
implementation within the police service 'has been and still is long and tortuous' (Walklate 1996[b]:191).

Following Heidensohn (1992; 101-102) the implementation of equal opportunity policies allows policewomen to impact upon policing in the following ways:

i) By maintaining the law, making the bureaucracy more representative, bringing change and new ideas into policy, 'feminising' the police, breaking down the male culture of the service and providing opportunities for women both as individuals and a group. Although there is no guarantee that there will be 'service by policewomen to women' (Hanmer & Saunders 1991, quoted in Leishman et al 1996:198).

ii) It is likely that as more women enter the service it will be easier for them to survive their daily working life (Walklate 1995:116) as well as providing greater opportunities for positive changes to police culture through 'new and different perspectives on employment' (Colgan & Ledwith 1996:1). However it has been suggested that this could only be successful if women made up 25% of the workforce (Moss Kanter 1977). In March 1998, female officers represented 16% of the total strength of the police service in England and Wales (Prime et al 1998).


There is a considerable body of research which describes a more negative response to women in the police service:

- That they are subjected to widespread sexual harassment (Smith & Gray 1983; Jones 1986; Her Majestys' Inspectorate of Constabulary 1993) but when confronted with such allegations many organisations give the view that they are isolated and individual (Cairns 1997).
Under-representation in specialist departments (Coffey et al 1992) but more likely to be over-represented in those dealing with offences against women children or domestic violence (Brown, Maidment and Bull 1992).

Poorer promotion prospects (Halford 1987; Low 1993; Guardian/10/97:4; Police Review/11/12/98:7) even though female officers are as concerned about promotion as male officers (Holdaway & Parker 1998). However nearly 95% of officers above the rank of Inspector in England and Wales are male (Prime et al 1998); resulting in reduced job satisfaction and motivation (Pole & Pogrebin 1988).

Brown & Campbell (1995) give the following reasons for resistance against the full integration of women into the police service:

i) Supposed physical and emotional inferiority of women.

ii) Unsuitability of police work for women.

iii) Lack of career mindedness of women.

iv) Premature retirement of women through marriage or child bearing.

(ibid: 84)

Race and ethnic minorities

Although assimilation and integration were the buzz words associated with the increase of immigration that was encouraged by the British government after the second world war (Williams 1992), such assimilation failed to materialise. This resulted in many ethnic minorities, particularly black groups, seeing themselves as being excluded from the rights of full citizenship (Jewson 1990, Yuval-Davis 1999) and consequently they looked inwards to the consciousness of their own community, that which included 'respectable' adults, in order to 'share a common cause' (Reiner 1992: 102-103).

In Britain these groups make up 6% of the population but only 2% of the police service
(Economist 24.10.98: 37), with black and Asian officers usually occupying low-visibility jobs not compatible to the types of roles seen by the organisation to lead to career progression (Dizaei 1998). Research findings suggest that black and Asian officers face problems of racial prejudice both from the public and other police officers (Holdaway 1996, 1991; Leishman et al 1996) but for ethnic women such prejudice is more gender than racially based (Neyroud 1992).

Although the 1971 House of Commons Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration noted that ‘in order to work in a multi-racial community then the force must itself be multi-racial’ (House of Commons 1972:56), it was not until the Scarman Report of 1981 that the Home Office responded by setting up a Working Party (Home Office 1982).

The subsequent report recommended the following initiatives to recruit from ethnic groups:

- Special education schemes.
- The removal of strict physical requirements for potential police officers.
- All serving police officers should ‘make it clear that black and Asian officers are treated in the same way as white officers both by their colleges and supervising officers’ (para 11).

The consequent response in recruitment of black police officers was slow, and one of the reasons given for this was that those who join will not only be subjected to racism within the service will also receive opposition or hostility from friends, relatives and members of the black community (Hope 1995:37-45).
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 made racially discriminatory behaviour specific offence under the Police Discipline Regulations, however research conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (1996, 1997[b]) identifies the following:

- Police officers using racially inappropriate language and behaviour.
- Lack of intervention in this respect of this by Sergeants and Inspectors.
- Ethnic minority officers felt unsupported by their management, leaving them reliant upon the support of colleges from similar backgrounds.
- Promotion and entry into specialist departments was slower for ethnic minority officers than for white officers.
- Lack of commitment to equal opportunity policies by the majority of officers and a corresponding lack of confidence by minority group officers to such a commitment by senior managers.

Their follow up report *Winning the Race - Policing Plural Communities Revisited* (1999[a]) noted an unsatisfactory response to these comments by 'a large section of the police service'.

It is quite clear that in such circumstances the ability of ethnic minority officers to significantly challenge and change the police culture, the grievance system, and the confidentiality of some welfare departments of racist and sexist stereotypes limited (Kushnick 1999: 8, para 4.3).

The inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 (MacPherson 1999) again brought the issue of police attitudes towards race and ethnicity under closer scrutiny, both publicly (for example BBC: 11.1.99; Channel 4: 17.1.99) and academically, through the issue of institutional racism within the Metropolitan Police (despite this being refuted by the then Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon, [MacPherson 1999]), and therefore by default, to
policing in general (Waddington 1999: 2).

Despite the continuing debate in the wake of the MacPherson Inquiry, the fact remains that the assimilation of black and Asian officers into the police service remains problematical (Eze-Anyika 2000). Compared to white officers their recruitment is limited, their role deployment is different and their resignation rates are higher (Fielding 1999).

Gays and lesbians

The problems surrounding police reaction to gays and lesbians both as colleagues and communities is similar to those between the police and black and Asians (Burke 1993), where for many years the police have been seen as infamous in their treatment of homosexuals (Graef 1989: 189) with lesbians and gay men afraid of the police (Richardson 1997). The conventional wisdom of police officers, moulded under a machismo canteen culture, is contradictory to that of the gay and lesbian community. For heterosexual police officers, homosexuality is seen as a threat to society, and as such, any condoning of such activity within the police would damage the services' integrity in its efforts to maintain social order and morality (Burke 1992). However the fact remains that there is no accurate record of the number of homosexual or lesbian police officers in the service (Leishman et al 1996)

The police service has made efforts to reflect societies' changing attitudes to homosexuals and lesbians, but not without disagreement. For example the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire was quoted in the Police Review (18/1/91:105) as saying that homosexuals, as
long as they remained within the law, should not be treated any differently in the police service. Whilst an editorial in the same journal commented that homosexuality amongst men was ‘immoral, unnatural and irreligious’. Similar dichotomies can be seen over time: an advertisement by the Sussex Constabulary for gay police officer in Gay News in 1995 was received less tolerantly by some police representatives (Police Review 26/5/95) and similarly, an advertisement placed in Gay Times by the South Yorkshire Police, was supported by the Chief Constable but criticised by police officers and police representatives (Guardian 9/1/97:4).

Although there is a dearth of literature on the subject (Burke 1993) there is evidence to suggest that homosexuals and lesbians are now more readily accepted within the police service, facilitated through consultation with gay and lesbian groups, by the setting up of the Lesbian and Gay Police Association (Richardson 1997), and through their representation in popular television police series, such as ‘The Bill’.

Home Office Circular 87/1989

It was not until 1989 that the Home Office issued guidelines requiring the police service to take positive action in respect of both policy and practice in respect of equal opportunities, and only then because of recent inner city disturbances and a growing number of discrimination cases being brought by women police officers (Walklate 1995:117-118). The response was unenthusiastic, polite and limited (Low 1991) and it was 1993 before all police forces had published a written equal opportunities policy (Anderson, Brown & Campbell 1993).
The circular pointed out 'that the object of equal opportunities policies in employment was to ensure that fair and non-discriminatory treatment is given by management to all applicants for employment with the organisation, to all the employees of the organisation and by those employees to each other' (para 2). That 'the implementation of equal opportunities policies is particularly important in the police service' (para 3) and that such policies were not solely concerned with aspects of 'race sex or marital status, in that 'no-one was immune from unfair discrimination' (para 4). It was not enough for a force to 'claim it was an equal opportunities employer' (para 9) but must put into place a written statement of equal opportunities policies, which should:

a) Demonstrate a commitment to eliminate unfair discrimination.

b) To make the commitment clear to members of the force and potential recruits.

c) To focus the action of senior management in monitoring the application of equal opportunities policies.

d) To demonstrate the commitment to undertake remedial action where necessary.

The circular expected forces to make a 'genuine commitment' to the development and implementation of effective equal opportunities policies, that should be:

a) To ensure the best use is made of the abilities of every member of the force.

b) To demonstrate the willingness of the police to show that all members of the service are firmly opposed to discrimination in the service and in their dealings with the public. (para 13).

Police forces were expected to publish 'a final policy statement, taking into account any
difficulties encountered during the implementation stage' (para 15). A check list for implementing equal opportunities policies was produced in respect of candidates for appointment (in terms of height/educational requirements, quotas for percentage of women/ethnic minority members), deployment (in terms duties, specialist departments’ disproportionate representation in particular areas of policing), promotion, training, promulgation of the policy to staff and grievance procedures.

Details of grievance procedures under the relevant legislation was set out in an annex to the circular and suggested examples of force policy statements.

The Research

The force policy document


The first four paragraphs of the document sets out force policy in respect of equal opportunities, the remainder is taken up with details of grievance procedures.

The Force makes it clear that it ‘opposes all forms of unlawful or unfair discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, nationality, ethnic or national origin, sex, marital status, sexual orientation or disability’, and aims to ‘...achieve and maintain a work force which reflects are far as possible, the community in which it operates’ and that ‘decisions on
recruitment, selection, training, promotion and career development are based solely on objective and job related criteria’.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary

The report of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary for the inspection of 1990, noted that the force ‘had not yet introduced an equal opportunities policy for civilian personnel’ (para 2.7) and this was an issue which should be developed. The report made no mention of women or ethnic groups within the force.

However the 1991 inspection report for the force pointed out that the Chief Constable was aware that ‘female officers were under-represented in the supervisory ranks of the force’ that the force was ‘taking steps’ to identify the reasons for this although the Inspectorate were satisfied that ‘every opportunity is given to all officers to qualify for promotion’ (para 2.19), and that ‘the career development of female and ethnic minority officers is considered in precisely the same way as all other members of the force’ (para 2.18). It further noted that in respect of its criticism in the 1990 report regarding equal opportunity policy for civilian staff, the Chief Constable had ‘pointed out that the force was not without a equal opportunities policy in respect of civilian staff but has reviewed its guidelines to reflect Home Office guidelines and best practice’ (Appendix A (i) (3)).

The 1992 force inspection report noted that there was no specific Equal Opportunities Unit, but that this was the responsibility of the Superintendent - Career Development Unit. It noted that a comprehensive review of equal opportunities polices had been undertaken leading to many amendments and the incorporation of new areas of policy, the force
having already ‘adopted the guidelines of Home Office Circular 87/1989’ which was ‘reflected in the existing structure’. (para 2.26).

Her Majesty’s Inspectorates’ Report (1993a) for the force for 1993 has six paragraphs relating to equal opportunities polices:

Firstly (para 2.8) it notes that ‘no ethnic minority recruits were appointed in 1992 and there are only three such officers currently serving’ and suggested three matters be reviewed to reflect best practice in equal opportunities policy in recruiting staff:

1) The policy of home visits to candidates was in ‘danger of not being objective and could be construed as discriminatory.’

2) The residential qualification for recruits restricting applications to only those resident in Devon & Cornwall could ‘particularly mitigate against ethnic and other applicants’ from elsewhere.

3) The practice of restricting female representation on the final selection board to the one female Chief Inspector in the force.

It then goes on to note that maternity leave and the use of pregnant policewomen was causing the force ‘some concern’ (para 2.11) especially where there is long term absence, and the difficulty of finding non-operational work for them during the last three months of pregnancy. The inspectorate suggested the application of ‘career-breaks’ or ‘part-time working’ in these cases.

The report points out that the original Force Standing Orders were being reviewed and that the issue of equal opportunities had been brought to the attention of staff, through leaflets and ‘a comprehensive management guide’ (para 2.21). That the Force ‘recognised there was under-representation of females within the Traffic Department in particular and
surveyed all such officers who were qualified to apply. However, it was found that there was little interest amongst them, despite having attended advanced driving courses, and recommended that advanced driving courses should only be offered to those ‘with a commitment to becoming traffic officers...which may attract more female applicants’ (para 2.22). The report was critical that ‘only a limited number of women have achieved managerial positions’ (para 2.27) and that further research should be carried out into career opportunities for women.

Overall her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary is satisfied the Force is now making good progress in equal opportunities. (para 2.23).

At this point it is worth noting that, investigating equal opportunity policies in twelve police forces, (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary: 1993) found that policy was being blatantly breached, with some Chief Officers not committed to equal opportunities.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary report of the inspection of the Force for 1994 points out that ‘On the whole good progress has been made in equal opportunities’, the Force now having an Equal Opportunities Unit which he hopes ‘...can be expanded to visit divisions on an advisory basis’ and provide ‘facilities to individuals for confidential counselling.’ (para 2.19). It was noted that an internal survey was being carried out to evaluate levels of training and staff awareness of equal opportunities policies but would have been enhanced if carried out by an external agency.

The report went on to state that, ‘The representation of women in specialists posts could be improved with only 11 female officers on traffic duties out of a branch establishment of
228, and 23 female officers on CID duties out of a branch establishment of 254, or 4.8% and 9% respectively.' It noted that in respect of the traffic branch, applications for forthcoming vacancies ‘would be particularly welcome from women officers, whilst ultimate selection would still be on merit’ (para 2.22), and that female officers overall form 12% of the ‘regular force’ with female supervisory officers only 0.9% of the force compared to 23% for males (para 2.23).

Finally the report recommended that the Force should employ civilian, professionally qualified personnel officers in divisions and that ‘equality of access to career opportunities for all staff would be improved by:

   a) Implementing new, more formal selection procedures for local specialist squads.

   b) Introducing a similarly clear and open procedure for ‘acting’ ranks.

   c) Monitoring selection for informal career development attachments to specialist departments on territorial divisions in order to avoid any suggestion of bias.

