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Imagining the Scottish Economy: Economic (In)Security and the 'Hidden Politics' of Independence

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**RESEARCH
DEGREES
WITH
PLYMOUTH
UNIVERSITY**

*Imagining the Scottish Economy: Economic (In)Security and the
'Hidden Politics' of Independence*

By

James Gilgrist

A thesis submitted to Plymouth University in partial fulfilment for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Imagining the Scottish Economy: Economic (In)Security and the 'Hidden Politics' of Independence

.....**Abstract**.....

On September 18th 2014, voters in a Scottish independence referendum were asked the yes/no question: "Should Scotland be an independent country?" Scotland voted 'no' to independence from the United Kingdom by a margin of 55% to 45%. The majority of the debate focused on what was termed 'the economics of independence'. Whilst economic implications ought always to have been an important consideration, the key arguments for and against independence were built almost exclusively on how independence could influence the economic prospects of Scottish people. Essentially, through the articulation of the economic insecurities of either union or independence, unionists and nationalists drew on the assumption that people in Scotland are bound up within a shared community of economic fate, signified by the 'Scottish economy' and/or 'UK economy'. Through the articulation of these insecurities arguments both for and against independence were justified, demonstrating the potential significance of economic security in the re/territorialisation of political geographies vis-à-vis more conventional matters of security thought predominant in this regard. Through a poststructuralist discourse analysis of key texts, including those issued by the official nationalist and unionist campaigns – 'Yes Scotland' and 'Better Together' respectively – this thesis challenges a fundamental assumption upon which such arguments are made, namely, the idea of 'the economy' as a unifying object space within which subjects are thought to have an especially shared economic (in)security. It is argued that the articulation of economic (in)security is inextricable from the very idea of the economy, and critically, the perceived legitimacy of arrangements made for its governance – an established discursive context that made possible almost entirely economic arguments for and against independence, which served to obscure the necessarily 'political' underpinnings of what ultimately proved to be a sterile debate.

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Author's Declaration

At no time during the registration for the research degree has the author been registered for any other University award. The author also declares that no work submitted for this research degree at Plymouth University may form part of any other degree either at the University or at another establishment.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Taking the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as the key empirical context, this thesis looks at the way in which the ‘imagined economy’ served to shape the terms of the public debate. The debate revolved almost exclusively around what were termed ‘the economics of independence’ and was characterised by utterances pertaining to the economic threats, vulnerabilities, and insecurities of independence. As will be shown, the presentation of a largely ‘economistic’ case either for or against independence was in part a deliberate ‘strategy’ by key protagonists. Ignoring the fact that the economic implications of independence could never really be ‘known’, such economistic arguments appeared to be practical, utility-based, and non-political. However, said justifications relied fundamentally upon the myth of ‘the economy’.

The economy is imagined insofar as it does not denote an ontological given, but something ideationally or discursively re/constructed. This is not to deny that ‘economies’ have no foundations in reality, just that those foundations are necessarily contingent. Moreover, those foundations are often significantly exaggerated. For instance, we might talk about a UK economy, attempt to measure it, compare its competitiveness with other economies, and over time create an institutional infrastructure (e.g. currency, public finance, international trade rules and regimes, etc.) that helps make it ‘real’, it does not represent an especially coherent entity or ‘system’ within which our lives are especially determined. In fact, it will be shown that this conception of the economy is a pretty modern one. And yet, it will be suggested that the economy is in some respects seen as even more ‘real’ than the state. Whereas the imagined ‘state’ is increasingly recognised as contingent and

constructed, the economy is seen as especially real, as an objective or apolitical spatial-scalar referent that is nevertheless thought to speak to our lived experiences and life chances.

‘Mapping’ all the ways in which the economy, or any given economic space, is discursively constructed is beyond the scope of this thesis, and represents a far broader challenge for approaches looking to better understand and employ the concept. The more modest aim here was to look at one aspect in particular, namely, articulations of economic threats/vulnerabilities/insecurities, and consider their potential role in re/affirming the idea of the economy. In the event, the thesis actually argues that the articulation of economic security is fundamental to the very idea of the economy. Explicitly or implicitly, to talk of the economy is to speak of the lived experiences of those deemed within it, of both their opportunities and vulnerabilities, their security or insecurity. In the case of the Scottish independence referendum, articulations of economic insecurities were central to the terms of debate.

Yet articulations of ‘the economy’ are fundamentally political insofar as they serve, deliberately or not, to convey a space (and populace) as governable, and insofar as it is only really meaningful to talk of ‘the economy’ in correspondence with a political space. Crucially, whilst those for or against independence disagreed on the economic implications of independence, both fundamentally reasserted the exaggerated assumption that economies represent ‘real’ unifying object spaces within which subjects’ economic (in)security is both shared and largely determined. Through a poststructuralist discourse analysis of key texts from the referendum debate, including those from the official, opposing ‘Yes Scotland’ and ‘Better Together’ campaigns, this thesis seeks to challenge this fundamental assumption.

This introductory chapter will begin by setting out what are considered to be the key theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis. It will then give an overview of the thesis to follow, including the key themes dealt with in each of the chapters.

Contributions to Knowledge

This thesis makes a number of theoretical and empirical contributions. One such contribution regards the conceptualisation of economic security, as well as its role in the territorialisation of political space. Economic security is hitherto an under-theorised concept (Buzan *et al.* 1998; Dent 2007; Kahler 2004; Nesadurai 2006). One of the key reasons for this, it is argued, is that economic insecurity is a fundamental feature of modern economic life, and something that is often largely accepted according to dominant (neo)liberal economic reasoning. It is nevertheless important to better understand, for it is argued here that the articulation of economic (in)security is central to the re/imagination of ‘the economy’ as a real spatial-scalar entity, and therefore as something which is a significant determinant of the life-chances of ordinary people.

An ancillary contribution is also made here insofar as this thesis represents a rare example of an analysis of security that more ‘honestly’ assumes the meaning of security to be fundamentally ‘constructed’. Chapter 5 presents a brief critique of the highly influential securitisation thesis (Buzan *et al.* 1998), arguing that whilst the concept is illuminating in many regards, the specific ‘framework’ provided for its application by the so-called Copenhagen School is analytically and normatively

insufficient. Whilst stressing the constitutive role of language in how security is intersubjectively constructed through speech-acts, it leaves little room for recognition of either the broader contextual determinants of securitisation, the inevitable subjugation of other ‘voices’ in the construction of security, or the constitutive role of theorising in said construction (Ciuta 2009; Balzacq 2005; Hansen 2000; McDonald 2008). Whilst other authors have highlighted this, this thesis provides an empirical application of this insight, through a discourse analysis of economic (in)security.

‘The economy’ is a relatively recent invention (Mitchell 1998 & 2006) and remains a largely imaginative abstraction, and yet one that serves to shape political identities and legitimacies within political discourse. This thesis makes a contribution to what is a limited literature on the importance of the imagined economy as a distinct spatial-scalar entity (Rosamond 2002 & 2012; Herrera 2007 & 2010; Tooze 1998). Whilst Rosamond (2002 & 2012) has looked at the importance of the imagined economy for the legitimisation of governance capacities at the supra-state level, no comparable attempt has been made to do so at the sub-state, national level. This thesis also reveals a key (discursive) practice involved in its re/imagination of the economy, namely, the aforementioned articulation of economic (in)security.

Better understanding both economic (in)security and the imagined economy – and their inter-relationship – also highlights a broader contribution to understanding the politics of identity and legitimacy and their role in the shifting of governance capacities within the plurinational (Keating 2004) UK state, where traditional analyses of expressions of national identity are insufficient alone for explaining claims to greater self-determination among sub-state actors (Harvie 2004; Mycock

2012; Soule *et al.* 2012; Ichijo 2012; Leith 2010; Keating 2009), both in the UK and elsewhere. Indeed, there is an important empirical contribution also to understanding what might loosely be referred to as ‘the terms of debate’ on Scottish independence specifically. Throughout the debate it was commonly asserted, albeit only anecdotally, that it hinged almost entirely on the so called ‘economics of independence’. The evidence presented here supports that view, and arguments are presented which help us to understand why this may have been the case.

The economics of independence have similarly been noted to be a key locus of debate regarding other secessionist movements elsewhere in the world, such as in Quebec and Catalonia (Duch *et al.* 2000; Duchesne *et al.* 2003; Howe 2009; Muñoz & Tormose 2015a & 2015b). The conceptual arguments made herein help give some reasoning for why this might have been the case, and why this may well continue to be the case in future constitutional debates in Scotland. They may also have a wider currency given clear similarities with the terms of the debate on Britain’s membership of the EU prior to the referendum in 2016.

Finally, there is a contribution of a methodological and indeed normative nature, with regards the thesis’ highlighting of the hidden politics at play in the legitimization of governance capacities. The ‘critical’ aspirations of poststructuralist discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Howarth 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Phillips & Jørgensen 2004; Torfing 1999; Torfing 2005) encourage efforts of reveal the hidden political implications of discursive practices, based on a fundamental assumption that discourse, or ‘the social’, is necessarily political. This thesis helps to reveal (some of) the ‘hidden politics’ at play in the Scottish independence referendum

debate, and illustrated, more generally, how the ‘politics’ is often ‘removed’ from ‘the politics of identity and legitimacy’.

Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 2 sets out the methodological assumptions underpinning this research. The analytical approach used is underpinned by the ontological and epistemological assumptions of poststructuralist discourse theory, specifically that inspired by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and their successors in the so called ‘Essex School’ of discourse theory (Howarth 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Phillips & Jørgensen 2004; Torfing 1999; Torfing 2005). After outlining the key research questions, Chapter 2 progresses, therefore, with an explication of those assumptions and their methodological implication for the analysis. It is this view of the world as fundamentally mediated by discourse, and meanings and identities as strictly contingent (although often reluctantly so) that sits behind the theoretical and conceptual discussions that run throughout the thesis, shaping the author’s view of concepts such as nation, legitimacy, identity, politics, security, and perhaps most crucially, ‘the economy’. Chapter 2 then describes the empirical materials employed and the techniques used for processing the data gleaned. The remainder of the chapter addresses two additional theoretical considerations stemming from the research methodology employed, namely, the capacity for genuine critique in poststructuralist research of this nature, and the capacity to make claims to external validity (i.e. generalisations) from the findings of such research. These additional considerations are important given the ‘critical’ nature of arguments made and the broad claims to

the wider validity of these arguments for comparable constitutional debates elsewhere. Hopefully, they also rebuff some misconceived criticisms of poststructuralist research.

Chapter 3 is essentially an introduction to the empirical and (overarching) conceptual context of the research. It provides a short historical introduction to contemporary Scottish politics and therefore the broader discursive context for the independence referendum debate. It then sets out the conceptual arguments pertaining to the so called shift from government to governance within which emergent and shifting governance capacities at the sub-state level are bound up. A number of fundamental political concepts are explicated - the state, the nation, identity, legitimacy – along with insights from political geographers pertaining to space, place and territoriality. Whilst the historical context and conceptual insights described provide a crucial background of understanding for the terms of referendum debate, it is argued that those terms of debate also demand a broader appraisal of the politics of identity and legitimacy, namely one which better considers explanations for the predominantly ‘economistic’ focus of that debate, as well as the potential implications for shaping economic identities and the perceived legitimacy of proposed governance arrangements.

Chapter 4 deals with one of the key ideas (or signifiers) featuring in the referendum debate, both in arguments for and against independence: the economy. One of the key research questions laid out in the methodology is ‘*What is the (Scottish) economy?*’ What appears at first to be a very straightforward question is, in fact, anything but straightforward. This is because the term ‘the economy’ is so familiar to us both in

everyday language - as well as that of political elites - that we take it almost entirely for granted and as something significantly representative of economic 'realities'. Chapter 4 explains, however, that 'the economy' is actually a relatively modern conceptual invention (Mitchell 1998 & 2006), and one which remains a largely imaginative abstraction, not nearly as representative of economic realities as the 'acceptedness' of the term would have us believe. This recognition of the fundamentally imagined and taken-for-granted nature of the economy is important for understanding the largely 'economistic' terms of the referendum debate, as well as the implications for shaping political identities and legitimacies.

The predominant focus on the so called 'economics of independence' was noted by commentators at the time, if only anecdotally. Chapter 5 addresses this observation specifically. Drawing on various texts, mainly government documents, speeches, and the reported comments of key protagonists in the mainstream media, efforts to direct the focus of the debate towards 'economistic' arguments is evidenced. These arguments, it is shown, are explicitly conveyed as being more rational, utilitarian, and ultimately better. The implication is that voters can 'know' the right way to vote based upon largely objective rationalisations of economic implications of independence. However, drawing on the insights from Chapter 4 with regards to the imagined economy, it is argued that such arguments are misleading and serve to obscure the taken-for-granted, but necessarily political assumptions underpinning them.

Up until this stage, it will have been noted several times in passing that one of the key 'techniques' through which the economy is imagined is through the articulation of economic vulnerabilities, threats, or insecurities. Just as discourses of 'conventional'

security are thought to have been (and continue to be) key to consolidating the idea and legitimacies of the state (Campbell 1998; Kuus & Agnew 2008), it is argued that economic security is vital in the imagination of the economy - and by extension the legitimacies of the state and/or other governance arrangements. In Chapter 6 this proposition is developed. Given the theoretical ‘baggage’ that comes with the term ‘security’ within academic literature it is necessary to address some of the key conceptual disagreements associated with that term. It is also argued that economic security itself is simultaneously all pervasive in everyday and elite discourse and yet conspicuous by its absence in security literature. Based on the assertion that the meaning of security, like all meaning, is mediated through discursive practice, justification is given for why this might be the case. It will be argued that through an analysis of articulations of economic (in)security, in this case by key protagonists in the Scottish independence referendum debate, it is possible to see how ‘the economy’ and ‘economic (in)security’ are reciprocally re/imagined through discursive practice, and to glean a broader understanding, therefore, of the role of the politics of identity and legitimacy in the shifting of governance capacities within modern multi-level political systems.

Chapters 7 & 8 provide the main body of empirical evidence in support of this latter argument. These two chapters evidence the predominance of utterances of economic (in)security in support of arguments both for and against independence, the specific topics of economic (in)security identified, as well as the comparatively fewer utterances of more ‘conventional’ security concerns in the texts analysed. The reader will note that throughout these two chapters and the thesis generally, that the terms ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ are used to denote those favouring or rejecting

independence respectively. The author is mindful, however, that nationalism and unionism cannot be so easily defined, nor nationalists and unionists so easily separated. Within Chapter 3 it is explained that nationalism is not simply about seeking independent statehood, even though that is precisely what was at stake in this case. In fact, in the case of Scotland there has been a long recognised phenomenon of ‘unionist-nationalism’, since many unionists will consider themselves ardent nationalists too. However, the decision was taken to employ these terms for the purposes of analytical distinction, because they were the ones used within the texts analysed and by key protagonists and other commentators besides. Therefore, based on a thoroughgoing analysis of some 1,200 articles across the opposing ‘*Better Together*’ and ‘*Yes Scotland*’ campaigns, Chapters 7 & 8 present the unionist and nationalist positions in turn, and reveal the specific types of economic (in)security uttered by each. Certain similarities between the two campaigns are noted, and clear differences too, which reveal underlying assumptions about how the economy is imagined and how it ought to be governed.

In light of the findings presented in Chapters 7 & 8, Chapter 9 brings together the key theoretical themes of the thesis. It highlights the importance of articulations of economic (in)security in the imagination of ‘the (Scottish/UK) economy’ and stresses what this means for better understanding the role of the politics of identity and legitimacy within the referendum debate. Building on the observations of previous chapters with regards the different types of economic (in)security articulated, it addresses implications for the different ways in which ‘the economy’ is imagined, both spatially (i.e. with the ‘Scottish’ or ‘UK’ economy as the determining context of shared (in)security) and ideologically (i.e. as something corresponding with an

entirely *material* or at least partly *ethical* ‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003). The last and final section of the chapter reintroduces poststructuralist discourse theory. As stated above, the key ontological and epistemological assumptions of this approach, as laid out in the methodology, sit behind the theoretical and conceptual discussions developed throughout the thesis. However, at this juncture, there is explicit recourse to the intricate grammar of concepts which define the approach to discourse analysis advocated by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and developed by their successors in the ‘Essex School’. Doing so provides an ontological language and conceptual architecture to explain the discursive construction of key signifiers like ‘the economy’ and ‘economic security’. In doing so, it also provides reasoning behind the effective depoliticisation of arguments for and against independence which rely almost entirely on the employment of these signifiers. Essentially, as per the title of the thesis, it provides a plausible account for the ‘hidden politics’ of independence.

Chapter 2: Methodology

This chapter elaborates the methodological assumptions and tools employed in the research. Principally, the thesis is characterised by a methodological commitment to poststructuralist discourse theory. The underpinning ontological and epistemological assumptions of poststructuralist discourse theory are considered especially well suited to the topics of the research, principal among which: the idea (or discourse) of the imagined economy. Moreover, poststructuralist discourse theory provides a number of useful analytical tools for enquiry, which will be outlined below. The adopted methodological apparatus helped to both shape and ultimately answer the core research questions outlined below.

Primary Research Question

1. What role do articulations of economic (in)security play in the Scottish independence referendum debate?

Subsidiary Research Questions

1. What is ‘the (Scottish) economy’?
2. What role do articulations of economic security play in the imagination of ‘the (Scottish) economy’?
3. What are the implications of this for the debate on Scottish independence?

After addressing the core methodology, the chapter will outline the empirical focus of the research and the specific types of data used in the analysis. Finally, the chapter will address two further theoretical considerations. First, the capacity for critique in discourse theory research, and second, the capacity for external validity in discourse theory research and interpretive research more broadly.

Discourse Theory/Analysis

The type of discourse theory employed here stems principally from the insights of Laclau and Mouffe as laid out in their seminal 1985 text *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. Various thoroughgoing contributions explain the core assumptions of their theory in more detail than can be done here (Torfing 1999; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Howarth 2000; Phillips & Jørgensen 2004) but it is still important to give a brief overview. So, what is discourse, and what are discourses? Discourse from the point of view of poststructuralists like Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe is essentially synonymous with how other social constructionists perceive ‘the social’ (this is different to other discourse analysis approaches, notably Critical Discourse Analysis – see below). It is the universal background of meaning that mediates our experience of the world. There is, to all intents and purposes, no reality for us external to discourse. In the words of Derrida, ‘[t]here is nothing outside the text’ (1976, p. 158, emphasis in the original). This does not however mean that there is no world external to thought as idealists would suggest. Rather what is denied is that that world could be understood outside of discourse (Laclau & Mouffe 1985 cited Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, p. 3).

Discourse is populated by discourses. These are the historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects (Foucault 1972). They are the specific 'systems of signification' that construct social reality (Milliken 1999, p. 229). Moreover, discourses are intrinsically political and inevitably involve the exercise of power, for their constitution necessarily involves the exclusion of other interpretations and meanings. However, discourses are consequently contingent because they are 'always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production' (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, p. 4). Howarth and Stavrakakis explain that 'discourse theory investigates the way in which social practices articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality' (2000, p. 3). Importantly discourses can be problematised and destabilised by illuminating their intrinsic contradictions. The approach used to do this is discourse analysis.

Discourse analysis can be defined as 'the process of analysing significant practices as discursive forms' (Howarth 2000, p. 10). This can be done using a wide range of both linguistic and non-linguistic forms of data including speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, and ideas, which are treated as 'texts' (Howarth 2000, p. 10). Importantly, critical/emancipatory approaches that share this assumption have a normative commitment to highlighting how certain texts are 'depoliticised' by essentialist, exclusionary discourses. This thesis explicitly adopts such a 'critical' position in the analysis of nationalist and unionist 'texts' from the Scottish independence referendum debate, with the aim of highlighting that which is taken-for-granted therein, and the implications for the effective 'depoliticisation' of the referendum debate.

Poststructuralist discourse theory has its genesis in Saussurean structural linguistics. Saussure emphasised the relationships within which things are placed in sign systems, relations by which one object is distinguished from another in the system (Milliken 1999, p. 229). Essentially things acquire meaning through the systems of signification in which they are situated. Within such systems, all meaning is relational i.e. things acquire their meaning by virtue of their relationship with what other things mean. However, whereas Saussure conceived of such systems or structures as rigid, poststructuralists such as Derrida recognised that they are conditioned by history and culture and are thus contingent. Poststructuralist discourse theory employs a strictly anti-essentialist ontology and anti-foundationalist epistemology and thus, following Derrida, argues 'there is no pre-given, self-determining essence that is capable of determining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and totalizing structure' (Torfing 2005, p. 13). Torfing explains that there have been numerous attempts to 'explain the course of history, the structure of society, and the identities of subjects and objects by reference to an underlying essence...[and] God, Reason, Humanity, Nature, and the Iron Laws of Capitalism and are some of the celebrated candidates for this transcendental determining centre' (2005, p. 13). It is just such a transcendental centre, or underlying essence, that discourse theory abandons. We can therefore restate a definition of a discourse as 'a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated' (Torfing 1999, p. 85). But the consequence is not a completely fluid picture of social reality, as is the common criticism levelled against such social constructionist approaches. As Torfing stresses, employing the vocabulary of Laclau and Mouffe, 'The result is not total chaos and flux, but playful determination of social meanings and identities within a relational system which is

provisionally anchored in nodal points that are capable of partially fixing a series of floating signifiers' (2005, p. 13). If all social meaning and identity is fluid in principle, the reality is that they often tend to be rather viscous in practice.

Torfinn states that 'Within discourse, meaning is constructed either in terms of difference or equivalence...; Most often, meaning is constructed both through the assertion of difference and the articulation of chains of equivalence' (2005, p. 14). Through an analysis of various texts it should be possible to discern such 'chains of equivalence' whereby certain key signifiers are invested with meaning by being linked to other signifiers. That is, we can see how through acts of articulation, elements become moments in a given discourse (see below). As Philips and Jørgensen explain, '[w]hat the key signifiers have in common is that they are empty signs: that is, they mean almost nothing by themselves until, through chains of equivalence they are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning' (2004, p. 50). For example, liberal democracy only acquires its meaning by being combined with other signifiers such as 'free elections' and 'free speech' (Philips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 50). Similarly, economic (in)security only acquires meaning through association with specific types of insecurity and particular understandings of 'the economic'.

In the absence of an 'ultimate centre that is capable of invoking a totalizing discursive closure...tentially empty signifiers will tend to function as nodal points for the partial fixation of meaning' (Torfinn 2005, p. 14). Furthermore given that a discursive system cannot be constructed by reference to an inner essence, we must look for that which is necessarily excluded by a given discourse - its 'constitutive outside' - in

order to account for the limits of said discourse (Torfing 2005, p. 15). It is the existence of this constitutive outside that necessarily gives rise to social antagonisms. Thus this process of ‘othering’ simultaneously helps to stabilise a discursive system while giving rise to a ‘radical other’ that threatens it. However, Torfing (2005, p. 16) explains that the line separating the friendly inside from the threatening outside is never fixed and the everlasting struggle over who and what is included/excluded from certain discourses is fundamental to politics. As such, where there are conflicts across articulations we can ask ‘What different understandings of reality are at stake...?’ (Philips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 51).

We can now reiterate some of these points in a more concise fashion by further explicating the grammar of concepts afforded us by Laclau and Mouffe. *Moments* are all the signs situated within a discourse. A discourse is formed by the partial fixation of meaning around a *nodal point*, which is a privileged sign around which other signs (moments) are ordered. As we have already said, signs are fixed by the *exclusion* of all other meanings that they could have had. The consequent *surplus of meaning* excluded by a discourse is what Laclau and Mouffe call the ‘field of discursivity’. *Elements*, therefore, are those signs whose meaning has not yet been fixed into moments. Discourses are re/produced through the practice of *articulation*, thus it is through articulation that elements are turned into moments. We can now bring together these ideas neatly in the words of Laclau and Mouffe themselves.

‘[W]e will call *articulation* any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we call *discourse*. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call *moments*. By contrast, we will call *element* any difference that is not discursively articulated’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 105).

An important point is that while discourses attempt to create *closure* - to produce a 'totality' – by turning elements into moments, '[t]he transition from the "elements" to the "moments" is never entirely fulfilled' (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 110). This is because the fixity of meaning that a discourse produces is always in danger of being undermined by the other potential meanings that it excludes; thus 'all moments stay potentially polysemic...[they] are always potentially elements' (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 29). Hence, as we have already stated discourses are not fixed; they are necessarily contingent.

It is this very contingency that points to the primacy of politics. For as Torfing explains, '*Discourse* is defined as a relational ensemble of signifying sequences; but if the relational and differential logic prevailed without any limitation or rupture, there would be no room for politics' (1999, p. 91). The usage of the term politics from the point of view of discourse theory is rather more fundamental than its usage in common parlance. As Phillips and Jørgensen (2004) explain, it is not used in the narrow sense to refer to say party politics, but it instead refers to the way in which the social is constituted in a manner necessarily involving exclusion.

'Politics, then, is not just a surface that reflects a deeper social reality; rather, it is the social organisation that is the outcome of continuous political processes' (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 36).

The concepts of objectivity, hegemony and antagonism need addressing here.

Objectivity refers to those discourses that become so sedimented, so naturalised, that their contingency becomes forgotten, they appear apolitical; they are taken for granted, seen as 'common sense'. To all intents and purposes they appear to represent truths. Yet, however unlikely their contestation might seem, such sedimented discourses are necessarily contingent (due to their vulnerability from

that which they necessarily exclude), and, can ‘at any time, enter the play of politics and be problematized in new articulations’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p.

36). Phillips and Jørgensen (2004, p. 36) state that ‘*hegemony* comes between ‘objectivity’ and ‘the political’’. It refers to instances whereby articulations re/produce dominant or hegemonic discourses.

‘Articulations that manage to provide a credible principle upon which to read past, present and future events, and capture people’s hearts and minds, become hegemonic’ (Torfing 2005, p. 15).

However, Torfing (1999, p. 101) explains how such articulations - given that they necessarily include an element of force and repression in the negation of alternative meanings, or alternative identities - take place within a political terrain of power and resistance, inevitably giving rise to social antagonism. In sum,

‘[I]f we put all of this together we can define hegemony as the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context criss-crossed by antagonistic forces’ (Torfing 1999, p. 101).

Another discourse theory concept that needs to be outlined here, which also features in the empirical component of this thesis, is floating signifiers.

Floating signifiers help us to better understand antagonism and hegemony. More specifically they help us see how different discourses struggle over the ascription of meaning to certain key signifiers. Crucially, floating signifiers differ to empty signifiers outlined above.

‘...[G]eneral equivalents can be either empty signifiers or floating signifiers. Their status depends on whether the conditions are stable (normal or ‘the social’) or relatively unstable (‘the political’). General equivalents in the former are empty signifiers where as in the latter they resemble ‘floating signifiers’. Floating signifiers are general equivalents that have multiple

meanings because actors grounded in multiple discourses are seeking to hegemonise their meaning during a period of dislocation' (Jeffares 2007, pp. 58-59).

Defined simply, a floating signifier is 'a signifier that is overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within different discourses' (Torfing, 1999, p. 301). It is not uncommon of course for certain terms to have completely different meanings. This is a consequence of the Derriderian arbitrariness of the sign (there is no *necessary* relationship between signifier and signified) and the consequent unfixity of all meaning. But Laclau shows us that a distinction needs to be made between instances of *equivocality* and those of *radical ambiguity*.

'For example, when I say "down the hill" or "the soft down on his cheek: the term down is equivocal: its meaning varies in relation to different contexts, although in each context its meaning is perfectly clear. On the other hand, if I speak about "democracy" in the political context of Western Europe during the cold war years, the ambiguity of the term proceeds from the context itself, which is constituted to some extent by the simultaneous presence of communist and anticommunist discourses. The term, therefore, is radically ambiguous and not simply polysemous. It is not a matter of its meaning one thing in communist discourse and another in anticommunist discourse; this, of course, may happen, but if that were the sole distinguishing circumstance, we would be left with a plurality of perfectly well-defined contexts and, consequently, with a case of simple equivocalness. Something very different, however, takes place: since both discourses are antagonistic and yet operate largely in the same argumentative context, there is a loosening of the relational systems that constitute the identity of the term. Thus, the term becomes a floating signifier' (Laclau, 1988, pp. 70-71).

'Floating signifiers are the signs that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning in their own particular way. Nodal points are floating signifiers, but whereas the term 'nodal point' refers to a crystallisation within a specific discourse, the term 'floating signifier' belongs to the ongoing struggle between different discourses to fix the meaning of important signs. The 'body' is thus a nodal point in medical discourse, and a floating signifier in the struggle between medical discourse and alternative treatment discourses' (Phillips and Jørgensen 2004, pp. 28-29).

In sum, floating signifiers help us to see ‘[w]hat different understandings of reality are at stake, [and where they are] in antagonistic opposition to one another’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 51).

The above grammar of concepts helps to make sense of how meanings within discourse are re/configured. Within discourse theory the social practices which orchestrate this re/configuration are referred to as articulations. The concept of articulation accounts for the necessarily performative nature of discursive practice, where what is ‘said’ through discourse necessarily has an impact – however minute – on the social and political world. Put very simply, discursive approaches recognise the performativity of language; to say something is to do something. Speech act theory stresses the capacity of speech and communication not simply to communicate but rather to act or consummate an action, or to construct and perform an identity (see Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Butler (1988) famously built on the notion of the speech act by exploring the ways in which linguistic constructions serve to create our reality *in general* through the speech acts we participate in every day. Focusing specifically on ‘gender acts’, Butler stresses how in the act of performing the conventions of reality, and by embodying certain fictions (e.g. regarding gender) in our actions, we make those artificial conventions appear to be natural and necessary.

However, as stressed in the critique of the securitisation framework in Chapter 6 - according to which security can be understood through an analysis of speech acts – it is vitally important to not only consider the performativity of the utterance, but also to recognise that the utterance itself would be meaningless were it removed from its essential discursive context. In other words, acts of communication are both shaped

by and help to shape their discursive context. Importantly, unlike other approaches to discourse theory (e.g. Critical Discourse Analysis), Laclau and Mouffe do not make an ontological distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena as components of discourse (see below). As such, the concept of articulation can actually account for all sorts of other social practices as well as simply the linguistic practices which might be assumed from the expression ‘acts of communication’. This is consonant with the assumption that all the world is mediated through discourse, or in Derrida’s terms, ‘[t]here is nothing outside the text’ (1976, p. 158, emphasis in the original). It is nevertheless the case, as explained below, that analyses conducted for the purposes of this thesis were of linguistic phenomena, specifically ‘concrete’ texts, including speeches, news articles and policy documents. In any event, as with textual utterances more narrowly defined, articulations should be viewed as both conditioned by and serving to condition the social and political world.

Weldes provides a useful description of articulation as referring to the construction of discursive objects and relationships out of ‘cultural raw materials’ and ‘linguistic resources’ that already make sense within a particular society (1999, p. 154). In combining and recombining extant cultural materials, and in repeating successful combinations, ‘contingent and contextually specific representations of the world’ can be forged that ‘come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, to be an accurate description of reality’ (Weldes 1999, pp. 154-155). It is through an ensemble of articulatory practices that the identity of objects and subjects is re/configured in discursive practice. As such, objects and subjects are necessarily positioned, and performed, within a discursive context.

The name given to the process through which subjects are ‘hailed into’ (Althusser 1971, p. 174) subject positions through certain discursive formations, and come to recognise the representations of ‘reality’ purported therein, is ‘interpellation’. As Weldes stresses, ‘Once they identify with these subject-positions, the representations make sense to them and the power relations and interests entailed in them are naturalized. As a result, the representations appear to be common sense, to reflect ‘the way the world really is’ (1996, p. 287). Moreover, subjects necessarily ‘speak’ (or ‘articulate’) from within a given discursive context, having different discourses (some more hegemonically determined than others) available to them, and of course they themselves play a part (some more powerfully than others) in shaping that discursive context through acts of re/articulation. However, those subjects may find that in certain contexts they are ‘overdetermined’ where their identities clash (Laclau stresses that subjects are always overdetermined given the impossibility of fixity) and find they have to ‘choose’ between those different subject positions (e.g. when voting one may have to choose between being an environmentalist, a social democrat, and feminist, or a pacifist, depending on the espoused ideals and proposed policies of those for whom they are voting). As will be shown in later chapters, there were clear instances of such overdetermination of the subject within texts from the independence referendum debate. Ultimately, this relationship between discourse and identity, and the consonant implications for what is or is not considered a legitimate view of social reality, has fundamental implications for understanding the politics of identity and legitimacy. As such, this poststructuralist view of identity construction runs like a red thread throughout the thesis.

Contrary to what is commonly assumed about discursive approaches, articulation need not necessarily refer simply to that which is spoken, or even that which is written. As Laclau and Mouffe stated, an articulation is ‘*any practice* establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’ (1985, p. 105 emphasis added). Indeed, articulation can refer to any type of social practice, irrespective of how menial they might appear at a superficial level. Crucially, both ‘linguistic’ and ‘non-linguistic’ phenomena are instances of discourse and both serve an articulatory purpose that shapes discursive reality, consonant with Derrida’s claim that ‘[t]*here is nothing outside the text*’ (1976, p. 158, emphasis in the original). Indeed, as Howarth points out, the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic data is ‘pragmatic, rather than ontological’ (2004, p. 335). This clearly differs to the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Norman Fairclough for instance, who, when describing his approach, explains that ‘There is a major contrast here between textually- (and therefore linguistically-) oriented discourse analysis (henceforth abbreviated as TODA) such as mine, and Foucault’s more abstract approach’ (Fairclough 1994, p. 37).

Nevertheless, it is the case that the analysis here is based principally on concrete instances of spoken and written language (the aforementioned linguistic phenomena). It is however commonly assumed that poststructuralists are not interested in such things and tend to shy away from any allusion to the sort of methodologism that characterises other approaches focusing on discourse. Fairclough explains that ‘whereas the analysis of spoken and written language texts is a central part of TODA, it is not part of Foucault’s discourse analysis’ (1994, p. 38). On the contrary however, many discourse analyses employing the insights

of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory do study written and spoken texts. As Phillips and Jørgensen explain, Laclau and Mouffe 'do not supply concrete methods for analysis, but a range of analytical focus-points can be extrapolated from their model' (2004, p. 165). Indeed, far from being an exercise in navel-gazing, discourse theory provides us with significant analytical tools that can help us to make sense of the empirical world (Milliken 1999; Howarth 2005). These analytical focus points comprise the grammar of concepts such as chains of equivalence/difference, hegemony, antagonism, nodal points, floating signifiers, articulation, etc. as set out above. Nevertheless, it is still possible to employ other concepts and methods from other more linguistically oriented approaches to discourse analysis, such as Fairclough's CDA, while still remaining faithful to the ontological assumptions of a more poststructuralist discourse theory. In fact, doing so can help demonstrate the practical utility of discourse theory, which is something that many critics of poststructuralism incorrectly refute.

Another concept commonly employed by discourse analysts is intertextuality, which refers to 'cases where one oral or written text directly or indirectly quotes another text or alludes to another text in yet more subtle ways' (Paul Gee 2014, p.

61). Fairclough says of intertextuality that it is

'how the 'outside' of a text is brought into the text, as we might put it...how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts. It is also partly a matter of the assumptions and presuppositions people make when they speak or write. What is 'said' in a text is always said against the background of what is 'unsaid' — what is made explicit is always grounded in what is left implicit' (Fairclough 2003, p. 17).

'Intertextuality refers to the condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events' (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 73).

Although both essentially describe the same broad phenomenon, a useful distinction is often made between intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Intertextuality broadly refers to links between ‘texts’, but this can be specific concrete texts, like speeches, reports, news articles, etc., or indeed to ‘grander’ texts, which we might otherwise call narratives, or discourses. Interdiscursivity is often used to refer specifically to the later, ‘when different discourses and genres are articulated together in a communicative event’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 73). Phillips and Jørgensen explain, therefore, that ‘Interdiscursivity is a form of intertextuality’ (2004, p. 73). In Chapters 7 & 8 instances of both intertextuality and interdiscursivity are highlighted in the materials analysed from Scottish independence referendum.

An important concept related to intertextuality that Fairclough discusses is dialogicality, which refers to the way in which different ‘voices’ can be interpreted from a given text. Dialogicality can apply to both ‘types’ of intertextuality described above, but I think it is particularly useful with regards the latter (i.e. interdiscursivity), insofar as it can address the extent to which different discourses can (and must) be implicated through given texts. He stresses for instance that one important difference between intertextuality and assumption is that intertextuality illuminates the dialogicality of a text, ‘the dialogue between the voice of the author of a text and other voices’, while assumption does not, since it ‘assumes common ground’ (Fairclough 2003, p. 41). Fairclough argues that all texts are dialogical, to the extent that other ‘voices’ are always implicated by a text, however, they differ with regards the extent to which those other voices are made obvious. Such instances of dialogicality are revealed in the analysis. Fairclough points out how Laclau and Mouffe build on the Gramscian view that politics is essentially a

struggle for hegemony based on the understanding that power is exercised through consent, not mere coercion. In the language of discourse theory we might say that various discourses aim to assert themselves as *the* representations of reality. But as we have already seen, such discourses can only ever be contingent since they are vulnerable to that which they necessarily exclude, and thus we must ask, what versions of reality are at stake in any given text? Drawing on Butler *et al* (2000), Fairclough stresses how ‘The hegemonic struggle between political forces can be seen as partly a contention over the claims of their particular visions and representations of the world to having a universal status’ (2003, p. 45). By way of illustration, Fairclough uses a European Union text in which globalisation, in particular global economic change along neoliberal lines, is seen as an inevitable development distinct from human agency (2003, p. 45). Dialogicality is in this instance reduced, and done so in a manner that obscures the fact that the version of reality purported therein is but one of many possible versions. As such it works to obscure the political or ideological nature of all social practice and with it the inescapable contingency of the social. On a more practical note, it is worth pointing out that different types of documents will likely differ in the extent to which dialogicality is apparent in them. With policy documents for instance it is often that case that dialogicality will be less explicit. Paul Gee states that ‘Research, when it is mentioned, tends to speak with one voice and a voice that supports the policy in the policy document’ (Paul Gee 2014, p. 48).

Whilst some of the concepts outlined above are drawn upon throughout the thesis, some are not returned to fully until the Conclusion. However, for the most part, Laclau & Mouffe’s grammar of concepts effectively sits behind the thesis, informing

the ontological and methodological lens through which observations are made throughout. As such, the reader need not be intimately familiar with discourse theory to make sense of said observations per se, providing they are at least familiar with the assumptions of poststructuralism broadly defined; specifically, but not exclusively, that reality is indeterminable other than through discourse, and that all discourse is inevitably 'political'.

Collection of Empirical Data

For this research a triangulation of methods was used. Hewson defines triangulation as 'a research strategy that involves approaching a research question from two or more angles in order to converge and cross-validate findings from a number of sources' (2006, p. 180). Denzin distinguishes between 'within-methods triangulation', where either multiple quantitative or qualitative methods are used, and 'between-methods triangulation', where a mixture of each is used (Denzin 1978 cited in Gray 2009, p. 205). The latter type of research is commonly known as 'mixed methods' and has a number of benefits for particular types of research questions.

However, mixed methods research is not suitable in many cases where a single approach, either quantitative or qualitative, is all that is needed. Ultimately, at the end of a mixed methods research project the end product should exceed the sum of its constitutive quantitative and qualitative parts (Bryman 2007). Indeed, while quantitative methods are not necessarily incommensurable with the epistemological and ontological assumptions of this research, they were not suitable for this research. Here a 'within-method' or 'multi-method' approach was used to glean data.

Interviews were conducted at the Scottish Parliament with a number of Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) from a cross section of political parties during November 2012. Interviews were semi-structured (or semi-standardised) to offer flexibility, but also a certain level of standardisation. An initial pool of respondents was identified and contacted, after which 'snowball sampling' was used, whereby a respondent interviewed was asked to identify further potential respondents to be approached. Besides more obviously helping to identify appropriate respondents, such a practice successfully lead to respondents acting as 'gatekeepers', facilitating access to other respondents. Respondents were afforded informed consent; they were briefed on the nature of research and the interview process, and given the right to withdraw at any stage should they wish. However, given the non-sensitive nature of the questioning this was not to be a problem. Interviews were recorded using a voice-recorder, and accompanying hand-written notes were taken. Interviews lasted approximately forty-five minutes to one hour. In total, 14 interviews were conducted, not all of which produced material that has been used as extracts in the body of the thesis. This was felt to be sufficient at this early, exploratory stage of the research process. Interviews were useful for uncovering MSP's opinions regarding the independence referendum and their different understandings of economic security. They were also very useful for helping to determine the discursive context within which those views are articulated. At the time the intention was to return at a later date for further interviews. However, as research progressed it became clear that other types of data from publicly consumed texts such as speeches, policy documents and manifestos, press releases and media reports, would be more meaningful for answering the research questions given that they could be considered to command greater performative significance.

The issue of performative significance is important given that a guiding assumption of a discourse theoretic approach is discourse's productivity. One could question whether or not what is uttered in the relatively private setting of an interview can be treated as significantly performative. In response to this one might argue that as far as the respondent is concerned they are still 'performing' when taking part in an interview research because as far as they are concerned the findings will be publicly disseminated and consumed. In fact, whilst the context may not be quite the same as if they were giving a public speech to a large audience, carried on popular media platforms, what they were able to meaningfully say would have been delimited by their discursive situatedness and thus indicative of it. Hansen and Sørensen explain that through interviews 'knowledge is obtained about the ways individuals in different positions within a given discursive structure construct meaning and identity – and thus knowledge – about themselves and the other actors, and how and where they draw discursive patterns of inclusion and exclusion' (2005, p. 99). However, the other data sources used were considered more useful, not least because of their assumed performative significance.

In addition to published government documents, of particular use were the online materials of the opposing Better Together and Yes Scotland campaigns in the referendum debate. The campaigns' respective websites re-published speeches by key protagonists, as well as media reports and government press releases, and various other publicly consumed materials in support of their cases either for or against independence. These materials are a particularly useful gauge of the terms of the debate as they represent managed collections of articles including text from key

speeches, documents and reports, along with editorials, blogs, etc. In total, approximately 1,200 such texts were ‘read’ for the purposes of this analysis¹. A basic content analysis was used for the purposes of processing these ‘texts’ in particular, the detail of which are elaborated upon in Chapter 7.

Online news media resources (principally from the BBC) were also used extensively, not for opinions or as substantiating evidence in themselves, but for direct quotes from key protagonists in the debate. It was judged often to be more meaningful to access this data from these sources as they were clearly in the public domain and would have been widely consumed, and therefore, could be thought to command greater performative significance in the debate and in shaping public opinion. The timeframe for data used in the analysis was from the summer of 2012 up until the referendum on Scottish independence in September 2014. Details of these online materials are elaborated upon in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, and are listed in full in the Appendices.

To manage the data, computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) was used, specifically the programme NVivo. Perhaps the main advantage of using CAQDAS is it allows one to store vast amounts of data of various formats (text, audio, images, videos) in one place. One other basic, but nonetheless very useful function it has, is to allow the analyst to run text search queries, thus enabling one to navigate through the data and potentially find analogous information. It also has the

¹ Full lists of titles and information on accessing full articles can be found in the appendices. Full articles were not inserted in the appendices as they would have run to several thousand pages.

significant advantage of making the process of coding such data easier, faster, more flexible and virtually limitless. Put simply by Miles and Huberman,

‘Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. Codes usually are attached to ‘chunks’ of varying size-words, phrases, sentences, or whole paragraphs’ (Miles & Huberman 1994, p. 56).

From the point of view of discourse analysis, being able to assign codes to chunks of text was useful for highlighting important signifiers and relationships. Coding was particularly useful for gleaning the data used in Chapter 7 pertaining to the different types of economic (in)security uttered by nationalist and unionists in the referendum debate. Coding qualitative data is traditionally a very laborious and time-consuming process, but with the advent of software like NVivo this is less the case (Gray 2009, pp. 518-521). Moreover, unlike with a filing cabinet of data, CAQDAS allows you to jump from coded data to its context and back again almost instantaneously (Richards & Morse 2007, p. 149) making the process of analysis both easier and more thorough.

Additional Theoretical Considerations

A Capacity for Critique?

Given the poststructuralist conception of truth, what is the capacity for critique and normative conviction in discourse theoretic research? Torfing states that ‘Truth is always local and flexible, as it is conditioned by a discursive truth regime which specifies the criteria for judging something to be true or false’ (2005, pp. 13-14). But does this mean that there can be no conception at all of what is true, right or good?

And if so, what are the implications of this for knowledge production, and for normatively driven critique? Phillips and Jørgensen (2004) engage excellently with questions such as these in a chapter dedicated to understanding the potential for critique in light of the premises of social constructionism. They explain how ideology critique has its roots in Marx and the Frankfurt School, and the idea that critique ‘should undermine power by revealing the reality behind ideology’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 179). People can be seen therefore to suffer from a ‘false consciousness’ whereby they are blinded from how things really are by ideology.

But Norval explains how in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* Laclau and Mouffe critique the essentialism (specifically the class determinism) at the heart of the Marxist conception of ideology by rejecting the view of society as a ‘given’ object of analysis, and stress ‘that society is traversed by antagonism and that it lacks an essence since it is an overdetermined and precarious unity resulting from discursive, articulatory practices’ (Norval 2000, p. 328). Thus, against a more traditional ideology critique that ‘aims to unmask power with truth’ (Phillips and Jørgensen 2004, p. 179), a discourse theory approach raises various objections. For one, it contests that there is a truth behind the various discourses through which we experience the world and to which the researcher has privileged access, and, also, that this truth can somehow be free from power. There is in fact no extra-discursive reality to which we have access, nor – as Foucault among others has shown us – can there be a conception of truth as divorced from power. Thus, when we say that hegemonic articulations (as discussed above) always comprise an element of ideological totalization (Laclau 1996 cited in Torfing 2005, p. 15) we employ a modified conception of ideology. No longer can it be understood as a distorted

representation of an immutable, objective reality, but as obscuring the necessary undecidability of all social identity (Torfing 2005, p. 15). However, it might seem to follow from this that there is no longer any room for critique, for if all representations are ideological how can we positively say what is true, right or good?

Norval (2000) stresses how some have asked in light of the ‘linguistic turn’ fundamentally challenging the idea of absolute truths and absolute falsities whether we should abandon the concept of ideology from our analyses altogether. However, rather than abandoning it, and thus assuming that we live in a non-ideological world, many contemporary approaches, including those drawing on the insights of Laclau and Mouffe, have chosen to stress the very ubiquity of discourse (Norval 2000). Of course the problem that arises is one of relativism. However, the fact that all truths are discursive constructions and thus fundamentally contingent does not dispose discourse theory to the sort of nihilistic relativism that many critics of poststructuralism suggest, whereby ‘it is impossible to defend any particular set of claims about what is true right or good’ (Torfing 2005, pp. 18-19). In fact, since we are never divorced from discourse we are never in a position where we can contend that all claims are equally valid or just.

‘God is the only entity capable of rising above the historically contingent discourses and viewing all the competing truth regimes and ethical standards as equally valid. We mortals are tied to a particular discursive framework within which we define and negotiate our criteria for accepting something as true, right, or good’ (Torfing 2005, p. 19).

Contrary to what the critics say then, poststructuralist discourse theory stands opposed to the very nihilistic relativism it is accused of inspiring. Just as there can be no extra-discursive position from which to determine what is *really* true, right, or good, there

can be no similar position from which to consider all claims to the latter as equally valid. Therefore, Phillips and Jørgensen state ‘if critique is understood in a broad sense as the proposal of one understanding of the world at the expense of other possible understandings, we do not think that one can avoid being critical at all’ (2004, p. 204). The assertion that knowledge is always political means ‘one can neither present the absolute truth nor completely avoid saying something’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 206). As researchers we ought to take responsibility for the fact that we are saying something about the world that has consequences, while being mindful that ‘other representations cannot be rejected on the grounds that researchers have privileged access to truth’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 205). Furthermore, in addition to accusations of nihilistic relativism, the anti-essentialism of poststructuralist discourse theory, some argue, results in an essentialist statement of its own, namely, that the world is devoid of essence. However, as Torfing (2005, p. 21) points out, this supposed paradox is based on ‘a fallacy of equivocation’.

‘when discourse theorists claim there is no essence they take issue with the metaphysical idea of a positively defined essence that is given in and by itself and from which it is possible to derive a whole series of determinate effects. Now, for the claim that there is no such essence to be an essentialist stipulation it requires that the affirmation of the absence of a deep ground of social identities produces a series of determinate effects. This requirement is exactly what is not fulfilled’ (Torfing 2005, p. 21).

Thus, this fallacy of equivocation is based on two very different understandings of the ‘essence’.

A Capacity for External Validity?

Something rarely addressed in qualitative work of this sort is the issue of generalisation. However this need not, and perhaps ought not, be the case (Williams 2000a; 2000b; Payne & Williams 2005). Generalisation pertains to the external validity of research findings; ‘A concern with the question of whether the results of a study can be generalized beyond the specific research context in which they were generated’ (Bryman & Teevan 2005, p. 383). Clearly deterministic generalisations are not possible in the social world. The fundamentally constructed and interpretative nature of social phenomena makes such generalisations impossible. However, even if possible in principle, they certainly are not in practice, as indeed is the case with most natural sciences where one is dealing with complex and open systems e.g. geology, oceanography, biology, etc. Furthermore, interpretive research does not lend itself to the sort of statistical, probabilistic generalisations found in much quantitative survey work either. In such research generalisation is a guiding rationale, given the need to generalise from sample to population. However, it is a strategy predicated upon large samples of easily quantifiable data that qualitative researchers cannot replicate, since, after all, their aim is to look at fewer, or even a single case, in much greater depth (Seale 1999, p. 107). Consequently there is often seen to be a ‘trade-off’ between external validity and internal validity, the latter being facilitated through ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) that quantitative researchers cannot replicate. However, despite the scope for generalisation obviously being restricted in interpretative research, it need not, as some commentators have argued (Denzin 1983; Guba & Lincoln 1982; Seale 1999), be precluded altogether.

Indeed, despite the fundamentally constructed and interpretive nature of the social and political world it is still perfectly reasonable to assume that there will be similarities between interpretations, for everyday life depends on the existence of such regularities. Where Marsh and Stoker deal with the question of generalisability in interpretive research they stress that 'it is rarely the case that a sample of interviewees is so unrepresentative or the interpretations so misleading that suggestion about the wider incidence of certain phenomena is wholly specious' (2002, p. 207). From the point of view of discourse theory the constructed and contingent nature of social and political world does not preclude cautious explanations and generalisations for the reality is that such constructions, while contingent in principle, tend to be rigid and stubborn in practice, and while different cases represent unique contexts the fact remains that there are often regularities and resemblances across cases. As Phillips and Jørgensen stress, 'even if *in principle* everything can be different, it does not mean that everything is in flux or that change is necessarily easy' (2004, p. 54). It can be argued that an intermediate and limited form of generalisation, called 'moderatum generalisation' is in principle possible, albeit with inescapable limitations (Williams 2000a; 2000b; Payne & Williams 2005). Williams explains that moderatum generalisations, 'in their simplest form are the basis of inductive reasoning...; they are the generalisations of everyday life' (2000b, p. 215). But, just as with the aforementioned generalisations, they are 'testable propositions that might be confirmed or refuted through further evidence' (Payne & Williams 2005, p. 297). Moderatum generalisations are considered to be moderated in two senses; first, in terms of the scope of what is claimed they are moderated (given inescapable limitations) and second, they are moderately held (given the contingent and temporally specific nature of social phenomena).

While it is worth noting that generalisation is not always an important consideration for research such as this, it is nevertheless the case that it usually is, if only implicitly, for ‘there is little point in conducting research studies whose significance cannot extend beyond their local context’ (Seale 1999, p. 41). Moreover there are instances where it is crucial to assess the external validity of research, for example when formulating public policy or legislation it is necessary to ask whether findings are authentic enough to be acted upon (Lincoln & Guba 2000, p. 178). Indeed interpretative researchers do make generalisations either knowingly or unknowingly when they hope ‘to persuade us that there is something to be learned from that situation that has a wider currency’ (Williams 1998, p. 8). After conducting an analysis of a single volume of the journal ‘Sociology’, Payne and Williams (2005) discovered that whilst the issue of generalisation was barely dealt with in the thirty-eight articles, the seventeen empirically based qualitative articles all made generalisations of some sort. They stress that whilst generalisation is clearly central to social research ‘avoiding the question [of generalisation] is apparently a legitimate practice under contemporary canons of academic publishing in sociology’ (Payne & Williams 2005, p. 299). They thus advocate the explicit consideration of generalisation in interpretative research from the stage of research design onwards; they stress that ‘moderating generalization does not reduce the importance of internal validity, but rather adds an emphasis to external validity’ (Payne & Williams 2005, p. 310). Moreover, being explicit about claims to validity will put readers in an arguably better position to judge the research for themselves.

These considerations are pertinent to instances throughout the thesis where insights are drawn from and comparisons are made between the imagined Scottish economy,

and imagined economies elsewhere and at other scales, such as the Welsh economy or the European economy. It is the same set of assumptions that sit behind comparative case study research. Howarth highlights this in his discussion of the use of comparative case study research in the application of discourse theory (see Howarth 2005, pp. 332-335).

‘[T]he practice of comparison needs to be related to the practice of interpreting problematized phenomena. This means that a comparative perspective in discourse theory has to be detached from purely positivistic and quantitative stances’ (Howarth 2005, p. 332)

For this research, the case study used clearly represents a unique context and set of circumstances. I could simply say that generalisation from this are impossible and thus should be avoided. The alternative, as discussed above, would usually be to point out that I am instead interested in them as individual cases; with their ‘thick description’, or internal validity. But it is still possible to meaningfully compare and contrast with other cases - as is the case with most research in the interpretive tradition – in the hope of saying something about the wider significance of my findings based on the assumption that there are discernible regularities in the social world. Again, Howarth is useful here.

‘Even though we are interested in why and how one set of patterns exist rather than another, comparative research in discourse theory does not involve the comparison of identical practices or institutions which are treated as purely equivalent units. Instead we compare practices and objects which share certain *family resemblances, rather than essences*. It is for this reason that the interpretation of particular phenomena necessarily precedes the comparative dimension’ (Howarth 2005, p. 334, emphasis added).

Ultimately, whilst the data presented here are not vast, the aim is nevertheless to contribute something to wider knowledge and understanding of the economy, of economic security, and of processes at work in the re/configuration of political

geographies. This assumption about the external validity of interpretative findings underpins the discussion in the Conclusion to this thesis, wherein it is suggested that the insights of this research may have implications for other contemporary debates, such as those surrounding ‘Brexit’, Welsh devolution, and indeed a potential future referendum on Scottish independence.

Conclusion

This chapter began by introducing the key research questions underpinning the thesis. It then presented an explanation of poststructuralist discourse theory, specifically (though not exclusively) that of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and their successors in the so called Essex School. The ontological assumptions (and consonant normative convictions) of discourse theory, and of poststructuralism more generally, inform the conceptual discussions that follow in the thesis, which along with associated epistemological and methodological insights informs the analytical approach used in the empirical elements of the research. The specific methods used in the research were also elaborated, although the specific details of the ‘texts’ (or data) analysed will be outlined later when they are actually analysed. The chapter finished with a discussion of what is considered to be two important additional methodological considerations stemming from the poststructuralist approach adopted for this thesis, specifically, the capacity afforded for ‘critical’ enquiry, and for claims to external validity from the research findings.

Chapter 3: Shifting Governance Capacities within a Plurinational State

On Monday 15 October 2012 the First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, David Cameron, met in Edinburgh and signed an agreement to hold a single-question referendum on Scottish independence. The question put to the Scottish electorate on 18 September 2014 was, ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ Scotland voted ‘no’ to independence from the United Kingdom by a margin of 55% to 45%. Despite the outcome, the referendum represented a momentous juncture in Scottish and British politics and generated an enormous amount of interest both in the UK and abroad. But how did a Union that had stood for nearly 300 years get to this point? In what follows this chapter will give a basic historical introduction to Scottish politics from the Union of 1707 to the 2014 referendum.

Thereafter, it will explore a number of basic but fundamental political concepts and look, more broadly, at the significance of the politics of identity and legitimacy for understanding shifting governance capacities within the ‘plurinational’ (Keating 2004) UK state. Of particular interest is the concept of the nation and associated theories of nationalism. The rise of Scottish nationalism has played an important part in shaping the politics and society of Scotland and is an important contextual factor to the independence referendum. Yet matters of national identity were largely ‘backgrounded’ in favour of utilitarian, economic arguments for and against independence in the referendum debate, as will be stressed at the end of the chapter.

This thesis is principally concerned with the role of the imagined economy and economic (in)security in the referendum debate on Scottish independence; themes which will be advanced in subsequent chapters. However, the overarching themes of governance, legitimacy and identity addressed below are ever present, and represent an essential academic background for understanding a (re)emergent Scottish polity, and more generally, the shifting powers of governance within an increasingly complex, multi-level governance setting. Moreover, it is towards this broader literature on political geography that this thesis aims, at least in part, to contribute - albeit through a novel application of new conceptual insights. In sum, the purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the main thesis, both theoretically and empirically.

The Road to Referendum:

Under the Union of the Crowns in 1603, King James VI moved south to become King James I of the Kingdom of Great Britain. By the later 17th Century two of the key conventional prerogatives of the sovereign state, foreign policy and war, had already migrated south with the crown (Devine 1999; Pittock 2012). Thus, prior to the Union of 1707 Scotland was already in a situation of shared sovereignty with England. The Acts of Union, passed by the English and Scottish Parliaments in 1707, led to the creation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain on 1st May of that year. The UK Parliament met for the first time in October 1707. A Scottish parliament would not meet again until 1999. Importantly, whilst parliament had been unified, a number of distinctly Scottish institutions of civil society remained, notably its legal and religious

systems (Brown *et al.* 1998; Devine 1999; Paterson & Wyn-Jones 1999; Harvie 2004).

It is a simplification to claim that the union was simply imposed on Scots by the English. There has also been a long held popular narrative attributing the Union of 1707 to the selfish interests of elite contemporaries in Scotland, supposedly bribed to smooth the way for union. Scotland's national poet, Robert Burns, famously said in 1791, 'We're bought and sold for English gold- Such a parcel of rogues in a nation!' Yet there is evidence that many Scottish parliamentarians fervently wanted the union (Whatley 2006). It is, however, thought that economic insecurity had a part to play legitimating the Acts of Union in the eyes of Scottish contemporaries. Many have cited the catastrophic failure of the attempt to create a Scottish colony on the Isthmus of Panama for trading with the Far East (the so called Darien Venture – see, for example, Watt 2007) as having made union almost unavoidable, meaning Scotland needed to profit from access to British trade. In any event, the pursuit of economic benefits was clearly a central justification for union.