   (ibid, 8.1. (ii) and (vi)).

The 1995 inspection report for the Force made comment upon the on going problems in recruiting women officers onto Traffic Branch, in this case based upon the difficulties of attracting females to take on firearms duties, required through the introduction of armed response vehicles in the Force traffic department.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary then carried out a second national thematic inspection in respect of equal opportunities policies, ‘Developing Diversity in the Police
which although identifying examples of good practice found examples of "tokenism and indifference" and a "worrying lack of faith in the grievance system" (1996:9).

Consequently (as in 1993) the Force annual inspection report for 1996 contained heavy reference to equal opportunities policies, including an Appendix relating solely to this subject.

The report again repeated comments of the difficulty of attracting women officers into the traffic branch, and despite previous efforts, recommended further canvassing of female officers to discover how to overcome the perceived barriers of recruiting women into certain specialist posts. It praised the Force for the thoroughness of its review of the effectiveness of equal opportunities policies and its good use of the recommendations detailed in the thematic report 'Developing Diversity in the Police Service', but criticised the failure of the Force to circulate copies of the thematic inspection report to divisional Chief Inspectors who were responsible for implementing equal opportunities policies. Such reports should be circulated to personnel managers as 'essential reading' who should receive suitable training and clear policy guidelines.

The Appendix to the report contained Force performance against eleven recommendations contained in their report 'Developing Diversity in the Police Service' (1996):

1) A business case for equal opportunity, through a service-wide reflecting local achievement. Force response: addressed through the Investors in People Programme.

3) Recruitment targets for all groups; positive action for minorities; all appointments to be on merit. Force operates an objective and equitable selection process and guidelines exist for recruitment to reflect local community.

4) Carry out constancy review to identify most successful techniques to assist ethnic minority recruitment and prospects of its achievement. For Home Office to progress.

5) Part time working and job-share available for all grades/ranks. Force review highlighted need to improve managerial commitment to the value of such schemes. Force to consider extending such schemes to ranks above inspector.

6) Post-exit reviews at least three months after leaving. Force procedures to be drawn up.

7) Appraisal for police and civilian staff to ensure comprehensive structure of succession planning and career development. Force has introduced appraisal system for civilian staff and police officers as part of the Investors in People Programme.

8) Wider and more probing research into why women and ethnic officers are underrepresented in specialist squads and supervisory ranks. Home Office to research.

9) The acceptance of the business case for equal opportunities to improve performance and the identification of training requirements to achieve this end. Recommendation previously noted from report in respect of training issue.

10) Statistics on civilian staff maintained and monitored in same way as for police officers. Force to draft monitoring strategy to cover all staff.

11) These recommendations from the thematic report sub-headed ‘Agenda for Action’ to be used as check list for good practice. Accepted by Force and used as part of their equal opportunities review.

The 1997 report notes that the Force has an equal opportunities standing group which has staff association and divisional representation and reports to the personnel and training strategy sub-committee. It is responsible for monitoring force responses to the H.M.I.C’s ‘Agenda for Action’ recommendations referred to above.
The Inspectors remain disappointed with the 'paucity' of female officers in senior posts of the Force and again remark upon the difficulty of recruiting female officers into the traffic department, underlining the fact that attempts have been made to understand the reasons for this by sending questionnaires to all female members of the force but with 'disappointing results' (para 4.11) and suggesting that their perceived role of the traffic department and its' requirement for firearms trained officers may impact upon this problem.

The 1998/99 Force Inspection Report noted that there had been an increase in female officers who 'now constitute 15.3% of police staff' which they suggest was 'mirrored in supervisory positions' and that 'Women are well represented in some specialist departments, for example in C.I.D, family protection and training.' (para 4.10).

However representation of ethnic minority officers and civilian staff was below average, with only five such officers (a short-fall of thirteen) per 1,000 ethnic minority population, although the report accepted that there was a very low ethnic population in Devon and Cornwall which 'limited scope for increases' (para 4.11).

The Inspectorate recommended that the force should 'take an early opportunity' to 'bring fully up to date the Force's approach to equal opportunities issues' (ibid:21).
The Management perspective

From the top corridor

There was a diversity of views from top corridor managers in their perception of the force equal opportunities in its broadest sense. Ranging from:

‘The force claims to be an equal opportunities employer which broadly speaking it is. That’s what I understand by the policy on equal opportunities.’ [13].

To:

‘It’s a long policy document covering recruitment, ethnicity, and grievance procedures which has been reviewed and changes made. The force now has a civilian officer dealing with grievance procedure, not a police officer, formerly it was a Superintendent. The system is probably not being used to any great degree. The force has monitored members of staff to ensure they have knowledge of the grievance procedures and it is becoming more acceptable.’ [2].

Others considered it to be a matter of fairness and equality:

‘When I applied for my present position the job was advertised with specifications for the applicant. Written assessment, marked objectively, and an interview. I’m sure that five years ago this wouldn’t have happened. The job would have been given through the ‘old boys network’. It’s been for the good and gives me the opportunity to apply for a job which I wouldn’t of had before. When opportunities do arrive then the force should give it to those who merit it. I’m worried that people are abusing the grievance procedures using at a threat to get what they want.’ [12]

But:
‘There is a strong view within the police service that it is not our fault that women do not serve for as long as men and that the organisation will not get the same from their investment in a woman as in a man, and this will mean that a woman will not be promoted over a man for that reason. The needs of the force must always come first, and the needs of the individual shall meet those of the force, but where there is conflict the needs of the individual comes second.’ [10].

Some suggested that it was to overcome organisational culture:

‘This issue is still high on the political agenda. I think there is some conflict that the interpretation of the statutory requirements imposed upon us has been effected, when perhaps the real problem is dealing with change in culture and attitude. Whereas, being firmly committed to it, our Force response is a little over the top, because the real issue is cultural change which is difficult to attain.’ [1].

*The Divisional Managers - caught between the top and the bottom of the managerial pyramid*

Most divisional managers saw the policy as relating to the issues of fairness and equality:

‘I would say that force policy is very good. There is a clear equal opportunities policy in being and it is adhered to, and people do get post on merit, regardless of age, sex, whatever. Staff are made aware of this, there is a grievance procedure in being, which is used, and you could say the more grievances there are, the more successful the system is, because people are aware of it now. Again those figures are published as part of the annual plan. Personally speaking, I’m not aware of any difficulties in that area, people are,
and do, make use of the system if they feel that they are aggrieved.’ [43].

And:

'I think divisions employ equal opportunity policies more or less to the letter. I think equal opportunities stops at Headquarters, at A.C.P.O level, and I think there's lip service paid there, and at times it's pressed to the point where, if it were actually confronted in some form of tribunal, I think there would be some very embarrassed faces.' [45].

_Ground Level Managers - closer to practice than policy!

Most of these managers also felt that the force equal opportunities policy was intended to ensure fairness and equality, which some saw as successful:

'It means to me a far more open personnel policy in the force. An attempt to try and match skills to particular jobs by trying to create a better structure for selecting people for jobs, is the impression I get. Although I don't suggest for one minute that happens on every occasion but in the majority of cases it does'. [24].

With this, the most extreme comment to the contrary:

'It hasn't changed over the years if you're a black one legged lesbian you got more chance of getting promoted. Sometime ago there was a memo that went out to policewomen asking them if they were interested in going on traffic, when no replies were received another letter went out. I don't know why they're not interested, but this was almost reverse discrimination. The only thing I would say is, that on my staff I have five policewomen who have taken maternity leave, had babies and come back. Now, I know we accommodate this part-time scenario, but I can see a stage, as time goes on, where it is going to be difficult to accommodate them. Particularly where they want to work day
shifts during the week because of their personal problems or circumstances and of course, the other people on the same sections say, hang on why am I doing all the bum shifts, and although we try and accommodate it, you could actually have a bit of bad feeling here.' [19].

*The influences over local equal opportunity policies*

Managers at all levels saw the major influence on force equal opportunities policy coming from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Home Office, legislation, the Audit Commission.

Top Corridor Managers refer to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary as having the greatest influence from the above groups:

‘Most impact, the H.M.I. They may comment upon it and I think that these comments may have resulted to a change to the policy. H.M.I had a lot of influence.’ [11].

And:

‘H.M.I.C probably a fair amount because they ask, “Do you have a grievance procedure? Does it work?” They have influence through the inspection process and the resultant report back to the force.’ [2]

Or, more positively:

‘The H.M.I had a very great effect. It was re-written as a result of an H.M.I Thematic Inspection. The Home Office, yes significant. They give guidance which is reflected in the policy. [5].

Divisional Managers also made much of the influence from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary:

'I think the most influence I have felt on equal opportunities has to have come from Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary. I think that has been a very healthy influence. I can see that influence now coming into play very much from the racial things and the Lawrence Enquiry we talked about earlier, and that's where that pressure will come. And I think where equal opportunities was flavour of the year a few years back, that's why divisions, because we're the ones that are inspected so closely, that's why divisions are so bloody good at it. But because the old boys brigade is strong and how it's not in the public interest to embarrass Chief Constables too much, the H.M.I is a little bit easy going on them frankly.' [45].

But included the influence of the Chief Constable:

'The H.M.I will obviously look at it and I was questioned on it last year by the H.M.I, as it was my responsibility in division for it and as such I ensured that all first line managers were instructed as to their responsibilities in this respect, both civilians and police, and tried to get them some training. The Home Office Circulars have got a lot to do with equal opportunities because we based a lot of force policy on that. The Audit Commission, I'm not too sure whether they look at that or not. We do get criticised under equals opportunities perhaps in some high profile cases up country, where they beat us about the head with that and they give advice. I think that the biggest player to make sure it works by example and by policy are the Chief Officers. That's particularly true in this force as the Chief rules on everything.' [18]

And legislation, with this manager being one of the very few to make mention of ethnicity:
‘Well clearly there is legislation which is a major factor but well I don’t know if we would have done it if it weren’t for legislation. I remember in the early days having one of the influencing factors as the thought that there would be tribunals and money. Most of these things come down to money don’t they, and you sometimes need those sort of things to wake people up and think, you know, we just haven’t thought about that. I wonder if people are not being treated fairly, Oh dear yes. To some extent, I mean I can give you a perfect example of that, I mean you know, I was talking yesterday to someone about stop checks on ethnic minorities. Now if you ask anyone in Cornwall about stop checks and ethnic minorities they will say, well you know we have actually got so few people of ethnic minorities that, you know, its not a problem. But if you actually look at the figures and say that if you’ve got one per cent of your population as ethnic minorities and 10% of your stop check are ethnic minorities*, then, even though its very small numbers, then clearly you’ve got it, so you know, you’ve got to monitor it. That’s to say that that’s not the way things are here but you can see how things can be mis-interpreted by people, not sort of realising that there is a an issue involved in this and as I say the Staff Associations obviously, again I think to a certain extent, I think, the staff associations really follows on from legislation. Rather than being leading authorities and in fact many of the things follow through legislation really to bring it to a point where we are actually actively and I suppose most of us really like to think that, from an ethical point of, view that we’ve always been equal opportunities people. To actually get to the stage of having a policy and making sure that it is driven with grievance procedures and what have you. I mean the over riding factor of that is the legislation which actually leads to it.’ [47].

*Not based upon statistical fact.
Views from ground level managers reflect those of their senior managers:

'The policy is certainly centrally led either A.C.P.O. Audit Commission or where it has come from in terms of the centre. The Home Office it is centrally led, I think as a result of legislation. A.C.P.O have had to take it on board simply because they are more liable, the force is more legally liable and so that has attention.' [29]

And:

'I think wasn't it in this force that we were ignoring equal opportunities for years and it was the H.M.I, I think it was that said, here hang on what are you doing. So the H.M.I kicked us up the backside I believe. The H.M.I kicked us into shape but politics started the government, so I suppose the major influence has got to be the H.M.I.' [25].

Some saw legislation alone, as the main influence:

'Legislation has the foremost influence and pushed the force into equal opportunity policy, as we have an obligation to make people aware of equal opportunities under legislation. So legislation has led it. I am aware then that the training package was designed within force but was presented to our A.C.P.O officers to see if they were happy with that.' [24].

Representation of women in specialist squads

Managers were asked their views about how the force reacted to comments in Her Majesty's Inspectorate reports criticising the under representation of female officers in specialist squads. Most Top Corridor Managers believed this response lay in positive recruitment and canvassing female officers:
"We are under represented in every specialist branch in the force with the exceptions of domestic violence units and child protection departments. We have attempted positive discrimination for women, not in terms of standards but in that females are always called for interview, whereas males are paper sifted prior to interview." [10].

Whilst others felt that opportunities for female officer had improved:

"I believe there's now the opportunity for female officers to belong to specialist squads and they can have preferential treatment to get them there. We have moved a long way from the 'standards quota' in this respect, bearing in mind the total percentage of females in the force. However the personal motivation of the individual female officer is often the motivating factor in whether they become members of such squads." [8].

This motive issue was remarked on by other interviewees, for example:

"The force tried positive recruitment especially in respect of the traffic branch aimed at female officers. The bottom line is that none of them wanted it. In a free organisation as we feel we are, if they don't want to do it then the organisation should not force them. My question is, has the organisation asked them what it is about the specialist squad that makes them [women] reluctant to apply? For example, is it something inherent in that branch which makes it unacceptable for women to join? For example, is the traffic branch chauvinistic? How well are women accepted in what is often a male oriented department? I would suggest, for example that traffic officers are more authoritarian in their views, which may in some way exclude women from joining and we told him why. [5].
Traffic Branch and C.I.D, were the specialist departments referred to by most managers, for example:

'Traffic and C.I.D is our current concern and we are involved in discussions and surveys of our female officers. Why for example why do they not apply for specialist posts. We have tried affirmative action that targets women as applicants but they do not apply for the traffic branch for example, and we want to know why.' [4].

Many divisional managers also believed that the force had employed positive recruitment methods canvassing female officers to join specialist squads:

'There have been occasions, now if we’re talking about equal opportunities, where adverts have gone out for members of squads, that the force is particularly looking for female officers to try to balance things out and satisfy an equal opportunities figure. [23].