Professor William Miller states that the union was always a marriage of convenience rather than one of affection; 'the Scots who supported the Union supported the Union as a means of advancing Scottish nationalism' (BBC 2007). Scots can be said to have assumed 'unionist-nationalism' (Brown *et al.* 1998, p. 11). Similarly, McCrone explains that the Union 'was, classically, a *mariage de raison*, a marriage of convenience, which suited both sets of ruling elites. It kept the Scots out of the clutches of the French, and it gave them access to burgeoning markets at home and abroad' (2012, pp. 72-73). He argues, 'the rationale for joining the 1707 union in the

first place was to take advantage of economic opportunities afforded by empire, first English then British, membership of that union was always pragmatic and opportunistic' (McCrone 2012, p. 73). In addition to the widely held belief that Scotland had a mission to spread Scottish liberalism and Scottish Protestantism, something for which the political influence gained from union was essential (Brown *et al.* 1998, p. 11), they were, in no small part, using the union to get access to the wealth of the English empire and reap the spoils in a manner that would have been totally impossible for a small country like Scotland without being part of a large empire. Cumbers explains that 'Scotland was at the heart of the British imperial project', and Glasgow, 'with its massive industrial growth at the centre of the world's greatest heavy engineering and shipbuilding complex in the nineteenth century, was famously the 'second city of the Empire' (2014, p. 33).

If the Union was predicated in part upon the perceived benefits of a joint imperialist project (Colley 1992), it was in part the erosion of the perceived economic benefits of union at the end of Empire, and the concurrent Scottish deindustrialisation and economic decline – as well as a strong rejection of economic policies of Thatcherism - that is thought largely responsible for re-invigorating Scottish nationalism in the 1960s (Devine 2012; The Economist 2014). As Cumbers stresses, 'the decline of empire also coincided with the decline of industrial power, as formerly captive and actively policed colonial markets were lost, and new competitors, with more efficient and productive deployment of capital gradually displaced British manufacturing' (Cumbers 2014, p. 33).

Incidentally, it has been noted that nationalist discourse has tended to convey the notion that Scotland itself can be considered a colonial subject, clearly ignoring the very active role Scotland played in empire (Devine 2012; Mackenzie & Devine 2011; Ichijo 2012, pp. 29-30). As Ichijo states, 'The Nationalists typically present the Union as a shackle that prevents Scots from realizing their full potential and therefore as something to be liberated from' (2012, p. 29). And yet, as Brown *et al.* (1998, p. 11) stress, 'All the evidence is, moreover, that the mass of the Scottish population shared this enthusiasm for Empire'. We can see this discourse of victimisation at play behind many aspects of the nationalist argument for independence.

McCrone explains that 'Much of the decades after 1945 seemed to confirm Scotland's relative economic backwardness compared to England, reflected in much higher levels of unemployment and out-migration. Being British seemed a matter of common sense rather than commitment' (McCrone 2012, p. 73). The 1970s brought the discovery of oil in the North Sea, for which 'the impact on political psychology was considerable' (McCrone 2012, p. 73). For many the discovery of oil enabled them to imagine a secure future outside of the British state (McClellan *et al.* 2014 – see Chapter 7). This coincided with the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP), with the slogan, 'It's Scotland's Oil!' The SNP breakthrough came in 1974, when it won 11 seats in Parliament with 30 per cent of the Scottish vote, which led the then Labour government to propose establishing a devolved assembly (Dardanelli & Mitchell 2014, p. 90). The Labour Government commissioned a white paper and bill for devolution which resulted in a referendum on devolution in 1979. The referendum was undertaken with the odd stipulation that 40% of people on the electoral list must

vote 'yes', so whilst 51.6% voted in favour, with a turnout of just 63.8%, the 'Nos' effectively won.

McCrone explains that the constitutional anomaly within the new British state, whereby there was a single shared legislature as opposed to a federated system, was not an issue for a long time, but then democracy and universal suffrage 'presented the greatest challenge'; it 'gave legitimacy to the state, but contained within it the nub of a later crisis' (2012, p. 73). For as long as Scotland and England voted more or less in the same way, the fact that Scotland would always get the government the English voted for was not an issue, but this would all change as interests and ideologies later diverged. The period following the 1979 referendum saw significant political divergence between Scotland and Westminster, which, coupled with the continued and rapid deindustrialization of Scotland's key industries, proved a significant fillip for the nationalist agenda. Soule *et al.* explain that 'Heavily industrialized Scotland asymmetrically felt the negatives of economic decline, and cultural and political consequences followed' (Soule *et al.* 2012, pp. 2-3).

Cumbers argues that 'British deindustrialization was first and foremost a process of spatial uneven development as the old industrial regions (especially Scotland, Wales and the north of England) saw their economic and employment bases collapse while London and the south east of England embarked upon a new growth phase around the City of London's financial sector' (Cumbers 2014, p. 33). Cumbers argues that deindustrialization, followed by a period of neoliberal market deregulation from the 1980s onwards (and concurrent growth of financial and services industries in London and the South East) has resulted in 'historical spatial imbalances in the UK economy

to a point where the UK's economic geography is dysfunctional', and the UK's 'territorial integrity may well be untenable' (Cumbers 2014, p. 33). Presiding over this period of neoliberal transformation was a series of Conservative UK Governments, most notably, those of the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Dardinelli and Mitchell state that, 'If Scottishness was defined in contradistinction to some 'other', that other came to be personified in Mrs Thatcher' (2014, p. 90).

It was the perceived economic insensitivity of Thatcherism (and neoliberalism more generally) to Scottish economic needs that drove the clearest wedge of all between many Scots and the Union.

'The Thatcher and Major governments, which never enjoyed even a plurality of support in Scotland, were widely seen as violating not just the welfare tradition of the post-war years but also deeper conception of community and solidarity embedded in Scottish self-understandings. As England moved towards the combination of neo-liberalism and social authoritarianism known as Thatcherism, Scotland appeared to be a bastion of social democracy' (Keating 2007, p. 9).

Brown *et al.* (1998) state that the Conservative administrations of 1979 – 1997 stressed a rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques aimed at full employment, in favour of a macro-economic approach aimed at reducing inflation and public expenditure, which coupled with free market policies was contrary to the policy position of all the main opposition parties in Scotland (Brown *et al.* 1998, p. 71-72). Soule *et al.* explain that the consequence was that 'Conservative success in Scotland declined to the extreme of losing every Scottish seat in the 1997 Labour landslide... The Conservatives, on the other hand, became seen as an English party... antonymic to Scotland politics' (Soule *et al.* 2012, p. 3).

McCrone states that this is when the concept of ‘democratic deficit’ entered into the lexicon of Scottish politics as ‘Conservatives were returned overwhelmingly on English votes. Scots were too few to matter’ (2012, p. 74). The SNP effectively capitalised on this situation by moving from a party defined almost entirely by the commitment to national independence, to being a part of ideology too. Lynch charts the decline of Conservative electoral support in Scotland (and the later decline of Labour support too) vis-à-vis the rise and rise of the SNP, made possible by the adoption of ‘the ideology of social democracy’ (2009, p. 619). The reasons he cites for this are: ‘the ideological position of elites, the policy preferences of the party’s membership and the adoption of an electoral strategy to challenge a dominant political party in the region (Labour)’ (2009, pp. 619-620). Yet the evidence was not that Scotland was especially socially democratic. Rosie and Bond (2007) show that Scots are not especially left wing; surveys reveal them to be only very slightly to the left and close to voters in the North of England. Keating explains that it was not so much that the English had embraced Thatcherism on a popular level because social democratic values remained strong, rather it was the case ‘that in Scotland social democracy was underpinned by a revived and repoliticised national identity’ (2007, p. 9).

In 1997, New Labour won a landslide victory at Westminster and with that came a second referendum on Scottish devolution. Despite the significant popularity of New Labour in Scotland, three terms of Conservative governments which Scots had not supported meant that devolution presented an opportunity to preserve what had become seen as ‘Scottish values and institutions’ from Westminster. Dardinelli and Mitchell (2014, p. 90) state that:

‘When Scots voted overwhelmingly in favour of a Scottish Parliament in the referendum in 1997, they did so for conservative reasons. Scots saw devolution as the means of conserving Scottish institutions and welfare policies. In essence, devolved government was a means of conserving institutions from the Conservatives’

Electoral turnout was 60.4%, and nearly 75% voted yes to independence. Voters were also asked a second question of whether the new Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers, which 63.5% supported. Incidentally, the latter powers have never been used. There were clearly different views at the time about how devolution would impact upon the nationalist agenda and calls for independence. Georg Robertson argued “Devolution will kill Nationalism stone dead”, whilst Tom Dalyell argued “Devolution will be like a motorway to independence with no exits” (both cited in Cairney & McGarvey 2013). In the event, neither prophecies were accurate; nationalism is alive and well, and if devolution proves ultimately to be a ‘motorway to independence’, the failed referendum in 2014 surely represented at least an exit of sorts.

The first two fixed term Scottish Parliaments (1999-2003 and 2003-07) were Labour-led coalitions with the Liberal Democrats, with the SNP as the main opposition party. During this time, Scottish Labour ‘gained a reputation, deserved or not, for slavishly following the party line from London’ (Dardinelli & Mitchell 2014, p. 91). In 2007 the SNP won and, failing to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and with 47 out of 129 seats, established a minority government. The SNP then won an overall majority in 2011. However, support for the SNP could not directly be correlated with support for independence; ‘Scots liked the party of independence more than they liked independence itself’ (Dardinelli & Mitchell 2014, p. 92). The SNP knew this and has been careful not to build their electoral platforms on independence, though had stated

their future commitment to holding a referendum. With an overall majority in 2011 a referendum was more or less assured. The Edinburgh Agreement between the UK and Scottish Governments, with subsequent approval by the Westminster parliament, ensured there would be no legal challenge to a referendum.

The aforementioned political context is important for understanding the broader context for the debate on independence immediately prior to the referendum in 2014. The 2010 general election brought the Conservatives back into government, albeit in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and as Dardinelli and Mitchell stressed in the lead up to the 2014 referendum, ‘Scottish independence is seen as a means of avoiding the prospect of a succession of Conservative governments’ (2014, p. 94), just as devolution in 1997 had done before. Lynch (2009) had argued that the SNP had ‘moved from social democracy back to no ideology’ from the mid-1990s and ‘adopting policies across the left-right spectrum to compete with different parties and especially with New Labour’ (Lynch 2009, p. 620). However, if this was true at that time, it no longer is with the ‘traditional’ Tory enemy reinstated again in Westminster, a much greater rhetorical commitment to social democracy has been made in recent years. This becomes a significant analytical point later in the thesis where this will be shown to be the case in nationalist arguments for independence, specifically, the positioning of ‘Westminster’ as the threatening ‘other’ in economic security discourse, and the articulation of economic insecurities that clearly resonate with social democratic sentiments.

Thus far this chapter has attempted to address the historical and political context for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, and the associated shifting of governance

capacities with the UK state. The remainder of the chapter explicates a number of fundamental conceptual discussions pertaining to that shift. It will look at the so called shift from government to multi-level governance, and the role of the politics of (specifically national) identity and legitimacy in the (re)territorialisation of political space. This provides the essential academic context from which the thesis stems and forms an ever-present background, or set of overarching themes, for the subsequent conceptual and empirical discussions in later chapters.

From Government to Governance

It is within the context of a broader shift from government to governance in an era of the ‘post-sovereign’ state (Keating 2004) that we need to consider the emergent, continually shifting and differential capacities of the Scottish polity. Governance is a fundamental political term, and a useful descriptor - without normative connotation - of the shifting of political authority among entities. Until quite recently the term governance carried no significant theoretical baggage and was largely used as a synonym for government (Wilson & Game 2006, p. 141). Yet governance pertains to the recognition of the heterogeneity of actors involved in the process of governing besides that of a formal, national government.

‘[Governance] is no longer assumed to involve a single, homogenous all-powerful government, but rather a shifting combination of public departments and agencies, quasi-public bodies, private and voluntary sector organisations, operating at different but interdependent levels’ (Leach & Percy-Smith 2001, p. 22).

In addition to the horizontal shift from traditional government to governance, characterised by a growing interdependence between governments and non-

governmental actors, there has been a notable shift along a vertical axis too, whereby governance is characterised by a growing interdependence between governments operating at various territorial levels, on a 'multi-level' basis (Bache & Flinders 2005, p. 3). The UK remains a unitary and highly centralised state (Wilson & Game 2006) vis-à-vis developed comparators (e.g. fully federated systems), but there have been significant shifts along both these horizontal and vertical axes. The vertical axis alone requires consideration of an increasingly complicated (multi-tiered) system of local government, three 'regional' governments at the sub-state level (including the Scottish Government), and the various bodies of European governance at the supra-state level. As such, nation-states have to 'justify their right to govern in competition with other potential territorially or functionally demarcated polities', raising questions regarding legitimacy such that one might ask 'what polity is the legitimate body of authoritative decision-making' (Hansen & Sørensen 2005, p. 94).

Legitimacy is another fundamental political concept, and is crucial to understanding the shifting of political geographies. In the context of Scottish devolution and independence, it usefully describes the dynamic by which a (re)emergent Scottish polity establishes and/or maintains authority in the minds-eye of the public. Heywood explains that legitimacy is usually defined as 'rightfulness', and in contrast to the concept of power can be seen as 'the quality that transforms naked power into rightful authority' (1999, p. 141). Thus, legitimacy asks 'who has the right to govern', the answer to which is considered to hinge on the *consent* of those governed. Rousseau stated in '*The Social Contract*' that '[t]he strongest is never strong enough to be always the master unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty' ([1762] 1969 cited in Heywood 1999, p. 142). In this formulation then, legitimacy is

essentially a *normative* concept. However, Heywood explains that in contrast to most political philosophers attempting to ascertain a moral or rational basis for legitimacy, Max Weber's understanding was that if people were prepared to comply with a system of rule then that system is legitimate. Rather than legitimacy being seen as a predominantly normative concept and political enquiry being concerned with seeking some moral 'essence' to legitimacy, within this formulation legitimacy is deployed as a *descriptive* concept. This is not to preclude debates about what should rightfully constitute legitimate political authority - fascism, for example, generated a remarkable following in parts of Europe during the inter-war period, but most would contest in normative terms its 'rightfulness' as a legitimate political ideology vis-à-vis liberal democracy – but rather it opens up discussions of legitimacy as an empirical phenomenon operating in practice.

A useful distinction often made within literature on European Supranationalism is that between input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). In many respects this mirrors the above point about the difference between applications of legitimacy as either a normative term, or a descriptive term. According to input-oriented legitimacy, 'political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the 'will of the people' - that is if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community' (Scharpf 1999, 7). In other words, they are representative. Input legitimacy might therefore include the various 'nationalisms' discussed below, including for instance, both ethnic and civic expressions, as 'inherited' qualities which establish legitimacy. By contrast, according to output-oriented legitimacy, 'political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question' (1999, 7). In other words, they are judged by

their results. Bogdanor (2007, p. 5) explains that ‘legitimacy depends ultimately on the individual citizen feeling that he or she is part of the polity under which he or she lives’. However, Bogdanor also explains that in addition to the EU’s acceptance as being bound up identity, it is also predicated upon effective delivery insofar as ‘EU citizens ‘tend to judge it by results’ (2007, p. 5).

In the context of Scottish independence, output legitimacy appears to have been crucial in delivering support to the SNP, and ultimately appearing to provide the mandate the SNP required to call a referendum on independence. The SNP garnered a lot of support on the basis that they were considered to form a government that delivered on its promises in its first two parliamentary terms. McCrone stresses that ‘Scots have consistently placed more trust in Holyrood than Westminster when it comes to running Scotland’s affairs. From the outset, well over two thirds have thought the former should have more influence, while at most 30 per cent think it does have such influence—a figure which has grown steadily over the devolution decade’ (2012, p. 74). He points out that ‘The success of the SNP in 2007 lay in capturing a much higher proportion of those who were in favour of independence, as well as persuading many in favour of devolution that they would provide competent government, and be more likely than Labour to stand up for Scotland’s interests against Westminster’ (McCrone 2012, p. 74). Citing the electoral success of the SNP 2011, Dardinelli and Mitchell stress ‘that victory had little to do with independence. The SNP won because it was deemed to have been highly competent in government, especially as compared to its rivals’ (2014, p. 92). As will be explained in later chapters, the Scottish Government has been keen to stress its successes on ‘the

economy' to date, and instil confidence in the electorate of its capacity to govern successfully an independent Scotland, delivering economic prosperity and security.

A poststructuralist approach, as employed here, would argue that the meaning of legitimacy in theory, and the realities of it operating in practice, are both necessarily mediated through discourse. Moreover, it would remind us of the constitutive relationship between theory and praxis. Legitimacy does not therefore have some essential meaning; rather it is socially/politically/discursively contingent. Liberal democracy's success as a model for government is thought to hinge on its ability 'to guarantee continued legitimacy by ensuring that government power is not unchecked or arbitrary but is, rather, exercised in accordance with the wishes, preferences and interests of the general public' (Heywood 1999, p. 143); consent is established through a 'social contract' between government and the governed. Yet historically the 'right to rule' has been justified in other ways, such as through the divine right of monarchs. Democratic credentials of representativeness and accountability may well be considered normatively desirable but are based on a particular understanding of what legitimacy means, and the advent of liberal democracy has not come about because humans have managed to grasp the 'real' meaning of legitimacy; it is the outcome of pronounced political struggle and normative debate over a protracted period of time.

That the sovereign state is the single legitimate site of political authority in world politics is a staple assumption (whether explicit or implicit) in much of social and political science. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the democratic nation-state has typically been used as the yardstick against which the legitimacy of other polities

have been measured, as in extensive debates about the legitimacy of the European Union for example (Bogdanor 2007; Moravcsik 2002; Follesdal & Hix 2006). Yet the world has not always been divided into states, rather all sorts of polities and political geographies have existed (Agnew 2002, p. 9). Moreover, globalisation, supranationalism and sub-state nationalism, along with the general decentralisation and privatisation of governance, we are told, increasingly undermines the institutions of the sovereign state. However, whilst these factors certainly engender a more diffused picture of governance, the sovereignty of the state has never been an absolute. As Keating stresses, 'The classic doctrine of sovereignty has always been intellectually problematic and, in the modern world, is becoming increasingly untenable' (2004, p. 27).

John Agnew (2002) has done much to challenge taken for granted assumptions about sovereignty and the territorial state. He points out that there is an unhelpful tendency towards either/or arguments concerning state sovereignty, whereby the state is seen to be either in imminent decline or as an enduring absolute.

'States have never actually monopolized politics in the way they have monopolized political theory. Now they do so even less. But if we allow political understanding to be dominated by a particular territorial form, then we remain oblivious to the emergence and the possibilities of other geographical entities such as politically reinvigorated cities, stronger municipalities, and supranational modes of political organization' (Agnew 2002, p. 10).

In analysing the conceptual link between sovereignty and state territoriality, a distinction is often made between *de jure* (legal) and *de facto* (effective) sovereignty. Agnew suggests that it is effective sovereignty which is crucial for understanding the dynamics of political geography and he stresses that '[effective] sovereignty is neither inherently territorial nor is it invariably state-based' (2002, p.

9). Kuus and Agnew stress, ‘territoriality is only one type of spatiality or way in which space is constructed socially and mobilized politically’ (2008, p. 101). Much poststructuralist work has been done to unravel the essentialist assumptions of state sovereignty.

Within political geography, Kuus and Agnew explain how critical approaches have revealed ‘state sovereignty not as a universal and foundational principle of politics, but as a historically specific construct, whose effects vary across space’ (2008, p. 97). The authors stress that the state has no ontological status separate from the practices which constitute it, and yet, ‘To say that states have no separate ontological existence is not to say that they have no materiality’ (Kuus & Agnew 2008, p. 98). However, as stressed in Chapter 2, the material world is necessarily mediated by discourse and, as such, ‘the materiality of state power is part and parcel of, not prior to, the discourse of sovereignty’ (Kuus & Agnew 2008, p. 99). Likewise, within the discipline of political economy, Bruff has stated that the state only appears ‘real’ due to ‘the constant and widespread repetition of practices providing for regularized sets of ‘facts’ which validate the notion that there is a state’ (2011, p. 94).

‘[T]he state’ exists *only* because we implicitly accept such ‘existence’ on an everyday basis. As such, it has a self-reproducing social purpose *only* because of the way in which human activity - and thoughts about the world embodied in it - validates this ‘capability’. In consequence, the state is a ‘natural’ fact or ‘structure’ only in phenomenological terms; it is humans and their common sense which comprise, validate and reproduce the state. In this sense, the state does not exist’ (Bruff 2011, p. 95).

Moreover, within the discipline of International Relations, Cynthia Weber stressed the constitutive nature of discourse for state sovereignty, arguing that ‘to speak of the sovereign state at all requires one to engage in the political practice of stabilising this concept’s meaning’ (1995, p. 3). Such discourse effectively ‘writes the state, with

particular boundaries, competencies and legitimacies available to it' she argues, but what we should be asking is 'how is the meaning of state sovereignty is fixed in theory and practice' (1995, p. 3). Weber looks specifically at discourse on 'international intervention' in both theory and practice, urging that far from undermining state sovereignty, we consider said discourse partially culpable for 'writing' the state. It was stated by another scholar of International Relations, R. B. J. Walker, that questions about sovereignty are rarely asked, and far from being an 'essentially contested' (see Gallie 1956) concept, state sovereignty expressed instead a 'commanding silence' (Walker 1992).

In practical terms it can be argued that the aforementioned shift towards multi-level governance, despite presenting a challenge to the sovereignty of given states, does not really challenge the notion of state sovereignty itself. In the case of the UK, devolution does not present a challenge to the existing UK state *or* the notion of state sovereignty itself, so long as one accepts that state sovereignty has never been an absolute. And whilst Scottish independence might be an existential challenge to the UK state as currently configured, the notion of the sovereign state as *the* legitimate actor remains unchallenged given that formal statehood is the end goal of Scottish independence. Nevertheless, if it remains the case that the sovereign state remains *the* legitimate model on which governance is based, albeit in the context of an increasingly complex array of other governing bodies, it raises questions as to why governing legitimacies are shifting among different scales through devolution, or why one state might be considered more legitimate than another through the materialisation of a newly independent state? Why is it that one configuration of

political geographies arises rather than another, and how and why does that configuration continually shift?

These are important questions insofar as the analysis is concerned with the looking at how independence is justified by key protagonists within the public debate and thus how the legitimacy of the respective governing arrangements (either Union or Independence) and associated bodies (either the UK or Scottish Government) is conveyed. In order to try to answer these questions it is necessary to address the purported connection between the politics of identity and the politics of legitimacy. The following section looks at the conceptualised connection between identity and political geography, more specifically, how identity serves as a determinant of a subjects' connection with 'place' and the implications for governance and legitimacy. Identity construction is central to social science, and very clearly so in the case of poststructuralist approaches to social and political enquiry (see Chapter 2). Forefront among literature on the role of identity in shaping political geography is the focus on concepts of the nation and nationalism. However, whilst the idea of a Scottish nation and fervours of Scottish nationalism have undoubtedly been (and continue to be) important influences in Scottish politics, it will be argued below that matters of national identity were largely back-grounded in favour of ostensibly less political, economic arguments for and against independence in the texts analysed for this research. This has implications for how we might understand the politics of identity and legitimacy in cases like this.

Political Identity and the Demarcation of Political Space

Given the insights of ethologists on the territorial behaviour of animals it is perhaps unsurprising that people have wondered whether there is a basis for comparison between humans and animals in terms of territoriality. Is the acquisition or control over space an instinctive impulse for humans? Muir (1997) explains that while it is difficult to resist the idea that there may be biological determinants of human attitudes towards place and territory, social factors like cultural norms are clearly very significant in shaping our feelings about these things. As Agnew (2002, p. 6) observes, 'People also invest meaning in the places they inhabit'. Muir reiterates Smith's statement the 'Territoriality is...not some innate human trait but a social construct' (Smith 1990 cited in Muir 1997, p. 9).

Furthermore, Muir stresses that 'Territorial identification need not be an exclusive phenomenon. There will, for example, be many who regard themselves as being simultaneously Dalesmen or Daleswomen, Yorkshire folk and English and/or British' (1997, p. 13). It is commonly recognised that such identities can be multiple (Smith 1992). Similarly Agnew explains that,

'The scales by which they [people] identify themselves and their group memberships (national, local, international) vary both from country to country and over time. Since the nineteenth century in Europe the national scale has often been presumed as the scale for establishing primary political identity. But sense of place at the national scale can coexist with or be replaced by alternative ones' (2002, p. 6).

Keating employs the term 'plurinational' in recognition of the complex and multi-layered nature of identity whereby citizens often identify with the local nation, the ('nation'-) state, and the supranational order; unlike multinationalism which might

refer to ‘the coexistence of discrete and separate national groupings within a polity’, plurinationalism recognises that ‘more than one national identity can pertain to a single group or even an individual’ (2004, p. 27). Crucially, Keating argues that it is in the interest of democracy that decision-making spaces are developed at the level of these communities.

Human identification with geographical space² creates a ‘sense of place’, of which territoriality is an example. ‘Sense of place’ then amounts to far more than some physical geographical entity, and shows how we can have strong emotional attachments to particular places like landscapes, monuments, architecture, etc. Storey explains how it may refer to ‘the place we grew up in, places we have spent some time in, places with which we have fond memories, places associated with love, etc.’ (2001, p. 19). In terms of national identity the importance of place is obvious. First of all, ‘all nations possess a geographical referent in their claims to a particular territory’ (Jones *et al.* 2004, p. 83). Additionally Jones *et al.* (2004) stresses that while nationalism is an ideology existing at a national scale, generally manifested in claims for a piece of geographical territory, ‘nations always draw on specific places as sources of ideological nourishment’ (p. 87), such as national monuments, memorials, or specific pieces or types of architecture. And in addition to specific places such as these, the national imagination may be fired by more general images of the landscape too, such as the mountains, the rivers, or the lakes (Jones *et al.* 2004).

² Jones (*et al.* 2004, p. 3) summarise the sometimes confusing distinction between space, place and territory when he states that ‘space (or spatial patterns or spatial relations) is the core commodity of geography. Place is a particular point in space, while territory represents a more formal attempt to define and delimit a portion of space, inscribed with a particular identity and characteristics’.

Furthermore, as with all identity, our identification with place is never fixed or generalizable (in any deterministic sense) across time and space.

‘Mapping politics involves showing how political identities and interests are structured geographically as the result of human agency in the places where people live. Human agency and the changing conditions under which that agency takes place, however, mean that mapping is never complete. Just as a map comes into focus, it is transformed into another one’ (Agnew 2002, p. 1).

Indeed this is a product of the constructed and contingent nature of social identity generally, whereby identities are continually re/produced through social practices. Indeed, discourses of nationalism represent just one of the ways in which the sovereignty of the territorial state has historically been sedimented. The notion of sovereign states being *the* subjects of international politics rests on them being seen as sites of legitimate political authority, which according to the doctrine of popular sovereignty resides with the people. Drawing on Yack (2001), Kuus and Agnew posit that ‘states are the masters of territory and peoples the masters of states’ (2008, p. 99). It is the concept of the nation that has been used to define the collective identity of ‘the people’, and which has proven paramount in the territorialisation of the state. Storey stresses that democracy requires people to have a say in how they are governed, and ‘this implies some idea of who the ‘people’ are’ (2001, p. 74). But nationalism has been equally important in the general decentralisation of political systems and the growing importance of sub-state actors where governments have had to try to appease the forces of bottom-up regionalism; ‘a political force, expressing itself as a demand for more autonomy for areas that lacked an institutional outlet to express their identity’ (John 2001, pp. 111-112). In any event, the significance of nationalism in Scottish politics, to which the wealth of literature on the topic is itself a

testament to, demands a better understanding of this concept (see Devine 1999; Harvie 2004).

Nations and Nationalism

Heywood states that 'For over two hundred years the nation has been regarded as the proper, indeed only legitimate, unit of political rule' (1999, p. 97). Moreover, he states that 'nationalism is, at heart, the doctrine that each nation is entitled to self-determination, reflected in the belief that, as far as possible, the boundaries of the nation and those of the state should coincide' (Heywood, 1999, p. 97). It was stated earlier that sovereignty, predicated upon the perceived legitimacy of political authority, had previously been derived not from popular consent but divine right. However, the ideas of the likes of Rousseau, Locke and Mill, such as the general will, popular sovereignty, majority rule and representative government based on individual self-determination, changed this (Penrose & Mole 2008, p. 273). Though not specifically employing the concept of nation, Rousseau did stress that where the 'general will' would be likely to emerge was where there were culturally related communities already in existence.

This is congruent with Anthony D. Smith's (2001) understanding of nations as being based on pre-existing ethnic groups, or *ethnies*, which are long established cultural groups with their own iconography and folk myths. This approach contrasts with that of those labelled primordialist, where nations, or certain features of nations, are considered to have always existed, and are thus not produced. Obviously

the anti-essentialist assumptions underpinning this thesis preclude primordialist explanations, given that identity is seen to be constructed and contingent. Modernist theories of nationalism, conversely, see nations as modern fabrications (Gellner 1983; see also Hobsbawm 1990). Somewhere in the middle lie perennialist theories like Smith's which posit the long development of nations out of already existing ethnic communities, while recognising the impact of institutions of modernity, like capitalist industrialisation and the state.

Benedict Anderson famously argued that the nation is an 'imagined political community';

'[I]magined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 2006, p. 6).

This sociological understanding of the nation corresponds with my conceptualisation of 'the economy' as imagined and socially (or discursively) constructed and contingent. It will be argued in the next chapter that the economy necessarily corresponds with an assumed 'community of fate' (Williams 2003). Crucially, imagined communities are no less 'real' in the everyday lives of their constituents, or as a determinant of social and political action. As Storey reiterates,

'none of this makes the nation 'unreal' for an ordinary man [*sic*] born into a concrete society, culture, and state, and faced with concrete choices on the social and political as well as the spiritual and existential planes. The nation need not be "rational" in order to be "real"' (Nodia 1994 cited in Storey 2001, p. 74).

Anderson stresses, nations may be but 'the shrunken imaginings of recent history' but they have made 'it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of

people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings' (2006, p. 7). As Keating stresses, 'The nation is a sociological concept, based upon a community which, while constructed, represents a reality based in social institutions and practices' (Keating 2004, p. vii). Moreover, nations and nationalisms are far from transient, indeed they (and constructed identity generally) can be incredibly resilient. As will be argued in Chapter 4 and throughout the thesis, the very same is true of the idea of 'the economy'.

The following quote from Muir succinctly highlights the emergent, socially contingent nature of nations, but also how they often draw on more deeply rooted cultural and historical characteristics.

'Most of the evidence shows that until quite recent times ordinary people did not regard themselves primarily as members of nations, but as belonging to families, villages, localities, and provinces. National consciousness arose as a Romantic movement among the European middle classes. But having said this, when it did arise, there already existed among the various peasant societies a long-established heritage of national folklore, costume, dance and mythology to sustain it. There was also a powerful territorial component – the national territory – which gave issues of nationalism the potential to reshape the world' (Muir 1997, p. 47).

It seems to be the case that 'nationalism as an instrumental political device of the modern age performed a central task in the state-building project by providing the ideological glue adhering the loyalty of the populace to the physical space of the state' (Tierney 2011, p. 119). Penrose and Mole (2008, p. 274), point out that nation-state formation occurred both where the state preceded the nation, 'which began with the state based on new political doctrines and then sought to create a nation within its boundaries', for example in France after the French Revolution of 1789, and where the nation preceded the state (i.e. where the cultural unit of the nation sought its perceived right to self-determination through statehood).

However, while the nation has been a crucial feature of the modern state the boundaries of the nation and of the state have rarely coincided so neatly as is often thought. Anthony D. Smith points out that the 'nation-state' is very rare indeed, much more common is the 'national state' (see Smith 2001). Nevertheless, it remains the case that the two terms are often, misleadingly, used synonymously. Keating stresses that we are 'moving from a world of sovereign nation-states (although this was never more than an ideal type) to a postsovereign order, in which states must share their prerogatives with supra-state, sub-state and trans-state systems' (2004, p. ix).

In an increasingly complex multi-level governance setting, wherein national identities are often multiple/layered, discerning the impact of the nation as a determinant of shifting political geographies (including motivations for Scottish independence) is far from straightforward. In fact, other bases for governing legitimacy also need consideration, as argued here in the case of the referendum debate where economic justifications were made for and against independence. In the case of the latter, formulations of group identity are still crucial, albeit on the basis of seemingly more practical, shared economic intersubjectivities largely separate from sentiments of nationhood. Nevertheless, it is clear that nations, and nationalisms have been (and continue to be) instrumental in the delineation of political space and the re/production of legitimate political authority. There is a vast literature on nationalism. In what follows some of the ideas most directly relevant to this thesis and the conceptual arguments developed in subsequent chapters are addressed, including the relationship between nationalism and calls for independent statehood, and the commonly made distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms.

Nationalism and Statehood

We are told sub-state nationalism acts as a challenge to the institution of the sovereign state. Putting aside the fact that where nationalist groups do seek statehood they do not in principle pose a threat to the idea of the state (just to the existing territorial jurisdictions of the state of which they comprise), it is not always the case that nationalists necessarily seek independent statehood, seeking instead other forms of self-determination short of independent statehood (Keating 2004). A rather simplistic distinction is often made between political and cultural nationalisms, whereby the former refers to calls for greater political self-determination – principally independent statehood – while the latter refers to moves to preserve cultural symbols, like language, or national foods. Thus, for instance, Heywood points out that ‘the desire of the French Basques to preserve their language and culture is every bit as ‘nationalist’ as the openly separatist struggle waged by Basques in Spain’ (Heywood 1999, p. 99). Ultimately, what unites nationalist movements is the desire for self-determination, but the principle of self-determination ought not necessarily be associated with calls for independent statehood.

The problem with this argument, Keating (2004) points out, is that all that would then be necessary to refute claims for self-determination would be to point out that there are far too many nations to all be ‘given’ a state. Self-determination can instead be seen as ‘the right to negotiate one’s position within the state and supranational order, without necessarily setting up a separate state’ (Keating 2004, p. 10). This may in theory challenge the institution of the sovereign state if we see it as an encroachment on the absolute sovereignty of the state, but as we have shown, such absolute sovereignty has only ever been an ideal. Tierney states that ‘the classical Westphalian

formulation of the state as a legally autonomous unit was always an exercise in hyperbolic self-aggrandisement by states that failed to reflect the reality of international interdependence and the relative strengths and weaknesses of different states at different times' (2011, p. 121). He points out that sub-state forces have often achieved a level of autonomy, not just in federal states, but in unitary ones like the United Kingdom too. As was explained near the outset of this chapter, 'even before the devolution settlement embodied in the Scotland Act 1998, Scotland through 'administrative independence' enjoyed a level of autonomy comparable to other small European nations which, despite formal independent statehood, have always had to negotiate their autonomy in relation to big powers' (Paterson 1994 cited in Tierney 2011, p. 121).

Sub-state national societies are not necessarily bent on secessionist programmes, but are able to re/negotiate their constitutional aspirations in accordance with changing circumstances; circumstances, that is, of an increasingly postsovereign environment.

Guibernau's (1999) analysis of Western 'nations without states' (including Scotland) suggests that the future may not be one of an ever closer fit between nations and states, but rather an evolution of differential and layered political communities.

Within the current 'asymmetrically devolved' system of UK governance, the devolved administrations of the UK may be united in calls for greater autonomy over economic governance, but there are clear differences in the extent to which said administrations see this as an end in itself, or as a step towards full independence.

Mycock asserts that 'Within the UK, nationalist groups are a product of their particular historical and contemporary national circumstances and independence is not necessarily a primary political aspiration' (2012, p. 55).

Many unionists will have considered themselves ardent nationalists too. Soule *et al.* stress that:

‘all Scotland’s politicians are nationalist in their outlook (McCrone, 2001, p. 126) but the UK state has provided a context in which a variety of constitutional and policy preferences have been claimed to be in the interest of Scotland, and resultantly said to be in the national interest’ (Soule *et al.* 2012, p. 4)

In fact, a key feature of unionist rhetoric is the mandatory reference to the importance of their nationality and their sentiments of patriotism to reiterate that unionists are nationalists too (Ichijo 2012, p. 26; Leith 2010). As such, one can speak of what might ostensibly appear as the oxymoron of ‘unionist-nationalists’ (Morton 1999; see also Ichijo 2012). McCrone (2012, p. 73) explains that after the union of 1707 one might consider Scots generally as unionist-nationalists, as ‘they remained Scots in strictly national terms, while embracing Britishness as and when appropriate as their state identity’. For many the union and the opportunities it afforded many Scots in an age of empire, helped to preserve and promote Scottish national identity and interests. This form of nationalism, or ‘Scottishness’, has, however, regularly been challenged as a less genuine form of nationalism by those who support independence though. Mycock states that the SNP has often denigrated the views of Scottish nationalists that do not translate into separatism as those of ‘pseudo-nationalists’ who disingenuously play the Scottish card for electoral purposes’ (2012, p. 56). Drawing on an article that Alex Salmond wrote for the Wall Street Journal in 2006, Mycock points out how Salmond ‘asserted ‘Scotland remains an anomaly, a stateless nation’ whose destiny is independence’, thus suggesting he believes that all nations should seek self-determination and become sovereign states’ (2012, p. 55). Results from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey have repeatedly shown that many Scottish people consider

themselves Scottish and would wish to preserve that identity, but do not seek independent statehood (see www.whatscotlandthinks.org; see also Keating 2009).

With the above in mind it is worth re-stating an analytical decision employed in this thesis, which was outlined in Chapter 1. Throughout the thesis, and notably in the analyses of texts from the independence referendum debate, the opposing sides are referred to as ‘the nationalists’ and ‘the unionists’. The former being those who supported independence and the latter being those who did not support independence. I might instead have chosen to refer to the nationalist campaign as secessionist, but chose not to as this is not how they were referred to within the texts analysed themselves, nor by key protagonists and other commentators. Ultimately, given that independence is what was at stake in the debate, it ought not to present any real confusion to the reader. However, I use these terms whilst mindful of the fact that nationalists and unionists cannot be so easily categorised, or indeed separated, and that nationalism need not necessarily be about independent statehood.

Ethnic or Civic Nationalism?

Ethnically based explanations of nationalism were mentioned above in relation to primordialist, modernist and perennialist explanations, with the latter accounting for the importance of pre-existing ethnic groups as well as the emergent quality of nations in the modern era. Another related distinction is often made between ethnic and civic nationalisms. According to ethnic nationalism, nationhood is defined by a shared ethnic origin, including language, religion, customs and traditions. According to civic nationalism, nationhood is defined by common citizenship and is based on common

subscription to shared civic values - typically those of liberal democracy –
irrespective of ethnic differences.

‘Civic nationalism is a different mode of nation building. It is a collective enterprise of its members but it is rooted in individual assent rather than ascriptive identity. It is based on common values and institutions, and patterns of social interaction. The bearers of national identity are institutions, customs, historical memories and rational secular values. Anyone can join the nation irrespective of birth or ethnic origins’ (Keating 1996, pp. 5-6).

Drawing on Hearn (2000, p. 94), McCrone and Bechhofer state that ‘the distinction between ethnic and civic has more to do with opposing styles of argument than with measurable concepts’ (2010, p. 924). Both ethnic and civic expressions of nationalism remain important in the imagination of the nation. Certainly it is clear that elements of both are key to understanding Scottish politics.

Mycock (2012) presents an excellent appraisal of the importance of both ethnic and civic nationalisms in Scottish politics, and the roles that they have played in shaping sentiments about independence. Mycock explains the emergence of civic nationalism as a key factor in Scottish political discourse in the 1990s through discursive efforts of the SNP; ‘For some, the SNP now promotes a non-ethnicized, territorially located ‘impeccably civic’ Scottish nationalism (Mycock 2012, p. 55; see also Keating 2009, p. 17). Civic nationalism is often espoused with deliberate political motivations, given that modern liberal democratic thinking typically denigrates ethnic nationalisms as ‘illiberal, ascriptive, particularistic, and exclusive’ versus civic nationalism which is ‘liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and inclusive’ (Brubaker 1999, p. 56). We see this in the denigration of ethnic nationalisms in Eastern Europe for instance, where we see ‘the invocation of a dubious series of linked oppositions – between universalism and particularism, inclusion and exclusion, civility and violence, reason and passion,

modern tolerance and ancient hatreds, transnational integration and nationalist disintegration, civic nationhood and ethnic nationalism' (Brubaker 1999, p. 56). Mycock also points out, however, that the SNP's discursive strategies are not as 'wholly civic' as it might like to attest.

'It is clear that claims that the SNP version of Scottish nationalism is not 'wholly civic' and that its shift from ethnic-based nationalism during the 1980s and 1990s has not been absolute' (Mycock 2012, p. 64)

Torrance (2014) points out how Alex Salmond urged in a speech at the Glasgow Caledonian University's New York City campus that Scots would vote 'based entirely on consensual, civic, non-ethnic and peaceful principles' in the referendum, despite earlier referencing US citizens claiming Scots 'ancestry', the Declaration of Arbroath, statues of Robert Burns and Sir Walter Scott in Central Park, and other typical reference points for non-civic nationalism.

Crucially, the actual sentiments of Scots in many instances are not as wholly civic either. McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) demonstrate through a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis of respondents in both Scotland and England that people's willingness to accept or reject others' claims to nationhood often hinges on 'identity markers' (e.g. birth, accent, parentage, etc.) besides that of permanent residence. The authors essentially argue that the SNP's all-inclusive civic vision ignores certain realities about how people both self-identify and identify others in actual practice. The distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is not straightforward in practical terms, either analytically or normatively; 'nationalism resists neat parsing into types with clearly contrasting empirical and moral profiles...[and] The civic-ethnic distinction is overburdened; it is expected to do too much work' (Brubaker 1999, p. 69). Interestingly, McCrone and Bechhofer (2010)

argue that the independence debate would likely bring the importance of these contrasting expressions of national identity more clearly into focus.

However, it is argued here that this did not happen, with issues of national identity being largely ‘backgrounded’ in favour of issues of economics in public texts. That said, one suspects that in many cases ethnic forms of nationalism remain significant motivators for people, even if publicly they might not say as much due to the stigma attached to such arguments. In the case of Scottish independence, however, ethnic divisions were probably less important, not least due to the length of the union and the broad cultural assimilation it has made possible. A latent commitment to Scottish national identity has never really been in question, let alone existentially threatened, and Scottish cultural symbols have often been celebrated elements of ‘Britishness’. Certainly a commitment to the Scottish nation alone is insufficient to mobilise popular political support in favour of independence. As such, one of the strengths of the imagined economy and the economic arguments it facilitates, as outlined in subsequent chapters, is the potential it affords to speak to a different (and more materially) shared set of circumstances largely irrespective of ethnic particularities.

Back-grounding the Nation in favour of ‘The Economy’

In subsequent chapters it will be argued that national identity, whilst clearly a highly significant underlying factor in the debate, was in fact less emphasised than might have been expected. As stated above, discerning the extent to which national identity acts as a determinant of views on independence has always been difficult, and yet underlying commitments to ‘Scottishness’ are hardly an irrelevance. Wood explains that given the significance of national identities for the shaping political geographies,

‘It is surprising...that relatively little is being said about culture and identity in debates on Scottish independence’, however, she argues ‘this is in part a purposeful act by those who are trying to secure independence’ (2014, p. 40), as the following two quotes from the then Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, illustrate:

“But for me the fact of nationhood or Scottish identity is not the motive force for independence. Nor do I believe that independence, however desirable, is essential for the preservation of our distinctive Scottish identity. And I don’t agree at all that feeling British – with all of the shared social, family and cultural heritage that makes up such an identity – is in any way inconsistent with a pragmatic, utilitarian support for political independence” (Sturgeon 2012).

“The central debate we are having is a very practical debate. A utilitarian³ debate... It is about the economy...And whether with independence Scotland would be better off or not” (Sturgeon 2014)

As the latter quote suggests, the terms of the debate revealed a far greater emphasis on what have been referred to as ‘the economics of independence’. Utterances of national identity were back-grounded in favour of apparently less political, economic arguments for and against independence.

It should be stressed at this juncture, however, that economic rationalities and expressions of (national) identity are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for in some instances they can be viewed as mutually reinforcing. Exploring the changing role of identity in Cornish economic development, Willett (2013) and Willett and Tredinnick-Rowe (2016) have stressed the importance of identity not simply as a good in and of itself, but as a utility, a means to an end, insofar as it has been used to stress the particularities of the Cornish case for regional economic development.

³ Within this same speech Sturgeon explains the difference between this ‘utilitarian nationalism’ and ‘existential nationalism’, which supports ‘independence for its own sake’ (Sturgeon 2014).

‘identity has utility as a social, economic and even governance tool, encouraging regions to celebrate their identities and the things that make them different and distinctive from other spaces, in order to compete better in the European and global economy’ (Willett and Tredinnick-Rowe 2016, p. 772).

Through an analysis of economic development documents, Willett and Tredinnick-Rowe stress how in the 1970s and 1980s ‘identity is conspicuous by its absence’ (2016, p. 774), whereas from the late 1990s onwards it began to play a significant part in the articulation of Cornish economic development strategies. Similarly, Bond *et al.* (2003) have looked at the importance of Scottish identity for economic development, making it clear that Scotland’s nationalism and economy are deeply intertwined. They show that national identity is not ‘essentially cultural and/or narrowly political’, but is also mobilised in a more ‘banal’ fashion ‘within strategies and discourse of economic development’ (Bond *et al.* 2003, p. 371).

In the case of the Scottish referendum debate it is possible to reverse this argument. Whilst difficult to prove, it is likely that many who supported independence did so – at least in part - for ‘deeper’ and more emotive reasons of national identity, as opposed to the purely utilitarian economic reasons they purported, as in the above examples from Sturgeon (2012; 2014). Indeed there were some revealing instances of this in the materials analysed. However, as argued in Chapter 6, there was an explicit aim to downplay seemingly less rational, emotive reasons for independence in favour of seemingly more objective and rational, economic arguments. This is one of the ways in which the politics of the debate were effectively hidden.

This was made possible, it will be argued, by ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions about ‘the economy’, such that Scottish subjects are encouraged to see themselves and their

economic life-chances as especially bound up within shared material communities of fate (Williams 2003). Crucially, whilst forms of political or ethical association with those whom we are considered to share our fate may well further the legitimacy of those communities in our minds-eyes, and thereby necessitated governance arrangements, they are not strictly necessary to them being viewed as real. This observation has been made by Rosamond (2002) with regards the imagined 'European economy', but the same is also true at the sub-state level. In any event, whilst national identity, per se, was effectively downplayed in the debate, identity politics and their significance for shaping political legitimacies remain central, albeit assuming a broader understanding of identity consonant with poststructuralism. Crucially, poststructuralism reminds us that all identity is 'political' (See Chapter 2 - Methodology).

Scottish people are still very much encouraged to imagine themselves to be a part of, or identify with, what is still a fundamentally political spatial-scalar entity ('the economy') even if said identity and said entity might not appear so ostensibly 'political'. Like the state, 'the economy' is not an ontological given, it is discursively constructed, and the extent to which economies like 'the Scottish economy' even exist as material 'realities', determining the economic life-chances of subjects located therein, is hugely exaggerated. It is therefore, necessarily, a political designation, despite often being presented as somehow more real, and in spite of the general 'depoliticisation' of the economic. The implications of the imagined economy, and of economic arguments for and against independence, are very much political insofar as Scottish economic subjects are encouraged to view proposed governance arrangements (either continued union or an independent Scotland) as legitimate.

Moreover, the ways in which subjects are encouraged to imagine the Scottish economy reveal attempts to assert the distinctiveness and particularities of ‘the Scottish case’. The Scottish economy has historically been imagined in accordance with certain narratives, such as the ‘underdevelopment/dependency theory’, ‘branch-plant economy status’, the ‘north-south divide’, and ‘de-industrialisation’ (Brown 1998, pp. 77-85), all of which present the Scottish economy as structurally disadvantaged; the first three *explicitly* because of the Scottish economy being tied to that of the wider UK economy, and the latter because of the Scottish economy’s structural (re)composition, which, according to critics of Thatcherism and monetarism at least, can also be attributed to the Scottish economy being tied to the wider UK economy and policy choices in Westminster. Whilst such narratives may well have resonated with the lived experiences of many Scots, they represent broad generalisations about the Scottish experience.

Tomlinson notes that de-industrialisation was proportionally greater in its impact in Scotland than the UK as a whole given the predominance of industry there, but also that there is a misplaced tendency to refer to de-industrialisation in ‘declinist terms’ and ‘as evidence of a pathological failure in the Scottish economy’ (Tomlinson 2014, p. 173). Tomlinson stresses that this is despite the fact that Scottish incomes have continually grown in the wake of de-industrialisation and relative to the UK average. Indeed, despite economic growth in Scotland to the extent where it is now the second wealthiest region in the UK in aggregate terms, and consonant discursive efforts by nationalists to project an image of Scotland as economically stronger than the UK as a whole, the legacies of these older narratives are still apparent in the way in which the

Scottish economy is typically presented in unionist arguments against independence, wherein the Scottish economy is argued to be dependent on the UK for its survival. As argued above, and explored in Chapter 8, the Scottish economy is also thought to be more especially defined by a commitment to social democracy (Keating 2007; McEwan 2002; Lynch 2009), which may not appear to pertain to either ethnic or civic expressions of national identity, but which has nevertheless become a part of how Scottish identity is often understood. Willett argues the same to be the case with regards Cornish (and Welsh) nationalism, whereby it ‘comes from a cultural assemblage that combines identity with inequality and social justice’ (2013, p. 307). This also has implications for the way in which economic (in)security is articulated by Scottish nationalists in the independence referendum debate, whereby those insecurities are given to resonate with an established narrative of social democracy and the Scottish economy.

Key to conveying the idea of the economy and an associated community of fate, and therefore the legitimisation of their governance is the explicit articulation of shared threat. Kuus and Agnew (2008) argue that nationalist discourse and security discourse have been (mutually) reinforcing with regards legitimisation of the state.

‘The whole inter-state system is based on the fusing of identity and security so that each state supposedly protects its territorially defined national identity. Insecurity therefore is not external to the state, but it is an integral part of the process of establishing the state’s identity’ (2008, p. 99).

However, whilst Political Geographers like Kuus and Agnew, and students of Security Studies too, have emphasised the historical role played by assertions of ‘conventional’ (in)security (i.e. national defence), this thesis looks at role of *economic* (in)security and the articulation of shared economic threats of either union or

independence within the Scottish independence debate, wherein more ‘conventional’ utterances of security were all but absent. Across the next two chapters it will become clear just how the ‘interpellation’ of identities based on shared (in)security is a crucial determinant of the imagined economy.

Conclusion:

This chapter has presented an historical introduction to Scottish politics, and the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, and has elaborated upon some of the fundamental political concepts underpinning the thesis. In doing so it has set the scene for the further development of the thesis’ conceptual framework in Chapters 4 and 5, as well as the empirical application of that framework in the remaining three chapters. Whilst the thesis is principally concerned with the concepts of the imagined economy and economic (in)security, and their specific significance to the independence referendum debate, the overarching themes of governance, legitimacy and (national) identity explored above provide the broad thematic background upon which these concepts are latterly developed.

Political geographers remind us of is the importance of space, place and territoriality. They remind us how the delineation of these geographies is predicated upon the politics of identity and legitimacy. The themes of identity and legitimacy run throughout the thesis. Identity is key, as indeed it is to all poststructuralist work, insofar as discourses serve to ‘interpellate’ subjects into subject positions wherein representations of the world make sense to them and become naturalised, and given to reflect ‘the way the world really is’ (Weldes 1996, p. 287; Althusser 1974, p. 174).

Discourses of the nation may be an example of this, although it is argued here that in the referendum debate issues of nationhood were largely ‘backgrounded’ in favour of discourses on ‘the economy’, which similarly rely upon the interpellation of subject identities. Intimately related to the politics of identity, therefore, are the politics of legitimacy, and this thesis is concerned with the looking at how independence is justified by the key protagonists within the public debate and, thereby, how the legitimacy of respective governing arrangements (either Union or Independence) and attributed bodies (either the UK or Scottish Government) is conveyed through discursive practice.

Chapter 4: The Imagined Economy and the Depoliticisation of Political Space

Chapter 2 set out the research questions underpinning the thesis were set out. If the thesis as a whole aims to address the primary research question then this chapter and the next addresses the first two subsidiary questions respectively. The remaining three, more empirically focussed chapters, address the third. The focus of this chapter then is driven by the question, *what is the (Scottish) economy?*

Chapter 2 explored a number of core concepts associated with the shifting of governance capacities within the plurinational (Keating 2004) UK state, and more specifically, towards an emergent Scottish polity. However, early analysis of empirical ‘texts’ (policy documents, speeches, news media) on this topic immediately revealed the almost exclusively economic focus of the referendum debate. Notably, whilst the resurgence of Scottish nationalism and associated commitments to a Scottish national identity have been crucial to the shifting of governance capacities in recent decades, they were (often deliberately) ‘backgrounded’ within public texts. Instead, economic rationalities were central to discourse on independence as a means of mobilising support both for and against independence.

Within this context utterances of ‘the (Scottish) economy’ clearly assumed the existence of a concrete, or ‘real’ spatial-scalar entity (Rosamond 2002) to which that term referred, and within which a defined ‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003) is embodied. This chapter draws on literature from political economy and economic

sociology in order to better understand how and why the concept of ‘the economy’ became so central to the referendum debate, and what the implications might be for understanding how certain political spaces and associated polities become governable. Also, and in accordance with the poststructuralist commitments underpinning the analysis, it considers the potential implications for the effective ‘depoliticisation’ of debate.

What is the economy?

It can be helpful to distinguish between two separate, but nevertheless inseparable ‘ideas’ of the economy: One as referring to a particular domain or sphere of activity that we can call ‘the economic’; The other as referring to a specific, geographically demarcated entity, such as the Scottish, UK or European economy. In either sense, the economy is imagined. This is not to say that the economy (in either sense) has no foundation in reality as might be suggested from colloquial use of the term ‘imagined’. In fact, it is probably because such foundations exist that the economy seems more real than imagined. It is just that the extent to which the economy is ‘real’ is grossly exaggerated.

What follows looks first look at the imagined nature of ‘the economic’, specifically with insights from political economy and economic sociology. It is most commonly with reference to the economic that scholars within these disciplines explore the significance of ideas, or discourse, for our understanding of political economy. As well exploring generally the extent to which it is imagined as ‘real’, this first part of the chapter discusses the extent to which we consequently feel it is possible to ‘know’

the economic. This clearly has methodological implications for political economic analysis, but it also speaks to the validity of the sorts of economic arguments typically used by politicians (and others) in order to mobilise public opinion. With regards to this thesis, there are clear implications for the validity of overtly economic arguments for and against Scottish independence.

Consonant with the insights of constructivist political economy that we cannot explain nor understand 'the economic' by reference to material considerations alone, we clearly cannot understand the basis for thinking about economies as discrete spatial-scalar entities by reference to underlying material or structural conditions alone either. This is explored in the second part of the chapter, where it is shown that not only is 'the economic' largely imagined, the idea of 'the economy' as a functioning totality is imagined too, and came about not through conceptual deliberation and advances, but merely as a 'taken-for-granted'. And yet economies, like states, have to be continually 'sung into existence' (Smith 2004) (even if only 'discretely') both quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to remain meaningful to those whose circumstances are apparently bound up within them. As will be addressed in the next chapter, one of the ways in which this is done, is through the constant articulation of economic (in)security.

The economy clearly provides a spatial reference around (or within) which intersubjectivities can be formed and based on which governing rationalities can be legitimated. Crucially, and largely because of assumptions about the economic as something more real and less political than the social world generally, these intersubjectivities can be mobilised without explicit recourse to other more

controversial, or contestable foundations of group identity, like the ‘ethno-symbolism’ of national identity. This is addressed towards the end of the chapter with reference to the concept of ‘communities of fate’ (Williams 2003). Crucially, as demonstrated in Chapter 8, these communities of (economic) fate can serve to legitimise emerging of established governing rationalities with or without recourse to ethical or ‘political’ justification. In this sense it helps us to understand the constitution of ‘effective legitimacy’ and, building on the previous chapter, how legitimacy can be considered in both ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ terms.

Ultimately, it will be argued, the ‘taken-for-granted’ nature of both the economic and the economy makes it possible for economic arguments to be made both for and against independence, which effectively subvert political debate, and obscure the necessarily ‘political’ assumptions and implications underpinning the very idea of the economy.

‘Knowing’ the economy

To what extent can we know the economy? Despite various interventions stressing the importance of social or discursive factors for our understanding of economics, there is still a view that it is possible to know the economy in a similar way to that which we feel we can know the physical world, and in a way that differs to how we now generally accept it is possible to know the social world. Knowing the physical world requires the presentation of deterministic explanations for phenomena. In certain physical sciences we recognise that though in practice this may often be difficult (e.g. in meteorology or oceanography where you are dealing with open systems and

seemingly incomprehensible contingencies), in principle it seems as least possible (i.e. if we could only compute all those contingencies) (Williams & May 1996, see chapter 4 'Knowing the Social World'). However, the social world is fundamentally different as at its heart are humans who are thinking and feeling creatures who cannot be reduced to atomistic, rational actors. As such, our methodologies for understanding the social world must be different too. To a student of social sciences this seems obvious, but whilst the insights of various social constructionisms have taken a strong footing in many of the social sciences, including Politics and International Relations, they have come far later and remain less well rooted within political economy approaches, especially within the 'American School' of political economy (Cameron and Palan 2009). It remains the case that the common sense view of the economy is of a separate, almost objective material domain of activity that can be 'known'. Neo/classical economics certainly encourages us to view the economy as operating in accordance with immutable dynamics, wherein actors (e.g. humans, firms, etc.) are conceived of in atomistic terms, driven by rational - and thus, in principle at least, predictable - material interests, despite the fact that we are dealing with the self-same units as other social sciences (i.e. people).