The theme of “men’s work /women’s work” was also developed:

'Well in some squads for example they are over represented, if you look at the Child Protection Team and the Domestic Violence Unit. It’s not some kind of gender bias that’s at work, or gender stereotyping, its just the way it seems to work out. We have had male officers, in fact at the moment there are male officers in Child Protection and there has been a male Sergeant and Constable in the Domestic Violence Unit for some time. Perhaps these are bad examples because the female officer do excel in that sort of environment and the victims find it easier to talk to them. I think there is an old thing about policewomen which dictates why there aren’t so many, and I think you’ve got to look at how long they actually stay in the service. I mean there was a time when I think the average service length was four years but I don’t know what it is now. But in order to
get into a specialist squad you’ve normally done some time to gain expertise, and then you migrate into specialism, normally when you’ve got about seven or eight years service. So if the average [female] is leaving after four, then they’re not there to be had anyway. It’s not necessarily gender bias that’s at work, it's just the demography of the force and the fact that a lot of police women do not pursue a career, and that says more about the job share career break and maternity situation, which we’re a lot better at now. All the procedures are in place, better than they were in the past, the sad fact is that women have babies and they leave the job to have them’ [31].

And:

‘I think something’s got to be done about female representation across the board. I had a discussion with the Deputy Chief last week because I went away to a Police Superintendents Association Meeting with 170 delegates, of which three were females, and he said, doesn’t that reflect the police service, and I said yes. I mean there is insufficient representation of females through the ranks and we do not understand why that’s the case, though I can give some suggestions to it. We’ve got tokenism still going on. It seems that C.I.D departments have a quota, which they don’t allow the floor to go above and we have a lack of acknowledgement of the need to have women in this department and I flagged that up when they moved to armed response vehicles - females don’t work on traffic. We have done some road-shows, to get out and try and encourage women in, invited women only into a safe environment with presentations. I haven’t really had any feed back on it but then they suddenly went to this model of having people all armed. I’m not sure how many police women want to be armed police officers. I think you may have a cultural, sex thing there and so all the good work was immediately undone.’ [53].
Front line managers saw positive discrimination as the major response:

"They undertook, when advertising for staff in those particular units, to undertake positive action, which is not positive discrimination its positive action. By saying that we’re under represented they will not receive favourable treatment but that they would be welcome if they applied, or that their application would be welcome and then they would have to be judged and perform in the same way as anyone else to get that job. However I know of some examples where women were actually contacted in respect of some jobs and asked why they hadn’t put in for it. The impression that gives is that there is positive discrimination, even though probably it isn’t." [24].

However some managers saw it as a cultural issue:

"I have given a lot of thought to this. The problem with it is that you get an un-equal opportunities policy. You get an opportunity where you need a lady for example, The Regional Crime Squad have actually advertised for three month attachments for ladies on the squad because they haven’t got enough. Unfortunately, and I’m not anti-women, I’m pro-women, unfortunately they don’t last long in the job because of pregnancy etc which is fine, I understand that but not many of them return to the job. If they do they’re part time and they don’t want to come into the squads because they’ve got family commitments. I’m sure if it were the men who stayed at home it would be the opposite way round. What you find is that if you get a career girl, because of the pressure to have equal opportunities and to have women it becomes unequal, because they say they must have some women, or we will be blamed by equal opportunities for not having women. You get bias the wrong
way and you may not necessarily get the best person for the job. Can I say, and I have worked with many police women who are much better than policemen, that I am not ‘anti’ but it is an awkward situation which is difficult to resolve and I think that we will always be criticised for it and that is because they do an average of five years and a man does an average of thirty.’ [16].

Outcomes - front line staff

Front line staff were asked how important it was that the force should ensure that female staff are not under represented in all specialist posts. Just over 60% of constables did not believe it was either important or very important, but a little over 50% the sergeants, believing it to be either important or very important.

![Graph showing importance of female representation in specialist squads](image)

**Fig. 40**

Over-all front line staff were less concerned about the importance of female representation
in specialist posts:

Front line staff were asked how force equal opportunity policy had affected the situation of women in the force: 83% believing that it had improved.

They were asked how this policy had affected the situation of members of racial and ethnic groups in the force, once again it was seen to have a positive effect. With over 72% seeing...
an improvement:

![Graph showing affect of force equal opportunities policy on minority groups](image)

Fig. 43

They were asked how this policy had affected homosexual and lesbian police officers in the force. This question produced the largest group of officers (just over 19%) who did not know.

![Graph showing affect of force equal opportunity policy on homosexual officers](image)

Fig. 44

Although the sample contains fewer female officers, it is interesting to note that, although both male and female staff believe that force policy has had a positive impact upon the situation of women in the force, 25% of female officers felt that it had not changed their situation in the force.
### Effect of Force Equal Opportunity Policy on Minority Groups

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### Effect of Force Equal Opportunity Policy on Non-Scientific Officers

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**Note:** The tables represent the percentage of minority groups and non-scientific officers before and after implementing the Force Equal Opportunity Policy.
Font line staff were asked if they had any comments to make about force equal opportunities policy. This attracted a large number of replies, with fifty officers (53%) making some comment. The most common view was that staff for specialist posts should be selected on merit alone. The following quote is a good example:

‘The best person, best qualified for the post, irrespective of sex, colour, etc.’(197).

Some believed that there were difficulties for minority groups within the organisation:

‘It is difficult for a group who are in a minority in terms of overall numbers to be fairly represented on specialist departments’ (388).

Whilst there were several comments about males becoming the most discriminated against group, for example:

‘White, heterosexual males are clearly at the bottom of the ladder.’ (293)

For others it is not so clear cut:

‘The policy has heightened awareness of minority groups but I do not know if this has been for the better or worse.’ (139).
And:

'Gay groups are still ‘closeted’ and not spoken about openly - why?' (94).

Concluding comments

The police service has been a male dominated organisation since its early beginnings, with a reluctance to integrate women into its ranks, even after the introduction of equal opportunities legislation. Similarly, but for different reasons, racial and ethnic minority groups face the same integration problem. Lesbian and homosexual officers are only recently, and slowly, being recognised and accepted within the service. There is the suggestion that the organisation is now giving too much emphasis on career opportunities for females and members of ethnic minority groups, with a claim from one officer that white male heterosexual officers are becoming “a minority group”.

Although legislation has been the main instigator of equal opportunities policy, supported by Home Office Circulars to the police, it can be seen that reports from H.M.I (both national thematic reports and local inspection reports) have been very influential in the development of force policy in this area. This is reflected in consequent force responses, where all recommendations made by H.M.I are considered.

Managers from all levels of the force believed that the Home Office, H.M.I, legislation and the Audit Commission have had a great deal of affect on force equal opportunities policy, but of these, with, as in the case of domestic violence policy, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has the strongest influence.
Most of the debate regarding Equal Opportunities policy, both from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and from members of the Constabulary revolves around gender rather than ethnic or racial issues. However there is a problem of recruiting members of racial and ethnic minorities into the force, partly because of the lack of such groups within the community policed.

Problems are expressed of recruiting female officers into specialist squads because of the issues of marriage, child-birth and family commitments, which are perceived as a barrier for women. Encouraging female officers to join the Traffic Branch was highlighted as a particular problem, where the reasons for under representation remain that of a perceived incompatibility of the role for women and physical requirements of the job. However front line staff believe that force equal opportunities policy, regardless of how it was influenced, has improved the situation for women, members of racial and ethnic minority groups, and lesbian and homosexual officers in the force.

The following flow chart gives an over-view of the major influencers in this policy area.
The next chapter will consider the relationships between key players in the policy process - those players that were identified and discussed in chapter two of the thesis.
Relationships between the key players in the policy process have already been discussed. Of these, the research subjected the relationship between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable, and the relationship between Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Audit Commission and the Force to closer scrutiny.

- The Police Authority because of its greater involvement in the policy planning process.
- The Chief Constable because of his influence over the Authority.
- The Inspectorate of Constabulary because of its re-modelled approach to the inspection process.
- The Audit Commission, because it represents a national quasi-independent influence.

This Chapter will give the views of the 'top corridor', divisional managers, front line managers and members of the Police Authority about the strengths and weaknesses of their relationship, followed by the views of police managers about the relationship between the force, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Commission.

*The Police Authority - the police headquarters view*

Top corridor managers believed that the present Police Authority was much more critical, more analytical and more aware of the fiscal constraints of policing, than was the old style authority.
For example:

'Greatly improved in general, in respect of all three elements. The Police Authority have become more focused more challenging as they are now more accustomed to their present role. They have undergone a cultural change and they have certainly moved away from any rubber stamping ethos which they may have had in the previous arrangement. They are now very probing with committees which consider various issues for example performance reviews. The new ‘independent’ members tend to flex their muscles more and because of their business knowledge and other skills they are starting to become a very much stronger influence upon the police authority.' [8].

And:

'Yes. We shouldn’t forget that the old Police Authority were not involved in the same way that they are now. The new authority independent members have added something which wasn’t there before. They are more critical and more analytical. They will grow in confidence over the years in their role and it is my ardent hope that they will take the elected members of the Police Authority with them in this process. The elected members bring politics with them and they are more mindful of their own local political issues, which are important to them rather than having an overview of the force.' [5]

The Clerk to the Police Authority was also the subject of comment:

'My experience of the new Police Authority both in its members and leadership is that it has the potential to be more dynamic than in the past. I have personal experience of the Clerk to the Police Authority taking a more pro-active role and seen him personally analysing data the Chief Constable has published to test its veracity and its impact upon the public.' [1].
The Police Authority - the view of divisional management

As with top corridor managers, the divisional managers interviewed also believed that the present Police Authority was more critical, more analytical and more aware of the fiscal constraints of policing, than its predecessor. For example:

'Yes they are in my experience, and I think I have a peculiar input there-in because of the fact that I was a staff officer during the change over time. I saw the transition and I saw the move from 'the middle England I am a member of the Police Authority this is a social badge, aren't I clever', from that, to meaningful participation by not all, but in the main, people who really wanted to make a difference. Who wanted to understand and who were prepared to confront the Chief Constable. I don't feel that the previous Police Authority was about that at all, the new Police Authority are about, well the new members certainly are about, confronting the Chief Constable, challenging him to justify some of his actions and the more I see of that the more comfortable I feel that the Constabulary will actually give the community what it wants.' [45].

For many their knowledge was more anecdotal, with some agreeing, for example:

'I have experience of working with the new Authority but none with the old, but anecdotally its a yes to all of those questions, but also I would say that they too are growing into their new role and as time goes on they begin to feel more comfortable and want to flex their muscles quite legitimately and feel their space and make their presence felt. The fact that there is a very close working relationship between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable and his corporate planning team has helped that great deal. [22].
However some found it more difficult to ascertain:

'It's difficult to say. I was in 'X' Department when we had the old Police Authority and when we had the new independent members and I have to say it depends very much on individual members who make up that Police Authority. For instance at the moment there is one individual member of that Police Authority whose background is in banking and finance and I have to say she is very analytical, she's got an eye for detail and she does pick up issues of that sort. There have been previous members of the Police Authority of that ilk and it tends to be those one or two, as aside from the professional politicians, that pick up some of the more critical management and financial issues and that's most noticeable. So I think in terms of personalities at the moment, I think there are one or two on the Authority that are quite critical, and in terms of managing a large business they've got a good head and are quite decisive but I don't see that very often in the majority of the Police Authority.' [50].

And some didn't know:

'I am aware of it but only because of what I have read. I have had no practical involvement with it and I couldn't really comment on it' [38].

The Police Authority - the view from ground level managers

During the course of the research it became apparent that, as managers became more distant from police headquarters and consequently had less contact with top corridor managers, the less knowledge they had of the influence of central groups such as the Police Authority.
Arguably, as a consequence of this fact, in contrast to the views of managers on the top corridor, of the fifteen ground level managers interviewed, seven felt that the present Police Authority was more effective than its predecessor, seven felt that they were unable to assess this and one manager felt it was less effective.

These views can be summarised through the following comments:
‘I know that before there was a perception that they were ‘tweedled gentlemen and ladies’, magistrates and country folk, who more or less danced to the Chief Constable’s tune and thought he was a wonderful chap. Now I do know that there is a much closer involvement between the secretariat of the Police Authority and the Chief Constable and I do know that they have actually made changes, almost imposed changes to the force plan that was first produced for them last November.’ [26]

And:
‘My only contact with them really has been through the Police Liaison Meetings. They have lessened the elected people, so some would say therefore, that the voice of the community has been lessened, with more control from Whitehall more control from Central Government, the effectiveness of which I would question. We have ended up with two influences over the Police Authority, the Home Office, and the Chief Constable, and if he is a strong character he isn’t going to take much notice of what the Home Office is saying, well only then if he’s got to. People on the ground need to have a say and this new system detracts from that.[21].’

However:
'I don’t think it has made any difference to us on the coal face whether the Police Authority have more or less power. I don’t have any involvement with it really. It’s a change which I do not believe has made any difference to what we actually do.' [27].

This last comment again illustrates the gap between police managers and the Police Authority, in that the further removed they are from the top corridor of local policing, the greater the gap becomes.

The Chief Constable - the top corridor view

The influence of the Police Authority is dependant upon its relationship with the Chief Constable. For the latter group a good relationship is described as ‘....one which acts as a sounding board for local opinion, but which does not ultimately question the Chief’s decisions.’(Reiner, 1992: 251)

Most top corridor managers felt that the Chief Constable’s influence over the Police Authority was considerable:

‘Considerable. I know the Chief Constable has well developed influencing skills and he can influence the decisions of the Police Authority to a significant effect, but not entirely.’ [4].

And:

‘His influence is such that he will present an issue, they will debate and accept it. They still accept what he suggests but there is a much greater dialogue. He still has an enormous influence over them. He is a very powerful person.’ [6].

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As well as the issue of professional knowledge:

‘Quite a lot of influence, because he has the figures and facts prepared for him and he can use these to prove his arguments. He has a team to provide information which gives him power through knowledge over the Police Authority.’ [9]

Although there was agreement that the Chief Constable could influence the Police Authority, only three cases were provided to illustrate this:

- ‘Telephone call handling there was a difference of opinion and some conflict here.’ [14]
- He [the Chief Constable] gives them information on policy performance which he thinks they should have. For example the Performance Quarterly Review keeps them happy. It costs about £6,000 to £7,000 a year to produce but this is a small price to pay to keep the Police Authority happy and of his back. The information is fairly innocuous. [2]
- The ‘Pescado’ question. The Chief Constable sought the support of the chairman of the previous Police Authority who gave him one hundred per cent support over a politically contentious issue.’ [1]’

To further test the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Police authority, ‘top corridor’ managers were asked if there had been any disagreements in deciding the contents of the Annual Policing Plan. The overall view from the top corridor was that there was very little or no disagreement between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable:

‘It got virtually rubber stamped. The force was happy that they added a little, but it was
over-all a very amicable arrangement.' [12].

When there was a problem it was easily resolved:

'There were differences of opinion but they were easy to work through. When we couldn't put something into the plan we told them why. In my view there should be a meeting between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable to discuss how everyone felt about what we all want to put into the plan and to come up with a draft after the Chief Officers annual planning seminar. The Chief Constable however wanted the draft plan to be his document. This year there is a seminar covering issues including results of the Chief Officers Seminar to discuss the issues raised.' [6].

The Chief Constable - the divisional managers' view

With the exception of three managers who believed their experience did not allow them to comment, all those interviewed believed that the Chief Constable was able to influence the Police Authority:

'I'm certain the Police Authority listen to him and I think he argues his points in quite a persuasive way his points. I have heard him say at 'Policy Advisory Group' that "...the Police Authority took this view but I persuaded them that...".[39]

Others saw this influence as one relating to operational and non-operational matters:

'I think with the particular set up we've got here, in Devon & Cornwall, and the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Chairman of the Police Authority and the members, I would say that the Chief Constable has an enormous influence. I've never witnessed this but a majority of the Police Authority perhaps feel more comfortable with a
particular course of action and the Chief Constable has to manoeuvre them into another course of action. What I do think happens is that the Chief Constable is very careful about how information is fed to the Police Authority, how the Police Authority interacts with the Constabulary, his relationship with the clerk, in terms of feeding information to the Police Authority. He very much keeps operational issues at arms length. So I do sometimes think that he has handled the Police Authority extremely well and got decisions through them or resources from them when on any kind of more dispassionate or objective bed of facts you might have expected the Police Authority to be more robust in examining the decision that's been made.' [50].

Again, as managers become more removed from the top corridor, their detailed experience of the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority lessens considerably. The formulation of the Annual Policing Plan was used as a basis for their perception of this relationship:

'Being on the sharp end, unless you get some feed back from the Divisional Commander from Policy Advisory Group meetings or something, you really don't hear much, and you don't get much from the way he presents his plans to the Police Authority meetings. And even if you listen to the press reports, which I do, I am not really aware that anyone has been that critical.' [18].

And:

'I think, probably at the present time, he still retains a considerable degree of influence. The only examples there are is that the Chief Officer, when you look at the documents he
presents to the Police Authority, or proposals he makes, very rarely do they not go along with his recommendations. Now, whether or not that's because he carefully tailors them to know what they will accept and what they won't, or there are negotiations before and outside the meetings, is another matter, so it's very much a question of rubber stamping, but I really don't know. I don't work at that level to be honest.' [35]

Divisional mangers felt that generally there were few disagreements between the police and the Authority in respect of the contents of the Annual Plan, and many felt that the Police Authority were able to make adjustments to the draft document prepared by the police:

'I'm not aware of any great problems. I know that the Police Authority exerted their views in respect of the plan, I think it was two years ago, in that there was one area, I think it was road traffic accidents, when they said hang on we want that in. And I think that the police view had been, hang on that isn't really your domain and quite rightly so, mind you, but the Police Authority said, never the less, we want it in, so it was in.' [40].

The fact that the police produced the plan for the Authority was seen as important:

'This is the third year now that they have been presented with the plan and they actually review it. I'm not aware of any discrepancies or variance of opinions, I think it's their plan but we produce it. I mean it's really our plan which they are just rubber stamping because they haven't got the knowledge of the internal workings of the organisation or its problems and they don't spend enough time with us to know how to be able to influence the plan. That's my view. They have a lack of knowledge to produce the plan even if they had more
staff and I think its the right way round. I think we’re producing it but they are actively involved in the consultative group meetings and the focus group side of the consultative group meetings. They run that side and last year they ran the focus groups with a police officers, so they were actively involved in the gathering but the actual writing and the actual plan itself was written by police officer which I think is quite correct.' [30].

The Chief Constable - views from ground level managers

For the same reason ground level managers found it difficult to comment on the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Authority, in deciding the contents of the Annual Policing Plan. Most of their comments were anecdotal. For example:

‘A great influence because he has said, ‘I’m the professional police officer ’ and although I’ve never been to a police authority meeting I’ve been to a number of meetings he’s been at and because of the strength of character of the bloke I can see him wielding total influence, especially over people who are not as charismatic and forceful as him.’ [21].

The view of the Police Authority

Police Authority members were asked if they thought that the present Authority was more analytical; more critical; and more fiscally aware than the ‘old style’ Police Authority. All members interviewed believed it was.

Two members who were also members of the previous Police Authority said:

‘Yes, I think it is very different because of its very nature. We have been reduced from 45 to 19 and of course the old Police Authority had councillors and magistrates. This Police Authority has councillors, magistrates and what we call nominated people. I was not at all
happy with those proposed changes when they came in and I spoke against them and was very vociferous, it worried me. I don’t think there is any cause for complacency just because it works well for Devon & Cornwall. We do happen I think to have good nominated people but that is because we, the already settled members of the new Police Authority, that is the magistrates and the local councillors, were determined to know something about those people who had been nominated. We didn’t have any choice in the first instance who or from which group they were going to be nominated from, that was from the Home Office. There was a sort of advertisement for anyone who was interested. However the advertisement was such that one found out about it afterwards, in that I think it went in to one Sunday quality newspaper and unless you actually read the small advert you could miss it. Even the County Council didn’t know about it, the officers there, and we didn’t know about forms or anything and it did transpire of course that they were people on a Home Office list anyway, who they got in touch with immediately. These were people who always indicted that they were happy to do it and of course it was the time of Michael Howard so you can imagine the calibre possibly. We in Devon & Cornwall actually, by the time of selection, ended up with twelve names from which we had to select six because there is one more on our authority because of the Isles of Scilly. We actually met all twelve and we selected that way. I’m glad we did that, I think we did quite well as a result of it.” [2].

And:

‘It’s certainly a different animal. When the new Authority set up was initiated through the ‘94 Act’, I was fortunate enough to be the representative of the Authority who sat with the Home Office representative and the third member, to vet or make the recommendations if
you like, of the appointed members. They call them the independent members but I never use that expression, because we’ve got politically independent members, so they’re appointed members. It’s changed in so much from the financial point of view. Under the old Authority here of course we had forty five members. Just a small group of those members understood what was going on and I would hazard a guess and this is not a criticism, though I suppose it is, well it’s an observation, that 75% of the members of the old Authority would come to the meetings nod when they had to, shake their heads when they had to, and went away having had a good meal. Now under the new system you’ve got to be so much more focused. Everyone, everyone on the Authority, new Authority set up has a task to do. We’ve just gone though a system now where we have sub-committees, where we involve everybody somewhere along the line. In the old days of course there weren’t enough panels or sub-committees to go around so you only had a small handful who would be active, the rest would just turn up on the day.’ [4].

One member who was not a member of the old style Police Authority commented:

‘I would go from my background in education that’s all changed now and until we had new legislation it was tea and biscuits with the head once a term and I think the old Police Authority with forty five members was very much like that. A great majority of members would have no input what-so-ever. You came to a meeting you took your money and you went. It’s just not like that nowadays, in the same way that governors have a great deal of responsibility and are in and out of schools all the time, where they need to be aware of the legislation and what is happening, because in the end the buck stops with you. I think that is very much true with the Police Authority as well. You know we’ve got nineteen
members here and every one of us has a vital role to play in monitoring, particularly in the fiscal side of things anyway, very much so, we need to be on top of that but basically again you know its the 'P.R' side, the perception of the force. I think we deal a lot with that. We are always monitoring complaints and things like that and seeing how we can develop that. It’s the interaction with people and I think from the policing point of view its the every day people if you like because the police who are doing the job are so coloured by the criminals if you like, that much of the day their job is with ordinary people and sometimes I think the Police Authority has got a role in there, in that again it comes to being a bridge. I think we are actually quite a good liaison if you like between the force and the community which expects so much from their police force.’ [6]

Members of the Police Authority also believed that the Authority could be influenced by the Chief Constable. Some felt that he had a strong influence over them:

‘Oh absolutely! The Chief Constable can influence Police Authority members. He wouldn’t be any good at his job if he couldn’t. It’s like the Chief Officer of a Local Authority they can influence their members to the extent that they’re successful in doing that, then in some respect, that’s how their success is judged. Examples of this - I guess the new telephone system was a prime example. A lot of misgivings among Police Authority members about the removal of control rooms in the outpost of the Authority area like where I come from, --*. Not very happy about it, but we didn’t really have compelling evidence to show it was a mistake. After the event the system didn’t work well but its working better now, but not as well as it ought to work. So I think that’s a big example and that actually related to the public because they were on the receiving end of
not being able to phone the police, getting their calls lost etc.' [7].

* Removed to preserve confidentiality.

And:

‘I think yes he does, but I think quite rightly so, and I think it would be very wrong if he didn’t have the opportunity to have an input. It doesn’t necessarily mean to say that the Authority members need to take that advice or act upon his comments but I think it is very important that the Chief Constable has an input. There would be cases where, maybe we’ve made a decision because he’s been able to give us additional information and I think that’s very different’ [8].

Whilst some continued the theme of guidance from the Chief Constable:

‘I think they are inevitably guided by the Chief Constable. I don’t know that I can think of any examples where he has guided us in a way we did not wish to go but I feel on the whole that we don’t really make policy. But what is our role? It could be that we are there as a stop gap until something goes wrong and if we have a Grampian situation then the Authority obviously plays a vital role. Providing the Chief Constable behaves himself and goes along with general public backing I don’t think the Authority has got a great deal to say.’ [5].

Other members were more aware of the operational responsibility of the Chief Constable:

‘I think the Chief should influence them, because it’s all about delivery to the general public of policing, and that is an operational and active thing, and that is something that the Police Authority are not directly involved in. It must be through the operational force.
Now the operational force is of course represented by the Chief. What he says should influence the view of the Authority members, but the decision, if a decision has to be made, is that of the members. We don’t always necessarily, and I can’t think of a direct example here, but we never, I mean I never, feel under any obligation to, despite my regard for chief constables, I am under no obligation to follow directly what the Chief says, but he’s so close to the issue that to ignore his advice, well you’ve really got to understand it.

We’ve got an advantage down here as well, in that as far, certainly as far as this Authority is concerned, and I see this when I go up to national meetings, we’re sort of non-political. I wear a political label and as you know, other members wear political labels, well some of them anyway, but that doesn’t enter into it. Now when one sits with other members of Authorities from further up the way, you hear the political influences coming in, where they would give their right arm to be able to influence the operational activities of the Chief Constable. I mean, I went to a meeting not long ago where there were two different Authority members sat round a table and they were not boasting, but they were very proud to show how they had been in a position to argue, really argue with the Chief Constable, and no agreement was reached on certain things. That means, for me, the only people who suffer would be the general public.’ [4].

And a note about personality:

‘I have a sneaking suspicion that he does control us but he’s no fool and I think he does know his limits and he works hard, of course he works hard, you know we are all aware of what’s going on and he also and he also presents his case exceedingly well. I do have to say that I noticed with the very first meeting of the new Police Authority and I do get a feeling that he thought he was going to control us and I noticed a re-trenching I think is the
word. Perhaps other people wouldn’t agree with me but I found it well, it’s a partnership. I
do think it is a partnership, other people might disagree but I’m quite happy.’ [2].

Members of the Police Authority were asked who set the agenda for their meetings. They
considered that in general the agendas were decided by the Chief Constable, the Clerk to
the Police Authority and the Chairman. With comments varying from:
‘Well we have no input, the ordinary member has no choice or opportunity to put anything
on the agenda as far as I’m concerned the Chairman probably the Vice-Chairman and the
Clerk and the Chief Constable decide on the agenda for the meetings.’ [9].

And:
‘They just arrive and I suspect it’s between the Chairman the Chief Constable the
Treasurer and the Clerk.’ [2].

To:
‘There is an opportunity for Police Authority Members to influence the agenda but the
agenda is very much driven from the Chief Constable, the Chairman and the Clerk, but I
would say that it is more likely to be Chief Constable driven at the moment. [1].

The relationship quandary

Seven of the nine Police Authority members interviewed made specific reference to the
relationship between the Authority and the force.

In terms of it becoming too close:
‘There is one little thing that I think we have to be careful of, I think, well I know it is most
important for the efficiency and good operation of a police Force certainly the Devon &
Cornwall Force that you need to have a good working relationship not to be in each others
pockets but you need to have a good relationship with the force and the Police Authority i.e. the Chief Constable and the senior officers and the Police Authority. But I also believe that we have to be a little bit careful that we as a Police Authority don’t become high jacked, in inverted commas, by the force because it is most important that we have a slightly detached identity. We are the Devon & Cornwall Police Authority we are not the Devon & Cornwall Police Force and we should be seen by the public as being slightly detached and not part of. We have a need to be part of it to work together but the public perception must be that we stand slightly to one side because otherwise there is a danger of this bridge becoming a bit rickety I think.’ [8].