We must view the economic (insofar as it meaningfully exists), as inextricably rooted in social, or discursive, practice. One popularised term for this, a concept central to the discipline of economic sociology, is 'embeddedness' (Zukin & DiMaggio 1990). Embeddedness owes its intellectual inheritance to Karl Polanyi, who first coined the term in his book, 'The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time' (Polanyi [1944]2001). The concept has since been further

developed to convey, in a more fundamental sense, the social constructedness of the market economy. But first, let us look specifically at Polanyi's insights.

Karl Polanyi ([1944]2001) attributes the major trends in the global political economy throughout the first half of the twentieth century to the inevitable failure of the utopian liberal project to 'disembed' the economy from society. Based on historical and anthropological research Polanyi shows how 'man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships' (2001, p. 48). He explains that during the 'mercantilist period' despite markets becoming increasingly important, they remained tightly regulated; 'Regulation and markets, in effect, grew up together' (Polanyi 2001, p. 71). Defined simply, a market economy is basically a system controlled and regulated by the automatic adjustment of supply and demand through the price mechanism. Polanyi asserted that in order for the market economy to work it must comprise all elements of industry, including labour, land and money, which meant the subordination of society to the market mechanism. However, he explains that labour, land and money are in fact 'fictitious commodities' and '[t]o allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment indeed, even the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society' (Polanyi 2001, p. 76). The result, therefore, was an inevitable and spontaneous countermovement by society to protect itself from the self-regulating market. Hence, Polanyi's famous statement that 'Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not' (2001, p. 147).

Polanyi therefore stresses how the infiltration of the market mechanism into previously social exchanges led to a conception of the economy as an almost

autonomous (and ‘knowable’) sphere of activity. The idea of the self-regulating market helps to convey the notion of the economy as some sort of discrete and autonomous ‘system’ - or at least that such is an achievable ideal – separate from human agency and social indeterminacies. Polanyi argued that previously, with primitive or archaic economies, the market had been at most an accessory to society, whereas now, in the modern industrialised capitalist economy, society was increasingly becoming an accessory to the market. This paved the way for the birth of economics (and concurrent decline of political economy) and a feeling that we can in fact ‘know’ the economic.

What is not always clear from Polanyi’s observations is whether the economy could *in principle* be disembedded from society; despite *in practice* not proving possible. In any event, Polanyi’s insights have been massively influential, especially within the discipline of economic sociology, where others have built upon the concept of embeddedness by stressing the role of ideas. Doing so makes it possible to explain, for instance, why despite the futility of the aforementioned utopian liberal project to disembed the economy from society, the powerful logic upon which that project was based proved no less influential as an ideological regime, or discourse, that shaped the way in which we came to think about the economy (Block & Somers 2003); namely, as the aforementioned largely objective and material domain governed by market rationalism.

Block and Somers (2003) demonstrate this with a focus on the same key period of English and Welsh history as did Polanyi, namely that leading up to the passing of the New Poor Law in 1834. The Old Poor Law (or Speenhamland System) provided the

poor with a specific quantity of income assistance based on the price of bread and the size of their family; more specifically, when the gap between the price of bread and wages widened the parish would allocate poor relief funds to those workers and their families (Block & Somers 2003, p. 286). However, this created controversy, with critics arguing that it discouraged employers from paying a suitable wage, assured in the knowledge that it would be supplemented by the state. Moreover, opponents argued that because it was available to able-bodied workers too, the inevitable result was dependency and idleness. In 1786 Joseph Townsend's *Dissertation on the Poor Law* argued that without such state intervention the supply of food would eventually lead to the population of the poor reaching equilibrium (Block & Somers 2003, p. 287). Then in 1798, following a very similar vein - though without any mention of Townsend's pamphlet - Thomas Malthus published his *Essay on the Principle of Population*. Therein he argued that 'the labor market depends on a delicate self-regulating system in which a perfect equilibrium of supply and demand occurs only when it functions in its natural state of scarcity' (Block & Somers 2003, p. 288). The argument goes that without the necessary condition of scarcity, population burgeons unchecked and the incentive to work is undermined. Polanyi explained that what liberals inexplicably omitted is the fact that in order for a labour market to work labourers not only needed the allure of higher wages, but also the prospect of starvation (2001, p. 172). Similarly, Mencher states 'Poverty provided the incentive to work and restricted domestic consumption, thus encouraging production for foreign trade, and gave domestic industry a competitive advantage in foreign trade through low labour costs' (1967, pp. 87-88). Polanyi asserted that in order to release 'nature's penalty', hunger, 'it was necessary to liquidate organic society, which refused to let the individual starve' (2001, pp. 173).

Yet Block and Somers offer compelling evidence, based on recent scholarship, for an alternative account to the accepted Speenhamland narrative, or ‘perversity thesis’. They conclude that the success of the Speenhamland story (i.e. the aforementioned narrative created by the likes of Malthus) was its deflection of criticism away from other structural economic problems - including macroeconomic policy mistakes - which were the real causes of economic hardship among the poor. They state that ‘By shifting the blame for the problems on to Speenhamland and all its pernicious evils, the economic liberals successfully reframed the agricultural downturn into a problem of individual morality and an enduring parable of the dangers of government “interference” with the market’ (2003, p. 313). It is thus that Somers and Block (2005) state elsewhere that Malthus ideationally re-embeds the labour market.

‘For 500 years the poor has been a sociological classification of the propertyless that carried no moral judgement...The ideational regime change from poverty to perversity was all but triumphant’ (Somers and Block 2005, p. 276).

Essentially, by building on the intellectual insights of Polanyi, what the authors demonstrate is that ideas are vital contributing factors in shaping how the economic world is understood. Somers and Block assert that economic sociologists have ‘too often confined their institutionalist imaginations to the standard legal, political, and organizational structures of embeddedness’ and propose ‘expanding market embeddedness to include the ideas, public narratives, and explanatory systems by which states, societies, and political cultures construct, transform, explain, and normalise market processes’ (2005, p. 264).

Castree (2004) explains that there can be no conception of the economy divorced from the world of ideas. With reference to the ‘cultural turn’ in Human Geography, he

discusses debates between the sub-disciplines of Economic Geography and Cultural Geography⁴ over the so called ‘culture-economy nexus’. In his provocatively titled article ‘*Economy and culture are dead! Long live economy and culture!*’ Castree asserts:

‘To put it bluntly, polemically, and- with my tongue only partly in my cheek, I want to suggest that there are no such things as 'economy' and 'culture' ontologically speaking (whether separately or together). Rather, they are two powerful ideas whose continued use or imminent demise (whether in the academic realms of geography or in non-academic settings) says something important about the agendas of those propounding these ideas. This is not to deny that those ideas refer to real things - of course they do. But it is to insist that reference is conventional and also to recall that ideas have a force in their own right, rather than being mirrors of supposed ontological givens’ (2004, p. 206).

Castree reiterates Don Mitchell’s argument that ‘culture is ultimately an ideology: an infinitely flexible concept that powerful groups can and do use to govern others’, and thus, ‘[r]ather than interrogating what culture is, Mitchell believes a more productive task is for [cultural geographers]...to examine who defines 'culture', how and with what effects’ (Castree 2004, pp. 210-211). By extension, Castree explains, ‘if we take seriously Mitchell's suggestion that 'culture' is a concept that is constructed (and deconstructed) by myriad knowledge-producers (including academics), then we also need to take seriously the possibility that this argument applies to the concept of 'economy' too (Castree 2004, p. 212). Thus, Castree states that the economy is a ‘performative signifier’. When we talk about the economic we rarely specify what we are referring to and largely take as given the idea that it constitutes some objective and essential domain in our lives. Castree states that ‘Likewise, terms such as 'economic life', *the national economy*', 'economic activities' and so on routinely figure

⁴ The ‘new cultural geography’ that emerged from the late 1980s onwards drew on poststructuralist insights, in particular those of Foucault, and emphasised the importance of discourse in the contingent construction of meaning, and the role played by power in said construction (Jones *et al.* 2004).

in everyday life yet are rarely reflected upon or unpacked (2004, p. 217, emphasis added).

Within political economy approaches, the role of ideas has also been highlighted as important in shaping economic practices and structures. Mark Blyth has demonstrated the importance of ideas as determinants of institutional supply vis-à-vis purely structural theories of institutional supply (Blyth 1997; 2002). Considered in this way, Blyth (2002) explicates the ideational determinants for not just the institutionalisation of embedded liberalism as a reaction to the failures of classical liberalism after World War Two as Polanyi foresaw, but also the institutionalisation of neoliberalism, and thus the effective ‘disembedding’ of the economy again decades later as a reaction to the perceived failures of embedded liberalism. Mark Blyth is one of a number of scholars within the now growing sub-discipline of constructivist political economy, committed to demonstrating the role of ideas as determinants of political economy.

In short, constructivist political economy argues against wholly materialist and rationalist conceptions of political economy (Abdelal *et al.* 2010a; Blyth 2003; Abdelal 2009).

‘All political economy scholarship needs at least to consider, as a plausible hypothesis that economies might vary substantially for nonmaterial reasons. In other words, the field needs to engage more systematically with constructivism, a theoretical approach that emphasizes precisely those nonmaterial influences on both institutions and practices’ (Abdelal *et al.* 2010a, p. 2).

Similarly, Herrera stresses that

‘In addition to emphasizing the interaction between actors and institutional development, constructivist approaches to the economy consider the role of

norms, ideas, and ideology in shaping economic interests, rejecting the idea of economic interests as a direct reflection of economic conditions' (2010, p. 117; see also Herrera 2007).

Whereas in International Relations more broadly constructivism has become practically mainstream (although arguably less the case of more 'critical' constructionisms like poststructuralism), Abdelal *et al.* (2010b) argue that this is certainly not the case in international political economy (IPE). The unfortunate truth perhaps for scholars of political economy is that the economic (as far as it can even be said to meaningfully exist) is fundamentally uncertain and, therefore, unknowable in any *deterministic* sense.

Blyth (2002) argues that the economic world is inherently uncertain, given that it is a fundamentally human domain and a part of our social world. Herrera (2010) explains that according to rationalist-materialist accounts uncertainty comes only from a lack of information. She explains that the traditional cognitivist approach simply sees the mind as a calculator that computes objective material economic conditions. This underpins the concept of utility maximization 'in which individuals make choices that maximize utility by calculating the value of alternatives based on information and an ordered set of preferences' (Herrera 2010, p. 115). In contrast to this,

'constructivist approaches go further in that they reject the underlying objective economic reality in favor of the idea that economic reality is itself a social construction, that is, does not exist absent from human interaction, and the cognitive basis of constructivism departs significantly from the mind-as-calculator model' (Herrera 2010, p. 116).

It is such rationalist-materialist assumptions that underpinned a distorted conception of economic risks in the lead up to the global financial crisis. For many years the world's leading financial institutions sought to quantify risk and predict it accurately using complex modelling, and many actually thought that risk had been mastered and

finance enjoyed a ‘golden period’ of low interest rates, low volatility and high returns, but as financial institutions allowed themselves to become excessively leveraged, eventually ‘risk got ahead of the world’s ability to manage it’ (The Economist 2010, p. 3). Abdelal (*et al.* 2010b) point out how the ‘financial innovations of the past decades were based on the premise that risk was knowable, calculable, and possible to manipulate’.

‘Whereas some scholars and practitioners had come to believe that we really did live in a world of risk, as opposed to the uncertainty theorized by Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes the crisis of 2008-2009 clarifies once again that we do not have the “scientific basis,” in Keynes’s words, “to form a calculable probability”’ (Abdelal *et al.* 2010b).

It is rationalist-materialist conceptions of the economic that underpin the sorts of utilitarian arguments proffered in support of and against Scottish independence in the referendum debate. As explored in Chapter 6, it was conveyed to voters that it was possible, in principle at least, to calculate the value of either continued union or independence on a utility maximising basis (i.e. that they could ‘know’ whether they support independence or not), which aided the ‘depoliticisation’ of the debate.

It is worth noting at this juncture, however, that explanations, generalisations and predictions are not meaningless in economics, for the social world very clearly displays regularities. Humans and other ‘economic actors’ often do behave in rational and fairly predictable ways. Any conception of ‘the social world’ without the existence of such regularities (i.e. one in which there is continuous ‘flux’) would be impossible. It is just that those explanations, generalisations and predictions can never be posited in a causally deterministic fashion, neither in practice, nor in principle (see ‘Capacity for External Validity’ in Chapter 2-Methodology). Moreover, to stress the

necessary contingency of the ‘economic world’ is not to make an argument against empiricism in political economy approaches as is often inferred, but just a moderated form of empiricism (see Cameron & Palan 2009).

Imagining ‘The Economy’: A Coherent Spatial-Scalar Entity?

Not only is ‘the economic’ imagined as a largely objective and material domain of activity, but ‘the economy’ and economies, with regards really existing, concrete spatial-scalar entities are also imagined. In Jessop’s elaboration of a cultural political economy (CPE) based on critical semiotic analysis he outlines the following with regards the imagined nature of economies:

‘Substantively, at what orthodox economics misleadingly describes as the macro level, CPE distinguishes the “actually existing economy” as the chaotic sum of all economic activities (broadly defined as concerned with the social appropriation and transformation of nature for the purposes of material provisioning) from the economy (or, better, economies in the plural) as an imaginatively narrated, more or less coherent subset of these activities. The totality of economic activities is so unstructured and complex that it cannot be an object of calculation, management, governance, or guidance. Instead such practices are always oriented to subsets of economic relations (economic systems or subsystems) that have been discursively and, perhaps, organizationally and institutionally fixed as objects of intervention. This involves “economic imaginaries” that rely on semiosis to constitute these subsets. Moreover, if they are to prove more than “arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 376–377), these imaginaries must have some significant, albeit necessarily partial, correspondence to real material interdependencies in the actually existing economy and/or in relations between economic and extra-economic activities’ (Jessop 2004, p. 162).

As well as usefully illustrating the imagined nature of economies, the above quote reiterates the point that to talk of the imagined economy (either in terms of ‘the economic’ or ‘the economy’) is not suggest it has no foundation in reality.

However, consonant with the above insights of constructivist political economy that we cannot explain the economic by reference to material considerations alone, neither can we understand the basis for thinking about economies as discrete spatial-scalar entities by reference to underlying material or structural considerations alone. Such economic ‘realities’ exist, but they are often grossly overstated as well as discursively mediated. For instance, material factors such as physical geography, climate, natural resources, etc., may all play a part in shaping the geographical incidence of certain economic activities, whilst infrastructures of political and economic governance comprising currency arrangements, tax regimes, public expenditures, legal infrastructures, educational provisions, etc., can all play a part in demarcating economic activity into more or less coherent spaces or functional economic areas. In the case of a ‘European economy’, for instance, such factors as the single-market, the Schengen agreement, the single-currency, the common agricultural policy, etc., are all clearly important in shaping the geographical incidence of economic activity in Europe, as is their intention, but these governance practices/institutional infrastructures are the result of *political* decisions and are not merely reflective of an ontologically given economic space or entity any more than the institutions of the state are brought about to enable the governance of a pre-given political space. And yet, the idea of ‘the economy’ is important insofar as it has a performative significance in encouraging us to imagine a ‘real’ and governable space; in fact, it is more meaningful to view the idea and materiality of an economy as mutually constitutive.

Interestingly, ‘the economy’, as referring to a totality of economic relations (of production, circulation, exchange and consumption) within a given geographical area,

is actually a very modern invention and one that has come to pass not as a result of conceptual deliberation and advancement, but simply as a taken-for-granted (Mitchell 1998; see also Foucault 1978). Concepts such as the state and the nation (themselves intimately tied to imaginations of the economy) once occupied a similarly privileged and uncontested position, but whose ‘contestedness’ seems almost clichéd now within academic circles if not public discourse. The same cannot be said however for the concept of the economy, which remains very much uncontested, a seemingly apolitical expression of an actually existing ‘reality’ or ontological given. Mitchell suggests that,

‘the term seems more basic because it is still thought to refer to a material substrate, a realm with an existence prior to and separate from its representations, and thus to stand in opposition to the more discursive constructs of social theory’ (Mitchell 1998, p. 84)

Mitchell (1998) explains how the economy used only to refer to the notion of the good management (often in terms of frugality) of one’s money, an equivocal meaning that it carries to this day.

‘Between the 1920s and the 1950s, “the economy” came to refer to the structure or totality of relations of production, circulation and consumption within a given geographical space’ (Mitchell 2006, p. 183).

By way of illustration of this point, one can conduct a simple search of The Times electronic newspaper archives for reference to the economy over the last 100 years or so.

Before the late 1940s there is very scant mention of a ‘British economy’. Between 1785 and 1940 there are just seven mentions in total. Moreover, it only ever refers to the aforementioned antiquated meaning highlighted by Mitchell (1998). For example,

on Tuesday 2nd March 1947 a Mr John Bull writes; ‘true to the first maxim of British economy, “Take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves”’ (The Times 1947, Issue 19486; col. D). However, between 1941 and 1950 there are a further 82 mentions of ‘British economy’, between 1951 and 1960 there are 285, and between 1961 and 1970 there are 1283 (see Chapter 6 for a similar illustration using a search for ‘Scottish economy’). Mitchell posits that in addition to the influence of ideas of macroeconomics (and associated developments in statistics) and econometrics, the emergence of this new concept of the economy was concurrent with a revival of nationalist ‘imaginings’ in that era. In any event, the result was the now common-sense notion of a national economy as a coherent totality of economic relations within a given space.

Foucault’s work on ‘governmentality’ has interesting insights on the emergent concept of the economy too and helps to explain its significance for establishing governance capacities. Foucault argues that literature on the ‘art of government’ (including Rousseau’s work on political economy) is essentially concerned with how to introduce ‘economy’ into the management of the state. This is, however, drawing on an earlier use of the term economy within the family unit by the head (father) of the household; ‘the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family...and of making the family fortunes prosper’ (Foucault 1978, p. 92). This is essentially the earlier conception of ‘economy’ as highlighted by Mitchell as referring to the ‘management’ of money.

‘To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of

surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods' (Foucault 1978, p. 92).

However, Foucault goes on to stress that the word 'economy' has come to take on a new meaning. Whereas in the sixteenth century it signified purely a form of government, during the eighteenth century it comes to 'designate a level of reality, a field of intervention through a series of complex processes that I regard as absolutely fundamental to our history' (Foucault 1978, p. 93).

He goes on to explain that this is made possible due to the emergent concept of 'population' because 'prior to the emergence of population, it was impossible to conceive the art of government except on the model of the family' (Foucault 1978, p. 93). The idea of population, accorded a reality through phenomena identifiable by statistics (e.g. birth and death rates, diseases, cycles of scarcity, wealth, etc.) - many of which are irreducible to the level of the family or household - supplanted the family as *the* model of government. It was now possible to imagine a coherent body of people within a given geographical space, which was thitherto unimaginable. No longer did government have as its purpose the act of government itself, but the welfare and improvement of the population. What makes this possible is the modern concept of the economy, as it requires one to comprehend not just the people, but also material things, as well as interactions between peoples and things and all that can influence those interactions (e.g. climatic events, war, foreign trade, etc.). This last rather confusing sentence can be explained by using the analogy that Foucault uses when discussing the government of the family (and its application as the model of governance for the state); that is the analogy of a ship:

'What does it mean to govern a ship? It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but also the boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship also means to

reckon with winds, rocks and storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors who are taken care of and the ship which is to be taken care of, and the cargo which is to be brought safely to port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on; this is what characterises the government of a ship' (Foucault 1978, pp. 93-94).

Whilst here Foucault is talking of the family and its use as the model for government, the same can of course be said of the economy writ large, as a 'complex of men and things' that is (albeit with significant challenges) governable. He states:

'The new science called political economy arises out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of government, namely intervention in the field of economy and population' (Foucault 1978, p. 101).

This latterly mentioned notion of government intervention highlights a curious observation in the development of the 'the economy' as an entity deemed to spatially corresponded with the nation-state, while also being apart from it, with the state conveyed as a body that 'intervened' in it (Mitchell 2006, pp. 183-184). This helped to afford a frame of reference for 'the economy' and required governance solutions by governments.

However, this notion of 'intervention' is of course built on the aforementioned fallacious assumption that the economy refers to some sort of objective reality into which the state intervenes. The concept of interventionism relies on a state/market dichotomy that grossly simplifies 'reality' (See Bruff 2011). Moreover, insofar as *geographically specific* economies (e.g. national economies) can be said to meaningfully exist at all, they do so largely not *in spite of*, but *because of* these so called 'interventions' which shape and demarcate the incidence of economic activities within a given geographical space. In Chapter 3 it was stressed that the state 'has no

ontological status apart from the practices that constitute its reality' (Kuus & Agnew 2008, p. 98) and neither does the economy.

Singing the Economy into Existence

In order to render a political space governable one must also, to borrow a phrase from Smith (2004), sing it into existence. Tooze argues that,

'[T]he economy is not pre-existing reality, an object which we simply observe and theorise about. Our understanding of the "economy" as a distinct entity, a distinct social "sphere" or social "system", is the product of a dramatic process of imaginative abstraction and representational labour' (1998, pp. 213-214)

Mitchell (1998) shows us that the state played the critical role in the development of the idea of the (national) economy by being the authoritative actor providing representations of it as a discrete and knowable object by, among other things, producing (or sanctioning the production of) national economic statistics like gross national product.

'The emergence of macroeconomics, as the new science of this object was called, coincided with developments in statistics that made it possible to imagine the enumeration of what came to be known as the gross national product of an economy and with the invention of econometrics, the attempt to represent the entire working of an economy as a single mathematical model' (Mitchell 2006, p. 183)

Tomlinson too explains the role of national accounts - largely a response to the Great Depression - in the imagination of 'economic nationhood' (2014, p. 170).

Incidentally, he also stresses that:

'Torn from their original context as a way of understanding and measuring business cycles, national account measures have shown extraordinary persistence as measures of national economic performance and welfare

(despite being grossly ill-suited for this purpose, about which their originator, Simon Kuznets, was clear from the very beginning)' (Tomlinson 2014, p. 170)

Similarly, with the European economy, while other actors besides EU actors, such as national governments and national media, offer significant (probably more significant) 'voices' on the European economy, actors like the Commission play a crucial role in singing that space into existence.

'In the EU case, the emergence of an imagined spatial scalar order and its governing rationalities are co-constitutive, so that the emergent space of governance is constructed discursively, statistically and normatively in ways that enable the governance of that space to be undertaken by a particular (also) emergent agent' (Rosamond 2012, p. 2).

Rosamond's explains that not until the mid-1980s did 'the European economy' feature heavily in policy discourse from the Commission. At around this point the idea of an actual European economic space went from representing a future ideal, further down the line of integration, to being an ontological claim about the existence of an actual spatial/scalar entity.

Interestingly, devolution in the UK has brought with it more prominent territorial 'voices' for the regions, along with a new institutional architecture, which among other things is likely to have conferred a more authoritative voice to regional governance actors with regards to their respective 'economies'. It might be expected that there is a greater capacity for regional actors to sing their 'economies' into existence. Not that there is a deliberate policy of deception on the part of such actors in articulating a distinct corresponding economy, for it is merely reflective of the conferred responsibility of governments, politicians, media, chambers of commerce, and others, to speak and act on behalf of the space over which they are deemed to preside. It is simply the case that naturalised assumptions about 'the economy' and

attendant governing legitimacies provide an 'accepted' frame of reference (or discursive context) within which said actors must 'speak'. Nevertheless, in doing so they help to sing 'the economy' into existence; they make it 'real' in the everyday lives of people, and help to obscure the fact that it is otherwise a largely imaginative abstraction.

Both the quantification and qualification of 'the economy' are important for its imagination. Quantification is crucial in taking an economic space that is 'nameable' and conveying it as 'knowable' and contributing towards its 'naturalization' (Rosamond 2012). We have already seen the importance of the production of national statistics (Mitchell 2006, p. 183), which are the result of statistical abstractions that nevertheless appear to speak to a largely discrete population and an homogenous context. A good example of this is nationally reported statistics on inward investment. UK Trade and Investment (now the Department for International Trade) reported better than ever figures for foreign direct investment (FDI) into the UK for 2014-2015, making it the number one destination for FDI in Europe, and this despite an 11% fall in global FDI stock (UKTI 2015). Putting aside the matter of the state often appropriating inward investment as something largely effected and owned by it - regardless of whether the state was actually instrumental in bringing the investment or not - what these aggregated figures are clearly intended to convey is the vitality (through 'investability') of the UK economy. There is nothing wrong with that per se, but it clearly exaggerates the extent to which the UK is a bordered space, exhibiting

some sort of homogeneity of context vis-à-vis its ‘outside’ in terms of both opportunities and challenges for inward investment⁵.

The statistical representation of the economy at the supranational level is similarly telling. Shore notes how ‘invented’ ‘Euro-statistics’ such as Eurobarometer and Eurostat are ‘powerful political instruments for creating a knowable, quantifiable and hence more tangible and governable ‘European population’ and ‘European space’ (Shore 2000 cited in Rosamond 2002, p. 164). Elsewhere, Rosamond (2012) points this out where he demonstrates the coming to pass of articulations of ‘the European economy’ in (the Commission’s) formal policy discourse. He cites, among other examples, the importance of Eurostat in 1992 reclassifying intra-EU trade as ‘internal market’ rather than transactions between member-states, while trade between EU states and external parties became ‘foreign trade’ (Rosamond 2012, p. 15).

In addition to quantification, an economy’s qualification can be important too; it helps to render it ‘known as’ (Rosamond 2012). As elaborated upon above, it is the general recognition of constructivist political economy and economic sociology alike, that ideas about ‘the economic’ are crucial to its governability. Particular ideas, or sets of ideas (or discourses) are crucial to the ‘interpellation’ of economic identities and, related to which, the determination of economic interests. However, such ideas, or discourses, can easily be ascribed a geographical quality. For example, whilst the economy may indeed be thought of as a material and largely non-political entity, it can still be thought of as something to be governed in accordance with certain,

⁵ It is worth noting that the language of investment too (e.g. foreign, domestic, inward), is itself culpable for conveying a bordered national space.

shared ethical commitments. The concept of ‘communities of shared fate’ is very useful in helping to explain how the economy is imagined and will be briefly explored below. This concept can help us better understand how through the economy’s assumed materiality we can imagine our fates as materially bound up with those of fellow citizens. Crucially, shared ideas about how the economy should be governed (including accordance with ethical or normative concerns we may have) are not strictly necessary in its imagination, but may well be of significance.

A Shared Economic Fate:

Entitativity, a psychological term coined by Campbell (1958), illustrates how individuals might perceive themselves as a part of a group that is ‘real’, as opposed to merely an aggregate of individuals (see also Risse 2003). Willett (2016, p. 440) explains how in the development of narratives about place, assemblages of signs, symbols, practices and institutions are important for their construction. In many ways this explains how ‘the economy’ is successfully imagined as a spatial-scalar entity through the associated myriad of objects, symbols, institutions, networks, practices etc., all of which are given to shape our lived experiences of ‘the economy’ and reinforce it as ‘real’. As Risse explains, these things ‘have to be constantly reified in order to become meaningful objects of identification (2003, p. 489-490). It is such that the ‘fact’ of ‘the economy’ is naturalised as an objective truth. Essentially, we must be mindful of the ‘banal’ (Billig 1995) in imaginations of the economy, in much the same way as it has been shown to be crucial in imaginations of the nation (Anderson 2006). An illustrative example of how entitativity with the economy is fostered related to the adoption of national currencies. Given the importance of

articulations of economic insecurities pertaining to currency within the referendum debate (see Chapters 7 & 8), it is worth briefly discussing this matter.

To an extent, the money in our pockets is an everyday reminder that we are part of a shared territorial community. As a common means of exchange, territorial currencies encourage us to imagine an aggregated totality of economic relations, a coherent system of economic activity (i.e. 'the economy'). Eric Helleiner (1997) shows how territorial currencies arrived in the 19th century - long after the Westphalian state - in Britain, then other West European countries, the US and Japan, before spreading to Latin America and Eastern Europe, and finally Africa and the newly independent countries following the end of formal colonialism. Before territorial currencies, many different forms of 'money' existed alongside one another; foreign and domestic currency, local currencies, as well as of course - especially for much the poor - traditional bartering. Eventually territorial currencies were authoritatively established and widely circulated (no longer as weighted coins seen to have intrinsic value but as standardised coins with 'token value') and 'local currencies' were outlawed. The establishment of territorial currencies presented a standardised means of exchange, unit of account and store of value, as the general definition goes. Moreover, they helped citizens to imagine a distinct territorial economic entity; and more generally served 'as a constant everyday reminder to people of the fact that they were members of what nationalists considered to be a common, homogenous community' (Helleiner 1997). Reciprocally, Helleiner argues that faith in territorial currencies was likely underpinned by the attachment to imagined national communities.

[A] territorial currency was homogenous and was used by everyone in the nation on a daily basis. It thus acted as a constant everyday reminder to people of the fact that they were members of what nationalists considered to be a common, homogenous community' (Helleiner 1997).

Likewise, Hymans (2004) points out that money plays a part in what Billig (1995) refers to as 'banal nationalism', and discusses at length patterns in the changing iconography found on territorial currencies, and how the analysis of which can help us to understand the changing content of national and EU identities. Interestingly, Scotland has a tradition of printing its own Scottish bank notes with their own Scottish iconography and it would be interesting to see research done on what significance, if any, this might have for the imagination of a distinct Scottish economy, despite not actually representing a separate currency from that used in the rest of the UK (Pound Sterling). It is likely not a coincidence that threats to Scottish banknotes featured (marginally) debates over independence (See for example The Guardian 2013, 'Scottish banknotes: the Treasury's symbolic hostage in the independence debate').

Campbell (1958) highlighted a 'common fate' as one of three cues by which individuals might perceive the entitativity of a group. This is congruent with Williams' (2003) concept of a 'community of shared fate', a term used consistently throughout this thesis. A 'community of shared fate' helps to usefully describes how the taken-for-granted idea of the economy might serve to unite people under the assumption that their lives are bound up along a shared trajectory, irrespective of whether they see themselves as sharing an especially close sense of political identity.

'Like national identity, a conception of citizenship as shared fate requires that individuals be able to imagine themselves in a network of relationships with other human beings, some of whom they may never meet face-to-face. But in contrast to national identity, there is nothing in the idea of shared fate to require

that it is a shared cultural identity or heritage that links human beings in bonds of interdependence and mutual accountability. Although shared cultural identity may be one source of a subjective sense of shared fate, it is not the only source' (Williams 2003, p. 102).

Thus, whilst it is reasonable to assume that in some sense a Scottish national or cultural identity is an important pre-cursor for the idea of a Scottish economy (at the very least the idea of 'Scotland' is needed for the idea of a 'Scottish economy'), it is not clear that the idea of the economy necessarily requires strong identification with a Scottish nation. Rosamond stresses in the case of the 'European economy':

'Affinities to 'heroic' ideas of 'Europe' may indeed form the basis for the sorts of loyalty transference that would enable millions of consumers and other economic agents to consider themselves European. However, this would not negate the existence of limited, but nevertheless significant, intersubjectivities around the idea of Europe as a bounded economic area populated by European actors' (2002, p. 162).

Crucially, subjects need not necessarily associate normatively with the entities in question for them to seem real.

'A community of shared fate is not an ethical community as such. Its members are not bound to each other by shared values or moral commitments, but by relations of interdependence, which may or may not be positively valued by its members. Our futures are bound to each other, whether we like it or not. There is no plausible alternative to living-together. In this way, a community of shared fate is a descriptive rather than a normative category' (Williams 2003, p. 101).

One example Williams gives is of institutional interdependence, but she points out that 'Material linkages are also important sources of shared fate, whether in the form of *economic interdependence*, environmental impact, or natural resource access and use' (2003, p. 102 emphasis added). This thesis is obviously interested in how people imagine their 'economic interdependence'. Indeed, for the vast majority of us our economic prospects are indeed bound up with those of others to some extent, for we are not self-sufficient for our wants and needs. In that respect our fates are bound up

with those of others through ‘material linkages’. However, the *extent* to which our fates are bound up with our fellow national citizens is exaggerated.

Whilst a common political identity, or shared norms, may not be essential to the idea of a shared economic fate, such things can be important. Williams argues that a shared community of fate is generally a descriptive rather than normative category, but she also stresses that said communities may be more or less legitimate in the minds-eye of its constituents; ‘legitimacy consists in the ability to justify actions to those who are affected by them according to reasons they can accept’ (2003, p. 101), or reiterating Rawls’, a well-ordered society exists where people ‘*agree* to share one another’s fate’ (Rawls 1971 cited in Williams 2003, p. 102). It is here that an ‘ethical community’ may also be important in legitimating governance capacities pertaining to ‘the economy’. For people in Scotland who do have strong cultural affinities to the Scottish nation, it may help legitimise a corresponding economic community of fate in their eyes. Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 3, economic rationalities and expressions of national identity, far from being mutually exclusive, may often be reinforcing where discursive practices effectively appropriate national identity in legitimating economic rationalities (Willett 2013; Willett & Tredinnick-Rowe 2016; Bond *et al.* 2003).

Incidentally, such national, cultural affinities cannot furnish economic subjects with ideas specifically about ‘the economy’ and how it ought to be governed. In fact, they do not tell us how governance ought to be conducted at all. Essentially, the significance of national identity is limited and specific by virtue of the fact that it addresses a limited and specific set of questions. Freedon (1998) argues

that nationalism ought not to be viewed as a distinct ideology for this very reason, arguing instead that it should be seen as either a ‘thin-centred’ ideology (an example of which he gives is feminism), or, alternatively, not as a coherent ideology at all. In the case of the latter we would expect to see it instead ‘as a component of other, already existing, ideologies’ (Freeden 1998, p. 751). Instead, another means of fostering a shared ‘ethical community’ might be through the articulation of a sense of shared normative ideals pertaining to how ‘the economy’ should be governed. As explained in Chapter 3 with regards the rise of Scottish nationalism, and as elaborated upon further in Chapter 8 with regards articulations of economic (in)security, there have clearly been concerted efforts by Scottish nationalists to foster a distinct ‘ethical community’ around shared values of social democracy. Of course there is nothing necessarily Scottish about social democracy, and yet it is often articulated as being an important component of a Scottish civic identity that is more egalitarian than its English neighbour. This could be viewed as an example of Freeden’s observation above, namely that nationalism is often ‘a component of other, already existing, ideologies’ (Freeden 1998, p. 751).

Another way to conceptualise the role of an ethical community of fate for the idea of the economy (aside from the widely held view of a shared material community of fate) is as ascribing a ‘personality’ to the economy. Rosamond (2012) posits a three-stage model for understanding how economic spaces are discursively constructed: 1) The naming of a space that is potentially *knowable*; 2) The point at which that space becomes legible or *known* (e.g. it is statistically representable); and 3) Where the space is invested with a ‘personality’ and becomes *known as*. In the previous section of this chapter we saw the importance of statistics in the quantification of the

economy. If this is dealt with in the second stage of Rosamond's model, where an economy becomes 'known', then the conveyance of a shared ethical community is represented by the third and final stage, the attribution of a 'personality' representing shared ideas about how it *should* be governed (see also Fetzer and Gilgrist forthcoming⁶). Whether conceived of in terms of 'ethical communities', 'personalities', or even 'economic cultures', it is the case that intersubjectively shared norms pertaining to the 'rightful' governance of an economic space may also be important in its imagination and in the establishment of governing legitimacies.

Conclusion: Post Structuralism and Challenging the Taken-for-Granted Economy

We have seen in this chapter that the economy is largely imagined, both as a taken-for-granted material domain (the economic) and as something that tends to be more or less geographically discrete and a contextual determinant of a shared community of fate. But what does it matter if the economy is imagined? More specifically with regards the empirical focus of this thesis, what does it matter with regards the referendum on Scottish independence?

Taken-for-granted assumptions of traditional IPE approaches about the economic, such that it is re/represented as an objective, material domain of activity, populated by rational actors, have the capacity to effectively de-politicise arguments wherein it is used to mobilise public opinion. As de Goede stresses:

⁶ This article looks at the importance of discourses pertaining to a European Social Model for investing the European Economy with a 'personality'.

‘Poststructuralism offers the possibility to open up the domain of economic and financial reality to political questioning, a possibility denied by the prepolitical nature of a realm of hard facts or a refractory reality. Moving beyond economism requires the recognition that *neither* the politics/economics distinction, *nor* the idealism/realism distinction, exist beyond their historical articulation’ (de Goede 2003, p. 91).

De Goede explains that conventional approaches to political economy, and even more progressive, critical approaches to IPE, ‘rest upon a prior conceptual separation between the material sphere of the economic and the ideational sphere of the political, which is precisely being questioned within poststructuralist work’ (de Goede 2003, pp. 90-91). It is these assumptions of political economy, of rationalism and materialism, which make arguments such as those articulated by nationalists and unionists (based on purported factual analyses of the economy), appear meaningful and apolitical when they are not. It is argued in Chapter 6 that economic arguments for and against Scottish independence were misleading and unsatisfactory, built on taken-for-granted rationalist accounts of political economy, and taken-for-granted assumptions about ‘the (Scottish) economy’ as a functioning totality. It was suggested that voters in Scotland could (and should) objectively calculate whether or not independence was in their best material interests. As will be shown, this was never realistic, and the result was an inevitably sterile and ‘de-politicized’ debate on independence.

Crucially, poststructuralism asks: ‘how does power operate...within specific contexts to stabilize – with a tendency to normalize and depoliticize – particular discourses and their effects’ (Peterson 2006, p. 6). As outlined in the methodology, poststructuralism is essentially interested in interrogating the importance of discourse and representation. Unlike the (rationalist) mainstream of international political economy,

poststructuralism is not interested in the ‘objective pursuit of cumulative knowledge’ (de Goede 2006, p. 21).

‘It should be clear that the agenda of the study of world politics shifts under the recognition of the politics of representation: from the (objective) study of material capabilities, national interests, and economic power, to the study of, for example, the practices of representation of danger, security and violence (Campbell 1998, Coward 2002; Weldes 1999; Luoma-aho 2004), to a critical assessment of the rationalist myths of political projects (Hansen & Williams 1999)’ (de Goede 2006, p.6).

Rather than busy itself with the (objective) study of material economic considerations deemed pertinent to the independence referendum debate then, this research is instead interested in the discursive or representative significance of articulations of those supposedly objective material considerations - with specific regard to representations of security and threat - and with challenging the rationalist myths that make such articulations possible. Griffin (2011) comments that within IPE the term ‘critical’ is widely interpreted, but, that it can be usefully described as ‘a willingness to challenge the taken-for-granted’ and conduct ‘research that resists closure, [in favour of]...proliferating possibilities’ (Shephard 2010 cited in Griffin 2011, p. 43).

Poststructuralism reminds us that all meaning is constantly re/constructed or re/articulated, and whilst in some circumstances, certain ideas, or discourses, become so naturalised, or taken-for-granted, that they appear a-political, objectivity can always be challenged and established ideas can once more re-enter the ‘play of practice’(see Methodology). It is the aim of critical investigation to highlight such taken-for-granted truths and reveal their contingency.

‘The economy’ is essentially a discourse insofar as it represents a complex system of signification which imparts meaning upon what is in fact a largely disparate and

amorphous set of social activities. As a discourse which shapes how we view of 'realities' it is enormously powerful. So much so that it cannot even be viewed as a 'hegemonic discourse' because it falls beyond that and into the realm of 'objectivity' in the language of discourse theory (see Chapter 2-Methodology). To all intents and purposes 'the economy' is real. Though we might dispute the extent to which the spatial integrity of given economies is preserved or challenged (e.g. through 'globalisation') there is an unquestioned agreement that these things exist as a real systems shaping our economic circumstances. To speak of the Cornish, Scottish, UK or European economy is implicitly to speak, to some extent at least, of the prospects for people living there, even though we know this to be largely an abstraction of economic 'realities'. It is through a myriad of discursive practices economies are imaginatively consolidated so as to appear 'real', and crucially, those imaginations are inevitably 'political' and require continuous discursive 'effort'. One of the ways in which these discursive efforts can be evidenced is through an analysis of utterances of economic (in)security. This is the topic of the next chapter, wherein it will be argued that economic (in)security and the idea of 'the economy' are inextricably linked.

Chapter 5: Economism and the Scottish Independence

Referendum

On September 18th 2014 voters in a Scottish independence referendum were asked the yes/no question: "Should Scotland be an independent country?" Scotland voted 'no' to independence from the United Kingdom by a margin of 55% to 45%.

Unsurprisingly, the referendum generated huge interest given the prospect of a 300 year old political union being dissolved. Some commentators argued that the referendum debate was a boon for democracy (see Mullen 2016, pp. 23-25). At the time, the First Minister for Scotland and leader of the SNP, Alex Salmond, spoke of a "democratic sensation" (BBC 2014a) in Scotland. However, whilst it may have generated greater civic engagement in Scotland, far from being a boon for democracy, this chapter argues that by focusing so heavily on the economics of independence the debate was de-politicised and the electorate ultimately misinformed, thereby limiting the transparency and accountability one might expect from a democratic exercise. Crucially, this particular constitutional debate is by no means exceptional in this regard. Not only were the economic *implications* of independence the main consideration, but the key protagonists among both nationalists and unionists made explicit *cases for or against* independence on almost exclusively economic lines.

Making an almost exclusively economic case for or against independence is unfortunate *in principle* because it suggests that voters *should* have made their decision through rational, unemotional calculation, when in fact it is unavoidably

political. MacPhee (2014) asks ‘if we, the voters, simply cast our votes on the basis of how our markets and economies function, where is the real democracy?’ Moreover, it is highly misleading, as it suggests voters could have *known* what the right decision was on a utility-maximising basis in the first place, based on the assumption that the outcomes of independence could be rationally and objectively calculated. This was always impossible in practical terms given the indeterminacies involved (see Chapter 4, ‘Knowing’ the economy’), but also misleading insofar as it relies upon the assumption that people in Scotland live out their lives within a significantly agglomerated economic system, or shared material community of fate (see Chapter 4).

To all intents and purposes the claims and counter-claims of nationalists and unionists regarding the economic prospects of an independent Scotland could be seen as struggles by each to assert their claim to the truth about independence, a truth presumably un-muddied by politics and emotional sentiment. Poststructuralism reminds us to be wary of apparent truths and to remember that truths are always conditioned by politics and power (Torfing 2005; see Methodology). In this instance the ‘hidden’ politics of the referendum campaign pertain to taken-for-granted truths regarding the separation of the economic and the political (de Goede 2003; Bruff 2011; Griffin 2011) and the associated notion that voters could know the economic outcomes of independence and *ought* to cast their vote on that basis. They also pertain the taken-for-granted truths about the existence of ‘the (Scottish or UK) economy’ as an aggregated spatial-scalar entity (Rosamond 2002; Mitchell 1998 & 2006) and encompassed populace over which governance can be exercised and authority legitimised.

These truths make it such that it was possible for protagonists to articulate arguments for or against independence that seem ‘a-political’ and divorced from the apparently less measured and unemotional considerations of nationalism, whilst conveying that voters in Scotland ought consider themselves as largely bound up in a shared material community of economic fate within which they have an especially shared experience of the opportunities and/or vulnerabilities of independence. As has been shown, the dichotomy between the political and the economic is false, and the extent to which it is meaningful to talk about ‘the economy’, it can only be as a fundamentally political space.

The Independence Debate and the Imagined Economy

The independence debate massively exaggerated the extent to which one can usefully talk about ‘the (Scottish) economy’ as a discrete, aggregated spatial-scalar entity. It served as a taken-for-granted in both unionist and nationalist arguments; as an organising referent, or trope, around which economic arguments for independence were made possible, based on the assumption of collective economic (in)security. Using evidence from nationalist and unionist ‘texts’, this proposition will be developed fully in Chapters 7 & 8. But taking as given this core assumption of economistic arguments for and against independence obscures the fact that the economy is a largely imaginative, political abstraction.

It was stressed in Chapter 4 how in the 1930s and 1940s the advent of the concept of the economy as referring to a ‘structure or totality of relations of production, circulation and consumption within a given geographical space’ (Mitchell 2006, p.

183) made it possible for nation-states to re-imagine themselves with reference to a 'natural' and bounded entity.

'the development of the economy as a discursive object between the 1930s and the 1950s provided a new language in which the nation-state could speak for itself and imagine its existence as something natural, bounded and subject to political management' (Mitchell 1998, p. 90).

In exactly the same way, Scottish nationalists were able to articulate arguments for self-governance on the basis of a naturally existing Scottish economy, populated by Scottish economic actors/subjects, bound together in a material economic community of fate. In other words it is conveyed as the important context for, and determinant of, the economic circumstances, (in)security and life-chances of people living in Scotland. But just as Bristow (2005) stresses how regional competitiveness discourses exaggerate the extent to which we can usefully talk about the regional economy as the determining context shaping the circumstances – either favourably or unfavourably – of economic actors who happen to be located within said region, so do protagonists in the independence debate where they talk about the economic prospects and security of Scots; arguably even more so. Insofar as it is meaningful talk about a 'Scottish economy', it can only be with reference to a political space (i.e. insofar as it corresponds with an already existing and accepted political community of some sort).

For example, whilst it seems largely justifiable that voters in Scotland might vote for independence if they could be convinced they would be better off, the notion of Londoners voting for an independent London on the same grounds seems almost absurd, despite the fact that one could easily argue that in aggregate terms a London city-state would be fiscally better off. London greatly outperforms the rest of the UK on almost all indicators of prosperity (see Dunnell 2009) and in many respects is

economically far more different or distinct from the rest of the UK than can be said to be true of Scotland (BBC 2013a; McCann 2016). Ironically, it has been argued that the uneven spatial development of London vis-à-vis the rest of the UK is in part to blame for demands for greater devolution in UK regions: ‘Irrespective of the result of the Scottish independence referendum, the UK faces a deepening political crisis stemming from the growing economic chasm between London and the rest of the country’ (Cumbers 2014, p. 34).

In chapter 4 it was stressed how previously ‘economy’ referred only to the notion of financial prudence - an equivocal meaning that it still carries. In Chapter 4, searches of The Times electronic archive were used to illustrate this point in the case of the British economy. Similarly, in the case of Scotland, between 1785 and 1948 there are eight mentions of ‘Scottish economy’. Where uttered it only refers to it in the more antiquated sense. Only from 1949 do articles start referring to a totality of economic activity in Scotland as the ‘Scottish economy’. As with the British economy, there seems to have been an exponential growth in its mention from this point onwards. A search for ‘Scottish economy’ between 1949 and 1986 produces 411 citations. Noteworthy perhaps is the fact that there are only 38 citations before 1960. Thereafter Scottish nationalism started to make significant advances. Just as it would have made little sense previously to talk of the British economy as distinct from the British Empire, it is perhaps no coincidence that the idea of a discrete Scottish economy was more widely imagined, or at the very least uttered, beyond the point at which the Scottish benefits of empire seemingly dissipated, and Scottish nationalism found increasing favour (see Chapter 3. One early mention of the Scottish economy is particularly interesting:

‘The Border is no economic barrier: England and Scotland are part of one economic system. Nevertheless, the segment to the north “is a distinct society with a unity and cohesion of its own.” It is natural to study it therefore by comparing its features with those of the unity south of the Border. The result is to show an “industrial economy lagging behind the rest of the country” (The Times 1954).

What we see here is a rather awkward juxtaposition at play between two seemingly inextricable yet distinctive economic spaces; the article argues that there is a distinct Scottish economy, which nevertheless is part of the same economic system as England/UK. This slightly awkward proposition, as will be seen in the next chapter, is also evident in articulations of the Scottish economy throughout the independence debate. As we have seen, the economy is to all intents imagined and not real.

It is therefore unsurprising that there will be inconsistencies like this in how economies are imagined spatially. However, one could argue that whilst both the Scottish and UK economies are imagined insofar as they are not ‘natural’ entities, it might be said that there are material or structural justifications for their imagination, as material economic flows of goods, capital and people can be spatially determined through forms of institutionalisation (e.g. currencies, regulations, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, public investment, etc.). Given the unions history and the heavily integrated nature of economic activity within the UK one could argue that the Scottish economy is perhaps especially imagined insofar as there is little, if any, material or structural justification for talking about it as a discrete spatial-scalar entity in spite of the continued existence of institutional independence in such matters as law and education in Scotland under union.

An important observation is that if there were such a thing as a Scottish economy functionally speaking, and indeed a Welsh economy, then presumably it would be meaningful to talk about an English economy too, as the bit that is left of the British economy, excluding Northern Ireland of course. However, searches of The Times online newspaper archive suggests that seemingly one does not really speak of the English economy. Moreover, where one does, it is in relation to the other regions, principally Scotland. The ‘English economy’ is mentioned just 8 times in all between 1785 and 1985, the first of which being in 1953 and the last in 1981. In only one instance it is referred to without mention of either Wales or Scotland (it talks about 16th Century English inns and public houses), but in all others it is mentioned in relation to sub-state nationalist questions in either Wales or Scotland. Compare this with mentions of the Welsh economy, where from 1947 it is mentioned in 71 different articles, or mentions of the Scottish economy, which as stated above featured 411 times in all. The English economy is probably taken to be synonymous with the UK economy, but in any event there is clearly far less discursive effort to encourage the imagination of an English economy. The English economy is not any less real. This is just symptomatic of the fact that articulations of the economy are politically motivated, intended to speak to the (legitimate) governance of a given space.

The Economics of Independence: ‘Knowing’ the economic

The idea of a ‘Scottish economy’ may be a relatively modern one, but as elaborated upon in Chapter 3, economic issues have always been central to the Union both in terms of its legitimation and de-legitimation. In the lead up to the independence referendum, it was clear that the economic implications of independence would be

central to the debate. Dekavalla's (2016) longitudinal study of media (newspaper) commentary on the referendum found that the economic consequences of Scottish independence dominated content. Moreover, a BBC documentary on July 7th 2014, presented by Robert Peston, entitled 'Scotland: For Richer For Poorer' (BBC 2014c) conveyed that the independence debate was fundamentally characterised by economics and aimed to gauge how Scotland's economy will be affected by independence, asking the question of whether Scotland would be richer or poorer. In May 2014, a study of business attitudes to constitutional change was published by the Scottish Chambers of Commerce and the Economic and Social Research Council (Bell & McGoldrick 2014). From a survey of 759 businesses in Scotland it reported that the majority of business saw economic considerations such as taxes, business regulation and currency as significantly important to their views on independence. Moreover, it showed that the importance of those issues in the constitutional debate had significantly increased between 2013 and 2014. Incidentally, it reported that 'SCC members see more business risks than business opportunities being associated with independence' (Bell & McGoldrick 2014).

For the SNP's part, it not only stressed from the outset the importance of considering the possible economic *implications* of independence, but made an explicit economic *case* for independence. This was clearly evident from Scottish Government publications like 'Scotland's Economy: The Case for Independence' (2013a), 'Building Security and Creating Opportunity: Economic Policy Choices in an Independent Scotland' (2013b), and the White Paper on independence: 'Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland' (2013c). Each of these documents cites Scotland's many economic successes and its viability as an autonomous

economic unit, whilst also urging that the union (or the policies of ‘Westminster’ governments) strongly hamper the Scottish economy. Talking a day in advance of the publication of the White Paper on independence, Salmond (2013) emphasised what he and the Scottish government saw as the most important issues for Scots in the debate: “jobs, economic growth and security”. It is worth noting that one must assume ‘security’ in this instance to pertain to economic security given the focus on economic concerns to the virtual exclusion of what one might consider more ‘conventional’ security considerations (See Chapter 7). Unionists were equally focussed on the economics of independence, albeit of course stressing the negative economic implications of independence vis-à-vis the security afforded by union. The details of these opposing arguments are elaborated upon in Chapter 7 and 8, with supporting empirical evidence.

It is argued here that these economic arguments are essentially arguments of economic (in)security, and that the fundamental consideration for people in Scotland to consider is how independence will impact upon their (collective) economic (in)security. This argument is developed fully in subsequent chapters. Chapters 7 & 8 will elaborate upon the numerous, yet often related, economic insecurities articulated by unionists and nationalists in support of their respective positions, drawing evidence specifically from an analysis of ‘texts’ from the official unionist and nationalist campaigns respectively. One of the key insecurities for both, one which remained central to the debate throughout, pertains to the perceived strength of an independent Scotland’s public finances. In many ways this was the core focus of the economic debate, with many of the other articulated insecurities stemming from this one or being directly related to it. Where the economics of independence have been

important with regards secessionist movements elsewhere in the world (e.g. Catalonia and Quebec) it is this aspect of ‘economics’ that perhaps unsurprisingly has tended to dominate debate.

Unsurprisingly, unionists argued that Scotland’s finances would be worse off and nationalists argued that they would be better off under independence. Without going into the finer details of these arguments, it is fair to say that it was never clear which side was correct. In Chapter 3 the importance of the discovery of oil in the North Sea in the 1970s is thought to have had significant implications for the subsequent rise of SNP support, as it was suddenly possible to see Scottish independence as fiscally viable. This was important since Scotland has typically been regarded as dependent upon the UK for fiscal transfers. In many respects the ‘disputedness’ of figures regarding the economics of independence is the result of the increasing recognition that Scotland is now far better placed vis-à-vis the rest of the UK in terms of its balance of revenue and expenditure, in contrast to what had been a long-standing discourse of Scottish dependency (Brown *et al.* 1996); a marked difference, for example, to the economic case for Welsh independence where financial dependencies on Westminster more greatly undermine the case for secession (See Keating & Loughlin 1997; for a Welsh nationalist perspective on Welsh economic dependency see Price 2011).

The significant focus of both unionist and nationalist arguments on the fiscal viability of an independent Scottish state is not surprising. In fact, a failure to do so by either side would have almost certainly have been portrayed as irresponsible, since it pertains to the capacity to deliver the key functions of the state. In one respect, arguments over

fiscal viability of an independent Scotland do speak to a shared Scottish circumstance in a way that other arguments pertaining to the general health of ‘the economy’ writ broadly do not, given that the latter is largely an imaginative abstraction, whilst the former pertains (albeit marginally) more truthfully to the economic ‘realities’ of Scottish people. And yet, such arguments are typically built upon, and help to further perpetuate, a fundamental conflation between the ‘public purse’ and ‘the (imagined) economy’ writ broadly, which exaggerates the extent to which the health of public finances speak especially to the wider ‘economic realities’ in Scotland and the shared economic prospects of actors/subjects therein. Obviously, the two are related to an extent, but they are not the same thing. There are likely many reasons for this conflation, not least the fact that the territorial state is assumed to be synonymous with the territorial economy and governments are taken to be both the authoritative voices on the economy and almost solely responsible for steering them (see Chapter 4) – an exaggeration that generally serves to their advantage when the economy is considered buoyant, but which is frequently denied when things look bleak. This conflation between the public purse and the (imagined) ‘economy’ writ broadly is not made clear in the arguments of either nationalists or unionists for the most part, the result being the same; they appear to speak to a broad Scottish community of fate with an especially shared economic (in)security.

Regardless of this conflation, there would always have been significant difficulties with estimating the public financial implications of independence. For, example, one could not be sure of an independent Scotland’s capacity to borrow money at favourable rates, Scotland’s inherited debt and the interest it would pay on that debt, the future price of North Sea oil and gas, growth projections and changing

demographics (e.g. immigration rates and population ageing), nor the infinitude of other unknowns, including economic forces or trends beyond Scotland's 'borders', and outwith an independent Scottish government's control (McLean *et al.* 2014, see also HM Government 2014b). Even excluding all contextual influencing factors, one could not second-guess the economic and fiscal policy choices of future Scottish governments. As one prominent supporter of union stressed, 'Economic success or failure of an independent state depends on the policies it follows, and indeed, the range of economic choices it could in principle make...is remarkably wide' (Gallagher 2014). Indeed, it was always impossible to 'know' what the financial implications of independence might be, due in principle to the inherent uncertainty of 'the economic' (see Chapter 4) and in practice to the disputedness of *estimated* figures on aspects like public finances.

With regard the latter one need only look at the disputed figures being reported by each side in same month of May 2014. In terms of the main governmental stakeholders we see the UK Government stating each person in Scotland will remain £1400 per year better off under union (HM Government 2014a) whilst the Scottish Government (2014a) claimed that each person in Scotland would be £1000 per year better off under independence. Likewise Business for Scotland (2014) argued in no uncertain terms that Scotland will be better off if independent. One interview respondent, a Labour MSP who was strongly in favour of union, was unusually candid about the impossibility of giving economic certainties.

"It used to be the case that a lot of the arguments against Scottish independence were that Scotland would be worse off, that we would certainly be worse off and that we wouldn't survive. It was talking Scotland down. And I think most of us have moved away from even referring to this argument, because it's not a

healthy argument to have. But on the other side there is not an absolute, [that]it would survive or it wouldn't survive. Scotland will be what it is. I think we will be far better in a union with others, but I can't say for sure...So therefore what are you left with? If you can't say absolutely for sure then you are left with making a judgement on loads of other things" (Respondent A)

Far from wishing to focus on the relative merits of the economic arguments for and against independence, the intention here conversely is to posit the futility of doing so. The same has been said of the annually produced, and annually disputed, Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland (GERS) figures, which Cuthbert & Cuthbert (2011) stress began as 'an essentially political document', but is now 'the focus of an inherently sterile annual debate', wherein figures can easily be used to support either union or independence. Focusing on the disputed figures of independence in the lead up to the referendum served to de-politicise and sterilise political debate too.

Whilst it would have always been impossible in practice to reliably calculate what the public finances of an independent Scotland would be, almost irrespective of that fact, neither unionists or nationalists were ever going to concede their position. However, whilst unclear, it is probably fair to say that the weight of independent opinion favoured the unionist position. The Institute for Fiscal Studies' report 'Financial Sustainability of an Independent Scotland', (Amior *et al.* 2013) funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), an independent think tank, bolstered the unionist position.

'Despite the considerable uncertainty surrounding the future path of borrowing and debt in Scotland, the main conclusion of our analysis is that a significant further fiscal tightening would be required in Scotland, on top of that already announced by the UK government, in order to put Scotland's long-term public finances onto a sustainable footing' (Amior *et al.* 2013, p. 1).

One of the report's authors, Gemma Tetlow, was reported by the BBC summarising succinctly that to ensure long-run fiscal sustainability, an independent Scotland would

need to cut public spending and/or increase other tax revenues, meaning it would face "even tougher choices" than the UK as a whole over the long term (BBC 2013b).

David Phillips of the Institute for Fiscal Studies said:

"Increasing benefit spending would make this task harder and it would not be surprising if the government of an independent Scotland felt the need to cut rather than increase the generosity of at least some benefits to help balance its books" (Phillips 2013).

Former Chancellor Alistair Darling, leader of the pro-Union Better Together campaign, said:

"This sober and impartial analysis by the IFS leaves the SNP's economic case for independence in tatters. SNP ministers pretend that in an independent Scotland there would be more money to spend, but that notion has been comprehensively demolished by the analysis from this respected institution. Today's report is clear that an independent Scotland would need big cuts to things like pensions, benefits and the NHS or a big increase in tax. This report sets a major test for the SNP's White Paper. If the White Paper does not face up to the long-term consequences of leaving the UK, then it won't be worth the paper it is written on" (BBC 2013b).

Also drawing on these IFS figures, Gallagher stresses that Scotland would soon run into unmanageable levels of deficit and debt and contrary to the SNP claim that 'it would be possible not only to maintain present or better public services and lower levels of taxation but also to put some of the oil revenues into an oil fund' that the result would have to be 'either higher taxation, perhaps with negative effects on economic growth, or very big cuts in public services' (Gallagher 2014, p. 77).

In spite of the difficulties in doing so, it was always far more meaningful to debate Scotland's projected public finances than the future trajectory of the 'Scottish economy' in its entirety, given that the latter is largely an imaginative abstraction. In terms of the perceived wider economic implications of independence beyond those

purely pertaining to public finances, it was also impossible to ‘know’ the realities. As shown above, the independent body, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, produced some of the most damning estimated figures for independence (Johnson & Phillips 2012), and yet the Director, Paul Johnson, spoke of the inherent difficulties with really knowing what the economic consequences might be, and how, by and large, inconsequential those consequences might in fact prove:

“I wouldn’t expect it [independence] to make a great big difference. It [Scotland] is not going to end up in twenty years’ time as a basket case, probably; it’s not going to end up in twenty years’ time as massively richer than the rest of the UK, the best place to start is: at the moment the Scots are about as well off as the rest of us, in twenty years’ time, in or out, I expect they’ll still be just about as well off as the rest of us” (BBC 2014c).

When asked if Johnson personally would make the decision on the basis of economics – if indeed he had a vote to cast –his response was:

“To be honest I wouldn’t make the judgement on the basis of economics. You can’t vote on the basis you’ll be five hundred pounds a year better off for sure, or five hundred pounds a year worse off for sure, you’re probably not going to end up terribly differently off” (BBC 2014c).

Moreover, to the extent that it is even meaningful to talk about the wider economic implications of independence for Scots as a whole, it greatly exaggerates the idea of a coherent Scottish economy and community of fate, wherein economic circumstances are especially shared.

Economic rationalities and motivations for independence

To reiterate a key argument of this chapter, the Scottish independence referendum debate revolved largely around economic arguments for and against independence⁷, whilst matters of national identity were largely ‘backgrounded’. Mullen makes this observation where he states:

‘One of the interesting features of both the official Yes and No campaigns was the extent to which they concentrated on the practical consequences of independence rather than identity politics. Perceptions of identity undoubtedly influenced voters’ views on independence, but the campaign was not fought principally on that terrain’ (Mullen 2016, p. 20).

But is it possible to ascertain the extent to which national identity and/or economic motivations were actual determinants of voting behaviour in the referendum?

Drawing on the results of the 2013 Scotland Social Attitudes Survey one year before the referendum, Professor John Curtice (2013) asserted that, generally speaking, polls suggest convictions either for or against independence had changed very little in the preceding year (up to September 2013), which he attributes to the fact that a crucially decisive factor, identity, while fluid, has a tendency to be rather ‘sticky’.

‘We perhaps should not be surprised that it is proving difficult for both sides to secure a decisive change in the balance of opinion. For in part people's views are a reflection of their sense of identity, that is whether they feel Scottish or British - and people do not change their sense of identity very easily’ (Curtice 2013).

As highlighted in Chapter 3, however, national identity is not so easily correlated with secessionism, not least because a commitment to national identity need not necessarily translate into support for independence (Keating 2004). The vast majority

⁷ For academic arguments for and against independence based on economics, see Scott (2016) and Gallagher (2014; 2016) respectively.

of people in Scotland consider themselves Scottish, and the majority of those who also consider themselves British, consider themselves to be more Scottish than British, and yet there is not majority support for independence (see annual Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys - www.ssa.natcen.ac.uk). Indeed, it is quite possible to talk of ‘unionist-nationalists’ (Morton 1999; see also Ichijo 2012). This will have been recognised by nationalists, as indeed it was recognised that support for independence cannot be significantly correlated with their electoral successes in the past (see Chapter 3). Whilst it is perhaps surprising that relatively little is being said about culture and identity in debates on Scottish independence, this is in no small part ‘a purposeful act by those who are trying to secure independence’ (Wood 2014, p. 40). One would imagine that for some voters who have strong prior preferences for independence, that even if it *were* possible to know how independence would impact upon their finances in advance, it would not be of consequence to their decision - providing, one would imagine, they thought their finances would not be severely worsened. Nevertheless, for many others, economics may well have been a key consideration; certainly this had to have been the driving assumption behind largely economic cases being made both for and against independence.

It is difficult to know for sure the extent to which economic motivations determined the decision voters made, although preliminary results from the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) referendum study concluded that whilst ‘identity provided core support for both camps...economic risk decided the outcome’ (ESRC 2014). It certainly seemed from prior polling results that individual perceptions of personal finances were likely to influence how people would be inclined to vote. Commonly cited polls suggested, for instance, that if voters could be assured that in

an independent Scotland their annual household budget would increase or decrease by just £500 it would have a decisive influence on their decision.

‘The referendum argument’s will likely be won and lost on perceptions for Scotland’s future economic performance, and impact on household budgets. If people could be convinced that an independent Scotland could thrive – in doing so making people £500 a year better off as a result – support for independence leaps to a victorious 56% yes, 44% for no. Even if people thought their finances would be unaltered it would be all to play for (yes 47%, no 53%), but given a household deficit of £500 the yes camp could forget it (yes 22%, no 78%)’ (ICM Research 2013).

Commenting on this same poll, Professor John Curtice explained how this poll demonstrates how important individual finances are in decision forming. Speaking hypothetically from the point of view of a prospective voter he says:

“I might be willing to leave my Britishness aside if I think I am going to be better off, but equally, conversely, a lot of people who feel strongly Scottish say, look I’m not going to do it unless you can convince me I am going to be better off...So, that in the end is why this issue of economy kicks in. Voters need more than just their sense of identity to decide how they are going to vote” (BBC 2014d).

Indeed, one might be forgiven for thinking that the aforementioned £500 poll suggests that Scottish people, for the most part, are largely indifferent to Scottish independence. John Kay states “it seems to me that if this debate is to be serious then people should be voting about identity rather than about how much cash is in their pockets’ (BBC 2014c). Not to deny that £500 is for many a significant sum of money, but it hardly speaks of impassioned nationalism wherein self-determination is seen as an end in itself. Moreover, in practice voters could not possibly have known how their finances would actually be affected; or for that matter, what the wider economic implications might be.

Comparing figures across the 2012, 2013 and 2014 Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys, ScotCen states that ‘having fallen from 34% to 30% between 2012 and 2013, the proportion that think Scotland’s economy would be better under independence has now dropped further to 25%’ (ScotCen 2014, p. 10). Whilst ultimately it is impossible to say for sure on what basis people actually casted their votes in September 2014, these survey results may reveal a tentative correlation between the relative success of nationalists and unionists in making their economic cases for and against independence and support for independence. Curtice (2014, p. 150) reported that 2014 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey results reveal 92% of those who thought the economy would be better under independence said they intended to vote Yes rather than No, whilst just 6% of those who thought the economy would be worse stated they would vote in favour of leaving the UK. He argues, ‘Voters’ propensities to vote Yes or No varied according to their social and economic circumstances. Not least of the reasons is that those circumstances affected their perceptions of the economic consequences of independence’ (Curtice 2014, p. 147).

However, just as it is difficult to correlate national identity with support for independence, it is also difficult to discern where economic motivations feature too. Whilst there may be a discernible correlation between perceptions of economic outcomes and support for independence, causality is not so easily determined between these two variables, or the direction of causality. Causality is not so easily determined given numerous other underlying factors (Duch *et al.* 2000), not least differences in extant economic circumstances among citizens (Duchesne *et al.* 2003), and the direction of causality cannot be easily determined for it is possible that economic

perceptions themselves might vary on the basis of prior-preferences regarding independence (Howe 2009).

Whilst not in the context of an imminent referendum on actual independence, in the case of survey data pertaining to secessionism in Catalonia, Muñoz & Tormos have highlighted how support for secessionism has grown significantly in less than ten years, but Catalan national identification has remained largely unchanged, suggesting other motivations; ‘many have pointed to the effect of utilitarian motivations, linked to expected economic gains from secession’ (2015a, p. 316). Similarly, in the case of Quebec, research has been done that looks at the relationship between perceptions of economic risk and nationalist support there (Duchesne *et al.* 2003). Interestingly, whilst Muñoz & Tormos argue that economic considerations are important, partly, the ‘perception that an independent Catalonia would perform better economically, based on the idea that the current fiscal relationship is detrimental to Catalonia’s interests’, they also stress ‘the possibility that economic expectations are mere rationalizations of prior preferences’ (Muñoz & Tormos 2015a, p. 316). Indeed, literature on Quebec has argued the very same thing with regards support for secessionism there.

‘Recent research has identified three factors as significant determinants of sovereignty support in Quebec: national identity, assessments of the likely impact of sovereignty on Quebec's economy and perceptions of the impact of sovereignty on the French language in Quebec. Drawing on data from the 1992–1993 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey, the article suggests that the latter two factors may not be genuine causes of sovereignty support, but rather rationalizations of other, deeply embedded sentiments. National identity and sovereignty support itself, it is argued, are important determinants of people's expectations concerning the economic and linguistic impacts of sovereignty’ (Howe 2009, p. 31).

Put simply, it is possible that ‘citizens that have pro independence attitudes tend to look on the bright side when inquired about the economic implications of secession while those that oppose it tend to rationalize their opposition by underlining its negative consequences’ (Muñoz and Tormos 2015b). Of relevance here is work within economics on so called ‘economic voting’, whereby electorates are thought to vote on perception of national economic conditions. Duch *et al.* stress that ‘On the basis of the macro-level evidence alone one would have little reason to doubt that the economy matters’ (2000, p. 635). However, they also stress that we must be mindful of the heterogeneity of individual level factors (including personal financial circumstances, as well as prior political preferences and political awareness) which likely affect perceptions of macro-economic conditions (see Duch *et al.* 2000). Essentially, whilst economics may be a key motivation, the relationship is far from straightforward, and almost certainly influenced by other pre-existing factors, not least in the case of independence, pre-existing views regarding independence.

Based on the result of their research, Muñoz and Tormos maintain that economics is likely a key motivation for some, and perhaps especially so for those citizens with ‘ambivalent identity positions’ (Muñoz & Tormos 2015a, p. 315). Thus, economic motivations may have been a greater consideration for some than others, and ‘undecided voters’ in particular may have attempted ‘rational’ calculation on the basis of perceived economic implications. This was certainly what voters were encouraged to do by the terms of the debate. The following response from one SNP MSP is revealing in this regard.

“...in terms of the voters, most people vote on economic issues, not exclusively of course, but if people think they will be better off in an independent Scotland they’ll vote for it, if they don’t, they won’t. A lot of people will vote for an independent Scotland because they believe Scotland, per se, should be

independent because we've got our own national identity, but, for many people the economy will be the deciding factor one way or the other..." (Respondent B)

It is perhaps interesting to note, however, that after asserting at great length this belief that people will vote on economic considerations, the same respondent closed the interview with the statement that "If Scotland is a distinct nation, which I believe it is, then we should make our own way in the world, good or bad" (Respondent B), revealing a prior-preference for secessionism as an end in itself.

The importance of economics for *elections* is well recognised. According to the 'economic voting' hypothesis the perceived state of the economy can be important to the re-election of a government (Sheafer 2008). One SNP interview respondent stated that "economics is always the key in any *election* at any time" (Respondent C; *emphasis added*). Indeed, a focus on the economy was clear in the SNP's 2011 election manifesto where, in the words of Alex Salmond, 'the economy would be the top priority' (Salmond 2012; See also SNP 2011). Leaving aside the question of how meaningful such projections of 'the economy' can and should be in such cases, elections and referendums are different political events. Dekavalla stressed that referendums are not meant to be competitions between political parties or groupings seeking power, but 'consultations of the electorate on a divisive issue that goes beyond the lifespan of individual governments' (2016, p. 1). This definition is insightful given that the main protagonists in the Scottish independence referendum often focused on matters of policy - mainly economic policy it is argued here - that could not be assured indefinitely. Moreover, this was not a 'normal' referendum, but an *independence* referendum. The implications differ in one crucial regard. In an election the polity and its territoriality are not contested, and thus whilst 'the

economy' is first and foremost a largely imagined political space, providing that that political space itself is not under question (as in an election) then it is less controversial (although equally misleading) to formulate a platform on the basis of assertions about an apparently less political, or given, economic spatial-scalar entity. The outcome of a national election is not the re-writing of that political territory. In an independence referendum, however, that is exactly what is at stake.

Moreover, whilst one would expect to consider the economic *implications* of independence and recognise that governments and political parties will attempt to speak and act on behalf of the economic interests of those within their administrative purview, it is another thing entirely for protagonists to argue an economic *case* for independence, which is precisely what nationalists attempted to do, explicitly stated for example, in the aforementioned Scottish Government document (2013a) '*Scotland's Economy: The Case for Independence*'. Something consistently reiterated by nationalists is how such an argument affords a rational, less emotional, and essentially less political case for independence:

“The central debate we are having is a very practical debate. A utilitarian⁸ debate... It is about the economy... And whether with independence Scotland would be better off or not” (Sturgeon 2014).

“There is little doubt that emotion will play a part in the independence debate. For most of us this will be a decision that engages the head and the heart. But I am going to talk to you today about the rational, reasonable and responsible case for independence” (Sturgeon 2013).

“But for me the fact of nationhood or Scottish identity is not the motive force for independence. Nor do I believe that independence, however desirable, is essential for the preservation of our distinctive Scottish identity. And I don't agree at all that feeling British – with all of the shared social, family and

⁸ Within this same speech Sturgeon explains the difference between this 'utilitarian nationalism' and 'existential nationalism', which supports 'independence for its own sake' (Sturgeon 2014).

cultural heritage that makes up such an identity – is in any way inconsistent with a *pragmatic, utilitarian support for political independence*” (Sturgeon 2012a, *emphasis added*).

“There can be no more important time for dispassionate discussion and debate on the future of our country” (Swinney 2013).

Another SNP MSP articulated this argument when interviewed.

“I think we have moved beyond the cultural arguments in regards to independence, I think identity is still really important, but it is more of an identity of all being in this together and we can do something, than it is about the whole cultural thing of we are different, I think we have got beyond that. There are still those who believe in it of course, but I do think it is much more now about straight politics and straight economy...I think people, for all that there is a care about community and wider society, I think at the end of the day what most people think of in their day-to-day life is how does this affect me and my family and those that I care about. And so I think any argument has to be on the economy” (Respondent D).

This desire to deflect the focus of the debate away from the more traditional, qualitative aspects of national identity is unusual when compared to independence debates elsewhere in Europe, such as Brittany and the Basque country, where despite perceptions of national economic conditions being important, there are more explicit efforts to protect national languages, traditions and other cultural items.

This is in no small part due to the fact that Scottish national identity, traditionally conceived of at least⁹, is well assured and accepted and not existentially threatened by the union. In one interview, for example, Sturgeon stated:

“For me, this [independence] debate isn't about identity, ” [...] “I don't feel we need to be independent for me to feel confident in my Scottish identity. I think Scotland is pretty comfortable in its identity. We won't need independence to preserve it ... if we don't become independent it won't disappear, it isn't under existential threat” (Jack, 2013).

⁹ As already discussed in Chapter 3, many consider social democratic values to be an important aspect of “Scottishness” and insofar as these are thought to be threatened by union, Scottish identity could be seen to be under threat.

It is also based on recognition that, as we have seen, voters typically express commitments to both Scottish and British identity, and among those exhibiting dual identities there is often still support for independence. In the case of Catalonia, Serrano states that the latter point ‘has generated the opportunity to appeal to the electorate not only in terms of the ethnocultural preservation of the nation but also on the potential benefits of secession, which seems to have expanded the traditional scope of the pro-independence discourse’ (Serrano 2013, p. 542). However, another significance of speaking to voters as economic (rather than political) subjects is the implication of rationalism and ‘apoliticism’. As discussed in the previous chapter, conventional, rationalist accounts of political economy encourage us to view the economic in this way (see Griffin 2011). Voters are positioned as rational actors encouraged into believing that they can and *ought* to make their decision on the bases of utilitarian calculation, divorced from presumably less valuable emotive sentiments. It may be symptomatic of the nature of national (political) identity as something deeply felt but almost impossible to articulate in concrete terms that make such supposedly more practical, utilitarian arguments appear to proffer more tactile and meaningful justification for independence. In the event, and irrespective of the motivations, the focus on economic arguments by key protagonists enabled them to speak to Scottish people as predominantly economic actors/subjects, separate from other (perhaps more ‘politicised’) aspects of identity.

At this juncture it should be stressed that it was never a stated aim of this thesis to posit, or prove or disprove, any sort of correlation between perceptions of national economic conditions and support for independence, and whilst this chapter clearly assumes that the perception of such a correlation likely underpinned the way in which

the debate was framed around almost exclusively ‘economic’ matters, it was never a stated aim to prove this either. Instead, the aim is to point out that almost irrespective of the motivations and implications, the very fact that the debate was framed in this way has separate ‘political’ implications, namely, it pedals the misleading assumption that Scots can ‘know’ what the right decision would be, as well as the misleading assumption that ‘the economy’ is ‘real’ and speaks especially to the economic realities of the Scottish electorate. It subsumes the electorate under one supposedly shared imperative of economic betterment to the exclusion of other considerations, and in doing so subsumes their otherwise multifarious identities under one largely shared (inter)subjectivity of the Scottish economic subject.

A de-politicised independence debate

The Scottish independence referendum debate was dominated throughout by economic arguments both for and against. Interestingly, in the last few days before the referendum, emotive cases for union were made by some of the key protagonists. The Conservative Leader and Prime Minister David Cameron stated, to paraphrase, that people have heard a lot about arguments of the head, but those of the heart are just as important. In response to questions about why he as leader of a Conservative party with only one seat in Scotland - and which would be more likely to secure a majority in Westminster if Scotland left the UK – wished for continued union he said “I love my country more than I love my party” (BBC 2014d). On the same day, Ed Miliband asked all labour councils across the UK to erect the Saltire (The Scottish flag). Meanwhile, the Saltire also flew over the UK houses of parliament. All emotive, symbolic stuff that is hard to rationalise, and yet is the nub of nationalism. It

is in the place of such arguments as these that more ‘rational’, economic arguments for and against independence seem more appealing.

In an effort to have a ‘rational’, less emotional debate, it proved sterile. The inevitable result was frustration for voters who were led to believe they could ‘know’ what the correct decision was if only they were informed of all of the facts. In a survey conducted on behalf of the Scottish Chambers of Commerce, the opinions of Scottish business regarding the quality of the independence debate was low, with the majority of respondents regarding it as either ‘poor’ or ‘dismal’ (Bell & McGoldrick 2014, p. 3). A subsequent press release by the SCC stated that ‘Scottish businesses demand more from the referendum campaigns’ (Scottish Chambers of Commerce 2014). Anecdotally, frustration among voters was evident in media reports and a recurrent theme in television and radio debates on the independence referendum (see for example BBC 2013d; BBC 2013e). Ultimately, by framing the debate in almost exclusively economic terms, it was ‘depoliticised’. Whether or not it is useful to look at this as a deliberate choice on the part of key protagonists in the debate, it can be seen as symptomatic of the wider discursive context defining the limits of what is possible and meaningful for protagonists to say.

In Chapter 4 it was explained that taken-for-granted assumptions of traditional IPE approaches about the economic, such that it is re/presented as an objective, material domain of activity, populated by rational actors, have the capacity to effectively depoliticise it. It was also stressed how poststructuralism provides the means with which to challenge such a view. As de Goede stresses, ‘Moving beyond economism requires the recognition that *neither* the politics/economics distinction, *nor* the

idealism/realism distinction, exist beyond their historical articulation' (de Goede 2003, p. 91). It is the assumptions of conventional accounts of political economy, of rationalism and materialism, which make arguments such as those articulated by nationalists and unionists (based on purported factual analyses of the economy), appear meaningful and apolitical when they are not. It was also explained in Chapter 4 that we take for granted the existence of the economy as a spatial-scalar entity determining to a greater or lesser extent the economic circumstances of economic subjects therein. Economic arguments for and against independence presuppose the existence of a material Scottish economy or UK economy that especially defines the opportunities and challenges of independence/union. However, designations of 'the economy' are fundamentally political insofar as they serve, deliberately or not, to convey a space (and populace) as governable, and insofar as it is only really meaningful to talk of 'the economy' in correspondence with a political space.

Poststructuralism reminds us that all ideas, or discourses, are fundamentally 'political', insofar as their meanings are not naturally occurring. It also reminds us that all meaning is constantly re/constructed or re/articulated. However, in some circumstances, certain ideas, or discourses, become so naturalised, or taken-for-granted, that they appear a-political. The aforementioned taken-for-granted assumptions about 'the economic' and 'the economy' are prime examples. Yet poststructuralism also reminds us that objectivity can be challenged at any time and established ideas can once more re-enter the 'play of practice' as their meaning is renegotiated. It is the aim of critical investigation to highlight such taken-for-granted truths and reveal their contingency. The aim here is to challenge the taken-for-grantedness of the economy. Clearly the idea of 'the economy' is deeply entrenched

in popular consciousness, a full appreciation of which is well beyond the means of this thesis. However, it is possible here to challenge the taken-for-granted manner in which the economy featured in the Scottish independence debate and how this effectively served to de-politicise said debate by appearing to offer rational, reasonable and non-political justifications for and against independence. More specifically, building on the conceptual insights from Chapter 4, this thesis will look at the way in which articulations of economic (in)security have been used both by unionists and nationalists in support of their arguments either for or against independence, and the manner in which those articulations draw upon, and help to cement, the very idea of ‘the economy’.

Conclusion

Introducing the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014, this chapter has looked at the significance of what was termed ‘the economics of independence’ in the preceding debate. More specifically, it has shown that much of the debate, on both nationalist and unionist sides, was focussed on making explicit economic cases either for or against independence, almost to the absolute exclusion of other considerations. It has been argued in this chapter that this served to de-politicise the debate (not unintentionally for some) and mislead voters. Drawing on the conceptual insights from the previous chapter, along with the methodological insights of poststructuralism, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate the ontological assumptions that made this possible.

Firstly, taken-for-granted assumptions about the existence of an economic sphere of activity, separate from the social and political contexts in which we live our lives, makes it possible to articulate largely economistic (de Goede 2003) justifications for or against independence. Whilst it is certainly meaningful to talk of ‘economic realities’ influencing our lives (as discussed in the previous chapter) those realities do not exist separately from our ideas about them. This assumption is central to constructivist and poststructuralist accounts of political economy. In any event, it was argued here that really ‘knowing’ the economic realities of independence was always impossible with any surety and the inevitable claims and counter claims of key protagonists were only ever going to lead to a sterile and uninformative debate.

Furthermore, with respect to one crucial ‘economic reality’ – incidentally, one largely agreed upon by both unionists and nationalists - the debate was highly misleading to voters, namely, the extent to which it is meaningful to consider economic subjects within a given territorial space to have an especially shared economic fate. As explored in the previous chapter, the notion that we live our lives within a shared material community of economic fate (largely) coterminous with our political community is, at best, grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the assumption makes it possible to articulate governing rationalities over subjects within that space. In the context of the Scottish independence referendum debate it will have made it possible for key protagonists to articulate arguments either for or against independence on the basis that voters in Scotland would have an especially shared experience of both the opportunities and the challenges of independence.

In the final part of this chapter it was stressed how these aforementioned taken-for-granted truths about a largely a-political economic domain and an actually existing Scottish (or UK) economy served to effectively de-politicise the debate. The oft assumed dichotomy between the economic and the political is fallacious, and the extent to which one can meaningfully talk about ‘the Scottish (or UK) economy’ it is only with regards to a fundamentally political space. Applying a poststructuralist methodology, this thesis challenges such taken-for-granted (or naturalised) truths, and reveals that there are always hidden political implications of their unchallenged acceptance.

A key term that has only been uttered in passing in this chapter is that of economic (in)security. The next chapter looks at the implications of taken-for-granted assumption about the economy - both with regards the supposed domain of activity and the spatial-scalar entity – for the conceptualisation of economic (in)security. Put very simply, it will be argued that insecurity is a fundamental feature of life in the modern world, wherein we are necessarily dependent on circumstances beyond our purview (i.e. our ‘economic’ lives are bound up with those of others), but those insecurities are both real and imagined. The idea of the economy as an aggregated spatial-scalar entity encourages, or in fact relies upon, the very notion that economic actors or subjects within it have - to a greater or lesser extent - a shared material circumstance with respect to their economic (in)security. As such, it will be argued that the articulation of economic (in)security is inextricably bound up with the very idea of the economy. In the context of the Scottish independence referendum, we can conceptualise arguments for and against independence as articulations of economic (in)security.

Chapter 6: Conceptualising (Economic) (In)Security - The Implications of an Imagined Economy

In order to answer the second of the three subsidiary research questions, *What role do articulations of economic security play in the imagination of ‘the (Scottish) economy’?*, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of what economic security is. The initial stimulus for this research was in part the aim to better understand what economic security means. This chapter, therefore, pursues a better understanding of ‘security’, and by building on the conceptual insights of the last chapter, brings the two concepts together to try and better understand what economic security means. What is proffered is a critical, reflexive conceptualisation of economic (in)security¹⁰ based on the poststructuralist assumptions underpinning this thesis.

It is argued here that we perceive economic (in)security to be a fundamental feature of modern economic life, wherein our economic circumstances are necessarily bound up with those of others and dependent on determinants that may be largely beyond our purview. We are very much aware of this, and yet our perception of those determinants is often muddled. ‘The economy’, for instance, is largely an imaginative abstraction. The extent to which it really exists is commonly exaggerated, and is the result, in any event, of political practice. Yet this idea of ‘the economy’ as an

¹⁰ Security is something that has to be maintained (or at least thought to be maintained), but which is never fully attainable, and therefore any given utterance of security is simultaneously one of insecurity, hence the use of parentheses in ‘(in)security’.

aggregated spatial-scalar entity encourages and also relies upon the very notion that the economic actors (or subjects) of which it is deemed to be comprised have (to a greater or lesser extent) a shared material context and fate. Within this supposedly shared context, or community of fate (Williams 2003), people are thought to share (to a greater or lesser extent) both economic opportunities and vulnerabilities, despite the fact our economic circumstances and life-chances are vastly heterogeneous, shaped by a myriad of both social and material factors including privilege, class, gender, geology, climate, geography, not to mention pure happenstance. Yet we are led to believe that our membership of a shared community largely transcends these other factors.

We can think of the articulation of economic (in)security as inextricably bound up with the very idea of the economy. The two are mutually constitutive in the same way that authors have argued that the idea of the state and articulations national security are mutually constitutive (Kuus & Agnew 2008; Campbell 1998). In the context of the Scottish independence referendum debate, it is possible to conceptualise economic arguments for and against independence as articulations of a shared economic (in)security. These articulations both rely upon and potentially serve to further sediment the idea of a really existing economy built upon a shared material community of fate.

Consonant with the ontological and methodological assumptions of this thesis, it is assumed that the meaning of (economic) security can be best understood through an analysis of discursive practice. Within the broad school of Security Studies, the ‘securitisation thesis’ is famously built on the same assumption (Buzan *et al.* 1998).

Indeed this 'thesis' is highly insightful and furnishes us with a grammar of helpful terms ('securitisation', 'securitising actor', 'securitising move', etc.). However, it also argues security issues are characterised by their 'exceptionality', which potentially precludes consideration of issues that, for whatever reason, are not deemed 'exceptional' enough to become 'securitised'. Given the 'routineness' of many economic insecurities in modern economic life, it may be that they often lack the 'exceptionality' required to satisfy the criteria of securitisation. Thus, within this chapter a critique of securitisation is proffered, which tends towards a broader, more poststructuralist, and critical understanding of the 'constructedness' of security.

As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the articulation of economic threats, vulnerabilities and insecurities were central to the referendum debate in arguments both for and against independence. Given the potential implications of that debate for the (re)territorialisation of political space, one can argue that to disregard articulations of economic (in)security on the grounds that they lack sufficient 'exceptionality' is potentially to ignore their significance - vis-à-vis articulations of conventional security threats - as determinants of territorialisation. It is specifically this latter point that the chapter subsequently addresses, where the importance of articulations of economic (in)security for the territorialisation of political and economic space is considered. This effectively sets the scene for the remaining chapters of the thesis, wherein arguments of unionists for independence, and those of nationalists against, are revealed to hinge largely on the articulation of economic (in)security.

Openings in Security Discourse?

Security is a concept that is central to the discipline of International Relations, and more specifically, to 'Security Studies'. Therefore, despite its colloquial use in everyday language, it is heavily 'loaded' with conceptual baggage (Huysmans 1998; Rothschild 1995; Smith 2005). It has conventionally been conceived of in militaristic terms with scholars of security studies traditionally occupying themselves with 'the study of the threat, use and control of military force' (Walt 1991, p. 212). With the end of the Cold War came a makeover for the discipline of Security Studies, traditionally concerned with the 'high politics' of nations, and preoccupied by the overarching military and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union, the latter's demise and the threat it represented left theoretical and policy openings in security understanding in to which economics, along with other 'new' considerations such as the environment supposedly permeated (Baldwin 1997; Buzan *et al.* 1998; Krause & Williams 1996; Buzan & Hansen 2009), accompanied by a focus on alternative 'referents' of security besides the state, as with Human Security (UNDP 1993; 1994) and Societal Security (Buzan 1991; Roe 2007).

Traditional security scholars remained critical of such attempts to broaden the remit of 'security' and feared for the 'intellectual coherence' of the discipline (Walt 1991). Indeed, despite an open and informed conversation being unlikely to render 'conventional' threats (where genuine and convincingly articulated) less potent or meaningful, security discourse has remained stubbornly preoccupied with conventional security concerns (see Ullman 1983). As Dalby puts it, 'it might be argued that the dilemma of academic security discourse after the Cold War is

precisely that its conceptual infrastructure has long outlived any usefulness it might have once had' (1997, pp. 4-5). The contention is not that traditional accounts of security are no longer meaningful, or insightful, it is simply that they tend to reaffirm themselves in a manner that ignores potential openings in security discourse. As Walker puts it, they potentially contribute towards 'a discourse of excluded subjectivities' like race, class, gender and humanity (1997, p. 73; see Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010; Wyn Jones 1999).

Moreover, whilst one might have expected the shift from traditional government to multi-level governance in the UK (see Chapter 3) to have opened up a space for the devolved administrations and other sub-state actors to articulate the specificities of their own national security - despite the fact that under extant constitutional arrangements foreign policy and national defence remain the preserve of the UK Government - it will be argued below that for various reasons conventional security threats were more or less absent from the Scottish independence referendum debate. Yet the re-writing of political geographies, something the invocation of (in)security is thought to be a determinant of (Kuus & Agnew 2008; Campbell 1998), was very clearly at stake in that debate. Which begs the question, what role did security play, if any? In order to answer this question it is necessary to employ a broader conceptualisation of (economic) (in)security sympathetic to the critical, poststructuralist assumptions underpinning the thesis.

Dent asserts that 'economic security' is an increasingly used phrase but also a relatively under-theorised concept in the political economy literature' (2007, p. 204). The concept of environmental security meanwhile, despite being controversial among

both traditional security scholars and environmentalists and green theorists alike, has received quite a lot of attention by comparison (see Barnett 2001 & 2007; Brauch *et al.* 2008). One reason for economic security receiving so little attention within security studies is purportedly the aforementioned resilience of traditional security discourse to the broadening and deepening of security (Dent 2007; Nesadurai 2004). Unsurprisingly then, where it is addressed, it is often with regards matters of defence, statecraft and/or ‘conventional’, militaristic security concerns. Nesadurai (2004, p. 463) explains, for example, that proponents tend look at how economic performance relates to military spending, how resource scarcity can lead to inter-state conflict and how economic instruments like trade and aid can be used to advance foreign policy objectives. The latter is commonly known as ‘economic statecraft’ and basically refers to ‘the use of economic tools and relationships to achieve foreign policy objectives’ (Mastanduno 2008, p. 172). The link between economics and military statecraft has long been recognised. In *‘Perpetual Peace’*, Kant spoke of armies being both prohibitively expensive and a threat and cause of war in themselves, but also that the alternative of accumulating wealth is no less risky.

‘But it would be just the same if wealth rather than soldiers were accumulated, for it would be seen by other states as a military threat; it might compel them to mount preventative attacks, for of the three powers within a state – the *power of the army*, the *power of alliance* and the *power of money* – the third is probably the most reliable instrument of war. It would lead more often to wars if it were not so difficult to discover the amount of wealth which another state possesses’ (Kant 1795 cited in Reiss 1991, p. 95)

Dent argues that such formulations do not, however, deal with economic security *per se*, but with what can more appropriately be called the ‘economics-security nexus’, since they focus more on ‘linkages between economic policy and traditional or politico-military security policy’ (Dent 2007, p. 209; see, for example, Goodwin

1991; Kapstein 1992; Kirshner 1998). For instance, in Cable's (1995) article, *'What is International Economic Security'*, he proposes four definitions of economic security, three of which pertain to the economics-security nexus¹¹.

Other contributors have argued that economic insecurities ought to be considered in their own right as matters of security concern (Dent 2007). Cable had suggested that 'to stretch the [economic security] definition to world poverty, population growth, global warming and the stability of the international banking system, as do some contributions, is perhaps to make the concept so wide as to be unmanageable' (1995, p. 308). However, more recent contributors (Kahler 2004; Nesadurai 2006) take the normative position that just such a more ambitious move is necessary in order to address the many threats precipitated within the global political economy, often over and above the militaristic concerns of states. Roesad suggests that in 'a world characterised by economic globalisation, economic security may be seen as a function of the state's capacity to pursue policies that maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of liberalising economic systems' (Roesad 2006, p. 108). In essence, it is argued that security analyses should consider the economic threats supposedly attributable to greater economic openness in a 'shrinking world'.

Correspondingly, it has been argued that security analyses ought to consider referents of security besides the state, for as stressed in Chapter 3, there is nothing strictly necessary about the state as the principal unit of political organisation. Some have

¹¹ Incidentally, it will be argued that the economics-security nexus is more meaningful when reversed in the case of arguments for and against Scottish independence in the referendum debate, since where militaristic concerns are voiced they are done so more to speak to their economic implications rather than the converse.

argued in favour of a more human-centred approach to security. Hough states, 'Security is a human condition. To define it purely in terms of state bodies whose aim it is to help secure their state and people in a certain dimension, rather than the peoples whose security is at stake, is both odd and nonsensical' (2008, p. 9).

Similarly, Ken Booth stated that the promising developments in security studies are 'those struggling to develop, at the end of a century of violence and change, a postrealist, postpositivist conception of security that offers some promise of maximizing the security and improving the lives of the whole of humankind – the security studies of inclusion rather than exclusion, of possibility rather than necessity, and of becoming rather than being' (1997, p. 105). A very prominent attempt to shift the focus of security away from purely states, and purely military security, towards humans is the UNDP's conception of Human Security (UNDP 1993). Similarly, the International Labour Office's (ILO) 2004 report 'Economic Security for a Better World', proffers a human-centred approach to understanding economic security and focuses on the importance of socio-economic security and equality in the face of heightened global economic insecurity (e.g. volatile financial markets, capital liberalisation and associated volatility of capital flows, shifting patterns of trade, growing competition and deregulation of labour markets, as well as the general reorientation of fiscal policy away from raising taxes for public service provision and social security), urging that 'basic economic security is a human right, one that assures a level of distributive justice and the attainment of basic needs (ILO 2004, p. 15). Despite efforts such as these, as the key actor in domestic and international politics, it remains the case that security is largely perceived to be the preserve of the state and the state continues to be regarded as *the* legitimate 'voice' on security.

Moreover, where security is articulated by the state (at least in the case of the UK) it is rarely with regards economic insecurities in their own right. In recent UK government security strategies, despite them typically referring to the wider economic context within which they sit (especially given the contemporary backdrop of a recent financial crisis and recession) no effort is made to ‘securitise’ economic risks per se. Instead, we are reminded of how our economic openness creates other types of vulnerabilities that others may take advantage of through international terrorism, transnational crime and cyber-attacks (HM Government 2010) or how economic investment, innovation and growth will better afford the wherewithal to satisfy our continued material defence needs (HM Government 2015). Rather than moves to ‘securitise’ the economic risks inherent within liberal capitalism, the concern instead is with ensuring a continued commitment to that economic model vis-à-vis the dangers of protectionism. This highlights an important paradox at the core of economic security which is dealt with later in this chapter, namely that economic insecurity is considered part and parcel of a market driven economy.

Indeed, in addition to the reported reticence within mainstream security studies to ‘open up’ it is likely that economic security simply evades straightforward theorisation as a consequence of how we perceive economic threat within a capitalist economy. Unlike in the case of environmental security, for instance, it is almost impossible to conduct any sort of meaningful literature review on the topic of economic security, either because existing literature claiming to explicitly deal with ‘economic security’ is so sparse (and revealing largely of dissensus), or because a consideration of all literature dealing ostensibly but implicitly with economic security (i.e. anything dealing with economic vulnerability) would be nothing like a coherent

body of literature as a consequence of economic (in)security being a fundamental and pervasive feature of economic life.

But this recognition does not furnish one with the tools to better understanding the Scottish independence referendum debate, which as we shall see, revolved almost exclusively around the articulation of economic threats. With this in mind, and building on a ‘critical’ appraisal of the securitisation thesis, this chapter develops a case for considering the contextual and contingent meaning of economic (in)security through an analysis of discursive practice, recognising both that the term has no real ‘essence’, but also that it cannot *in practice* mean anything, even if *in principle* it can.

Securitisation and the Constructedness of (Economic) (In)Security: A Critique

The Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, as laid out in ‘*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*’, was explicitly formulated as an attempt to resolve debates (and appease concerns) about the broadening of security discourse. The securitisation framework offers a useful starting point for conceptualising (economic) security since, like poststructuralism, it highlights the performative role of language (through ‘speech acts’) in constructing in/security. It recognises that security is socially constructed; ‘Threats...are fundamentally interpretative, not objectively given facts’ (Shephard & Weldes 2008, p. 532); and highlights the futility of attempts to understand security divorced from empirical practice. However, it does not follow through to its logical conclusion the assumption that security is fundamentally constructed. Whilst highly insightful, the securitisation thesis exhibits analytical and

normative constraints that preclude a capacity for sufficiently ‘critical’ theorising about security and, put simply, to understand why some issues become securitised whilst others do not.

The oft quoted definition of securitisation argues that security issues must be ‘staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures’ (Buzan *et al.* 1998, p. 5). At the heart of this concept then is the assumption that the meaning of security is to be found in its usage; through an analysis of discursive practice. Emmers argues that the approach, however, remains fairly new and underworked, and that important questions remain as to ‘why some moves of securitization succeed in convincing an audience while others fail to do so’ (Emmers 2007, p. 116). It is precisely such questions that McDonald (2008) poses to highlight the normative and analytical constraints of the securitisation framework.

‘How do some articulations of security and threat come to resonate with particular constituencies, and how do we know when they do? Through what processes are some actors empowered to ‘speak’ security on behalf of particular communities? And to what extent are there alternative articulations of security, and how have these voices been silenced or delegitimized? ...the securitization framework (while useful) is narrow in ways that are both analytically and normatively problematic, providing a partial account of the construction of security and potentially reifying traditional security discourses and practices in the process’ (McDonald 2008, p. 568).

Put simply, whilst the securitization framework is a potentially useful analytical tool, it also potentially forecloses broader questions about the ‘constructedness’ of (economic) (in)security.

McDonald explains that to an extent the School's 'facilitating conditions' acknowledge the importance of contextual determinants of securitization, as they refer to the 'dynamics, developments and institutional contexts that enable 'securitizing moves' to become successful' (2008, p. 571). Yet the problem is that such contextual factors are not specifically incorporated into the analytical framework, wherein the performative nature of the speech act is over-emphasised. While recognising the contextual importance of 'the audience', it is not sufficiently theorised; 'While recognizing that security is inter-subjectively constructed, the focus on the speech act as *performing* security arguably paints security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation¹²' (McDonald 2008, p. 572). Drawing on Balzacq (2005), McDonald suggests that the reason for the lack of theorising about the role played by the audience is that 'the power of the speech act would appear to be undermined by the full incorporation of the idea that the act itself is only one part of the securitizing process: that it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies' (2008, p. 572).

Moreover, over-emphasising the importance of the speech act vis-à-vis context has both analytical and normative implications, not least through the marginalisation of 'other' voices. Hough notes,

'[T]his approach still leaves the act of securing threatened people to the state. This can result in life-threatening issues being excluded from consideration because the government still chooses not to prioritise them or because the voices speaking for securitization are insufficiently loud' (Hough 2008, p. 18).

¹² Note the difference in meaning of the word 'articulation' here vis-à-vis its use in discourse theory (see Methodology) wherein discursive situatedness is integral to its meaning.

For instance, Lene Hansen argues that it subjugates the voices of women, for '[i]f security is a speech act... then it is simultaneously deeply implicated in the production of silence' (Hansen 2000, p. 306). It may be important to look at the articulations or 'securitizing moves' that are not successful, or are subjugated, since presumably the same discursive context that makes successful articulations successful simultaneously makes the latter unsuccessful.

Essentially, in answer to the perennial question, 'What is security?', securitization theory states that 'security is what actors make of it'. However, it does not remain sufficiently faithful to the notion that 'what security is', is constructed. Rather, it offers a framework that allows us (based on its strict criteria) to determine 'when' and 'where' a security issue is. But, as shown above, even then it fails to tell us why or how such a construction of security is possible due to its lack of emphasis on contextual determinants. Consequently, Ciuta (2009) argues that despite rightly refuting that there is a real 'essence' to security that needs to be found, the analytical framework it proffers suggests an 'essence' exogenous to articulations of it.

'Securitisation theory urges the analyst not to engage in the evaluation of security issues qua security issues (either 'real' or 'unreal'), since this is decided by the actors who decide to securitise or not these issues. At the same time however, securitisation theory provides a yardstick for estimating whether given policies are about security or not, since 'security' is what fulfils the criteria of securitisation, and nothing else. As a result, securitisation theory is torn between its aim to establish the 'essence' of security, and its claim that security is what actors make of it' (Ciuta 2009, p. 303).

Ciuta shows how two separate definitions of security are presented by the securitisation framework; the first discursive definition rests on the assumption that security is the product of a speech act, while the second, exhibiting a congruency with

traditional understandings, defines security as being about survival in the face of existential threats (2009, p. 306).

Furthermore, these two definitions, besides being contradictory, are actually 'bound up in a hierarchy that privileges the traditional definition over its discursive counterpart... [which] performs a key function for securitisation theory: it locks-in the meaning of security and insulates it from conceptual variation or practical reformulation' (Ciuta 2009, p. 307). Furthermore, it 'isolates the concept of security from its actors and politics' whilst privileging the analyst; 'conjuring something uncomfortably close to objectivism for an approach built on a notion of intersubjectivity, it is contradictory in securitisation theory's own terms' (Ciuta 2009, p. 315). Whilst offering a seemingly harsh appraisal of securitisation's analytical and normative implications, Ciuta is keen not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, arguing that securitisation offers the best starting point for analyses, but, 'that in order to fulfil its significant analytical potential, securitisation theory must have a thicker and more consistent understanding of its key argument that 'security is constructed'' (2009, p. 317).

An approach that in principle argues security can mean anything raises concerns that we might end up in a situation whereby security really means nothing (i.e. it becomes diluted). However, even if security *could* mean anything in principle, the fact is that its meaning is contextually legitimated. As Ciuta puts it, 'To argue hermeneutically for the significance of context is therefore not to argue for the boundless meaning of security: on the contrary, it is to highlight its boundedness – or in Gadamerian terms, to explore the 'horizons' within which actors and security analysts alike come to

understand what security means as well as what it means to practice security' (2009, p. 321). A similar misunderstanding is made of poststructuralism with regards concerns that meaning is in constant 'chaotic flux' (Torfing 1999, p. 95). However, asserting that the meaning of security is discursively constituted, and that like those wider discourses, articulations of security are political and contingent, does not point to unhelpful and nihilistic relativism such that anything can in practice be successfully articulated as a security issue (see Methodology). Rather the point is to assert that we need to understand the discursive constitutiveness of security, how certain articulations are made possible, whilst others are not. What is more, given the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice (see Zalewski 1996) to the extent that theory is practice, we must recognise the normative function of security theorising. From a 'critical' perspective we must bear in mind how securitisation, narrowly applied, has the potential to foreclose wider conceptualisations of security.

The above critique of Copenhagen School's securitisation framework is not meant to detract in any way from what is a highly insightful contribution to understanding security. It is likely because of that contribution that wider debates regarding the social constructedness of security were made possible. What the above critique does, however, is highlight why it might be that economic insecurities are rarely deemed sufficiently 'exceptional' to represent security concerns per se. With that in mind, the next section of the chapter draws on conceptual and empirical insights from the previous chapter, namely those pertaining to taken-for-granted assumptions about the economy, to explain how important articulations of economic (in)security could be missed using the securitisation framework, articulations which potentially serve an important role in the legitimisation of governance capacities.

Difficulties with 'Securitising' Economic (In)Security

If the securitisation framework can be used as analytical tool to discern when and where given insecurities are 'securitised', why might it be that economic insecurities rarely fulfil the criteria of securitisation in practice? Arguably, the naturalised quality of economic insecurities, such that they are considered part and parcel of economic life, make it such that where they are articulated they are rarely thought of in security terms. Securitisation theory tells us that it is the 'exceptionality' of security threats that see them raised above the level of politics ('politicisation') to that of security ('securitisation'). Yet, whilst exceptional circumstances may occur and a 'securitising actor' may leverage 'extraordinary measures' (e.g. public bailouts of commercial banks in a financial crisis), these are rare, and to focus only on these, it is argued here, is to miss much of what economic security is about and the significance that articulations of economic vulnerabilities might have regarding the consolidation of governance capacities.

In very 'real' terms, economic insecurities are a fundamental feature of modern economic life within a capitalist mode of production, whereby we are 'forced' to engage in wage labour for our subsistence, and wherein those wages and that labour are largely determined by the actions of others and the pursuit of profit. Unlike within pre-modern, subsistence societies, our livelihoods rely on a multitude of (largely imperceptible – and not always 'real') economic forces beyond our control, and this is something that most of us are acutely aware of. Polanyi's work looking at more

‘primitive’ societies where the individual’s security from starvation is assured as far as possible by the collective, illustrates the aforementioned point.

‘As a rule, the individual in primitive society is not threatened by starvation unless the community as a whole is in a like predicament. It is the absence of the threat of individual starvation which makes primitive society, in a sense, more humane than nineteenth century society, and at the same time less economic’ (Polanyi 1947, p. 99).

Indeed, in ‘ideational’ terms, liberal economic doctrine tells us that ‘the economic’ is underpinned by threat, and that vulnerabilities are largely necessary. Economic actors are supposed to feel insecure since this fuels competition and overall efficiencies. As Nesadurai (2006, p. 10) notes, economic insecurities are the natural consequence of the ‘creative destruction’ at the heart of capitalist progress. With insecurity a necessary corollary of the market ‘it is difficult for liberals to speak of economic security without becoming intellectually incoherent’ (Buzan *et al.* 1998, p. 106). Thus, economic insecurity appears not only ubiquitous, but largely ‘accepted’; if not necessarily by individuals, then by society broadly writ.

That said, views diverge regarding the extent to which certain insecurities are societally acceptable. As stressed in Chapter 4, Polanyi (2001) argued that the ideal of a purely self-regulating market was always practicably untenable, hence the inevitable counter-movement by society to protect itself. Besides perhaps being slightly too economically deterministic in its reasoning, and recognising the importance of ‘ideational embeddedness’ too (Granovetter 1985; Block & Somers 2003; Somers & Block 2005), this argument does reveal a propensity for societal arrangements to better protect citizens from the perceived insensitivities of the market throughout the 20th century. The (neo)liberal view is that the unfettered market is a positive-sum

game in which all eventually benefit, that it generates optimal efficiencies if only transient vulnerabilities can be borne out. In recent decades the only viable alternative to this dominant order, we are told, is social-democracy. It will be shown in Chapter 8 that social democracy was often important in nationalist articulations of the economic insecurities of union, and for better legitimising governance provisions to mitigate them. In many respects, economic security is precisely what social democracy is designed to better assure, as Elliott & Atkinson suggest here.

‘The central struggle of our time is that between laissez-faire capitalism, which represents the financial interest, and social democracy, which represents democratic control of the economy in the interests of ordinary people. These ideologies are incompatible, in that at the heart of social democracy is the one economic feature specifically and unashamedly ruled out by the resurgent free market: security. Social democracy offers nothing if it does not offer security; the free market cannot offer security (to the many at least) without ceasing to be itself’ (Elliott & Atkinson 1998, p. vii).

As such, Buzan highlights the liberal trade-off between vulnerability and efficiency¹³ that ‘occurs again and again at almost all levels of economic security, from the individual, through firm, class and state to the system level as a whole’ (1991, p. 237). Similarly, Kahler (2004, p. 492) argues that it is important to weigh our judgement of economic insecurities, such as financial volatility, with the perceived benefits to be accrued over time, whilst Roesad argues that in ‘a world characterised by economic globalisation, economic security may be seen as a function of the state’s capacity to pursue policies that maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of liberalising economic systems’ (Roesad 2006, p. 108). Incidentally, Cohen stresses that this ideal of optimal interventionism - ‘For every possible form of market failure, there can be a corresponding form of optimal intervention’ (2000, p. 176) – is as unrealizable as the

¹³ What is actually meant here is that there is a trade-off between vulnerability and inefficiency. That is, on the one hand you have efficiency at the cost of vulnerability, and on the other you have security (however short-lived and ill-advised that may be) coupled with inefficiency.

ideal of a perfect, free market (Chang 2011). Moreover, this very discourse of interventionism is built upon the false assumption of a state/market dichotomy (Bruff 2011) that simply does not exist (See Chapter 4). ‘Intervention’ is in fact a misnomer insofar as it suggests the possibility of an otherwise unfettered market. Yet this idea of optimal interventionism remains compelling, and resides beneath many articulations of economic (in)security.

The same taken-for-grantedness of economic insecurity in economic life can be seen in the all-pervasive discourse of competitiveness wherein threats provide the necessary dynamic at the heart of capitalist accumulation. Schoenberger (1998, p. 6) stresses how ‘the discourse [of competitiveness] has been successfully naturalized’.

“‘competitiveness’ seems to me a term that has become truly hegemonic in the Gramscian sense. It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that, when invoked, can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities. There is virtually no counterargument available to the simple claim that ‘doing X will make us uncompetitive,’ whatever X and whomever ‘us’ might be’ (Schoenberger 1998, p. 3).

Schoenberger argues that competitiveness is the discourse of the economics profession, which sees it as an inevitable dynamic of the market. He explains that,

‘the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle (cf. Niehans, 1990). As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it: ‘. . . when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is . . . unsustainable - that unless it improves its performance it will cease to exist’ (Schoenberger 1998, pp. 3-4).

In other words, competitiveness threats are conveyed as existential. However, securitisation also tells us that for a threat to qualify as a matter of security, it needs to represent *exceptional* circumstances requiring extraordinary measures, which given the general ‘acceptance’ of such threats is rare.

As with economic insecurities generally, such competitiveness threats ‘must be seen as real forces shaping real outcomes in society...[and] not just intellectual constructs that lend a false sense of order to a messy world’ (Schoenberger 1998, p. 3).

Nevertheless, the extent to which they correspond with neat geographical referents is often grossly exaggerated. This has been demonstrated by authors who have looked at the role of proposed ‘competitiveness threats’ for consolidating governance capacities at various geographical scales, for example, Bristow (2005) in the case of regional competitiveness, and Rosamond (2002; 2012) in the case of European competitiveness. Indeed the articulation of economic insecurities, it is argued here, are crucial considerations in the Scottish independence referendum debate (and the territorialisation of political space more generally), despite, due to their naturalisation, being partially complicit in the ‘depoliticisation’ of that debate.

Economic (In)Security and the Territorialisation of Political Space

In Chapter 4 it was shown that we are encouraged to believe the economic is apportioned spatially into a ‘real’ aggregated systems of economic activity (‘the economy’) that to a greater or lesser extent (given hegemonic narratives of globalisation, economic ‘spillover’, the integratedness and interdependency of economic spaces, etc.) determines the economic life-chances of those located there. Put differently, the imagined economy encourages us to imagine ourselves as bound up in a shared material economic community of fate (Williams 2003) wherein we share both economic opportunities and vulnerabilities with fellow citizens. An example of this is the Scottish economy. Yet the ‘reality’ is that the range of potential

factors influencing the life-chances of people within the ‘Scottish economy’ are infinite and unknowable (see ‘Knowing the economy’ in Chapter 4) and the idea of an especially ‘Scottish circumstance’ is grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, one can argue that the articulation of shared economic (in)security is crucial for the imagination of ‘the economy’.

Though not iterated as such in these precise terms, Crane (1999) illustrates how collective insecurity is vital to the imagination of ‘the economy’. Crane highlights three different ways in which the ‘economic nation’ is imagined: ‘economic historical experiences of *suffering* that are made into powerful signs of collective identity; economic accomplishments that can serve as emblems of shared *glory*; and assertions of an organic societal *unity* rooted in a common economic life’ (Crane 1999, p. 216). We see each of these at play in the imagination of the Scottish economy, or Scottish economic nation, as discussed in Chapter 3. We see narratives of ‘historical experiences of suffering’ through Scottish de-industrialisation and the perceived damages of Thatcherism (Cumbers 2014; Dardinelli & Mitchell 2014; McCrone 2012; Soule *et al.* 2012), ‘shared glory’ in the (contested) realisation of Scottish economic resurgence and resilience vis-à-vis the rest of the UK (Fitjar 2010), and ‘societal unity’ through expressions of communal solidarity and social democracy (Keating 2007; Lynch 2009). Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ endures ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, [for] the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (2006, p. 7). Crane notes how ‘The same can be said for the economy. Whatever the actual experience, narratives of economic life as something that the community shares are widely asserted; ‘We’ are

united because we toil together in the same field, even if we are doing different jobs and earning different wages' (Crane 1999, p. 217).

Incidentally, one of the examples Crane gives of 'shared suffering' is that of the Great Depression in the US, which Neocleous shows was a key historical determinant in the development of the concept of economic security, which itself, deployed through the concept of social security, was an ideational forerunner to latterly incepted concept of national security.

'If the key idea animating the Depression was fear, the New Deal was driven by the idea of security. On 8 June 1934, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that, among the objectives of his administration, 'I place the security of the men, women and children of the Nation first' (Neocleous 2006, p. 367).

Crucial to the conveyance of the economic insecurities of the nation at that time, was positing the apparent vagaries of capitalism.

'Security was now at the heart of political debate. One of the key problems of capital – the everlasting uncertainty generated by the market system – was becoming 'securitized' (Neocleous 2006, p. 369).

Thus we see how in this case certain economic insecurities were securitised through changing ideas and norms about societal tolerance of those insecurities. A similar re-framing or re-articulation of economic threats was evident in post-war Britain with, among other things, the institution of the welfare state and 'cradle to grave' societal insurance. It is likely no coincidence that during this time the very idea of the national economy as a distinct spatial-scalar entity was becoming increasingly popularised. Though, as argued in Chapter 4, it is likely that the idea of the economy was popularised through a myriad of discursive practices at that time. One such practice, which explicitly portrayed individual economic security as intimately tied to the

collective economic security of the nation, may have been the development of popular finance in the US (Aitken 2006). Aitken (2006, p. 81) points out how ‘experts and institutions keen to foster popular finance, begin also to diagram a connection between individual financial security and the integrity or security of national space’. What each of these contributions highlights, is the importance of a perceived ‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003) among the national citizens.

It is argued here that articulations of ‘the economy’ are necessarily bound up with the articulation of economic (in)security, insofar as they speak, either explicitly or implicitly, to a shared vulnerability among economic actors/subjects within that space. Crucially, through the articulation of economic (in)security by authorised actors, the consolidation of governance capacities at given spatial-scalar levels is legitimised in much the same way as conventional military based (in)securities are thought to have been crucial in consolidating the legitimacy and territoriality of the state (Campbell 1998; Kuus & Agnew 2008). In fact, the independence referendum debate offered an opportunity to assess the significance of articulations of economic (in)security vis-à-vis conventional security in disputes over territoriality.

Given shifting governance capacities within the plurinational UK state (Keating 2004; see Chapter 3), one might expect ‘emergent’ polities to be regarded as referents in their own right, or devolved governments to speak security more often, not least given the recognised importance of security discourse in the legitimation of governance capacities (Kuus & Agnew 2008; Campbell 1998). Yet for various reasons utterances of more ‘conventional’ security considerations, or indeed supposedly new threats like international terrorism and crime (HM Government 2010; HM Government 2015),

remained almost absent. Such things continue to be regarded as the preserve of the UK state. Moreover, where conventional concerns were ostensibly addressed (e.g. military provisions and security services of an independent Scotland), they often spoke more of economic concerns than conventional ones in actuality. Thus, we see what is essentially the reverse of the ‘economic-security nexus’ argument above (Dent 2006). In the case of the Scottish independence referendum debate, articulations of economic (in)security were seemingly central to the arguments of both nationalists and unionists.

As discussed above, ‘conventional’ security concerns remain largely the preserve of the state, and as much as Scotland increasingly might look like a state with devolved powers and institutions, including a parliament (see Chapter 3), it remains the case that under extant constitutional arrangements it is not within the official remit of the Scottish Government to make provisions for its own defence. It might therefore lack the institutional infrastructure and authority to meaningfully ‘speak’ security in more conventional terms, where this is considered to be the preserve of the UK Government. That said, there was and is nothing in principle preventing the Scottish Government or others talking about conventional security concerns, or indeed articulating ‘conventional’ security threats in support of independence, not least given that an independent Scotland would inherit the responsibility of affording for its own defence. Thus, either nationalist or unionists might have focussed on how an independent Scotland would provide for its defence in the event of independence. Yet, in practice utterances of more conventional (in)security were largely absent from the debate.