In terms of policy and practice:
‘Having been on the Authority since 1989, anything I’ve wanted to influence I’ve had the opportunity to do it. It does seem to me that here, in Devon & Cornwall, the relationship between the full time professionals and the Authority is probably about as good as anywhere. We wouldn’t wish it any other way and I think the Chief Constable and the Chief Officers up the road are sufficiently in touch with things that they’ll soon pick up if there is something that the authority members are not happy about and usually they’ll move to come along side even if they can’t actually agree with what members are saying. Chiefly I think that Police Authority members are conscious of the fact that operationally that’s not our route or responsibility. We may comment on particular operational issues if we know something about it or received criticism. We accept that it is the Chief Constable role in life and I think that as long as that relationship continues then you know there will be little or no problems down here.’ [7].
‘We were talking about influence in respect of the Policing Plan and of the influence the Police Authority have on the Chief Constable. I have an example which you may be interested to hear. It relates to licensing and the force policy in respect of liquor licensing and of course force policy is to hold the line at one am closing. We feel in —* that this goes against the —* ethos and that we should be allowed to go on to two. We have been told in no uncertain terms that force policy is one and that’s it. Having in the last few months talked to the Chief the A.C.C and the local Divisional Chief as well, they are now saying that although force policy remains, they are quite happy for us, at a divisional level, to talk and look at how we can see how we can work with it in —*.* I feel very much that if that wasn’t something that I had brought up it would still be the same now but at least we are working now towards changing that. Now I may only have achieved what deregulation may be bring, but at least the Chief is now talking to us about this sort of thing, which would probably not have happened five years ago.’ [6].

* Removed to preserve confidentiality.

The distinction between policy and practice was not a problem for most of the members, but one of the newly appointed independent members felt it could be difficult:

‘I am concerned because I often find that there is a difficulty in actually defining what is operational, for the concern of the Chief Constable, and what we should be looking at, because there is a grey area here which I have problems with.’ [9].

Another recently appointed member of the authority was concerned not only with the relationship between the authority and the force, but between members of the authority:
We have talked about change and how the latest Act has actually changed the Police Authority as there are now a lot less of us. It is also made up of slightly different people in so far as three J.Ps, six independent members and then you’ve got ten political appointees. Now having looked at other quangos or whatever you want to call them, in their way I have to say that the influence, and the very expertise that is required of the Police Authority is considerable. This doesn’t necessarily mean that its got it, but it is required to have it. I go away quite a lot on Home Office conferences to various Police Authority Associations and there is no doubt that some Police Authorities have incredible influence upon policy. Now whether that is a good thing or bad I don’t know, all I know is what the Home Office, what that Act required us to do. What that Act required us to do was to set the policing plan, be responsible for the budget, hire and fire the top officers and be answerable to the public. In doing that we require, in my opinion, a higher level of expertise than has been shown in the past and is indeed required on some other similar type functional authorities or organisations. It is my opinion that the Police Authority, if they are to serve the public and the constabulary well, must increase their expertise and they must be prepared to question to monitor and put away the rubber stamp. I feel very strongly that there is too much rubber stamping in this Police Authority. It is well known, I have made my views on this well known, it is no secret. It is not the case in all Police Authorities many have moved on in a way. This Authority still has a lot of people from the original Police Authority still on it. Now I’m not in any way criticising them, but it makes it more difficult for change to come about in a shorter space of time and for people to change their ways and actually to gain more knowledge themselves. I have got real doubts about the selection process of the Police Authority as it stands at the moment,
although I do say that the Home Office and The Local Authorities Association are trying to address the issue but I don’t know how to address the overall issue when you’ve got the political appointees. The political appointees do not like the independents, they see it as a lack of democracy and they shouldn’t be here. We, I, don’t know about the independents view because we don’t get together as a body, that’s another difference, the political parties are always together and that’s political, despite what this Police Authority will tell you, that we’re not political, it is. Decisions for appointments are politically motivated. Lib-Dems get together, the poor little Tories, there are not many of them, and Labour they do get together, and they don’t choose the right people for the job and the chairmanship is one example where they take it in turns and it is diabolical it is unprofessional and its out dated and it makes me angry.’ (giggle). [1].

**Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary**

In order to assess the influence of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, managers were asked if the process was becoming more rigorous and probing, and whether it was possible to deflect or defer their recommendations.

**The top corridor perspective**

The research indicates that the top corridor sees the inspection process carried out by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary as being much more rigorous and probing than it was, for example, five years ago. The following answers are representative:

‘Absolutely yes. The quality of the Inspectorate has gone up. Our own inspector is a good man and asks the right questions. The employment of civilian members is a good thing
they too ask the right questions. We now have a very focused Inspectorate who undertake
very focused interrogations, which they come back to at the next inspection to see if you
have met the targets they have suggested. They do not discuss the things you are doing
right, the good things, but look at the problem areas, look at the things that the force may
not be doing right the things that may be a problem. The Inspectorate also have good
quality staff officers which helps in the inspection process.’ [1].

And

‘I have seen two. The first though not fully, was a performance review. The interview was
hell, really challenging and really in-depth. The questions were really political and in
some cases I was hesitant to answer. Why did you do this? I can’t say ‘Because the Chief
Constable said so.’ I have to retain some loyalty. They were extremely rigorous.’ [6].

The top corridor also felt that it was possible to deflect or defer recommendations made by
the H.M.I:

‘Yes the H.M.I makes recommendations in a report to the Police Authority which the
Chief Constable does not always accept. For two or three years running the H.M.I has
wanted the force to set up a volunteer cadet force. However the force does not believe that
it can afford to do this and it has now been dropped. A current issue is the civilian
divisional personnel officers which the force does not accept and will not implement. This
has not worsened our working relationship with the H.M.I. A healthy tension exists. [4]

Whilst another went further suggesting that the force could in fact change the views of the
H.M.I:
'Perhaps not only can we deflect their recommendations but be able to show that their policy agendas may not be as effective as they previously thought and effect changes in their policy agendas.' [1]

It was also pointed out that to successfully deflect particular recommendations over time, the Chief Constable may require the backing of the Police Authority:

'If the Chief Constable doesn't think that the H.M.I is right he tells him so. Every year the H.M.I can repeat a recommendation, and every year the Chief Constable can tell him why he will not implement it. However where this does happen, every Chief Constable must have the backing of the Police Authority. We must remember that the H.M.I is an individual just as is the Chief Constable!' [10].

Most managers agreed that this would not effect the relationship between the force and the Inspectorate, with opinions ranging from:

'The Chief Constable will argue it out with the H.M.I.C to sort out best policy for the force and he is not worried about their relationship' [9]

To:

'I think that there is a buddies relationship between the H.M.I and Chief Constables.' [11].

Divisional Managers

The majority of divisional managers agreed that the inspection process had become more vigorous and probing, this comment represents the general response:

'I think the inspections process itself has changed and I actually think that the inspection
process now is more valuable than it used to be and, in turn, our internal inspection processes have changed. It's not about checking 'pocket books', 'lockers' and 'skippets', or over-time vouchers. It's about checking processes, systems and the planning process and I think that makes it a more powerful tool in terms of its ability to influence." [50].

There were some managers who felt that the process had become too adversarial:

'Only last week we had our pre-H.M.I visit. It was done completely differently than last years and last year I had a chat with them as well for about half an hour and I felt it was a safer environment I felt that I could tell him things like I can tell you. But this year he had the management team of this department, the four of us, in a room in the training block and went round the room asking us what our jobs were about. Asking us general questions and I'm not so sure that was the best way, it may have been quicker for him, but I'm not so sure he's getting the most out of the interviews, and also he had a Chief Inspector there and I think it should be on a one to one basis. And I know last year that some people from my department had two from the H.M.I's office interviewing them and it was very adversarial and I think that's completely wrong. Again as with any inspection process unless everyone has got faith in it then it's a waste of time to an extent. I've also heard rumours in the past that someone had a meeting with the H.M.I, or may have been the Staff Officer, and it was fed back to the Chief where that came from, which is wrong. And those sort of rumours quickly go through the police service, well not rumours but stories.' [52].

And:

'Oh absolutely I do. I was at the heart of things as staff officer at the start of several
different H.M.I.'s inspections and yes its much more rigorous now and I think that the manner in which the personal manner in which our current H.M.I does things is sadly wrong. Having experienced the totally unfair and inquisitorial manner in which questions are asked of me as a senior officer in the presence of people my junior when the H.M.I knows full well that I'm not going to be able to answer the question in a manner which is credible because he's already done his ground work. He knows that the systems that the questions are being asked about reveal them as being absent and those systems are certainly absent. I'm therefore going to be embarrassed. I'm going to be embarrassed in a way that undermines my operational credibility. That is bad practice and in my view denied me the opportunity of commanding a division at a higher grade than I recently have because of one slip up on that one occasion. My track record has been excellent and then I go and embarrass the Chief because I can't answer one question which everybody knows I'm not going to be able to answer. I'd only just been in that position having been away for months on end commanding another division and suddenly I'm embarrassed and it's an example of, I think, a very unfair individual approach by that H.M.I. I think the general process of the model the performance review inspection model I think its a very good catalyst for good practice and yesterday with my divisional management team I went through that document and we went through all the questions that we could to explore to examine our own processes and we came up with a number of things that we felt we weren't doing well enough and we've introduced a number of processes to address the issues. That's got to be good news. Now that's only because we've got H.M.I.'s inspection coming up and I want to be sure that I and my Divisional Management Team staff are in a position that, if they are asked these questions, they can come up with the sort of answers
that I wasn’t able to.’ [45].

The majority of divisional managers believed that it was possible to defer or deflect recommendations made by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary:

‘Yes. Its quite a robust relationship. The Chief Constables safeguard their autonomy and their independence quite jealously and the Inspectorate has a particular function but the Inspectorate is not there to manage police forces or direct chief constables. In one or two H.M.I reports there have been things in there which the Chief Constable has resisted and quite a topical one at the moment is the civilianisation of personnel officers. At the moment we still use Chief Inspectors as personnel officers on division and for several years now the Chief H.M.I has suggested that they should be a post that should be civilianised and other forces have civilianised that post, for example the ‘Mets’ have. So that’s one area and there are other areas, one is tenure of post. I mean this Chief Constable has resisted the implementation of tenure of post for a some time but I mean we have got one now. He’s resisted H.M.I policy in other areas as well because it’s not right for Devon & Cornwall.’ [50].

This kind of example, where the force deflects but eventually accepts the recommendations is often quoted.

‘It is possible it has been done. I think that is down to the Chief Constable to negotiate with the particular H.M.I who he is working with and I think it can. I won’t say it has but I think it could make the relationship between the force and an H.M.I precarious and I look at Derbyshire as a case in point where for two years running there was quite a problem and
it wasn’t necessarily the Chief Constable. In Derbyshire it was actually the Police Authority but I do know that in our own force we don’t agree with everything that the H.M.I says. I think that A.R.V’s is something that the Chief Constable is now had to acknowledge and work towards but in the early days he put it off as long as he could because of resource issues. Job tenure I think is another one and I think the H.M.I has been pushing that one for some years now and we have only just finally embraced it." [31].

Others believed the relationship would not be affected, for example:

‘Yes it is possible for the force to disagree and not comply with recommendations of an H.M.I. The relationship is not going to be a great relationship if you don’t implement an H.M.I recommendation but I’m sure that the Chief Constable and the H.M.I are big enough to be able to disagree and I’m sure they sit down and agree to disagree.’ [22].

There was also a view that it was too easy to deflect or defer recommendations:

‘I think it’s all too easy for the force to deflect recommendation of the H.M.I. I would prefer to see that we analyse his recommendations better, and we actually have a written case that says in a defensive but constructive way, to say yes we acknowledge this and in our priority for things to do this is where it sits, and this is our time scale for achieving it. I think with some of the other things we’re saying that we should be able to articulate why it isn’t an issue for us. I mean the A.R.V’s were a classic on that. We gradually got pushed into it and may be on Drug Squads we may get pushed the same but we should be able to articulate, based on facts, as to why we are not doing it. I think what we’ve done in the past is just ducked it, not answered, and we just wait for them to come back and beat us
again. I think we should say, it's on our list of priorities, look what's above it, what do you suggest we stop doing, we've got to manage that process better.' [53].

Ground level managers

Most ground level managers suggested that the inspection process was now more rigorous and probing, however fewer of these managers had been involved in the process than managers at divisional or top corridor level:

'Yes. I can remember a visit from an H.M.I when I was on traffic and his questions were quite probing about policy and you're aware now that when the H.M.I comes he is going to ask questions about policy. Whereas in the past I believe that H.M.I visits were more a jolly for the bosses.' [34].

And:

'Yes they are, because they comatose with set ideas of exactly what they are going to examine, whereas before it was just a guided tour of the force and I think it was a bit too cosy really. Whereas now they do come down and inspect and from what I've read in reports of forces they are critical and in some parts of the country they have with held money. Also when the H.M.I visited last year he took the opportunity to meet in private individuals at all levels and talk to them, and they were not people who were actually presented to him as stooges, they were people he identified, who he wanted to speak to, so the H.M.I had more control over the process.' [24].

And:

'I have not been involved in this but I am becoming involved, as we have an inspection coming up in three weeks time with his staff officer. Certainly, to a large extent I think you
would be better off if an H.M.I just dropped in. Take us as we are sort of thing, because we do so much preparation to get things right and this is a two edged sword because if it was wrong it would be put right, if we knew he was coming down, but if he came in and saw you, warts and all, and saw the pressures under which everybody was working then he may not be quite so benevolent as you would like him to be but you do spend a lot of time preparing for a H.M.I visit and briefing for them. I mean I'm doing this now and selecting the people who will come up and meet the staff officer, to make sure that we've got the people who will speak the right language, say the right things basically, which is what the boss feels should be said, if you see what I mean. So we shall be keeping the ones that are out-spoken or whatever out of the way on that day. Perhaps out-spoken is the wrong word but you know what I mean I'm sure. So I just say sometimes I wonder if it might be better to drop in, perhaps not for three days, but regularly for an hour, to see what it's really like. However I do not have enough experience of them to say if they are becoming harder or not.' [32].

Once again the remoteness of these managers from the centre of the organisation reflects their detailed knowledge as to whether the force can deflect or defer recommendations made by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and any resultant relationship between these actors. Many felt it was possible:

'Yes it can be done and it does effect the relationship. For example in terms of staffing levels in Special Branch when we had a thematic inspection by H.M.I and it showed us as being under represented by a Detective Inspector and a Detective Sergeant and about for or five Detective Constables and three civilians about four years ago. At that time we
made a bid to the force for an increase in staff and it was subsequent to that our staff were reduced. Totally arbitrarily in terms of the force re-organisation and ‘L Division’ was being set up and it had taken some of our staff for other functions. The report of the H.M.I thematic inspection was waved in front of the chief to no avail.’ [29].

And:

‘I think it is possible for a force to say we take onboard what you say but this is not the case in this force. I think that the H.M.I’s make their reports and those reports are quite categorical as to how they see it. I mean the Chief Constable is able to respond if he wishes but the would have to show a good reasons to why he has disagreed with the H.M.I as the H.M.I’s are looking at things which are of national concern at that time so the Chief Constable has got to be on strong ground if he is going to attempt to deflect criticism.’[23].

*The Audit Commission*

Similarly managers were asked if it was possible to easily discount a recommendation of best practice made by the Audit Commission, if the force considered it to be ineffective or inappropriate.

*The Top Corridor*

Four of those interviewed felt that it was not possible to discount recommendations from the Audit Commission and eleven said that it was. Opinions ranged from:

‘I think there is so much pressure on the force today to take notice of Audit Commission recommendations and one can see from the increasing number of their reports on the police, for example ‘Tackling Crime more Efficiently’, that the force has to respond, either by changing their structures, or processes, to show that they have met the spirit, if
not the letter of recommendations from the Audit Commission.' [1].

To:

‘Historically the force has reacted to Audit Commission documents but now I think people are beginning to question them. I think they are questioned and evaluated more and not merely implemented. Historically the police have reacted to central direction and it is taking time for us to question their guidance when not compatible to force direction.’ [2].

The Divisional Managers' Perspective

All but four of these managers believed that it was possible for the force to discount Audit Commission recommendations of ‘best practice’. However it was felt that such recommendations should be reviewed and only implemented if they were considered to be of value to the force. For example:

‘Yes, I wouldn’t say just discount it but argue against it in a proper manner. I don’t think any Chief Constable is just going to accept something because someone else has said it. I think we’re going to look in to it and say well what are going to be the benefits of this and costs and everything else. Because, remember, these people making these recommendations have never worked in the police service. Generally the Audit Commission, certainly are all about pounds shillings and pence really, that’s certainly what its about. So it might be easy for them on paper, to say do that but in reality it’s a lot more complex and expensive and I can’t see this Chief Constable just accepting something without researching into it.’ [52].

Even those who felt it was not possible, still referred to the need to evaluate:
‘I don’t know that we can actually discount anything the Audit Commission says because they are too tightly involved in our money situation. But I think what we can do is an evaluation of what they are saying, against what we do, against what’s best for the force and maybe show a business case to show we shouldn’t take it up. I have no examples.’ [39].

However there was some feeling that the police over-reacted to the Audit Commission:

‘But the Audit Commission is I think a classic it is something that is looking into us and we have to be circumspect on the depth of the things they go to, because of what they are telling us. We shouldn’t be up there saying, we know what’s best we should be mindful of public scrutiny and public comments, but the Audit Commission, I think, is a classic in that it’s something that I think the police service has been a bit too rolled over by, and they have said this and we say that must be the case, so that’s what we’ve done. And to some extent the Home Office fits into that, albeit in this democratic society that we’ve got, it must be the case that the Home Office is the arm of the political representation of the country so that is ‘Joe public’ through their elected members telling us what they want. I suspect that it is probably better these days and I think eventually you very often see politicians, particularly if they are not in office, spouting off about all sorts of things and when they get into office they become far more pragmatic in the nature of the way things are dealt with, because this is the world we live in, this is what is achievable, this is what we can do.’ [42].

And:

Every report that comes out must be reviewed and assessed and no knee jerk reaction to
the fact that the Audit Commission say we’ve got to do it, so we’ve got to do it. I have experience in respect of activity sampling where the Home Office were pushing us for activity sampling, the Audit Commission were pushing us and we went back to the Audit Commission and said, no we’re not going to give you our statistics for the past year because all you are going to do is look at them and beat us with the stick we have given you. It should be questioned, I have met people from the Audit Commission and they are amazed by the way police forces, when you tell them to go and do something or ask them or suggest to them they roll over on their back and they do it. Whereas other organisations say we haven’t got the staffing to do that, go away, and we are learning from that, because we are an organisation where somebody says that’s a problem go and deal with it and we deal with it, but we shouldn’t be. We mustn’t just accept what they say, because all their doing is that they’ve got their information from somewhere, we must remember that, and they got their information from police forces, and who is to say that those police forces are doing it correctly. I think you have to question it and look at your own circumstances.’\[30\]

Others were more pragmatic:

'It is a bit of all things really. I think we all get, well I get, copies of Audit Commission reports and I get copies of Police Research Group reports etc. I think anybody in my position, I’m not sure about the force, but anybody in my position a Divisional Commander must be trawling all the time and flagging up where ever possible things we need to look at. Now, because something works in Northamptonshire doesn’t mean that it’s going to work in Plymouth, so one would be aware of it, look at it and if there was something of value for my own policing locally then I would be anxious to progress it’
Some ideas can be more acceptable for other reasons:

'I think the 'Street-Wise' report was a good example of how easily something could be dismissed and I think it's a shame because there were some very important lessons. 'Tackling Crime Effectively' was taken on board because it happened to suit individual preferences. 'Street-Wise' didn't because it meant that it directed the Chief Constable to go down a particular policing philosophy with which he wasn't comfortable at that time. I think there has been a fundamental shift now and as we approach A.C.P.O Presidency I am sure there will be a much more holistic approach.' [45].

From the perspective of ground level managers

Eleven of the fourteen ground level managers believed that it was possible to defer recommendations made by the Audit Commission, again, however, not without some local review:

'Yes, if it has been identified as a good practice if it can be shown to be better than what we have now, then by all means use it. I would suggest that at the end of the day if you can show in a sensible way that what you have got is as efficient or better than, without 'poo-pooing' it, a constructive argument, then yes they are reasonable people.' [17].

And:

'They only recommend but I'm not aware of one that's been totally ignored, it may be tweaked but again I would say that the Chief Constable is looking towards the Police Authority and saying, this is what the Audit Commission is saying nationally about what
we’re doing, but we don’t have to worry too much about it here, we’ll do this, that, and the other and that will suffice’. [21].

And a closing comment from one manager in respect of the Audit Commission and the H.M.I:

‘Do we need an H.M.I. We have the Audit Commission, which is seen as a squeaky clean independent organisation outside of police influence. The H.M.I is not achieving very much.’ [10].

Concluding comments

The Police Authority is seen both by its members and by police managers as being a much more dynamic body than the larger old style authority. But they still see the Chief Constable as being able to affect their decision making, both through his advice based upon professional knowledge and through his own ability and strong personality, an opinion which is also expressed by police managers.

The research shows that there is no evidence to suggest that there has been a change in the power relationship between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable. In fact their relationship conforms to a Chief Constable’s ideal type, one which ‘...acts as a sounding board for local opinion, but which does not ultimately question the chief’s decisions.’ (Reiner 1992: 251).

For many managers the inspection processes carried out by the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is seen as a difficult and in some cases a traumatic experience. All those
interviewed saw it as being more rigorous and probing than it once was. It was generally considered that it was possible to argue that recommendations made by the H.M.I. need not be implemented locally (a course of action which would not affect the relationship between the force and the Inspectorate). However evidence from their Inspection Reports in the policy areas previously discussed, would indicate that it is only possible to defer such recommendations, rarely, if ever, to deflect them completely.

Papers published by the Audit Commission were seen by managers to demand close scrutiny, as they contained information applicable to policing on a national scale, which could be of value locally. It was generally considered that the Audit Commission had become an increasingly important influence on police policy, but their recommendations could be both deferred and deflected, if it could be argued that such recommendations were ineffective or inappropriate for local conditions.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

DRAWING THE STRANDS TOGETHER: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The avenues available to the public to influence the police, both in policy and practice, have increased considerably since the days of the Police Act 1964, where issues of accountability and control were essentially based upon the 'tripartite arrangement' of the Home Secretary, Local Police Authority and Chief Constable. So too has the influence of Quasi Government agencies, such as Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary; The Audit Commission; and Government Inquiries, such as 'Scarman'. How, then, have these new avenues of influence affected the issues of power, accountability, control and influence over the police at a local level?

Organisational structure is central to these issues, because it is through the organisation that people from various backgrounds are brought together to achieve specific aims, involving corporate culture and control, shared values and experiences. Like many other organisations in the public sector in England and Wales, the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary has undergone major changes in recent years, much of it implemented as a result of political pressure, originating from a desire to reduce management costs. Reports from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and The Audit Commission, as well as inquiries such as 'Sheehy', have had considerable influence over these changes. This is reflected by the perceptions of all of the managers interviewed who believed that the Chief Constable, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, The Audit Commission and The Home Office had the greatest influence on the introduction of these changes. Employees and staff associations/unions were seen as having the least influence. Senior managers from the top corridor felt that implementation was achieved through special project teams.
that would obtain views from various levels of the organisation; however middle managers and front line police officers believed that these organisational changes were implemented in a top down manner, with little local consultation. In particular, although the Audit Commission have enshrined the value of Basic Command Units, front line staff are not convinced that their introduction, and the Ward System in particular, was an effective method of policing for Plymouth.

The organisation has attempted to become less centralised and more organic, but it is still unable to escape the hierarchy of a tall organisation, with a rank structure firmly fixed in its militaristic origins, and with the ever-present positional and latent power of the Chief Constable at the apex of the organisation, it cannot be considered to be a truly decentralised organisation. It remains an administrative bureaucracy, as described by the classical theorists, where organisational rules and procedures are intended to control the actions of members of the organisation, a control that can be enforced by specialist departments, and an effective force wide system of computerised information technology.

Therefore, in terms of the power of the organisation to exert control, issues of policy making and implementation are important in a policing context, because of the discretion available to front-line police officers, that permits policy making to continue during the course of implementation, resulting in continuous policy making. This occurs even though managers believed that they could distinguish between policy and practice. The power available to those who implement policing policy is extended by their ability to apply 'bottom-up' control over policy implementation (also seen in other public service organisations) based upon a perceived need by street level staff to slow down, or ration the demands upon these services, allowing street level bureaucrats to apply policy to suit their
own needs: needs often based upon a desire to keep up with demand, rather than complying with specific performance indicators.

Managers conceded that it was possible for policy to be initiated by front line staff, by affecting policy initiatives by failing to implement them if they considered them to be ineffective or too cumbersome. But it was the 'committee system' that was highlighted, both by managers (in the interviews I conducted) and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (in their reports), as being the major driver in the policy and decision making processes. This system however enables both the positional power of the Chief Constable to control those who are chosen to be committee members, and his latent power to ensure that overt conflict does not occur. Essentially, then, the Chief Constable maintains control at a local level.

Applying a rational through to incremental continuum, the research suggests that decision-making is more inclined towards incrementalism and muddling through. Radical changes in policy were not made, and with many managers criticising the way in which policy is tested, there is little evidence of backward mapping in terms of assessing the effects of implementation.

With the requirement of Partnership Policing in respect of crime prevention and crime reduction initiatives implemented under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the implications of continuous policy making must be taken into consideration. This will require a more effective system of policy evaluation, and greater consultation with front line staff.

Much been made of local consultation and a partnership approach in terms of influencing what the police do. However, using policing plans as an example, both managers and members of the Police Authority considered that they had made every effort to involve the
public and lower ranks in the policy making process, expanding the rights of citizenship, by giving them the opportunity to influence what the police do and how they do it. Unfortunately, as can be seen from the attendance at internal police and external public consultation meetings, the desire for such involvement, both by the public and by ground level staff, remain at a low ebb. In terms of public accountability, control and influence over local policy and practice, this perceived lack of interest in policing issues permits the existence of 'non-decision making through non-participation', reaching a point at which local communities are 'unaware of their interests and therefore not in a position to demand that their interests are met', leaving the question of who controls (the senior - junior partner relationship) untested.

Papers published by The Audit Commission, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and The Home Office clearly had considerable influence over local policy, a view that is reflected consistently by the perceptions of managers in the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary, who saw them as having the greatest influence over the policy and decision-making processes in the five policy areas examined: followed closely by the Chief Constable. In contrast the Police Authority, employees not normally or routinely involved in the policy process, and police staff associations and unions were seen as having the least amount of influence. However front line staff (sergeants and constables) saw the greatest influence over their day-to-day work coming, firstly, from the consumers of police services, and thereafter from their colleagues, their immediate supervisors, and public opinion.

The Citizen's Charter has had a considerable impact upon local police managers, not only in coming to terms with the problems of quality in public service provision, but also with the issues of defining and measuring performance indicators. They saw the Citizen's Charter as having a positive impact upon the police service, leading to improved services,
but accountability was hardly mentioned by top corridor managers. However the majority of ground level managers saw the Citizen’s Charter as making the police more accountable, by enabling the public to be more aware of the service standards of the organisation. The strongest influence over the introduction of the Force Charter was seen to come from The Audit Commission, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Chief Constable, even if almost no one knew how the contents of the Charter had been decided. Front line staff were not convinced that it had improved police service to the community; more importantly, the majority of those who were members of the Force prior to the introduction of the Charter did not believe that it had made any difference to the way they carried out their work, even though they saw it as decreasing their general level of discretion as to what they actually did.

The publication of Annual Policing Plans gave notice to the community policed of the service they could expect to receive over the forthcoming year. However it is evident that documents published by the Home Office and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary have had the greatest influence over the Local Policing Plan. The process of deciding the contents of the Constabulary Annual Policing Plans (now Performance Plans) was seen by all managers to be one where the police produced a plan on behalf of the Police Authority, through the application of Ministerial Priorities and local consultation. They saw influence over the contents coming from The Home Office, The Audit Commission, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, and locally from the Chief Constable, who was seen as having a great deal of influence, being responsible for the production of the draft Annual Plan. However they considered that the Police Authority did have some influence.