Of course, it may have been difficult to speak conventional (in)security with reference to a defined Scottish space, or territory, because there is an ‘objective’ lack of such insecurities. For example, one could assume that Scottish conventional security threats could be articulated by nationalists if they argued that the (rest of the) UK, or England, or Westminster, etc., is in fact the *source* of these threats, thereby uniting the Scottish people through a shared security imperative in the face of a threatening ‘other’. Whilst this was possible in the case of economic insecurities (see Chapter 8), it is virtually unthinkable in the clear absence of such conventional threats. But even if it were the case that Scotland cannot be thought to face uniquely *Scottish* threats (i.e. ones the UK state does not), it is quite possible to assume that an independent Scotland would face the same threats that it is thought to currently face as a part of the UK, for threats need not be unique to a given territory or populace in order to be meaningfully articulated.

In the UK Government National Security Strategy at the time of the independence debate, threats such as international terrorism, cyber-crime, natural hazards, international military crises requiring UK involvement, chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) were all addressed (HM Government 2010, p. 27). For the sake of argument, if one assumes that these threats are real, unionists might therefore have argued that security from these threats would not be adequately provided for under independence, whilst nationalists might argue that they are not sufficiently provided for under union. As will be revealed in subsequent chapters, both parties did so, but only very rarely. One such rare example from the unionist side is evidenced in a Better Together article published on 31st October 2013, entitled ‘*Stronger, safer & more secure together*’ (see Table 1.0),

which argued that Scotland is more secure under existing UK security arrangements.

Conversely, a rare example from Yes Scotland just a day earlier argued:

‘Our strength and safety as an independent country will rely on collective defence and cooperation with our neighbours...But both deliberate UK policy decisions and the incompetence of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has left Scotland less safe than it would be if Scotland’s defence and foreign policy were left for Scotland to decide’ (Yes Scotland 2013).

This latter article stressed how Scottish military personnel will be better provided for under independence, for Scotland will have ‘tailor-made’ defences better suited to its own security needs (See Appendix 4.0).

Despite invariably having some basis in ‘reality’, insecurities are fundamentally constructed insofar as their interpretation is discursively mediated. In the case of conventional threats to an existing Scottish polity or notional Scottish state, it is likely less meaningful to talk about *Scottish* conventional security threats more so as a consequence of them not having been framed, or constructed as such. This may or may not be due to the fact that national security (i.e. defence) remains largely the preserve of the state (in the language of discourse theory, it remained largely outwith the discursive ‘limits of possibility’), but in any event across arguments both for and against independence there was very little discursive ‘effort’ to articulate conventional insecurities.

Conclusion

Here it is suggested that we can think of utterances of economic (in)security in the referendum debate as ‘designed’ to provoke notions of economic vulnerabilities or

threats associated with independence. In doing so, however, the author is mindful of the 'performative' nature of this formulation and his potential complicity in defining economic (in)security in a set way. However, as stressed in the methodology (see 'A Capacity for Critique'), poststructuralism recognises that it is not possible to 'say nothing at all' about the world. Rather, the key point is to remain mindful of what one *is* saying, and to be 'critically reflexive' in one's approach. What is argued here is that understanding the mutual constitution of utterances of economic vulnerabilities and the idea of 'the economy' as a defined spatial-scalar entity is revealing of important insights regarding how arguments for and against independence were framed and governing legitimacies consolidated.

Whilst recognising the futility of a search for the 'essence' of economic security, it is perhaps surprising that in light of the so called broadening and deepening of security understanding that there have been so few attempts to conceptualise economic security compared to other 'types' of security. Based upon this, and the poststructuralist assumptions underpinning the thesis, it was suggested that we might look at articulations of economic (in)security to better understand what it 'means' in political practice. One very influential body of work within security studies literature that advocates precisely this is the Copenhagen School and the concept of securitisation. It was stressed that whilst the securitisation thesis is highly illuminating in many regards, the conceptual framework provided for its application has analytical and normative deficiencies. Whilst crucially underlining the constitutive role of language in understanding how security is intersubjectively constructed through speech-acts, it leaves little room for recognition of either the broader contextual determinants of those speech acts, the inevitable subjugation of other 'voices' in their

utterance, or indeed the constitutive role of theorising in the construction of security's meaning. Consequently, a more open, reflexive and critical commitment to the 'constructedness' of security is advocated. Crucially, doing so may help us to understand why economic risks are rarely deemed as sufficiently 'exceptional' to satisfy the criteria of securitisation.

It was argued that economic insecurities are assumed to be a fundamental feature of modern economic life, and inextricably bound up with the imagination of 'the economy'. Economic (in)security is constantly articulated by, among others, governments on an 'everyday' basis. Whilst exceptional economic circumstances occur, requiring exceptional measures, the 'everyday' nature of the articulation of economic (in)security, coupled with the normalisation of threat, makes a literal application of the securitisation framework unsatisfactory. Yet to ignore articulations of economic threats, vulnerabilities or insecurities, precludes an understanding of just how significant they might be shaping political geographies. As revealed in subsequent chapters, there was significant discursive effort devoted by both unionists and nationalists to articulate the economic insecurities of either independence, or continued union. Put simply, in unionist arguments, independence is portrayed as the harbinger of economic insecurity, whilst in nationalist arguments independence is seen as the means for assuring security as well as the solution to the current and projected insecurities of union.

Probably the most significant protagonist in the unionist camp was the leader of the Better Together campaign and Scottish Labour MP (and former Chancellor to the UK Exchequer), Alistair Darling. In his opening statement of a prominent televised head-

to-head to debate with Scotland's then First Minister, Alex Salmond, on 5th August 2014, the theme of uncertainty and insecurity was clear.

“I want to see Scotland prosper. I don't want to see new barriers, new borders, new boundaries where none exist. I don't want to see anything get in the way of the jobs and security that we need in this country” (BBC 2014b).

Elsewhere, in a speech at the University of Glasgow in 2013:

“People are worried about economic security: their jobs, and the future for their families and children, at a time of great economic uncertainty. So, let's begin with the issue that's been central to the debate: the economy. The essence of the case for economic union is that it brings certainty at a time of insecurity and opportunity both for Scottish businesses and for individual Scots. Being part of an integrated UK economy helps us deal with risks, and share opportunities in a home market inside one of the world's largest economies” (Darling 2013, p. 6).

Similarly, in an article for the Scotsman newspaper entitled '*Referendum Comes Down to Money*', Professor Jim Gallagher (supporter of the Better Together campaign) asserted 'The essence of the case for economic union is not only does it bring opportunity for individual Scots and Scottish businesses, but also it's a way of providing stability and security' (Gallagher 2013). Conversely, the Scottish First Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party stated on the day before the publication of the White Paper on independence (Scottish Government 2013d) what he saw as the most important issues for Scots in the debate: "jobs, economic growth and security".

Whilst poststructuralism denies the existence of a foundational reality separate from our experiences of it, it clearly still makes sense to talk of economic realities. As Foucault's critique of ideology stresses, 'there is no reality (perceivable) outside of techniques of truth, and that techniques of truth are both less ideological and more political than assumed' (de Goede 2003, pp. 6-7). The result is that 'rather than

distracting from the study of material reality, [poststructuralism] enables it to be seen as profoundly political' (Goede 2003, p. 7). Thus the poststructuralist approach here simultaneously refutes the existence of a *foundational* reality behind discourse, whilst highlighting how accepted narratives or discourses can obscure economic 'realities' (however contingent and temporary they might be). As Peterson notes in his support of Critical Poststructuralism in Global Political Economy, 'uncritical adherence to particular stabilizations frustrates attempts to adequately understand 'reality'' (2006, p. 121). The role of poststructuralism then is to 'critically evaluate – to *politicize* – the specific effects and trade-offs of stabilizations, dominant orderings, and especially, what becomes normalized (depoliticized) as 'common sense'' (Peterson 2006, p. 121, *emphasis in original*).

Providing a political-economic appraisal of the claims made in unionist and nationalist arguments in order to ascertain their truth, to reveal the economic 'realities' behind the political rhetoric as it were - as far as it would have been possible or meaningful to do so anyway - is not the intention here. For the purpose of this thesis the latter is of less importance than the simple fact itself that articulations of economic (in)security were used, as this in itself reveals an accepted 'truth', namely, the purported 'truth' of 'the economy'. As we will see, whilst nationalists and unionists disagreed on the economic implications of independence – ultimately, whether Scots would be more or less economically secure in an independent Scotland – the fundamental assumption underpinning those arguments (i.e. the economy) remained unchallenged. This in itself is revealing of the way in which governing legitimacies are forged through elite discursive practices.

Chapter 7: Articulating (Economic) (In)Security: The Unionist Case Against Independence

Chapter 5 explained that economic considerations were at the heart of the referendum debate, with the proposed economic consequences of independence used to support justifications both for and against separation from the rest of the UK. It is proposed here that these can be thought of as arguments of economic (in)security. This chapter is concerned with evidencing articulations of (economic) (in)security in unionist arguments against independence in the referendum debate, whilst the next chapter will do the same with nationalist arguments *for* independence. Both chapters draw upon key government documents and speeches, but focus in particular on materials published on the websites of the opposing unionist (Better Together) and nationalist (Yes Scotland) campaigns. As stated in the methodology, these materials are felt to be a particularly useful gauge of the terms of the debate as they represent managed collections of articles including text from key speeches, documents and reports, along with editorials, blogs, etc. In total, approximately 1,200 such texts were ‘read’ for the purposes of this analysis¹⁴ with coding of data clearly revealing key themes in the arguments of both unionists and nationalists with regards to independence. Using basic quantitative and qualitative content analysis, the extent to which the Better Together and Yes Scotland campaigns were built on articulations of (economic) (in)security will be revealed, as well as the specific ways in which economic (in)security was articulated. The first part of each chapter looks at the significance of

¹⁴ Full lists of titles and information on accessing full articles can be found in the appendices. Full articles were not inserted in the appendices as they would have run to several thousand pages.

utterances of ‘conventional’ (in)security in unionist texts, whilst the remainder of the chapter reveals the far greater significance of utterances of economic (in)security, the specific ‘types’ of economic threats uttered, as well as the ultimate narrative, or discourse, that unionists are attempting to construct with regards to independence.

Conventional Versus Economic (In)Security: Revisiting the ‘Economic-Security Nexus’

Chapter 6 explained that economic (in)security has all too often been conceptualised as an adjunct to conventional security, specifically the capacity of the state to finance its defence needs. Rather than explaining economic security per se, this regards what has been referred to as the ‘economic-security nexus’ (Dent 2006). We can see this, for instance, in the UK Government security strategy where it states ‘[a] strong economy is a vital basis for our security’ (HM Government 2010, p. 21), or in the Prime Minister’s Foreword to the subsequent (and current) 2015 national security strategy which urged:

‘Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong’ (HM Government 2015, p. 5).

This latter strategy document draws a strong correlation between the need to ensure the UK economy’s continued recovery in the aftermath of a global financial crisis and subsequent recession, and the continued physical security of the nation.

‘Our strong economy provides the foundation to invest in our security and global influence, which in turn provides more opportunities at home and overseas for us to increase our prosperity. A growing global economy helps to reduce poverty and build security for all’ (HM Government 2015, p. 69).

Although less a feature of the Scottish independence debate, there were rare instances where this same argument was made, as in UK Government's 'Scotland Analysis:

Defence' paper (HM Government 2013).

'Various proposals or options have been put forward by the Scottish National Party (SNP) and others regarding the possible defence posture and capabilities of an independent Scottish state, with estimated costs ranging from £1.6 billion to £2.5 billion to cover defence, intelligence and cyber capabilities. Even the highest of these estimates is only about 7 per cent of the combined UK budgets for defence, intelligence and cyber, and less than countries such as Denmark and Norway spend on defence alone. It is not clear what level of security and protection the proposals would provide for Scotland; but it is clear that it would be much less than that provided to Scotland as part of the UK' (HM Government 2013, p. 10).

Here there is the implication, if not the explicit assertion, that Scotland will be less secure if independent. Incidentally, the publication of this particular document represented an important stimulus for the limited number of outputs by both Better Together and Yes Scotland that addressed considerations of defence.

Incidentally, it is arguably by reversing the 'economic-security nexus' argument that we find a better descriptor of utterances of conventional (in)security in the referendum debate. Seemingly the unionist' emphasis was less on Scotland's capacity to protect itself with a lessened defence capacity under independence, but on the likely impact of reduced defence spending and hefty defence restructuring costs on Scottish economic activity and livelihoods (i.e. the security of defence based jobs in Scotland).

For instance, in the aforementioned Scotland Analysis document it states:

'The Ministry of Defence spent over £20 billion with UK industry in 2011/12, just under half of which was with the manufacturing sector, providing significant employment opportunities and contributions to national and local economies' (HM Government 2013, p. 67).

‘The defence sector is an important part of Scotland’s industry, employing over 12,600 people, but is highly dependent upon domestic defence spending, particularly in the maritime sector’ (HM Government 2013, p. 67).

‘An independent Scottish state would certainly see lower domestic demand for defence goods due to a much smaller budget. It would also lose the support to exports provided by the UK’s international defence engagement and facilitated by the UK’s global reputation’ (HM Government 2013, p. 67).

The report stressed the enormous amount of public money dedicated to defence spending and how even more will be spent in Scotland in the coming years (disproportionately, incidentally, vis-à-vis other parts of the UK), with even more jobs being created. This was juxtaposed with the significant costs involved in establishing independent defence capabilities should Scotland choose to leave the union.

It is possible to simply quantify the significance of utterances of more ‘conventional’ security concerns in Better Together outputs by ascertaining the proportion of titles of published content that refer to matters of defence. Therefore, across 532 publications from the Better Together campaign (see Appendix 1.0 for full list of article dates and titles), just 9 articles (or 1.7%) exhibited titles which dealt ostensibly with such security concerns (see Table 1.0). These pertained almost entirely to the likely reconfiguration of national security infrastructures, and largely that of militaristic defence arrangements. It is worth noting that four of these (those published between 8th October and 8th November 2013) all pertained explicitly to the publication of the aforementioned ‘Scotland Analysis: Defence’ document (UK Government 2013a).

Table 1.0: Better Together – Threats to Existing Security Infrastructure

Article Date	Article Title	Indicative Quotes
24/06/13	The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let's keep it that way	<i>'The damning report published today by the Scotland Institute, an independent think-tank, issued a stark warning about the impact of going it alone on our defence industry and the ability of a separate Scotland to defend itself. It concludes that we are stronger and safer as part of the UK. Why put this at risk and undermine the Scottish national interest?'</i>
08/10/13	Defending Scotland: stronger together	<i>'The Scotland Analysis paper highlights that for more than 300 years Scotland has played an integral part in the defence of the UK – safeguarding our national security, protecting our people, economy and interests from threats'</i>
19/10/13	The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let's keep it that way	<i>'The first priority of any responsible government is the security of its people. As part of the UK, we enjoy a high level of security in a dangerous world.'</i> <i>'Our UK defence industry sustains thousands of jobs in Scotland – from those who serve on the front line to those in our shipyard workers on the Clyde and at Rosyth.'</i>
31/10/13	Stronger, safer & more secure together	<i>'Be it international or home-grown threats; cyber-attack; major accident or natural hazard; an increase in the levels of organised crime; or unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear or biological weaponry, we are better protected as part of the bigger United Kingdom.'</i>
08/11/13	Scotland's security	<i>'Scotland's security is best served by being part of the UK'</i>

20/03/14	Being part of the UK is good for defence jobs, say shipyard workers and employers	<i>'Thousands of jobs in Scotland rely on shipbuilding. Not just in our yards but also in the vast supply chain that supports jobs in businesses across the country.'</i>
14/04/14	Staying in the UK is best for defence and jobs in Scotland – Coaker	<i>'Thousands of Scots employed in our defence industry make the equipment and develop the technology necessary to make sure we have the best Armed Forces in the world.'</i>
15/04/14	Defence industry jobs are best protected by remaining in the UK	<i>'There was real concern over the future of these jobs if Scotland votes to leave the UK in September.'</i>
05/07/14	Carrier naming shows why we are Better Together	<i>'The construction of the 65,000 tonne aircraft carrier supports up to 2,000 jobs in the Rosyth area and a further 2,000 on the Clyde. The economy has been boosted by over £300 million of sub contracts being placed with Scottish companies by the consortium that built the carrier.'</i>

Upon deeper reading of each of the articles in Table 1.0, just three could be considered to have dealt almost exclusively with conventional security matters; the first was on the 24th June 2013 (*'The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let's keep it that way'*), another on the 31st October 2013 (*'Stronger, safer & more secure together'*), and the last on the 8th November 2013 (*'Scotland's security'*). The indicative quotes in Table 1.0 help to illustrate this.

A further three of the articles in Table 1.0 revealed some level of balance between economic concerns and conventional security concerns, albeit economic concerns directly associated with the security/defence industry and its significance to the 'Scottish economy' and 'Scottish jobs'. The first, on the 8th October 2013 (*'Defending*

Scotland: stronger together'), opens with discussion of conventional security, but then the majority of its content addressed economic concerns. The second, on the 19th October 2013 ('*The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let's keep it that way*'¹⁵), also comprised both economic and conventional security concerns, as illustrated by the two indicative quotes from this article in Table 1.0. The third article on the 14th April 2014 ('*Staying in the UK is best for defence and jobs in Scotland – Coaker*') is in fact a re-publication of a speech given by the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence. It also deals with both economic and defence concerns. The remaining three articles, despite appearing from their titles to pertain to conventional security concerns dealt entirely with economic implications and revealed no attempt to speak to conventional security fears at all.

As evident from the article in Table 1.0 from the 19th October 2013, the potential loss of jobs in the shipbuilding industry as a result of reconfigured defence arrangements in an independent Scotland was a stated concern of unionists. In fact, there were ten further articles (whose titles did not appear to pertain ostensibly to 'defence') that dealt with this topic specifically across the campaign period (See Table 1.1).

¹⁵ Note the use of the same title as that used for the article published on the 24th June 2013 and previously discussed. Although the titles were the same, the content of the articles was not.

Table 1.1: Better Together - Threats to the Shipbuilding Industry

Article Date	Article Title	Indicative Quotes
05/07/14	A Future for Scottish Shipbuilding on the Clyde	<i>'Scotland has a long and enduring relationship with shipbuilding and engineering. So much so, that the shipbuilding industry is synonymous the Clyde. Our industry has been key to the economy and to working class communities'</i>
11/11/13	The future of shipbuilding on the Clyde	<i>'It is a fact that, as part of the UK Scotland benefits from the sheer scale of the UK's defence budget and ambitions. This not only provides us with a level of security that it would be difficult to replicate in a separate Scotland, but it sustains thousands of highly-skilled jobs throughout the country.'</i>
01/06/14	BAE Chief Exec warns a vote for separation is a vote to put Scottish shipbuilding jobs at risk	<i>'With around 3,500 employees in Scotland, this is a very important intervention from BAE. It's clear that if we leave the UK then it would cost defence jobs in Scotland. This isn't a risk worth taking.'</i>
23/06/14	Jobs and opportunities in Scottish shipyards secured by being part of the UK	<i>'Being part of the UK secures the future of the Scottish shipyards and thousands of jobs - that's why we should say No Thanks to separation.'</i>
24/06/14	Being part of the UK secures the best future for Scotland's shipyards	<i>'Around 4,000 jobs in Scotland rely directly on our shipbuilding industry. If we leave the UK then these jobs would put at risk. Scotland's shipbuilding industry is one of the most advanced and vital parts of our economy.'</i>
07/07/14	Separation would put shipyard jobs at risk, confirms BAE boss	<i>'The chairman of the UK's largest defence contractor, BAE systems, has said that he doesn't believe the UK government would commission warships to be built in an independent Scotland.'</i>

09/07/14	Say No Thanks to secure the future of shipbuilding in Scotland	<i>'Senior trade unionists have said that separation will risk thousands of shipyard jobs...The economy has been boosted by over £300 million of sub contracts being placed with Scottish companies.'</i>
15/07/14	Being Part of the UK is the best way to secure shipyard jobs	<i>'Two of the biggest employers in Scotland's defence industry have given their strongest warning yet over the threat that separation poses to jobs in Scotland.'</i>
12/08/14	UK shipyard deal protects 800 jobs in Scotland	<i>'The UK Ministry of Defence today confirmed a lucrative deal worth £385 million to shipyards in Scotland. The construction of three Royal Navy patrol vessels on the Clyde will secure 800 jobs for years to come. Scotland's shipbuilding industry is one of the most advanced and important parts of our economy. The support of the UK Government is vital for the long term health of the industry. Separation would see the end of this support and put Scotland's shipyards at risk.'</i>
16/09/14	A letter to the Scottish Government and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders work-in veterans	<i>'Shipbuilding on the upper Clyde remains Glasgow's single largest manufacturing industry and it forms the largest defence manufacturing centre in Scotland. It sustains 8,000 direct and indirect jobs, £324 million worth of Gross Value Added per annum, and the largest private sector apprenticeship programme in Scotland.'</i>

What is clear from unionist texts is a situation where despite matters of conventional security occasionally featuring in the debate, where they did so they very often pertained to the *economic* implications of defence arrangements. Indeed, the same situation was evident in nationalist texts too, as will be revealed in the following chapter. Far more common again, however, were utterances of economic concerns in

their own right. The unionist argument was essentially built on discrediting the economic case for independence being proposed by nationalists. Unionists argued that under union people in Scotland, and the Scottish economy, benefit from the stability and security afforded by being part of a larger and stronger UK economy. Conversely, they argued that independence would create numerous economic insecurities for people living in Scotland.

The Better Together Campaign: The Insecurities of Independence versus the Security of Union

As explained in Chapter 6, in the context of arguments for and against independence we can define utterances of economic (in)security as any utterance that speaks to the economic livelihoods of people in Scotland, either conveyed as threats, or as assurances given regarding the protection from such threats. Based on this broad definition, it is possible, as in the case of conventional threats, to assess the extent to which the Better Together campaign was underpinned by articulations of the economic insecurities of independence through a basic content analysis of their outputs. Three measures were used to assess the proportion of Better Together articles dealing with economic (in)security, each of which can be regarded as revealing utterances of economic (in)security. It ought to be stressed that this is not intended to be a precise science, for it clearly relies upon assumptions the author made about: 1) What constitutes an utterance of economic (in)security (as stated above), and; 2) The audience's understanding of economic matters and/or the broader terms of the independence debate. The latter pertains of course to how the audience will have likely 'read' the texts published.

The first and second measures involved looking just at the titles of articles, as was done for conventional security utterances above (See Appendix 1.0¹⁶). In the case of the first, the intention was to illustrate the proportion of article titles which most clearly uttered economic insecurities. Examples are given in Table 1.2

Table 1.2: Better Together- Examples of Titles Uttering Economic (In)Security

Article Date	Article Title
04/09/2013	Our economic future: greater opportunity and protection as part of the UK family
29/10/2013	Experts say big cuts or tax rises if Scotland leaves the UK
07/11/2013	Leading experts warn that the cost of mortgages could rise if Scotland separates from the UK

This measure was deemed important, firstly from a consideration of the potential audience, since people will have been more likely to have read the titles of articles than full articles themselves (perhaps when ‘skimming’ to another article), but secondly, given that the titles obviously reveal the core topic and purpose of the content (i.e. they reveal what the publications are most trying to say to the reader).

In the case of the second measure the purpose was to illustrate the proportion of articles that could be *assumed* to be about economic insecurity from their titles alone.

Examples are given in Table 1.3.

¹⁶ A number of articles were removed; a series of articles entitled ‘Why I’m Saying No Thanks’ ran throughout the debate period, which were removed from the analysis as their titles were not topic specific and it was felt that they would dilute the findings.

Table 1.3: Better Together – Examples of Titles Assumed to be Uttering**Economic (In)Security**

Article Date	Article Title
17/06/2013	Unanswered questions about how separation would affect our pensions
01/05/2013	New report reveals true cost of Independence
22/06/2014	Employers back Scotland's place in the UK - new survey

None of the three article titles above explicitly articulate a threat, but one can assume that their content might reveal as much. For example, one might assume that the first will tell us pensions will be negatively affected, the second will refer to the negative economic costs of independence, whilst the third will reveal the negative implications for employment opportunities in an independent Scotland. Incidentally, an in-depth reading proved this to be true in each of the three cases. The reason for including this second measure is that those reading the titles alone might equally have assumed them to be essentially articulations of economic (in)security, based upon fairly straightforward assumptions about their likely content.

The third and final measure used was an in-depth reading of every article in the collection, based upon which it was possible to discern the proportion of articles that *actually* dealt with the topic of economic (in)security somewhere within their content. What was not considered within this third measure was the *extent* to which any given article was concerned with articulating economic (in)security, as doing so would have taken enormous effort and would have not have been terribly meaningful anyway. The results of the content analysis based on these three measures were as follows.

Table 1.4 Better Together – Proportion of Articles Dealing with Economic (In)Security

	Clearly about economic (in)security in title	Could be assumed to be about economic (in)security from title	About economic (in)security in article	Total
Number of articles	78	205	337	532
% of articles	14.7%	38.6%	63.0%	100.0%

Table 1.4 reveals the significance of articulations of economic (in)security across the published content of the Better Together campaign. More than one third of all 532 titles could have been assumed to pertain to the economic insecurities of independence, with nearly two thirds actually comprising content that did so.

Incidentally, from reading these materials one notes an escalation across the campaign period that was not evident with utterances of economic (in)security throughout the Yes Scotland campaign. Between 1st February 2013 and 1st February 2014 there were 208 articles posted, of which only 12 (or 5.8%) titles could be regarded as explicit utterances of economic (in)security, as per the first of the three measures outlined above. Between then and the day of the referendum on the 16th September, a shorter period of just over 7 months, 324 articles were published, and of these, 66 (20.4%) titles could be regarded as utterances of economic (in)security. Furthermore, in terms of the main content of the articles, as per the third measure outlined above, 101 of 208 articles (or 48.6%) comprised utterances of economic (in)security between 1st

February 2013 and 1st February 2014, whilst 236 out of 324 (or 72.8%) did so across the remaining campaign period. The following charts help to illustrate the observation of the escalation in utterances of economic (in)security in Better Together materials.

Figure 1.0 reveals the proportion of article titles which could be regarded as utterances of economic (in)security, whilst Figure 1.1 reveals the proportion of articles whose content revealed utterances of economic (in)security.

Figure 1.0: % of Better Together Article Titles about Economic (In)Security





Figure 1.1: % of Better Together Articles about Economic (In)Security



There was also a notable increase in both published content and the focus on economic (in)security in the first two weeks of September 2014 (i.e. immediately prior the referendum). There were 46 articles posted on the website, of which 37 (or 80%) pertained to the economic insecurities of independence. Furthermore, the language used in the materials at that time appears to reveal a greater sense of urgency. A selection of 8 titles from this two week period (see Table 1.5) reveal this greater sense of urgency and suggest somewhat more explicit utterances of insecurity. This can be seen, for example, when these titles are compared with those published at the same time the previous September (see Table 1.6).

Table 1.5: Better Together – Utterances of Economic (In)Security in September 2014

Article Date	Article Title
03/09/14	Currency chaos would mean painful cuts to public spending, say experts
04/09/14	Independence wouldn't put an end to austerity, it would make it worse
05/09/14	Independence would cost families in Scotland dear, says expert
08/09/14	The [economic] risks of leaving the UK are “huge” says Nobel prize winner (Paul Krugman)
10/09/14	Black Wednesday: The day the economic case for separation crumbled
12/09/14	The costs of separation laid bare
13/09/14	Leaving the UK would bring “severe austerity”
15/09/14	The poorest would be the hardest hit by separation, says top economist

Table 1.6: Better Together - Utterances of Economic (In)Security in September 2013

Article Date	Article Title
01/09/13	Alex Salmond's currency plan “fundamentally flawed”
03/09/13	Being part of the UK allows us to maximise the North Sea's potential
04/09/13	Our economic future: greater opportunity and protection as part of the UK family
12/09/13	The currency question: A roundup of what the experts say
17/09/13	What would independence mean for our currency and mortgage rates?
18/09/13	We're not asking for the shirt off your back

To summarise, articulations of the economic (in)securities of independence were central to the unionist argument – insofar as can be revealed by the materials published by the official unionist ‘Better Together’ campaign. Moreover, there appeared to be some level of ‘ramping up’ of said articulations, both quantitatively

and qualitatively throughout the campaign period. More important than this for my analyses, however, is what the Better Together campaign materials reveal about *the way* in which economic (in)security was articulated by unionists, specifically the different types or topics of economic insecurity uttered. Among other things, this revealed notable differences between the unionist and nationalist campaigns.

Table 1.7 presents the key topics of economic (in)security articulated across the campaign period by Yes Scotland. These were revealed by a detailed reading of the 337 Better Together articles (or 63%) considered to have dealt with matters of economic (in)security. Essentially, the majority of these 337 articles will have dealt with one or more of the insecurities listed in the table below. For the purposes of illustration a small selection of articles are presented along with indicative quotes.

Table 1.7: Better Together – Utterances of Economic (In)Security

Economic (In) Security	Article Date	Article Title	Indicative Quotes
Pensions	27/03/14	Being part of the UK protects the pensions of hard working Scots	<i>'In a devastating blow to the nationalist case for separation, it is now clear that breaking up the UK means the pension schemes of hard-working Scots could close.'</i>
	22/04/14	Being part of the UK secures the pensions of Scots – Gordon Brown	<i>'It is clear that pensioners are better protected when the risks are spread across the UK.'</i>
	25/08/14	Independence risk to pensions – new poll	<i>'A new poll released today has shown the vast majority of Scotland's pensioners are worried about the risk to their state pension if we leave the UK.'</i>
	17/06/13	Unanswered questions about how separation would affect our pensions	<i>'Separation would cause "serious risks" to the payment of pensions. For many of Scotland's pensioners that isn't a risk worth taking.'</i>
Shared currency	28/02/14	Keeping the security of the UK Pound matters	<i>'Today we have the strength and security of the UK pound.'</i>
	12/09/13	The currency question: A roundup of what the experts say	<i>'The choice of currency has huge economic implications. It would affect our mortgage rates, our trade with other countries, our financial stability, as well as how much our country could tax and spend.'</i>
	17/09/13	What would independence mean for our currency and mortgage rates?	<i>'As part of the UK, we have our own currency. We set our own interest rates. We have the strength and security of the</i>

			<i>bigger United Kingdom behind us if things go wrong.'</i>
	12/02/14	SNP Default Threat – What the Experts Say	<i>'The security of the UK pound means more jobs, cheaper mortgages, lower credit card bills and more affordable car-loans. The commentators and experts are increasingly asking why we would gamble that.'</i>
	13/02/14	They can't even tell us what currency we would use	<i>'Leaving the UK means leaving the security of the UK pound.'</i>
Jobs	03/09/13	Being part of the UK allows us to maximise the North Sea's potential	<i>'North Sea oil and gas is good for Scotland's economy. It sustains thousands of jobs, especially in the North East.'</i>
	19/10/13	The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let's keep it that way	<i>'Why would we want to risk the jobs of thousands of people because of Alex Salmond's obsession with independence?'</i>
	09/03/14	Alex Salmond has turned the ballot paper into a betting slip	<i>'Leaving the UK means losing jobs'</i>
	27/07/14	Say No Thanks to putting our economic future at risk	<i>'Putting a border between Scottish business and their customers elsewhere in the UK could cost our economy billions and put jobs in Scotland at risk, new analysis confirms'</i>
Cost of living	23/07/14	Being part of the UK keeps energy costs down for families in Scotland	<i>'Only by saying No Thanks to separation on 18 September can we...keep energy bills down for families in Scotland.'</i>
	09/12/13	UK Single Market keeps costs down, say supermarket bosses	<i>'The bosses of top supermarkets in Scotland have said that leaving the UK could result in higher weekly shopping bills for Scottish families.'</i>
	22/05/14	Lower cost of living as part	<i>'The price of our weekly shop, energy</i>

		of the UK	<i>bills and mortgages all face significant rises if Scotland leaves the UK. In these difficult economic times the last thing we need is to add hundreds of pounds to our monthly expenses.'</i>
	13/06/14	Scottish TV licence set to soar	<i>'A vote for independence on September 18 could lead to a higher television licence.'</i>
	12/09/14	Being part of the UK keeps the cost down for families in Scotland	<i>'The cost of everyday things would rise in a separate Scotland. That's the message this week from retailers.'</i>
Mortgages/borrowing	26/03/14	Employers say we are better and stronger together	<i>'Being part of the UK is good for jobs and keeps down costs for families in Scotland.'</i>
	14/01/14	Salmond's reckless threats on debt risk pushing up costs for families in Scotland	<i>'It would be hard working families in Scotland who would suffer. Defaulting on debt would push up mortgage rates, borrowing costs for businesses and credit card charges.'</i>
	24/04/13	Scots on what separation could mean for your savings, pension and mortgage	<i>'In these tough economic times Scots are concerned about their pensions, mortgages and savings.'</i>
Fiscal viability	09/10/13	What the SNP haven't been telling you about tax rises, cuts & their oil fund plans	<i>'We know that as part of the UK we get the benefit of North Sea oil without risking our public finances on its volatility.'</i>
	29/10/13	Experts say big cuts or tax rises if Scotland leaves the UK	<i>'Two groups of leading economic experts have said that we would face deep cuts or tax rises, if Scotland was to leave the United Kingdom.'</i>
	20/03/14	Budget oil forecasts show that being part of the UK protects public services in Scotland	<i>'Being part of the UK protects funding for Scotland's schools and hospitals, Better Together said today.'</i>
	09/04/14	Experts say leaving the UK	<i>'On the money available to spend on</i>

		would put our public services at risk	<i>schools and hospitals, pensions and benefits, the expert NIESR report said that there would need to be bigger cuts than anything necessary as part of the UK.'</i>
	13/09/14	Leaving the UK would bring "severe austerity"	<i>'Scotland would therefore have to engage in severe austerity, either by cutting public spending or raising taxes or both, to establish fiscal credibility.'</i>
Financial System Security	18/03/13	As Scots, we believe there is nowhere better. But we do know there is something bigger	<i>'The fact that the UK was there to stand behind a failed Scottish bank – and this was a calamity made in Edinburgh – is only one example of the strength of sharing risks.'</i>
	30/06/14	Being part of the UK protects the jobs, savings and mortgages of Scots	<i>'A global analysis of banks has shown that the UK economy offers more security and protection from shocks in the banking sector than would be possible in a separate Scotland.'</i>
	09/04/14	Being part of something bigger gives Scotland economic security without losing our unique identity	<i>'I know from my own time as Chancellor that being part of something bigger means greater economic security for Scotland. It was because we had the back-up of the larger UK that we were able to prevent the collapse of the Scottish and UK economy.'</i>

The most frequently uttered insecurities across the Better Together campaign, all of which independence was conveyed as being the harbinger of, were: 1) Threats to pensions, whereby an independent Scotland was argued to be unable to afford to pay the ever-growing pension bill associated with an ageing population; 2) Threats associated with the loss of a shared currency with the rest of the UK; 3) Threats to

jobs through lost economic opportunities (and public contracts) afforded under union;

4) Threats to the cost of living for Scottish people, most notably energy and grocery bills, either through lost economies of scale, or shifting commercial ‘obligations’ to spread costs like distribution over such a broad and complex geography; 5) Threats associated with potentially higher borrowing costs in an independent Scotland, including that of mortgages; 6) Threats regarding the fiscal (un)viability of an independent Scottish state (see Chapter 5), wherein taxes would need to rise or public spending fall in order to compensate for Scotland no longer benefitting from a net transfer of public wealth in its favour; and, 7) Threats resulting from no longer having a financial system backed up by the UK’s much larger public purse (much was made by unionists of the measures taken by the UK Government to shore up large Scottish financial institutions during the financial crisis in 2008, which an independent Scottish government would almost certainly have not been capable of, and an otherwise separate UK state could not have been expected to do).

Making a distinction between each of these insecurities is of course somewhat arbitrary given that many are related in very practical terms. For example, distinguishing between threats to a shared currency and threats to fiscal viability is difficult given the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy. Similarly, conceiving of threats to the oil industry as simply a threat to oil jobs (as per the indicative quote in Table 1.7 from the article ‘Being part of the UK allows us to maximise the North Sea’s potential’ published on the 9th March 2013) ignores the fact that oil revenues are also deemed crucial to the fiscal viability of an independent Scottish state due to the much greater proportion of tax revenues it would have

accounted for. In fact, many articles will have comprised utterances of multiple insecurities from the above table.

As such, it is not possible to illustrate the proportion of articles dealing with each of these insecurities in particular. Nor is it really possible - or terribly meaningful – to illustrate the extent to which each of these insecurities were significant in the overall articulation of the economic (in)securities of independence by unionists, although as stated in Chapter 5, matters of public finance provided probably the single most important topic of debate. Incidentally, as the campaign period progressed it became increasingly common for articles to comprise utterances of numerous economic insecurities, because as economic arguments against independence became better rehearsed, there was a tendency for any given article to refer to a number of economic arguments, often beyond what may have been the principle topic of that article. Here we see a very clear instance of intertextuality, as earlier texts or communicative events are implicated through newer ones - in this case previously iterated insecurities – as part of an increasingly rehearsed narrative or discourse of the economic insecurities of independence.

Intertextuality was also evident through commonly uttered words, terms or phrases in both unionist and nationalist texts. In the case of unionists, prominent examples were ‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘strength’, often uttered as single, repeated phrase. As they are constantly reiterated, these helped to act as organising tropes or signifiers in arguments against independence, around which the specific insecurities above could be organised or collated. If one was to ascribe a title to the overarching narrative, or discourse of unionists against independence, it might be that of ‘strength, security and

stability'. Put succinctly by Alisdair Darling in a speech given at Glasgow University in July 2013 (*We Belong Together: The Case for a United Kingdom*):

“It's the choice to look outward, not inward. It's the choice to share, not to separate. It's the choice of economic strength, not financial uncertainty. It's the choice of stability and security, not risk and weakness" (Darling 2013).

Similarly, in Better Together article published on 8th September 2014 ('Today the costs of separation became real') the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Douglas Alexander is quoted as saying:

“These are risks that we simply don't have to take. There is a much better way to secure the future of Scotland. We can have more powers over tax and welfare for Scotland, backed up by the *strength, security and stability* of the larger UK economy. We should say No Thanks to taking on all the risks of separation on 18 September” (emphasis added)

The next section of this chapter looks more closely at this argument about the greater strength, security and stability of being part of a larger UK economy, and drawing upon the conceptual themes developed in previous chapters, will state what this rather unremarkable looking argument in support of continued union in fact reveals about the taken-for-granted truths that make it possible.

Imagining the Economy in Unionist 'Texts'

In Chapter 6, it was explained that we are encouraged to think of our individual economic (in)security as inextricably bound up with those of the collective. Our economic circumstances are to a greater or lesser extent thought to be determined by the trajectory of 'the economy' and the community of economic fate within which we 'live'. The assumption is that people in Scotland have an especially shared economic circumstance at present (either within a Scottish economy or a UK economy) and will

have an especially shared economic circumstance (either improved or worsened) after the referendum either under continued union or in a newly independent state.

Here we see another instance of intertextuality at work in the texts analysed. Insofar as the economy is largely imagined, and is but one – albeit largely accepted - view of reality, and way of organising politico-economic space, it can be considered to be a (contingent) narrative, or discourse. A methodological distinction was made in Chapter 2 between intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The latter is in fact an example of the former, but usefully describes how any given concrete text might draw upon grander texts, narratives or discourses. Texts must draw upon a much wider discursive context in order to convey meaning and it is possible to identify specific ‘voices’ or discourses within that context. In this case, the very idea of ‘the economy’ can be considered to be such a discourse insofar as it renders meaningful the articulation of collective economic (in)security. Moreover, to the extent that discourse is inherently productive, said texts serve a performative purpose in helping to re/construct their discursive context, and the specific discourses implicated. Indeed, it is argued here that unionist articulations of the economic insecurities of independence both relied upon and potentially helped to further sediment the very idea of ‘the economy’.

Crucially, where one discourse, or view of reality, is seen to dominate over others, it is often considered to be ‘hegemonic’. It is argued in this thesis, however, that the discourse of ‘the economy’ is not merely hegemonic, but can be seen as largely ‘objective’. Phillips and Jørgensen (2004, p. 36) state that ‘*hegemony* comes between ‘objectivity’ and ‘the political’’, and refers to instances whereby articulations

re/produce dominant or hegemonic discourses. In Chapter 2 it was explained that objectivity refers to those discourses that become so sedimented, so naturalised, that their contingency becomes forgotten, they appear apolitical; they are taken for granted, seen as ‘common sense’. To all intents and purposes, they appear to represent truths. In this respect, within economic arguments for and against independence, and articulations of economic (in)security, dialogicality (see Chapter 2) is almost entirely absent between given texts, and what is a taken-for-granted discourse of ‘the economy’. Essentially, this discourse of the economy is implicitly assumed rather than explicitly iterated.

The UK Government document ‘Scottish Referendum: Money & the Economy’ stated:

‘When it comes to the money in your pocket and the wider economy, the outcome of the Scottish referendum on 18th September 2014 will have long-term consequences’ (HM Government 2014b, p. 1).

‘The economy and our financial strength is important to understand, as ultimately it affects the security of your family, your finances and the future of generations to come. Our comprehensive analysis gives you the facts you need to make a more informed choice’ (HM Government 2014b, p. 2).

Here ‘the economy’ is linked explicitly to individual (and family) economic (in)security. Crucially, articulating the shared insecurities of either independence or union both relied upon the conveyance of a distinct economic entity and corresponding community of economic fate whilst reciprocally serving to further sediment it. Of course, the principal referent for unionists was the *UK economy* and an associated UK economic community of fate, whereas for nationalists it was the *Scottish economy* and *Scottish economic community of fate*. However, this is not to say that nationalists only ever referred to the Scottish economy or unionists to the UK

economy. Unionists would commonly speak of a Scottish economy, but only ever with reference to it being inextricably bound up within a wider UK economy (i.e. the UK ‘scale’ would essentially be privileged as the determining entity) that is stronger, more stable, and more secure. If ever the Scottish economy was spoken of as an entirely separate community of fate, it was with reference to a future, independent Scottish economy characterised by insecurity once critically severed from the UK.

One of the Better Together campaign’s central slogans was the ‘the best of both worlds’, which argued that under union the people of Scotland benefit from a level of self-determination afforded by devolution whilst also benefiting from the security of being a part of something bigger. The indicative quote in the fifth row of Table 1.8 illustrates this. Coupled with the supposed opportunities of an integrated union, is the supposed security of being part of a larger, more stable economy in the face of external risks and shocks in the global economy. Table 1.8 provides a sample of articles from the Better Together campaign that illustrate this, along with key quotes to illustrate how Scotland and the Scottish economy was conveyed as being more secure as a part of a larger, more secure UK economy.

Table 1.8: Better Together – The Scottish Economy as part of the UK Economy

Article Date	Article Title	Indicative Quotes
06/05/13	“I should not have to, and will not, choose between being Scottish and British.”- Sir Robin Wales	<i>‘A strong Scotland as part of a United Kingdom sharing resources, risks and rewards.’</i>
08/29/13	Tell us why you think we get the best of both worlds as part of the UK	<i>‘Our Scottish Parliament has been a real success – backed up by the strength and security of the bigger UK economy.’</i>
09/04/13	Our economic future: greater opportunity and protection as part of the UK family	<i>‘Scotland benefits from being part of a larger, integrated UK economy.’</i>
09/17/13	What would independence mean for our currency and mortgage rates?	<i>‘We have the strength and security of the bigger United Kingdom behind us if things go wrong. The nationalists’ plans put all of that at risk.’</i>
09/19/13	New report evidence we benefit from the best of both worlds	<i>‘Devolution offers us the best of both worlds: we have a strong Scottish Parliament making key decisions here in Scotland about Scotland. But we still get the benefit of being backed up by the strength and security of the bigger UK economy.’</i>
01/04/14	Experts say we’re better off together as part of the UK economy	<i>‘It is clear that the Scottish economy benefits enormously from being part of one of the biggest economies in the world.’</i>
01/06/14	Devolution remains “the settled will of the Scottish people”, new poll confirms	<i>‘we benefit from the strength and security of the larger UK.’</i>
01/28/14	SNP currency plans take a pounding...	<i>‘In these economically uncertain times, Scotland benefits from the absolute reassurance that comes from the financial back-up of being</i>

		<i>part of the UK. The last thing we need is more uncertainty.'</i>
04/09/14	Being part of something bigger gives Scotland economic security without losing our unique identity	<i>'I know from my own time as Chancellor that being part of something bigger means greater economic security for Scotland. It was because we had the back-up of the larger UK that we were able to prevent the collapse of the Scottish and UK economy.'</i>
04/26/14	"It's because I am Scottish that I want Scotland to stay in the UK", says Reid	<i>'The positive case for our partnership of the UK lies partly in its capacity to reduce these risks through a larger, stronger economy, a centuries-old stable structure for investment and a greater capacity to weather the economic storms.'</i>
04/29/14	Women in Business back the UK	<i>'The UK single market, increased job opportunities and strength, stability and security of the UK Pound are major assets for Scottish business. Separating from the UK is an irreversible decision that businesses agree would cause major damage to the economy.'</i>
05/19/14	Young Scots say we are stronger and better together	<i>'...the brightest future for Scotland's economy is as part of the UK.'</i>
06/07/14	Polls show Salmond needs to come clean with a Plan on currency	<i>'...being part of the UK is good for Scotland's economy.'</i>
06/16/14	More powers for Scotland guaranteed	<i>'...strength, security and stability of being part of the larger UK economy.'</i>
08/13/14	Women Together celebrate the success of the 100 Letters campaign	<i>'We can have more powers for Scotland guaranteed without losing the back-up that comes from being part of the larger UK economy. Why put that at risk?'</i>

Professor Jim Gallagher, a key protagonist in the unionist campaign, asserted:

‘Economic union is a strategy for a small country in a globalised world. Not perhaps the only strategy but, I will argue, one that’s proved successful. It’s about two things. First, free trade and the opportunities that offers individual Scots and Scottish businesses. Second, it’s a way of managing risk and uncertainty and coping with the effects of economic shocks, so as to provide economic stability and security’ (Gallagher 2013).

Elsewhere Gallagher stressed ‘Free trade offers an argument for economic opportunity: by contrast, economic integration offers one from economic security’ and that ‘Larger economies tend to be less volatile, as risks and shocks are absorbed over a wider pool’ (2014, p. 71). This view of the Scottish economy (and thereby Scottish economic subjects) being more secure within a union with a larger UK economy relies upon the assertion of an environment of constant and inherent risk, which helps to bring the imagined boundaries of ‘the economy’ into focus. Here we see a notable difference between many utterances of economic insecurities compared to those of more conventional insecurities. In the case of the latter there is often a defined threat in the form of specified actors (traditionally states, but now terrorist groups, criminal gangs, individuals, etc.), but in the case of economic insecurities the designation of a threatening ‘other’ is sometimes apparent, but need not be, as with unionist arguments against independence.

Articulating Economic (In)Security in the Absence of an ‘Other’

Social constructionist literature (see Burr 2015), of which poststructuralism is a key component, commonly stresses the importance of ‘the other’ in constructions of social identities. Put simply, this is based on the recognition that identities rely

fundamentally upon difference, and differences have to be articulated. Indeed, in the methodology, the importance of ‘othering’ in the construction of discursive formations was stressed. In the previous chapter it was argued that among others one reason why it might have been difficult to speak conventional (in)security in the independence referendum was the effective absence of an ‘other’ for the articulation of collective threat. The requirement for ‘othering’ in the case of articulations of economic (in)security is quite different. In many nationalist articulations of economic (in)security there was a clear ‘other’ in the form of ‘Westminster’, or a commonly associated signifier like ‘the union’, ‘the UK’, or ‘the UK Government’. However, in most unionist articulations of economic (in)security there *was* no obvious ‘other’. Arguably, this is often the case with articulations of economic (in)security due to the assumed, inherent insecurities of economic life (see Chapter 6) and the taken-for-granted nature of ‘the economy’, such that to talk of shared insecurities within a given object space (i.e. the Scottish or UK economy) need not necessarily require the same level of validation. As explained in Chapter 6, *economic* insecurities are considered part and parcel of economic life according to economic liberalism. As such, whilst ‘blame’ for either specific economic insecurities can certainly be attributed to certain actors they need not be. In place of an ‘other’ we see the ‘spectre’ of insecurity - the one constant in economic life.

Intimately related to this doctrine is the discourse of globalisation, through which the spectre of insecurity is the consequence of necessarily being part of an increasingly integrated, competitive and potentially volatile, global economy. Globalisation is seen as the harbinger of both opportunities and dangers, but something that is ultimately

unavoidable. Bristow (2005) stressed this point with regards to regional competitiveness in the UK.

‘Current policy documents extolling the language of ‘competitiveness’ tend to present it as an entirely unproblematic term and, moreover, as an unambiguously beneficial attribute of an economy. Competitiveness is portrayed as the means by which regional economies are externally validated in an era of globalisation, such that there can be no principled objection to policies and strategies deemed to be competitiveness enhancing, whatever their indirect consequences’ (Bristow 2005, p.285).

Bristow (2005) argues, basically, that through conveying competitiveness threats to the regional economy, the latter is made governable. Whilst Bristow focuses on the regional (sub-state) level, the same discursive strategy can be seen at different scales, including the national and supranational. Rosamond (2002; 2012) has observed with regards to the ‘European economy’, for example, that it is imagined as a regional, supranational economy in the face of global competitiveness threats (see Chapter 4). In other words, ‘economies’ are seen as needing to be competitive in order to survive, much like the capitalist firm. The competitiveness of ‘economies’ in the face of globalisation, we are led to believe, is the critical existential consideration regarding their viability, and with it, the life-chances or economic (in)security of individuals therein.

For some time now the Scottish economy has been imagined within the context of historical decline (in particular it’s de-industrialisation) in the face of structural shifts in the global economy and the growing competitiveness of other regions/parts of the world (Brown *et al.* 1998; Tomlinson 2014). The same is true in fact of the Welsh economy, although whereas the Welsh economy continues to be seen as especially disadvantaged (and therefore dependent upon fiscal transfers within the union), the

Scottish economy is increasingly imagined (not least through the efforts of the Scottish Nationalist Party) as having redressed much of its historical disadvantage, and as an economy set to benefit from the opportunities globalisation can afford.

Nevertheless, the Scottish economy can still be thought to face the inherent threats associated with globalisation and must respond accordingly to remain competitive according to established thinking. The aforementioned UK Government's national security strategy, current at the time of the referendum, entitled '*A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*', explains a context comprising both the need for closer ties with other economies, but also the inherent vulnerability of interdependence in light of a global financial crisis.

‘The [most recent financial] crisis demonstrated the level of interdependence and the depth of integration of economies across the world. This trend towards closer integration is set to continue... The UK has strategic and economic imperatives to build closer ties with the new economic powers’ (HM Government 2010, p. 15).

Whilst the latter ‘globalisation discourse’ does not always feature in unionist arguments against independence - in some it is explicitly stated, and in others only implied – the unionist argument that remaining part of a larger UK economy better ensures Scottish economic security relies upon the assumed, inherent uncertainty, instability and insecurity of being part of a turbulent global economy. This is clearly evident from the articles in Table 1.6.

Here again we see an example of intertextuality between the specific utterances of insecurity and an assumed context (or discourse) of vulnerabilities and threat.

Moreover, as with the idea of ‘the economy’ above, the dialogicality at work in such

utterances is almost invisible. Besides relying on the taken-for-granted discourse of ‘the economy’, unionist utterances (and many nationalist ones too – See Chapter 8) of economic (in)security rely on commonly accepted views of ‘the economic’, namely those of neoliberalism, whereby economic life is (and should be) largely governed by the market, and wherein economic risks/vulnerabilities/insecurities are deemed to be part and parcel of economic life.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the significance of articulations of economic (in)security in unionist arguments against Scottish independence in the referendum debate. Chapter 5 argued that whilst conventional security assurances are thought integral to the consolidation of the governance capacities and territorialisation of the state, economic (in)security assurances are also important. In the case of the Scottish independence referendum, articulations of conventional (in)security were all but non-existent from unionist ‘texts’ - as was the case with nationalist ‘texts’ (see Chapter 8) - and yet the (potential) re-territorialisation of political space was very clearly at stake.

Moreover, revisiting the concept of the ‘economics-security nexus’ (Dent 2007; see Chapter 5) this chapter argued that, conversely to the standard formulation, where matters which might be thought to pertain to conventional (in)security were articulated they were in fact done so more for their proposed implications for economic (in)security than the converse.

The remainder of the chapter addressed what we might think of as articulations of economic (in)security in their own right across unionist texts. As well as illustrating

the proportional significance of articulations of economic (in)security across the Better Together campaign's online materials, the specific types of insecurities uttered were also revealed. In essence, the unionist case against independence was built on a narrative, or discourse, of the economic insecurities of independence, based on the assertion that the Scottish economy and Scottish people (or rather people living and working in Scotland) benefit from the stability and security of being part of a larger and stronger UK economy.

Chapter 6 argued that articulations of economic (in)security are inextricable from imaginations of 'the economy'. The insecurities posed by unionists can be seen as complicit in the construction of 'the economy'. Articulating the insecurities of independence assumed the existence of a strictly material 'community of fate' (Williams 2003) within which Scots can be thought to reside, and within which the economic implications of independence would be especially shared. Besides exaggerating the extent to which such a thing as the Scottish/UK economy actually exists and *is* the determining context of people's livelihoods and life-chances, this focus on economic insecurities also serves to obscure the necessarily political nature of 'the economy' as a spatial-scalar designation. Moreover, regardless of the actual motivations behind people's ultimate choice in the referendum, by encouraging them to vote on the basis of material utility to the virtual exclusion of almost anything else, broader discussions regarding the politics of identity and legitimacy discussed in Chapter 3 were foreclosed.

Chapter 8: Articulating (Economic) (In)Security: The Nationalist Case For Independence

This chapter follows a very similar structure to the previous chapter. Whereas the latter focussed on unionist ‘texts’ this one focuses on nationalist texts. As well as key government documents and speeches, materials from the official nationalist ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign are used to illustrate arguments for independence. As stressed in Chapter 5, there were notable and often explicit attempts by key protagonists to proffer what they professed to be a more rational and utilitarian argument for independence based upon economics. As in the case of unionist arguments against independence, one can consider these as arguments (at least largely) of economic (in)security.

The nationalist proposition is that people in Scotland face specific economic insecurities under union, but will be more economically secure with independence. Interestingly, whilst certain components, or topics of economic (in)security, were the same across unionist and nationalist texts (albeit with the opposing sides disagreeing on the other’s assessment of them) nationalists also articulated a set of different insecurities, which revealed very different ideas about the economy and the political values thought representative of Scottish people. The first part of the chapter looks at the significance of utterances of ‘conventional’ (in)security in nationalist texts. The remainder of the chapter reveals the far greater significance of utterances of economic (in)security, the specific ‘types’ of economic threats uttered, as well as the ultimate

narrative or discourse that nationalists are attempting to construct with regards to independence.

Conventional Versus Economic (In)Security: Revisiting the ‘Economics-Security Nexus’

As with Better Together texts in the previous chapter, Yes Scotland texts revealed far fewer instances of ‘conventional’ security concerns being uttered, and where they did, they referred more to the economic implications of defence arrangements than to conventional security concerns per se. Incidentally, the Yes Scotland website included a list of ‘categories’ under which articles were listed by way of aiding navigation of the website’s content, including that of ‘Will we be secure?’ (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: Yes Scotland - Sample Webpage

The screenshot displays the Yes Scotland website. At the top left is the 'Yes' logo with the tagline 'Scotland's future in Scotland's hands'. A navigation menu includes links for 'THE REALITY', 'THE REASONS', 'THE CHOICE', 'TAKE ACTION', 'NEWS', 'DONATE', and 'SHOP'. Below the header is a social sharing bar with icons for Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, Google Plus, LinkedIn, and a share button.

The main content area features a large quote from the Financial Times: "An independent Scotland could expect to start with healthier state finances than the rest of the UK". Below the quote, there is a short article snippet starting with "An independent Scotland can expect to start with healthier state finances than the rest of the UK, the Financial Times confirms today." and mentioning that the FT stresses Scotland's prospects after a Yes vote.

On the right side, there is a search bar and a 'CATEGORIES' section with the following items: 'Can we afford it? (184)', 'How do we get there? (392)', 'What does it look like? (370)', 'What's in it for me? (480)', and 'Will we be secure? (233)'. Below this is a 'POPULAR TAGS' section with buttons for 'Fairness', 'Volunteers', 'Prosperity', 'Jobs', 'NHS', 'Labour', 'Families', and 'Polls'. At the bottom of the sidebar is an 'ARCHIVES' section listing months and years with article counts: 'September 2014 (81)', 'August 2014 (105)', 'July 2014 (75)', and 'June 2014 (71)'.

Besides being a navigational aid, the assignment of this category can also be seen as (perhaps deliberately) ‘performative’ insofar as it asserts that Scotland’s security is, or at least should be, a key consideration in the referendum debate. Incidentally, the overall website design changed during the campaign period, including the introduction of this and the other categories. It is highly likely that the introduction of this particular category was reactionary to a proliferation of unionist texts purporting the insecurities of independence. As discussed later in the chapter, several of the topics of economic (in)security uttered by nationalists mirrored those of unionists, and many of the Yes Scotland articles appear to have been reactionary to the outputs of the unionist campaign in this manner. In any event, what the inclusion of this ‘Will we be secure?’ category does afford us is an opportunity to discern what the nationalist campaign itself considered to be matters of (in)security, and whether this included conventional security concerns, economic security concerns, or indeed other formulations of security.

Appendix 2.0 lists all 129 article titles within the aforementioned category of ‘Will we be secure?’ posted between 23rd September 2013 and 16th September 2014 (i.e. over the course of approximately one year). As with Better Together publications, the proportion of Yes Scotland articles dealing with conventional security concerns, even within this specific category, was very small indeed. Based on a content analysis of just the titles of the articles themselves, only 12 (or 9.4%) could be assumed to be about conventional security, and 3 of these pertained to the provision of emergency services (specifically policing) as opposed to matters of national defence arrangements (see Table 1.9). By comparison, 61 article titles (or 47.7%) pertained explicitly to economic concerns or threats.