The strength of these influences over the contents of local plans is reflected by front line police officers. However, although they believed that this had lead to greater influence being placed upon measured tasks, over forty five percent those officers who were
members of the force prior to the introduction of Annual Policing Plans believed that this had made no difference to the way they carried out their day-to-day work.

In terms of these two generic policy areas, the issue of 'management level' and 'street level' control over local policing remains. The former policy network concerned with plans, targets and achieving performance indicators for the benefit of the Chief Constable, the Local Police Authority and Central Government, and the latter concerned with keeping up with local demands and satisfying the 'consumer with a cause'.

Therefore, considering the resource implications of producing the Force Charter and Annual Performance Plans; the requirements to publish reports giving details of performance against complex and varied lists of performance indicators; the limited affect it has on front line service providers; and the interest shown by local communities; then the value of these documents, at the local level, is questionable. Although they may have improved police accountability to the public through the publication of performance indicators, there is no evidence to suggest that these policy documents have changed the power relationship between front line service providers and consumers.

Domestic violence is the policy arena that has produced the most positive comments from all levels within the police organisation, and one in which the power of the victim/consumer has been greatly enhanced, as against that of the service provider, both in terms of influence, accountability and control. From the examination of published documents and the views of managers, it is clear that the major influences over this policy area come from: public opinion; Central Government; and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. Front line staff agreed with this view, but they also believed that the Chief Constable had an influence. Interestingly, they felt that they themselves had no influence in this policy arena. Although discretion was an issue, there was general agreement from
all levels of management and from front line staff that it was a policy of positive arrest; one that was accepted throughout the force, with a strong feeling that this was a policy area that attracted the greatest and most effective top down control over its implementation, applied through rules and procedures, enforced through force-wide information technology systems, Domestic Violence Units, and the requirement to complete ‘domestic violence report forms’.

The examination of published documents in respect of equal opportunities policy indicate that the major influences came from legislation, The Home Office, and The Audit Commission, with the strongest influence coming from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. This was reflected by the views of police managers, with front line staff believing that this policy had improved the position of women, racial minorities, and lesbian and homosexual officers within the force.

The opinions of managers and front line staff differ regarding the influences over generic policy areas, such as the Force Charter and Policing Plans: areas that managers see as having an influence on the services provided, but which front line staff perceive to be policies that have done little to change their day to day work. Only in policy areas such as domestic violence, can the power and influence of the key players in the policy process be seen at the implementation stage; where it has been possible to shorten chains of command, thereby ensuring greater top down control over policy implementation.

Police managers believed that the present Police Authority was much more effective than the old style Authority, but believed that the Chief Constable still had considerable influence over its day to day decision making processes. This power relationship was illustrated by the fact that, generally, managers perceived that there were few disagreements between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable in deciding the
contents of the Annual Plan, but the Police Authority was able to make minor adjustments to the draft document prepared by the police. Front line staff, particularly the constables, did not see the Police Authority as having any power or influence over their day-to-day work.

Police Authority members believed that they were more analytical, more critical and more fiscally aware, than the old style Authority. However they also acknowledged that the Authority could be influenced by the Chief Constable.

Essentially the power relationship between Police Authority and Chief Constable remains unchanged since the implementation of the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994. One in which the power of professional knowledge is likely to ensure that the Chief Constable remains in control; where Lukes (1974) 'third dimension of power' allows the Chief Constable to shape the views of members of the Police Authority, thus avoiding both overt and covert conflict and maintaining the status quo. In fact the situation remains the same as it did when Brogden (1977) identified the 'third dimension of power' in his research into this relationship: furthermore control over the agenda of meetings by the Chief Constable, the Chairman, and Clerk of the Police Authority, can allow non-decision making to occur.

Managers made it clear that the inspection process carried out by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary is much more rigorous and probing than it was, for example, five years ago, with some managers saying that they felt it had become too adversarial. However they did believe that it was possible to deflect or defer recommendations made by the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and in doing so not affect the relationship between the Force and the Inspectorate. However research from Inspection Reports for the Force show that, although it may be possible to defer their recommendations, they are
inevitably implemented in due course. It is through Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary that pressure is applied from Central Government in all its forms; influence that has since been re-enforced by the Local Government Act 1999, that now empowers them to inspect local police authorities in respect of Best Value (Home Office 1999).

Managers felt that the police service has complied too readily with recommendations of best practice proposed by The Audit Commission, a view that is supported by the examination of their reports. They felt that these recommendations should be reviewed and only implemented if they were considered to be of value to the force, but it was essential that a constructive argument should be made before they could be discounted.

The relationship between the Chief Constable and these two bodies is an interesting one in that the positional, expert and resource power of the Chief Constable can enable him/her to defer or deflect or deny recommendations made by the Audit Commission that he/she thinks are inappropriate or unacceptable to the force. However this power is greatly reduced when he/she is dealing recommendations made by his/her peers and equals - members of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. However the influence of these two bodies, although present, diminishes in importance until it reaches those on the front-line, who perceive them to be less influential than, for example, their senior managers.

With members of the Police Authority and police managers believing that the Chief Constable has influence over the decision making processes of the Police Authority and with internal control over policy through the committee system, then, locally the balance of power over policy-making lies with the Chief Constable. However this local influence is tempered by a perceived increase in the power of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. With front line officers believing that there is a greater influence coming from local sources, in particular from consumers of public services, but also from their
colleagues, immediate supervisors, and local public opinion, then, with the exception of domestic violence issues, using the power of professional knowledge and their position as 'street level bureaucrats' they have the balance of power over the implementation of local police practice.

Despite recent introductions of policy initiatives proposing changes in organisational structure, partnerships, planning, audits, and performance indicators, very little has changed; other than enhancing the gap between 'street level' and 'management level' police. The former being accountable at a local level to consumers, public opinion, their colleagues and immediate supervisors and the latter at a central level, to published performance indicators and policy documents. In public sector organisations issues of accountability, control, and influence remain as complicated as ever; especially in respect of policing, where the ever presence of continuous policy making is an important ingredient in the relationship between Central and Local Government policy makers, policy implementers, local public opinion, consumers with a cause, and other groups that have the power to influence public policy and practice at a local level.
Appendix A
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

POLICE MANAGERS

1) ANNUAL POLICING PLAN

A/ Can you please describe the processes involved in producing the Force Annual Plan.

B/ How much influence do you believe the following groups shown on this card have upon the contents of the Force Annual Policing Plan.

CARD:

i) The Police Authority
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) Home Office Circulars
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.
viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation
x) Public opinion

PLEASE KEEP THE CARD AS I SHALL RETURN TO IT LATER.

C/ How much freedom are divisional commanders given to produce their local annual policing plans.

D/ From your experience as a member of a divisional Management Team can you tell me how the force ensures that members of 'ground level' staff (Inspector rank and below) are conversant with both the Force and the divisional Policing Plan.

E/ How were members of the Special Constabulary involved in the formulation of these plans. For example was the Commandant of the Force Special Constabulary involved in the policy making process.

2) THE 'NEW' POLICE AUTHORITY

A/ From your experience in the policy making process do you think that the 'new' Police Authority is:

i) More analytical than its predecessor.
ii) More critical in its decision making
iii) More aware of the fiscal constraints of effective policing

B/ Are you aware of any differences of emphasis or disagreements between police representatives and the Police Authority in deciding the contents of the annual policing plan.

C/ How much influence do you think the Chief Constable has over members of the police authority in their decision making processes.

D/ Are you aware of examples of any such an influence either:
   i) Under the previous Tripartite Police Authority system or
   ii) Under the present system

3) ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES TO THE FORCE DIVISIONAL BOUNDARIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM STRUCTURE.

A/ How much influence do you believe the groups shown on the card had upon this change:

CARD:  
i) The Police Authority  
ii) Audit Commission  
iv) Home Office Circulars  
v) ACPO  
vi) The Chief Constable in person  
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.  
viii) Police Staff Associations  
ix) Legislation  
x) Public opinion

B) Can you please tell me why you think the organisational structure was changed.

C/ How was the organisational change implemented.

D/ Would you describe this as a standard approach to policy implementation within the police service.
   PROBE Why?

E/ How do you think the new structure affected communication between:

The Public and Divisional Commanders,  
Divisional Commanders and Chief Officers,  
and Chief Officers and the public
   PROBE Can you give me any examples to illustrate this.
F/ Would you agree that the present organisational structure is one based upon a system of 'Basic Command Units'.

G/ Do you consider that further changes are likely to the Force divisional structure within the next couple of years.
PROBE: Why What

H/ What are your views on the comment that divisions should become completely self sufficient to the extent that they are to all intents and purposes agencies of the host force.

4) WARD POLICING

A/ Can you tell me why the Ward Policing System was introduced in Plymouth.
(PROBE: Why Plymouth. Why not elsewhere)

B/ How is its success to be measured.

C/ Has any interest has been shown in this policy initiative by the following groups:
   i) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
   ii) The Audit Commission
   iii) ACPO
   iv) Other police forces
PROBE Can you give me any examples.

D/ Do you think it likely that this scheme will be introduced to other areas of the force, or to other police forces.
PROBE Why?

E/ Can you please describe the processes involved in deciding a new force policy.
PROBE How is this policy tested. Is it possible for new policy to originate from Divisions.

F/ The Audit Commission report regarding 'effective police patrol' makes recommendations regarding the direction and targeting of patrol work. How do you think the force should respond to these recommendations.

5) THE CITIZENS CHARTER
A/ Can you tell me what effect the Government's Citizens Charter initiative has had upon the Police Service.

B/ Very briefly how did the force formulate its Charter.

C/ How much influence do you believe that the groups shown on the card have upon the content of the Force Charter:

CARD:
   i) The Police Authority
   ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
   iii) The Audit Commission
   iv) Home Office Circulars
   v) ACPO
   vi) The Chief Constable in person
   vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.
   viii) Police Staff Associations
   ix) Legislation
   x) Public opinion

D/ How does the force maintain public interest in its Policing Charter.

E/ Do you believe it is likely that there will be changes to the charter, within the next couple of years, for example any of the performance indicators.

F/ From your experience, how does the force ascertain, firstly, how much importance that members of Divisional Management teams place upon the Force Charter and secondly how much importance that members of 'ground level' staff (eg. Inspector rank and below) place upon the Force Charter during their routine tours of duty.

G/ Its been suggestion that there is duplication between the Force Charter and the Annual Policing Plan and that they should be merged. What's your view on this?

6) EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES/HMIC

A/ Can you briefly describe force policy in respect of equal opportunities in its broadest sense.

B/ How much influence do you believe that the groups shown on the card have upon force equal opportunities policy:
CARD:

i) The Police Authority
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) Home Office Circulars
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.

viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation
x) Public opinion

C/ A recent H.M Inspectors report for the force suggested that females were under represented in drug squads. How did the force react to this and do you think anything else should be done in respect of female representation in specialist police squads.

D/ Is it possible to deflect or defer recommendations made by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, which the force does not consider acceptable. If so how would this affect the relationship between the force and the Inspectorate.

PROBE Can you give me any examples of where this has been done.

E/ From your experience of HMIC force inspections do you believe that the inspection process is more rigorous and probing than it was, for example five years ago.

PROBE Can you give any examples.

RIGHT, THIS IS THE LAST SECTION NOW:

7) DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY

A/ Can you briefly describe force policy in respect of domestic violence.

B/ Would you please describe the policy making process in respect of domestic violence; for example is it one which has developed incrementally over time as a result of pressures placed upon the police service.
Do you think this is the way in which most policing policy is decided.

How much influence do you believe that the groups shown on the card have upon the policy:

CARD:

i) The Police Authority
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) Home Office Circulars
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.
viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation
x) Public opinion

How is the effectiveness of force domestic violence policy monitored.

Should a report from the Audit Commission indicate a 'best practice' in respect of domestic violence policy would the force implement it as a matter of course or can such recommendations be easily discounted if it is considered that they may be ineffective or inappropriate.

PROBE Can you give me any examples of where this has been done.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING MY QUESTION.
ARE THERE ANY POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE WHICH YOU FEEL ARE IMPORTANT OR HAVE NOT BEEN COVERED.
1. How would you describe your profession or occupation?

2. Can you please tell me how long you have been a member of the Police Authority?

3. Was this before the implementation of the Police & Magistrates Courts Act 1994?

4. How do you see the role of the Police Authority?

5. Do you believe that this role will change. If so, in what way?

6. Either from personal experience, or anecdotally, do you think that today’s Police Authority is:
   a) more analytical than its predecessor
   b) more critical in its decision making processes
   c) more aware of the fiscal constraints of effective policing

7. Can you please tell me how the Agendas for Police Authority meetings are decided?

8. Do you think it is possible for the Chief Constable to influence members of the Police Authority in their decision making processes. If so, can you give me any examples of where this has been done?

9. How has the Force taken the opportunity to educate members of the Police Authority in respect of policing issues which may be useful for them in their role, for example in deciding the contents of the Annual Policing Plan and its performance indicators?

10. In what way do you think any such training might affect the decision making processes of the Police Authority and their relationship with the Chief Constable?

11. Could you please describe to me the processes involved in deciding the contents of the annual policing plan?
12. How much influence do you think that the following groups have upon the contents of the Police Authority Annual Policing Plan:

(USE CARD. PLEASE KEEP IT AS I MAY RETURN TO IT LATER)

i) The Police Authority itself
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) The Home Office
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.
viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation

PRESS FOR REASONS

13. Are you aware of any differences of opinion or disagreements between police representatives and members of the Police Authority in deciding the contents of the annual policing plan? If so can you give me an illustration of this?

14. How effective do you think the consultative processes is in deciding the contents of the annual policing plan:
   a) for the public
   b) for members of the police organisation not normally or routinely involved in the policy making processes but involved in its service provision.

15. If you were to be given the opportunity to improve these consultative processes, what measures would you like to introduce?

16. Do you consider that the Police Authority and your clerk have enough involvement in the drafting, writing and publication of the annual plan, including the setting of its performance indicators? WHY?

17. What are your views on the statement that Home Office National Key Objectives restrict local autonomy when it comes to deciding your Police Authority Annual Policing Plan?

18. It has been suggested that there is duplication between the Citizens Charter for the Force and the Annual Policing Plan and that they should be merged. What are your views on this?

19. Do you think that it is possible for the force to deflect or defer recommendations made by HMI which the Chief Constable considers are inappropriate or unacceptable for the force. If so how do you think this would this effect the relationship between the Chief Constable, his senior staff, the Police

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Authority and the Home Office?

20. If the Audit Commission should indicate a best practice in respect of a particular policy initiative, do you consider that the force should adopt it as a matter of course or can it be easily discounted if it is considered to be ineffective or inappropriate for local needs. If so how do you think this would effect the relationship between the Chief Constable, the Police Authority and the Home Office?

21. Is your knowledge of the Force Charter, prepared under the Citizen’s Charter initiative, sufficient to give your view of how the policy was influenced by the groups shown on this CARD?

(Please keep the card as I shall return to it later)

i) YES
ii) NO
iii) DON’T KNOW

If YES. HOW much influence the following groups have upon the Force Charter:

i) The Police Authority itself
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) The Home Office
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.

viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation

PRESS FOR REAsonS

22. Is your knowledge of Force policy in respect of the organisational structure of the force and how it has developed sufficient to give your view of how the policy was influenced by the groups shown on the CARD?

i) YES
ii) NO
iii) DON’T KNOW

If YES. HOW much influence the following groups have upon the organisational structure of the force:

i) The Police Authority itself
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) The Home Office
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.
viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation

PRESS FOR REASONS

23. Is your knowledge of Force policy in respect of incidents of domestic violence sufficient to give your view of how the policy was influenced by the groups shown on the card?

i) YES
ii) NO
iii) DON'T KNOW

If YES. HOW much influence the following groups have upon Force policy in respect of domestic violence issues:

i) The Police Authority itself
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) The Home Office
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.
viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation

PRESS FOR REASONS

24. Is your knowledge of Force policy in respect of equal opportunities sufficient to give your view of how the policy was influenced by the groups shown on the CARD?

i) YES
ii) NO
iii) DON'T KNOW

If YES. HOW much influence the following groups have upon Force policy in respect of equal opportunity issues

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i) The Police Authority itself.
ii) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
iii) The Audit Commission
iv) The Home Office
v) ACPO
vi) The Chief Constable in person
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally involved in the policy making process.
viii) Police Staff Associations
ix) Legislation

PRESS FOR REASONS
APPENDIX C

TEMPLATE ANALYSIS CODE FRAME

Used for responses to questions to police managers which produced a qualitative response, other than a quantitative yes or no based answer.

Annual Policing Plans

Processes - Top Corridor:
1) Consultation
2) Police Authority Plan written by the police
3) National Key Objectives

Processes - Divisional Managers:
1) Consultation
2) National Key Objectives
3) Top Down Approach
4) Police Authority Plan written by the police

Processes - Ground Level Managers:
1) National Key Objectives
2) Consultation
3) Top Down approach
4) Police Authority Plan written by the police

Influences - Top Corridor:
1) Chief Constable
2) H.M.I
3) Legislation

Influences - Divisional Managers:
1) Chief Constable
2) H.M.I
3) Home Office

Influences - Ground Level Managers:
1) Audit Commission
2) Home Office
3) Public opinion & Police Authority

Freedom of Commanders:
1) A lot
2) Limited
3) None

Conversant with plan - Top Corridor:
1) Knowledge of Divisional Plan means knowledge of Police Authority Plan
2) Through Divisional Meetings
3) Internal Inspection process
4) Performance Indicators

Conversant with plan - Divisional Managers:
1) Divisional Meetings
2) Aide Memoirs
3) Consultation
4) Performance Indicators

Conversant with plan - Ground Level Managers:
1) Aid Memoirs
2) Performance Indicators
3) Divisional Meetings

Organisational changes

Influence on Change - Top Corridor Managers:
1) Chief Constable
2) H.M.I
3) Audit Commission

Influence on Change - Divisional Managers:
1) Audit Commission
2) H.M.I
3) Chief Constable

Influence on Change - Ground Level Managers:
1) Audit Commission & Chief Constable
2) Home Office

Why the Changes
All Managers:
1) Reduce Management costs
2) Co-terminus with council boundaries
3) Flatten the Organisation
How change implemented:
   All Managers:
   1) Special project team
   2) Top down approach

Communication:
   All Managers:
   1) Poor internal communication (eg. H.Q to Divisions)
   2) Better communication with local communities

Ward Policing - Why Plymouth:
   All Managers:
   1) Fitted Plymouth
   2) Driven by local police commander at the time

Measuring success of Ward Policing:
   All Managers:
   1) Public satisfaction
   2) Performance indicators

The processes used to decide force policy:
   All Managers:
   1) Through Policy Committees
   2) From anyone in Division

The Citizen’s Charter

   Top Corridor Managers:
   1) Improved services
   2) Positive impact

   Divisional Managers:
   1) Improved services
   2) Positive impact
   3) Little effect

   Ground Level Managers:
   1) Made people more aware of their right to services
   2) Made police more accountable
   3) Improved services
Influence on contents of Force Charter.

Top Corridor Managers:
1) Chief Constable
2) Audit Commission
3) H.M.I

Divisional Managers:
1) H.M.I
2) Chief Constable
3) Home Office
4) Audit Commission

Ground Level Managers:
1) H.M.I
2) Chief Constable
3) Home Office
4) Audit Commission

Maintaining public Interest.

Top Corridor Managers:
1) Annual results published in local press
2) Not much public interest

Divisional Managers:
1) Not much public interest
2) Not done very well
3) Leaflets

Ground Level Managers:
1) Not much public interest
2) When things go wrong
3) Leaflets

Ensuring importance of Charter to staff.

Top Corridor Managers:
1) Influence of performance indicators
2) Staff meetings

Divisional Managers:
1) Influence of performance indicators
2) Little or no interest maintained

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Groimd Level Managers:
1) Influence of performance indicators
2) Little or no interest maintained

Equal opportunities policy.

How policy is described:

Top Corridor Managers:
1) We are an equal opportunities employer
2) Fairness and equality

Divisional managers:
1) Fairness and equality
2) Not fully implemented

Ground Level Managers:
1) Fairness and equality
2) Not being enforced

Influence over force policy.

Top Corridor Managers:
1) Legislation
2) H.M.I
3) Home Office

Divisional Managers:
1) H.M.I
2) Home Office
3) Chief Constable

Ground Level Managers:
1) H.M.I
2) Home Office
3) A.C.P.O

Females in specialist squads.

Top Corridor managers:
1) Positive recruitment
2) Canvassing females
Divisional Managers
1) Positive recruitment
2) Canvassing females

Ground Level Managers
1) Positive recruitment
2) On merit

Domestic Violence Policy

Description of force policy

All Managers
1) Positive arrest/positive action
2) Positive support to victims

Policy Process.

All managers:
1) External pressure
2) Home Office

Influence on force policy.

Top Corridor Managers:
1) Home Office
2) Public opinion
3) A.C.P.O

Divisional Managers:
1) Public Opinion
2) H.M.I
3) Home Office

Ground Level Managers:
1) Public Opinion
2) Home Office
3) H.M.I

How monitored.

Top Corridor Managers:
1) Supervision of staff by computer and D.V.U Staff
2) Case referrals

Divisional Managers
1) Case referrals
2) Supervision of staff by computer and D.V.U Staff
3) More recorded incidents

Ground level staff
1) Supervision of staff by computer and D.V.U staff
2) More recorded incidents
3) Victim satisfaction
POLICY AND PRACTICE QUESTIONNAIRE

CONFIDENTIAL

The following questions concern your views on how various people, groups, organisations and legal requirements influence local policing policy and practice.

For each question please place a circle around the number of the answer that you consider to be the nearest to your opinion. (These numbers are for coding purposes only).

The first section relates to your local Policing Plan for Plymouth:

1) How influential do you think the following are in deciding the contents of your **Plymouth** Annual Policing Plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Influential</th>
<th>Influential</th>
<th>Not Very Influential</th>
<th>Not Influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Police Authority Force Plan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constables, sergeants and unsworn staff at Area level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Public Opinion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Constable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Home Office/Central Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Area Commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2) How important do you think it is for local public opinion to influence what the police actually do?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
<th>Very Unimportant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) In general how well informed do you think you are of the Plymouth Annual Policing Plan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very well informed</th>
<th>Well informed</th>
<th>Un-informed</th>
<th>Very un-informed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) How much influence does the Plymouth Annual Policing Plan have on the way you carry out your work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A great influence</th>
<th>Some influence</th>
<th>Very Little influence</th>
<th>No influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) How much importance do you personally place upon the Plymouth Annual Policing Plan during the normal course of your work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A great deal of importance</th>
<th>Some importance</th>
<th>Little importance</th>
<th>No importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6) Were you a member of the force before the introduction of annual Policing Plans prior to 1995?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>..........Please go to question 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>..........Please go to question 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Policing Plans increased public influence over what the police do</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Policing Plans improved the quality of service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Policing Plans mean that the Police give too much priority to tasks on which they are measured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Policing Plans increased Government influence over what the police do</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Policing plans increased the influence of the Police Authority on what the police do</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Policing plans made no difference to the way most police carry out their job</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This section relates to your views on the organisational structure of the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary.

8) The present structure of the force, consisting of Areas and Districts, was the latest of a number of recent changes to the force structure. How influential do you think the following have been upon these changes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Very influential</th>
<th>Influential</th>
<th>Not very influential</th>
<th>Not influential</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constables, sergeants and unsworn staff at Area &amp; District Level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views of local people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Constable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the Special Constabulary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior managers (Supt. and above and equivalent unsworn ranks)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Audit Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.I.C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Home Office/ Central Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other important influencer:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Please specify)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9) How much do you agree or disagree with these statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The present organisational structure of the force is one of Basic Command Units</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ward Policing system as used in Plymouth can be utilised in any police area (rural or urban).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10) How effective do you think Ward Policing is as a means of combining a desire for immediate response policing with that of the idea of community policing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Effective</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very ineffective</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11) What do you think is thebest thmg about Ward Policing in Plymouth?

OFFIGEUSE
ONLY

(37)

(38)

335


The next section concerns the effects of the Citizens' Charter on your work.

13) Were you a member of the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary prior to the introduction of the Force Policing Charter ('Our Commitment to you....' etc) prior to 1993?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Please go to Question 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Please go to Question 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14) Considering the services provided before the introduction of the Force Policing Charter and its accompanying performance indicators, with the service provided after its introduction, please indicate how far you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Force Charter increased public awareness of the services provided by the police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Force Charter improved the quality of service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance indicators decreased the level of discretion available to me in my work</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Force Charter made no difference to the way I carry out my work</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This section will focus on force equal opportunities policy.

15) Please indicate how influential you think the following are upon force equal opportunities policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very influential</th>
<th>Influential</th>
<th>Not very influential</th>
<th>Not influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants, Constables and unsworn staff at Area and District level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The views of local people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Constable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the Special Constabulary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior managers (Supt. and above and equivalent unsworn ranks)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Audit Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.I.C.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Home Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other important influencer: (Please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54)
16) How important do you think it is that the force should ensure that female staff are not under-represented in all specialist posts?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Un-important</th>
<th>Very un-important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments

17) With regard to the Force Equal Opportunities policy, how do you think it has affected the situation for the following groups in the force:

Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Made Worse</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members of racial & ethnic minority groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Made Worse</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lesbians & homosexuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Made Worse</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments
This section concerns force policy in respect of domestic violence issues.

18) Please indicate how much influence you think the following have upon force policy in respect of domestic violence issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Level</th>
<th>Very Influential</th>
<th>Influential</th>
<th>Not Very Influential</th>
<th>Not Influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants, Constables and unsworn staff at Area &amp; District level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Constable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior managers (Supt &amp; above and equivalent unsworn ranks)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.P.O</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Audit Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.I.C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HomeOffice/ Central Govt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other important influencer. (Please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19) How do you think force policy has changed police working practice in respect of domestic violence issues?

[Blank lines]

20) How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

"Force policy in respect of domestic violence issues detrimentally restricts officers' discretion as to how they deal with these types of incidents."

| Agree strongly | 1 |
| Agree          | 2 |
| Disagree       | 3 |
| Disagree strongly | 4 |
| Don't know     | 5 |
The last section deals with general issues of policy and practice.

21) What is the likelihood of Constables, Sergeants or Unsworn Staff at Area/District level initiating force policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Not very likely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Police policy should reflect public opinion not direct it."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23) During the course of your normal working day within the force, how much influence do you think the following have upon what you actually do?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Great deal of influence</th>
<th>Some influence</th>
<th>Very Little influence</th>
<th>No influence at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your work colleagues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your immediate supervisors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of your Area Management Team</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers of police services (i.e. victims, witnesses or offenders)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views of local people (Not victims, witnesses or offenders)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Constable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.P.O</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Audit Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.I.C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 23 continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A great deal of influence</th>
<th>Some influence</th>
<th>Very Little influence</th>
<th>No influence at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Home Office/Central Govt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Crime and Disorder Strategies produced under the Crime &amp; Disorder Act 1998.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other important influencer. (Please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally would you please complete the last section about yourself. Once again circling the appropriate category number.

24) How long have you been a member of the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 years or less</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 5 and under 10 years</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years and under 15 years</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 years and under 25 years</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 years and over</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25) How long have you worked in the Plymouth Division/Area 2 during your career in service?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under 2 years</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 years and under 5 years</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years and under 10 years</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years and over</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26) What is your age?

| 20 years or under | 1 |
| 21 to 30 years | 2 |
| 31 to 40 years | 3 |
| 41 to 55 years | 4 |
| 56 years or over | 5 |

27) What is your gender?

| Male | 1 |
| Female | 2 |

28) What is your role?

| Ward Sergeant | 1 |
| Response Sergeant | 2 |
| Ward Constable | 3 |
| Response Constable | 4 |
| Other (Please specify) | 5 |

Thank you for your time and I reassure you that your views are confidential and will not be attributed to individuals.
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