Table 1.9: Yes Scotland – Threats to the Existing Security Infrastructure

Article Date	Article Title	Indicative Quotes
27/09/13	Defence forces designed for Scotland - and to support our service personnel	<i>'A Yes vote means we can better ensure Scotland's protection – with defence forces designed for Scotland's needs.'</i>
15/10/13	Reports of US accidents show risks of Scotland's nuclear weapons	<i>'Recent reports about the very large number of "significant incidents" involving American nuclear weapons show the danger of having these weapons of mass destruction in our country.'</i>
21/10/13	The Scottish Police Federation tells politicians to be honest about Westminster cuts	<i>'Many things are important in deciding the future of our nation and the safety and security of our citizens has got to be at the very top of that list. The fine men and women of your police service...'</i>
27/10/13	Independent Scotland can have first-class security service	<i>'A former counter-terrorism chief says an independent Scotland can have a first-class intelligence and security service, built on the country's wealth of experience and talent in this field.'</i>
29/10/13	Yes vote will give Scotland the chance to build an excellent security service	<i>'A Yes vote in next year's independence referendum will give Scotland the opportunity to build a first-class intelligence and security service that meets our needs and priorities.'</i>
12/11/13	Scottish Defence Force 'would be better and cost less'	<i>'An expert report published today concludes that a Scottish Defence Force has the potential to "deliver a better defence for the citizens of Scotland", and could be "delivered for less than Scottish taxpayers currently pay.'</i>
22/11/13	Silly scare story about	<i>'Scotland is proud of its armed forces and we can</i>

	armed forces proved false	<i>look forward to a strong Scottish defence force capable of protecting our national interests after a Yes vote.'</i>
17/12/13	Trident 'not an insurance policy, it's a booby trap'	<i>'Given the price, I'm not convinced the public think it would be such a terrible thing to get rid of nuclear weapons. With huge cuts in public spending, there is no convincing argument to spend billions on a redundant defence system.'</i>
04/02/14	Daily Digest: MoD Relying on Twitter for Intelligence and Tory Sabre-Rattling Doesn't Bode Well for a No vote	<i>'In a country which such an extensive coastline and so many important offshore assets, the absence of either new maritime patrol aircraft and any major surface vessels from Scotland shows that the Ministry of Defence is not working for even the most fundamental of Scotland's interests.'</i>
15/08/14	Senior former police figures declare support for a Yes vote	<i>'The police service - like so many other areas of Scottish public life - needs to be protected from the worst excesses of the cuts and austerity threatened from Westminster now and for years and years to come. This referendum is the one opportunity to make sure Scotland avoids that fate.'</i>
14/09/14	Yes support from senior Scottish military and diplomatic figures	<i>'Scotland is in an excellent position to properly equip and maintain defence forces, just like other northern neighbours. I know many Royal Navy colleagues who would be delighted to serve in Scottish Defence Forces. More settled military service in Scotland will also be of huge benefit to defence dependent communities like those around Faslane and Coulport.'</i>
16/09/14	Former police chief says a Yes vote will help secure a safer Scotland	<i>'Ex-Chief Superintendent David O'Connor says he believes that independence will help guarantee the future of Police Scotland - the new single force he helped to create - and lead to a safer society.'</i>

As with the Better Together materials, the articles in Table 1.9 published between 27th October 2013 and 22nd November 2013 were, in part at least, reactionary to the publication of the HM Government (2013) paper, ‘Scotland Analysis: Defence’. In essence, the majority of discussion (in both nationalist and unionist texts) pertaining to conventional security considerations of defence featured at this time. Two of the articles in Table 1.9 pertain to the maintenance of the UK’s nuclear deterrent sited in Faslane, Scotland. This has long been a contentious topic, with the Scottish Government vehemently arguing that it is an outdated security provision in the modern world, and that the cost of its maintenance directs public funds away from more worthy causes (see House of Commons 2013; Jamison 2006).

Of all of the articles from Table 1.9, the article that is perhaps the best example of dealing exclusively with conventional security concerns is that published on 29th October 2013 (*‘Yes vote will give Scotland the chance to build an excellent security service’*). Not only does it argue that Scotland would be able to build a fit-for-purpose security service of its own, but also, drawing on views of various security ‘experts’, it argues that Scotland would be less likely to face some of the threats the UK as a whole faces due to the very different geopolitical position it would likely inherit (See Appendix 4.0 for full article). As with the Better Together articles that appear to be about conventional security, the content of these Yes Scotland articles, which ostensibly refer to conventional concerns, typically pertained instead to considerations of economic (in)security, such as misspent public funds in the case of the aforementioned UK nuclear deterrent, or threats to jobs through likely reduced defence budgets under continued union. Again, this suggests a reversing of the logic of the so called ‘economics-security nexus’ (Dent 2007; see Chapter 6).

As stated above, within the ‘*Will we be secure?*’ categorised articles, there is by comparison a much greater emphasis on economic (in)security. This is briefly illustrated in Table 2.0 with a selection of just 10 articles published across the space of one month at the end of 2013, and thereby comprising one of the 12 articles from Table 1.9 above. Besides that one article (‘*Silly scare stories about armed forces proved false*’) the remainder pertain largely to economic concerns.

Table 2.0: Yes Scotland – Sample of ‘Will we be secure?’ Articles

Article Date	Article Title
22/11/13	Spreading the benefits of wealth across all of Scotland
22/11/13	Questions for No, as 'positive case for the Union' reaches new low
22/11/13	Silly scare story about armed forces proved false
28/11/13	A better deal for Scotland’s farming communities
28/11/13	'Yes best for farming, best for Scotland'
03/12/13	Economic experts deal double blow to No campaign scaremongering
08/12/13	Westminster pensions raid gives insight to full cost of a No vote
10/12/13	A stronger economy with more support for small businesses' Attracting the talent to help build our prosperity
13/12/13	More Westminster welfare cuts show why Yes is better for Scotland
16/12/13	UK inequality is no 'myth' despite what Tories say

As with the Better Together campaign, the majority of Yes Scotland materials emphasised the economic (in)security implications of independence. In what follows the chapter will look at nationalist utterances of economic (in)security across the campaign period. Conversely to conventional (in)security, it was perfectly meaningful

to speak of Scottish *economic* insecurities and a shared security imperative, potentially reinforcing the territorialisation of political space. Moreover, whilst unthinkable in conventional security terms, nationalists were even able to argue that the UK Government, Westminster, the union, or another commonly associated ‘other’, was the key source of those insecurities, not just a failed protector from them. One key reason why it was meaningful to do so is the taken-for-granted, imagined economy and a corresponding community of shared economic fate.

The Yes Scotland Campaign: The Opportunities of Independence versus the Insecurity of Union

As with the analysis of Better Together materials in Chapter 7, the extent to which the Yes Scotland campaign was built on utterances of economic (in)security was assessed using a basic content analysis. The method that was used, or rather the *measures* that were used, were explained in Chapter 7. Whereas the analysis of Better Together materials was based on the entire published content of that campaign’s website, the following analysis of Yes Scotland materials is based on articles published between 3rd December 2013 and 16th September 2014 (see Appendix 3.0). This was deemed to provide a sufficiently representative sample of texts. Moreover, outputs from Yes Scotland far outnumbered those of the Better Together campaign; even across this shorter time period there were 659 articles published compared with the 532 articles that comprised the entire Better Together collection. As with the analysis of Better Together materials in Table 1.4, Table 2.1 attempts to illustrate the extent to which the Yes Scotland campaign’s content was built on articulations of economic (in)security. Again, each data point within the table should be regarded as an instance

of an utterance of economic (in)security, albeit with some utterances perhaps more impactful than others.

Table 2.1: Yes Scotland - Proportion of Articles Dealing with Economic (In)Security

11.8% of article titles could be regarded as utterances of economic (in)security, 23.4% of titles could be assumed to regard utterances of economic (in)security, and 52.8% of articles comprised utterances of economic (in)security within their content. This can

	Clearly about economic (in)security in title	Could be assumed to be about economic (in)security from title	About economic (in)security in article	Total
Number of articles	78	154	348	659
% of articles	11.8%	23.4%	52.8%	100.0%

be compared therefore with figures of 14.7%, 38.6% and 63% respectively for Better Together content (See Table 1.4). This suggests a greater focus on utterances of economic (in)security in unionist arguments. If we compare the aforementioned Yes Scotland publications with Better Together publications across the exact same time period (i.e. 3rd December 2013 – 16th September 2014) then the greater focus on utterances of economic (in)security in unionist texts is even more apparent. Of the 367 articles published, 69 (or 18.8%) of titles can be regarded as utterances of economic (in)security, 163 (or 44.4%) could be assumed to regard utterances of economic (in)security from the title, whilst 261 (or 71.1%) comprised utterances of economic

(in)security in the article's content. For this time period then, whilst the actual numbers of articles for each of the three measures are broadly comparable across both campaigns, there appears to be a much greater focus proportionally on economic (in)security in Better Together materials.

This apparently greater focus on the economic insecurities of independence in unionist texts likely accounts, in part at least, for nationalists branding the Better Together campaign 'project fear'. The following images from Yes Scotland materials are effectively attempting to satirise what nationalists argued was sensationalist fear-mongering in unionist arguments against independence.

Figure 1.3: Project Fear



Certainly there were far fewer instances of positive sounding arguments being made by unionists, whom in principle one could assume, might have chosen to focus on the positive case for union as much as the negative case for independence. Scotland's First Minister, Alex Salmond, stressed what he saw as a crucial deficiency of the unionist position in a speech as early as 2012.


“I hear occasionally from the Prime Minister that he is just about to make a positive case for the union, on the evidence of the last two weeks I think that positive case is still on the drawing board... Talking down to a country is never a good idea, and failure to present a positive vision to a country, is always a bad idea” (Salmond 2012).

The same sentiment was evident in interviews carried out with members of the SNP in 2012, as in the following quote from one respondent.

“Have you seen any of the leaflets going out by the ‘Scotland isn’t up to much campaign’ [Better Together campaign], it’s basically, thirty one thousand Scots employed by the UK civil service, the implication being that all these folk will be on the dole [social security]; one million people work for companies owned by UK companies, the implication being ‘you’ll not have a job’, all their campaign is about is you’ll not have a job, you’ll be worse off...” (Respondent B).

For their part, unionists seemingly attempted to redress this, albeit perhaps not very successfully. On the Better Together campaign’s website one of the main page headings (see Figure 1.4) was ‘the +ve case’, under which lay what was essentially their “mission statement”. Yet no such positive case was made therein, with the focus instead purely on asserting the negative ramifications of ending the union.

Figure 1.4: Better Together –Webpage Extract



One possible explanation for this of course is that the insecurities of independence were in fact more ‘real’ than those of continued union and therefore easier to convey convincingly. Certainly, with regards state finances at least, the weight of expert opinion was that Scotland would likely be worse off (Johnson and Phillips 2012; see Chapter 5). Yet this could never really be proven given the wealth of indeterminacies involved, and nationalists certainly disputed these figures right up until the very end of the campaign period. Another likely explanation is that unionists were advocating what might have been viewed as the *relative* assurances of maintaining the status quo vis-à-vis the greater unknowns of independence. Conversely, whilst nationalists certainly articulated the insecurities associated with the status quo, as evidenced below, it is likely that they were also more greatly necessitated to convey the economic opportunities of independence so as to instil confidence in this project given the necessary disruption to the status quo, not to mention the need to combat the negativities being posited by unionists¹⁷.

The result for nationalists was an argument which was still built on the articulation of economic (in)security, but often couched in more positive language of opportunity. Thus we see nationalists arguing how much more prosperous Scotland would be if independent, with new jobs being created and business opportunities forthcoming. The articles titles and indicative quotes in Table 2.2 illustrate this.

¹⁷ Other research has been done that looks at the likelihood of economic arguments for independence resonating with different groups according to their economic circumstances, with people who are wealthier being less likely to view disrupting the status quo positively (Duchesne *et al.* 2003).

Table 2.2: Yes Scotland – Opportunities for Prosperity

Article Date	Article Title	Indicative Quotes
07/02/14	Scotland could be even richer than previously thought, say economic experts	<i>‘Yes Scotland today welcomed a report by economic experts which suggests that Scotland could be even wealthier than has been previously estimated.’</i>
12/03/14	Daily Digest: Scotland one of the world’s wealthiest countries	<i>‘Scotland would be placed 14th in the rankings of the world’s wealthiest countries, the OECD - four places above the UK.’</i>
23/06/14	Blueprint draws on best in the world to double Scotland's economic wealth	<i>‘Drawing together business, government and the public sector the strategy aims to boost GDP by 86% by 2037, increasing GDP per capita by two-thirds from around £27,000 to more than £45,000.’</i>

Nationalists spoke frequently of the ‘two futures’ at stake in the independence referendum and their implications for the economic life-chances of people in Scotland. On the one hand an independent future of Scottish prosperity and security, and on the other hand a future of continued and growing insecurity under union.

Figure 1.5: Yes Scotland – A better future

The following quotes illustrate these alternative futures and the corresponding idea of a distinct Scottish economy and/or community of economic fate. The first quote is from John Swinney MSP (Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Employment and Growth), the second is from Nicola Sturgeon MSP (then Deputy First Minister), and the third is from an SNP MSP interview respondent.

“That is the choice of two futures open to voters on the 18th September next year and one I am confident will see Scotland take the steps we need to transform our economy for the benefit of all of Scotland” (Scottish Government 2013a, p. iii).

“The choice on September 18 next year is one between two futures. Both these decisions have consequences. A vote for independence means control of our own resources and the ability to take decisions that will grow our economy faster. While a vote against independence means endorsing the current system. It means supporting the idea that Westminster will do a better job of running Scotland and the Scottish economy than the people who live here” (Sturgeon 2013).

“Some people might be too insecure to go for independence because they think, ooh well, you know, we don’t really know if we are better or worse off so why take the chance. We are hoping that people in Scotland will be slightly more optimistic about the future, and that, Scotland has chronically underperformed economically and not lived up to its potential over many, many years, if not decades, and that the vote yes to secure an independent future for Scotland will create an economic and cultural renaissance and will improve the quality of life in Scotland as well as our economic performance” (Respondent D).

The alternative future is presumably one in which prosperity is hampered, jobs growth is restricted and business opportunities are frustrated. Moreover, nationalists did focus heavily on articulating a specific set of other extant economic insecurities under union, with independence presented as the only viable antidote to them.

Table 2.3 comprises a selection of utterances of economic (in)security across Yes Scotland materials, as was done for Better Together materials above. Note that they consist both of attempts to convey the insecurities of union, as well as (i.e. in contrast to) the future security and opportunities of independence.

Table 2.3: Yes Scotland – Utterances of Economic (In)Security

Economic (In) Security	Article Date	Article Title	Indicative Quotes
Inequality	16/12/13	UK inequality is no 'myth' despite what Tories say	<i>'As we approach Christmas many thousands are forced to turn to foodbanks to feed themselves, real wages continue to fall, and the inequality between what's earned by the rich and poor keeps increasing.'</i>
	21/03/14	Only a Yes vote can create the equality that Westminster has failed to deliver	<i>'...the reality is that the UK is one of the most unequal countries in the developed world.'</i>
	27/05/14	Perspective: 'With Westminster, gap between rich and poor can only widen	<i>'There is a pervasive and persistent gap in attainment between schoolchildren from the richest and poorest households in Scotland.'</i>
	24/06/14	Independence 'only way to address ever-widening wealth gap'	<i>'Independence is the only way to turn back the ever-widening wealth gap between the richest and poorest in Scotland.'</i>
Public Finances & Austerity	13/12/13	More Westminster welfare cuts show why Yes is better for Scotland	<i>'At a time when hundreds of thousands of families are struggling to make ends meet, more and more children are being plunged into poverty and the gap between the richest and poorest in our society continues to widen, this underlines why a Yes vote next September is a better choice for Scotland.'</i>
	25/05/14	Only a Yes vote can protect Scotland's health service from cuts threat	<i>'Only independence can protect Scotland's health service from Westminster spending cuts - including the damaging financial impact of the privatisation already running rampant through the NHS in England'</i>

	03/07/14	Yes for fair pay and an end to austerity cuts	<i>'Deep and ongoing cuts to services...are driving thousands of workers into poverty.'</i>
	15/07/14	A Yes vote for prosperity and an end to Westminster austerity	<i>'Independence supporters will today hear about the two futures on offer at Scotland's referendum in September – one of increased austerity, the other of new Scottish prosperity.'</i>
	13/11/13	Bang goes the great unionist myth of subsidised Scotland	<i>'The myth that the UK subsidises Scotland is one of the greatest confidence tricks in modern political history.'</i>
	11/05/14	How Westminster has mismanaged Scotland's oil wealth	<i>'We find the crucial report advising Westminster not to pour the oil money down the drain.'</i>
Poverty	23/10/13	Perspective: Independence and full employment offer route out of poverty	<i>'...independence offers the opportunity for a road out of poverty.'</i>
	06/02/14	Committed Labour Party member backs independence to reduce poverty gap	<i>'an independent Scottish Parliament would 'radically reduce the gap between rich and poor'.'</i>
	10/03/14	Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty – Westminster isn't working	<i>'The growth of zero-hours contracts is one of the reasons why so many hard-working people are fearful for their jobs and struggling to make ends meet.'</i>
	13/03/14	Scottish poverty report reveals cost of voting No	<i>'The appalling level of inequality in Scotland was revealed today with the publication of a report by the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG).'</i>
	16/04/14	Soaring foodbank use "the tip of the iceberg	<i>'The Trussell Trust has given out over 900,000 emergency food parcels in the last</i>

		in terms of UK food poverty”	<i>year in the UK...despite the fact we have more millionaires than ever before.’</i>
	28/04/14	Daily Digest: More negative responses and ‘A Scotland without Poverty	<i>‘Kevin McKenna’s column in the Observer where he wrote: “The eradication of poverty, especially child poverty, in a land of plenty must be the top priority in the new, just society that... will follow after independence is gained”.’</i>
	07/05/14	Daily Digest: UK government paper misleading - and child poverty continues to soar	<i>‘New research by charity Save the Children shows why Scotland must be independent – so we can choose a different path from an increasingly unfair system which will see five million UK children face being “sentenced to a lifetime of poverty” by 2020.’</i>
	01/07/14	Appalling child poverty figures show why we need Scotland’s wealth in Scotland’s hands	<i>‘...today’s paper shows that in-work poverty is on the rise in Scotland. 60% of children living in poverty come from a household where at least one adult is in employment.’</i>
	25/07/14	Yes vote is ‘the key to tackling poverty’	<i>‘Independence is the only sure way to deal with the ever-growing gap between Scotland’s rich and poor.’</i>
Jobs	07/02/14	A Yes vote is the route to more job security and better living standards	<i>‘A Yes vote is the path to greater job security and good standards of living, Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has said.’</i>
	27/02/14	A Yes means a stronger Scottish economy and more jobs	<i>‘...we’ll be able to build a stronger and more diverse economy which can provide high-quality employment opportunities for the people of Scotland.’</i>
	10/03/14	Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty –	<i>‘The growth of zero-hours contracts is one of the reasons why so many hard-working people are fearful for their jobs and</i>

		Westminster isn't working	<i>struggling to make ends meet, in spite of the recovery.'</i>
	24/06/14	A plan to create more jobs and opportunities	<i>'Jobs are the backbone of any economy, but at present the most important economic powers that can be used to create more and better jobs and new opportunities are at Westminster.'</i>
	05/07/14	46 ways to create more and better jobs	<i>'Scotland has a wealth of ideas about how we can make those resources work better for the people that live here – creating more and better jobs, and growing our economy.'</i>
Pensions	23/09/13	Fairer pensions, tailor-made for Scotland	<i>'...for many, they will also provide concrete illustrations of how a Yes vote can deliver a fairer country, using our undoubted prosperity to make real and significant improvements to the lives of our older people.'</i>
	22/11/13	Disarming the pensions 'time bomb' myth	<i>'So is the No campaign right that Scotland is too old and frail to build a strong economy and welfare state?'</i>
	11/12/13	Westminster pensions raid gives insight to full cost of a No vote	<i>'Young people in Scotland will bear the brunt of the UK government's state pensions raid, a leading pensions expert said today.'</i>
	18/02/14	Daily Digest: Yes for Stronger Pensions and the Currency and EU threats crumble	<i>'A Yes vote allows us to...protect and enhance pension and savings credits. And we can put in place a lower state pension age...'</i>
	22/02/14	Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's pensioners	<i>'A Yes vote in September's independence referendum provides the opportunity to provide fairer pensions.'</i>
	13/05/14	Pensioners 'let down	<i>'Independence offers people in Scotland full</i>

		time and time again by Westminster'	<i>control over the type of pensions system that they would like to see.'</i>
Currency	29/01/14	Common sense from Carney on currency	<i>'The Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney, today set out a common sense approach to a common currency between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK.'</i>
	01/02/14	Sensible negotiations on currency will begin immediately upon independence	<i>'...their argument against a monetary union after a Yes vote does not stand up to scrutiny, on a number of levels.'</i>
	17/02/14	Why a Sterling Area is in everyone's interests	<i>'The FM reminded us just why a Sterling Area is in everyone's interests.'</i>
	23/03/14	Osborne's opposition to currency union 'conjecture and fantasy'	<i>'Professor Leslie Young says the Chancellor's reasons for opposing a shared currency post independence are 'unsubstantiated'.'</i>
	01/04/14	Daily Digest: Royal Mail, research funding and more currency union woes for No	<i>'The only coherent position on the currency we've heard from a No politician is the UK minister who on Friday confirmed that "of course there would be a currency union".'</i>

Table 2.3 reveals the most frequently uttered topics of economic (in)security by the nationalist campaign. Many of the articles are not so much asserting the insecurities of union as presenting the security of independence, countering the arguments of unionists (see Chapter 7) to allay fears regarding independence. Many Yes Scotland articles, including a number of those in Table 2.3, appear to have been largely reactionary to outputs from unionists.

The topics of economic (in)security addressed by nationalists comprised: 1) The threat of extant and growing inequalities within Scotland - specifically the growing

wealth gap between the richest and the poorest in Scottish society; 2) Threats associated with the UK government's management of public finances, and in particular the damage purportedly caused by the UK governments ongoing programme of austerity; 3) Poverty, which is clearly very closely related with the first two threats, specifically inequality and continued austerity; 4) Threats to jobs, or more commonly in this case, the hampered 'opportunities' for new and better jobs under union; 5) Threats to pensions, with nationalist arguing in direct contradiction to unionists that Scottish pensioners will in fact be better provided for under independence; and, 6) Threats associated with currency arrangements in an independent Scotland, with nationalists (and the Scottish government in particular) attempting to reassure Scots that an independent Scotland will remain within an official UK currency union contrary to the assertions of the UK Government and the Bank of England. As with the Better Together materials, clearly distinguishing between these topics of economic (in)security is largely arbitrary given their obvious interconnections (e.g. public finances, austerity and poverty). Nevertheless, as was also the case with Better Together materials in Table 1.7, the materials used in Table 2.3 clearly illustrate the key insecurities employed in building an overarching narrative or discourse of the insecurities of union versus the security and opportunities of independence.

The specific types of economic insecurity uttered in Yes Scotland materials are revealing of distinct differences between the assumptions underpinning nationalist conceptions of economic (in)security and unionist ones. As explored below, it reveals an attempt by nationalists to speak to a more ethical community of economic fate in addition to the purely material economic community of fate largely assumed

throughout texts from both campaigns. Most notable in this regard are insecurities associated with austerity, poverty and inequality (see Table 2.3). These insecurities resonate with one of the most commonly uttered themes in nationalist discourse; ‘fairness’. Table 2.4 lists a selection of article titles employing this term of fairness.

Table 2.4: Yes Scotland – A Fairer Scotland

Article Date	Article Title
05/12/13	A Yes vote can deliver a better and fairer pensions system
06/12/13	Top trade unionist says Yes is key to fairer, more balanced Scotland
26/02/14	Daily Digest: A fairer Scotland and a fairer nation
07/03/14	Why a Yes vote is the key to a better and fairer deal for women in Scotland
09/06/14	100 days to go for a chance to build a better, fairer, more prosperous Scotland
23/06/14	Independence is key to a fairer, equal and more democratic Scotland, say Lawyers for Yes
08/07/14	Perspective: With Yes, we can work to create a fairer and more inclusive Scotland for us all.
13/07/14	Vote Yes for fairness and prosperity – Plaid ex-Leader
30/07/14	50 mums call for Yes vote for fairer Scotland
14/09/14	Labour supporters sign open letter calling for a Yes vote to build a fairer Scotland

Coupled with ‘prosperity’, and commonly uttered in the same breath, ‘fairness’ was one of the key signifiers with which the nationalist campaign’s argument for independence could be associated. If one of the key phrases reiterated throughout the campaign period by unionists was ‘strength, security and stability’, then ‘fairness and prosperity’ represented the nationalist response. Salmond, for instance, stated,


‘independence is an essential step if we are to build a better, more prosperous and fairer country’ (Salmond cited in Scottish Government 2013a, p. 3).

In the Scottish Government’s latterly published industrial strategy, Salmond again explicitly correlates economic (in)security with fairness:

‘In an independent Scotland we will have the powers we need to build a fairer and more secure economy’ (Scottish Government 2014, p. iii).

In fact, these themes were selected by the Yes Scotland campaign as key ‘tags’ attributed to published content on the website. Earlier in the chapter it was explained that the Yes Scotland website utilised selected ‘categories’ as navigational aids for users to filter content, of which ‘Will we be secure?’ was one (See Figure 1.2). As can be seen in Figure 1.2, ‘Popular Tags’ were also used for a similar purpose. Figure 1.6 is a screenshot of the webpage displaying the entire list of these tags. Notably, ‘Fairness’ was the most commonly employed tag, whilst ‘prosperity’ was the third most common (Note that ‘volunteers’ was the second most popular tag due to there being a great many articles focussed on recruiting volunteers for the Yes Scotland campaign, and not because ‘volunteering’ was an important theme in arguments for independence).

Figure 1.6: Yes Scotland – Article ‘Tags’



But what do the specific types of insecurities uttered by nationalists and these themes of prosperity and fairness reveal about the way in which the nationalist argument for independence encourages us to imagine the Scottish economy and a corresponding community of economic fate? The following sections will address this question, revealing notable differences between the unionist and nationalist case.

Moreover, nationalists stressed how the insecurities of union could be attributed to the union itself, or rather the economic policy choices imposed upon Scotland by UK Governments. As will be seen below, Westminster was essentially articulated as the threatening ‘other’ in nationalist arguments for independence. By conveying economic insecurity as inherent within the union the imagined boundaries of the ‘Scottish economy’ are brought more clearly into focus in a way that simply would not have been possible, for example, with the articulation of more ‘conventional’ security threats (see Chapter 6). Crucially, this was largely made possible by the articulation of the aforementioned set of insecurities, which drew upon (and had the

potential to further sediment), the idea of a more distinctly ethical community of economic fate in Scotland.

Articulating Economic (In)Security: Westminster as a Threatening ‘Other’

Nationalists projected an image of a Scottish economy currently doing very well under union whilst simultaneously hampered by it (see below), which in order to make tenable required crediting themselves for its successes whilst blaming the union for its failings. The Scottish Government’s Cabinet Secretary for Finance,

Employment and Growth urged:

“My simple point is that based on the performance of the Scottish economy since devolution when we got some control of economic policy here in Scotland, we’ve made good job of it and we’ve improved the long-term economic performance of Scotland, and if we have more economic levers at our disposal we could do much, much more to strengthen the Scottish economy and to create the real opportunities for our people” (Swinney 2013).

Leaving aside the fact that this exaggerates the extent to which government policy can be credited for steering ‘economies’ anyway - either because of the multitude of (often more long-standing, structural) reasons why aggregate economic activity in Scotland might be improving, or because the extent to which there is such a thing as a ‘Scottish economy’ to be steered is exaggerated – it illustrates the necessity of blaming the union, or a commonly associated ‘other’ like the UK, England, or more usually, ‘Westminster’.

“We know that Westminster governments have made some disastrous mistakes which have damaged Scotland’s economy” (Sturgeon 2013).

“So the costs and the losses to people in Scotland and to the Scottish economy of a Westminster system that isn’t working are clear” (Sturgeon 2013).

Whilst almost unthinkable insofar as conventional threats are concerned, Westminster is conveyed as being - if not always the main source of the threat - a significant part of the problem.

In the previous chapter the importance of economic competitiveness threats and other volatilities associated with globalisation were shown to be central to the unionist arguments that union affords the stability and security of a larger and stronger UK economy. In nationalist articulations of (in)security the challenges associated with globalisation still speak to the seemingly inherent insecurities of the economic, but they are more commonly cast in a positive light by conveying the opportunities afforded to a small, successful, outward-looking economy, which as explained above, was required to project a positive independent future. Moreover, where those insecurities are uttered, 'Westminster' is conveyed as being both a failed protector from and creator of those insecurities. Commenting on the Scottish Government's Chief Economist's report on the 'State of the economy' (Gillespie 2012), John Swinney stated:

“This report shows that while the Eurozone crisis and continued global uncertainty is slowing growth, the real impact on UK growth rates comes from the failure of the UK Government to invest in recovery, to get banks lending to small business and to build consumer confidence with support for household budgets” (Swinney 2012).

Moreover, he stresses that despite the poor choices of the UK Government, the Scottish economy continues to fair better than the UK as a whole, arguing that Scotland's recession has been 'shorter and shallower' than the rest of the UK (Swinney 2012).

Often, very *explicit* arguments were made within the nationalist campaign for independence that focussed on what it argued to be the misguided economic policies of Westminster and the resultant damage to the economic prospects of Scottish people. Nicola Sturgeon exclaimed in one speech:

“What do we get from leaving our powers in the control of others? A high risk economy and an eroding social fabric” (Sturgeon 2012a).

“The poverty and inequality that is a scar on the face of our nation, the lag in economic growth, the flow of our brightest and best out of Scotland – these are not recent problems. These are long-standing and long-term challenges that UK governments of whatever colour have failed to address” (Sturgeon 2012a).

“The UK today is the 4th most unequal society in the developed world. 1 in 5 Scottish children live in poverty. 800,000 Scots live in fuel poverty” (Sturgeon 2012a).

In a separate speech at the Economics of Independence Conference, Sturgeon stressed:

“We know too that the UK is the 4th most unequal economy in the developed world. Since 1975, income inequality among working-age people has risen faster in the UK than in any other OECD country. So this is not just about the economic policies of one government - it is a long-term trend that shows no sign of slowing down. What is true is that the policies of the current Westminster government are only going to increase the gap between the richest and the poorest. Based on estimates from the Institute for Fiscal Studies, we can predict that an additional 50,000 children in Scotland will be living in poverty by 2020” (Sturgeon 2013).

The aforementioned Scottish Government (2013b, p. 8) document includes a section titled, ‘Economic policy-making: six examples of why Westminster isn’t working for Scotland’s economy’. Among the (in)securities articulated therein are: 1) The failure of the UK to establish an oil fund which would have put Scotland in a better financial position; 2) The UK governments ‘decision to allow the UK economy to engage in, in the words of the current UK Business Secretary, a “massive boom in credit and debt expansion” which allowed a “very dangerously unstable position” to develop’ – thereby holding the UK Government culpable for the financial crisis and subsequent

recession, although stopping short of actually saying as much; 3) ‘The decision to allow income inequality to grow dramatically’; 4) ‘The decision to impose a policy of austerity on Scotland, which according to the former Chancellor, Alistair Darling, is causing “immeasurable damage” to the economy’; and, 5) The decision to cut capital spending that could have generated 19,000 new jobs. Here we see the insecurities noted in Table 2.3, but with Westminster as the problem.

Furthermore, the table below presents a small selection of article titles from Yes Scotland published over the space of a few months in 2014, each of which positions Westminster as the threatening ‘other’.

Table 2.5: Yes Scotland – Westminster as a Threatening ‘Other’

Article Date	Article Title
09/03/14	Westminster austerity offers Scotland's children a bleak future
10/03/14	Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty – Westminster isn't working
16/03/14	Westminster's whirlwind of fear has failed
21/03/14	Only a Yes vote can create the equality that Westminster has failed to deliver
09/05/14	Daily Digest: Westminster's cost of living crisis laid bare and Miliband first to offer “Jam Tomorrow”
11/05/14	How Westminster has mismanaged Scotland's oil wealth
13/05/14	Pensioners 'let down time and time again by Westminster'
27/05/14	Perspective: 'With Westminster, gap between rich and poor can only widen'
08/07/14	Westminster's austerity obsession is harming people
15/07/14	A Yes vote for prosperity and an end to Westminster austerity

It is no coincidence that ‘Westminster’ was a particularly popular referent in nationalist rhetoric, as it has long been portrayed as being both geographically and ideological detached from Scotland and Scottish interests. This points to a critical difference between nationalist and unionist arguments for and against independence, and the sorts of economic insecurities articulated, as nationalist texts not only drew upon a taken-for-granted material economic community of fate, but also hegemonic assumptions about a distinctly *ethical* Scottish economic community of fate too.

Imaging the Economy in Nationalist ‘Texts’

In Chapter 6, it was explained that we are encouraged to think of our individual economic (in)security as inextricably bound up with those of the collective. Our economic circumstances are to a greater or lesser extent thought to be determined by the trajectory of ‘the economy’ and the community of economic fate within which we ‘live’. The same assumption underpins the nationalist argument for independence as was argued to underpin the unionist argument in the previous chapter; people in Scotland have an especially shared economic circumstance at present and will have an especially shared (and improved) economic circumstance afterwards, within a newly independent state.

In the previous chapter it was shown that unionists talk of a ‘Scottish economy’, but as intimately bound up within a wider UK economy and community of economic fate. Nationalists encourage the imagination of an already more discrete Scottish economy (albeit it still integrated into the wider UK economy) and economic community of fate under union, since the Scottish economy is typically conveyed as being more of a

functioning spatial-scalar entity of its own. In other words, of the two ‘scales’ addressed, the Scottish economy is privileged as the more important determinant of economic Scottish livelihoods. Far from being dependent on the UK for its successes, nationalists assert the relative successes of the Scottish economy *despite* the union, and how the Scottish economy’s potential for delivering even greater prosperity is ultimately held back by the misguided policy choices of the UK government. This is no doubt symptomatic of the requirement of nationalists to instil confidence in the electorate and allay fears about independence.

In Chapter 3 it was stated that the Scottish economy has historically been seen as a disadvantaged and dependent upon the UK (Brown *et al.* 1998), characterised even by ‘pathological failure’ (Tomlinson 2014). Whilst the unionist case suggests that the Scottish economy is still dependent upon the UK economy for its security, Scotland’s economic performance vis-à-vis the rest of the UK is now considered to be much improved. This fact has not been lost on Scottish nationalists, and has greatly supported the nationalist case for independence by making viable an economic case for separation (See Chapter 5). Examples of this, and how the Scottish economy was typically portrayed as an already functioning entity of its own, are revealed through the use of statistics in nationalist arguments for independence.

A figure commonly reported by the nationalist campaign and used by the then Deputy First Minister for Scotland Nicola Sturgeon (2012b) when outlining the ‘Seven Key Strengths of the Scottish Economy’ was that based on *current* figures ‘[a]n independent Scotland would be ranked 6th in the OECD in terms of GDP per head,

compared to the UK's sixteenth place (in 2010)'. Elsewhere, the then First Minister, Alex Salmond stated:

“In truth, it is absurd to suggest an independent Scotland will struggle to make its own way economically. On current figures Scotland would have the sixth highest per capita GDP in the OECD as an independent nation, the UK currently ranks sixteenth, and incidentally without Scotland would still rank sixteenth per capita” (Salmond 2012).

Similarly, in the Scottish Government (2013b) document, ‘*Scotland’s Economy: The Case for Independence*’, a table of facts and figures (e.g. GDP and employment/unemployment rates) are presented to illustrate how Scotland is apparently better placed economically compared to the UK as a whole. In an article published by Yes Scotland on the 2nd June 2014 entitled ‘16 Things You Need to Know about Scotland’s Economy’ (See Appendix 5.0 for full content) there is a list of facts and figures which present the same story. Finally, the following two quotes from John Swinney, the then Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Employment and Growth in the Scottish Government, also attempt the same.

"While times remain challenging, Scotland's economy has grown faster than the UK over the last year to quarter two, with employment now at a five-year high and the economy growing for the fourth consecutive quarter” (Swinney 2013).

"On figures for employment, unemployment, inactivity and youth employment Scotland continues to perform better than the UK as a whole” (Swinney 2013).

At first, the presentation of these facts and figures seems perfectly reasonable insofar as they appear to be supporting the case for independence. However, a more considered reading reveals that the intention is not merely to stress that the Scottish economy is *strong enough* to be independent, but that it will actually be *better off* if independent. One can assume the latter for if Scotland’s economic performance is indeed so favourable *within* the union then these facts and figures could be read as an

argument for maintaining it. One might ask, why disrupt the status quo? What is suggested is the existence of an economy that is already a largely functioning entity of its own, for its relative successes are attributed to it *in spite* of union rather than because of it.

The aforementioned facts and figures, along with many other representations of the Scottish economy, convey the notion of a distinct *material* community of economic fate in Scotland. This was revealed to also be the case in unionist arguments in the previous chapter. However, for unionists said community of fate was critically delineated by the union; the Scottish economy was seen as intimately bound up with the UK economy and reliant upon it for its survival. In both cases, what are presented are ‘real’ economies, existing irrespective of the norms, values, or indeed wishes of Scottish people. This thesis has argued that the extent to which the economy actually represents such a material community of fate is grossly exaggerated as a consequence of the taken-for-granted nature of ‘the economy’. As stressed with regards unionists in Chapter 7, to the extent that economic arguments vis-à-vis independence are built upon the assumption of such a material community, intertextuality (or dialogicality) between concrete nationalist texts and the discourse of ‘the economy’ is obscured.

However, nationalists also made explicit attempts to ‘speak’ to a more *ethical* community in Scotland too, which are more revealing of intertextuality (and dialogicality) between nationalist texts and their wider discursive context. It was stressed in Chapter 4 that whilst such ethical foundations are not required for imagining an otherwise material community of fate, they are often evident and can play a part in defining governing legitimacies (Williams 2003).

Imaging the Scottish Economy: An Ethical Community of Fate

It was outlined in Chapter 4 that the concept of a community of shared fate is built upon the recognition that such a community need not have ethical bases but can be thought of in largely material terms.

‘A community of shared fate is not an ethical community as such. Its members are not bound to each other by shared values or moral commitments, but by relations of interdependence, which may or may not be positively valued by its members. Our futures are bound to each other, whether we like it or not. There is no plausible alternative to living-together’ (Williams 2003, p. 101).

However, it was also pointed out that said communities may well have ethical bases too, and where they do, it may afford them greater legitimacy in the minds-eye of those subjects of which they are comprised: ‘legitimacy consists in the ability to justify actions to those who are affected by them according to reasons they can accept’ (Williams 2003, p. 101). Another way to conceptualise this is to think of the economy as being assigned a distinctive ‘personality’ (Rosamond 2012; see also Fetzer and Gilgrist forthcoming) that helps determine its governability.

Essentially, nationalist economic arguments for independence attempted to convey an ethical substance that was not about national identity narrowly defined, but about Scottish people as sharing other distinctive ‘economic values’. Nationalists very often articulated economic (in)security (e.g. austerity, inequality, poverty, pensions) in a way designed to resonate with what have been considered to be Scottish ethical values associated with social democracy. Two of the key themes identified from the Yes Scotland materials above were ‘fairness’ and ‘prosperity’. Arguments pertaining to prosperity can be regarded as having largely revolved around expressions of a

material community of fate, whilst those pertaining to ‘fairness’, conversely, are clearly built on assumptions of a more distinctly ethical community too.

Methodologically this is revealed through instances of intertextuality apparent in nationalist ‘texts’, and in the specific utterances of insecurity they contained. In such texts there are notable discursive efforts to draw intertextually upon a well-established discourse of Scottish social democracy. We see this where texts explicitly draw upon discussion of the post-war consensus, the values of welfarism, and of social democratic ideas. We see it in the adoption and constant reiteration of the signifiers of ‘fairness’ and ‘equality’, themselves key signifiers or tropes around which a broader narrative or discourse of the insecurities of union are organised. Moreover, we see it specifically in the utterances of economic insecurities consonant with the values and ambitions of social democracy.

Put succinctly by Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish Government’s vision for an independent Scotland was of:

“A country with a stable economy that works for the many and not just the few; one that knows it must create the wealth it needs to support the strong public services we value... My conviction that Scotland should be independent stems from the principles, not of identity or nationality, but of democracy and social justice” (Sturgeon 2012a).

The above quote is taken from a speech by Sturgeon at Strathclyde University in December 2012, entitled ‘*Bringing the powers home to build a better nation*’, in which she makes perhaps the clearest case for Scottish social democracy as the means with which to ensure a more *secure* and *fairer* Scottish economy. The Scottish Government report ‘*Building Security and Creating Opportunity: Economic Policy Choices in an Independent Scotland*’ also makes the case that in an

independent Scotland the Scottish economy would be more secure and fairer, as the following quotes from that report indicate.

‘The Scottish Government believes that the best option for Scotland is to become independent. It will create the opportunity to build an economy that takes advantage of Scotland’s unique strengths and size, and which delivers a more outward focussed, fairer and resilient economy’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. ii).

‘While Scotland performs well as an economy within the UK, many other comparable independent countries perform better, not just economically, but also on measures of equality and well-being, pursuing economic models that are designed for their own needs and which deliver more sustainable and inclusive levels of growth’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. iv).

‘Building a new vision for the type of economy and society that captures the values of the people of Scotland’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. v).

In addition to asserting again that Scotland is ‘an economy within the UK’ (see second quote) - not just a portion of the UK economy but a distinct spatial-scalar entity in its own right - each extract also speaks to the capacity for a better, stronger and fairer economy under independence, one in which Scottish people will share in the opportunities afforded.

As we have seen, one of the key insecurities articulated by nationalists was inequality (see Table 2.3). This perhaps more than any other illustrates the different understanding of the economy at stake in nationalist arguments for independence. The Scottish Government urged:

‘The UK economic model has not always served Scotland well. It is prone to instability and has increasingly large social and regional inequalities – with the UK now one of the most unequal societies in the OECD across a range of measures’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. iv).

Crucially, the Scottish Government was keen to stress that inequality is not merely an undesirable by-product of the pursuit for economic growth, but that inequality and

growth are in fact two sides of the same coin, due to inequality being damaging for economic growth.

“We do this because we believe that such services benefit the common weal of Scotland. They provide a sense of security and well-being, of equity within communities. Such a sense of security is essential to a sense of confidence. And as we have seen over the last three years confidence is central to any resumption of economic growth” (Salmond 2012).

‘There is a recognition that an economy’s ability to tackle inequalities is not only important in its own right, but also for a country’s long-term economic growth potential. The Fiscal Commission Working Group was clear about inequality in the UK and its impacts: ‘Such patterns of inequality will continue to have a negative impact on growth and prosperity in the long-term’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. 30).

“This matters. Not just because of the costs to individuals and society. The economic consequences are also disastrous. Christine Lagarde of the IMF noted earlier this year that: “Excessive inequality is corrosive to growth; it is corrosive to society,” and that “a more equal distribution of income allows for more economic stability, more sustained economic growth, and healthier societies with stronger bonds of cohesion and trust.”” (Sturgeon 2013).

As well as revealing assumptions about an ethical community, this also reveals a different understanding of the economy, whereby social intervention is not merely normatively desirable, but seen as inherently productive; the Scottish Government argued,

‘...we believe tackling inequalities will enhance our competitive position by increasing opportunity and participation’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. 7).

This is perhaps most clearly summed up in the title on page 7, ‘A competitive economy and a fairer society: two sides of the same coin’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. 7).

Scottish Social Democracy and the Dissolution of the Post-War Consensus

As stressed in Chapter 3, social democracy is actually thought to have been crucial in the re-imagination of Scottish nationalism in recent years, largely in light of the perceived dissolution of the British post-war consensus, Scotland's rapid deindustrialisation, and a popular distaste for Thatcherism, monetarism and neoliberalism. Support for social democracy remained strong elsewhere in the UK, as indeed it still does, however the concurrent revival of Scottish national identity made provision for a territorial expression of social democracy (and vice versa).

Delivering his Hugo Young lecture in January 2012, the First Minister of Scotland Alex Salmond (2012) asserted the following:

“The SNP will campaign confidently for independence, not just as an end in itself, but as the means by which the Scottish economy can grow more strongly and sustainably...and by which the Scottish people can best fulfil their potential and realise their aspirations. For much of the post-war period people in Scotland largely embraced the great social reforms that were implemented by Clement Atlee's government, and sustained through much of the 1950s, '60s and '70s: national insurance, housing for all, the establishment of a national health service; these commanded a consensus which spanned political boundaries and national borders. There is a view that some of these post-war institutions, perhaps the National Health Service above all, forced a sense of cohesion and common-purpose between all the people of these islands. Professor Tom Devine of Edinburgh University, for example, has expressed an explicit view that in the post-war world the welfare state became the 'real anchor of the union-state'. Now I'm not sure that the welfare state was in truth ever a direct consequence of the union. As the Nordic countries show very clearly, common aims and social policy don't require a common state, but it probably is the case that Scotland subscribed particularly strongly to these values of the post-war consensus” (Salmond 2012).

This quote demonstrates, firstly, the centrality of 'the economy' as an organising referent around which arguments for independence were made, but secondly, the explicit reassertion of Scottish adherence to the underpinning values of the post-war consensus and social-democracy as the determining characteristics of Scottish

political consciousness and identity. This was similarly asserted in speeches given by Nicola Sturgeon (then Deputy First Minister of Scotland) and John Swinney (Cabinet Secretary for Employment, Finance and Growth):

“in the mid-20th century, the creation of the welfare state played an overwhelming role in giving the union a new purpose. Britain lost the colony of India, but we all gained a new territory in the shape of free health care and social protection from cradle to grave” (Sturgeon 2012a).

“So can we meet the aspirations of the many Scots who support a more prosperous, more socially democratic and a more equal society in the current framework? For much of the post-war period, the people of Scotland embraced the great social reforms first implemented by Clement Atlee. National insurance, housing for all and the establishment of the National Health Service commanded a consensus that crossed political boundaries and national borders. Scotland subscribes particularly strongly to the essential values of the post-war consensus” (Swinney 2012).

In considering such assertions about the apparent decline of the post-war consensus it is important to consider the mutually constitutive relationship between state welfare policies and evolving commitments to (and identification with) the nation-state. It is commonly asserted that the establishment of welfare policies relies upon such commitments to the nation, due to the feelings of solidarity and mutual obligation required to establish systems of redistributive welfare (Millar 1995 cited in McEwen 2002, p. 67) and, as such, ‘the welfare state served a nation-building purpose, reinforcing identification with and attachment to the state as a *nation*.’ (McEwen 2002, p. 66). Whilst this may be true, the converse may equally be true.

‘while justifying public policy in the name of ‘the nation’ presupposes a shared national understanding of who and what the nation represents, the sense of belonging to a national state can be reinforced by the substantive recognition of citizenship rights which address social and economic need. In other words, public policy designed to recognize citizenship rights may in turn reinforce the national identity and sense of national solidarity upon which they are founded’ (McEwen 2002, p 67).

McEwen argues that the neo-liberal shift in policy discourse from the late 1970s onwards, with its ideal of the flexible free-market with minimal state intervention, had implications for the extent to which the UK state was able to foster a sense of unity and solidarity around the values of welfarism. In the case of Scotland this certainly resonates with nationalist rhetoric regarding the dissolution of the post-war consensus and the promotion of an economic ideology with policy prescriptions considered to be at odds with ‘Scottishness’ itself (see Chapter 3).

When asked if they believed there to be something particularly ‘Scottish’ about these values, interview respondents elicited some interesting (if not largely expected) responses. One SNP respondent stated:

“Yeah, and I think that’s an historical one as well, and it’s also part of our future, and if we’re working towards building a Scottish constitution for our future then some of these values should underpin that, and it’s about fairness, it’s about justice, about integrity, and I think there is a very ethical, there’s always an ethical view to any business that Scotland does... A very strong ethical view is something that distinguishes Scotland” (Respondent E).

Conversely, when asked if there is something about the economic ideals or ideology of Scots, a senior member of the Conservative Party in Scotland exclaimed:

“I can’t think what that would be, no. And you can talk a load of old hooey over that!” (Respondent F).

The latter respondent went on to stress the importance of removing values from one’s view of the economy.

“I think there is a perception amongst some; a belief that somehow there can be something nobler about the Scottish economy, which I think is a bit far-fetched. Economies are ultimately driven by businesses that create profit” (Respondent F).

A Conservative Party politician might be expected to take this view given that party's politico-economic ideals are considered at odds with those of social democracy and, as described, much of the historical rhetoric regarding Scottish social democracy has been formulated on the basis of explicit opposition to the ideals and values of the Conservative Party.

Nevertheless, the idea that the Scottish economy and Scottish people are especially 'social democratic' is well established in Scottish political discourse, as illustrated by one Labour MSP respondent:

"Politically, for example, it is expressed that Scotland tends to be more left of centre. But these things are often generalisations but in general terms Scotland tends to be more left of centre. There are lots of reasons for that. I don't think we are innately less conservative – with a small c – than anyone else...but politically there has been a, possibly since Thatcher's time because she was seen to be a little Englander and very anti-Scottish, there has been a hangover since then. But it has turned into a sort of virtue" (Respondent G).

When asked specifically if there is something distinctive about the economic ideals or ideology of Scots this respondent stated:

"I think that it is more perception than reality. I have seen enough academic studies of this to show that our behaviours on most things are absolutely identical as anybody in the rest of the UK. So we pride ourselves on difference but actually our behaviours are identical, not identical, but very, very similar. Most Scots in terms of voting behaviour are likely to be social democratic, left of centre, progressive. Most Scots like to think that they are less, less, not less selfish, but that idea, that rampant individualism that Thatcher preached, I am not saying it didn't catch on here, but not in the same way" (Respondent H).

A separate Labour MSP respondent said:

"But I think Scottish people are equally prone to communitarian thought, and selfish thought, as anyone else in the UK" (Respondent G).

"Scotland prides itself on thinking its more communitarian and more progressive. I am not entirely sure it is true in practice. But at the same time, if we think we are, then we sort of are" (Respondent G).

Significantly, this respondent recognises that his political party has traditionally benefitted from the assumed commitment to these communitarian values, for the Labour party was the left-of-centre party of choice in Scotland long before the rise and rise of the SNP. That said, one might expect a unionist politician to be reluctant to suggest that there is anything exclusively *Scottish* about such commitments.

Incidentally, independent polling measuring Scottish attitudes to social welfare do not point to clear differences between Scots and Brits, and measured longitudinally it seems that Scots are less and less likely to support of redistributive policies (Curtice 2013). Curtice (2013, pp. 6-9) showed that there was no statistically significant differences between Yes and No voters with regards their stance on ‘social democratic issues’. Similarly, McCrone and Keating argue that social democracy may be a widely shared reference point, but that its ‘definition and content are elusive’. More political substance might have been brought to the debate were unionists to challenge the assumption that Scots are more socially democratic, but this was unlikely to happen given that the unionist movement comprised a multi-party cohort among whom views on social welfare (whether genuine or rhetorical) clearly diverged. In any event, this thesis is not interested in assessing and/or commenting on how genuine were espoused commitments to social democracy, for almost regardless of this, the very idea is significant in itself for conveying a sense of ideological cohesion among Scots and the imagination of an ethical community of fate. The Scottish Government stated that:

‘It is only through independence that Scotland can maximise its potential and deliver the type of economy and society that reflects the values of the people of Scotland’ (2013b, p. iii).

As the above respondent suggested, regardless of whether Scots are more communitarian and progressive, “if we think we are, then we sort of are” (Respondent G).

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the significance of articulations of economic (in)security in nationalist arguments against Scottish independence. It assessed their significance vis-à-vis conventional security utterances, and addressed the specificities of nationalist economic insecurities vis-à-vis unionist ones. In essence, the nationalist case for independence was built on a narrative or discourse of the opportunities and security of independence, versus the economic insecurities of continued union, based on the assumption of a really existing Scottish economy and associated community of economic fate (Williams 2003).

As with unionists, the nationalist case assumed the existence of a largely *material* community of economic fate, within which economic (in)security is determined irrespective of any emotive or political attachment to that community. However, nationalists also attempted to speak to a more *ethical* community of fate too, revealed through the types of insecurity uttered, the employment of signifiers of fairness and social justice, and efforts to portray the Scottish economy as intimately wedded to the so called post-war consensus and the values of social democracy.

It is possible to see how nationalist arguments which asserted a more ethical substance to the Scottish economy might have been seen as more overtly political and

ideological than unionist ones. However, it should not be assumed that unionist articulations of economic (in)security were any less ‘ideological’ or indeed somehow, therefore, more ‘real’. In fact, unionist arguments clearly relied upon an equally ideological understanding of economic (in)security, albeit one based upon economic liberalism, wherein threats are seen as part and parcel of the ‘forces’ of the market, and intimately tied to the ‘inevitable’ processes of globalisation.

In summary, whilst ethical arguments may have been an important part of the nationalist case for many, they may not have been, and certainly need not have been, given the general taken-for-grantedness of ‘the (UK/Scottish) economy’ and corresponding *material* communities of economic fate. It is likely that many Scottish people could disassociate normative ideals upon which the economy *ought to be* governed from the ‘fact’ or ‘reality’ of an actually existing Scottish economy in their minds-eye, and with that the realisation (or not) of the economic insecurities associated with independence.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This final chapter will bring together the key theoretical and empirical themes of the thesis. It will also reintroduce poststructuralist discourse theory and the grammar of concepts it provides - as outlined in the Methodology - to better understand the discursive 'strategies' at work in the articulation of economic (in)security in 'texts' from the independence debate. Finally, the chapter will discuss a few potential avenues for future research. First, however, the author wishes to draw briefly upon an experience which served as a stimulus to the ideas that have been presented in this thesis.

More of a Scottish economy than ever before?

Whilst at an international workshop on '*Economic Nationhood and Globalisation*' at the Central European University (CEU), Budapest, in May 2013, the author was sat beside Professor Jim Tomlinson, who delivered an excellent paper entitled '*Economic globalization and Scottish nationhood since 1870*'. It argued that Scotland's economy is now more national than ever before. These ideas were subsequently published in '*Imagining the Economic Nation: The Scottish Case*' (Tomlinson 2014). However, despite purporting to stress the imagined nature of the national economy, Tomlinson's insights are inconsistent with regards their application of the concept of an imagined national economy (and community of fate), and can be considered, in fact, to be paradoxically complicit in perpetuating the very idea of a concrete, or 'really existing' Scottish economy. Whilst not explicitly stating whether or not the arguments therein support or refute the case for independence, framed as it was within the context of the

upcoming independence referendum, the paper is illustrative of how the ‘taken-for-granted’ economy can fuel ‘economistic’ justifications for and against independence.

As was explained in Chapter 3, de-industrialisation in the latter half of the twentieth century had a particularly notable effect on Scottish political economy and is thought to have been crucial in the emergence of Scottish nationalism. The discourse of de-industrialisation (see Chapter 3) reflects very real changes in the economic lives of many Scottish people at that time, and to that extent, meaningfully speaks to the concrete economic insecurities that many will have experienced. As Tomlinson himself notes, this narrative, however, has had significant implications for the way in which the Scottish economy has been imagined in ‘declinist’ terms during much of the period since then, and as necessarily dependent, therefore, on the security afforded by the union. Accordingly, unionist arguments against independence have tended to focus on the supposedly inherent economic security of union.

Tomlinson argues that previously, especially prior to 1914, Britain had the most globalised economy in the world due to its vast empire, and that in relative terms Scotland was even more globalised than Britain as a whole. Within this context of free trade, virtually non-existent welfare provisions and a very minimal public sector, there was little capacity for national economic management and to talk of the national economy at this time would have carried little meaning. However, Tomlinson argues that recent development have resulted in Scotland becoming ‘de-globalised’ and thus ‘more of a ‘national economy’, imagined as an ‘economic community of fate’, than has been the case at any time in its modern history’ (Tomlinson 2014, p. 171).

What is not clear here is whether in employing the term ‘community of fate’ Tomlinson is referring to said community as ‘real’ or ‘imagined’ (i.e. a ‘real’ or concrete system which defines the material fate of the community, or something which is just collectively imagined to be ‘real’). To begin with he suggests the latter and presents useful insights about how the imagined national economy first came about (see Chapter 4), but then subsequently argues that due to the structural changes created by de/globalisation there has been less/more of an economic community of fate at different times in Scotland, seemingly referring to something more concrete, or ‘real’.

Whilst in one respect it might be meaningful to talk of the Scottish economy as more national than ever before in terms of economic activity being increasingly homespun, one should be mindful that in highlighting such ‘objective’ developments and trends within the Scottish economy, one is culpable for conveying them as something necessarily ‘Scottish’. This applies whether we assume those trends to be driven by endogenous or exogenous forces. For instance, we could point out, as Tomlinson does, that exogenous forces created by material or structural shifts in the global economy have been responsible for making the Scottish economy more national. But, while there may well have been (and may continue to be) exogenous challenges like competitiveness threats to manufacturers in Scotland, these threats still need to be imagined as ‘Scottish’ threats (and indeed those manufacturers as ‘Scottish’ manufacturers); as threats to a defined ‘Scottish’ referent, and as exogenous to a ‘Scottish economy’. And where there are endogenous forces that may have resulted in the (Scottish) economy becoming more national than ever before (e.g. the introduction of the post-war welfare state and a burgeoning public sector) they are the

result of political decisions that have been taken by national executives (often justified as reactions to exogenous forces).

In any event, empirically speaking, it makes little sense to talk of (and would be very difficult to validate the existence of) a Scottish economy as an especially functional economic area or entity, even though we might point to certain trends that suggest it is becoming more or less functional. Indeed, were we to zoom in or out to geographical scales above or below Scotland would we genuinely find spaces that are notably less functional? Yet in exaggerating the extent to which a ‘really existing’ Scottish economy and community of fate exists, assertions like Tomlinson’s can actually be regarded as complicit in perpetuating the very idea of a Scottish economy.

None of this is terribly important so long as it is recognised that the economy is an essentially ‘arbitrary’ and ‘political’ designation. National governments will continue to have an interest in ‘measuring’ economic activity within their respective territories and attempting to govern it in accordance with the stated interests of the citizenry over which they preside. Indeed, their ‘effective legitimacy’ largely relies upon how well they are seen to be doing so. But it is such recognition that is almost entirely missing in most articulations of the economy. In the case of the Scottish independence referendum debate, it is clearly missing in articulations of economic (in)security, which are instead reliant upon the assumption of a concrete, or ‘real’ Scottish/UK economy that especially determines the economic circumstances or economic (in)security of subjects therein. As was shown in Chapter 4, the result is almost entirely ‘economistic’ arguments being made for and against independence by key protagonists and a frankly ‘sterile’ and ‘depoliticised’ debate.

Thesis Summary

Chapter 2 outlined the key research questions along with the methodological framework for the thesis. Practical considerations including the types of data used and the methods for its collection were explained, but the bulk of the chapter was reserved for outlining the ontological and epistemological assumptions and attendant methodological implications of poststructuralist discourse theory. The specific grammar of concepts afforded by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and their successors in the Essex School (Howarth 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Phillips & Jørgensen 2004; Torfing 1999; Torfing 2005) was outlined. Discourse theory research tends to vary in the extent to which these concepts (and discourse theory generally) are foregrounded or back-grounded in their written analyses. It was stated in the Methodology that for the most part this very complex grammar of concepts largely sits behind the thesis, informing the ontological and methodological lens through which observations are made. It was felt that doing so allowed the author to develop the thesis' key themes without constant reiteration of the specifics of discourse theory, and in a way that would be meaningful to readers both familiar and unfamiliar with a discourse theory approach. At times certain concepts have been used in passing, but this final chapter affords an opportunity to return discourse theory to the foreground and show what it reveals specifically about the ideas and observations that have been made. Crucially, doing so will help to explain the 'hidden politics' of the independence debate.

Chapter 3 provided a short historical introduction to contemporary Scottish politics along with conceptual arguments pertaining to the so called shift from government to

governance within which Scottish politics need to be viewed. A number of key political concepts were elaborated, including ‘the state’, ‘the nation’, ‘identity’, and ‘legitimacy’. Also, insights from political geography pertaining to ‘space’, ‘place’ and ‘territory’ were introduced. It was stressed that whilst the aforementioned historical introduction and the latter conceptual insights provide some understanding of the discursive context for the referendum debate, a broader appraisal of the politics of identity and legitimacy is required to account for the predominant focus among both nationalists and unionists on the so called ‘economics of independence’.

Understanding the implications of the predominantly economic focus of the referendum debate demands a better understanding of what ‘the economy’ means. This was the purpose of Chapter 4, which in many respects introduced the core conceptual argument underpinning the entire thesis, namely, that ‘the economy’, far from representing a material ‘reality’, is a largely imaginative abstraction. It is imagined both where it refers to a domain of (social) activity called ‘the economic’ and where it refers to specific, territorially defined, spatial-scalar entities, like the Scottish, UK or European economy. This chapter also introduced the concept of a ‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003). This concept, as well as its capacity to account for both the ‘material’ and ‘ethical’ foundations of such communities, helpfully describes the way in which ‘the economy’ can be assumed to speak to the economic (in)security of a territorially defined community.

Chapter 5 explained that claims about the economic implications of Scottish independence were central to the debate. Moreover, it showed that the presentation of largely ‘economistic’ cases for and against independence was in part a deliberate

‘strategy’ by the opposing sides. Whilst appearing to present practical, utility based justifications for and against independence, the reality was a sterilised debate within which economic implications could never really be ‘known’ and other political considerations were ignored. This chapter also revealed the intention to challenge the aforementioned common sense assumption that underpinned these economic arguments, namely the idea of ‘the economy’ as a unifying object space within which economic (inter)subjectivities are cemented and economic circumstances are especially determined.

It was argued in Chapter 6 that the idea of ‘the economy’ relies upon the assumption of shared economic (in)security. However, economic (in)security is very much under-theorised (Dent 2007), and rarely dealt with in empirical literature, and yet the failure to do so given its potential importance for shaping political geography is regrettable.

It was argued that economic (in)security is a fundamental feature of economic life under a modern capitalist mode of production, given that our capacity as individuals – people, firms, organisations, states, etc. – to satisfy our own material wants and needs are never wholly within our purview. Economic insecurities are largely ‘accepted’ as part and parcel of modern economic life. We tacitly recognise that much of our capacity to satisfy those economic wants and needs (our economic security) are also determined by numerous circumstantial factors largely beyond our control.

Chapters 7 and 8 provided an analysis of unionist and nationalist ‘texts’ respectively. They revealed the way in which the opposing Better Together and Yes Scotland campaigns based their arguments regarding independence on the articulation of

economic (in)security. In both cases the proportion of utterances of ‘conventional’ security vis-à-vis those of economic security was revealed, along with the specificities of the insecurities articulated. Essentially, the unionist argument was one of the ‘strength, security and stability’ of a larger UK economy, whilst the nationalist argument attempted to convey the ‘fairness, prosperity and security’ of an independent Scotland. Both of these discourses encouraged Scots to imagine themselves as bound up within a largely material community of fate, but the nationalist discourse also attempted to convey an ethical substance to this community (i.e. an ethical community of fate) built upon supposed Scottish preferences regarding social democracy (see Chapter 3). This is revealed through the employment of signifiers of fairness, equality, and social justice, and is evident from the specific ‘types’ of insecurity uttered, namely poverty, austerity and inequality. Irrespective of whether Scots view themselves as united by such ethical commitments, the claim that people in Scotland will have had a necessarily shared economic experience of independence is conveyed through unionist and nationalist texts as an objective truth or matter of fact requiring little or no validation.

Yet articulations of ‘the economy’ are fundamentally political insofar as they serve, deliberately or not, to convey a space (and populace) as governable, and insofar as it is only really meaningful to talk of ‘the economy’ in correspondence with a political space. The taken-for-grantedness of the economy was highlighted here with regards the debate on Scottish independence, for whilst the opposing campaigns disagreed on the economic implications of independence, and attempted to speak to different communities of economic fate, both fundamentally reasserted the assumption that economies are ‘real’ and within them our economic (in)security is both shared and

largely determined. The intention here has been to reveal the ‘hidden politics’ at play in this constitutional debate and the truth claims that served to obscure them.

Poststructuralist Discourse Theory reminds us that all ideas, discourses, or meanings, are fundamentally re/constructed. They are never whole, or complete, but always vulnerable to that which is excluded in their re/articulation. In the case of given examples of ‘the economy’ as economic realities (e.g. the Scottish economy, the UK economy, the European Economy, the global economy) they have to be continually reasserted through discursive practices to appear and/or remain seemingly real to people. However, in some circumstances, certain ideas, or discourses, become so naturalised, or taken-for-granted, that they appear a-political. ‘The economy’, as a way of thinking about the aggregation of economic activities, may be thought of as an example of such a taken-for-granted. Yet objectivity can be challenged at any time and established ideas can once more re-enter the ‘play of practice’ as their meaning is renegotiated. It is the aim of critical investigation to highlight such taken-for-granted truths and reveal their contingency. The purpose of this thesis has been to show how this truth made possible economic arguments for and against independence that seemed divorced from other normative, political or ideological judgements or considerations. The grammar of concepts that poststructuralist discourse theory presents us with helps us to understand how arguments for and against independence, whilst disagreeing on the economic implications of independence, served to perpetuate this idea.

Discourse Theory and the 'Hidden Politics' of Independence

Poststructuralism reminds us that 'signs' are essentially arbitrary as they have no necessary meaning. The signifier 'the economy' means nothing without being articulated through chains of equivalence with other signifiers that give it meaning and define the object space that we think of when that term is uttered. As

Torfinn Utne states, 'Within discourse, meaning is constructed either in terms of difference or equivalence...; Most often, meaning is constructed both through the assertion of difference and the articulation of chains of equivalence' (2005, p. 14). Through an analysis of various texts 'chains of equivalence' can be discerned through which certain key signifiers are invested with meaning by being linked to other signifiers. It is through acts of articulation that elements become moments in a given discourse. As Philips and Jørgensen explain, 'What the key signifiers have in common is that they are empty signs [and]...mean almost nothing by themselves until, through chains of equivalence they are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning' (2004, p. 50). The economy is an example of an 'empty signifier'. As with the state, the myriad of signs that fill 'the economy' with meaning are understandably vast. Moreover, discourse is 'performative' too, and like the state, 'the economy's' meaning, far from being neutral or without consequence, encourages a particular view of reality and with it the actions and interests of subjects.

As shown in Chapter 4 'the economy' did not used to mean what it does today, and it has not come about through conceptual development or indeed as a consequence of 'economies' becoming (more) 'real'. Nevertheless, it is now regarded as representing something real, and as something ontologically given. It acts performatively through helping to make governable given political spaces. It appears to speak to an

aggregation of all of the ‘everyday’ activities we think of as inherently ‘economic’, despite in fact being just social activities like any other. What is often excluded by this discourse of ‘the economy’ is discussion of all the other ways in which political legitimacies, or political authority, ought to be determined. It makes it possible to convey seemingly practical justifications for governing rationalities (in this instance, independent statehood) without recourse to *supposedly* less rational, emotive considerations, such as national identity.

As outlined in the Methodology, the concept of ‘interpellation’ helps to make sense of how subject positions are intersubjectively constituted. The following explanations of interpellation help us understand the discursive construction of ‘the economy’ and how it becomes sedimented as ‘common sense’.

‘Interpellation refers to a dual process whereby identities or subject-positions are created and concrete individual are ‘hailed’ into (Althusser 1971, p. 174) or interrelated by them’ (Weldes 1996, p. 287).

‘Once they identify with these subject-positions, the representations make sense to them and the power relations and interests entailed in them are naturalized. As a result, the representations appear to be common sense, to reflect ‘the way the world really is’ (Weldes 1996, p. 287).

‘Social constructions become common sense when...they are treated as if they neutrally or transparently reflected [sic] reality’ (Weldes 1996, p. 303).

It is argued here that the idea, or discourse, of ‘the economy’ helps bind people into what one can refer to as a (largely material) community of fate.

Security is central to this process. ‘The economy’ does not mean anything unless it speaks to our view of a broader system in which we are a part, and within which our material circumstances are at least partly determined. In other words, the economy relies upon the articulation of shared opportunities and vulnerabilities (or shared

(in)security) which help to define it as an object space within which our material realities are realised, either positively or negatively. This is what makes the interpellation of subjects possible - a (largely) material community of fate is conveyed to subjects on the assumption that their economic fates, both positive and negative, are to a greater or lesser extent bound up with each other's. In the case of nationalists the aim is to articulate a Scottish economy currently defined by both material successes and hampered by the insecurities of union, contrasted with an alternative future Scottish economy of security and prosperity. In the case of unionists the aim was the opposite, to articulate the UK economy as the principal determining context of economic fates of people in Scotland – even where 'the Scottish economy' is uttered by unionists it is seen as inherently bound up with the wider UK economy as the principal determining context – with security under continued union, contrasted with significant economic insecurities of an independent Scotland. Whilst the people of Scotland ultimately voted against independence, it is difficult to tell how 'convincing' the opposing arguments will have been. Some prior polling evidence suggested the unionist's economic case against independence was shaping public opinion (ICM Research 2013; Curtice 2014; ScotCen 2014), and subsequent survey research revealed the impact of economic risk on voter choice in the referendum (ESRC 2014).

Nationalist and unionist arguments for and against independence were based on the articulation of discourses of economic (in)security. Obviously these discourses disagreed on the economic (in)security implications of independence, and through building chains of equivalence (or organising elements into moments) within their respective discourses revealed differing projections of what those insecurities were.

We have also seen that they disagreed to some extent on where the (imagined) boundaries of ‘the economy’ exist, as a consequence of the necessity to speak to different communities of economic fate. However, what remained fundamentally unchallenged by either side, was the taken-for-granted idea of ‘the economy’ as a real spatial-scalar entity within which the economic fortunes and (in)security of people in Scotland is especially determined. This was highlighted in Chapters 7 and 8 as revealing an instance of ‘intertextuality’ (or ‘interdiscursivity’) insofar as the very idea or discourse of ‘the economy’ effectively renders meaningful such articulations of economic (in)security. Moreover, it was observed that ‘dialogicality’ between concrete unionist and nationalist texts and the wider discourse of ‘the economy’ was largely non-apparent. This is in fact typical of such practices. The idea of ‘the economy’ has become so entrenched in popular consciousness as to appear not like an idea at all but an objective reality, or truth, when the real truth is that economies, at least as we are encouraged to imagine them, do not exist at all.

This latter point helps to account for what has been referred to as the ‘depoliticisation’ of the independence debate. It was explained in the methodology that all discourses are fundamentally contingent. However, in certain circumstances, their contingency is obscured, or forgotten. Torfing explains, '*Discourse* is defined as a relational ensemble of signifying sequences; but if the relational and differential logic prevailed without any limitation or rupture, there would be no room for politics' (1999, p. 91). The concept of ‘objectivity’ in discourse theory explains those discourses that become so sedimented, so naturalised, that their contingency becomes forgotten, they appear apolitical. However, insofar as it is meaningful to talk about ‘the economy’ it is only with reference to the *political* space or territory with which it is thought to

correspond, in the exact same way as the state. In any event, it is this idea of the economy that the articulation of economic (in)security relies upon (and vice versa).

Discourse Theory reminds us that all discourses are necessarily contingent, and must constantly be re/articulated. They are always vulnerable to alternative understandings of reality. As such, they can at any time be destabilised (along with the subject positions they make possible) and re-enter what Milliken refers to as the ‘play of practice’. Here lies the ‘critical’ aspect of poststructuralism generally, to ‘problematise’, ‘deconstruct’, ‘juxtapose’, ‘destabilise’, or simply challenge taken-for-granted or accepted truths. However, this is not always easy, far from it. In this thesis, for example, it is shown that the imagined economy is just that, largely imagined and not ‘real’, and that this had significant implications for shaping the terms of the Scottish independence debate. The intention is therefore to challenge an accepted view of social reality. Yet clearly, changing this received wisdom would require enormous discursive effort. A secondary, and perhaps more realistic expectation here, is to encourage the reader to consider some of the political implications that this received wisdom might have had in the context of the Scottish independence referendum debate, specifically how it may have shaped the terms of the debate (i.e. to be based on the articulation of the shared economic (in)security implications of independence) and how it may have served to ‘depoliticise’ it.

From a poststructuralist position, all concepts, and all meanings, can be thought of as essentially ‘contested’ (see Gallie 1956). We have seen, however, that ‘the economy’ remains “essentially” uncontested. Yet the same is not true of the concept of security, which as explained in Chapter 6 is increasingly subjected to alternative

conceptualisations seeking to challenge its dominant formulation. In the language of discourse theory, whilst conventional accounts of the meaning of security remain ‘hegemonic’, the ‘antagonistic struggle’ over its meaning is revealed through alternative accounts which aim to rearticulate the meaning of security. Through evidencing the significance of articulations of economic (in)security in the Scottish independence debate this thesis has followed a similar vein. Political geographers and International Relations scholars have regularly highlighted the importance of (conventional) security in the (re)territorialisation of the state, but articulations of conventional (in)security were almost absent from the independence debate, and yet, the (potential) (re)territorialisation of the state was very clearly at stake. This thesis can be regarded as an example of an alternative account of security based on the assumption that its meaning is fundamentally constructed, and the product of discursive practice.

It was proposed here that we might think of unionist and nationalist arguments pertaining to independence as fundamentally underpinned by the articulation of economic (in)security. Crucially, the methodology explained that ‘general equivalents’ can either be ‘empty’ or ‘floating’. Arguably, across the opposing nationalist and unionist discourses, ‘economic (in)security’ can be regarded as a ‘floating signifier’. Defined simply, a floating signifier is ‘a signifier that is overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within different discourses’ (Torfing 1999, p. 301).

‘Floating signifiers are general equivalents that have multiple meanings because actors grounded in multiple discourses are seeking to hegemonise their meaning during a period of dislocation’ (Jeffares 2007, pp. 58-59).

Though there were clear similarities in the types of (in)security uttered between unionists and nationalists (e.g. the impact on Scotland's fiscal position) – albeit with disagreement on the actual implications of independence for these (e.g. whether Scotland's fiscal position would be improved or damaged) - there were also clear differences. Within nationalist texts it was possible to discern an attempt to articulate a more social democratic conception of economic (in)security, which drew 'intertextually' upon an established discourse of Scottish social democracy. Chapter 8 revealed how nationalist arguments for independence drew upon signifiers of social justice, equality, and most notably of all, 'fairness'. Arguably where this was done it will have been seen, by some at least, as a more overtly political argument, speaking as it does to more overtly political values. Almost irrespective of this social democratic understanding of economic (in)security presented, such nationalist articulations still took as given the existence of a 'Scottish economy' and corresponding community of fate as a material reality sitting beneath any ethical community.

Unionist arguments had no such ethical connotations and relied purely on the economic threats associated with *necessarily* being part of a competitive global economy. Economic (in)security is articulated as pertaining to threats that are taken as given within accepted (neoliberal) economic doctrine (see Chapter 6). Conversely to nationalists, no attempt is made to speak to a discourse of Scottish social democracy, not least, one would assume, because of the multi-party make-up of the unionist movement and attendant ideological disagreements between parties. In other words, unionists will have more readily suffered from a subject position that was essentially 'overdetermined'. Any given articulation of economic (in)security from any given

protagonist is inevitably done so from a given subject position within a wider discursive context, and for the Better Together campaign to appear harmonious it may have been necessary to put aside ideological disagreements among subjects. This is not an issue if one is seen to be focusing instead on the seemingly more practical, material, economic arguments against independence.

Yet this unionist argument was no less ‘political’, or ‘ideological’ than nationalist articulations of (in)security. As with nationalist articulations of economic (in)security, unionist ones offer clear instances of ‘intertextuality’, whereby the ‘outside’ of a text is brought ‘inside’ by drawing on earlier communicative events, or ‘texts’ (Fairclough 2003, p. 17; Philips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 73). However, in the case of unionist texts this was done much more implicitly. Related to intertextuality is the concept of dialogicality, which refers to the extent to which different ‘voices’ or ‘texts’ are apparent in discursive utterances. Coincidentally, Fairclough uses by way of illustration the example of a European Union text in which globalisation, in particular global economic change along neoliberal lines, is seen as an inevitable development distinct from human agency (2003, p. 45). In the case of nationalist articulations of (in)security, where the discourse of social democracy was drawn upon more explicitly, dialogicality is more apparent. However, such ‘dialogicality’ was more readily obscured in unionist texts. In unionist texts especially, the political or ideological underpinnings of the argument is obscured, appearing instead to speak only to objectively verifiable truths about the economic implications of independence.

Avenues for Future Research

In terms of further empirical applications of the ideas developed in this thesis, it would be interesting to look at the role of the imagined economy and associated articulations of economic (in)security in other areas of the world where secessionist movements exist and there are elite debates comprising economic justifications for independence. Notable inclusions would be Catalonia and Quebec, where typically deliberative discourse regarding legitimacy has tended to focus on national identity issues, but economic justifications seem increasingly important (Duch *et al.* 2000; Duchesne *et al.* 2003; Howe 2009; Muñoz & Tormose 2015a; 2015b).

Another potential application of this thesis' ideas regards the UK referendum on membership of the EU in June 2016, which revealed very similar 'economistic' arguments being made by the opposing sides. Those who favoured remaining in the EU (the so called 'remainers') made significant discursive efforts to articulate the economic insecurities of leaving, whilst those who favoured leaving (the 'leavers') stressed the converse, and mirroring nationalist claims about unionists in the Scottish referendum debate, branded the remain campaign 'project fear'. However, just as matters of national identity are thought to have been significant determinants of the Scottish vote despite elite discourse strictly avoiding the topic, it is highly likely that issues of national identity, notably ethnic formulations, were a significant determinant of voter choice on membership of the EU too, despite elite discourse in this case also refusing to engage with these issues.

This latter observation regards what might be seen as a growing disjuncture between what might be referred to as ‘elite’ and ‘everyday’ discourse. If the former refers to the deliberative debate of politicians and other elites as reported through the mainstream media, then the latter might be given to refer to debates comprising the views, opinions and arguments at the level of the citizenry (increasingly done on social media platforms). It has been noted in the case of the Scottish referendum that such ‘everyday’ discourse often focussed on more heated and emotive matters of national identity despite elite debate not doing so (ESRC 2014) and the same was very clearly the case in the lead up to the EU referendum, with strong and heated views being exchanged. If a challenge for future research is to better understand the extent to which economics and/or identity drives voter choices in such referenda, a challenge for politicians and for civil society is to better ensure a more meaningful and engaging debate that better takes account of the views of the electorate.

In terms of theoretical avenues for future research the opportunities are many. In was stated in the introduction that the author regards this thesis as making a contribution to what is a limited literature on the importance of the imagined economy and its role in determining governing legitimacies (Rosamond 2002 & 2012; Herrera 2007 & 2010; Tooze 1998). The project of exploring the multifarious ways in which the taken-for-granted economy is imagined might comprise a vast body of works. Moreover, from a more ‘critical’ perspective, the project of ‘problematizing’ the imagined state has provided a vast body of works on postsovereignty (see Chapter 3) and has been a topic of interest to students of class, gender, the environment, etc. In that regard the project of exploring the implications of the taken-for-granted, imagined economy,

including the many 'hidden voices' that potentially result from it, also presents a multitude of opportunities for future research.

Appendices

Appendix 1.0 Better Together Articles

Date	Article Title
01/30/13	A victory for the campaign for a fair referendum
01/30/13	Scottish Science, UK Funding
02/01/13	Share to win a free T-Shirt
02/07/13	Materials page launched
02/11/13	It's time Scottish Ministers released their legal advice
02/13/13	Better Together Ups Pressure on Scottish Government to Release Legal Advice
02/13/13	Phil Anderton joins board of Better Together
02/17/13	Will you join Emma on our National Campaign Weekend?
02/18/13	Emma on why she's pledging to help deliver one million leaflets
02/21/13	Better Together launches unprecedented campaign activity
02/22/13	Glasgow Uni students vote Better Together
02/22/13	Nationalist plans on currency and tax are falling apart
02/24/13	National Campaign Organiser (Grassroots) talks national campaign weekend
02/26/13	Victoria on why we're looking forward to the SCVO's The Gathering
02/27/13	Charities need the facts
02/28/13	Better Together marks first birthday of Devo Plus
03/04/13	Our NHS doesn't recognise borders
03/07/13	One thing in public, another in private
03/08/13	Read Alistair Darling's speech to COSLA Conference
03/08/13	Better Together Women launches on International Women's Day
03/11/13	The strength of the UK pension system
03/11/13	You can't believe the nationalists on oil
03/12/13	Better Together Youth Rep, Michael, on votes at 16 and how young people can get involved
03/13/13	It's the Biggest Campaign In Scotland – You Can Be A Part of It

03/15/13	“We must step up now.”
03/18/13	‘As Scots, we believe there is nowhere better. But we do know there is something bigger’
03/19/13	A Future for Scottish Shipbuilding on the Clyde
03/21/13	The countdown has begun
03/22/13	Why Have I Been Sent A Text Message About The Referendum?
03/23/13	The Nationalists cannot hide from the debate any longer
03/25/13	Salmond hasn’t given Scots the facts, he should give us a debate.
03/25/13	Compare and Contrast - John Swinney
03/26/13	‘Oil boom’ claims ‘not supported by the evidence’, say experts
04/03/13	Perhaps the best place on Earth to carry out scientific research
04/04/13	The choice we face: further devolution vs. separation
04/05/13	No Reply, No Plan B
04/07/13	Why I’m supporting Better Together
04/08/13	The ground game
04/09/13	Could you be part of the most important campaign in Scotland’s history?
04/10/13	Former Secretary General of NATO criticises the Nationalist’s hypocritical defence policy
04/10/13	New report slams nationalist currency plans
04/10/13	Smear and Fear
04/11/13	The way I see it, the United Kingdom is a community
04/15/13	Support for Scotland’s place in the UK on the increase in North and North East
04/17/13	Our Youth Rep, Rory, On Why We Are Better Together
04/18/13	Cameron Stout says he is ‘Proud to be leading Better Together in Orkney’
04/19/13	Alistair Darling, speaking straight after his speech to Scottish Labour Conference
04/19/13	‘We are better and stronger, when we stand together’
04/20/13	Our Grassroots Organiser on what Better Together has going on today at Scottish Labour Conference
04/22/13	Leave the UK, Leave the UK Pound
04/23/13	Why let Salmond gamble with your money
04/24/13	Scots on what separation could mean for your savings, pension and mortgage
04/24/13	What the experts say (about currency)
04/29/13	A crisis of credibility for the independence argument

04/30/13	Currency, Confusion & Credibility
05/01/13	A strong voice in the world
05/05/13	Alistair speaking after the launch of Better Together Edinburgh
05/06/13	500 days to go...
05/07/13	Better Together Youth Rep, Lachlan, on what Burns' words can teach us about our shared challenges
05/08/13	The future of the National Lottery
05/09/13	Working together to unlock Scotland's potential...
05/12/13	The fight for LGBT rights transcends borders
05/14/13	Better Together Youth Rep, Hannah - 'We have a shared history, culture and experience'
05/15/13	Become a Better Together Youth Rep
05/20/13	It's the Economy, glaikit!
05/21/13	Is that it?
05/24/13	Salmond's Default Position Bankrupts His Credibility
05/25/13	Referendum Review
05/29/13	Alistair Darling speaking after the successful launch of Better Together Lewis and Harris
05/30/13	LGBT Together launches as UK declared 'best place in Europe' to be gay
06/02/13	Nas Fheàrr Còmhla ga cur air bhog ann an Steòrnabhagh
06/03/13	"I like the fact that we are part of something bigger and staying united makes sense to me"
06/03/13	"Come join us. Come play your part."
06/04/13	I'm voting to keep these opportunities alive, why not join me?
06/05/13	"I should not have to, and will not, choose between being Scottish and British."- Sir Robin Wales
06/06/13	Mary MacLeod speaking after the launch of Better Together London
06/06/13	'A united Parliament makes people work together'- Rory Stewart MP
06/06/13	Recognising that the UK is a feast of opportunities is quite possibly something young people do best
06/07/13	Better Together Youth Rep, Jamie, on how our Union works to benefit people's lives
06/08/13	Rob on what Better Together has going on at Scottish Conservative Conference today
06/08/13	Forces Together
06/09/13	Come and lead this campaign.
06/11/13	Pooling our resources within the UK makes sense. It's an argument for devolution, not separation.
06/13/13	The nationalists' welfare plans: What the experts say

06/13/13	Even more pension pressure for the Nationalists
06/17/13	Unanswered questions about how separation would affect our pensions
06/20/13	Our National Organiser, Rob, looks ahead to the National Campaign Weekend
06/22/13	One year on
06/24/13	The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let's keep it that way.
06/27/13	Signed, sealed, delivered
06/29/13	Better Together Local Leader, Cameron Stout, on the launch of Better Together Orkney
07/02/13	Steelworkers Union backs Better Together
07/03/13	Could you be part of the most important campaign in Scotland's history?
07/07/13	Club Together
07/11/13	We belong together: The case for a United Kingdom
07/17/13	Oil black hole highlights strength of pooling our resources
07/22/13	Blether Together
07/24/13	If it seems too good to be true...
07/25/13	Guidance enables charities to be part of important debate on our future
07/31/13	Our pensions and welfare system are safer and more sustainable as part of the UK
07/31/13	They will say anything and do anything
08/02/13	A sustainable Scotland, a United Kingdom
08/06/13	Local voices, big message
08/09/13	Alex Salmond is Running a Counterfeit Campaign
08/09/13	Bordering on the ridiculous
08/19/13	'Anyone who thinks the referendum is already won is making a dangerous mistake'
08/22/13	1 year until the referendum
08/22/13	It's Freshers!
08/29/13	Tell us why you think we get the best of both worlds as part of the UK.
09/01/13	Alex Salmond's currency plan "fundamentally flawed"
09/03/13	Being part of the UK allows us to maximise the North Sea's potential
09/04/13	Our economic future: greater opportunity and protection as part of the UK family
09/09/13	"I want to be part of a reforming movement which aims to improve the whole of the UK."
09/12/13	The currency question: A roundup of what the experts say

09/17/13	VIDEO: What would independence mean for our currency and mortgage rates?
09/18/13	We're not asking for the shirt off your back
09/19/13	New report evidence we benefit from the best of both worlds
10/04/13	A passport to the world
10/04/13	Taxing Questions
10/07/13	Could you be part of the most important campaign in Scotland's history?
10/08/13	Defending Scotland: stronger together
10/09/13	What the SNP haven't been telling you about tax rises, cuts & their oil fund plans
10/14/13	Time to Change the Old Tunes
10/18/13	Pooling and sharing our energy resources across the UK works for Scotland. Why put that at risk?
10/18/13	Being part of the UK allows us to make the most of North Sea oil and gas
10/19/13	The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let's keep it that way.
10/21/13	Our food & farming industries, better placed to thrive thanks to Scotland being part of a strong UK
10/21/13	James from the Great British Bake Off on why he's backing Better Together
10/24/13	The referendum is there to be won – but only if you get involved
10/25/13	Working together for global debt justice
10/28/13	Join us for the launch of Academics Together
10/29/13	Experts say big cuts or tax rises if Scotland leaves the UK
10/30/13	The facts on pensions the SNP didn't want you to see
10/31/13	Stronger, safer & more secure together
11/01/13	Devolution is delivering
11/02/13	The day I stopped supporting the SNP
11/04/13	Scotland's research and science sector thrives as part of the UK. Why put this at risk?
11/04/13	We are stronger when we work together, says GMB activist
11/07/13	Leading experts warn that the cost of mortgages could rise if Scotland separates from the UK
11/07/13	Senior academics say we are stronger and better together as part of the UK
11/08/13	Scotland's security
11/11/13	The future of shipbuilding on the Clyde
11/11/13	Scottish science and research - better as part of the UK
11/12/13	'There must be no gagging orders over independence debate in which all must have their say'

11/12/13	Academics respond to SNP Minister's attempt to silence respected Professor
11/13/13	Expose the SNP's attempt to silence critics
11/16/13	Salmond currency union 'blown out the water' by own strategy chief
11/18/13	Independence is a risk we don't need to take
11/19/13	It's official: We're better off as part of the UK
11/21/13	The people of Glasgow cannot be made to pay the price for Alex Salmond's Independence gamble
11/21/13	You can believe Alex Salmond or you can believe the people who look after your pension
11/22/13	Nairn Academy backs Better Together
11/24/13	Former Prime Minister and Chancellor, Gordon Brown slams Nationalist currency union plans
11/24/13	Contact our media team
11/24/13	Work pensions at risk with Independence - Pension Protection Fund
11/24/13	Presumption and the Price of Independence
11/26/13	Do you think Alistair Darling is in favour of a Eurozone style currency union? Read this...
11/26/13	Act on childcare now - Co-Sign working parent Stacey's letter
11/26/13	White Paper - LIVE BLOG
11/27/13	People in Scotland wanted yesterday to be about facts, but all they got was a wish list.
11/28/13	White Paper: The experts' verdict
11/28/13	Why can't Alex Salmond just tell the truth on Europe?
11/28/13	We Check The SNP's Maths
11/29/13	Salmond 'rather stupid' on currency says former advisor
11/29/13	Blair McDougall on the White Paper Week and What it Means
12/02/13	'Turning inwards would reduce chances for Scots to change the world'
12/03/13	UK's first Green Parliamentarian and Former Scottish Greens Co-Convenor backs Better Together
12/06/13	Independence Black Hole Getting Deeper
12/09/13	The Grassroots team is now recruiting
12/09/13	UK Single Market keeps costs down, say supermarket bosses
12/12/13	Experts brand White Paper a "wish list"
12/15/13	Publication of Better Together Donors
12/16/13	Leaders of Europe dismiss nationalists' EU claims
12/17/13	Former Bank of England Deputy Governor criticises 'vague' and 'unconvincing' White Paper

12/18/13	White Paper sums don't add up
12/19/13	Scotland and the UK - an international development success story
12/19/13	The only way to guarantee that we keep the Pound is to stay in the UK
12/21/13	"As a Scot I am proud of the UK's record on international development"
12/28/13	Brightest future for Scottish medical research is as part of the UK
12/29/13	Alex Salmond is spending too much public money on independence propaganda, new poll reveals
12/30/13	Your country needs you
12/31/13	Alex Salmond is promising things he can't deliver
01/02/14	SNP attack on business leader unacceptable, says Darling
01/03/14	As part of the UK we have the best of both worlds
01/03/14	Alistair Darling's New Year Message
01/04/14	Experts say we're better off together as part of the UK economy
01/05/14	Scots tell Salmond: Act on childcare now
01/06/14	Devolution remains "the settled will of the Scottish people", new poll confirms
01/09/14	Salmond default threat is "reckless in the extreme", says Darling
01/11/14	Academics call on Salmond to publish legal advice on tuition fees
01/13/14	Brightest and most secure future for Scotland's Universities is as part of the UK, say academics
01/13/14	Salmond 'misleading' public on tuition fees - Former Universities Scotland Chief
01/14/14	Salmond's reckless threats on debt risk pushing up costs for families in Scotland
01/15/14	Not for the first time...
01/17/14	No borders between our young people and opportunity
01/18/14	Pay less, get more
01/19/14	Stronger and safer together
01/20/14	Alex Salmond trying to dupe Scots on Currency, says top economist
01/21/14	What have they got to hide?
01/21/14	This Burns night, join our secret celebrity
01/21/14	Better off together & worse off apart
01/23/14	Nobody will believe what Alex Salmond has to say on fees until he reveals his legal advice
01/26/14	The UK Pound: the absent voices will not for ever be silent
01/28/14	SNP currency plans take a pounding...

01/29/14	Salmond's Pound Claims Quietly Demolished by Bank of England
01/29/14	Bank of England Governor's Speech: The Reaction
01/30/14	Nationalists ruling out currency union by default
02/01/14	FACT CHECKED: 13 of the SNP's craziest currency claims
02/03/14	Scotland's accountants warn pensions at risk with independence
02/10/14	Scots not buying Salmond's currency claims
02/10/14	More young people back Scotland's place in the UK
02/11/14	Currency uncertainty putting off investors
02/11/14	Without the pound the nationalists are left without a viable plan for independence
02/12/14	Top economist spells out the consequences of SNP's reckless threat to default on debt
02/12/14	SNP's tuition fees plan illegal, confirms EU Commission
02/12/14	The Grassroots team is now recruiting four Local Campaign Organisers
02/12/14	SNP Default Threat – What the Experts Say
02/13/14	They can't even tell us what currency we would use
02/13/14	What the experts say on the UK Pound
02/14/14	Alex Salmond is now a man without a plan
02/14/14	Nationalists admit there will be no currency union
02/14/14	This Valentine's Day don't break up with us - We love Scotland!
02/15/14	Salmond challenged on currency as his own experts suggest Plan B
02/16/14	"The wheels are falling off the independence wagon" says Darling
02/18/14	"Salmond pretending the last week never happened"- Darling
02/23/14	Being part of the UK is essential to tackle unfairness and inequality
02/23/14	EU warns of separate Scotland VAT bombshell
02/23/14	Polls confirm momentum is with campaign to keep Scotland in the UK
02/24/14	New Highlands and North East Scotland poll confirms momentum with pro-UK campaign
02/24/14	Business case for Independence doesn't stack up, new survey reveals
02/26/14	Alex Salmond must tell us Plan B on currency
02/27/14	Salmond's economic for separation in disarray says Darling
02/27/14	Alex Salmond's Independence obsession will cost jobs
02/27/14	Could you be part of the most important campaign in Scotland's history?

02/28/14	Keeping the security of the UK Pound matters
03/03/14	Independence will cost jobs in Scotland
03/04/14	New poll confirms 25 point lead for the campaign to keep Scotland in the UK
03/05/14	Experts warn SNP on unrealistic oil estimates
03/07/14	Leaving the UK would involve huge risks and job losses, say large employers
03/08/14	Happy International Women's Day!
03/09/14	Alex Salmond has turned the ballot paper into a betting slip
03/09/14	Leaving the UK would cost jobs, new business survey confirms
03/10/14	Glasgow students say we are better together
03/11/14	Alex Salmond's £1.3m taxpayer bill for the White Paper doesn't look like money well spent
03/12/14	Bank of England Governor quietly demolishes the SNP's economic case for separation – Part II
03/12/14	Leading investor George Soros says the Euro is the only viable option for a separate Scotland
03/12/14	Scottish Government figures confirm being part of the UK protects budget for schools and hospitals
03/13/14	White Paper full of "optimistic assertions", says security expert
03/14/14	More business leaders set out the benefits of being part of the UK & warn of the risks of separation
03/17/14	Those who have the least would lose the most if Scotland separates from the UK
03/18/14	6 months to play your part
03/18/14	With 6 months to go Scots face a clear choice: continuing the success of devolution or taking a risk
03/18/14	Leaving the UK would cost Scottish jobs, say business leaders
03/18/14	Even the nationalists admit Scottish employers think we're better off as part of the UK
03/20/14	Eddie Izzard launches "Scotland, please don't go" with special one-off gig
03/20/14	Budget oil forecasts show that being part of the UK protects public services in Scotland
03/20/14	Being part of the UK is good for defence jobs, say shipyard workers and employers
03/22/14	Nationalist Deception on Tuition Fees Exposed
03/24/14	Separation day in 2 years? They can't even tell us the basics
03/25/14	New poll shows momentum is with Better Together and confirms Salmond's problem with women
03/25/14	Russell must publish legal advice on fees
03/26/14	Employers say we are better and stronger together
03/27/14	Salmond's top aide backs Panama Plan
03/27/14	Being part of the UK is good for jobs and keeps costs down for Scots, new report confirms

03/27/14	Being part of the UK protects the pensions of hard working Scots
03/31/14	Scotland's youngest voters say we are stronger and better together
03/31/14	Top celebrities want Scotland to remain in the UK
04/01/14	Barrhead Travel boss says we are better together
04/02/14	Small business owner says we are better together as part of the UK
04/03/14	Another Large Employer Believes We Are Stronger and Better Together
04/05/14	Bright new Scottish comedy talent has a chance to shine at Better Together gig
04/05/14	We must win this referendum for the sake of future generations of Scots, says Darling
04/06/14	Another North Sea employer says we are better together
04/09/14	Being part of something bigger gives Scotland economic security without losing our unique identity
04/08/14	Top Treasury civil servant says currency union would not happen
04/09/14	Experts say leaving the UK would put our public services at risk
04/09/14	Lower energy bills as part of the UK
04/10/14	Campaign to keep Scotland in the UK increases lead, new poll reveals
04/11/14	New poll shows opposition to a currency union in the rest of the UK
04/11/14	Devolution is the settled will of the Scottish people, new poll confirms
04/12/14	'Whatever way you look at it we in Scotland are stronger and better together as part of the UK'
04/12/14	SNP should ditch separation and support devolution if there's a No vote in September, say Scots
04/14/14	Staying in the UK is best for defence and jobs in Scotland - Coaker
04/15/14	Defence industry jobs are best protected by remaining in the UK
04/16/14	Better Together launches 'Best of Both Worlds' advertising campaign
04/17/14	Industry experts say energy bills cheaper as part of the UK
04/17/14	We should back co-operation and partnership over division and grievance
04/20/14	If I thought independence would be good for Scotland then I would support it. But it isn't & I don't
04/22/14	Being part of the UK secures the pensions of Scots – Gordon Brown
04/24/14	Pensions more secure as part of the UK
04/24/14	Another student referendum victory for Better Together
04/26/14	More powers for Scotland: Guaranteed
04/26/14	"It's because I am Scottish that I want Scotland to stay in the UK", says Reid
04/27/14	Another trade union backs Scotland's place in the UK

04/29/14	Women in Business back the UK
05/01/14	Women know a dodgy deal when they see one, and that's exactly what Alex Salmond is offering
05/01/14	New report reveals true cost of Independence
05/02/14	Two Positive Cases
05/02/14	Better Together - Gwell Gyda'n Gilydd
05/02/14	Better Together unveils Best of Both Worlds cinema advert
05/03/14	Former Vice-Principal: Our universities get the best of both worlds
05/07/14	The majority of businesses outside of Scotland want Scotland to remain part of the UK
05/08/14	Expert slams White Paper for failing to face up to reality
05/08/14	"Scotland, Please Don't Go" say UK's big cities in Glasgow Declaration
05/09/14	Labour pledge more powers for Scotland – we can have the best of both worlds
05/09/14	New evidence shows the challenges of an ageing population are best met as part of the UK
05/11/14	New poll delivers fresh blow to Salmond
05/12/14	The facts you need
05/12/14	Overseas students highlight benefits of the UK
05/12/14	Better Together launch new Best of Both Worlds devolution animation
05/13/14	Want the facts on why we are Better Together? Here's 19 pages
05/14/14	A vote to stay in the UK is the patriotic Scottish choice
05/15/14	Experts call for Plan B on currency from the nationalists
05/17/14	Scotch Whisky industry warns of the risks of separation
05/18/14	New polls confirm Salmond's separation campaign is failing
05/19/14	Young Scots say we are stronger and better together
05/19/14	EU official confirms VAT would have to rise in a separate Scotland
05/20/14	Scotland's accountants demand answers from nationalists
05/21/14	Sharing risks so that we can all enjoy greater reward in our senior years
05/22/14	Lower cost of living as part of the UK
05/23/14	Senior scientists highlight significant benefits of the UK for Scottish medical research
05/25/14	Danish Foreign Minister confirms a separate Scotland would have to reapply to join the EU
05/26/14	Now is the time to play your part...
05/28/14	Alex Salmond's EU claims not credible, new report confirms

05/28/14	“The answer to division is to work to bring people together”- Blair McDougall
05/28/14	John Swinney must come clean on separation start up costs
05/28/14	A vote to stay in the UK is a vote to protect Scottish Schools and Hospitals
05/29/14	The Economics of Independence: sometimes it’s the funding that matters most.
05/29/14	The Economics of Independence: no match for working together.
05/29/14	The Economics of Independence: spreading the risks.
05/30/14	B&Q boss says that the brightest future for Scotland is to remain in the UK
06/01/14	BAE Chief Exec warns a vote for separation is a vote to put Scottish shipbuilding jobs at risk
06/02/14	Scottish Engineering warns of investment fears due to currency uncertainty
06/03/14	Experts say leaving the UK means reapplying to join the EU
06/03/14	Alex Salmond needs to come clean on immigration
06/04/14	Expert reports prove we are stronger and better together in the UK
06/04/14	Swedish Foreign Minister warns separation could be painful for Europe
06/04/14	We’re better off sharing welfare across the UK
06/05/14	Oil and gas investment being put at risk by referendum, new survey warns
06/05/14	President Obama calls for the UK to stay “united”
06/06/14	Young Scots say we are better and stronger together
06/07/14	Polls show Salmond needs to come clean with a Plan on currency
06/08/14	State of the Race - 100 Days to Go
06/08/14	A No vote is not a vote against Scotland - John Reid
06/09/14	The Nationalists are running out of arguments and running out of time - Darling
06/09/14	Scotland deserves the best of both worlds - that’s why we say No Thanks
06/09/14	Scots in London should speak out on independence - Darling
06/10/14	100 Towns in 100 Days – Jim Murphy
06/13/14	Scottish TV licence set to soar
06/14/14	Jim Murphy: Enough is enough with the hateful online attacks
06/15/14	Former university principals say No Thanks to the risks of leaving the UK
06/16/14	Honest John strikes again
06/16/14	Belonging Together: The Scottish case for a United Kingdom - Darling
06/16/14	More powers for Scotland guaranteed

06/17/14	Momentum is with the campaign for Scotland to stay in the UK
06/17/14	New research shows people in Scotland want the best of both worlds
06/18/14	New poll confirms increased support for Scotland staying in the UK
06/19/14	Young people back Scotland staying in the UK... again
06/22/14	The union is the most successful multinational state in the world - Ed Balls
06/22/14	Employers back Scotland's place in the UK - new survey
06/23/14	Jobs and opportunities in Scottish shipyards secured by being part of the UK
06/23/14	By saying no thanks to separation we can build on Scotland's modern day success stories
06/24/14	Being part of the UK secures the best future for Scotland's shipyards
06/25/14	Expert survey sinks SNP tuition fees policy
06/25/14	Souter drives a coach and horses through Salmond's case for separation
06/26/14	What cost independence?
06/27/14	Only by staying in the UK can we protect our UK rebate
06/30/14	Being part of the UK protects the jobs, savings and mortgages of Scots
07/01/14	Jack McConnell fights for home rule within the UK
07/01/14	Jobs and opportunities in Scottish shipyards secured by being part of the UK
07/03/14	Say No Thanks to Separation to Secure Shipbuilding Jobs in Scotland
07/04/14	Saying No Thanks Will Get The Best Deal For Our Cities
07/04/14	Farmers Are Saying No Thanks To Separation
07/04/14	Brian McConnachie: Independence is risky business
07/04/14	European Court Ruling Blows Away Nationalist Wind Farm Plans
07/05/14	Carrier naming shows why we are Better Together
07/06/14	Say No Thanks to separation to protect our NHS
07/06/14	For the sake of medical research in Scotland we should say No Thanks to separation
07/06/14	By saying No Thanks to separation Scotland's medical research can continue to thrive
07/06/14	Scotland succeeds because we are part of the UK, not despite it
07/07/14	Expert Research Exposes Nationalist Corporation Tax Plans
07/07/14	Nationalist pension proposals don't add up
07/07/14	Separation would put shipyard jobs at risk, confirms BAE boss
07/08/14	"Senior nationalists have a habit of warning-off opponents in a threatening manner" says businessman

07/08/14	Our pensions and benefits are safer with Scotland in the UK
07/09/14	Say No Thanks to secure the future of shipbuilding in Scotland
07/10/14	Being part of the UK keeps energy bills down
07/11/14	Independent oil forecasts downgraded
07/11/14	“The British NHS kept me alive” says former health minister Sam Galbraith
07/12/14	Raise a glass to a true Scottish success story.
07/12/14	Scotland’s top doctors say No Thanks to separation
07/13/14	Embarrassment For the Nationalists as Sir David Edward Says No Thanks
07/13/14	“Better Together are all momentum, the nationalists are all mouth”
07/14/14	By saying No Thanks to separation we can protect places for Scottish students
07/14/14	Scotland’s legal experts call for Plan B on currency and the EU
07/14/14	New poll confirms momentum is with the campaign to keep Scotland part of the UK
07/15/14	Being Part of the UK is the best way to secure shipyard jobs
07/15/14	Don’t pull up the ladder from our young people by separating Scotland from the UK - Ruth Davidson
07/16/14	Juncker Ends Salmond’s European Dream
07/16/14	We need you to do your bit
07/16/14	Let’s stay together
07/17/14	Alex Salmond’s NHS claims are nothing but a scare story
07/17/14	All inclusive: why the UK is better for Scottish tourism
07/18/14	A single market, securing jobs, trade and opportunities
07/18/14	Key unanswered questions bad for Scottish economy
07/18/14	Marching with pride in the UK’s LGBT record
07/19/14	The Director’s Cut – a weekly round-up from Campaign Director, Blair McDougall
07/20/14	Nationalist advisor: SNP tax plans would start a race to the bottom putting public services at risk
07/20/14	Scots say No Thanks to separation Alex Salmond’s “race to the bottom”
07/20/14	John Swinney’s latest economic assertions are nothing but a fantasy
07/21/14	A Eurozone-style currency union? The parrot is dead
07/21/14	Political legend Tony Benn hoped Scotland would remain part of the UK
07/22/14	New report shows currency and EU questions vital
07/23/14	A clash of ideas - not about where power lies, but what we do with that power - Ruth Davidson

07/23/14	Obama backs Scotland's place in the UK
07/23/14	Being part of the UK keeps energy costs down for families in Scotland
07/26/14	The Director's Cut – a weekly round-up from Campaign Director, Blair McDougall
07/26/14	Wherever you are in Scotland, get involved and do your bit
07/27/14	Say No Thanks to putting our economic future at risk
07/28/14	If we leave the UK then we leave the EU, says leading QC
07/30/14	Voting No is patriotic and pragmatic
07/30/14	Salmond currency deception slammed by experts
07/30/14	Say No Thanks to protect Scottish jobs
08/01/14	Currency and EU uncertainty make separation a risky business
08/01/14	New expert report confirms we're better off in the UK
08/02/14	Business could get on their bike if we break up the UK
08/03/14	Independence would cost thousands of jobs, defence firms confirms
08/04/14	Another small business says No Thanks to Separation
08/05/14	Follow the debate tonight here from 8pm...
08/05/14	Oil and snake oil in new SNP propaganda leaflet
08/05/14	Do you think Alistair Darling is in favour of a Eurozone style currency union? Read this...
08/06/14	Blair McDougall's live reaction to the STV referendum debate
08/06/14	Salmond takes a pounding
08/07/14	Celebrity open letter urges Scots to reject separation
08/07/14	Salmond undermined again as senior Nationalists call for separate Scottish currency
08/07/14	The Facts You Need - Prof Jim Gallagher on currency
08/08/14	Salmond Can't Keep Dodging the Question – What is Plan B?
08/09/14	The Director's Cut with Blair McDougall
08/09/14	One of Scotland's top surgeons says Scotland's NHS is better protected as part of the UK
08/09/14	More embarrassment for Alex Salmond as top nationalist star rejects his plans to break up the BBC
08/10/14	We can have the best of both worlds for Scotland
08/10/14	Pooling and sharing our resources across the UK supports those in need
08/10/14	Alex Salmond has no tenable plan for currency, says expert
08/11/14	More and more people are saying No Thanks as Salmond fails on Plan B

08/11/14	Being part of the UK secures the pensions of Scots
08/11/14	Expert evidence shows Salmond needs to name Plan B on currency now
08/12/14	A Campaign increasingly talking to itself
08/12/14	Our economy is stronger in the UK
08/12/14	Scottish Social Attitudes Survey shows that the economy is the key issue
08/12/14	UK shipyard deal protects 800 jobs in Scotland
08/12/14	VAT on our kids' clothes? No Thanks
08/13/14	Women Together celebrate the success of the 100 Letters campaign
08/13/14	Doctors say the best way to protect our NHS in Scotland is to stay in the UK
08/13/14	The stakes couldn't be any higher
08/14/14	Alex Salmond should stop the scare stories on the NHS
08/15/14	Breaking up the UK would mean cuts to our public services
08/15/14	How much more of a pounding can the SNP's economic plans take?
08/17/14	Alex Salmond is offering austerity plus in an independent Scotland
08/17/14	Make sure you, your friends and your family can all vote to say No Thanks to separation
08/18/14	Leading Scottish business figure calls for currency Plan B
08/19/14	Rural leaders back Scotland staying part of UK
08/20/14	Six key questions on currency that Scots deserve answers to
08/20/14	Separation would break up the BBC
08/21/14	Television production here is on a roll - let's keep it rolling by saying No Thanks
08/21/14	Energy expert fatally undermines Salmond's economic case for separation
08/21/14	NHS scare stories are a "total and utter lie" say top doctor
08/22/14	SNP Oil Lies
08/22/14	Alistair Darling takes up James McAvoy's Ice Bucket Challenge
08/23/14	Experts hit out at SNP NHS lies
08/23/14	SNP NHS Lies
08/23/14	Nationalist scaremongering on the NHS is a "big, huge lie".
08/24/14	The nationalists' own poll shows our NHS is more secure as part of the UK
08/25/14	The United Kingdom, Solidarity and Community - Carwyn Jones, First Minister of Wales.
08/25/14	European Court Judge demolishes SNP tuition fee policy for a separate Scotland

08/25/14	Independence risk to pensions – new poll
08/25/14	Salmond stretching the truth
08/26/14	Families will pay a price for Salmond’s debt default threat
08/26/14	Director’s Cut - Debate Reaction
08/27/14	Football legend Archie Macpherson says No Thanks to separation
08/27/14	Prof Susan Shaw says No Thanks to separation to protect world class university research
08/27/14	Yet more business leaders are saying No Thanks to separation
08/29/14	SNP Government plan for tuition fees in ruins
08/29/14	Statement from Jim Murphy on suspending his tour
08/30/14	Salmond’s currency chaos exposed
08/31/14	Being part of the UK keeps costs down for Scottish families
08/31/14	SNP defence plans “amateurish and unrealistic” says former NATO chief.
09/01/14	Say No Thanks to keep our universities world class
09/02/14	Being part of the UK is best for our families, our future and our country.
09/02/14	Families would lose most from Salmond’s debt default threat.
09/02/14	Alex Salmond’s currency chaos hits EU prospects.
09/03/14	For the sake of our families, Scots are saying No Thanks to independence
09/03/14	Independence offers nothing for the working class
09/03/14	Currency chaos would mean painful cuts to public spending, say experts.
09/04/14	White Paper fundamentally flawed on security - Sir David Omand
09/04/14	Independence wouldn’t put an end to austerity, it would make it worse
09/04/14	Disabled people up and down the UK need each other now, more than ever
09/05/14	We are stronger when we stand together
09/05/14	Independence would cost families in Scotland dear, says expert
09/06/14	SNP claims on welfare don’t add up
09/07/14	Big pension firms moving money out of Scotland over separation risks
09/07/14	Trade unions back a No vote
09/08/14	A separate Scotland could have to wait 6 years for EU membership
09/08/14	The risks of leaving the UK are “huge” says Nobel prize winner (Paul Krugman)
09/08/14	Today the costs of separation became real. (Refers to Krugman article as above)

09/08/14	The truth about the NHS and separation
09/09/14	Change is coming to Scotland with a No vote
09/09/14	B&Q boss warns of higher costs in a separate Scotland.
09/10/14	Black Wednesday: The day the economic case for separation crumbled
09/10/14	A Proud Nation
09/11/14	Seven days to make a difference
09/11/14	Reality and risk
09/11/14	Scottish Businesses say No Thanks to the risks of separation
09/11/14	Experts expose SNP NHS lies
09/11/14	With 7 days to go, we sum up today in 7 tweets
09/12/14	A number of high street banks prepare contingency plans to move out of Scotland
09/12/14	The costs of separation laid bare
09/12/14	Expert confirms 'There will be no oil bonanza'
09/12/14	Being part of the UK keeps the cost down for families in Scotland
09/12/14	Vote No to keep our NHS healthy
09/13/14	Leaving the UK would bring "severe austerity"
09/13/14	Separation could lead to increased costs, say mobile and broadband firms
09/14/14	If you don't know, vote No
09/15/14	Labour heavyweights nail SNP NHS lies
09/15/14	David Beckham joins the No team
09/15/14	The poorest would be the hardest hit by separation, says top economist
09/15/14	Former Performance Director of British Cycling backs a No vote
09/15/14	Property website warns that separation would see house prices fall
09/15/14	Aviva boss warns of public spending challenges in a separate Scotland
09/15/14	Scotland's top economists back Scotland staying in the UK
09/16/14	A letter to the Scottish Government and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders work-in veterans
09/16/14	REVEALED: Explosive leaked paper exposes SNP NHS lies
09/16/14	Is this Plan B?

The above materials can be accessed from: <http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20140915210710/http://www.bettertogether.net/>

Appendix 2.0 Yes Scotland Articles (Will we be secure?)

Date	Title
23/09/2013	Fairer pensions, tailor-made for Scotland
25/09/2013	Scotland better placed to defuse pensions time bomb
26/09/2013	Challenge to bankers' bonus cap will cost taxpayer £1m
26/09/2013	Yes to an economic recovery that benefits all
27/09/2013	Defence forces designed for Scotland - and to support our service personnel
02/10/2013	UK economy 'will thrive' after Scotland becomes independent
02/10/2013	The oil funds we could have had - and could still have
02/10/2013	Correcting Alistair Darling on oil and gas
03/10/2013	Young people next in line for Cameron's welfare cuts
04/10/2013	Balls and Darling – more scare stories but no genuine debate
06/10/2013	Yes vote can lead to a greener, more sustainable Scotland
07/10/2013	Green conference highlights range of Yes possibilities
10/10/2013	No campaign opposed to sharing energy wealth fairly
11/10/2013	Perspective: 'The benefit of equality and self-determination'
14/10/2013	Closing Westminster's £35bn tax gap
15/10/2013	Reports of US accidents show risks of Scotland's nuclear weapons
21/10/2013	The Scottish Police Federation tells politicians to be honest about Westminster cuts
22/10/2013	Growing bedroom tax arrears highlight necessity of Yes
23/10/2013	Bright future for renewables after Yes
23/10/2013	Perspective: Independence and full employment offer route out of poverty
24/10/2013	Yes vote will underline Aberdeen's status as economic powerhouse
27/10/2013	Independent Scotland can have first-class security service
29/10/2013	Making Scotland's wealth work for all
29/10/2013	Yes vote will give Scotland the chance to build an excellent security service
31/10/2013	Prison Officers trade union supports Yes campaign
31/10/2013	We can build a safer Scotland

31/10/2013	'I've lost my fear of Scottish independence'
04/11/2013	Call for the rights of disabled people to be enshrined in a written constitution
04/11/2013	Tax powers for a purpose – new report shows opportunities of a Yes vote
06/11/2013	Audio: Patrick Harvie talks about the green case for Yes
10/11/2013	Study explodes myth that Scotland is subsidised by UK
11/11/2013	Farming for Yes reacts to UK snub to Scottish farming
12/11/2013	Scottish Defence Force 'would be better and cost less'
13/11/2013	Bang goes the great unionist myth of subsidised Scotland
13/11/2013	Westminster votes to keep the Bedroom Tax opposed by Scotland
14/11/2013	Green Yes unveils vision for independent Scotland
19/11/2013	Listen: George Kerevan on the IFS report
19/11/2013	Positive choices and a better future with Yes
22/11/2013	Disarming the pensions 'time bomb' myth
22/11/2013	Spreading the benefits of wealth across all of Scotland
22/11/2013	Questions for No, as 'positive case for the Union' reaches new low
22/11/2013	Silly scare story about armed forces proved false
28/11/2013	A better deal for Scotland's farming communities
28/11/2013	'Yes best for farming, best for Scotland'
03/12/2013	Economic experts deal double blow to No campaign scaremongering
08/12/2013	Westminster pensions raid gives insight to full cost of a No vote
10/12/2013	A stronger economy with more support for small businesses' Attracting the talent to help build our prosperity
13/12/2013	More Westminster welfare cuts show why Yes is better for Scotland
16/12/2013	UK inequality is no 'myth' despite what Tories say
17/12/2013	Trident 'not an insurance policy, it's a booby trap'
18/12/2013	Imbalanced UK is fundamentally unstable and wasteful
20/12/2013	Blair Jenkins welcomes Wealthy Nation to independence debate
10/01/2014	Norwegians point the way as 'oil fund millionaires'
12/01/2014	50 questions the No campaign must answer
15/01/2014	No camp adviser sees independent Scotland's 'accelerated' EU membership as 'likely'

15/01/2014	Nicola Sturgeon challenges Westminster to accept 'common-sense' position on EU
16/01/2014	PM's refusal to debate 'bizarre' as Hague sent north
20/01/2014	Scotland can get a triple-win from tidal energy
23/01/2014	They won't erect a border. For a start, they couldn't get it to work
29/01/2014	Daily Digest: Westminster's mixed messages on currency and immigration
29/01/2014	Common sense from Carney on currency
30/01/2014	Daily Digest: exports, currency union and debates in the Lords
31/01/2014	Daily Digest: Patrick Harvie, Westminster Cuts and No campaign pushing the boundaries of fair debate - again
01/02/2014	Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's small business community
01/02/2014	'Sensible negotiations on currency will begin immediately upon independence'
03/02/2014	Financial Times analysis underlines that an independent Scotland's got what it takes
04/02/2014	Daily Digest: MoD Relying on Twitter for Intelligence and Tory Sabre-Rattling Doesn't Bode Well for a No vote
05/02/2014	Yes Scotland welcomes Bedroom Tax agreement
06/02/2014	Daily Digest: bedroom tax banished and Bob Holman backs Yes
07/02/2014	Scotland could be even richer than previously thought, say economic experts
10/02/2014	Daily Digest: Voters believe Scottish Parliament should have control of immigration policy
11/02/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland's hydro and a tale of two futures
12/02/2014	Daily Digest: They said one thing last week – but something starkly different this week
13/02/2014	Daily Digest: Henry McLeish calls Osborne's bluff
14/02/2014	Daily Digest: Osborne's posturing backfires and U-turns
17/02/2014	Daily Digest: Barosso continues with absurd comparisons and Osborne's visit not well-received
17/02/2014	Why a Sterling Area is in everyone's interests
18/02/2014	Daily Digest: Yes for Stronger Pensions and the Currency and EU threats crumble
24/02/2014	Seven in 10 North Sea oil workers back Yes, survey reveals
25/02/2014	'It is better for Scotland to manage its remaining reserves' says Academics
25/02/2014	Scotland's future should be in Scotland's hands
25/02/2014	Common sense on Scotland and the EU
27/02/2014	Scotland is a wealthy nation and will be a great place to do business
27/02/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland a good place from which to run business

27/02/2014	A Yes means a stronger Scottish economy and more jobs
28/02/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland worthy of top credit rating and British Airways CEO - Independence “positive”
01/03/2014	We've heard it all before
06/03/2014	'With a Yes vote, we can expand the community'
06/03/2014	'Hauntingly familiar ring to the No campaign's woe forecasts'
07/03/2014	Boss of UK's biggest insurance giant says referendum a matter for Scots
07/03/2014	Daily Digest: Aviva chief says referendum a matter for Scots.
07/03/2014	Perspective: The importance of International Women's Day
10/03/2014	Why we can, should and must be independent
10/03/2014	Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty – Westminster isn't working
11/03/2014	Daily Digest: TV #indyref bias to be explored and Leading economist backs shared currency after Yes
12/03/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland one of the world's wealthiest countries
13/03/2014	Daily Digest: Yes support continues to grow and Yes to fair pay
24/03/2014	Dennis Canavan answering your #indyref questions
25/03/2014	'No campaign demolishes its own argument'
25/03/2014	Former Liberal Democrat chief executive Andy Myles backs Yes
26/03/2014	Daily Digest: YouGov opinion poll boost and continuation of common research area after Yes
28/03/2014	Another leading Lib Dem says Yes is right answer for Scotland and the rest of UK
28/03/2014	There are many reasons why Lib Dems will be attracted to campaigning for Yes #sldconf
28/03/2014	Clegg can't persuade liberals to vote No. He has little chance of convincing Scotland
31/03/2014	Daily Digest: No camp's currency union crisis and shipbuilding to continue after Yes
31/03/2014	'My whole family are voting Yes - that is six former Labour voters'
01/04/2014	Only Yes can end the democratic deficit that gave us the Poll Tax and Bedroom Tax
01/04/2014	Daily Digest: Royal Mail, research funding and more currency union woes for No
02/04/2014	Daily Digest: voter registration, Muscatelli on currency, Westminster benefits cuts
24/06/2014	Only a Yes vote will give Scotland's NHS the protection it needs
05/07/2014	'If we vote Yes, Scotland can become more prosperous'
06/07/2014	Building a wealthier country
07/07/2014	Top European science advisor says Scotland's elite status will remain after Yes vote

14/07/2014	Yes Scotland says new poll shows there is everything to play for
15/07/2014	Senior former police figures declare support for a Yes vote
24/08/2014	Former Scottish Labour chairman says NHS is safe only with a Yes vote
27/08/2014	Former boss of betting giant William Hill says smart money is on voting Yes
30/08/2014	Cameron must reverse policy on Westminster farming cash grab
09/09/2014	Generation Yes sets out to win the grandparent vote
10/09/2014	UK Benefits Crisis
11/09/2014	Former RBS boss says bank announcement will have no impact on jobs in Scotland
12/09/2014	Banks' move are a credit to Yes
13/09/2014	Independent Scotland will have a successful and secure banking sector, says former Lloyds risk manager
13/09/2014	Cash-and-Carry boss dismisses supermarket scare story
13/09/2014	Generation Yes and National Collective set out to win the grandparent vote
14/09/2014	Former Lloyds risk manager dismisses scaremongering over bank jobs and investment
14/09/2014	Yes support from senior Scottish military and diplomatic figures
16/09/2014	Former police chief says a Yes vote will help secure a safer Scotland

Note:

The official archive of Yes Scotland materials sits with the National Library of Scotland.

The above materials can be accessed from: <http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20140916211421/http://www.yesscotland.net/>

Appendix 3.0 Yes Scotland Articles

Date	Title
03/12/2013	Henry McLeish criticises 'uncompromising and consistently' negative No campaign
03/12/2013	Economic experts deal double blow to No campaign scaremongering
04/12/2013	Childcare Policy in an independent Scotland: Independence for women and working families
05/12/2013	A Yes vote can deliver a better and fairer pensions system
05/12/2013	The costs of a No become clearer
06/12/2013	Top trade unionist says Yes is key to fairer, more balanced Scotland
08/12/2013	Westminster pensions raid gives insight to full cost of a No vote
09/12/2013	Crowdfunding our community campaigning
10/12/2013	Attracting the talent to help build our prosperity
10/12/2013	'A stronger economy with more support for small businesses'
11/12/2013	Mary Dejevsky - I would have voted yes to Scottish independence
11/12/2013	Think tank demolishes myths about EU membership after a Yes vote
12/12/2013	Yes Scotland welcomes Third Sector support for independence
13/12/2013	More Westminster welfare cuts show why Yes is better for Scotland
16/12/2013	UK inequality is no 'myth' despite what Tories say
17/12/2013	Trident 'not an insurance policy, it's a booby trap'
17/12/2013	Tory donations for No campaign should be wake up call for Labour supporters
17/12/2013	Perspective: We can change things for the better
18/12/2013	Imbalanced UK is fundamentally unstable and wasteful
18/12/2013	Only a Yes can deliver economic transformation
20/12/2013	Blair Jenkins welcomes Wealthy Nation to independence debate
20/12/2013	We can empower Scotland's workers by Working Together after a Yes vote
21/12/2013	No campaign admits a No vote is a vote against Scotland's interests
23/12/2013	No campaign plans relaunch, but will never trump Yes
29/12/2013	Yes vote can deliver real improvements to lives of working people
29/12/2013	Yes continues on winning path as No camp in-fighting escalates

30/12/2013	2014: However you say it, say Yes to a better Scotland
31/12/2013	2014 is the Year of Yes - and can also be the Year of Yes Labour
31/12/2013	Your Year of Yes resolutions
03/01/2014	Thatcher's secret plan to slash millions from Scots budget
05/01/2014	Former Labour council chief is latest high-profile figure to say Yes
05/01/2014	More evidence of Westminster acting against interests of Scotland
06/01/2014	Only a Yes vote will meet demands for more powers
06/01/2014	Nicola Sturgeon questions likelihood of additional powers after No vote
06/01/2014	'2014 is the year of hard truths' for the UK – and for the No campaign
07/01/2014	More hard questions about a No vote
08/01/2014	Former BBC journalist demands greater scrutiny of No campaign
09/01/2014	If Cameron isn't right to debate Scotland, why is he right to govern Scotland?
10/01/2014	Norwegians point the way as 'oil fund millionaires'
10/01/2014	Scottish farmers' support for independence grows
12/01/2014	Survey underlines why an independent Scotland has got what it takes
12/01/2014	50 questions the No campaign must answer
13/01/2014	Yes Scotland hails 'common sense' UK Treasury debt decision
15/01/2014	No camp adviser sees independent Scotland's 'accelerated' EU membership as 'likely'
15/01/2014	Nicola Sturgeon challenges Westminster to accept 'common-sense' position on EU
15/01/2014	School #indyref debate produces spectacular swing to Yes
16/01/2014	PM's refusal to debate 'bizarre' as Hague sent north
16/01/2014	Perspective: Independence means that people of Scotland would get the governments they vote for
16/01/2014	Every local #indyref debate producing a swing to Yes Scotland
17/01/2014	False barriers to independence will vanish after a Yes vote
20/01/2014	Scotland can get a triple-win from tidal energy
21/01/2014	'If this is the way the UK is really heading, I would rather get out'
21/01/2014	Yes Scotland - Response to Social Attitudes Survey
23/01/2014	They won't erect a border. For a start, they couldn't get it to work
23/01/2014	This is the Year of Yes: 2016 can be the Year of Labour

24/01/2014	River City star says Yes to independence
24/01/2014	Yes Daily Digest: Traditional values of social justice
24/01/2014	Yes is a vote to empower the people of Scotland
25/01/2014	'Yes puts women in the driving seat of our own destiny'
26/01/2014	Poll shows Yes is gathering pace and momentum
26/01/2014	The Scotsman: Yes campaign playing the long game
27/01/2014	Daily Digest: A choice of two futures
28/01/2014	Hamish Macdonell: 'Yes campaign right back in the hunt'
28/01/2014	Daily Digest: 'We need a recovery that benefits all'
29/01/2014	Daily Digest: Westminster's mixed messages on currency and immigration
29/01/2014	Common sense from Carney on currency
30/01/2014	Scottish trade unions stay secure from Westminster's attack
30/01/2014	Daily Digest: exports, currency union and debates in the Lords
31/01/2014	Daily Digest: Patrick Harvie, Westminster Cuts and No campaign pushing the boundaries of fair debate - again
01/02/2014	Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's small business community
01/02/2014	'Sensible negotiations on currency will begin immediately upon independence'
03/02/2014	Yes Edinburgh Super Saturday
03/02/2014	Daily Digest: No campaign empty promises and Spain 'won't interfere' in referendum
03/02/2014	Financial Times analysis underlines that an independent Scotland's got what it takes
04/02/2014	Daily Digest: MoD Relying on Twitter for Intelligence and Tory Sabre-Rattling Doesn't Bode Well for a No vote
05/02/2014	Yes campaigners appeal to the 'Missing Million' to register for #indyref vote
05/02/2014	Daily Digest: Signing up the Missing Million and Scotland Working to End Bedroom Tax
05/02/2014	Yes Scotland welcomes Bedroom Tax agreement
06/02/2014	Massie: Victory is within reach of the Yes campaign
06/02/2014	Committed Labour Party member backs independence to reduce poverty gap
06/02/2014	Daily Digest: bedroom tax banished and Bob Holman backs Yes
06/02/2014	Why a Yes vote is good for Scotland's trade unions and working people
06/02/2014	Glasgow's No campaign adopt cowering Cameron's approach to debates
07/02/2014	Scotland could be even richer than previously thought, say economic experts

07/02/2014	Daily Digest: David Cameron, Bedroom Tax arrears & No's negativity
07/02/2014	A Yes vote is the route to more job security and better living standards
09/02/2014	Scottish Parliament campaigner remains sceptical of further devolution
09/02/2014	Yes Scotland response to trio of polls
10/02/2014	Daily Digest: Voters believe Scottish Parliament should have control of immigration policy
11/02/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland's hydro and a tale of two futures
12/02/2014	Daily Digest: They said one thing last week – but something starkly different this week
13/02/2014	Daily Digest: Henry McLeish calls Osborne's bluff
13/02/2014	Silent Auction - Give the gift of Yes this Valentine's Day
14/02/2014	Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's young people
14/02/2014	Daily Digest: Osborne's posturing backfires and U-turns
16/02/2014	Only with a Yes vote can Scots feel the full benefit of our vast wealth
16/02/2014	Massive credibility gap in the Commissioner's comments
16/02/2014	Yes Scotland response to the Baroness Jay
17/02/2014	Free higher education can be secured only with independence, say Academics for Yes
17/02/2014	Daily Digest: Barosso continues with absurd comparisons and Osborne's visit not well-received
17/02/2014	Why a Sterling Area is in everyone's interests
18/02/2014	Only way to get the powers most Scots want is with a Yes vote
18/02/2014	Daily Digest: Yes for Stronger Pensions and the Currency and EU threats crumble
18/02/2014	Scotland's strong economy is another reason why Yes is the right choice
19/02/2014	Yes Scotland hails union branch backing for independence
20/02/2014	Yes Scotland welcomes polls showing #indyref gap is narrowing
20/02/2014	Daily Digest: Opinion poll boost and Alexander has no answers on inequality
20/02/2014	The No camp's status quo is no longer a viable option
21/02/2014	Daily Digest: Trade Union members 'more attracted' to Yes and More doubts about more powers if there is a No
21/02/2014	Yes Scotland continues to triumph in #indyref social media battle
22/02/2014	Sturgeon to address PCS union consultative conference
22/02/2014	Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's pensioners
23/02/2014	Yes Scotland welcomes union's decision to reject No campaign

23/02/2014	Polls show that Yes is winning the arguments
24/02/2014	Recent polls chart a steady direction towards growing Yes
24/02/2014	Voters believe #indyref result be closer than polls currently suggest
24/02/2014	Daily Digest: No campaign playing a bad hand today and Momentum remains with Yes
24/02/2014	Seven in 10 North Sea oil workers back Yes, survey reveals
25/02/2014	'It is better for Scotland to manage its remaining reserves' says Academics
25/02/2014	Daily Digest: Commons sense from Cameron on EU and National Insurance the next Tory target
25/02/2014	Scotland can be a successful, independent country
25/02/2014	Scotland's future should be in Scotland's hands
25/02/2014	Common sense on Scotland and the EU
26/02/2014	Daily Digest: A fairer Scotland and a fairer nation
26/02/2014	Business figures ramp up the pressure on No
27/02/2014	Scotland is a wealthy nation and will be a great place to do business
27/02/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland a good place from which to run business
27/02/2014	A Yes means a stronger Scottish economy and more jobs
27/02/2014	Yes for a better standard of life
27/02/2014	The economic strengths of an independent Scotland
28/02/2014	Another Labour stalwart declares support for Yes
28/02/2014	British Airways Boss sees benefits of Yes vote in #indyref
28/02/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland worthy of top credit rating and British Airways CEO - Independence "positive"
28/02/2014	Common sense on currency
05/03/2014	'My Scotland. My future. The future of my children and my children's children'
06/03/2014	We still need more women's voices being heard
06/03/2014	Daily Digest: Putting citizens at the heart of the debate and Osborne 'not serious on currency'
06/03/2014	'With a Yes vote, we can expand the community'
06/03/2014	'Hauntingly familiar ring to the No campaign's woe forecasts'
07/03/2014	A Yes vote allows us to 'do what's right for older Scots'
07/03/2014	Boss of UK's biggest insurance giant says referendum a matter for Scots
07/03/2014	Perspective: I am excited at the prospect of what an independent Scotland can do

07/03/2014	Why a Yes vote is the key to a better and fairer deal for women in Scotland
07/03/2014	Daily Digest: Aviva chief says referendum a matter for Scots.
07/03/2014	Perspective: A vote for independence is a vote for women
07/03/2014	Perspective: Female involvement is vital in all aspects of this debate
07/03/2014	Perspective: A country where we can look after all of the people, all of the time
07/03/2014	Perspective: The importance of International Women's Day
08/03/2014	Perspective: 'The UK is certainly not OK for many women'
09/03/2014	'A campaign based almost entirely on fear has lost the argument'
09/03/2014	Westminster austerity offers Scotland's children a bleak future
10/03/2014	Why we can, should and must be independent
10/03/2014	Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty – Westminster isn't working
10/03/2014	A Yes vote is the way to achieve tax and welfare powers Scotland needs
11/03/2014	Daily Digest: TV #indyref bias to be explored and Leading economist backs shared currency after Yes
12/03/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland one of the world's wealthiest countries
12/03/2014	GERS: Scotland's got firm financial foundations to be a successful independent state
12/03/2014	Yes Scotland chalks up student vote win in the heart of Glasgow
13/03/2014	New poll shows 'Project Fear' is failing as support for Yes continues to rise
13/03/2014	Daily Digest: Yes support continues to grow and Yes to fair pay
13/03/2014	French politicians say Oui to Scotland's EU membership
13/03/2014	Scottish poverty report reveals cost of voting No
14/03/2014	Tories kicking further devolution into the long grass
14/03/2014	Daily Digest: Cameron back in Scotland and Survey finds independence could boost tourism in Scotland
14/03/2014	Scotland is a backseat passenger in the Union
14/03/2014	'No' chiefs start to shift towards Yes
14/03/2014	Cameron's speech exposes 'more powers' for Scotland as a sham
15/03/2014	Momentum continues to build for Yes with two more debate wins
16/03/2014	Judo champ Connie throws her weight behind the Yes campaign
16/03/2014	Stars of TV, film and stage back a Yes vote in #indyref
16/03/2014	Westminster's whirlwind of fear has failed

17/03/2014	Daily Digest: MoD wants to dump more waste into the Clyde and Charles Kennedy calls for No to be less negative
17/03/2014	Yes welcomes plea for No to drop negativity, but fears it will go unheeded
17/03/2014	Only a Yes vote guarantees the powers people want and Scotland needs
18/03/2014	Yes movement has grown arms and legs
18/03/2014	We've been building the biggest grassroots movement in Scottish history
18/03/2014	Daily Digest: 6 months to Yes and Labour's promises fall short
18/03/2014	With six months to go, it's vital to stay focused on the big picture of Yes
18/03/2014	As Labour retreats on more powers now is the time to join Yes, says Jenkins
18/03/2014	Labour's biggest donor Unite refuses to endorse the No campaign
19/03/2014	Yes Scotland polling numbers are on the increase - and so is the coffee intake
19/03/2014	Daily Digest: Reaction to Labour leadership's devolution fudge and Reflections on 6 months to go
19/03/2014	Actor Brian Cox appeals to America to support a Yes vote
19/03/2014	Yes Scotland is winning battle of engagement over No campaign
20/03/2014	New poll shows Yes continues to close the gap on No and is on a winning path
20/03/2014	Independent analysis demolishes Labour leadership's 'more powers' figures
20/03/2014	Daily Digest: Another opinion poll shows Yes support rising and Osborne's budget for Tories
20/03/2014	Women for Independence welcome Carol Fox
21/03/2014	Former Labour chairman appeals to party colleagues to join him in backing Yes
21/03/2014	Daily Digest: Talks taking place on post-independence intelligence and security
21/03/2014	Perspective: Labour's prospects in an independent Scotland would be very strong indeed
21/03/2014	Only a Yes vote can create the equality that Westminster has failed to deliver
21/03/2014	Next chief executive says independence not a 'business issue'
23/03/2014	ICM poll confirms 'more and more people are moving to Yes'
23/03/2014	Income tax proposals dropped after Balls intervention
23/03/2014	Osborne's opposition to currency union 'conjecture and fantasy'
23/03/2014	Yes wins Shetland debate on Scottish Secretary's home turf
24/03/2014	Dennis Canavan answering your #indyref questions
24/03/2014	Allan Grogan: 'Independence could lead to the fair Scotland Labour has always stood for'
24/03/2014	Daily Digest: Another opinion poll shows momentum with Yes and EU membership common sense

24/03/2014	'No campaign demolishes its own argument'
25/03/2014	Monthly poll of polls shows gap halved since November
25/03/2014	Former Liberal Democrat chief executive Andy Myles backs Yes
25/03/2014	Scots TV star Freya Mavor is backing Yes in the #indyref
25/03/2014	Daily Digest: "Don't believe defence scares" says expert and Job losses at Royal Mail
26/03/2014	New poll shows Yes continues to close the gap on No
26/03/2014	Brian Cox Responds to Eddie Izzard
26/03/2014	Daily Digest: YouGov opinion poll boost and continuation of common research area after Yes
26/03/2014	Common sense on shared energy market and research areas
27/03/2014	Daily Digest: Osborne's bluff called on currency – No's negative messaging continues to grate
28/03/2014	Another leading Lib Dem says Yes is right answer for Scotland and the rest of UK
28/03/2014	Daily Digest: Scotland's renewables can blossom and Westminster's complicated tax system isn't working
28/03/2014	Joan Burnie leaves Daily Record with Yes message
28/03/2014	There are many reasons why Lib Dems will be attracted to campaigning for Yes #sldconf
28/03/2014	Yes is the start of great things for Scotland's young people
28/03/2014	I cannot wait to go to the polling station bright and early on the 18th September 2014
28/03/2014	Clegg can't persuade liberals to vote No. He has little chance of convincing Scotland
28/03/2014	Graeme, 22, student: Why I'm voting Yes
28/03/2014	A good week for Yes at debates
29/03/2014	Young people should grab independence with both hands
29/03/2014	Generation Yes: Largest youth and student movement in Scotland launches
30/03/2014	Why the Dowager Duchess of Hamilton will be voting Yes
31/03/2014	Daily Digest: No camp's currency union crisis and shipbuilding to continue after Yes
31/03/2014	'My whole family are voting Yes - that is six former Labour voters'
01/04/2014	Only Yes can end the democratic deficit that gave us the Poll Tax and Bedroom Tax
01/04/2014	Daily Digest: Royal Mail, research funding and more currency union woes for No
02/04/2014	Perspective: Colin Fox on the socialist case for Yes
02/04/2014	Daily Digest: voter registration, Muscatelli on currency, Westminster benefits cuts
03/04/2014	Scotland's world renowned universities will thrive after Yes vote

03/04/2014	DailyDigest: No vote EU risk, Yes will bring workplace improvements
03/04/2014	Business as usual for Sky and Waitrose after Yes vote
04/04/2014	Daily Digest: Oil jobs boom, childcare and Sky
04/04/2014	Margo MacDonald MSP
05/04/2014	Trident, Nuclear Disarmament and Scottish Independence
06/04/2014	Panelbase: Highest support for Yes so far in #indyref campaign
06/04/2014	Fetlar-born Louise Thomason: I'll be voting Yes in September, but I wasn't always going to.
07/04/2014	Daily Digest: Greens launch ideas and Energy report details plans for common energy market after Yes
07/04/2014	The Internationalist Case for Scottish Independence
08/04/2014	Glasgow Clyde students back Yes in #indyref Vote
08/04/2014	Daily Digest: Worst of welfare cuts still to come and Lord George Robertson's rattled ramblings
08/04/2014	Former Labour councillors join growing numbers moving to Yes
09/04/2014	Daily Digest: Lord Robertson receives frosty reception and Irish visit shows the way ahead
09/04/2014	Making our energy resources work for all of Scotland
09/04/2014	Scottish independence will open more self-development opportunities for Poles
10/04/2014	Yes for stronger local democracy – and the opportunity to transform Scotland
10/04/2014	Daily Digest: Friends of the Earth attack Westminster nuclear subsidies and Onshore renewables also threatened
10/04/2014	New Poll: Yes 47% - Strong majority would vote Yes in #indyref if better off
11/04/2014	#YouYesYet are mobilising our generation
11/04/2014	Blair Jenkins to deliver guest speech at SNP conference
12/04/2014	Former Scotland manager calls for Cameron v Salmond debate
12/04/2014	World voices tell Scotland to 'go for it'
13/04/2014	Edinburgh's Asian community to hear case for Yes
13/04/2014	Yes vote increases with prospect of Tory and Labour general election victory
13/04/2014	Scots trade unions shackled by Westminster
14/04/2014	Daily Digest: Westminster's currency bluff has crumbled and "Murkier and more offensive" No campaign scare stories
14/04/2014	Top Labour official is backing independence
15/04/2014	Daily Digest: David Cameron will resign if Scotland votes Yes
15/04/2014	Busy time for Trade Unionists for Yes at STUC Congress

16/04/2014	Overwhelming majority want more positive campaign from 'No' - poll
16/04/2014	Soaring foodbank use “the tip of the iceberg in terms of UK food poverty”
16/04/2014	Scottish foreign policy will see world through a more ‘ethical lens’
16/04/2014	Green Yes – “Digital Rights Are Civil Rights”
17/04/2014	Daily Digest: Yes to help our universities attract top talent and Expert explains energy bill bonus with Yes
18/04/2014	STUC sets priorities as Yes momentum builds in Scotland’s trade union movement
19/04/2014	Why I'll move to Scotland after I graduate if it votes yes
20/04/2014	Polls shows highest support for Yes so far
20/04/2014	New poster shows we CAN be a thriving independent country
20/04/2014	Yes Scotland asks No campaign to detail guaranteed new powers
21/04/2014	Carolyn Leckie: 'Bercow has exposed culture of sexism at Westminster'
21/04/2014	Daily Digest: Momentum continues to build towards “Yes”
22/04/2014	Daily Digest: Britain is sleepwalking towards a retirement timebomb
22/04/2014	Julie Fowles: A once in a lifetime opportunity - Scotland's #IndyRef
23/04/2014	The patron saint of optimism
23/04/2014	Glasgow's #BigIndyDebate says Yes
23/04/2014	From Scunthorpe Conservative to Yes campaigner
23/04/2014	Daily Digest: St. George's Day, Gordon Brown and more CBI resignations
24/04/2014	Perspective: Yes is an opportunity to better manage Scotland's resources
24/04/2014	Daily Digest: Welfare scare stories, High-Speed Rail study and Welsh Barnett funding
24/04/2014	Yes supporter gets on bike to cycle from Rome to home
24/04/2014	Canavan challenges Brown to independence debate
25/04/2014	Labour activists launch site about Labour in an independent Scotland
25/04/2014	Daily Digest: Labour after Indy, Small Nations and Remembering Margo
27/04/2014	Rebus actor Ken Stott declares support for Yes
28/04/2014	Daily Digest: More negative responses and ‘A Scotland without Poverty’
29/04/2014	Mums for Change launch campaign for a Yes vote in #indyref
30/04/2014	Daily Digest: Westminster caught out again and UK currency position untenable
30/04/2014	Academics for Yes welcomes university research proposals

01/05/2014	Poll of polls reveals steady rise in support for Yes vote in #indyref
01/05/2014	Daily Digest: Yes supporters more likely to vote in #indyref
01/05/2014	Yes voters more likely to vote in referendum, says latest attitudes survey
01/05/2014	Perspective: 'Scottish Independence would boost solidarity'
01/05/2014	Five green gains of Scotland's independence
04/05/2014	Why a Yes vote will put a spring in our nation's step.
04/05/2014	Sunday Herald declares support for a Yes vote
04/05/2014	Why independence can make Scotland a healthier and more confident country
05/05/2014	Daily Digest: Sunday Herald says Yes and Prime Minister happy to debate on TV – but not Scotland
06/05/2014	'Real threat to research in Scotland's universities is the Union'
06/05/2014	Daily Digest: More criticism of No negativity and Academics anticipate thriving research base after Yes
07/05/2014	Daily Digest: UK government paper misleading - and child poverty continues to soar
07/05/2014	Daily Digest: State Pensions will be paid in an independent Scotland and Cameron “toxic” for No campaign
07/05/2014	With a Yes vote we can use Scotland's wealth to halt the scandal of child poverty
08/05/2014	Daily Digest: Don't believe Westminster promises
09/05/2014	BT to stay in Scotland after independence
09/05/2014	Daily Digest: Westminster's cost of living crisis laid bare and Miliband first to offer “Jam Tomorrow”
09/05/2014	It's time to take control and determine our future in Europe ourselves
10/05/2014	No campaign organiser defects to Yes
11/05/2014	Yes Scotland publishes details of campaign donations
11/05/2014	How Westminster has mismanaged Scotland's oil wealth
11/05/2014	Yes Scotland welcomes support from chief devolution architect
12/05/2014	Scotland's pensioners losing out
12/05/2014	A Yes vote allows us to do what's right for older Scots
13/05/2014	Pensioners 'let down time and time again by Westminster'
13/05/2014	Irish for Yes group launches
13/05/2014	Daily Digest: Tories ahead in the polls and London dominance being felt across the UK
14/05/2014	New poll shows gap between Yes and No slashed to single figures
14/05/2014	Daily Digest: Referendum there to be won and Standard Life myths scotched

15/05/2014	Stars of sport say Yes to an independent Scotland
15/05/2014	Perspective: 'Fight for equality at Westminster moving at pace of a bad sludge metal band'
15/05/2014	'Scotland's fishing industry has suffered terribly under successive UK Governments'
15/05/2014	Daily Digest: Osborne upsets, Inequality laid bare, and Cameron in Scotland
16/05/2014	Rival cup final fans show their solidarity for a Yes
16/05/2014	Daily Digest: Cameron's 'jam tomorrow' promises & common sense on currency
16/05/2014	ONS highlights massive wealth gap and growing North/South divide
18/05/2014	Panelbase poll finds undecided voters leaning to Yes
18/05/2014	Labour and Lib Dem MEPs confirm independent Scotland's place in EU
19/05/2014	Daily Digest: No campaign MEPs admit common sense position on EU membership; Clegg latest to promise "Jam Tomorrow"
19/05/2014	Top TV chef adds spice to referendum campaign
19/05/2014	Scotland's young people have the most to gain from a Yes vote
20/05/2014	Perspective: Scotland can save the last of what made Britain great
20/05/2014	Daily Digest: Wages lag behind rising living costs once again; UK tax gap estimated at around £40 billion
21/05/2014	Generation Yes call on school leavers to examine the case for Yes
21/05/2014	A Yes means more and better jobs closer to home
21/05/2014	Daily Digest: Evidence to Holyrood, 2014 v 2016, and more 'jam tomorrow'
22/05/2014	Daily Digest: Darling's involvement in currency and Privatised Royal Mail threatening universal service
22/05/2014	Scotland will see clearer priorities for its people without Westminster
23/05/2014	Third Sector poll, broken Westminster, academics rebuff funding concerns
23/05/2014	Third Sector poll shows overwhelming support for a Yes vote
25/05/2014	Darling urged to lift the secrecy on talks with Treasury chief
25/05/2014	Only a Yes vote can protect Scotland's health service from cuts threat
25/05/2014	Independence is an opportunity to create a better Scotland.
26/05/2014	NHS for Yes, another No myth debunked and EU elections
27/05/2014	Perspective: 'With Westminster, gap between rich and poor can only widen'
27/05/2014	Scotland's extraordinary potential and closing the attainment gap
27/05/2014	Perspective: 'Look at Norway and stop worrying!'

31/05/2014	Let's make Scotland's wealth work better for people living here
01/06/2014	'Scotland would be better represented by our own people, our own government, our own choices'
02/06/2014	16 things you need to know about Scotland's economy
03/06/2014	The Yes side in this debate has a vision of a better future for the people of Scotland
03/06/2014	Firm foundations for a more successful Scotland
03/06/2014	Alex Salmond: A vision of a better future for the people of Scotland with Yes
03/06/2014	Yes Scotland's response to Gordon Brown and Johann Lamont's United With Labour rally
04/06/2014	A Yes vote is best way for Scottish Labour voters to show solidarity with England
06/06/2014	We can maximise our children's potential by giving them a head start
06/06/2014	I have to ask myself, are we really better together?
06/06/2014	Audrey Birt - I believe we can do it, if we are willing to put the work in.
06/06/2014	Rock guitarist adds to string of Yes declarations
06/06/2014	Yes Scotland welcomes endorsement from sitting Labour MP
08/06/2014	Taggart star Alex Norton backs a Yes vote
08/06/2014	Leading Labour figure Anum Qaisar backs a Yes vote
09/06/2014	100 days to go for a chance to build a better, fairer, more prosperous Scotland
09/06/2014	Poll shows Yes Scotland is running the most effective campaign
09/06/2014	With 100 days to go Yes is on course for success as Declaration signatures near 800,000
10/06/2014	Independence promises a better future
10/06/2014	More high school debate wins for Yes
10/06/2014	100 days to go and 100 years apart
11/06/2014	Senior Labour Party official backs Yes
11/06/2014	The campaign for Scottish independence has reached new heights - the roof of Africa.
12/06/2014	Poll shows Yes vote is within reach as gap continues to narrow
12/06/2014	Yes will start a race to the top on wages
13/06/2014	Poll success as a majority of young people say Yes
13/06/2014	A Yes vote can revitalise Scotland's industry
13/06/2014	Briefing: Yes to better support for our carers
14/06/2014	The only word on my lips on September 18 will be Yes, says River City star

15/06/2014	Yes support climbs to campaign high
15/06/2014	Former STUC president and leading Labour figure declares support for Yes
15/06/2014	Cameron McNeish: Why I'm voting Yes
16/06/2014	Quebec experience says Scots will 'pay a price' after No vote
16/06/2014	Making our island wealth work better for our island communities
16/06/2014	The people will be sovereign
17/06/2014	Young people will be better off with a Yes
17/06/2014	'Young people have the most to gain from independence'
18/06/2014	Six in 10 people trust Holyrood more than Westminster to make best decisions for Scotland - poll
18/06/2014	The power to close the wealth gap should be in Scotland's hands
18/06/2014	Equal Pay: Poll highlights #indyref Opportunity
18/06/2014	Rural Scotland is best served by a Yes Vote
22/06/2014	Athletics icon Cameron Sharp supports Yes
23/06/2014	Independence is key to a fairer, equal and more democratic Scotland, say Lawyers for Yes
23/06/2014	Another myth debunked - No campaign's latest claims on set-up costs "bizarrely inaccurate"
23/06/2014	Blueprint draws on best in the world to double Scotland's economic wealth
23/06/2014	The Spirit of Yes
23/06/2014	"Scotland Means Business" strategy is right to set ambitious targets for Scotland
24/06/2014	First Minister joins young farmers in push for Yes vote
24/06/2014	Labour could use full powers to give our generation job security
24/06/2014	A plan to create more jobs and opportunities
24/06/2014	Only third of Scots trust Westminster parties to deliver more powers
24/06/2014	Academics for Yes dismisses scare stories on medical research
24/06/2014	Only a Yes vote will give Scotland's NHS the protection it needs
24/06/2014	Independence 'only way to address ever-widening wealth gap'
25/06/2014	Veteran broadcaster John Duncanson campaigns for Yes vote
25/06/2014	Braveheart stars stage support for Independence
25/06/2014	Gains of Yes for hard-pressed households
25/06/2014	New report shows need for a Yes vote to tackle Scotland's wealth inequality

25/06/2014	Nearly a quarter of people more likely to vote Yes because of UKIP
26/06/2014	Seafood company boss takes the Yes message on the road
26/06/2014	We share this unique opportunity to make Scotland an even better place to live
26/06/2014	Only way to get equal status and sovereignty is with a Yes vote
26/06/2014	A Yes vote will enhance the social union across the British Isles
27/06/2014	More and more Labour supporters moving to Yes
27/06/2014	Yes Labour supporters challenge Ed Miliband to independence debate
27/06/2014	Major boost as Unison representatives sign declaration of support for independence
27/06/2014	Boss of Scotland's top women's football team says Yes
27/06/2014	Balls up for the No campaign
28/06/2014	A plan to reindustrialise Scotland
29/06/2014	Unison reps sign declaration of support for independence
30/06/2014	Scotland to deliver greater financial security for people and families
30/06/2014	A Yes vote is essential so we have powers to deliver greater financial security
01/07/2014	Appalling child poverty figures show why we need Scotland's wealth in Scotland's hands
01/07/2014	Senior citizens champion marks 15th birthday of Scottish Parliament by declaring for Yes
02/07/2014	Scotland's continuing EU membership after a Yes vote.
02/07/2014	Vote Yes for bairns, not bombs
02/07/2014	Firefighters for Yes join the growing Yes movement
03/07/2014	A plan to end austerity
03/07/2014	Yes for fair pay and an end to austerity cuts
03/07/2014	Rampant privatisation of NHS in England is key reason to vote Yes
04/07/2014	A plan to make Scotland's economy grow
04/07/2014	'I'm voting for a country, not a party or its leaders'
04/07/2014	The austerity of No or prosperity of Yes - the stark choice facing voters in referendum vote
05/07/2014	46 ways to create more and better jobs
05/07/2014	'If we vote Yes, Scotland can become more prosperous'
06/07/2014	Former Labour government minister declares for Yes
06/07/2014	The hills are alive with the sight of Yes

06/07/2014	Building a wealthier country
06/07/2014	Outlander actor Sam Heughan backs a Yes vote
06/07/2014	The only way to guarantee the powers Scotland wants and needs is with a Yes vote
06/07/2014	Cream of Scotland's literary community gather to say why they are voting Yes
07/07/2014	Even Westminster agrees that pensions are secure with a Yes vote
07/07/2014	Expert report highlights an independent Scotland's 'uninterrupted' EU membership
07/07/2014	Academics for Yes welcome statement by Glasgow University principal
07/07/2014	Top European science advisor says Scotland's elite status will remain after Yes vote
08/07/2014	Perspective: With Yes, we can work to create a fairer and more inclusive Scotland for us all.
08/07/2014	Westminster's austerity obsession is harming people
08/07/2014	Yes Scotland responds to No campaign pensions paper
08/07/2014	Yes Scotland response to the Electoral Commission donations publication
09/07/2014	NHS Scotland - Westminster controls the purse strings
09/07/2014	Senior Labour member back Yes for Scotland's workers
10/07/2014	A Yes vote can help tackle fuel poverty in Scotland
10/07/2014	Yes from distinguished academic and former Royal Society president
10/07/2014	Oui picnic in the park organised by French for Yes on Bastille Day
10/07/2014	Support for Yes rises to new high in Survation poll
11/07/2014	What Yes means for older people
11/07/2014	Voting Yes for Scotland's families
13/07/2014	Yes Scotland says new poll shows there is everything to play for
13/07/2014	Vote Yes for fairness and prosperity – Plaid ex-Leader
14/07/2014	Asian business tycoon signs up for Yes
14/07/2014	Making the most of rural Scotland's vast potential with a Yes
14/07/2014	Yes Scotland donor sees great potential after independence
14/07/2014	Yes Scotland says new poll shows there is everything to play for
15/07/2014	A Yes vote for prosperity and an end to Westminster austerity
16/07/2014	Scotland has rejected the industrial privatisation of the health service
16/07/2014	New economic opportunities with a Yes

16/07/2014	Scotland's economy has grown to record levels
17/07/2014	Only a Yes vote can ensure our NHS remains fully protected
17/07/2014	Membership drive success leads to launch of Yes Thornhill group
17/07/2014	Former Labour defence minister backs a Yes vote
18/07/2014	Highest Yes rating in TNS referendum poll
18/07/2014	Growing Labour movement who want to see an independent Scotland
18/07/2014	Scotland's LGBT communities have much to gain from a Yes vote
18/07/2014	Poll of polls shows Yes continues to close the gap as independence vote draws closer
18/07/2014	'You don't have to choose between voting Yes and voting Labour; you can do both'
19/07/2014	Val McDermid and Richard Holloway add to growing support for Yes
20/07/2014	Ending austerity with a Yes can support 30,000 jobs and stronger public services
20/07/2014	Welcome for view that Yes could be 'very positive' for Scotland's health
21/07/2014	A Yes vote is the chance of a lifetime for Labour voters, says Sturgeon
21/07/2014	Scotland's shipyards have a bright future – after a Yes vote
21/07/2014	Edinburgh Festival Fringe goes #indyref
21/07/2014	Independence – the business opportunity of a lifetime for Scotland's small businesses
22/07/2014	Welsh support for Yes welcomed by independence campaign
22/07/2014	Edinburgh's first female Lord Provost declares for Yes
24/07/2014	Yes Scotland endorsed by Pride Glasgow Chief Executive
25/07/2014	Yes vote is 'the key to tackling poverty'
27/07/2014	River City star moving back to Scotland to join campaign for independence
27/07/2014	Support for Yes is solid - a swing of just four points will put Yes ahead
27/07/2014	William McIvanney and Frank Skinner voice support for a Yes vote
28/07/2014	Carmichael undermines claims of more powers for Scottish Parliament
28/07/2014	What do young people have to gain from a Yes vote?
29/07/2014	NHS for Yes responds to Andy Burnham privatisation speech
29/07/2014	A Yes means a joined up energy policy
29/07/2014	Scotland's fishing industry will thrive with a Yes vote
30/07/2014	50 mums call for Yes vote for fairer Scotland

30/07/2014	A Yes means real gains for Scotland's people – but it's our NHS that will see the biggest cost if it's a No
31/07/2014	Canavan appeals to Scotland's 'missing million' - make sure you vote to protect our NHS
06/08/2014	ICM snap poll shows Yes support boosted by debate - up to 47%
06/08/2014	New report highlight Scotland's business opportunity of a lifetime
06/08/2014	Vote Yes to scrap Trident
06/08/2014	Another prominent Liberal Democrat joins Yes campaign
07/08/2014	One Opportunity - to use our wealth for Scotland
07/08/2014	A reply to the No campaign's celebrities
08/08/2014	Former No campaign councillor calls for a Yes vote
08/08/2014	Football couple make their pitch for a Yes vote
08/08/2014	John Lambie adds to Team Yes managerial experience
08/08/2014	Ed Miliband must admit the NHS is not safe with Westminster
08/08/2014	Warning to Miliband from Labour heartland – 'More than 30% of your voters back Yes'
09/08/2014	Yes is Scotland's one opportunity to protect our NHS, says Sturgeon
09/08/2014	Leading Environmental Campaigners Welcome 5 Green Gains of Yes
10/08/2014	Poll of polls analysis shows narrowest gap so far
10/08/2014	A Yes will see Scotland re-emerge as a nation of enlightenment, says Brian Cox
10/08/2014	Teachers for Yes launches with 'hands off' message to Westminster
10/08/2014	Boris tells Scotland 'there's no need' for new powers
11/08/2014	Actor Brian Cox hits the Dundee campaign trail with Yes message
12/08/2014	Yes is the key to unlocking Scotland's entrepreneurial spirit
12/08/2014	Independence creates Jobs
12/08/2014	UCS workers predict bright future for shipyards in an independent Scotland
12/08/2014	The key offer from independence is a written constitution
12/08/2014	New high for Yes among those certain to vote in TNS poll
13/08/2014	Only a Yes vote can end the scandal of poverty in wealthy Scotland
13/08/2014	NHS for Yes applauds pledge to protect Scotland's health service in written constitution
13/08/2014	No campaign has no Plan A for Scotland's future
13/08/2014	Four Past Presidents of the National Farmers Union Scotland throw their weight behind Yes

13/08/2014	3 things the No campaign don't want you to know about the NHS
14/08/2014	Yes Scotland challenges Alistair Darling on NHS funding hypocrisy
14/08/2014	Godfather of Devolution urges voters to vote Yes and take the 'Road of Hope'
14/08/2014	Expert Economist moves from Devo Plus to Yes
14/08/2014	Two weeks before first postal ballots are cast, we still don't know Darling's Plan A for Scotland
15/08/2014	Senior former police figures declare support for a Yes vote
15/08/2014	Only a Yes can protect our NHS
15/08/2014	We don't have to march to protect our NHS – we just have to vote Yes
16/08/2014	Study shows gap just 5 points when people are asked for probable vote
17/08/2014	New poll shows referendum is on a knife edge
17/08/2014	Leading historian Sir Tom Devine joins growing number of Scots moving to Yes
17/08/2014	A Yes vote is Scotland's one opportunity to protect the NHS
18/08/2014	An opportunity that's too good to miss
18/08/2014	One month to go - one opportunity to protect the NHS and build a better Scotland
18/08/2014	Disabled People for Yes join growing Yes movement
19/08/2014	Six ways we can strengthen our NHS with independence
19/08/2014	Letter from 50 Scottish Farmers on why Yes is best
19/08/2014	Darling faces challenge to come clean on real threat to the NHS
19/08/2014	Leading nursing trade unionists back Yes to protect our NHS
20/08/2014	Scotland's leading children's campaigner backs Yes vote as best way to tackle inequality
20/08/2014	Why I will vote Yes on September 18 - by Anne Houston
20/08/2014	No campaign must answer six questions on Scotland's health service
20/08/2014	Sturgeon to outline 'one opportunity' for women voters in Leith
20/08/2014	Vote Yes for our children's future
21/08/2014	People of Scotland expect budget cut after a No vote - new poll finding
21/08/2014	Scotland will be the wealthiest country ever to have gained its independence
21/08/2014	Senior Liberal Democrats make the move to Yes
21/08/2014	Fishing for Yes welcomes new report detailing key gains of independence
22/08/2014	Target hit as one million people sign the Yes Declaration

22/08/2014	Sir Donald MacKay responds to Sir Ian Wood's remarks on oil and gas
22/08/2014	Five reasons to vote Yes
22/08/2014	Scotland has a bright future with Yes according to American-Scot
23/08/2014	Yes Scotland launches campaign to win over EU migrants
23/08/2014	Use a Yes to save the NHS, urges Sturgeon and Harvie
23/08/2014	Why are the No campaign saying different things north and south of the border?
24/08/2014	Former Scottish Labour chairman says NHS is safe only with a Yes vote
24/08/2014	Singing star Michelle says a Yes vote will deliver the 'opportunity for change'
25/08/2014	Top land reform campaigner Wightman backs a Yes vote
25/08/2014	We are in safe hands with independence, say Carers for Yes
25/08/2014	Scotland's future in Scotland's hands
25/08/2014	There is a vision on the Yes side
25/08/2014	BBC referendum debate - a convincing win for Yes
26/08/2014	Three things we learned from the BBC #indyref debate
26/08/2014	Debate moves on to who best runs Scotland
26/08/2014	Yes Scotland appeals to 'missing million' - make sure you vote to protect our NHS
27/08/2014	Former boss of betting giant William Hill says smart money is on voting Yes
27/08/2014	Only a Yes vote can guarantee protection of Scotland's NHS
27/08/2014	Star of Shetland crime series Douglas Henshall declares for Yes
27/08/2014	Creating jobs with independence
28/08/2014	Top business leader says a Yes vote will be good for Scotland - and the rest of the UK
28/08/2014	Video: Yes Means
28/08/2014	New No campaign revelations show why Scotland must be independent
28/08/2014	Constance visits college with message for young voters
28/08/2014	Tory Minister's no guarantee comments create fresh fears for Scottish NHS
28/08/2014	New poll confirms momentum is with Yes
29/08/2014	Scotland's referendum result is 'on a knife edge'
29/08/2014	We have one opportunity to invest in our children's future
29/08/2014	Five point plan for Scotland's veterans

30/08/2014	Cameron must reverse policy on Westminster farming cash grab
31/08/2014	NHS activists in England call for Yes vote to protect health service in Scotland
31/08/2014	Leading health expert says only Yes will protect Scotland's NHS
31/08/2014	A night for Scotland as stars take to the stage in bumper #VoteYes concert
01/09/2014	Gay rights campaigners urge 'Vote Yes for equality'
01/09/2014	Make sure you can have your say on Scotland's future
01/09/2014	Yes on the hill
01/09/2014	Breakthrough poll shows that Yes has the big momentum
02/09/2014	Momentum with Yes as eight-point swing away from No in just three weeks
02/09/2014	Independent Scotland could be 'model to us all' - Westwood
02/09/2014	More and more people are realising why we must be independent
02/09/2014	Surge in Labour support for independence
02/09/2014	Yes wins Glasgow Disability Debate
03/09/2014	Former NATO ambassador backs Yes vote
03/09/2014	River City actress to join Blair Jenkins at Kirkintilloch public meeting
03/09/2014	Leading business figures accuse Westminster of playing politics over the pound
04/09/2014	North Sea offshore oil and gas could net Scotland £600bn
04/09/2014	RMT union members vote Yes
05/09/2014	Skye Liberal Democrat and independent councillors back Yes
05/09/2014	The best way to protect our Scottish NHS is to vote Yes, says children's doctor
05/09/2014	When I looked at all the facts, I knew Yes was the right thing to do
05/09/2014	Fresh embarrassment for No as Tesco reject supermarket scares
05/09/2014	Pop icon Amy Macdonald to take to the stage for Yes
06/09/2014	Young people say Yes vote will deliver 'better Scotland'
06/09/2014	YouGov poll shows Yes support surge to 51 per cent
07/09/2014	Alan Cumming Campaigning
07/09/2014	Italians for Yes becomes 50th group to join broad Yes movement
07/09/2014	Osborne 'more powers' gimmick already mired in confusion
08/09/2014	No party politicians confirm: England's NHS privatisation hurts Scotland's NHS too

08/09/2014	Osborne's gimmick has a 'whiff of desperation' – Canon Wright
08/09/2014	Hollywood star Alan Cumming joins Nicola Sturgeon on the campaign trail for Yes
08/09/2014	New TNS poll shows surge in Yes support
09/09/2014	Top energy and defence figure: Why I've switched from No to Yes
09/09/2014	Canavan urges Labour voters to win a famous and historic victory for Yes
09/09/2014	Poll shows voters trust Yes leaders far more than No politicians to deliver for Scotland
09/09/2014	Iconic chef Albert Roux says Yes is best
09/09/2014	No campaign proposals 'nothing like home rule Keir Hardie would have wanted'
09/09/2014	Generation Yes sets out to win the grandparent vote
09/09/2014	Keir Hardie and Independence
09/09/2014	Labour member for half a century critical of Brown's devo strategy
09/09/2014	Which path to tackle inequalities
09/09/2014	One opportunity to give Scotland a voice in Europe
09/09/2014	Sir George Mathewson dismisses No campaign's financial markets fears
10/09/2014	Prescott is off-the-ball with his 'bizarre' Scotland football team claims
10/09/2014	UK Benefits Crisis
10/09/2014	Survation poll shows Yes in touching distance of success
10/09/2014	BUPA chairman announcement should act as a call to vote Yes
11/09/2014	Architects poll gives Yes a solid lead
11/09/2014	Former RBS boss says bank announcement will have no impact on jobs in Scotland
11/09/2014	Rural Scotland will prosper with independence
11/09/2014	Visiting Westminster MPs should be honest about NHS in Scotland
11/09/2014	Szkocja daje gwarancje polskim obywatelom
11/09/2014	Westminster caught co-ordinating latest wave of scare stories
11/09/2014	YouGov poll shows Yes in touching distance of success
12/09/2014	Professor of Petroleum Accounting backs Yes
12/09/2014	Scotland's strength lies in tolerance and diversity, not a narrow UKIP-driven agenda
12/09/2014	Banks' move are a credit to Yes
12/09/2014	Head of NUS Scotland is latest backer of Yes

13/09/2014	Senior NUS figures declare for Yes
13/09/2014	Independent Scotland will have a successful and secure banking sector, says former Lloyds risk manager
13/09/2014	Cash-and-Carry boss dismisses supermarket scare story
13/09/2014	Generation Yes and National Collective set out to win the grandparent vote
13/09/2014	Committed Labour family are voting Yes from the heart
13/09/2014	Poll shows everything to play for in countdown to referendum
13/09/2014	Conservative MP confirms a 'No' is a vote for the status quo
13/09/2014	New ICM poll puts Yes 8 points ahead - the polls all show everything to play for in countdown to referendum
13/09/2014	Panelbase poll puts Yes at record high, within touching distance of success
14/09/2014	Labour supporters sign open letter calling for a Yes vote to build a fairer Scotland
14/09/2014	Former Lloyds risk manager dismisses scaremongering over bank jobs and investment
14/09/2014	A Yes vote will protect Scotland's NHS from privatisation – Sir Harry Burns
14/09/2014	Yes support from senior Scottish military and diplomatic figures
14/09/2014	'Scottish vision and values are different from those dominant south of the Border'
15/09/2014	Nationalists? We're the People's Movement
15/09/2014	Labour Mayor asks Scots to vote Yes - to help England too
15/09/2014	Scotland will carve out a unique and valuable role in international development.
15/09/2014	Forces veterans issue open letter responding to Lord Dannatt
15/09/2014	Same old story of empty threats and empty promises from David Cameron, says Jenkins
15/09/2014	Only a Yes vote will give Scotland's farmers and fishermen a top table seat in Europe
16/09/2014	Robert Burns actor John Cairney says Yes
16/09/2014	Dundee United's Stephen Thompson signs for Yes Scotland
16/09/2014	Former police chief says a Yes vote will help secure a safer Scotland
16/09/2014	Lawyers call emergency meeting to combat 'absurd' No campaign scare tactics
16/09/2014	Not just a seat at the top table - we will bring the top table to Scotland

Note:

The above article list omits 10 articles from March 2014 and 15 articles from August 2014. The official archive of Yes Scotland materials sits with the National Library of Scotland. Due to access issues it was not possible to access these 25 articles.

The above materials can be accessed from: <http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20140916211421/http://www.yesscotland.net/>

Appendix 4.0

YES VOTE WILL GIVE SCOTLAND THE CHANCE TO BUILD AN EXCELLENT SECURITY SERVICE



A Yes vote in next year’s independence referendum will give Scotland the opportunity to build a first-class intelligence and security service that meets our needs and priorities.

Rejecting claims by Home Secretary Theresa May that an independent Scotland’s ability to detect and prevent terrorist and criminal threats might be reduced, Yes Scotland Chief Executive Blair Jenkins said: “This amounts to yet another Project Fear fiction from a Tory minister on a flying visit to talk Scotland down.”

- UK security has multiple organisations fight for power and influence, and inappropriate UK Govt interference is rife.
- An independent Scotland would face less of a threat as we would not add to international tension by taking part in illegal wars.
- An independent Scotland as a nuclear-free state potential terrorist targets would be removed from our country.

Mr Jenkins pointed out that only a few days ago the former police chief in charge of counter-terrorism in Scotland had declared that an independent Scotland would be able to create an “excellent” intelligence and security service.

Allan Burnett, who was the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) Co-ordinator of Counter Terrorism from 2008-10, said he had witnessed first-hand “the great Scottish talent in military, secret and police intelligence services, and can readily envisage the huge ability, energy, integrity and innovation they would pour into this exciting mission.”

He said the starting position for security experts was to establish the threats faced, and their probability and impact.”

Mr Burnett said: “I believe an independent Scotland would face less of a threat from terrorism for a number of reasons. We would not add to international tension by taking part in illegal wars, and as a nuclear-free state potential terrorist targets would be removed from our country.”

Mr Burnett’s previous roles, in a distinguished 30 year career, included being the Director of Intelligence, and Force Race Relations Officer for Strathclyde Police. He now works in the security industry.

He said: “Based upon my experience, I simply do not accept these criticisms of Scotland’s abilities to have effective security arrangements.

“I have no doubt that an important part of the remit (after a Yes vote) would be to maintain and enhance existing relationships and build new ones. Our friends, including those south of the border, will want Scotland as allies as much as we want them. Our Scottish intelligence service will be welcomed as a professional, trusted ally.

“UK security is a long way from being perfect. Multiple organisations fight for power and influence, and inappropriate UK Government interference is rife. Trust and information sharing can be lacking - witness the struggling Borders Agency. There is a great opportunity for an independent Scotland, where cooperation is a reality and not just an aspiration, to do very much better.”

Mr Jenkins said: “Security is very much a matter of international cooperation and we look forward to Scotland’s security services playing their part. As our nearest neighbours, we can expect a particularly close working relationship with the security services of rUK, to our mutual best interests.

“That makes sense for Scotland and for the rest of the UK and Theresa May knows it.”

Posted by Peter Dempsie, 29.10.13

Appendix 5.0

16 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SCOTLAND'S ECONOMY



Scotland's got what it takes to be independent, with strong public finances, a range of successful industries and abundant natural resources. Here are sixteen key facts which add up to a bright and successful future for Scotland as an independent country.

1. Scotland's bank balance is healthier than the UK's. Over the past five years, Scotland has been better off than the UK as a whole to the tune of £1,600 per person.
2. We've generated more tax per head than the rest of the UK in each of the last 33 years.
3. Scotland has a lower fiscal deficit than the UK – averaging 7.2% of GDP compared to 8.4% for the UK as a whole over the past five years.
4. In terms of national wealth per head, Scotland is the 14th wealthiest nation in the OECD club of developed nations – that's ahead of the UK at just 18th place.

5. Scotland is the top location in the UK for foreign direct investment outside London and the South-East of England – a great expression of confidence in Scotland’s economic future.
6. Analysis from the Financial Times shows Scotland’s exports total £73.6bn a year – and that’s even without Scotland’s North Sea oil production.
7. Scotland’s food and drink industry turns over more than £13 bn every year, and last year the equivalent of 40 bottles of Scotch whisky were sold overseas every second.
8. Our life sciences sector is one of the fastest growing in Europe – the value it adds to Scotland’s economy stood at £960million in 2011, up 9% on 2010.
9. Scotland’s creative industries have a combined turnover of £5bn – with growing strengths across our heritage, artistic and cultural industries.
10. Manufacturers in Scotland export £15.4bn worth of goods abroad annually.
11. Scotland’s tourism sector employs almost 200,000 people and contributes £3.1bn to the economy annually.
12. Scotland has one of the world’s strongest higher education sectors, with the most top universities relative to our size – producing talented graduates to contribute to our economy.
13. Scotland has 60% of the EU’s oil reserves, with the North Sea generating around £34.3bn in the next five years.
14. There remains up to £1.5 trillion wholesale value of oil and gas in the North Sea, with production forecast to continue to the 2050s and beyond.
15. We’ve got 25% of Europe’s offshore wind and tidal energy potential, putting Scotland at the forefront of the coming renewables boom.
16. And we have 10% of Europe’s wave energy potential – with projects in Scotland leading the way in this cutting edge sector.

Appendix 6.0 - Interview Participants

Respondent A

November 2010

Interviewee remained anonymous

Labour SNP

Respondent B

November 2010

Christina McKelvie

Scottish National Party SNP

Respondent C

November 2010

Interviewee remained anonymous

Scottish National Party SNP

Respondent D

November 2010

Linda Fabiani

Scottish National Party SNP

Respondent E

November 2010

Interviewee remained anonymous

Scottish National Party SNP

Respondent F

November 2010

Jackson Carlaw

Conservative MSP

Respondent G

November 2010

Ken Macintosh

Labour MSP

Respondent H

November 2010

Interviewee remained anonymous

Labour MSP

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